(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/109 Image Reference:0003

G.(62) 53 COPY NO. jjjP
19th M a r c h , 1962

CABINET

KENYA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

M e m o r a n d u m b y t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r t h e Colonies

T h e p u r p o s e of t h e C o n f e r e n c e h a s b e e n t o a g r e e o n a c o n ­
s t i t u t i o n w h i c h c o u l d b e i n t r o d u c e d w i t h s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t arid w o u l d c o n t i n u e
basically unaltered into independence. In t h i s p u r p o s e it is c l e a r , after
f i v e w e e k s of d i s c u s s i o n , t h a t t h e C o n f e r e n c e h a s f a i l e d . I have tried
as h a r d a s p o s s i b l e to find a b a s i s for a g r e e m e n t a s I thought this to
be the only w a y to p r o c e e d , b u t t h e gulf b e t w e e n t h e m a i n p a r t i e s
r e m a i n s too wide to be bridged. T h e r e is h o w e v e r in this failure one
i m p o r t a n t c o n s o l a t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t t h e r e c a n b e n o q u e s t i o n of f i x i n g
now a date for i n d e p e n d e n c e . Although everyone will p r o t e s t when I
tell t h e m this - and the e x t r e m i s t s will p r o t e s t with genuine passion - I
d o n o t t h i n k t h a t a n y of t h e m i n t h e i r o w n h e a r t s r e a l l y e x p e c t m e t o d o
otherwise.

2. (i) T h e K e n y a A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l U n i o n ( K A N U ) . KANU, led

b y M r . K e n y a t t a , r e p r e s e n t a c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e K i k u y u , L u o a n d
Kamba tribes. T h e y a l s o h a v e s o m e s u p p o r t a m o n g s t s o m e of t h e
other tribes. T h e s e t h r e e m a i n t r i b e s r e p r e s e n t just over half the total
p o p u l a t i o n of K e n y a a n d a t t h e l a s t e l e c t i o n t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s r e c e i v e d j u s t
o v e r t w o - t h i r d s of t h e v o t e s c a s t . r W i t h i n K A N U t h e r e a r e d i s s e n s i o n s :
t h e L u o a n d t h e K a m b a a r e n o t n a t u r a l a l l i e s of t h e K i k u y u , w h o are
generally r e g a r d e d as being the m o s t able - as they are the m o s t n u m e r o u s
tribe in K e n y a . The political leaders a r e divided between the moderates
led by M r . M b o y a , who in m y v i e w genuinely d e s i r e s to see a civilised
K e n y a , a n d t h e o l d g u a r d of t h u g s a n d e x - d e t a i n e e s w h o w o r k w i t h
Mr. Oginga Odinga, the main beneficiary from Communist money.
M r . K e n y a t t a i s t h e a c c e p t e d l e a d e r of t h e K i k u y u , a n d a l t h o u g h h i s
m e n t a l p o w e r s a r e clearly declining (and his colleagues openly acknowledge
this) his hold over his tribe and its t e r r o r i s t organisation r e m a i n s strong
enough for h i m still to be a m o s t f o r m i d a b l e figure, p a r t i c u l a r l y in
alliance with M r . Oginga Odinga.

(ii) T h e Kenya A f r i c a n D e m o c r a t i c Union (KADU). KADU, led

by M r . Ngala together with Sir Michael Blundell's New Kenya P a r t y ,
f o r m t h e p r e s e n t G o v e r n m e n t of K e n y a . T h e y r e p r e s e n t a n u m b e r of
smaller tribes. In s o m e c a s e s , s u c h a s t h e K a l e n j i n , t h e y c o m m a n d
t h e e n t i r e l o y a l t y of t h e g r o u p : i n o t h e r c a s e s t h e y c o m m a n d a s u b ­
stantial proportion. At the last election their candidates obtained between
 o n e - f i f t h a n d a q u a r t e r of t h e v o t e s c a s t , a l t h o u g h t h e y d i d m u c h b e t t e r i n
t h e n u m b e r of t h e s e a t s w h i c h t h e y o b t a i n e d . They are basically friendly
p e o p l e g e x i u i n e l y o p p o s e d t o t e r r o r i s m a n d f e a r f u l of d o m i n a t i o n b y
the Kikuyu, and p a r t i c u l a r l y by the thug e l e m e n t in that t r i b e . Unfortu­
nately, they a r e as a political p a r t y far less well organised or effective
t h a n K A N U a n d I f e a r t h a t if a n y t h i n g t h e y a r e l o s i n g g r o u n d i n K e n y a
as a whole.

