Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Vs Strategic Alliances
by
Executive Summary
1 Mergers versus Alliances
1.1 Alliances with growing
1.2 Leveraging Rewards while lowering risks
1.3 Rules of the road.
2 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
2.1 Methods of amalgamations and takeovers
2.2 Rationale for growth by acquisition
2.2.1 Application #1.
2.3 Sources of synergy
2.3.1 synergy from operating economies
2.4 Financial synergy
2.4.1 Application #2.
2.4.2 Application #3
3 Other synergistic effects
4 Why a company may want to be acquired
5 Gains from mergers
6 Causes of failure
7 Conclusions on growth by acquisition
8 Merger and acquisition activity in different countries
9 STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
9.1 Strategic steps
9.2 Tactical steps
10 IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE ACQUISITION TARGETS
10.1 Information required for appraisal of acquisitions
11 ACQUISITION CONSIDERATION AND STRUCTURE
11.1 Share or asset purchase
11.2 Financial value
12 ACQUISITION OF QUOTED COMPANIES
12.1 The regulation of takeovers
12.2 Procedure for a public bid — preliminary steps
13 City Code regulation of acquisitions
13.1 The stages of an offer
14 ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE COMPANIES
14.1 Preliminary considerations
14.2 Documentation of the agreement
15 DEFENCE AGAINST TAKEOVERS
15.1 Management attitude to a bid
15.2 Non-financial considerations
15.3 Reasons for predatory bids
16 Strategic defense
17 Good housekeeping
18 The reaction of the target company
19 Anti-takeover mechanisms
20 Defense document
21 Acceptable offers
22 ISSUES INFLUENCING THE SUCCESS OF Acquisitions
22.1 Pre-offer issues
22.2 Post-audit and monitoring of post-acquisition success
23 Strategic Acquisitions Involving Common Stock
24 Sensible Motives for Mergers
24.1 Economies of Scale
24.2 Economies of Vertical Integration
24.3 Surplus Funds
24.4 Eliminating Inefficiencies
24.5 To Diversify
25 Right and Wrong Ways to Estimate the Benefits of Mergers
26 Divestitures
26.1 Divestiture Illustrations
27 Conglomerate Mergers and Value Additivity
28 Appendix(es)
29 References
Executive Summary
THE JOURNAL Mergers and Acquisitions listed over gets t 5,000 mergers involving
U.S. corporations in 2000, and the total value of the companies acquired was $1.7
trillion. The year included the announcement of U.S’s largest merger, as AOL and
Time Warner its bus agreed to form a company valued at $350 billion, group
What are the likely gains from mergers? How can managers calculate their benefits
and costs? How can target companies defend themselves against unwelcome
bidders? Who gains and who loses in mergers? This book considers these
questions[3]
Rising earnings pressures, accelerating global competition, and increased
consolidation are driving unprecedented levels of corporate collaboration through
mergers, acquisitions, and strategic alliances.
When two businesses combine their activities, the combination may take the form of
an acquisition (also called a takeover) or a merger (also called an amalgamation).
The primary purpose of any combination should be to increase shareholder wealth,
such an increase normally coming from the effects of synergy.
In this book I will discuss further the meaning of synergy and explain the various
explanations for synergistic gains , Explain why many business combinations do not
in fact realize the gains that were hoped from them. I will also discuss the blend of
assets comprising the consideration on an acquisition. and identify relevant rules
from the City Code which impact on any given situation
1 Mergers versus Alliances
In many situations, mergers and acquisitions are the only options for
maintaining competitiveness. Shareholder demand, for instance, often
mandates spinning off non-core divisions, and then quickly acquiring new
and strategically complementary resources to maximize achievement of core
objectives.
The forms such alliances take are virtually unlimited, but they include joint
marketing arrangements, shared research and development, collaboration on
product design, technology licensing, and outsourcing of virtually all types.
• Access to top-tier engineering talent that would normally shy away from a
mammoth corporate structure
Instant access to the technology that holds the most potential for shaping
market place demands frequently most available from smaller companies
that maximize incentives for creativity and fast-paced development
A mutually beneficial means for sharing the risk, expense, and potential
return involved with entering a promising new market. For growing
companies, alliances with large corporations provide validation and
accelerated visibility for their products, increased overall valuation of their
companies, and added clout that makes funding more readily available.
partnership. There are both legal and strategic routes for getting the most
out of every
alliance while minimizing their hazards. Among steps companies should take
to tap into the “gold mines” that alliances offer are the following:
• Begin with due diligence. Due diligence is important both for assessing
the potential contribution of new partners, and for evaluating companies that
have worked with yours in the past, but through markedly different
arrangements. For instance, corporations entering into alliances with former
vendors should use due diligence to assure that the vendors have the
financial and management depth to execute new roles. Companies engaging
in international alliances should find an overseas firm with skill in ferreting
out and interpreting documentation about potential foreign partners. In many
countries, financial documentation is difficult to access except via a local,
hands-on approach.
