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A Grammar of The English Tongue (5th Ed.), 1728 PDF
A Grammar of The English Tongue (5th Ed.), 1728 PDF
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THE
APPROBATION
O F
Iſaac Bickerflqflſi, Eſq;
HE following TREATlSE being ſubmitted to my
Cenſure; that I may paſs it with Integrity, l.muſt
declare, That as GRAMMAR in general is on all
Hands allow'd
appears to me, the
thatFoundation of All Art:ofſſand
THlS GRLAMMAR theScience-s,
ENGLISH ſo it
Engliſh Tongue,
wITH THE \ '
Arts of Logick, Rhetorick, Toetry, &c.
ILLusH-RATED with USEFUL
N 0 T E s; Giving the
Grammar in General.
The Whole making Ea Compleat SYSTEM
LONDON:'
Pxinted for F. CL A Y, at the Bible, and D. B R 0 WNE, at the
Black-swan, both without Temple-Ear. M.DCC.XXVIII
[5768/26 43.
zs Mb'
. HWFTT oſſ ,ct .r. . -
1 'T r
'.' LZL x WHAITPÞ T'HB;:.,,:.U'J ,r a
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;nU;._HL 'in . C A.
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al:
a
. 1.',1.
wis-t. (4 .. . Land
'zS
- I'W E WMVLWWW'P '._ wzou ..\ . '."='.'- (444.
" 'Fy ' "U
- 'ral l- tiſ- wiſ: L'j N 1.'3 w'
. *- i.
*MAT5A , 'V
as; Ww.
'_ MA as , \{'*-"'xe>s*.z
'vfflm 'bcſſ__
a &SIR. AN, In, ffx
-_ . XCWQ jafl
. z .%<.>Pls at five-alsothe
LangUage for Wthh the fgl- '
IOWing Grammar is made, Mix
Pe'ſormance ddth'-- A Naturally
claim Yovn MAJEsTY's
Protefliidni'; - - 'Oz- 'NT
A,.*\Grflmmr_\\g£ , the French
Lafiiſage wastheFikſt Labour
of that Learned Body the
French Academy, That being
"sm'I'mfiz azf'iA. the
37'2-7ſſ-ſſ AD-E' D I C A "ctr icto ſſN. '
the Foundaltiion of'a'll Writing:
And-'als Yj) U RLM Aj g s His
(Arrfif have been Suþetiorf-to
thfiwflffixwwf sleepe
that, "by Tour Royal? Hfluence,
You will give the ſame Supe
riority to Our Afſiti ancſfiscz
'li'f'c'H hie Xllfflfiiltz,
ffifit 'a Z'to
To BYMK J m if,
w on? riuſ-'r 'IOZ D((Z;{.>J:£jjſf£;t-'
'LZJY (Shem ai 'tzzvzaaqn'XIÞ grziwol
Y'LZLIULMMZÞMZ) sz'xnsscuilzjadl
BZ'ZTBFH LM 51qu mid:
Thu? MONK'S WEMWGMZ
&NNW. Otlj 'esv=2*w_'<.{27 A
ZLJO'JRJ zflqii CLZQYMLX
Oſi vhofl fanned zed) '30
$ rq>
ſi 'h 'X \ ,
rugd 3*='I
ed,
1 gſxzwlsuzlſi &NNW
I a
. a Voc.Ea.lathu . i - l A 7
' .*'. Abl. Angitc, 1; A AngumkYf - ,
ſ
P- R--E-F A C E-L Vii
Thefim'th Declenfion he: the ſame "victim-5 In 'he figfl, ex
nyt that the Nominative Plural is theſam as the Nomir
natwe singular; at, Word.
Nom. Word Word'
Gen. Wordes Worda
smguL
. AZZ.. WWfrſſriie
D Pluffl- gggum
Voc. Eala thu Word - - Ealn ge Word
Abl. Worde Wordum.
He fifth Declenſion agree: with. the firſt, extegt that the Gc
nitive singular
at in Wiln, ends in e,' and
A' Maid. * ' the
' ſ ' Nominmvc ' Plural
' in a',
. Nom. Wiln "X Wilnav
Gen. WiIne ' *Wilna
. Dat. Wilhe Wilnum
Smgul- Acc. Wiln Pluml- Wilna
Voc. Eala thu Wilu 'Eala ge Wilna
Abl. Wilne. _ Wilnum. ' '
The ſixth Declenſinn it: Nominaſſtirre Singular in u, it: Ge
mtivc in a, Dative, Aecufitive, Voeative in u; and the
Pluml Caſes all form'd like thoſe of the fifth; a: Sunu, a Son.
Nom. Sun r - Suna_
Gan. Snna Suna
. th.Sunu . Sgnum
Smgul. ACQ Sunu Plural. sum
Voc. Raia thu Su-au Eala ge sung.
Arbl. Sunu. A " Sunqm. *
The "caitives, or ualitiendi War-'With rom thoſe in out he.
ſenfimguago; FZtL-eir Tewtglnaflm dijflngmſh the Genfler;
that is, theſme Termination iefor the Maſtuline and Neuler,
but a different for Feminine 5 4.', God, gqu.
Maſculine Neuter. The Femine.
Nom. God bonus, bonum.
Gan. Godes
. - Dat. Gndum
singul- - Acc. God
Voc. Goda
Abl.-Godum . . .
Now. Gode ' . Buni, home, bone. - v'x
Gcn. Godra ffl _
Dat. Godum
final' Acc. Gode
Voc. Gods " - _
Abl. Godum; m
viii X P- R_ --E.'F At .C , Eli.
"W'e might giveyou various Iryianſices more of the eſſential Di e
rence between the old Saxon and modern Engliſh To'n egxhutz eſe
mu atisfl any.reaſimahle Man, that it. is. ſo great, t atthe Saxon
can e no Rule tb us ſand that to underſtand ours, there, is'no need
o knowing the Saxon. eAnd tho' Dr. Hickes mufl 5.? allow'd to have
een a very curious Enquirer into thoſe Ohſblete Tongues, out of
Dſ/Z, and containing nothing valuahle, et it does by no meansfollow
(as is plain from what has been ſaid that we are not o'hlig'd to
derive the Senfi', Conflrntt'ion, or Nature of ourpreſint Language
from his DZ/Zoveriese But it-is the preſent Tongueſ/tak is the, onl
Ohjeii'qf out; Conſideration, as. it matters not to'the underſtanding
of that,from
Swine whether we know
Soyvin. Timethat Kiile
indeed hasiſderiv'ed
an 'entirefrom Cowin, or
'Dominion'ſi'over
H/ords,
in our as well as over
Language, aH other
as well as inPnpductions
all others,ofI-ſ/ordrv
Human Kind.
have Thus
extreamly
vary'dlfrom their Original significations. Thus Knav'cjignijjr'd
origina no more thanfa Servant," Villain, a Country Steward, or
Villager : Yet, I lear, i ouſhou'd calla Man Knave, or ſiVillain,
it would not __muc ame-a' e. his Chſioler, to tell him, that theſe Wbrds
(ſinne Hundreds of Tea'rsſince) had'a very harmlefi signification; -
'Our proper Defign, therefore, is to conveya Grammayical Know
ledge of the'Mnguag'e we now ſþeuh, from whatever' springs' and
Sources deſcending'dowri to us, in the mqfl eaſy, familiar, and com
pendious Method that we could pofflhlyfind out. Nor could we hy any
means he divertedfrom' this genetj'aus Aim, hy any' Poor-Ambient: of
ſinning skill'd in the Foreign Terzns of the old Grangmarians; and
tho' we have not-rejected them out ofConternpt ofLearning(as they
call it) or ofthe 'Languages from which the are deriv'd,*yet we
touid' much' le/i 'refolve to-ſacriſice the Eaſe ofZour Learne' to a Cu
ſtom 'injurious to thegeneral Progre/i of thoſe, who are diſh-ous to,
[enow the Grammar of their own Mother-Tongue only. .
To this End, we have heen atſome Pains to Put all the Rules in
to asſmooth and ſhnorous Ver/e as the Nature of thesuhject wou'd
hear; and we hope, that this has beenfar fromgiving any Ohſcurity
to the Senſe ,- hue to give them the greater Light, unden eat/'Twehave
added anfeſuit
learned Explanation in in
Alvaruſſsſſ, Pro ise, Grammar,
according tozthe
whichWay taken
is not any hy that
uſed 'of
almoſt all the Schools 'if-Europe, except. England, but, commended hj
Schioppius, as the heſ-i practical Gtammarwfithe Latin Tongue.
It could not he avoided, intzthatſome aſ them m: t run kAhaW
niouſh than the reſt, hut we believe the Numher o them is notgreat.
m have never met with anyſolid Ohjectiqn againſt. this V/ay (ex
ceptſhrne People's Inahility to do the like) hee-an e,- indeed; its Ex?
cellence is in the very Nature of the Thing. For Vc'siþ is' far more
23.
P®REFACE. ix
eaſily learnt, and better retain'd, than Proſe; and Engliſh Verſe, by
Reaſon of the Rhimet, yield: a greater Affiſtance to 'he Learne'
than Latin Vcrſe, one End of a Vcrſc recalling the other. An Au
zho'quooa' Reputation confirms our Opinion in theſe Wordr. All
Men paid great Reſpect to the Pocts, who gave them ſo cle
Iightful an Entcrtainment. The Wiſh' Sort took this Oppottu
nity of Civilizin the reſt, by putting all their Thcological and
Philoſophical In ructions into Vale, which being learnt with Plea
fiere, and retain'd with Eaſh, help'd to heightcn and pcrſitrve the
Veneration already, upon other Scorcs, paid to the Pocts.
By thi: mean: the Child, or Learner will be oblig'd to burthen
his Memory with no more than it abſhluteþ nec'ſſh'y to the Knew-
ledge afthe Art heſtudiet.
Nothing being more neceffiny to acquire a clear Knowledge of my
Thing, than a clear Method, me have taken a peculiar Care in this'
Edition to obflr-ue all the Rule: of Method. ÞVe begin with what
i: firſt to be learnt, that what flllom ma be under/food ,- and pro
ceed that Step by Step, till we canst to the and moſt difficult, and
which depend: on all that goe: before it. V'e have reduced the
Tfflſu, which are plain and obvious, into a:ſmall a Number a: was
conflflent with Perſpicnitj and Diſtinction ,*for our End being the teach- l
ing onl] the preſent Engliſh Tongue, we hold no Regard to my Term
whatſoever, which had not an immediate Regard to that .- Bſ 'his
man: we believe we 'na/ſay, flat 'me have deliver'd the' Learne'
fromſome Scom ofhard V/ordt, impos'd in other Gram mars.
The Text i: what is only meant to be taught in the Schooltg and
in that, me hope, no Teacher ofany tolerable Capacity, will find an]
Difficulty, that may not beſurmounted by a 'very little A plication.
The Notes have been ple/'ſternly miſtaken, by a Man-t at ſhould
have known better Thiagr, fbrſuch Commentaries at the Dutch Au- -
thors have put to maſt of the Claffics, i. e. an Explanation of ob
feare Placet, difficult Expreffiom, hard Mrd: or war-loue Reading: 3
whereas thefi Notes conſiſt of more difficult Enquirie: into Grammar
in general; or ſhmetime: contain a Difence of Particulars in the
Text, and at other Timerſheu the Ana ogy between the Grammar
of the Engliſh, and that of' the Latin Tongue: All which muſt
be dl great Uſe to Men or V/omenof Judgment and Learmng, but
are not to be taught the young Beginncr, who/i Head cannot be '
jhppot'd ſtrong enoughfbr Diſtjuiſitiom of that kind. = \ P'
Having tal-en theſe Precautions in' the Grammar, we thought '
morſel-ver obliged to par ue them through the refl of'he Arts contain'd
inthir Volume 5 in I' ich me have had a peculiar Regard to the
Truth of eath, withont an] Reſþet'l to ſuch Book: as have been too
long in the Poſeffion of the Schoolt. Poetry, Rhctoric, and Logic
'J have
x FRsEJÞAPC e.
have generalh' heen taught in moſt of the Reſhm of Learning in Eu
rope, in the Latin Tongue: It wax, therefore, neceſſity to our De
ſign of accompliſhing our Engliſh Scholar, that he ſhould loſe no
Advantage which thoſe enjoy, who make theirfirfl Court to the dead
languages. Nay; we may without Vanity-fi' ,' that no Puhlicle
School in Europe hat an Coarſe of Poetry equal to what we give
here. V/ehave ſeen al that have heen taught, and not one ofthem
proceed: any farther, than the Art of Verſifying, by teaching the -
ſeveral Quantitie: of Words, and what each Son ofVerſe requires.
But thi: it the Art o making Poetaſters,- not Poets ;.of giving a
Tafle of Numbers, ut not of theſublimer Beautie: of the Authors
theyrefld, which are of the Magnitude ,- hy which meant we
qftenfind, that thoſe who have ſpent many Tears' in teaching Schools
authgzwoiyl' Judge: in the World ofthe very Authors thy' teach.
TfiPoen-y, he -at all to hefludy'd (for- which there are a thouſand
zrrefi-agahle Argumenn) it ought to he truly:taught,,whieh yet it
hat never been in any School: that we could ev'r heat-haf." In thin"
ArtþfPoetry, there are, vwe have fix'd the Rulerþf every Sortlof x
Poetry, which will e a great Diminution in Time of had-'Poets z'
and we haveflirther, we hope, given a Standard ofthe O uantitie:
ofout Tongue, which ifwezhave 'not perfectly ahtaine we 'nay
venture toſhy, that we are not arfrom it; ' ' *
The General Rhetorics t e School: in. England meddle onl
with the-Trojan; and Figure: ofWordt. and Sentencee, hue neglect' e
Cultivation of _-a young Invention. '. We know ſome ingeniou: Men
have di/allow'd qfþuttin any People on the Exerciſe o that Fa
culty ,- hutwe preſume, t at we ought todo in 'hie a: t e Touth of
Antiquity did in their Gymnaſtic ExereijZ-sz th?ſtaid not till they
wore Men of confirm'd Strength and Rohuſme s, ut hegan- in a more
tender 'Ageto make their Limb: pliant, an ſn to knit their sine-we' '
and Nervex, that the ſhou'd he without a Stiffnefi, which would
not he remov'd hy a ate A plication to that Art. Thu: hy uſing
Touth early to a Methodica Invention, Exerciſe and Time will give
av Readintſſ' and Facility infleing what all Subject: will afford aſ
Uſ? 'a Perſuaſion, which a Mind nnufizd to that way of thinking, wi L
me eaſily find out. ,. . .
W'e may farther venture to ſit , that velry few School: in Europe
can boaſt/i) a Logic, clear'd of the o dſfargon, and delivering
the direct1 way to Truth, not to uſeleſs Wranglex. This wax drawn
u'hy a very eminent Hand from Mr. Lock. Father Malebranch,
t e Meffleur: of Port-Royal, and/brae others, tho' we have ventur'd
to give it you ſomething ſhot-'er than it lJ in the Original. r
* \
Upon
lb -' Vi£l M i]- ' l."-'.' Hull; T
Engliſh Tongue',
PART L
CHAE L
R A M M A R doe: all the Art and Knowledge
* According to the Uſe of ever] speech, ſtead),
How we our Thought; moſt juſtly may exprefi
In Win-ds, together join'd, in Smtemes.
