Counsel seeks to permission to approach the dice.

Much obliged your lordship.

Good morning to the Hon’ble bench. If it may please, the counsel seeks permission to address
the bench as your lordship. [if only male judges are present, now if only lady judges are there
then directly say ladyship]

Goodmorning to the Hon’ble bench. The counsel recognizes the gracious presence of your
ladyship, however, for the convenience of the proceedings, the counsel seeks permission to
address the bench as your lordship. [if female judges are also present]

Much Obliged your Lordship.

Before the counsel proceeds with the 4th issue, it would be obliged to address if any query of
this bench is left unattended due to paucity of time. [However this can also act against you
guys, if you feel the judges there are not getting convinced with the first speaker, don’t even
ask this unless the judges say something, directly start with the 3rd issue]

1. As we come to factual matrix of this case the counsel humbly submits that
section 124-a does not violate freedom of speech & expression. The Counsel
shall base his argument on three premises; Firstly, that there is a presumption
of Constitutionality; Secondly, § 124-Ais not in contravention of Art. 19;
Thirdly, § 124-A does not violate Art. 14 & 21.
2. Moving to the first fold of the argument counsel submits that in the question of
Constitutionality, it falls upon the Petitioners to prove that the impugned law is
unconstitutional. The same has also been affirmed by the Hon’ble SC of India
in Charanjit Lal v. Union of India,1 that, the presumption of constitutionality is
always in the favor of the Act. Applying the above-mentioned doctrine in the
present case, the court is to presume that the impugned law is constitutional
until it has convincing grounds to proclaim it as unconstitutional.
3. Moving on to the second limb of my argument, it is humbly submitted that the
though it is indispensable to uphold freedom of speech & expression in a

1
Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
 democracy, it is also essential to put some restrictions on this freedom for the
maintenance of public order.
4. In a landmark case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Apex Court of India
identified three parts of free speech under Art. 19(1)(a), namely, discussion,
advocacy & incitement. When such discussion or advocacy reaches to the extent
of incitement, restrictions are invited. Thus, for such incitement, laws may be
made restraining the speech or expression that leads inevitably to or tends to
disturb public order.
5. The offence of sedition does not penalize ‘discussion’ or ‘advocacy’. It does not
curtail the freedom to have healthy political deliberations. It merely emanates into
the picture when the words or activities of a person stretch to the level of
incitement, which is probable to disrupt the security of the state.
6. In Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar observed that:
7. “The freedom must not become a license for maliciousness & condemnation of
the Government established by law, in words which incite violence or have the
propensity to disturb public order.”
8. Applying the above stated case in the present factual scenario, there lies a direct
nexus between the article published & the violent protest in region of Kazalia as
well as other regions of Flavia. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the article
necessarily created hatred against the Head of the State which disturbed the public
order & jeopardized the security of the state. The aim of the article was to
overthrow the incumbent regime. Hence, it is submitted that §124-A of the
Flavian Constitution is inevitable for the security of state, thus, constitutionally
valid.

9. Coming to the third premises of my argument that Sec 124-a is not violating
Art 14 & 21. Your lordship when a law is questionable under Art. 14, the court
has to decide whether the law is arbitrary or irrational.

10. The assessment of arbitrariness lies in whether the impugned law is reasonable,
& if there is a nexus between the restrictions impose by the provision, &the
object required to be achieved by it, which is to protect the security of the state.
§ 124-A of FPC imposes restrainment on the fundamental right to freedom of
speech & expression in the interest of security of state & for maintenance of
 public order. Therefore, there is a clear nexus between the restraint imposed &
the object to be achieved. Hence, § 124-A does not violate Art. 14.

11. It is humbly submitted that § 124-A of FPC is not violative of Art.21 of the
Constitution of Flavia. The right to life & liberty so conferred under Art. 21 is
subject to the rule of proportionality. When personal liberty comes into
disagreement with an interest of the security of state or public order, the
freedom of the individual must give way to serve larger public interest.