Allow for continual change. The best alliances are structured with room
for experimentation, pullbacks due to adverse marketplace changes, and
dissolution if they are hampering financial performance.
Suppose firm A (the acquirer) has a market value of £2m and it buys firm B,
market value £2m, at its. current market price.
If the resultant new firm AB has a market value in excess of £4m then
the merger can be counted as a success, if less it will be a failure.
Essentially, for a successful merger we should be looking for a situation
where:
If this situation occurs we have experienced synergy, that is, the whole is
worth more than the sum of the parts. This is often expressed as:
2+2=5
(d) Others.
If the victim company is badly managed its performance and hence its value
can be improved by the elimination of inefficiencies. Improvements could be
obtained in the areas of production, marketing and finance.
(a) Diversification
The argument goes that diversification normally reduces risk. If the earnings
of the merged companies simply stay the same (ie, no operating economies
are obtained) there could still be an increase in value of the company due to
the lower risk. This argument is developed by application #2.
The risk and return of the combined company may be calculated in a similar
way to the analysis of a two asset portfolio (in portfolio theory).
The same total earnings are available but the risk is considerably less than
the weighted average of the risk of the two individual companies (18+8)/2 =
13%
The major fallacy in this argument is that it is based on total risk. Well-
diversified shareholders evaluate companies on the basis of systematic risk,
which, in one of the conclusions of CAPM, cannot be eliminated by
diversification.
Assume, for example, that the following additional data were available:
βA = 1
βB =3.00
Rm = 10%
Rf = 5%
The systematic risk of the combined company would simply be given by the
weighted average of the two β factors:
(0.5 x 1.00) + (0.5 x 3.00) = 2.00
= 15%
£0.6m/0.15 =£4m
Note, however, that managers often concentrate on total risk, as total risk
affects their job security and the diversification argument can make sense
from a managerial viewpoint if not a shareholder’s.
If the future cash flow streams of the two companies are not perfectly
positively correlated then by combining the two companies the variability of
their operating cash flow may be reduced. A more stable cash flow is more
attractive to creditors and this could lead to cheaper financing.
It is often argued that companies with high PE ratios are in a good position to
acquire other companies as they can impose their high PE ratio on the victim
firm and increase its value.(see application #3)
2.4.2 Application #3
Company A Company B
(i) Earnings available to shareholders £0.2m £0.4m
(ii) PE ratio 10 5
(iii) Market capitalisation (i) x (ii) £2m £2m
(iv) Number of shares Im Im
(v) Value per share £2 £2
This would involve the issue of 1m new shares by company A. The resultant
company
Company AB
Earnings available to ordinary shareholders £0.6m
Number of shares 2m
Earnings per share £0.3
The value per share will depend upon the PE ratio set by the market. Both
parties would hope that the market would continue to apply A’s PE ratio to
the combined company. This would lead to a share price of: EPS x PE ratio =
30px 10= £3 and a market capitalization of:
This is an overall increase in value of (over the value of the two companies
prior to the merger) and would benefit both sets of shareholders.
The low PE ratio given to B presumably reflected its high risk or poor growth
prospects. Why should the market change its mind simply because ownership
has changed?
=6.667
The combined market capitalization of A and B would then be:
(i) Buying low geared companies with good asset backing in order that they
may be geared up to obtain the benefit of the corporation tax shield on debt.
(ii) Buying companies with accumulated tax losses in order that they may be
offset against profits of the acquiring company.
Companies with highly skilled managers can make use of this resource only if
they have problems to solve. The acquisition of inefficient companies is
sometimes the only way of fully utilizing skilled managers.
Companies with large amounts of surplus cash may see the acquisition of
other companies as the only possible application for these funds. Of course,
increased dividends could cure the problem of surplus cash, but this may be
rejected for reasons of tax or dividend stability.
(d) Speed
(b) Business – an expanding small company may find that it reaches a size
where it is impossible to restrain growth, but funds or management expertise
are lacking.
Such factors can apply to companies that are quite large by most standards,
eg, Rolls-Royce Ltd was too small to absorb the losses on one new engine.
(b) Bidding companies usually pay a substantial premium over the market
value of the victim company prior to the bid.
Let us further assume that to acquire B’s shares A has had to pay a
premium of £1m, i.e., total cost of B is £3.m
£
Market value of AB 4.5m
Original value of A 2.0m
Price paid for B 3.0m
Loss (0.5m)
This loss will be to the cost of the acquiring company shareholders but to the
benefit of the victim company shareholders (as they received the £1 m
premium).
This in fact reflects the overall conclusion of research in this area: the
consistent winners In mergers and takeovers are victim company
shareholders; the consistent losers are acquiring company shareholders.