[2] Into
NOTES.
[1] The modern, as well as old I cannot omit the learned and ju
Grammarians, have given us vari dicious Mr. J'abnfan's Definition,
ous Definitions of this Yew uſeful Grnmmar i: 'be Art of expre me 'be
AnnThat ofa certainAuthor ſeems Relation: of Thing: in Conjtruflinn,
defective, when he ſays, Grammar is will' due Accent in Speaking, and
the Art ofSpeaking z ſince'ti: plain Orrbograpby in m-iring,according 'a
a Maſtery of it, is of more Conſo the Czdiom oftkoſe, wbofieLan 'rage
quence in Writing; the Solcciſms we learn. If he had ſaid of or r,
of Vulgar Diſcourſe paſſing unheed not Thingr, and uamity for Ac
ed, tho' they would be monſtrous ce-zt, (which is a hing or Art:
in Writing. Of thls Opinion we which no Body alive underſtands,
find the great Mr. Larke. ſmcellzttelates to the xmng andlfþl
mg
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
'7
2
[2.] Into Four PM'M the Learn'd this Art divide:
The Firſt to Letters i: preciſely ty'd ,
The Second doe: to Syllables extend ,
The Third the various Rule: of Words commend;
The Fourth itſelfon Sentences doesſþend.
For in Engliſh, as well as other Languages, this Art conſiſts
of LETT ens, SYLLABLES, Worms, and SENTEN'CES.
The Second is produc'd by the various Conjunctions of the Firſt ;
the different Union of the Seeondbegets the Third; and the vari
ous joinings of the Third compoſe the Fourth.
ln the perfect Knowledge of theſe Four Heads conſiſts the
whole Art ofGRAMMAR.
Letters being evidently the"'Foundatidn of the Whole, ought,
in the firſt place, to be thoroughly conſider'd, and' all thoſe Rules
which Induſtry and Obſervation have been'able to furniſh, laid
down in ſuch a Manner, that the Underſtanding of the Learner
being in ſome meaſiire inform'd of the Reaſons of Things-may
not paſs through this Book to ſo little Purpoſe, as to learn only
va fewWords by Rete.
[3] A
ling oftheVoice, not thth'antity) Manner in which Men make uſe of
we think it the moſt extenfive De them to expreſs their Thoughts.
finition we have met with z but, in [22 Others divide Grammar in
deed,every Thing is extraordinary the ollowing Manner; as Ortha
in this Author's Book. And we are graphyz or the Art oftrue Spelling;
pleaſed to find, that ours (which Ortboepy, or exact Pronunciation,as
was made before we had the Hap to uantity and Accentz Etimolo
pincſs of ſeeing his Book) contains gy, or the Derivation of Words, to
the Scnſe of it. But to ſpeak, is to iſcover the Nature and Propriety
explain our Thoughts 'by thoſe of ſingle Words; and Sjnrax, to
sum, which Men have invented to join Words agreeabiy in Sentences.
that End. We find the moſt conve Or!hagraþhy,or$peiling, has rela
nient Signs, are Soundr, and the tion to Letters, both to the Know
Voice ; but becauſe theſe Sounds are ledge of their Figures, and the
tranfient, and paſs away, Men have Soundsexpreſſed by them, and the
invented other Signſ, to_rendcr them puttingrhem together to form Syl
more durahle and Cgenuanent, as 1ahles and Words. Orrhoepy directs
well as viſible, or hiects of the the PronunciationofSyllables,as to
Eye, which are the Characters in their Length or Shortneſs: Etimo
Writing, called by theGreeks 1951.',
lazy, or Deri-uation, regards Word: 5
ua-ra, whenceourTerm ofGram And Symax, Senremer. _
Mr. Job'ljbn,-inhij Giammatical
mar is deriv'd. Two Thingswe may
.confider in theſe Signr: The Firſt Commentaries, much better:
what they are by their Nature,that " From hence there ariſe four Parts
is as Sound: and Characten. The Se
5' oi'Grammar. Analogyfflhichtreats
cond, their Signijicatian; that is,the ** ofthe ſeveralPatts ofSpecchzttgir
, t e_
ſhe Engliſh Grammar', with Notes. 3
[3] A Letter, therefore, is a Character, or Mark, either in
Print or Writing, which denotes the Various Motions, or Poli
tions of the [4.] Inſh-uments of Speech, either in producing,
or ending of Sounds. Or you may term them Marks and Signs,
expreffing the ſeveral Sounds us'd in conveying our Thoughts to
each other in Speech.
A Letter is an uncompoandetl Sound,
Of which there no Di-vzſt'on can be fount-I:
Theſe Sound: to certain Characters we fix,
V/hich, in the Engliſh Tongue, are Twenty-ſix.
Of theſe Si s, Marks, or Characters, the Engliſh Langurlge
makes Uſe o Twenty-ſix, as will appear from the following
Alphabet. r
Of
'5 Definitions, Accidents and For of our Modern Tongue, the ſame
" mations. Syntax, which contains Sounds are often expreſs'd by dir
" the Uſe of thoſe Things in Con fcrent Chamcters; and different
" ſtruction, according to their Re Sound: are mark'd by one and the
"lations Orrhography of Spelling, ſame Charact er ;/ ln the next Place,
*' and Proſody of Accenting in Pro Letter' are the signs ofSoundsmat
K nunciation." Our Diviſion is eaſi the Sounds themſelves: For th
ly reduc'd-to this,-f0r Orthography, Greek: ypdppa-mis from Writ i ny,
whoſe natural Place is firſt, as the and theLatinr,/i'em, fiom llile'rYlLlr),
Foundation of the whole, contains (as linen itſelf) or inemlo, ſo illa:
Letter: and &ſyllableſ. Analogy both Words ſignify that which is
Words, Syntax Sentenccs. As for mark'don the Paper. But if'tlu-le
Profatly, we preſtune it 'falls more be any Character,Sign and Murk,'
juſtly (eſpecially in Engliſh) under that does not expreſs a Sound en -
the Art of' Poetry,as we have plac'd tirely fimple, but a Sound compos'd
it; but as much as relates to the and corn oundcd of Two or mon',
Pronunciation of Proſe is taken in and is r oluble into as many, it is
by Letterf, where their true Sound not ſo properly a Letter, as an Al;
is taught; and our Term! being bre-uiature of ſeveral Letter', or a
more plain and eaſy, and needing Contraction 'of them into one Note
no Explanation, we have choſe to' or Mark, containing in itſell'l'o ma
keep ſtill to them. ny Letters, as its Power contains
[3] There are-other Definitions ſimple Sounds. This is plain in the
of Letters, as the following: A Latin 83', x, th'e Greek 2, o, g, and "
Letter may be ſaid to be, a ſimple un many others ſufficient] y known, l'or
commanded Sound of, or in, the they are compos'd ol an) (ad
Voice, 'which cannot be ſubdi-oided (u;,) (Beaſt-13) &do. On the con
into any more ſimple, and it gene trary, a ſimple Soundl tho' it be ex
rall mark'd 'La/'th a particular Cha preſs'd perhaps by diflerentCharn
ra er. This Definitionwctake to cters, yet it is robe eſteem'd but
err in two Particulars; firſt, tho' one Letter: For (th,) (ph,) no leſs
every Sound ou he to be mark'd 'than 4), 6, and f, are but ſimple
with a proper an pecnlhr Chane Letters.
ter, yet by the Corruption, or _Pn [4] The chief Inſtmments of'
mjzjve Ignorance offlne finthters SPMDiſeouxſeorI-etters, are the
B 2. Lungs,
4. ſhe Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
Lungs, the Wind-pipe, Throat, the different Parts oſ their Ages)
Tongue, Noſtrils, Li s and ſeveral but chiefly from the Larynx, or
Parts ofthe Mouth. he Breath, or Knot of the Throat; For the Tone
that Air that is inſ it'd or breath'd oſ the Voice is more or leſs grave
into us, is blown rom the Lungs or acute, as the ſmall Cleft ofthe
throughthe Wind-p] , which ſur Throat opens more or leſs; and
niſhes the Matter o the Voice or this is the Seat of all Mufical Mo
Diſcourſe. For from the various dulations.
Colliſion oſthisAir or Breath,ariſes From the ſame Seat muſt we ſeek
theVariety both ofTones andArti the Reaſon of the Difference be
culation: And this Variety comes twixt a gentle Whiſper, and loud
not from the Lungs, but from other Talk. For if, When we ſpeak, we
Cauſes, as will anon be evident. make a tremulous Concuffion of the
For allthe Variation which Sounds Throat and Wind-pipe (that is, by
receive from the Lungs, is only reaſon of their Extenfion) it pro
from the different Force, with duces loud ſpeaking; but when the
which they ſend out the Breath, Throat and the Wind-pipe are leſs
by which the Voice becomes more ſtretch'd, and more lax, it is Whi
or leſs ſonorous, or loud; for the ſparing. Butall Letters are not ca
Lungs perform in Speech the Of pable of this Diverſity, or Varia
fice of the Bellows in the Organ. tion ; but only thoſe, which we call
I knowAnatomilts have obſerv'd, Vowels, half Vowels, half Mutes
that we cannot ſo much as talk with (and ſuch as derive themſelves from
out the Concurrence oſ twelve or halfMntes :) For 11, r, c, or k, are
thirteen ſeveral Parts, as the Naſe, ſimply Mutes, and their Aſpirates
Liþr, Teeth, Palate, Jaw, Tongue, never admit oſ that Concuſſron :
H/unfim, Lungſ, Mtſcle: ofthe Che/i, nor is their Sound in loud Speeeh
Dia lzmgma, andMufc/e: of 'beBel different from what it is in a Whi
ly; ) at l have nothing to do with ſ er.
any Part, but what is immediately To this Head we may refer the
eoncerſſd in the Formation of Hoarſeneſs, often the Companion
Sounds, theObſervation of theMan oſ Catarrhs, which hinders that
ner of which, leads the Obſerver to Concullion of the Throat, and the
certain uſeſul Concluſions in the Wind-pipe. -
Subject we treatoſ. FartherEnqui The Articulation of Words, or
ries into other Partsconcern'd more the Formation oſ the ſeveral Let
remotelyin Speech, have little but ters, begins when the Breath has
Amuſements here, tho' of Conſe paſs'd the Throat; and is almoſt
quencc in theContem lation ofthe wholly erſorm'd by the Noſtrils,
admirable Order of ature. Mouth, ongue and Lips. Tho'
- 'I he V ariety oſTones (that is, as theſe Remarks ſeem out of the
for as they relate to Gravity or A. way to the common Reader, yet a
cuteneſs, flat or ſharp) ariſes from indicious Maſter will _find it worth
the Wind-pipe. For asa Flute, the his while to ſtudy this Point tho
longer and ſmaller it is, the more roughly. For by Rhomng what
acute or ſharp, or ſmall the Tone; Letters are formed by the Mouth,
and the larger and ſhorter, the more Tongue,Throat,Lips, (50. the Ma
grave and big the Tone is, that it ſter may give a t-Light to the
gives. The flame holds good in the Learnerjnthe oiSpelling, and
Wind-pipe ( whence, at leaſt, in rhaps the mofltertainflule of.
iome meaſure, ariſes the Variety of King it juſtly, becauſe m theſe
'ſones iu the Voices of ſeveral Notes we ſhall ſhew_h0w every
Men; or even of the ſame Men in Vowel and Conſonant is form'd.
[s] Tho'.
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t .
s l .
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WÞPRLZT Cut-a At t
The Engliſh Grammarz with Notes. 5'
Oftbe LETTERS. [7]
Old-Engliſh. Roman. Italian. - Soumled.
I A 'a*_£_a_ .a a
275 L B T B i- be. ell _
'if ſ o ſhe et: ice
15 des ed
e _
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8 'p H h fl b atcb ba each
EZZIILLi
LP_l.J_._-Lll__-_i£2_ se ____
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BITLIZLH it;"
13 FD m M m fill cm me
en no fiv
rr A
BEFLFZL w eP _ſi
HQIZZNL m' law: "He"
R-'r in'
igDſssTJTsTF-eſh ſh w
T t tee et nd
[5] lt
The Engliſh Grammar, 'with Notes. 7"
C_.HAA_1_*.ſſ-n;,,_
Of J-Vo'w e ns-p [6]
Under Two Heads theſe Letters ſtill are plac't,
Thefiz/Z holds Vowels, Conſonants the lafl.
Heſi: Twen -ſix Letter: are naturally divided intoTwo
Sorts, whic are call'd VOMII and Conſbm'm. Vowelx,
or perfect Sounds, being by Nature of greater Excel-.
lence than Conſhmnts, as founding by themſelves, and giving the
latter their Sounds, juſtly demand our firſt Conſideration.
A Vmel, therefore, is a Letter' denoting a fiill Sound made in
the Throat, and can be pronounc'd without the help and join:
ing of any other Letter to it.
A Vowel by itſhlf compleat i: fbund,
Mde in the Throat, one full and perfect Sound, ,, \
Five Letter: we m" only Vowels tall, 1
For A, E, I, O, U contain them all. '
[7] In Ength we have but theſe Five Marks, or Character
of theſe perfect Sounds call'd Vowels, a, e, i, o, u, and y at the
End of a Syllable for i, which is only a differq'nt Figure, but
entirely of the ſinne Sound. When theſe Vowels end a Syl
lable, they are ufiially long, but generally ſhort in allothcr Poli
tions.
To
' l
in
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 9
[8] When a ſingle Conſonant ends a Syllable, Bat, um, far,
ſe) is ſhort ; and when Two of the ſame Conſonants meet in the
Middle of aWord, as in better, cannot, Fdrrier, &e. and when
a ſingle Conſonant in the Middle ſounds double, as in hanz'ſh,
Dragon, Habit, &e. and when it precedes Two Conſonants that
end a Word, as Haſt, paſt, &e. But ſilent (e) ev'r after theſe Two
Conſonants, lengthens the V) as pafle, &te.
A ill 'mewhich
(Ink-Lard: long mqfl 'uſtlHilahlepcompe/E,
but hine do ſu pqſe
i
The Engliſh Grammar, with NOtes. 13'
(E) is ſilent when (e) is added to Ends of Words in Names
' Beherſi,
which &ce.