(iii) O t h e r P a r t i c i p a n t s : A p a r t f r o m one o r two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s

of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s t h e o n l y o t h e r m a i n p a r t y t o t h e C o n f e r e n c e i s t h e
Kenya Coalition Party, who r e p r e s e n t the European farming interests.
It i s d i f f i c u l t t o b e s u r e h o w m u c h s u p p o r t t h e y h a v e a m o n g t h e E u r o p e a n
c o m m u n i t y , w h e r e g e n e r a l l y they would be r e g a r d e d as too m o d e r a t e .
At this Conference they a r e being v e r y helpful and sensible.

The P r o p o s a l s and Tactics of t h e Participants

3. KANU have put forward from the start a fairly orthodox con­
s t i t u t i o n of a c e n t r a l i s e d c h a r a c t e r . T h e i r p r o p o s a l s differ f r o m the
so-called W e s t m i n s t e r m o d e l in that they p r o v i d e for a written con­
stitution with special safeguards for individuals and for s o m e local
i n t e r e s t s , t o g e t h e r with s u b s t a n t i a l s a f e g u a r d s a g a i n s t c h a n g e s in the
c o n s t i t u t i o n t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of m i n o r i t i e s . F r o m t h e p o i n t of v i e w
of e f f i c e n t g o v e r n m e n t I h a v e n o d o u b t t h a t t h e i r p r o p o s a l s a r e o n t h e
r i g h t l i n e s - a n d i n d e e d t h e y w o u l d t a k e o v e r m o s t of t h e e x i s t i n g s y s t e m ­
but it i s q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r t h e i r s a f e g u a r d s for i n d i v i d u a l s w o u l d
in p r a c t i c e be a d e q u a t e , a n d c e r t a i n l y t h e y a r e not t h o u g h t to b e a d e q u a t e
by KADU. In t h e c o u r s e of t h e C o n f e r e n c e K A N U h a v e s h o w n t h e m s e l v e s
conciliatory and willing to negotiate. They have m a d e two major con­
c e s s i o n s t o t h e K A D U p o i n t o f v i e w - f i r s t , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of a s e c o n d
c h a m b e r , a n d s e c o n d , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of g o v e r n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s , w i t h
p o w e r s of t h e i r o w n e n t r e n c h e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , a t a l e v e l h i g h e r
than existing local authorities.

4. KADU have b a s e d t h e i r i d e a s on what they call " f e d e r a l i s m " or

"regionalism". In d e t a i l t h e i r p r o p o s a l s h a v e b e e n m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y
the fact that they a r e advised by a Swiss constitutional expert; and
m a n y f e a t u r e s of t h e i r p r o p o s a l s , w h i l e n o d o u b t w o r k a b l e i n S w i t z e r l a n d ,
m a k e no s e n s e in K e n y a . They have been d e t e r m i n e d to e r e c t what they
c a l l " d e f e n c e in d e p t h " b y dividing K e n y a i n t o s i x r e g i o n a l s t a t e s w i t h
legislative andadministrative p o w e r s on a large scale, and further by
i n s i s t i n g o n a s e c o n d c h a m b e r w i t h p o w e r s e q u a l t o t h a t of t h e f e d e r a l
lower house. While their p r o p o s a l s might p r o t e c t local i n t e r e s t s ,
t h i s is n o t t o m y m i n d c e r t a i n : on t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is quite c l e a r t h a t ,
f r o m t h e p o i n t of v i e w of p r a c t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e y m a k e l i t t l e s e n s e .
Unfortunately, KADU's tactics throughout have been to be as intransigent
as possible, and such concessions as they have m a d e have been very small
and wrung f r o m t h e m only by a p r o c e s s like extracting teeth.