6 Causes of failure
Reasons advanced for the high failure rate of takeovers are:
7 Conclusions on growth by
acquisition
(a) Not all mergers are failures; some in fact are very successful. On
average, however, research shows that expansion based on merger and
takeover seems to bring few value gains to acquiring company shareholders.
(b) Mergers, however, are often in the interests of managers. They view
success in a different light from shareholders and are often more concerned
with the job security and career prospects brought by sheer size.
In the UK and USA most shares are held by institutional investors (pension
funds, unit trusts, insurance companies, etc,). Their traditional tendency has
been to sell their shares if they are dissatisfied with the company’s
performance or if offered a significant premium to market price.
Some commentators have also argued that lax accounting standards in the
UK have encouraged takeover activity in the past. Mergers were generously
defined in SSAP 23 so that many acquisitions could be structured to fall
within the SSAP 23 definition of a merger and so be accounted for using
merger accounting. Additionally SSAP 22 allows purchased goodwill to be
eliminated directly against reserves on acquisition, which is more generous
than the international standard requiring capitalization and amortization. The
ASB are grappling with these problems as part of their current work
programmed and hope that FRS 6 will prove more acceptable than SSAP
The implications of high takeover activity in the UK and USA are not clear
cut. One view is that this contributes to the efficiency of the market, with
resources being directed towards good managements. The opposing view is
that most anticipated synergy gains are not realized in practice and that high
takeover activity simply leads to short-term investment horizons by
managers. This is an interesting area of the current debate on corporate
governance in the UK.
Step 3 Decide on the financial strategy ie, the amount and the structure of
the consideration
Step 3 - Success will be achieved if more than 50% of the target company’s
shares are acquired
10 IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE
ACQUISITION TARGETS
10.1 Information required for appraisal of
acquisitions
Once a company has decided to expand by acquisition, it must seek out
prospective targets in the business sectors it is interested in.
For each company examined, clearly the first objective is to examine the
prospect closely from both a commercial and financial viewpoint. In general
businesses are acquired as going concerns rather than the purchase of
specific assets, and thus this section summarizes the variety of areas which
require special examination:
(a) Organization
Special requirements:
Clearly, businesses are about people, and their quality and organization
requires examination. Further, comparison needs to be made with existing
group remuneration levels and pensions, to determine the financial impact of
their adoption, where appropriate, on the acquisition.
Special requirements:
(ii) Market position, including customers and competition for major product
groups.
Special requirements:
(ii) Need for future capital investment to replace existing assets, or meet
expanded volume requirements.
(d) Technology
Special requirements:
Thus, an analysis would be made of the technical assets acquired, and their
past and potential future maintenance costs.
Special requirements:
Special requirements:
(i) Amounts and terms of bank facilities and all other external loans and
leasing facilities (including capitalised value, if not capitalised).
(iii) Details of restrictive covenants and trust deeds for such facilities.
(iv) Details of guarantees and indemnities given for financial bonds, letters of
credit, etc.
All this information will be useful in planning the financial absorption of the
business into the acquiring group, and will in particular reveal any ‘hidden
assets’ (eg, low coupon loans) and ‘hidden liabilities’ (guarantees liable to be
called, or hedged foreign exchange positions).
Special requirements:
This can identify any potential tax assets (eg, utilisable losses) and liabilities
(eg, likely payments of tax not provided), and assist in pricing and
structuring the transaction having regard to the vendor’s tax position.
Special requirements:
(ii) Details of trading with related parties; management charges and prices.
11 ACQUISITION CONSIDERATION
AND STRUCTURE
In general a purchaser and a vendor will need to agree on three basic issues
in regard to an acquisition:
(a) An asset purchase will enable the purchaser to claim tax allowances on
certain assets acquired, principally fixed assets other than land. The vendor,
on the other hand, will probably have certain tax ‘claw-backs’ or ‘balancing
charges’ to pay arising from tax allowances he has taken earlier, again
principally on fixed assets other than land. The consequence is that, at least
so far as tax efficiency is concerned, vendors do not generally favour this
route, whilst acquirers seek it wherever possible.
(b) A share purchase is much more complicated, principally because of all the
actual and contingent liabilities attaching to a company, as opposed to the
underlying assets in the business, which can be sold separately from such
liabilities. The documentation is much more lengthy and the cost of
professional advisors far greater. In addition, stamp duty may be payable on
the entire share transfer (as opposed to only on the property element of an
asset sale). Where the vendor can be persuaded that his tax position is not
prejudiced, therefore, this argues for an asset purchase.
(a) If the acquisition is for shares, any borrowings within the company
would need to be added to the cost of the shares in computing the final
consideration for the company. The combined consideration would then
represent the financial value of the underlying assets concerned, and would
normally be the price on which the investment appraisal for the acquisition
would be based. Thus, total consideration for a company whose shares are
valued at 200, and whose internal borrowings are 100, is in reality 300.