ſignify more
but the than of
Reaſon one;
thisasis,inbecauſe
Blades,theDfltleſ,
Word Glades,
had (e)
ſilent to'ſoften and lengthen- the Sound before, and the (3) is only
added to' ſhew that it ſignifies more than one. Thus in date-3,
him, takes, likes, ſtrilm, Bcc. which you will find anon. to be
call'd, by way of Excellence, Words that affirm ſomething of
ſome Name, or Perſon. And tho' the Affirmation and Name
are often written with the (Lime Letters, as Trades ſignifying
many Trades, and mule-r, he trades; yet, beſides the Senſe, the
Writing the Name iNith a Capital'or great Letter, and the Word
of Affirination with a ſmall, (for ſo they ought to be written)
may ſufficiently diſtinguiſh them. -
Nor muſt (e) final be omitted, tho' the Syllable, that goes be
fore conſiſt of a double Vomel, as, Houſe, cleanſe, Diffiiſh, Increaſe.
&C. and in Horſe, Nmſt, ijſc. '
But (e) between two (s's) at the End,
Da': to the Ear a certain Sound commend,
O'r elſe hetween c, g, ch, z, and s,
It flill another Syllnhle muſt expreſs.
Bnt hctere it is to be noted, that Words that have the Sound of
(:), or (.c) min led>in their Sound, (e:) then makes another and
a diſtinct Sylla le; as after (e) in Traces, Pluces, Slicex, &e. af
ter (ch) in Breachex, Kenelm, Leather, Riches, &e. after-(g) in
Stages, Siege', ahliges, &e. after (5') in Ho'jſes, MI/fls, Cloſm,
Nofls, Rag/es, &e. after (z)' in nues, amazes, ſurpizer, &c.
[13] The (u) long isgronounc'd like the French (u), finall or
fie Engliſh Grammar, 'with Notes. 19.
buried, Study, &e. where the (u) is ſhorten?d and falls 'into the
Sound of (o) ſhort or obſcurc.
No Engliſh Word in (u) tun fhirl) enoC
It: Sound exprefi'd by (ew) or (ue) me
Except. you, thou and lieu, and this' one Word adieu,
Few Word: begin with, or fth' Middle have (eu).
Inſtead of (u) in the End, we put (ew), or (ue), as Nephew,
New, sinew, rew, &e. and uecrue, Ague, Avenue, &e. Nor
is the Sound of (u) in the Beginning and' Middle of Words, in
many Words, except ſuch as are deriv'd fiom the Greek; as
Eutburiſt, Eunueh, Enphrutes, Eulogj', Eutj/clyut, Euphonj, Deute,
Deuteronomjl, Europa, Euroclydon, Euſkbius, Euſtuee, Euterpe,
Eutyehex, Feud, Grundeur,1>leuriffl, Pleuritick, R/zeumutiole, Rheu
rnutz'ſm, Rheum. *
Were e'er the (u)'i: long beſidex, 'tis foundct
Tbctut- it; own character denote: it: Sound.
Ar, ir, "or, 'with ure, and er,
T' expreſi the Sound of we oft prefer,
Vſlaen ut the End of V/ords, thut do eanſi t. ſi
, of man] syllables, the] ure pluck,
The Sound of (u) in-all other Plaees, but what are mentiondd
where it is long,. is expreſs'd by the Vowel it ſelf; but when'it
is obſcure and ſhort in the End of Words of many Syllables (and
ſome of one) it is ſometimes expreſs'd by (or), by the Corrupt-
ncfs of our Pronunciation 5 as in Altur, Angulur, Culendur, for
cular, Medlrzr, Pedlur, Pillur, Solur, &c., or by (ir), as Birth,
Dirt, shirt, Sir, Sirnume, to ſpirt, or ſquirt' Water, ſtir, Tloird,
Thirty, the Words deriv'd from it, &a. or by (or), as in Anoeſtorx,
Actorx, Adminiflrutor, Ambuffudor, Ancbor, Affeffor, Correct'or,
Counſellor, Oppreſflvr, &e. or by (ure), as in Adventure, Archi
tecture, Conjecture, conjure, Creuture, Feuture, Figure, Fracture,
Fumiture, Geſture, Impqfiure, Intloſure, Indenture, injure, join
ture, Juncture, Lecture, Lelſure, Munufucture, Mixture, Nature,
Nurture, Overture, 'Faſt-me, peradventure, Picture, Pleufiore; Po
ſture, Preffiore, Rupture, Rupture, Scripture, SculPture, Stuture,
Structure, Superſtrufz'ure, Tcnure, Tincture, Torture, Treuſure,
venture, Veſtm'e, Verdure.
Theſe we have inſerted becauſe the (u) is ſhort and obſcure
tho' it have (e) final at the End, and ſerves therefore for an Ex
ceptiou to that Rule, as well as an Exampleof this;
Or by (er), as-Adder, Adulterer, Anger, a Tool, Balliflſſers, Bun
m, Fedden, Crezfler, Crupzzerz Daughter, slaughter, &c. [14]
CH A F.
zo The Engliſh'Grammar, with Notes;
liſh ſource any where allow, or'l'
[14]We ſhall here, at the End of
theVowe/r, ſay a fewWords of their know, 'except when the ſhort. (e)f
Formation, which well ſtudy'd, will. immediately precedes theLetter(r),
(as we have obſerv'd) be a great As liberal, Virlue, Liberty, &t.
Help to theArtofSpelling.To pro The ſame Place is the Seat of the
ceed therefore according to the Di Formation of (o) and (u) obſcure,
viſion made in our Notes on Num but ſtill with a leſs opening of the
ber [6] The Gutrumlr, or Throat Mouth , and it differs from the
Lenerr,or Vawelr,are form'd in the French (e) Feminine only in this,.
top or upper Part ofthe Throat, or that the Mouth being leſs open'd,
the lower Part oſ the Palate or the Lips come nearer together.This
Tongue, by a moderate Compreffion ſame Sound the French have in the,
of theBreath. When theBreath goes laſtSyllables oftheWords fer-vireur,
out with afull Gnſt,or larger open ſacrificateur,&c.TheEng/zſh expreſs
ing of the Mouth, the German (a), this Sound by ſhort (u), as in turn,
or the open (e) is form'd. But the burn, dull, cur, &e. and ſometimes =
Frenchand other Nations,as well as by a Negligence of Pronunciationr.
the Germam, moſt commonly pro they expreſs the ſame Sound by (e)
nounce their (a) in that manner: and (au),asin came, ſome, done, com
The Eng lifl: expreſs that Sound, pany, countrypauþlfflcow', lowe, &e.
when itis ſhort, by ſhort (e); but and ſome others,which they ought
when it is longhy (..u)or(aw); but' more juſtly to give anotherSound to. -
'ſeldom by (e). Forin theWords fall, The Weljb generally expreſs this
Folly, Call,CoI/ar,Law.r,Lafr,Caufe, Sound hy(y),only thatLetter at the
Coſr,and0dd,ſawd,jbd, and in many End of Words with them ſounds (f).
other Words like theſe, there is the The Palatine Vowels are form'd
ſame Sound of the Va-welr in both in thePaIate, that is, by a moderate
Syllables,only in the firſt it is long, Compreſſion of the Breath, betwixt
and in the laſt ſhort. And this per. the Middle of the Palate and the
haps might bring our former Divi Tongue: that is,when the Hollow
fi m ofSonnds into doubt, ſince that of the Palate, is made leſs' by the
ſuppoſes the Difference to ariſe raiſing ol'rhe Middle oftheTongue,
from their Length or Breviry ; 'than in the Pronnnciation of the'
whereas here we make the Sounds Throat, or Gnnural Saundl. Theſe
the ſame- But this muſt be horeun Sonnds are of three Sorts;aceording.
derſtood of the Formation of the to the leſiening or cular-ging of the; _
Sounds, that is, the ſhort and the ſaidHollow, whichDifference may
long Sonnds are producd in the he produc'd two ſeveral Ways, ei
ſame Seats or l-'Iaces of Formation; ther by contracting the Mouth or
but in the formerRule, theI-Iearing Lips, the Tongue remainingin the -*
only as the judge of the Sounds, ſame Poſition ; or by elevating the
as they are emitted, not as to the hiiddle of the Tongue higher to
Place or'thcir Formation the Fore-parts oſ the Palate, the
ln the ſame Place, but with a Lips or Mouth remaining in the
more moderate Opening of the ſame State. This is done either
Mouth, is form'd the French (e)FC way, and it is the ſame Thing if it
minine,with an obſcure Sound: Nor were done both ways. ar;4.
is there any Difference in the For The Engliſh ſlender (A) is form'di
mation ofthis Letter', from theFor by a greaterOpening ofthe Mouth -,
mation of the 'foregoing open (e), as in But, bare, Sam,.ſame, dam,
but that theMouth orLips are more Dame, Bw", bare, ban, bane, Cro;
contracted in this, than in the ſor This Sound differr from the'fat or,
mer. This is a Sound, that the Eng open (ay Of theflermapgbyſſaxſhg;
The Engliſhv-Gnammar, with Notes; ar,
the Middle of the Tongue, as the (a) ſlender, very ſwiftly pronounc'd .
Engliſh do, and ſo compreſſmg the The Weljb expreſs this Sound
Breath in thePalate; but the Ger not only by (i),- and in the laſt
n'am, on the contrary, depreſs their Syllable by (y), but alſo by (rd),
Tongue, and ſo depreſs the Breath _which Letter they alway-s pro
into theThroat. The French enpreis nounce in that manner, and ſound
this Sound when- (e) goes before the Diphthongs or double Vowels
(no or (n) in the ſame Syllable, as an, en, like err-and ei.
Enrendement, &e. The Wellh and The thial, or Lip Vowels, are
the Italian: pronounce their (a) form'd in theLips, being putinto a
with this Sound. round Form, the Breath being there
In this ſameSeat the French form moderately comprel's'd. There are
their ſe) Maſculine, by a leſs, or the three Sorts or Claſſes of theſe, as
middle Openingoſ the Mouth,with well as of the former.
an acuteSound,as thelraliomfing. The round (o) is form'd by the
liſk, Spaniardx, and others, pro larger Aperture or Opening of the
nounce this Letter; for it isa mid Lips, whichSound moſt People give
dle Sound betwixt the 'foregoing the Greekw; the French with the'
Vowel, and that which follows: ſame pronounce their (au)-, and thev
But the Engliſh expreſs this Sound Engliſh almoſt always pronounce
not only by(e), but when it is long, their long (aj and alſo (ao), the (a)
byiea), and ſometimes by (ei); as as it were quite vaniſhing in the
Utterance; oſwhich the ſamemay
the, theſe, ell, Seal, tell, Tenl,ſteal,
ſet, Sent, efi, Beaſt, red, read, re be ſaid as was before on (ea), as
ceive, deceive, &e. But thoſeWords one, none, whole, Hole, Coal, Boar,
which are written with (en) Would thoſe, choſe, &e. The ſhort (o) is
really be more rightly pronounc'd, expreſs'd by the open one, as I have
if to the Sound of (ej long, the ſaid before, but mone rarely by the
Sound of the En'lzfl: (oxjuſtly pro rough one. -
nounc'd, were added 5 as in all Pro The German ſat (a) is form'd in
baHlity they were of old pro the Lips, by a more moderate or
nounc'd, andas they are ſtill in the middle Degree of opening 'em. The
Northern Parts. And thus thoſe ſame Sound is us'd by the [In/innſ,
written with (ci) wou'd be more Spaniardr, and not a few others.
juſtly ſpoken, if the Sound of each TheFrencb expreſs this Sound by
Letter were mix'd in the Pronun ou,theWelſb by w; theEng/iſhgene
ciatinn. - but yet with a rally by oo, more rarely by u or on,
In the ſamectPlace,
as boon/boot, full, Fool, Pool,good,
leſſer opening of theMouth,( 1)llen ſtood, IVood, -Mon;{, Source, could,
der is form'd, which is a Sound very wouldſtoould, &e. But do', move and
familiar with the French, Irolirmr, the like, are better enpreſ'si'd by
Spaniardſ, and moſt other Nations, round (o) than ſat (u).' 4
This Sound, when it is ſhort, is ex silent he), ſo much in uſe with
refls'd by the Engliſh by (i) ſhort, both French and Engliſh, iS'form'd
ut when it is long, it is generally in the ſame Place, butwitha leſſe:
written with (or ), not ſeldom with opening oſ the Lips. This Sound is
(ie), and ſometimes by am), asfir, every where expreſs'd by the Eng
fee't,fi' eel,_fill.feeI,fle[d,flill,fleel, liſh with their long (u), ſometimes
ill,eel, rn,feen, near, dear, hear,&c. by (toand (e-w), which yet are bet.
Some of thoſe Words which with ter pronounc'd by retaining the
this Sound are written with (ea), Sound of the ( e) Maſculine,asMnſe,
are often and more juſtly expreſs'd Tune, Lute dure, muſe, mmſhrew,
by hee), and others ſpelt with (e), knew, &c. iForeigners wou'dobtain
Maſtulhte, adding to it theSound of the Pronunciation of this Lette? if
t ey
az The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
they wou'd endeavour to pronounce there were fourNames,then twelve, i
the Diphthongfiu), by putting the and atlaſt thirty-two; thus where
ſlender (i) before the Letter (u) or as the Arabtam, and perhaps the
(w)-, as the Spaniard in Ciudade, a ancient Hebre-zw, had only three
City z' but this is not ahſolutely the Vowels, or one in each Seat, now
fame Sound, tho' it comesyery near in our' Times we plainly diſcover
it; for,(iu) is a compound Sound, at leaſt three in every Seat; per
hit: the French. and Engliſh (u) is a haps our Poſterity may interpoſe
ſimple. The Waſ/I: generally expreſs ſome betwixt each of theſe.
this Sound by i-w,yw,uw, as in ſlit', But: all' theſe Vowels are capable
Colour z Ilyw, a Rudder z-Duw,God. ofbein g made long or ſhort,whence
We allow theſe Nine Sonnds to ariſes theDifference of Alantity in
beVowels, that is, diſtinct, un long and ſhort Syllables, tho' ſome
mixt Sounds, nor do we know any of'em are very rarely long, as ob
more; for the En, lijb broad (i) does ſcure (u) and (e) Feminine: Others
not ſeem to bea imple Sound, yet are more rarely ſhort, as round (u)
We do not dcny,but that there may and ſlender (u), at leaſt in onr
now be in ſome Ptut of the World, Tongue.Butſomeoi'theConſonants
or Poſterity may diſcover more Vo are capable ofContradiction, and
cal Sounds in theſe- Seat: of Voice, being lengthened, (eſpecially ſuch
dan thoſe Nine which we have at make the neareſt Approaches to
mention'd, and ſo"tis poſſible there the Nature ofVowels) except p,t,k,
may be ſome intermediate Sounds, or hard c,which are abſoluthutes,
ſuch as perhaps is the French (e) nor have any manner of proper
Neuter,betwixtthePalatineVowel Sound, but only modify the Sound
(u) ſlender and (e) Maſculine; for either of the precedingvor ſucceed.
the Aperture or Opening of the 'ing Vowel:
Mouth is like the continu'd Alan Here we think it proper to bring
tity, divifible in infiniſum: For as all theſe Vowel: into one View,
inthe numbering the Winda, firſt rang'd in their proper Claffis.
[15] Theſe
ſhe Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. '23
r-C H A' P. III.