5. The Kenya Coalition P a r t y have concentrated mainly on the

p r o t e c t i o n of E u r o p e a n l i v e s a n d p r o p e r t y . On the whole they share
K A D U ' s v i e w s on t h e K i k u y u t u t r e c o g n i s e t h e u n p r a . c t i c a . l i t y of K A D U ' s
proposals and have been trying to i m p r o v e them.
The ^ ^ e ^ ^ n t ^ i j u a t i o n

1
6. If i t w e r e p o s s i b l e t o s t r i p a w a y p h r a s e s l i k e " F e d e r a t i o n ' ,
"Regionalism" and "Unitary Government" and to look d i s p a s s i o n a t e l y
a t t h e r e a l i t y of t h e p r o b l e m , n a m e l y , p o w e r s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d r i g h t s
of i n d i v i d u a l s , a n d h o w t h e y a r e t o b e e x e r c i s e d a n d s a f e g u a r d e d , t h e i j
it w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e t o d i s c e r n a g o o d d e a l t h a t i s c o m m o n t o b o t h p a r t i e s .
It i s a g r e e d t h a t t h e f r e e d o m of t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d t h e r u l e t h a t n o
p r o p e r t y shall be taken without due c o m p e n s a t i o n should be written into
a B i l l of B l i g h t s a n d t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e a n i n d e p e n d e n t j u d i c i a r y t o e n f o r c e
it. K A N U n o w a g r e e t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e a s e c o n d c h a m b e r , n o t b a s e d
m a t h e m a t i c a l l y on c o u n t r y - w i d e adult f r a n c h i s e , which will act as s o m e
c h e c k on a m a j o r i t y in a l o w e r h o u s e . I t i s a g r e e d t h a t s o m e of t h e p o w e r s
of g o v e r n m e n t m u s t b e d e c e n t r a l i s e d , i n c l u d i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t r o l
o v e r l a n d t e n u r e i n n a t i v e a r e a s , e d u c a t i o n a n d a n u m b e r of o t h e r m a t t e r s .
L o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s m u s t h a v e c l e a r p o w e r s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d of m a k i n g
the n e c e s s a r y laws or b y e - l a w s , and these p o w e r s m u s t not just devolve
f r o m the c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t but m u s t be e n t r e n c h e d in the constitution.
F i n a l l y we m u s t p r o v i d e that t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n b e c h a n g e d only b y a
m o s t r i g o r o u s p r o c e s s a n d t h a t t h e u s e of e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s m u s t b e
controlled,

7. So m u c h has been a g r e e d and provides a b r o a d f r a m e w o r k . Much

m o r e r e m a i n s to be a g r e e d . Who is to control the security forces ?
Who is to hold the p u r s e s t r i n g s ? On t h e s e and on m a n y other m a t t e r s
no a g r e e m e n t h a s yet b e e n p o s s i b l e . But even m o r e important is the
fact that t h e r e is a s yet no a g r e e m e n t in t e m p e r a m e n t o r e m o t i o n .
The two main parties have publicly aligned t h e m s e l v e s for and against
" R e g i o n a l i s m " , often with a s m u c h i n t e l l e c t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g as s m a l l
boys choosing Oxford or C a m b r i d g e for the boat r a c e , and unfortunately
they a r e liable to struggle for their p a r t i c u l a r colour with equally
unthinking vigour. F i n a l l y , K A D U a n d m a n y of K A N U b e l i e v e , i n m y
opinion with justification, that M r . Kenyatta and his followers have
n o i n t e n t i o n of b e i n g b o u n d b y a n y u n d e r t a k i n g s o r a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n if
e v e r they can get p o w e r into t h e i r h a n d s .

8. M y c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t it i s p o s s i b l e t o d e v i s e a c o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h
will provide effective s a f e g u a r d s against its o v e r t h r o w by constitutional
means. No g u a r a n t e e c a n b e given a g a i n s t a coup d ' e t a t but the d a n g e r
c a n b e m i n i m i s e d b y d e c e n t r a l i s i n g c o m m a n d of t h e s e c u r i t y f o r c e s
and by preventing the Kikuyu, and their allies, f r o m establishing a
p r e d o m i n a n t position in the a r m e d f o r c e s . This is what we m u s t seek to do.

T h e G o v e r n m e n t of Kenya.

9. W h e n t h i s C o n f e r e n c e o p e n e d it w a s w i d e l y h o p e d t h a t a s p l i t
between the m o d e r a t e s and the old g u a r d in KANU could be achieved.
This, I fear, is not now p o s s i b l e at this stage. The r e a s o n s are twofold.
F i r s t , t h e i n t r a n s i g e n t t a c t i c s of K A D U h a v e t e n d e d t o u n i t e K A N U .
Secondly, M r . Mboya and the m o d e r a t e s do not feel strong enough at
t h i s s t a g e to. b r e a k w i t h M r . K e n y a t t a a n d h i s K i k u y u a n d t e r r o r i s t
following, nor can they yet p e r s u a d e M r , Kenyatta to b r e a k from
M r . Oginga Odinga and his m o n e y .