(b) Tax liabilities or advantages to the vendor or acquirer. The
structure of the acquisition clearly affects the tax position of both parties,
and there may be other tax assets or liabilities (eg, tax losses carried
forward) which are additions to the commercial value of the business. These
would affect the overall value of the business.
below) for shares, or existing internal borrowings acquired with the business.
The present value of the difference over the life of the borrowings between
the going market inter rate and the actual rate on the bon concerned is
generally deducted from the total consideration.
Thus, where the total consideration is nominally 500, of which 300 is a loan,
the inter rate on which is 7% (when the market rate is 10%) and the after-
tax present value of t difference between the two interest rates is 10, the
total consideration could be taken to 490.
The means of transferring the financial value of the shares or assets of the
business, ti consideration, can be satisfied in a combination of several
alternatives:
(a) Cash.
(b) Debt.
The value of ordinary shares issued is, generally speaking, based on their
market value at the tin of issue. In principle, too, the issue of shares is no
more expensive to the purchaser than cash debt consideration, despite the
implicit difference in the cost of equity and debt. The reason for ti is that, in
general, projects, whether internal or external (ie, acquisitions) should be
considered to financed from a ‘pool’ of financial resources based on the
optimum relationship between debt a equity, and basing the appropriate
hurdle on the ‘blended’ cost of such a pool. If equity is issued consideration
for a project, the change in the debt/equity ratio resulting is usually
considered to temporary, and the group will subsequently make appropriate
adjustments in the level of debt order to optimise the ratio. Adjustments
would equally have to be made where debt rather ti equity is issued.
The acquirer may feel the then current share price might rise in the future,
either bec the share market as a whole is depressed, or because the value of
the acquiring comp shares are temporarily depressed. Thus, the vendor may
be getting the shares ‘cheap’.
This will be a problem where the acquirer has a limited number of major
shareholders may not, for control or other reasons, wish to see their
interests diluted.
Where debt or preference shares are concerned, there is often a quid pro quo
exacted by the acquirer in the form of a lower interest and dividend rate than
the going market, in return for the tax advantage conveyed.
12 ACQUISITION OF QUOTED
COMPANIES
12.1 The regulation of takeovers
The acquisition of quoted companies is circumscribed by the City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers (‘the City Code’), which is the responsibility of the
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. This code does not have the force of law,
but it is enforced by the various City regulatory authorities, including the
Stock Exchange, and specifically by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the
‘Takeover Panel’). Its basic principle is that of equity between one
shareholder and another, and it sets out rules for the conduct of such
acquisitions.
The Stock Exchange Yellow Book also has certain points to make in these
circumstances:
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) regulates the monopoly aspects of bids.
Many bids, because of their size, will require review by the OFT, and a limited
number will subsequently be referred to the Monopolies Commission. In
addition, if the offer gives rises to a concentration (ie, a potential monopoly)
within the EC, the European Commission may initiate proceedings. This can
result in considerable delay, and constitutes grounds for abandoning a bid.
(b) Where there appears to be a good chance of making an offer for the
target ‘agreed’ management before the bid is announced.
(c) Where the bidding group does not wish to appear ‘hostile’ or ‘predatorial’.
(a) 3% disclosure
than 10% if, after this additional purchase, his aggregate holding will be in
the range of 15% to 30%.
This is designed to limit the speed at which a bidder can acquire a significant
stake, so ti the target’s management have a fair chance to comment and
prepare for a possible bid. T exceptions to this rule are acquisitions:
There are also provisions for disclosing the acquisition of such an interest to
the target company much more quickly than required under the Companies
Act.
The significance of this rule is that it limits to 15% of the total available the
number shares that can be bought in a ‘dawn raid’ – a quick, organized
share-buying operation usually over in a few minutes, which is often a
prelude to a full bid. Such raids considered by many to be inequitable to non-
institutional shareholders who will not hear the operation until it is over; but
in any event, they are much rarer than in the past, since institutional
shareholders have found in general that they obtain more for their shares by
waiting for a full bid.
(ii) a time period within which the shareholder can withdraw his
acceptance.
If a would-be bidder decides to make an offer, the City Code is specific about
the information it must contain. Furthermore, it cannot be withdrawn without
the Takeover Panel’s consent, unless it lapses or certain conditions are not
met. Two conditions are common to most offers:
(b) Acceptances in excess of 50% and, at the option of the bidder, 90% of
the shareholding are received.
A shareholder may withdraw his acceptance forty-two days after the offer
document has been posted, if the offer has not gone ‘unconditional’.
(d) Revision
(e) Lapsing
Offers may be for cash or, in principle, for any of the alternative forms of
consideration set out above. If for cash, the bidder may use its existing cash
or borrowing facilities, or, where shares are available as an alternative, such
shares may be underwritten, so that acceptors can accept cash if they desire.
14 ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE
COMPANIES
14.1 Preliminary considerations
The acquisition of private companies can be undertaken without public
scrutiny and, therefore, with the following particular characteristics:
(b) There will be an agreed price structure and consideration to suit both
parties.