Of DOUBLE Vownns, proper and improper. 15]
When of two Vowels the compounded Sound
Full in one Sj'lluble i: flund
Of oth par-taking, yet diſhinct from all,
Thi: we a Double Vowel ſtill do all.
[15] Theſe double Vowels are (or blending) the Sound of Two
commonly call'd '.Diphthongt, or Vowels in One.
compounded Soundx, as ſhaking in
[163 (u)' -
24. The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
Of the proper Double .Vowel (ai), or (ay).
six proper Double Vowels we allow,
* Ai, au, and ee, and oi, and 00, and ou,
At th' end qf Wbrdx (write ay, oy, and ow. v 7'_
ſ
The proper Double Vowel: are therefore only theſe mention'd
in the Rule. Firſt (ai), or (afiz for (ai) ends no Engliſh Word,
according to the former general Rule, that ('i) ends_no Word in
our Tongue, and (ay) begins none, except a Word of one Syl
lable; as ay in A] me! an Exclamation. This Double Vowel is
therefore written (ai) in the Beginning and Middle of Words;
but (ay) at the End.
In the Beginning, asAir, Aim, Ail,Az'd, butEigbtin Number,
'and thoſe Words that are deriv'd from it, have the Sound of (ai),
but are ſpelt (ei): In the Middle of Words, as Brain, frail, Af
fair, repair, but ſome few are ſpelt here likewiſe by (ei) for
(ai), as Conceipt, Reeeipr, Deceipt, Hei", Reign, Vein, I/l-Þiglur,
&e. (a]) is put at the End, as Dray, Clay, Pray, Play, Day, and of
all other Words that ſound (ai), except tom-gy, Grey, (Colour
and Badger) Grey/hound,- 0bq', prey, Parruey, ſterve), they, fro),
or treypoint, Whej.
Tho' ſometimes the Letters of this Double Vawel (ai) deviate
from their proper Sound, into that of (i), or (e) ſhort, yet is the
Spellingpreſerv'di11(ai), as again, Villaz'a, Faamain, V/ainſrot,
See
The finical Pronunciation in ſome Part of this Town of
'London has almoſt confounded the Sound of (ai) and (a), the
Maſter and Scholar muſt therefore take a peculiar Care to avoid
'this Error, by remembring that (a) ends no Englzſh Word, un- -
leſs before excepted - and however you pronounce, write always
Day, not daz and ſo/pf the reſt.
When (a) and (i) come together in proper Names, eſpecially
thoſe of Scripture, as Ya-ir, Mo-ſa-ie, Re-pba-im, &e. they are
parted, and make two Syllables.
ſr7] oo is ſounded like the ſat n, French; as inthe Words good, flood,
uſ the"German, ſi and the on of th Root, Foot, looſe, Gm [x8] All
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 27
Billow; where the (w) ſeems only ut for Ornament-like,
meerly to cover .the Nakedneſs of mgle (o). This holds in
moſt Words of more than one Syllable. (0u) is alſo ſounded
like (u) ſhort in couple, Trouble, ſcourge, &e. in which the
Sound of the (e) is entirely ſunk, and leaves it no longer a pro
per double Vowel. Thus in you, your, and ſouth, the (u) is
ſounded long. .
ButInincould, would, Wa
the modern ſhould, and a few
of ſpelling and others,
ſounding,it the
ſounds
(l) is (oo).
leftſi'
out, and cou'd, wou'd, ou'd, ſoundscood, wood, ſhood, &ce. 'ſſ
C H A P. IV.
Of the CONSONANTS. [20]
A Conſonant m proper Sound obtuim,
But fi-om it: founding with, its Name it gaine,
And jet it 'varies e-ve'y Vowel': Sound,
W'bether before, or after it, 'rix found.
H O' a Conſonant be a Letter that cannot be ſounded,
pro in probable.
(C) the hard Sound of (k) will e-uer keep -=-.52.egſi, .:.rH
ſhall call deriv'd, or open Conib- tho' it muſt be confeſs'd, that: there s.e.-3.
nants. As to the particular For- is ſo much the leſs need of a new
mation of them; ſee the Notes, at Character,as the Rule is ſo gefferal
the End of the Chapter. as to admit ofno Exccption. Some
[21] The Frem h expreſs the ſoft affect. to imitate the FrencbWay of
(e) by thisFigure(e)forDiſtindion, Spellmg here, and write Publique
which Character won'd be of uſe ſorPub/ick,n0tconſideringthat they
iſ it were intreduc'd among, usz uſe (qu) becauſe they have no (ie),
[21] The
The Engliſh Grammar, withNotes. 33
Cat, Coll, Cap, clear, creep. But before (e.), (i), and Or), and
when there is an Apoſtrophe or Comma above the Word, de
noting the Abſence of ('e), it is generally the Sound of (:), as
Cell, City, Cypreſſr. If in any Word the harder Sound precedes
(e), (i), or U), (kl is either added or put in its Place, as Skill,
skin, Publie/z: And tho' the additional (U in the 'foregoing
Word be an old Way of Spclling, yet it is now very juſtly lett
off, as being a ſuperfluous Letter; for (c) at the End is always
hard, without U) or the ſilent (e) to ſoften it, asin Chaee, Cle
menej, &e.
Moſt Words ending in the Sound of an, ere, ice, oire, at',
muſt be written with (ce/l, not (ſe ), except abaſe, ahflraſe,
haſe, caſe, ceaſe, amuſe, conciſe, debaſe, decreaſe, Geeſe, im
haje, enrreaſe, 'nor-riſe, Paradiſe, profaſe, promiſe, recluſe, Trea
tz'ſh, abuſe, dlſaſe, excuſe, Houſe, Louſe, Mouſe, refreſh, aſe, cloſe,
00 e.
Moſt Words ending in anee, enee, inee, once, and ame, muſt
be written with (til between the (nj and ('e), except durſt, con
denſe, dl/þenfe, immenſe, incenſe, tenſe, intenſe, prayen e, ſajþenſt,
ſtll (C)
e.
before (h_), has a peculiar Sound, as in chance, Cherry,
Church, chalk, Chip ,- but in Chart 'tis like (k), and in Chonl
in Muſick.
The genuine Sound of (S) i; ſtill acute
And hiffing; but the Cloſe that doe: notſhete,
There 'th ohſrure, andſoft Pronoane'd like zed,
Andſbmetime: 'mixt Two Vowels when 'tirſpuL
(S) being ſo near akin to the ſoft Sound of (c), we thought
lt naturally follow'd that Letter in our Conſideration, tho' not
in the Alphabet. When (.r) therefore keeps its enuine Sound,
it is pronounc'd with an acute or hiſſmg Soun , but when it
cloſes a Word, it almoſt always has a more obſcure and ſoft
Sound like (2._), and not ſeldom when it cornes between Two
Vowels, or double Vowels, when it has this ſoft Sound, Propriety
and Diſtinction require, that it be writ with the ſhorter Cha
racter of that Letter, as hie, adviſe, &ac. and with the larger
in all other Places, as hiſ', als-viſe, if written with an (U and
not with a (e), as it too often is. There are but Four
Words of one Syllablc, which end with hard (:), for, this, thar,
m.
That (S) with (C) you may not ſtill confound,
To learn, and mind thefollowing Raleryoa're hound.
r
37
34. The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes;
By Vowel: follow'd," (ſi), (ti), and (ci), alike
Mth theſame Sound do ſtill the Hearing ſtrike.
In Word: deriv'd the] keep a certain Law,
ImPor'd by thoſe from whence their Sotmd they dram.
thcyein (de), (ſ), or (ſc) do end, '
To their-Deri-vati-ue; the] (ſi) commend ,
Ifwith (ck) or (ce) their cloſe the] make,
Then the deriv'd (ci) will ſurely take,
But with (t) or (te) the] do conclude,
Then with (ti) Deri-vative'rendu'd.
[22.] si, ti, and a? ſound alike, as in Perſtealon,:Muſitian,
Section, Imitation, &e. Theſe Words are all deriv'd from others,
and therefore when the Original Words end in (de), (5)ſſ, or
-(/[e), then (ſi)Confuſhn,
zon, confuſe, is ue'dz See.
as perſuade,
If withPerſuaflon, confeſr,orConfeſ
ſſ(ce), or (tle), hard
(c), then (ti) is_ us'd; as Grate, Graciour, Muſtck, Muſieian,
&C. But if with (t), or (te), then (ti) is us'd, as Sect, Section,
imitate, Imitatian, &c. except ſubmit, Suhmiffion, permit, Per'
mt ran. '
Tho' this Letter ſeems very regular in its Sound of (ſe)in the
Beginning, and (es) at the End of Words, yet it is too apt tobc
miſtaken for (c), eſpecially in the Beginning :* Yet by the follow
ing Rules and EXCCPtionS, the Miſtake may be obſerv'd2 to be?
remov'd. -
Moſt Words beginnin with the Sound of (s) before (e) and
(i) muſt be written Witfi (:), except theſe with (e) before (e).
Ceaſe, Cedar, Celandine, Celery, celebrate, Celehration, Celc
rit), Celeſlial, Celz'hacy, Celihate, Cell, Cellar, Cellarage, cement,
(leg/"e, Cenſor, cenſhrious, Cenſure, cent, Centaurs, Center, Centþ
no j, Knot-graſs, an Herb; Centorzy, or Centaur), an Herb;
Centrj, Centurt'on, Century, tepha ic, Cere-tloth, eerernomal,
ceremoniom, Ceremonj, certain, certainlyxCertzzſitate, eertgſy, ce
rulean, Ceruſt, Cefi, Ceffatz'on, Ceffion, Cetraeh, Finger-fern; and"
theſe roper Names, Cemzps, Celſar, Centhrea, Cephar, Cerberus,
Cerint m, Ceres, Caſhr.
And
[22] The Reaſon to thoſe who from a Latin thſtantive ofthe fiffl;
know Latin, is much eaſier; for if Delenfion ending in (ca) or (Ue),
they are deriv'd from a Latin Su or of the ſecond Declenſion ending
pine ending in (tum), then (ri) is in (irum)or(cium),then (ci) is us'd,
us'd, as Narum, Nation zbut if the as Logiea Lagieian, Gratia Graci
Supine end in (_ſum), then (fi) is our, Vitium Viciouſ, Benefieium
us'd; as Viſum, Vſſan; Confeflium, Beneflciem, &a.
Confeflion. _ If the Word be derlv'clv
[23] This
= The Engliſh Gram'mar,v with Notes. 35
_ And theſe of (e)-before-(i).
Cicatrice, Cicely, ſweet and wild Herbs; Cieling, Cicbſio'y,
Cileire, Drapery of Foliage Wrought on the Heads of Pillars;
Cina'erc, Cinnabar, Cinquefoil, Cinnamon, cinque-parts, Ciperuxh
a ſweet Root; Cion, or Scion, Cipher, Circle, Circlet, 'circu
lar, Circaic, circulate, Circulation, circamcifl," and all Com
pounds of cirmm ,-_Cz'/Zern, Citarion, Cicizen, citrine,
or cicrean, Citron, Cit'ral, a ſort of Cucu'mberz Citadel, Cicffl,
cines, a ſort of ſmall Lceks; Ci-vet, Ci-vilian, Ci-vilit , ci-vilize 5
and theſe proper Names, Cicero, Cicllia, Cilicia, Cim rians, Cim
mejians, Circe, Cirencefler, Cisbarj, Clffic, Ciſh-rtian, Monks,
Cichcrides. ' _
And theſe likewiſe are excepted of (c) before O),
qbele, C cladec, C cle, Cjclometry, Cjcloþs, ngnetx, Cylin
irt'cal, ij al, cynica , Cjnnic, Cjntbia, Cyprian, Cypreſs, ercne,
Cril.
The Sound of (ſ) in the, Middle of Words is uſually writ
ten with (ſ) except Acerbitj, Acetoſizy, adjacent, Anceſſors,
antecedent, Artificer, cancel, Cancer, Bene/icence, Chancel, Clean
cellor, Chancellorſhip, * Chaneery, conceal, concede, conceit, Can
ceicednefl, conceive, conſinr, Agreement or Harmony in Mu
ſick; concenter, concentric, concern, Chalcedonj, Concernmenr,
conccrt, Cancertation, an affected Word, Conceffion; Deceaſt,
decede, an affected Word,- Deceit, docei-ue, December, Decenc ,
decennial, decent, Deception, decepti-ve, Decertation, an affected
Word for ſtriving; Decefflon, as bad a Word for departing;
exceed, excel, Excellency, except, Exception, Exceſi, Grocer,
Grocery, immarceffible, a pedantiquc Word for incorruptible;
imperceptible, Incendia'y, Incenſe, incarccrate, incentive, inceſſ'
ſtint, inceſſantly, inceſtuam, Innocence, innocent, interceie, In
torccffdr, Interceffion, intercept, mer'cena'y, macerace, Mercer,
Merce'y, Magniſicence, magnl'ſicent, Munzſicence, mantficent, ne
ceſſary, Necefficries, neceffitate, Neceffitj, neceffimm, Necroman
cer, Larceny, Ocean, Parccl, Parcelx, precede, precedential, Pre
cedence, Precedent, precepti-ue, Preceþts, Predeccffm, ſincere,
sincerity, Saucer, Sorcerer, Sarcere/L, Sorceiy, Macedon, Macc
donia. Before ſi) in the Middle, as Acid, Acidity, Accident,
ancient, Angliaſm, Galliciſm, &c. in czſm; anticipate, artifi
cial, affliciate, andaciom, Aadacity, beneſicial, calcine, calci
nate, Coancil, capacious, capacitate, Capacity, conciſe, cruciare,
trucic'7le, cracifl, Crucifix, decicle, decimal, decimate, Decima
tion, deciplzer, Deciſion, clcciſive, Deficiency, delicious, docible
Docibilitj, efficaciom, efflcient, ſpecial] , Exceptian, Exerg/Y),
x
36 The Engliſh Grammar, 'with Notes.
Egrciſi, Exciſe-ma'n, Exciſion, excite, excruciate, explicite, fect'
H' for feajihle, gracious, implicitly, implicit, incapacitate, In
capacity, inauſþicious, incident, incidentallj, incirsle, Inciſion,
Inciſure, incite, invincible, judicial, judicious, Loquaciy, medi
-cinal, Multiplicity, municipal, Nuncie, officiate,_offlcious, pacifj,
paci c, Parcimonj, Particide, Participate, Peneil, pe'ffiicacious,
Petjþicacitj, per-vicacious, pertinacious, Precinct, precious, Pre u;.