-3­

SEC&ET
 10. In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s I believe that it is m o s t i m p o r t a n t to

m a k e a strenuous effort to achieve a coalition g o v e r n m e n t . M y r e a s o n s

are the following: ­

(i) It is only b y w o r k i n g together that the rival politicians will

learn to live together in K e n y a .

(ii) Strong security m e a s u r e s will h a v e to b e taken, particularly

against s o m e of the K i k u y u , a n d it will b e salutary if this is d o n e b y

a coalition g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s will tend to drive a w e d g e b e t w e e n the

y o u n g e r K i k u y u leaders a n d the old g u a r d .

(iii) It s e e m s to p r o v i d e the oiily c h a n c e of avoiding the defeat of

K A D U at the next elections b y a united K A N U party u n d e r M r . K e n y a t t a

w h i c h could then hardly b e denied the right of f o r m i n g a G o v e r n m e n t .

(iv) T h e r e is m u c h to b e negotiated about the future constitution

and this can best b e d o n e b e t w e e n u s a n d a coalition g o v e r n m e n t .

11. It m u s t b e r e c o g n i s e d that a coalition at this stage is i m p o s s i b l e

without M r . K e n y a t t a . N o m e m b e r of K A N U will b e p r e p a r e d to

join a coalition w h i c h excludes M r . K e n y a t t a for the s i m p l e r e a s o n

that his o w n life w o u l d then i m m e d i a t e l y b e in great d a n g e r . Equally,

it is to m y m i n d v e r y h a r d to c o n t e m p l a t e M r . K e n y a t t a at this stage

leading a g o v e r n m e n t (though if h e w o n a n election it w o u l d b e v e r y

difficult to see h o w this could b e p r e v e n t e d ) . I therefore envisage

a g o v e r n m e n t of w h i c h the G o v e n o r r e m a i n s the h e a d a n d with M r . N g a l a

a n d M r . K e n y a t t a holding leading positions. T h i s will b e a bitter pill

for m a n y £oeople to s w a l l o w in E n g l a n d as well as in K e n y a but without

it I see n o prosj^ect of a coalition; a n d without a coalition at this

stage the i m m e d i a t e p r o s p e c t s of p r o g r e s s a n d the l o n g - t e r m c h a n c e s

of a civilised K e n y a will g r o w m u c h d i m m e r . I h a v e s p o k e n to

M r . N g a l a about this a n d h e r e c o g n i s e s the position. Pie w o u l d , I believe,

b e p r e p a r e d to c o - o p e r a t e in a coalition if h e believed that the next

constitution w o u l d contain a n a d e q u a t e d e g r e e of r e g i o n a l i s m .

T h e E u r o p e a n Interest

12. T h e principal E u r o p e a n interests a r e the p r e s e r v a t i o n of l a w

a n d o r d e r a n d the protection of their p r o p e r t y .

13. A constitution containing the best s a f e g u a r d s w h i c h v/e c a n devise,

c o m b i n e d with a coalition g o v e r n m e n t , s e e m s to offer the best protection

of l a w a n d o r d e r . Eritish forces will r e m a i n until i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d

I h o p e for s o m e t i m e after. In a n y c a s e I a m not p r o p o s i n g to n a m e

a date for i n d e p e n d e n c e n o w a n d I should h o p e to defer n a m i n g o n e until

a g o v e r n m e n t h a s b e e n elected a n d installed u n d e r the n e w constitution.

14. S o far a s land is c o n c e r n e d K A D U's p r o p o s a l s m i g h t offer s o m e

d e g r e e of protection. K A N U o n the other h a n d clearly intend to take o v e r

a g o o d p r o p o r t i o n of the E u r o p e a n la.nd in the W h i t e H i g h l a n d s . (They

u n d e r t a k e to p a y c o m p e n s a t i o n t h o u g h they expect the c o m p e n s a t i o n to

c o m e f r o m u s , a v i e w w h i c h I h a v e f i r m l y d i s c o u r a g e d . ) It is true that

the existence of g r o w i n g n u m b e r s of landless a n d u n e m p l o y e d , particularly

a m o n g the K i k u y u , r e p r e s e n t s the m a j o r m e n a c e to the future of K e n y a

a n d the m a j o r source of strength to M r . Kenyatta a n d the terrorists.