(b) Warranties given by the vendor in respect of the business covering, inter
alia, the following:
(i) Accuracy of all information supplied and statements made by the company
to be acquired.
(ii) Value of assets and liabilities of the business at a certain date after the
latest accounts and, often, trading results from the latter date, either before
or after the date of contract.
(c) Tax indemnity covering past, current, and often future tax liabilities
resulting from trading up to the date of acquisition.
(d) Limits on vendor’s liability. Both warranties and tax indemnity may give
rise to financial obligations by the vendor. The document would indicate how
these might be satisfied, for instance against part of the consideration
withheld in the first instance.
(e) Disclosure letter. The contract will normally refer to a ‘disclosure letter’,
in which exceptions to the warranties and indemnities given are noted by the
vendor’s solicitors and tabled prior to contract and/or complejion. Thus, if a
specific warranty was that no material litigation exists, the disclosure letter
would note any legal actions currently in course. Conceptually, anything
disclosed• in this letter cannot form the basis of a claim under a warranty or
indemnity, since the purchaser has been made aware of it prior to contract
and completion.
The contract is normally signed, with a nominated completion date, and may
be conditional on one or both parties fulfilling certain conditions. These might
be:
In fact, both financial and tax investigations may take place before contract;
between contract and completion; and even after completion. In the two
latter cases they may be used as a basis for warranty/indemnity claims.
(a) The share price is depressed. This can usually be identified by:
(i) the group’s market value being below the net value of its shareholders’
funds; or
(ii) the group’s price/earnings ratio being below, or its yield being above that
for its sector.
In this case, however, the predator may believe that under its management
the group can recover and perform much better financially than under
existing management.
(b) The group’s prospects are better than the share price would indicate. A
period of fluctuating profits may be about to be followed by a good recovery.
A predator might recognize this before it became apparent to the stock
market as a whole, and seek to capitalize on the opportunity.
(c) The group occupies a strong position in one or more markets. The
predator may see the acquisition of the group as a unique opportunity to
purchase a major market share, and wish to do so without paying the market
premium which should, in theory, attach to such a one- off situation.
The purpose of corporate defence is, therefore, either to obtain a full and
satisfactory price from an unwelcome bidder, or to ward off the bid, and
remain independent. It would also seek to ward off the bid if it felt that
national economic interest, as defined by law, or employees’ interests might
be seriously threatened.
16 Strategic defense
The principal aim of strategic defense is to try to eliminate, as far as
possible, the attractions of the group to a would-be predator.
It is clear from above that a depressed share price, either from fundamental
business difficulties, or where a recovery may be shortly forthcoming which
has not yet been recognized by the market, is a major attraction for
predators.
(c) Communication
(i) Use of a good external financial public relations adviser. Such a role
should not i any way substitute for management’s direct communication with
the media, b should complement it, where appropriate, through extending
the range of contact advising on the style and method of communication, and
keeping an ear close to the ground.
- they should therefore be provided with all publicly available material, and
have good grasp of the strategy and current trading.
(iv) Use of press and brokers’ results conferences. Many groups use these
occasions (which usually take place on the day that the preliminary
announcement of interim or final results takes place) formally to restate their
aims and objectives and measure them against their actual trading results.
They provide an opportunity disseminate corporate financial messages to a
wide media audience.
The level of cash dividend is often held to influence share price. Accordingly,
it is argued that an increase in dividend should cause a rise in share price.
However, Chapter 4 has argued that the level of dividend, and thus dividend
policy, should be based fundamentally on the cash flow generation, debt
policy and returns on assets generated by the group. Thus, a change in
dividend without regard to these fundamentals, or changes in them, can only
be a short-term expedient towards share price maximization.
Furthermore, a high dividend payout narrows the scope for large increases in
dividend in the event of a bid. Such a policy, if continued, may actually have
the effect of weakening the group’s defense following a bid.
In the case of a rights issue, the value of the equity will be increased, since
the proceeds will initially go to reduce the company’s borrowings in an equal
and opposite amount. However, the defender’s position may be weaker, in
that, if a predator bids on a share-for- share basis, the total borrowings
involved (in this case the internal debt of the target company) would be less.
Under-gearing may in this case prove a substantial weakness since it would
make the target company more attractive.
In the case of an increase in gearing, eg, buying assets in exchange for loan
stock, two negative points apply. ‘First, cash acquisitions causing an increase
in gearing should be consonant with the group strategy: if not, they will
become a waste of financial resource, and may lead to financial weakness
which may even accelerate a bid. Second, if safe gearing limits are thereby
breached, the group creates a further financial risk for itself.
However, high gearing, if within safe. limits, may constitute some form of
defense, in that, in contrast to the above, it will actually increase the total
cash consideration for a share-for- share bidder with limited resources.
17 Good housekeeping
There are four elements of good housekeeping which should be observed at
all times.