'41
cipice, precipitate, Precipitation, preciſe, preciſely, prejudicial,
proficient, Pronunciation, provincial, rapacious, Ratiocination,
r'eciprocal, recital, recite, reconcile, reconcileahle, Rouncivals,
ſagacious, Sagacity, Sicily, Simplicity,-ſbciahle, Sociahlemſr, So
ciet , Socinians, Soleciſm, ſolicite, Solicilation, Solicitor, ſhlicitctus,
Sol titude, ſhlſlicial, jþacious, ſþecial, speciali , fpecifical, spe
cies, ſþecific, Specimen, jþecious, Sufficiencz, ſuflZient, ſuperciliaus,
ſupe'ficial, Superficies, ſuſpicious, tacit, Taciturniy, Turci/m, Ve
racit
hoſt , Vi-uacit
Wordys . ending with the Sound of (fl) or (fl), muſt
be written with (e)) except quflaſj, buſj', Controverſy, Cour
teſy, Daiſy, Ecſtaj), eaſy', Epilepjjl, Pan/je ſpelt likewiſe, tho'
wrong, Fanc , Frenjj, or Frenzj, Gipffl, greaſy', Herejj', [inw ,ar'_.
r . cr) be,
ſhe Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 37
(T) before (i), t' another Vowel join'd,
To ſhund like th' Acute, and hiffing (S) we find:
Bat when an (x) or (S) do's (i) precede,
For it: own Sound it ſtrenaoaſh' do's plead.
(T),- when (t) comes before (i), follow'd by another Vowal,'
it ſounds like the Acute, or Hiffing (:), as in Nation, Potion,
expatiate, &e. but when it follows (ſ) or (x), it keeps its own
Sound, as in Beſtial, eQueſtion, Faflian, &e.
(T) with an (h/l after it, has Two Sounds, as in thin, the
Tongue touching lightly the Extreams of the upper Teeth; and
the Teeth,
then, wheremaking
the TonElme Mixturethe
e reaches of (d).
Palate, and the Root ofſ
as (K)
keep,begins
kill, all Words
know, of a&e.
knack, hard
norSound
is it before (e), before
ever put (z') and any
(u), uſſ_
Conſonant but (u), and then with ſo much Conſtraint, that it r'
Almoſt loſes its Sound for that of (h). a
Before all other Conſonantr (e)'s plac't, .
Altho' the harder Sound is there expreſt. a
'l
And if the Sound of (le) comes before any other Conſonant, it
is expreſs'd by (e), as in character, clear, cringe.
The Sound of (k) at the beginning of any Word or Syllable
before (u), (e) or (u), is always expreſs'd by (e), as Cat, con,
Cup,- or when a ſilent (e) fo lows (k), as ſpake, ſpoke,- or (u)
in the middle, as ſþea/e, bleale, &e. and then (le) is written ſing
ly without (e) final. lIſ
To (y) a double Nature does belong,
A: Conſonant and Vowel in our Tongue;
' The firſt begins all Words, yet none can end,
4
The Jaſt, it for the Gloſe does ſtill contend. l
,_,-_.
,v ,.
[13] (17j
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 39
[23] (r) is both a Vowel and Conſonant; as a Vowel, it
has appear'd to an ingenious Author to be ſiiperfluous, yet it_
is of great Uſe in our Language, which abhors the ending ot
Words in (i); and when the Sound of (i) comes double, tho'
in Two diſtinct Syllables, as in dying, frying, &e. When it fol
10ws a Conſouant it is a Vowel, and when it precedes a Vowel
it is a Conſonant, and ought to be call'd (je ), and not (wfiz
and tho' it ends ſo many Wo:ds as a Vowel, it can end none as
a Conſonant.
At the End of all Words oſ one Syllable U) has a ſharp and
clear Sound, as 5), dy, dry, ſly, why, ſhy, thy, &e. But at the'
End of Words oſ more Syllables it generally ſounds obſcure,
like (e), as eternally, glorioufly, gadlj, &e. except at the End of
Why-ds of Affirmation, as apply, deny, edify, &e. ) only pre
cedes Vowels, and ehiefiy (a), (e), (e); and thele it alſo Fol
lows and incorporates with them into double Vowels, for (u)),
(e)), (or), have the ſame Sound with (ai), (ei), (oi); but the
former are more us'd at the Endof Words. In the Middle of
Words it is not ſo frequently us'd for a Vowel, except in Words
of the Greek Origin.
And the ſinne Right the double (u) demands;
Begim a: Conſonant, a: Vowel ends.
[24] 07), This Letter in its moſt general Ufi: is a conſo"
nant, going before all the VOWels, except (u); it likewiſe pre
cedes (r), and follows (.r) and (tb), as Want, went, Winter,
Math, write, thwarc. It foHOWs as a Vowel (a),* (e), (e), and
unites with them into the double Vowel: (aw), (ew), (ow?, as
Well as (u) z as fine, firm, ſaw, few.- But in (00. it generaly is
obſcure, e pecially in Words of many Syllables, as in shadow,
Widow, &e.
It likewiſe, as has been obſerv'd under'M), goes before (h),'
tho' it be ſounded after it, as in when, what, &e.
(Va) to the (f) in Nature it allſd,
And to it: final, hat (e) alway-ty'd.- 1'
[U] (Wh
[29] This Conſonam: is ſounded do, Iinguaduadeo, and others after
like the German U) Conſonant,that , g,f. e generally make this
is with a Sound 'moſt nearly ap- Letter a Conſonant, yet its_ Sound
preaching an extream rapid Pro- is not very different (tho' it does
nnnciation of the Vowel (0. The ſomething differ) from the German
Arabian: expreſs (y) by their ye, or Vowel, the fat or groſr (u) very ra
our (w) by their waw. pidly pronounc'd.
in] The (w) is ſounded in Eng
liſh as (u) in the Latin Wordsqzian- v E- e. [as] The
40 I'he Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
[aſ] (Va), or (V) Conſonant, as 'tis call'd, is near akin to
(f) .- It never ends a Word without ſilent (e) after it, nor is it
ever doubled, however ſtrong the Accent may be upon it; in
Engliſh it only goes before VoWels, it likewiſe follows U) and
- (r), as Cal-ues, Car-ue, &e.
When
To
l
.'fle' Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 43
Part of the Tongue to the hinder ink, Iynx,&c- ſo in band, band, ran;
Part of the Palate, (k) or hard (e) is from what it is in hang, bank, rank,
form'd, and the Greek (u), &c. The &e. Nay, the Sound of this Letter
Welfl: always give their ( c) this hard is vary'd in the very ſame Words:
Sound. Theſe three Conl'onants we For (u) ſounds 0therwiſe_in [on-ger,
call abſolute Mutes; for they give ſtranger, anger, drinke' 5 in-grua,
no manner oſ Sound in themſelves, can-grim; but otherwiſe in longer,
nor indeed can give any,becauſe the ſtrong er, ang-er, drink-er; ing-rue,
Breath no way gets into the free mngrua. So we hear ſome ſaying
Air, for it neither gets out by the in- num, tanquam, nun-quam, &c.
Noſtrils, nor by the Mouth. While others pronounce them as if
If the Breath, equally divided be they were written ing-warn, rang
tween 'be Noſtril: and 'beMaurb,be wam, nunq-wam; or ink-wam,
interce ted by the cloſing of the rank-warn, nunk-wam. When (u)
Lips,t eConſonant (B) is form'd, is pronounc'd in the former, the
the Greek ( 8), the Arabian Dal, &e. Extremity of the Tongue always
But iſ the Breath be intercepted in ſtrikes the Fore-part of the Palate
the Throat by the hinder Parts of near the Rootsoſthe up r Teeth ;
the Palate andTongue(G)is form'd, but in the latter, the ame Extre
the Greek fit), &a. The Wel/b al mity oſ the Tongue rather depends
ways give this hard Sound to their to the Roots of the lower Teeth ;
(G). And theſe we call balfMuler but the Hinder-part ofthe Tongue
for they make a little Sort oſ Sound is rais'd to the Hinder-part oſ the
in the Noſe, which can be heard by Palate, and there intercepts the
it ſelf Without the Aſſutance oſ the Sound; to wit, it is form'd in the
Sound of any other Letter, Mouth in the ſame manner, as (g);
If the whole, or, ifyou leaſe,the but it has the ſame Direction of the
greaterPart oftheB reath divided Breath with (u). And this, if we
tothe Noſtrils, only in its PaflZige are not deceiv'd, isthat very Sound
ſtriking the Air that remains in which many wou'd give to the
theConcave or HollnwoſtheMouth, Hebrew y, when they teach us to
the Lips being juſt clos'd, (M) is pronounce it by ng, ngb, gn, ng/m,
form'd, the Greek (u), the Arabian &je. for they infinuate ſomeSound,
Mim, &e. But iſ the Cloſure or In which does not perfectly agree with
terception be made in the Fore-part either (u) or (g), but hasſomething
of the Palate, (N) is form'd, the common to both. And we know
Greek U), and the Hebrew and Ara not but the Spaniardr mean the
bian Nun. But if in the Throat, ſame Sound by their (h')mark'd thus
that is in the Back-part of the Pa over-head.
late, that Sound isform'd which the We call theſe Three Conſonants
Greek expreſs by (y) before ſhe), balfVawe/r -, for they have a greater
( ), ſhe), (£).: And the Latznr of proper Sound than thoſe which we
aid by (g), as Age/liſtſ, agcepr, ag ately call'd Half-Mater.
gulur, &c. tor Antblſer, ancepr. an Theſe nine Conſonants, which we
gulur, as Triflian and Varro aſſiire have diſcours'doſ, are form'd by a
us. Which all now write with (u) total Intetception oſthe Breath, ſo
before the ſame Conſonants, eſpe that it has no manner of Paſſage
cially in the ſame Syllable -, ſuppoſe through theMouth, which therefore
a), (a ),(x), and (e),(g),(c z1), gre we nam'd clar'd : But the ſame For
normc'd with a hard, that ls t eir mation remaihing, zſ 'be Breath
genuine Sound. For the Sound of hardly prefl'd, ye' (tba' with Dzffi.
(u) is different in the Wmds rbm, culty) find an Out/et, thoſe Conſo.
ſin, in; fiona tlnt mfing,fingleffink, inants are form'd, which we call
open'd',
44 YZze Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
open'd,which are the A pirare: of all which now are writ give, Heaven,
thoie (except the bal Vowel: (from &c. The Arabian! and Ter-flux: have
whence they are deriv'd .- Mote ful' not this Sound: And the Turkr pro
'le and thin, if the Breath goes out nounce their Vaw in this manner,
by an oblong Chinlt,$litor Creviee ; and as a great many, the Van ofthc
or more roſr, ifit go out by a round Hebrew: ( which ſome think more
Hole. hey are referr'd to the properly pronounc'd as the Arabic
ſame Claſſes their Trimiri-ve: were, Wa'w, or w). And we doubt not but
as being near akin to them. We 'the Walic (f) had this Sound z for
ſubjoin no Aſpirarer to the half ſince the Greek: had before the Cha
[ſo-welt', not that there is noSound racter (QL there was no manner of
when the Breath breaks from him need to mvent a new one to expreſs
that is about to pronounce them, the ſame Sound. Beſide: <Pn cian
but becauſe that Sound has not yet, owns, that the Latin (f) ha for.
as far as we can diſcover, obtain'd merly the ſame Pronunciation,that
any Place in the Liſt, or Catalogne is, the ſame Sound, that was after
of Letters; for it expreſſes theLow wards given to the (71) Conſonant;
ing of an Ox, or the Human sigh; and ſo the Letter (f) paſs'd to the
that is, ifthat be made in the Lips, Sound of (w or (la/2),
this chiefly is in the Palate or But ifthe Breath make its Way
Throat. out through a roundHole,the Engliſh
Ifthe Breath eſcape the Mouth, (w) is form'd, and the Arabian
when we are going to pronounce (um-w), which Sound many give to
the Letter (p), its Aſpirate (f), or the Hebrew (vdu). But the German
(pb),that is, theGreek( ),the/lra (w) ifwe miſtake not, has a Sound '
bian (Pbe), the Welfl)( ), isfbrm'd compounded of this and the former
and pronounc'd; nor is it of Con Letter; that is, by placing that be.
iequence, whether the Breath gets forethis; ſo that the Engliſh wou'd
out by a longiſh Chink, or by a ſpell that with man, which the Ger.
round Hole ; for tho' that: Way the man: expreſs by wa. This Sound is
Sound is more fubl le and fine, and not very different from the Englzfly
this moregroji, yet the Diſtinction (ao),the French (0u),:md theGerman
of both is ſo very nice and ſmall, groſs or fat [u] moſt rapidly pro
that we doubt whether they in any noune'd- For this Reaſon ſome have
Language areexpreſs'd by different thought it a Vowel, tho' it be in
Letters. Reality aConſonant z yet it muſt be
Ifthe Breath break out by aChink, own'd Very near akin to a Vowel.
when we are going to pronounce The Wel/Hmaltc that a Vowel, as
(h), it formg the Engliſh (e) Conſo well as this a Conſonant,expreffing
nant, &je. TheSpanmrd not ſeldom them by the ſame Character(w),but
gives the ſame Sound to (h), uſing when 'tis a Vowel, it is accented
tthettcrs( b) and(-v) promiſcuouſ over-head, and ſounds long -, in o
ly.The Wel/b expreſs this Sound by therPlaces'tis aConſonant,itsSound
(f), and the foregoing Sound by being ſhort ; as, Gwydd, (which is
(f). The Engliſh Saxomeither had two Syllables)aGooſe -,e;-w*yr, croo
not this Sound, or expreſs'd it by ked; qw'yr, Men. Whenever this
(f) in Writing, for they knew no Sound in Latin follows, ſ, , g, as in
thing ofthe(-v)Confonnnt z and they ſuadeo, ſguzmdo, linzua, r, mofi:
wrote many Words with (f) (as the take it or a Vowel, and perhaps
Engliſh did after them for ſomeAges) ſome, who wou'd have it a Conſo
which are now written with (71) nant in the Engliſh Words wade,
us much as thoſe which ſtill are perfivadg, ſway, &t. and yet the
ſpelt with (f) z a' gif, Heafen, &e. Sound is the very ſame in both
Plates,
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 45
Plates. But the ſubjoin'd Vowel in this with (D), (S), as is plainfrom
the Diphthongs or double Vowels their Writings, (tho' they ſome
(au),(eu),(ou),tmly pronounc'd, is times confounded theſe Characters)
no other than this very Conſonant; but in following Ages the Engliſh
as any Man may ſee by conſulting expreſs'd both Sounds by (p),
the diſcerning Gula/ter, in hisTrea which by Degrees, degenerate into
riſe of double Vowelr. the Character (y), which in very
If the Breath more grolly goes many Manuſcripts perpetually bc
out by the Hole, when we are go gins thoſe Words which now are
ing to pronounce the Letter(T),the written with my), And hence
Greek (e)is ſorm'd,the Arabic(Tbe), ſprung the Abbreviations of the,
&c. and the Engliſh (Tla), in that, 'bau,by },_)'y, _y TheWelſb
Thigh, thin, thing, though', throng 2 expreſs the former Sound by Mr),
The Anglia-Saxon: formerly ex. the latter by hid), only ſome pre
preſs'd this Sound by this Note tend thatit is betterwrittenbwdb),
(P), which they call'd Spina, or the who have not been able to alter the
Thou: The Welfl: always write it old Or'bagrapby. But we( as we have
with (rb). obſerv'd) expreſs both Sounds by
But if the Breath on this Occa my), hut erroneoufly, ſince neither
fion go more ſubtilly out of the of them is a compounded Sound,
Mouth by a Chink , that Part of the but evidently ſimple, varying or
Tongue which is next to the Ex deſcending almoſt in the ſame man
tremity, being lifted up, that the ner from the Sounds of (d) and (!) ;
Breath may, as it Were, be flatted as (f) and (o) do from the Sounds
or thin'd, and preſsd with a wider, 0f(/>) and (b). We grant, that by
but groſs Form, the Greek (e) is the ſame Reaſon, that (pin is writ
form'd,the Hebre-wSamecl: and S/zin, ten for (f),(bh),(rb) and (ii/1),migh':
the Arabic Sin and Sad y the Latin alſo written, that is in ſome
Fnd finglyb (ſ), pronounc'd with meaſurc,to ſhew the Affinity and
lLnghlZ Sound, that is, a ſharp, a Derivation of the AſpirateLetters,
rmy, or firidulourpr kiſſing Sound 5 to thoſe from whence they draw
a; m the Words, Ter, t u, m, thuſ, their Original. But it is evident
ill, le 1, ſend, ſtrong, &e. With this from the following Words, that the
Soun we alſo pronounce ſoft (e) genuine Sound compos'd oſthc Let
before (e), (i) and (y)-, as in ters, is plainly different from that
"race,Mercy,(Peace.fince,Principal, ofthe Aſpirate Letter , as Cob-bam,
(Ft The French ſometimes give CbanbamJVit-bam,Mair-bam,Wad
ſhe (e)the ſame Sound when it has bam, Wood-houſe, Shep-lzerd, Clap
a Tail, as in Gar-pon. bam, Meſr-bam, &c. And thus we
"them-eath get out oftheMoutb find entirely other Sounds in Oc
la Hole in a groſſerManner,when bam, Block-head, Hag-Irerd, Cog-bill,
you are about to pronounce (D), [louſ-bold, Diſ-honour, Mflbap, diſ
If forms the Arabic Dbal, the He honeſt, di -bearren, Majfbam, Can/3
ble'w_DaIet}!, the ſofter (D) of the bam, W'i -/7eart, &e. than thoſe
&Pan'ardr s that is, as that Letter is which we commonly write with
pronounc'd in the Middle and End (ch),(gb),(ſb)z But the French, the
"ſ Words, as Majeſtad, Trinidad, Flemingr, and many others, do not
&6. The Engliſh write this Sound at all, or extremely little, pro.