12. §124-A penalizes those acts which encourage insurgence, & bring the
administration of justice into contempt; & the very propensity of sedition is to
provoke people to rebel against the state. §124-A executes social limitation on
the freedom of an individual since an individual’s freedom is subservient to the
liberty of the society.2 Concludingly, the said section is not in contravention
with the Art. 14 & Art. 21.

13. Moving to second premises of my argument that § 500-A of Flavian constitution

is not violative of freedom of speech & expression. The counsel will submit this
argument in three folds.
14. Moving to the first fold counsel humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that
Art. 19 of Flavian constitution is itself conditioned by restriction which include
"defamation" as one of the grounds of restriction & is inclusive of criminal
defamation, & there is nothing to suggest its exclusion.
15. (The Counsel further contends that ‘defamation’ does not only include the
protection of private individual or a group of individuals but state action is also
involved. The words in the Constitution are not to be narrowly construed as
suggested. SC of India also held that the restricted meaning required to be given to
the term "defamation" is unacceptable & insupportable.)
16. Further, Right to Reputation is an inseparable part of Art. 21. A person's
reputation is an integral part of a person's character & it cannot be permitted to be
discolored for the sake of right to freedom of speech & expression because such
right to free speech does not give right to offend.
17. The purpose of assuring constitutional safeguard to freedom of speech &
expression is to encourage public debate & deliberation. However, speech loaded
with malicious intent or knowledge of causing harm or made in an irresponsible
2
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 651.
 way is not eligible to the protection of Art. 19. Such communication has no
public value except in cases where it is a truthful statement intended for the public
good is be protected under explanation 2. Hence, § 500-A of Flavian constitution
is not violative of Art. 19.
18. Moving to second limb of my argument that section 500-A is not violating article
14 .It is humbly submitted that reasonable classification is allowed under Art. 14
of the Constitution.
19. § 500-A of Flavian Constitution sought to protect the reputation of the President
which may negatively affect public opinion & imperil his creditworthiness
publicly. In the said section, President deserves advanced safeguard than all other
citizens as words expressed against him “are not only against his individual but
against the principles & functions represented by the President. Reasonable
classification is provided by § 500-A as it segregates President from rest of the
individuals which is an intelligible differentia due to the privileges available to the
President.
20. Therefore, the legislature has agreed the point of departure that any words or acts
against the President’s person should also be observed as offences committed
against the State. It is further contended that statute cannot be held to be invalid
merely because of apprehension of abuse. Possibility of abuse, as is well
established, does not offend Art. 14 of Flavian constitution.
21. Equality before the law does not mandate everyone standing through the same
standards in every respect. The President acts as Head of the State, & represents
the Flavian Nation &the Flavian Republic. The crime of insulting the President is
committed not only against the person, but also against the values & functions that
the presidency represents. The specified punishment is proportional to the
safeguard legal benefit.
22. Moving to third limb of my argument that Section 500-A is neither vague nor
ambiguous
23. The provision penalizes only that expression which is backed by malicious
intention to harm or knowledge that it will harm the said person. Further, harm to
reputation & mind is taken as injury alongside the injury to body & property under
§ 44 of FPC.
24. Thus, the standards pertinent to the harm caused to body & property are also
pertinent to the harm caused to the mind as well as reputation. §500-A is certain,
 unambiguous & unequivocal. Each of the explanation marks the outlines of the
section as clear & provide an adequate caution of the act which may fall within
the given definition.
25. Hence, it cannot be said that the said section is vague & leads to ambiguity.
Second explanation to § 500-A which does not make unintentional defamation an
absolute defense, has a very relevant purpose. This exception has been written to
ensure that the defense is available only in circumstances where the expression of
truth & unintentional results in 'public good'. Thus, the right to criticism will be
accepted to give way only to truthful disclosure, albeit private, for public good.
26. If your lordships are satisfied with my submissions on the second issue, the
Counsel seeks permission to proceed to the last Issue.