First, a group should keep a close watch on its share register and share
trading, in order to identify any sinister shareholding buildup at an early
stage. In particular, it should note the following:
(a) Any heavy buying or selling, whether or not it affects the share price.
(b) Any change in ‘major’ shareholdings. ‘Major’ is hard to assess, but a
range from 0.1% to 0.5% of total shares in issue should be considered. It is
probably worth obtaining immediate details of all share transactions down to
a size rather lower than 0.1%.
(c) Any large ‘Sepon’ balance or its equivalent outside the UK. The ‘Sepon’
balance measures the number of shares which have at any time recently
changed hands, but which the new shareholders have not registered. Since
registration may take a while to enforce, it provides a smokescreen for a
would-be predator building up a quiet stake. Any balance over 1% of total
shares on issue (dependent on normal turnover levels in the shares) should
cause an alert.
A group should also make sure its forecasting techniques are effective and
understood throughout its business units. An accurate forecast for at least
the current year’s trading is a vital part of a defense document, and would
normally have to be independently corroborated by a firm of accountants, so
that it should stand up to rigid scrutiny.
Since a takeover offer may quickly follow the acquisition of an initial share
stake as part of a predator’s tactics, it is essential to be able to draft
promptly a document in response, expressing the reasons why, in the
opinion of the board and its advisors, the price which might be offered in the
event of a predatory bid is inadequate.
(a) Comparison of offer price with recent market price of the group,
comments on premium offered, and comparison with net assets. Also,
comment on the disadvantages to remaining shareholders of a sizeable share
stake.
(e) Rebuttal of commercial logic of bid, taking each point put forward by
offeror. Also reference, if appropriate, to regulatory environment and
national interest.
An eye should be kept on all likely predators with a view to anticipating their
actions. Clearly, considerations of size (has the relevant candidate the
financial resource to acquire the group?) and industrial synergies will best
determine such a list.
All bids involve considerable numbers of public statements. Very little, apart
from an outline, can be agreed in advance, although vital holding statements
relating to dawn raids or outright bids can be prepared. The next moves will
depend on circumstances, and in particular on the identity and stated
intentions of the predator.
A ‘white knight’ might also, during the course of a bid, make a full counter-
bid, as a more desirable acquirer than the initial predator, or might acquire
shares which can be used in support of the board
Examples are:
The most commonly used and seemingly most effective takeover defense is
the so-called poison pill. Examples are:
(i) Flip-in pills involve the granting of rights to shareholders, other than the
potential acquirer, to purchase shares of the target company at a deep
discount. This type of plan will dilute the ownership interest of the potential
acquirer.
(ii) Back-end rights are usually in the form of a cash dividend allowing
shareholders other than the potential acquirer to exchange their shares for
cash or senior debt securities at a price determined by the Board of
Directors. The price set by the Board is usually well in excess of the market
price or the price likely to be offered by a potential acquirer. Because the
price that the target shareholder would receive is likely to be higher than that
offered by the potential acquirer, shares will not be tendered.
Like the video game, the Pac Man defense occurs when a target company
turns around and tries to swallow its pursuer, by use of a counter-tender
offer. Pac Man, while colorful in name, has seldom been used successfully.
In a ‘disposal of the Crown Jewels’ defense, the target sells the assets which
are of greatest interest to the raider. A more extreme variant of ‘Crown
Jewels’ is the ‘Scorched Earth’ defense. In practical terms, this means that
the target company liquidates all or substantially all of its assets. leaving
nothing to the raider, thereby eliminating the raider’s motive for acquiring
the target.
The other side of the ‘Crown Jewels’ and ‘Scorched Earth’ strategies is the
‘Fat man’ defense:
the target company acquires a large and/or underperforming company in
order to decrease its attractiveness to the raider.
One tactic that has often been mis-labelled as a takeover defense is the use
of golden parachutes which are, quite simply, severance arrangements for
senior officers of the firm should there be a change in the control. Although a
golden parachute for one Chief Executive Officer involved in a takeover battle
in the USA was reportedly US$35m, they usually are a low multiple of the
most recent year’s salary.
20 Defense document
A vital part of a defense document, which will obviously be prepared with the
group’s merchant bankers, will be the section dealing with the reasons for
preferring the group’s continued independence. This is a topic which, when it
comes to be debated, can prove very controversial and take considerable
time and effort to resolve and draft internally. Accordingly, it seems sensible
to prepare this element of the defense circulars in draft form as soon as
possible, having reached a reasonable consensus.
The section can take the form of a review of the past few years, comparing
strategy and objectives against achievement; and then projecting the
continuing strategy forward. The arguments would then be based on the
requirement for independence to achieve projected strategic objectives.
At an appropriate time during the course of the bid, but not necessarily in the
first defense document, a forecast, duly corroborated by an independent firm
of chartered accountants, would normally be presented, for at least the
current year’s trading. This has already been discussed above.