"I the ſame Manner as they do nounce either of thoſe Sounds
another, which we have lately which we expreſs hymn 5 and while
mld'd; that is, with ( rb) in thy, the French endeavour to pronounce
"He, ybir, rim', &e. The Angles-'x it, they utter (t), the Fleming! (n),
vhwnte that Sound with ly), but: and ſome others (ſ)- Yet it ishno:
ar
46 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
hard to pronounce theſe genuine with the harder Sounds, they are
Sounds,iſwe wou'd but take a more thus made Verb: or Wordr, to 'wi-va,
peculiar Care of, and have a nearer to live, to ſtrive, to balm', to cal-ye,
Regard to theirFormation ; that is, to ſave, to brearlze, to Clotbe. The
all the Parts of the Formation re Italian: (eſpecially when it is dou
main the ſame as if we were go bled) expreſs (z) ſtronger, as the
ing to ronounce U) and of), only Hebrew (y), (/z): Thus not a few
we ſu er the Breath to go out of pronounce in Latin- Words, when
our Mouths here, and not there. (i)goes beforeſi ) and anotherVowel
We muſt alſo take heed, that for follows; as Tiazza, Venetic, they
want ofAttention, the Parts oſthe pronounce Tiaſza, Venerzid, &e.
Tongue next to theExtremity riſe a We may add to (d), or, if you
little, and ſo form the Letters (ſ) pleaſe, to (u), two other Letters
and (z); foras (ſ) is to (e), ſo is form'd in the ſame Seat, that is, in
(z) to (a'),as we flnll now explain. the Palate, oiz. U) and (r). We
If when you are about to pro chuſe rather to join theſe Letters to *
nounce (d), you extrude the Breath (d) and (u), than to the Letter (e),
in a moſtfidnle manner, as it were by reaſon of the Concuſſion of the
thin'd by a Chink or Crevice, (the Larynx, orWind- pipe, and the Emo
Part next to the Extremity of the tion of the Breath to the Noſtrilsin
Tongue being tothatEnd lifted up) their Pronunciation, of which the
the Latin (z)is ſorm'd,theGreek(z). Letter (!), and all that are deriv'd
the Hebrew zain, and the Arabian from it, are utterly incapable.
(u), which Sound the Engliſh ex The Letter ( 1) is form'd if when
preſs by their ( z);but they, as well you are about to pronounce the (dj
as the French, do ſometimes expreſs or (u), you gently ſend out the
this Soundby (f), eſpecially when Breath from one or beth Side: into
it is placed between two Via-welt, the Mouth, and by the Turnings of
and in the End of a Word, as in the Mouth to the o en Lips, with a
Pleaſure,Eaſe,La-rw,&c. And when Tremblingoſ the ongue. And the
a Name or Noun,with hard [r]in the Sound ofthis Letter, if we are not
laſt Syllable is made a Verb orWord, deceiv'd, is the ſame in a l Lan
then this Verb orWord is pronounc'd guages, as the Hebrew , and
with ſofi: (ſ), (that is z); ſo a the Greek 74.
Houſe, a Louſe, a Moufe,aPrice,/1d But the WeIfl) have another and
vice, (or ad-Ui e, according to ſome) ſtronger, tho' a kindred Sound to
th ', in our pinion, the (e) ought this, which they write with a al),
to ke in the Name, as a ſar to diſtinguiſh it from that of the fin
ther Di inction of the Name from gle ( l), by the Breath's being much
the W'ord orVerb) cloſe, Brafl,G/afir, more forcibly preſs'd into the
Graflr, Greaſe, and with hard ( ſ) -, Mouth, whence proceeds a more
but to houſe, to loufe, to mouſe, to frothy Sound, as it were, compound
priſe, or prize, (tho' Prize with a ed of (e). ). But this Sound, we
[z] ſignifies a Purchaſe, a Caption think, no other Nation knows, un
of ſome Ship, &So. or the Reward of leſs perhaps the Spaniardr.
ſome Action, or to be obtain'd by TheLetter(r),which is generally
ſome Action, Go) to adviſe, to call'd the Dog-Letter, is likewiſe
cloſe, to braze, &e. are pronounc'd form'd in the Palate 5 that is, if
with ſoft (ſ) or (z). But other Let when you are about to pronounce
ters in the like manner have an (dj or (u), the Extremity of the
analogous Alteration. Forſrom the Tongue being turn'd inward by a
NamesWife, Life, Smſe, HaIf,Calf; ſtrong and frequent Concuflion,
ſafe, Breath, Cla'b, are pronounc'd beats the Breath that is going out: ;
from
He Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 47
from which Conflict that horrid or Vowels in the direct Line, butthey
rou h Sound of the (r) proceeds. ſet the (P) after them, it'we are not
An the Sound ofthis Letter is the miſtaken, and this makes them uſe
ſame in all Nations, as the Hebrew (b) for a Note of an Hundred; for
Re/b, and the Greek (p). The WeI/b what 15 now written Hung, was
frequently ſubjoin (h) to this Let formerly written .H'u-r"- Bm?
ter; and their (r/i) anſwers the we can ſee no manner of Reaſon
Greek' aſpii'ated (þ). They tell us, why (In ſhould not be a Conſomnt
that the Americnm bordcring on in all other Languages ; for it visby
New-England, or at leaſt a great no means to be rejected from the
Part of them, cannot pronounce Number of Letters, becauſe the
either an (l) or (r), but ſubſtitute Sound of it is ſometimes not ro
(u) in their Place ; thus,f0r Lobfler, noundd by the French, and lgme
they ſay, Nob/lan. others z for that is no more than is
If the Breath, being more ſtrictly common to many other Letters,
.compreſs'd, breaks out moreſubxilly, eſpecially ofthc Hebrm,and other -
when you are about to pronounce Oriental Tongues, which are quie
01) or hard (u), it forms the Greek ſcent or ſilent: Nor becauſe it does
(x), the Arabian (eſ/a), truly pro not hinder the Elifion of the forego
nounc'd, Go. that is by a middle ing Vowel, when another Vowel
Sound betwixt (e) and (h) -,and this follows in the ſubſequent Word;
Sound is very familiar to the Ger for (m) wou'd then lie under the
man; and Welflv and they both ex ſame Fare, and( ſ) anciently did
preſs it by cb. 'But it is quite laid not hinder thisContraction. But we
aſide in Englzjb; for our cb is a muſt confeſs, that there is ſome
quite different Sound, as we ſhall doubt whether theLatim, who were
ſhew hereafter. ſuch mightyEmulators of theGreek,
But if the Breath go out in a allow'd (1.1) tobea Letter or not, e
groffer manner, and leſs impreſs'd ſpecially when we find the Gram
(by reaſon oſ the morelax Pofition marian: ſo earneſtly denying it,
of the Tongue, and larger Exit for with Triſcian at the Head of them.
the Breath) the Latin 01) is form'd; lf when you are about to pro
and the Hebrew and Arabian Uſe) nounce (y), or the hard (g), the
and the Greek aſpirate Spirit. And Breath being more hardly com
this Sound is common to moſt Na preſs'd, goes out by a more ſubtile
tions. But the Bench, tho' they Chink, as I may ſay, or Slit, that
write ſly), ſeldom pronounce it. The Sound is form'd which is expreſs'd
Difference between the Sound of by gb. The Engliſh ſeem formerly
this and that ofthe foregoingLetter to have had this Sound in the
is only this, that the Breath in the Words Light, Right, Nigbr,Daugh.
former is expell'd with a greater ter, &e. but now they only retain
Force, and by a narrower Paſſage, the Spelling, entirely omittingthe
asit were through a Chink, and i_s Sound z but the North.Counr')-Pco
therefore nam'd the double Aſpz ple, eſpecially the Soon, almoſt rc
rate; this more fi'oely,and as 1t were tain it ſtill, or rather ſubſtitutethc
through a Hole or large Paſſage. Sound oſ [bl in its room. The Irijh
The Greekr, as if it were no Let in their [gh] have exactly this
ter, (becauſe its Sound isbut ſmall) Sound, as in Logb, a Lake, St. It
call it an Ajþirarion, and (at leaſt differs from the German [ab] as [5]
nowe-days) ſet it not down m the does from leg, that is by the Dire
direct Line oftheLettergt-ut ut lt ction o' the reath to the Noſtrils,
over the Head of a Letter: he' which neither [t] nor [dy] can do.
ſhzmedy they did ſet'em before the But' the German: generally write
by
48 Tbe Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
by (cl') thoſe very Words which ready obſerv'd; another which was
the Engliſh write with (gb), for us'd for (f) Vowel, and differing
their Nachr, mht, llecht, from the fox mer only by the Point
over it; and a Third ( 3 ), which
fcchten, tocbter, anſwer our was always put for ( y ) Conſonant,
Night, right, light, fight, Daughter; and which was found in thoſe Words
an there are many more Words of which we now ſpell with gb: But
the ſame kind. 'ſhe Latinr, Greekr, theLibrarykeepers,oflatterTimes,
Hebre-zwand/Irabiamknew nothing ignorant of the Matter, have by a
of this Sound. The cPerſiani pro very graſs Error ſubſtituted in the
nounce their G/mfwith this Sound, room ofit the Character ofthe Let
which is diſtinguiſh'd from the Ara ter ( 2), when they made thoſe mon
bic Kef by Three Points over it. ſtrous Words thouzt, ſouzt, &je.
But if the Breath go out more
freely, and as it were through a ſor thought, ſang/7', &e. or rather for
more large Hole, the Engliſh (y ) thauyr, fimyr, &e. as they were then
Conſonant is form'd; the German us'd to be written by ( y ) Conſo
(j ) Conſonant, the Arabian_ſye ), nant, as we may find them in the
which Sound many con'tend belongs Impreſſions of Chaucer, and others
to the Hebrew (jod). For thisSound of the old Poets. We muſt alſo add,
is very near akin to that of the that not a few Words, which we
Vowel ( i) ſlender, moſt rapidly pro now ſpell With (y ), the old Saxani,
nounc'd. The Diphthongs, as they and now moſt commonly the Ger
man: wrote with g 5 for our Words
are call'd at', ei, oi, or ay, ey, oy, are
promiſcuouſly written by (f) or Slay, ſayl, fay, pay, day, rain, and
( y), eſpecially by the Engliſh and many more, are partly by the An
the French. T is not only put for glo Saxom, and partly by the Ger
(f) at the End of Words, but inthe man: written bchlagen, ſegel,
Middle, when (i) follows the Sound ſeger, ſag, tas, tegem. And
of [i]-,asdying, lying, &c. the An on the contrary manyWordswhich
gla Saxon, and after them the En are now written with (g ), were
Iz'fla, for many Ages, always put a formerly written with ( y ); as,
goint o\er (y), when it was us'd again, againſt. given, &c. were an
for the Vowel (i), thus ( y-) gently written ayen,ayenfi,yeoven,
But it ismanifeſt, that there is a c.
great Affinitytetween this Letter Thus we have run through allthe
and g and gb, from thoſe Words, ſimple Sounds that we know, and
which are now written by gb, as have given Rules for their ſeveral
light, migbr,fbougbr, &c._ being in Formations, and diſtributed them
the old Manuſcripts written with into their ſeveral Families and
fy), in the ſame Character, as yet, Claffes; and as we have ofthe Vo
yonder, &c. For they had a Three wels, ſo ſhall we here ofthe Conſo
tbld Figure, one (y), which we nants, give you a Plan, which your
now expreſs by tb, as we have al Eye may view all at once.
-,wv=-5
Conſonants,
,4_J
. 2714- Engliſh'Grammar, with Notes.. 49
C
/
w
'sozerzdzv
_CHARM.
AOf SYNLNLABLES.
'J ſi . PART
58 The. Engliſhv Grammar, 'with Notes.
[3] At the End oſthis ſhort Tart join theſe into one Syllable which
'tis impoſſible for them to o, and
of our Diviſion,we ſhall lay down a
new Method of leaming-to read in the muſt expreſs this one Syllable
all Languages, as we find it in a by ive Syllablenwhich was not de
French Author, and which perhaps ſign'd, whereas they ſhould teach
an ingenious School-Maſter may vthem to expreſs every Syllable in
improve to the Advantage of his tirc at fitfl Sight, without diſmcm
Scholnrs: To which we ſhall add, bringit; and to do this, they muſt
'hat ' Mr; Lad-wick, our own proceed gradually: Firſt beginning
Countryman, has advanc'd on the with the moſt ſimple Syllabler, and
fame Head. , ſo by degreesproceeding tothemore
This Method (ſays our Author) diffiflflt and compounded, till they
regards chiefly thoſe who cannot can readily pronounce a whole Syl
mad : It is certain, that the Learn lable at fiiſt Sight; Even the moſt
ers find nogrent Difficulty in learn difficult that are.TothatEnd lecau
ing the Letters themſelves, but the the Pri'mnerr be thus contriv'd z at
hardeſt Labour and Pains they go theTop ofthe Leaf let all the Va
lthmugh, is in joining the Letters wels be plac'd flngly in Order, as
together in Syllables. For every they follow in one Rank, and in the
,_1-etterhas its peculiatNamemhmh Lſame plate Syllables, lfl. Of one
is pronounc'd differently by itſelf, Vowel, and oneConſonqn' following
from what it is in Conjunction with it, throughout all the Variatimls;
other Letters, for Example, If you then oſ one Canſanant and an:- Vowel
teache. Child to pronounce Fryin a followin that. zdly, OfrwnC'onſo.