27. The counsel humbly submits that the prosecution against ‘The Flavian Express’
& Mr. Dolfopa Sorial (Petitioners) should not to be quashed in any
circumstance. The Counsel will substantiate the argument in three averments;
firstly, Petitioners are guilty of sedition under § 124-A; secondly, Petitioners
are liable for defamation of the President under § 500-A; thirdly Petitioners are
liable for obstruction of justice.

28. Moving to my first submission the SC of United States laid down the test of
‘clear & present danger’ in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, which involves that
restriction cannot be placed on expression except when it is directly inciting, & is
expected to incite ‘imminent lawless action’. For an individual’s words to be
within the ambit of § 124-A, they would inevitably have to meet the requirement
of ''pernicious tendency” creating public disorder.
29. In the instant case, the article of the Petitioner satisfies such conditions that are
necessary for it to be seditious under the meaning of § 124-A. The Counsel
requests the kind attention of your lordships to paragraph 7 of the Written
Submission The article claims that the abolition of Special Category Status was
for the personal gains of the President & his family without any conclusive proof.
Moreover the article also calls for protest, thus, attempting to incite hatred against
the Government.
30. The SC of India, in the case of Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, held that in order
to establish an offence of sedition, it is not essential that the person alleged
himself has to be an author of seditious material. Under this section, even
 circulation of such material can be penalised. Thus, the contention that Petitioner
did not author the article is flawed.
31. Making provocative remarks about the President & his family members is bound
to add fuel to the unrest. If lordship please pay kind attention to para 7 again The
article also gained endorsement from the Federation of Rastow which tries to
create instability in the already chaotic Kazalia & other regions of Flavia. This
created a situation of ‘clear & present danger’ capable of inciting ‘imminent
lawless action’. Therefore, it is humbly contended that the article, was seditious in
nature, inciting hatred against the prevalent order & harmed the established peace
of the country.
32. Moving to my second averment of argument. It is humbly submitted before this
Hon’ble Court that the Petitioners are liable for defamation due to the malicious
propaganda.
33. The article published in the Open book by Flavian Express is prima facie
defamatory as it stated that, “The AZM Group has been given contract, without
following any legal procedure”. It further makes a blatant accusation on the
President that he has also been the beneficiary of this scam which is untrue as no
proof has been provided by the Petitioners, thus, harming the reputation of
President publicly.
34. Your lordship in the case Sim v. Stretch that the tendency to excite adverse
opinions & the feelings of the third person against the affected party must be
weighed. In the instance case, the Petitioner had published an article which had
brought hatred, contempt & ridicule to the President. It lowered his reputation in
the eyes of right- thinking members of society.
35. Thus, it is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court, it is up to the discretion of
the editor & Flavian Express to publish or not to publish the article. Hence, the
essential of the offence of defamation i.e. “Dissemination of information” is
fulfilled in the present case & thus, the President has suffered tremendous damage
on account of having his image degraded in the eyes of public because of the false
& defamatory statements published by the Petitioner in the newspaper.
36. Moving to the last averment of this issue Petitioners are liable for obstruction of
justice.
37. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the term ‘contempt’ includes
obstruction & administration of justice & no one can claim protection from the
 procedure of the law of contempt, if his action or conduct hinders the court or
court proceedings or interferes with or is intended to obstruct the due course of
justice.
38. It is further contended that freedom of disclosure should be lifted when it is
necessary in the interests of justice, national security or for the prevention of
crime or disorder. The Respondent submits that it is in the interest of justice for
the Petitioners to reveal the identity of his source so that the Respondent can file a
specific action against the writer for violation of his right to reputation.
39. The journalistic right not to reveal sources is not unconditional & remains subject
to some limitations. The alleged acts seeking protection should have been made in
good faith. The fact that there is no proof that the Petitioner made any attempt to
prove the legitimacy of the source’s information is adequate proof of lack of good
faith. Further, the Petitioners are not able to authenticate the defamatory
statements by providing proof or at least appropriate factual basis. Hence, the
Respondent submits that the Petitioner should be denied the right of non-
disclosure & are liable for obstruction of justice.
40. With this, I rest my case. It was certainly an honor for me to appear before the
esteemed bench.