21 Acceptable offers
Any board recognizes that there is a point at which an offer becomes
irresistible, although it would normally be appropriate to offer strong and
logical resistance right up to this point. This is based primarily on price, but
with important considerations being the interests of employees and
customers.
(c) A similar project may be undertaken in the future, and then the recently
completed project will provide a useful basis for estimation.
The management writer Drucker has suggested five golden rules for the
process of post-acquisition integration.
Rule 1 Both acquirer and acquiree should share a ‘common core of unity’
including shared technology and markets, not just financial links.
Rule 2 The acquirer should ask ‘What can we offer them?’ as well as ‘What’s
in it for us?’
Rule 3 The acquirer should treat the products, customers etc, of the acquired
company with respect, not disparagingly
Rule 4 The acquirer should provide top management with relevant skills for
the acquired company within a year
23 Strategic Acquisitions
Involving Common Stock
When the acquisition is done for common stock, a “ratio of exchange,” which
denotes the relative weighting of the two companies with regard to certain
key variables, results.
Many mergers that seem to make economic sense fail because managers
cannot handle the complex task of integrating two firms with different
production processes, accounting methods, and corporate cultures. This was
one of the problems in the AT&T–NCR merger. It also bedeviled Novell’s
acquisition of WordPerfect. That merger at first seemed a perfect fit between
Novell’s strengths in networks for personal computers and WordPerfect’s
applications software. But WordPerfect’s post acquisition sales were horrible,
partly because of competition from other word processing systems but also
because of a series of battles over turf and strategy:
Do not assume that more vertical integration is better than less. Carried to
extremes, it is absurdly inefficient, as in the case of LOT, the Polish state
which in the late 1980s found itself raising pigs to make sure that its had
fresh meat on their tables. (Of course, in a centrally managed economy it
may be necessary to raise your own cattle or pigs, since you can’t be sure
you’ll be able to buy meat.)
Some firms have excess cash and do not pay it out to stockholders or
redeploy it by wise acquisitions. Such firms often find themselves targeted
for takeover by other firms that propose to redeploy the cash for them.
During the oil price slump of the early 1980s, many cash-rich oil companies
found them selves threatened by takeover. This was not because their cash
was a unique as set. The acquirers wanted to capture the companies’ cash
flow to make sure it was not frittered away on negative-NPV oil exploration
projects.
If this motive for merger is important, one would expect to observe that
acquisitions often precede a change in the management of the target firm.
This seems to be the case. For example, Martin and McConnell found that the
chief executive is four times more likely to be replaced in the year after a
takeover than during earlier years. The firms they studied had generally been
poor performers; in the four years before acquisition their stock prices had
lagged behind those of other firms in the same industry by 15 percent.
Apparently many of these firms fell on bad times and were rescued, or
reformed, by merger.
investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors
instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the
toad, those kisses better pack some real dynamite. We’ve observed many
kisses, but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses
remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses, even after
their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.
The benefits that we have described so far all make economic sense. Other
arguments sometimes given for mergers are dubious. Here are a few of the
dubious ones.
24.5 To Diversify
We have suggested that the managers of a cash-rich company may prefer to
see i use that cash for acquisitions rather than distribute it as extra
dividends. That is why we often see cash-rich firms in stagnant industries
merging their way into fresh woods and pastures new.
The trouble with this argument is that diversification is easier and cheaper for
the stockholder than for the corporation. No one has shown that investors
pay premium for diversified firms; in fact, discounts are common. For
example, Kaiser Industries was dissolved as a holding company because its
diversification apparently subtracted from its value. Kaiser Industries’ main
assets were shares of Kaiser E Steel, Kaiser Aluminum, and Kaiser Cement.
These were independent companies and the stock of each was publicly
traded. Thus you could value Kaiser Industry by looking at the stock prices of
Kaiser Steel, Kaiser Aluminum, and Kaiser Cement. But Kaiser Industries’
stock was selling at a price reflecting a significant discount from the value of
its investment in these companies. The discount vanishes when Kaiser
Industries revealed its plan to sell its holdings and distribute the proceeds to
its stockholders.
Why the discount existed in the first place is a puzzle. But the example at le
shows that diversification does not increase value. The appendix to this
chapter provides a simple proof that corporate diversification does not affect
value in perfect markets as long as investors’ diversification opportunities are
unrestricted
The same advice holds when you are contemplating the sale of part of your
business. There is no point in saying to yourself, This is an unprofitable
business and should be sold. Unless the buyer can run the business better
than you can, the price you receive will reflect the poor prospects.
26 Divestitures
In this section, I will briefly discuss the major types of divestitures, in which
corporations sell divisions or other operating units. Types of Divestitures
There are four types of divestitures: (1) sale of an operating unit to another
firm, (2) setting up the business to be divested as a separate corporation and
then “spinning it off’ to the divesting firm’s stockholders, (3) following the
steps for a spin-off but selling only some of the shares, and (4) outright
liquidation of assets.