Syllable, you fixſt'mahe him pro 'man be re, and one Fo'welfollew;
nounce eſ, er,15' which muſt per ing' throughout the LxVaniations.
fectly ccgietfnndhunyhenhe. es. sdlz,0f one Vowel, and them
to join t eThreeSoundgtogWr; fourConſonanrt following; and
out of them to form the Sound of 'brae Confihgmþ'gomg beflire . _
tbeSyllable by. 1 ' m ramztouomfng. my, afar-e,
The ſamcflbh'vetion ismade by M,and The' Conjoun: going
Mr. hid-mid; As the prddnt Al before 'Vowel zendOu, I', Me,
pbabmſiays he,are imperfect, ſo are or Four Coxjinumu followmk stir/1,
alſothe Tiimmerx, or firſt Book: Oſ ſome Syllablbs with Dip hong:
wheteinChildren aretaught to Spel and fiipbthongs, For Example; -
and Read: "Firſt, In not having: a. e._ 1. it. &no. ſi
AI'MN. nd- Secondly .- ab. ed, ib. "cingv ' fat, 'Itch
n not beingdigdte?in ſuch aMe: ad. 1ed- ad. "d," - he.
thod, as is fit ought
and proper
to betotaught.
teach 'ct"Þ (51. 'me bi:v Bujmwbui
them as the? Hid: '14- ildz. Mi- 'lit-IGLCF
For the uſha Way of teaching to , du. 'dom dri. d'o. dry kc. .
ſpell,isto diſmembet everySylhble balm. balm; MYmLÞoIMjbulzz 'fig
(ofmore than oneLetter) into many
Syllables,hy expreſiing everyLetter After this, pllace a Number d'
apart, and Syllabicatly; and the Words of Two, but, a: Found-'la
Conſhnants with ſuch a Vowel, as Her, from the more eaſy, to the
they are ordinarily nam'd widtand mote difficult Exprezfione without
then uiring them to join all heed to theirsignifieofionzz tho'
theſe Sy lables into one Word. _ i inoun iniom, iſtliere could be
But how prepoſterous this Me ſome Or ersnd 'Connection in thek
thod is, onelnſtance for all will ma Signification,it would help theMe
nifeſt. Suppoſe the Monoſyllable mory: Further, let there follow
Brand, to be ſpell'd,they will teach ſome Words of ſeveral Syllahlcs,
vthem thus to diſmember it -, Bee,er, with thcAccent varioufly lac'd, as
a, en, dee, and then require them to on the fir/I, ſea-and, and r ifd, &c.
Thue
T/je Engliſh 'Groin-Hide; with Notes. 59
Thus far M. Ladwick, who pro The more, unuſual Sound is
ceeds farther, but that relat' too Jmewn toall by common Practice. '
mudi to -th UnivetſI-l Make' p Thus none can fail to lmow
cannot have a Place here. _ which is the longeſt and moſt 'm- .
To this we ſhall addſome Rules uſual Sound, and that is ſufficient
of Spelling, which tho-'we did not almoſt in all Caſes, becauſe the
thinkfull enou hof Demmfirationl Length and Unuſualneſs of' the
to be inſerted m the Body of the Sound cauſes it to be the harder
Rules, yet fincethey really afford Sound,which is the third Thing to v
Matter of Speculation ſufficient to be obſerved in this UniverſalRule.
employ the curious ſſeueher , or , But: maketheUſeofthisRule
Leamer 'of his Mother Tongue, 'and Comple' , bedauſeit may happen
m_ay,perha£s_þ_e_rendred copy-le of that ſome Words (tho' not mgny]
mprovement, we all hereſſaTl'H';l nihſiy'ſhilnſſclivers Ways, andyet ex- ,
They were given us by oneDr. jane', preſstbe ſame Numberof Letters,
who (as we gueſs ing-hie, Name she-a and-that in the ſimeManner, either
ing a Wax/man, may, in ſon'ie at? long' o'r ſhort,and Both Sounds alike
ticulnrs of his Book, he miiled by uſual, as in Anger, and uſ;
the Pronunciat'ion of- his (ii-in Finger, and ſin-gar, &e. i will
Tongue; yet is his Book worth' he.tn'efillto,.1<now,whith in Iſu a.
on' Conſiderntion._ But this will Caſe isxheeaflecmd ſleaſanten m.
begainexj from his Obſewations. ple Sound, and toawhieh harder and_
' s Nſaxims
Word: a're, firſt,Wfirk't-ſiitr
'wi-re Originally Thiſ lgl/ hflrſhegS'mmclls they are ſo' lilfle, di
tateey area to exca _
&an. Tho' thislmay'be diſpqted£ Sonmiswith 'em. r - - "
yet the Conſequenee is not fiyggeat, \ ( ., " A . ' :
as to make us enter into the Con -Ais much eaſier than E or 0; B',
troverſy. * *' ' 'I _ v thanTP; D, than 'For tb' in tho' ;
His next is,T/zat all Ter'mr Which E,than I, 0, U; E E',than E, I, 0;
bewſince alſer'd their'Soflni-lxthffl iG, than'C'for K,*or hard C, or et: in ,
Ogigm oi'theDifficnlty of Spelling) che-w -, M, ng, than Nz On, than O'
d'd it for Eaſe and Pleaſure.z. t _ or U; Sir, thaan or-S', Tin The,
From the hardenbmflzer longer, than To 5' ſhort U,than A, E, I, 0'-,
ruthe eqfierffileaflmtefian' "flJbrtEf V,- thnn Foer; Z, than S in ſo.
Sounds, which For-that Reaſon be Simple Sonn'ds are eaſier than
'Fame the more uſual. From hente Compounds, Compoundsof Tvio
It follows,;T/.1at .nll W'ard: 'time can Sounds, than Compounds of me,
In' flunded ſeveral Way, muſi'be and ſo on; and Compounds of eaſy
V'n'tteu according 'o 'be ſ'a/de/i, Sounds, than Compound: of hard
barſbe/i, lorn-zeſt and mu/i lnnuſzml Sounds. -- -
Sound. And this Rule, he aſſures Double Charactemane to be ree
us, is without Exccption in our kon'd asſingle, if they have but
Tongue. _ _ ' - _ . one Sound. ' - X þ
The. longeſt Soimrl is that, which We'have omitted the particular .
expreſſes moſt ſimple Sounds, or Prooſs of theſe Rules, which the
founds the ſame Number 'after 'the 'R'eadermay conſulc his Book for, if
longeſt .manner .-,. thus, if.yon ſay his-Curiofity prompt. him -, this be
agen and again, it muſt he written ing ſufficient to give Ground 'to his
again; lecauſe it ſounds more Let Enquii'y -, And we believe, ,in>try_
ters, The ſame may he ſaid of ing, he will find 'cm 'ſometimes
Fawr and Ev'n-am;- . * pretty true, iſ not always. a
PART
'*t
'FPARE'HL
'-_QfVVQFÞ&f£fl{lJſi'
A 3' "uſ
-
'
A'W) 1? zD; r;
l 'ct' ſi' ' A 15..AP'YZF
la;
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 6:
- [1] It may herehe preper to ex many Words may be form'd of
plain, ,what we mean by a Word, three Letters; that is to ſay, Fiſ \J
which we think mayhe thus defin'd: 'teen thouſand and fix; and Twen
A diſtinct articulaterSound, which ty-ſlx times as many more may
Men have made the axdible Sign of 'he made of four ſeveral Letter',
[mue one of their Tboicgbſr. Or if ithat is, Nine hundred thouſand
we rather take it from Words, as 'thirty-fix; and ſo on in Proportion.
Written and sinken, we may define Fromthis manifold Generation of
itthus, Mrdr are diſtinct articu Words, from the various Comhi
hue Soundſ, implyi'tg by common nationsof Letters, we may judge
Confem, ſome Thought: or Opera of their vaſt Variety, as being in
tion' of 'be-Mind expreft'd by ſame deed dlot much leſs than infinite
certain Maria', figure-r, or Cham 7 is] In all Langmges there are
cter: agreeden bylMeJ', a: 'be 'vi Namer, anliu'e' and Affirma'ian! t
fllzle Sign: of thoſe Sound: and 'Namer ſignify Thing; &in/iden
Tbougbu. = . - - a ſignify the Manner or Qpalitiesof
A This laſt Definition ineludes thoſe Things; Affirmationt affirm
Words in both Senſcs, that is, both ſomething of them, And there
as Spakea and Written. are other Words, which ſignify
a] Manheing a Converſſhle An' neither of theſe, but the Relationof
mal, and form'd ſorSociety, there one to the other, and thoſe are the
was a Necefiity of ſome Way or Manna-i ofqu-Jr : But theſe Rela
Means of conveying the- Mind, or tions of Words to Words are of ſe
Thoughts of one Men to another; veral Kinds, which are expreſs'd by
which tho' it- might he in ſome ſome of theſe Particles, or ſhort
meaſure done by the'Lyes, Hands, Words,. aſ, to, for,- 0, by, with,
Fingers,Motions and Geſtimlations through, nt, &c.-, of which in Can
of the Body, Sc- asin the Pantn ſtructwn. - n- _
mimes of the Ancients, and Mutes 1 It; is nue, that ſome havecndea
of the Seraglio &30. yet thoſe being vour'd to reduce all Words to three
more imperfe , aszwell as more Claſſcs, which we jhall conſider in
crook-leſome and tediousp Nature, our Notes; but others vainly leaſt,
(which always chooſes the eaſieit or. _ ,tocqntract 'em ye. eld.
and moſt efficacious Way) directs ſcr into Twa, either ignorant ofthq
Maan to impaitthe Sentiments Operations of the Mind, which they
of the Mind, rather by the Voice, were invented to expreſs,and which
endure Motions of the Tongue, can never-be brought into thathm
which are more eaſy in the ſeveral Paſs, as will be plain from what
Variations oſSoundsthanany other ollows, or for want of conſidering
Way. For this Reaſon, Men have what they ſay,, or to be thought
diſtinguiſhed every Modification of Men of wonderful Penetration by
the Voice by a particular Letter, ignorantHearers.ThoſcGentlemen,
Lgfwhich we have already diſcouts'd who have with great Clearneſs of
a: large, both in the Text, and the Reaſon propos'd themunder Three
Notes),
had ſſmanyand
in tho? theſeyet
Number, Lettersare
are thev Heads, have, however told us, that
ſome Philoib *crs, have thought
by their variousflonjundtions, ſuf themſelves oh ig'd to add a Fourth,
fident for all the Languages that diſtinct from the, other Three, as
.,ever were, or ever can he in the U will a pear from the chuel.
niverſe.They are indeed liut Twen War I having ſomething corporeal
ty-fix in our Tongue, and,Yet they and ſomething ſpiritual in 'em, we
may be ſo variouily diſpos'd, as to may ſay, they conſiſt of Soul and
make more, than five Hundred and Body. Thc'Ideas ofthe Mind, when'
Seventy-ſix ſeveral Wordspf twa they- command the Organs of the
Letters, and Twenty-ſix times as Voice, to form ſuch soundS, WfflCh
'* - a ' - > ate
62 Y'be Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
are the andible Signsofthok ldeas, ſer a Third, as when we have judg'd
are the Soul ofWords ; but Sounds that Virtue is Praiſe-worthy, and
form'd by the Organs of the Voice, that Paiirnce is a Virtue, we infel'
are the material Part, and may be and conclude that Patience is
call 'd the Body of Wordr. Praiſe-Worthy.
We ſhall therefore here conſider Hence we may eaſily obfirrve,that
them, as they are ahttracted from this 'bird Operation of the Mind,i'
Sound,in theirRelation to theMind but an Extenſion of the ſecond. It
of Man, and in whichwehave the will therefore be ſufficient for our
Advantage of all other Cteatures, reſent Subject, to conſider the firſt
anda very ſtrong Proofof our Rea ji'wopr what oſ the firſt is contai n'd
ſon ſhfperior to them; that is, hy in the ſecond; for it' we ſeriouſly
the U e we make of Wordsto con attend' what paſſes in our Mind, We
vey our'rhoughts to each other,and ſhall find, that we very rarely con
that ſurpriſing Invention ofCombi. ſider the ſimple Perccption of
ning Six and Twenty Sound: in ſo Things, without affinning ſome
multi lltious a Manner, aawe have thing 01' other of it, which is the
ſaid; which we diſcover the Va )udgmcnt.
riety 0 our Thoughts, and all our This Judgment we make of
Sentiments on all manner of Sub Things,as when we ſay the Earth i:
jects,tho'thcre beno real or natural round is call'd a *Pra a/irion; and
Likeneſs betwixt the Words, and thcr ore e'etyPro ition natural
Operations of the Soul of Man ; but ly incliides TWo ermr, one call'd
only Signs by Compact and Agree theo'nbject, which is the Thing, of
ment, to figniezfflu Thoughts. which the Aflirmatian is, as 'be
Words ther re,being(as isſaid) Earth -, and the other is call'd the
invented to expreſs our Thoughts, A'tribine, which is the Thing that
it follows that we cannot perfectly is affirmed of the Subject, as round ;
diſcover the different Sorts andSig and then,ii,which is the Connexion
mifications of Words, without firſt betwixt theſe Two Terms.
conſidering what paſſes in our But it is eaſy to perceive, that
Minds. theſe Twa Terms do properly he.
It is agreed by all Philoſophers, long to the firſt Operation of the
that there are Three Operations of Mind, becauſe that is what 'e can
the Mind, viz. Percep'ion, judg ceive, and is the Object of' our
ment, and Reaſoning. Thoughts z and that the Connexion
PERCEPTlON is the ſimple belong: to the ſecond, which may
Apprehenſion ofany'l'hingpr Qua he properly call'd the Action of'the
lity of a Thing, whether purely Mind, and the Manner in which
int/lectufl, as when we ſimply we think.
think of the Being, Ererm'ry and And thus the greateſt Diſtinction
Decree of God; or Corporenl, and of that which paſſes inour Mind, i'
[Hare-rid, asa Squa'e, a Circle, a to ſignify, that we may conſider the
Horſe, a Dog. Objects of our Thoughts, and the
J UDGMENT affirm', that the Form andMannerof them,nfwhich
Thing we perceive,is ſo, or not ſo: the chief is the Judgment. But
as, having the Ideas oſ the Earth we muſt beſides refer thither the
and Roundnefi, weaffirm, that 'be Conjunctionr,Dirjunctiom,and other
Lia-lb ir round. the like Operations of the Mind, a'
By REASONlNG,we drawCon well as all the other Motions ofthe
ſequences to evince the Truth, or Soul, as Deſires, Commands, Inter.