I a m forced to the conclusion that K e n y a will n e v e r b e a stable oountry

if so m a n y landless Africans h a v e to live alongside so f e w landed

E u r o p e a n s . I accept that a c o m p e n s a t i o n s c h e m e covei'ing E u r o p e a n

p r o p e r t y - o w n e r s generally w o u l d b e financially disastrous for u s a n d ­

that it is difficult to c o m p e n s a t e the people w h o h a v e a special c l a i m

o n u s (and there a r e a n u m b e r of t h e m ) without opening the d o o r s

wide, but I h a v e r e a c h e d the conclusion that a m u c h larger effort m u s t

b e m a d e to resettle landless A f r i c a n s . T h e fact that m a n y E u r o p e a n s

w i s h to sell their land n o w if they could only obtain e v e n a tolerable

price p r o v i d e s us with an opportunity of securing o u r objective

without c o m m i t m e n t to a c o m p e n s a t i o n s c h e m e . I a m afraid that

even so this will involve the provision of substantial finance f r o m this

country, but I a m n o w c o n v i n c e d that the alternative will involve

a m a s s e x o d u s of frightened a n d e m b i t t e r e d E u r o p e a n s c o m b i n e d

with a free-for-all seizure of -European land b y A f r i c a n s , p r o b a b l y

leading to tribal w a r f a r e . T h e p r e s e n t resettlement s c h e m e s a r e a

help but they are nothing like e n o u g h . M y D e p a r t m e n t a r e e x a m i n i n g

a n u m b e r of s c h e m e s a n d I should like in the n e a r future to discuss

the w h o l e p r o b l e m with the Chief S e c r e t a r y , T r e a s u r y .

Recommendations

15. I should like i m m e d i a t e l y to put to the C o n f e r e n c e the b r o a d

outline of a constitution w h i c h w o u l d include all the m a t t e r s on w h i c h
a g r e e m e n t h a s b e e n r e a c h e d and, in m a t t e r s still disputed, w o u l d
go as far as m i g h t be practicable t o w a r d s the strengthening of
regional authorities. S u c h a b r o a d plan w o u l d not b e difficult to
put f o r w a r d , leaving the details to b e w o r k e d out subsequently. I
w o u l d then like to give the C o n f e r e n c e a f e w d a y s to consider m y p r o p o s a l s
a n d give m e their reactions, m a k i n g it clear that w h e n I h a v e r e c e i v e d
these I w o u l d , after consultation with m y colleagues, a n n o u n c e h o w w e
intend to p r o c e e d . In the m e a n t i m e I should like to p r o c e e d with dis­
cussions about the f o r m a t i o n of a coalition g o v e r n m e n t . M y object
w o u l d b e , b y admitting K A N U to g o v e r n m e n t , to obtain their a c q u i e s c e n c e
in a d e g r e e of regionalism w h i c h K A D U m i g h t b e b r o u g h t to accept.
T h e next step w o u l d be for u s to w o r k out with the K e n y a Coalition
G o v e r n m e n t then f o r m e d the details of a n "internal s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t "
constitution w h i c h w o u l d b e introduced i m m e d i a t e l y after elections b a s e d
on a g r e e d n e w a r r a n g e m e n t s . It is difficult at this m o m e n t to b e clear
a s to a time-table but I cannot see h o w elections could b e held until
the last quarter of the y e a r at the earliest, a n d I p r o p o s e that the question
of the length of s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t before i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d negotiations
on the future position of British forces should b e held o v e r a n d not d i s r ­
c u s s e d until s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t h a s b e e n introduced.

16. I m u s t w a r n m y colleagues that this p r o g r a m m e is likely to

p r o v o k e violent reaction f r o m K A N U a n d to p r o d u c e a serious security

situation. B u t I believe that these risks m u s t b e faced. T o go faster n o w

w o u l d b e inexcusably r e c k l e s s . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of slowing d o w n m a y b e

serious, particularly as r e g a r d s calls u p o n o u r limited r e s o u r c e s of

m o n e y a n d military m a n p o w e r , but the c o n s e q u e n c e s of going full s t e a m

a h e a d straightaway into i n d e p e n d e n c e m i g h t well b e catastrophic.

R. M .

Colonial Office, S . W . 1 .

18th M a r c h , 1962.