Sale to another firm generally involves the sale of an entire division or unit,
usually for cash but sometimes for stock of the acquiring firm. In a spin-off,
the firm’s existing stockholders are given new stock representing separate
ownership rights in the division that was divested. The division establishes its
own board of directors and officers, and it becomes a separate company. The
stockholders end up owning shares of two firms instead of one, but no cash
has been transferred. In a carve-out, a minority interest in a corporate
subsidiary is sold to new shareholders, so the parent gains new equity
financing yet retains control. Finally, in a liquidation the assets of a division
are sold off piecemeal, rather than as an operating entity.
In this section I will examine more carefully my assertion that present value
add. It turns out that values do add as long as capital markets are perfect
and investors’ diversification opportunities are unrestricted.
where
Suppose A and B are merged into a new firm, AB, with one share in AB
exchanged for each share of A or B Thus there are 1,500,000 AB shares
issued If value additivity holds, then PVAB must equal the sum of the separate
values of A and B just before the merger, that is, $300 million That would
imply a price of $200 per share of AB stock
But note that the AB shares represent a portfolio of the assets of A and B
Before the merger investors could have bought one share of A and two of B
for $600. Afterward they can obtain a claim on exactly the same real assets
by buying three shares of AB.
Suppose that the opening price of AB shares just after the merger is $200 so
that PVAB = PVA + PVB Our problem is to determine if this is an equilibrium
price, that is, whether we can rule out excess demand or supply at this price.
For there to be excess demand, there must be some investors who are
willing to increase their holdings of A and B as a consequence of the merger.
Who could they be? The only thing new created by the merger is
diversification, but those investors who want to hold assets of A and B will
have purchased A’s and B’s stock before the merger. The diversification is
redundant and consequently won’t attract new investment demand
Is there a possibility of excess supply? The answer is yes. For example, there
will be some shareholders in A who did not invest in B. After the merger they
cannot invest solely in A, but only in a fixed combination of A and B. Their AB
shares will be less attractive to them than the pure A shares, so they will sell
part of or all their AB stock In fact the only AB shareholders who will not wish
to sell are those who happened to hold A and B in exactly a 1:2 ratio in
their premerger portfolios!
That is, corporate diversification can’t help, but it may hurt investors by
restricting the types of portfolios they can hold. This is not the whole story,
however, since in vestment demand for AB shares might be attracted from
other sources if PVAB drops below
PVA + PVB
28 Appendix(es)
Application #4 – Estimating
merger gains and costs
Suppose that you are the financial manager of firm A and you want to
analyze the possible purchase of firm B. The first thing to think about is
whether there is an economic gain from the merger.
There is an economic gain only if the two firms are worth more
together than apart. For example, if you think that the combined firm
would be worth PVAB and that the separate firms are worth PVA and PVB, then
If this gain is positive, there is an economic justification for merger. But you
also have to think about the cost of acquiring firm B. Take the easy case in
which payment is made in cash. Then the cost of acquiring B is equal to the
cash payment minus B’s value as a separate entity. Thus
is positive.
I like to write the merger criterion in this way because it focuses attention on
two distinct questions. When you estimate the benefit, you concentrate on
whether there are any gains to be made from the merger. When you
estimate cost, you are concerned with the division of these gains between
the two companies.
An example may help make this clear. Firm A has a value of $200 million,
and B has a value of $50 million. Merging the two would allow cost savings
with a present value of $25 million. This is the gain from the merger. Thus,
PVA = $200
PVB = $50
Suppose that B is bought for cash, say, for $65 million. The cost of the
merger is’
= 65 - 50 = $15 million
Note that the stockholders of firm B–the people on the other side of the
transaction are ahead by $15 million. Their gain is your cost. They have
captured $15 million of the $25 million merger gain. Thus when we write
down the NPV of the merger from A’s viewpoint, we are really calculating
that part of the gain which A’s stockholders stock holders get to keep. The
NPV to A’s stockholders equals the overall gain from the merger less that
part of the gain captured by B’s stockholders: -
Just as a check, let’s confirm that A’s stockholders really come out $10
million ahead. They start with a firm worth PVA = $200 million. They end up
with a firm worth $275 million and then have to pay out $65 million to B’s
stockholders.’ Thus their net gain is
It makes sense to keep an eye on what investors think the gains from
merging are. If A’s stock price falls when the deal is announced, then
investors are sending the message that the merger benefits are doubtful or
that A is paying too much for them.
29 References
1. Leveraging the Rewards of Strategic Alliances,” by
Gabor Garai. Journal of Business Strategy,
2. Financial Strategy by AT Foulks Lynch
3. THE JOURNAL Mergers and Acquisitions
4. Principles of corporate Finance by Brealey Myers
5. Financial Management Theory and Practice