Fallacy ofaconteſted Propoſition, ro ationx, &je.
by comparing it with one or more rom hence it follows, that Men
incontefiable Propoſition'; or in wanting Signs to expreſs what
ſhort, from Twa Judgments, to in paſſes inthe Mind,the moſt gent-Sal
1
Me Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 63
Diſtinction ofWords, muſt te of' Verb; (call'd in the Latin Partici
thoſe which ſignify theObjects, and ples), Fare-plac'd Wardx, (or Prepo
Manner of our Thought', tho' it fitions), and added Wardz, orAdo
frequently happens, that they do 'verb-t), Thoſe of the ſecond, are
not figni 'y theManner alone, hutin Word: of Affirmatin, (or Verbt)
Conjunction with the Objects, as jaining Wardr, (or Conjunctions)
we ſhall ſoon demonſtratez having and Interjection', a' the old
already ſhewn, that the Know GRAMMARIANS call'd them
ledgeof what paſſes in the Mind abſurdly, dlſtinguiſhing than into
is neceſſary for the underſtanding a peculiar Part of Speech, which
the Principles of GRAMMAR. are plainly only added Word: of
The Word; of the firſt Claſs, are Paſſion, which all derive them
thoſe which we call Name-r, Pur ſelves, by a neceſſary Conl'cquenoe,
fonal Namer; QUALITIES de from the natural Manner of ex
riv'd from H'ard: afAffirmation, or preſſmg our Thought'.
CHA P. VI.
Of NAMES. [I]
Whatfer we ſee, feel, hear, or touch, or taile;
Or in our Underſtanding': Eye i: plac'd,
N A M E S properly we tall ,- fin- always they
Some certain Image to the Mind convey ,
lb Man, Horſe, Houſe, Virtue, andHappincſs,
And allſuch Want', a: Things tlzemſelwt expreſt.
L.
'72 The' Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
Ihree Perſons only me? Longdage'elaim:,' "l
' Which we expreſſ ſtill' chVfolloiszg' Nh'mes;
'" I, Thou, and He; She, "It, e,*Ye, and They,
Ifyou to theſe will ddd,Who, What, you may,
[5] Since in Diſeourſe whatever isdlnd, is lpoke either
of ourſelves, to another, or of a third, it is neceſſary, that
there be Three Perſonsz 'I, the firſt,_thbr4,' the ſecond, and he,
. . ._,, e,
and
e * e'ifirfi nifiNation
Mdergt/JE a Pero hfffiq itNoun,
muſt' our ſelveshfipul' Ptp -Namez,and
[gab 'Ppr on i." o'Thin , filth a for that Reaſonthe, anon-e oflche
firſt Perſon was introduc'd toil-and
hi' a! may he eanfiderdalane by in. the; Place of his_Namq who
the' l aderſtanding, and he the Sub ſpeaks,.as I, We. _ _ .
jaſt bfa Pronouſſn,j'orſithere
jtaintive 'Medieval mean 'he areSub
alſo And'on thevotherHand, to avoid
the 'toofr uentiujkepetition of the
Pronqrms Adjectiize. Indeed, thi: Name of ,_Perſ n to whom you
fart ofS 'ech i: in order of Nature ſ algthou or you, Pronamer of the
'the firſt [grim for 'when Adam and [good Perfon) were invented.
Eve were only"in the World they And laſtly, toavoid thetoooften
' eeded no orherkName but, and repeating the Names of other Per
Short to ſþeak to. one another, and ſom orTbings of which we diſcourſe,
' Aho e Name: 'ty/Ere no' gie-en them the Bet-ſone] Name-1. of the third
(drofany Neee ny, flePronoun Perfon were invented, as He, She,
'thergZore i: a 0un,onl) alPetibnal it, who, What. ' ' , .
gle, elſe, ur'dP-when We peak of Theſe' Per-florid, Nomer perform
._ hings fer-fiendly, 'to 'which (upon ing the Office, and ſhpplying the
the Mtliip'lieation of Mankind) Place oſotherNamer,they haverlikc
Two' added the proper. Name to, di them two Numben, that which fig
flzngutgvaeffons by, andalſo parti nifies one, vand
moreſithan gite, that
(i. e. which
the Si ſignifies
ular),
cular 'ngs, which are a: it were as Lthoſſn, you, he; and the lurol,
'ſpoken of erfonally, when the-yore
'ſpoken o 'particularly And thy' s we, ye, or w, and Jhey. Tou
_'-we fiiul Nouns ru'd in 'he-firſt Per (as lus been aid) is us'din the Sin
ſon, a: Romulus Rex Regia Alma gular for thou and thee, as well as
affero. L'v. i. xx. alſo Anobal pcto in the Plural for ye.lThus in French,
pacem. I .l, 30. and Cal ius re vour' 'For tu and thy.
cenſui.at the End erence's In other Langnages, which have
Plays. And thus fat/Mr. jolmſon, Genderr,the Pronaun: have the firme,
which is ſufficient to ſhew, that we the' firſt and eeond'are common,ex
have juſtly lae'd them here under cept in the ebr'e-w, and thoſe Lan
the Head 0 Names. gwages whiehimitate that in (which
Lz] The frequent Repetition of the Mafculine is diſtinguifizfd from
the ſame Wotds, being as diſagree-s the Feminine, but in the Eut/ill:
ahle,asit is neceſſary for us to lpea kj We'have no_Genderr,,as has -cu
_oſtcn of the ſame Thing, to awoidz, ſeen in'xhei'oregoing Notes. .'I'he
this,there are, in all known Lan ſame play he ſaid of Caſes. There
guages, certainWords eſtabliſh'd tq is this to be obſerv'd in theſe Per
ſupply this Defect, and remove this? ſonalNamer, That theTermination
Indccorum, which are call'd Proj changes in both Number; when it
name-r, for Name', Perſonal Namer; Comes after a Verh or 'Yard of Af
or as vulgarly in Engliſhffironoum: firmation, asI, me; we, ur; thou,
In the firſt Place it has been ob' her,
'hee th:y,ſſz*hfm
z you, or ye,5 you; be, itA
except him; ſhe
which
ſerv'd, that it would be tedious a;
w ell as indu'ent to be oiten training does not vary. [r] In
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 73
ſhe, or it, the third of which all other Words but I or thou, with
the Plurals, are. If we ſpeak of a Male, we lay, he; if of a
Female, ſhe, if of Things that have no Sex, we uſe it. The
Plural Number of I is we; of thou, on and ye ,- tho' by Cuſtom
we num, when we ſpeak but al]one Perſon, thou being ſel
dom us'd but to GOD, as Wilt thou, 0 Lord! and on ſolemn Oc
caſions to Princes, Remember, O Prince! that thou art horn a
Man ,- otherwiſe thou is never us'd but in Contempt, An er, Diſ
dain, or Familiarity. He, ſhe, and it, have (in the Plur Numz
ber) only they.
Theſe Names in hath the Number: we allow
A leading and a following State to know;
The leading State is I, the following ME, i
The following State i: US, the leading WE,
That THOU and THEE, YE, YOU, HE, HIM and SHE
HER; THEY and THEM; who and whom 5 but WHAT;
To 'vary like the refl do not think fit. (and IT,
Thoſe Perſbnal Name: have in both Numbers a double Form
or State, the firſt is what we may call the leading State, as I;
the ſecond the following State, as ME. In the Plural Number
the leading State is We, the felle-ming Us. The Second is in the
leading State TH o U, in t e following TH EE, in the Plural
TE and YO U. The third is in the leading State HE, if we
ſpeak of a Male, in the flllowing, H I M ,- or S H E, H E R, and
in the Plural THer, THEM, which is the Plural of HE,
SHE, and I T, which never varies its Endin , and is in both
Fates I T, when we ſpeak of Things of neit er Sex. WHO
m the leading State or both Numbers has WH OM in the&fil
hwing State in both. It 'is call'd the Interrogati-ue, becau it:
asstieſtions ofPe'jfbn: or Indi-uidaal: (as, Who i: there, Peter P)
asWhae does of the Kind, or Qalit] 5 and alſo in the Order of
a'I'hing; as, What is that e it is a Book; What are thou? in the
Order of Number, the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, &a. (which
is the ſame in both the leading and following State, or indeed,
like 12) It has no State.
But to make this the plainer, we ſhall lay down a Vicw of
alltheſe Perfimal Name: together, in both their States.
Perfil'{ Sing. { I Ille
Plur. WP U'
sin _ Thou. Thee
erſ. 2.. { Plu? { Te Uſ
t He IIIſim
Parſ. 3. -{ JHK- -{ Sbe Her
Plur. The] The"
Perſons who
i nterrog.{ Things lem 'whom
3 \ CHAP.
74 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
C H A P. VII.
Of QUALITIes.
W'e've ſeen, that Names the Things themſelves expreſi,
Quilitics the Manners of thoſe Things eoafeſu
And on the Names intirely do depend,
For without them the can no Senſt: pretend:
As round, black, w ite, ſwift, crooked, ſquare,
Mogfl (to be under/load) to Names adhere.
[1] A MES, as we have ſeen, expreſs the Thing: them
ſelves, Qalitie: are the Manners of thoſe Things,
as good, had, round, ſquare, &c. For Example, The Being of
Wax, is the Subſtance of Wax, or Wax it ſelf, without regard
to any Form or Colour, and is what we properly call the
Name; the Roundneſi, Squarcneſs of the Figure, (which may
be abſent without an Dctriment to the Being of the Wax)
are the Manners of the Being; as to be ignorant, or know
ing, are the Manners or Walities of our Being,- thus we ſay
a round, black, white, &e. Table; Table is the Name, and
round, black, white, &a. are the Valities of that Name.
And ſince theſe Words are added to Names, to explain
their Manner of Being, in reſpect of ſome Quality, Num
ber, Figure, Motion, Relation, Poſture, Habit, (y-c. as a cun- '
ning For, the third Heaven, a crooked Crab-tree, a ſwift Horſe,
a Golden Candleſtitl', &e. they are properly call'd Walities,
and are incapable, preſerving their Nature, of being added
to any other Part of Speech. '
Thing, that to follow Names did ſtill dat),
Dne: afier Qualities good Senſe ſapply,
A' black Thing, white Thing, good Thing may cen-uince,
This make: that underſtood, and be good Senſe.
. Your
, .
(11 In out Note: onv NAMES, the GeneralGRAMMAR. But we
wc have likewiſe deliver'd ſuch cannot omit Mr- Jol-njon's Proof,
Sentiments of anh'xier, underthe That the Adjectivc ar ÞIBUW i! a
Title of Adjtcti'ver, Adnamer, &C. different cPart of Speec from the
'as are ſufficient to be ſaid on thic Name or Subſmmi-ue. Grammati
Head,at1caſt as far as relates to cal Commcncaries, p. 8. T/ge Ad
jective
ſhe Engliſh Grammar, 'with Notes. '75
jective (no doubt of it) requires a Here it thena 'very different End
Subflanti-ue to be join'd with it in and Intention in the Uſe of theſe'
Spcecb, to which it may adhere. Wordt, and that i: one good
But the Queſtio" it, 'whether it be Ground of tonſtitutiug different
a Noun, or Name ofa Thing;rhat Tartt of Specch. But then, not on
ir, whether it he equally ſo with the ly the End in signification, but
Subſtantive ;for if it he not, there i: the End alſo in Conftruction it very
not an unequal Participation ofthe different, and that i: the other
Genus between theſe Two, and ſo Gr'O'Ind of making different Parts
the Divi/ion it imperfect and Equi of Speech. For I know no Reaſon,
vocal : That it, theſe Two have not why any Body ſhould he troubled
'be fame Genus, and therefore can with the Diſnnction oſ the ſeveral
not he the fame Tart of Speeeh. Parts ofSpeech, but to know their
Now, IſupPoſe,thatnoBody willſay, different Signiflrationr and Con
the Adjetnve it equally, or a: much ctructiont in general, or how gene
the Name of a Thing at a Subſtan rally to make uſe of them in
tive. The Subſtantive repreſent: all Specch.
that it e/jeiztial to the Nature of the Tho' this be a Demonſtmtion of'
Thing, at Homo, a Man, repre the Difference between the None
ſent: Animal rationale, or a ratio and Qtality, or Suhftanti-oe and
nal living Creature; but Bonus, Adiecti-ue, and that they are Two
Good, repreſent: only an accidental different Parts of Specc'h; yet ſmczr
&la/fly, 'which tho' morally ne what follows proves the Far/iciple
ceſſary, it not naturally ſo, .hut and Adjefli-ve to be one Part of
merely accidental. So that tho' a Speecb, we ſhall purſue ourlenrncd
Man may be call'd Good, and there Author's Diſcourſe, only adding,
fore Good, in game Sex/e, may he that Scioppiut long ſince eontended
ſaid to he hit ame, yet it i; not for the ſame Thing in his Inſtitu
equally at much hit Name ar Man, tionet Grammn'iec Latin-e, in the
Yl'lf laſt repreſenting all that i: ef beginning of' his Auctaarium, p.
fenrial to hit Nature, the other only 161. of the Book. '
'what i: accidental. For Adjectivum Now the Conſtruction of a Sub
corner from adjicio, and there can ſtantive i: it: Governmenr, I>y which
be no need of adding any thing to it i: govern'd in ſuch Cafe ar it:
theSubſtantive, but what it acciden DePendence require: in it; few.
tal, for what it neceſſary and eſſen ral Relation' that it may have in a
tial, it in the Subſtantive already. Sentence: Whereat the only Con
7Tir therefore a ſufiicient Defini ſtruc'lion of the Adjoctive iſ it: A
tion of a Subſtantive, That it if the greement with itt Subſtantive, or
Name of a Thingzbur that it may being govern'd by it, ſo at to a ree
he known 'what it meant by Thing, with it in Cafe, Gender and um
I have added, which may ſo ſhbfiſt her, whatever Relation it he in, or
in the Imagination, as to be the whate-ver Cafe it he in by that Re
Subject of Predication: And the lation. And tho' Subſtantives he
true Definition of an Adjective. iſ, Put in Appafition with other Sub
that it is aWord added to the Sub 'ſtantives and agree with them, yet
ſtantive, t'o declare ſome additional thit i: no real Objection, ſuch Sub
Accident of the Suhſtanti-ve conſi ſtantives becoming Adjectives by
der'd by it ſelf -, as of Qnalityfflro that very Uſe, at an Adjective or
perty, Relation, Action,Paflion, or any other Part of Speech become: a
manner of Being. I have added Subſtantive, when it it uſ'd like a
conſider'd by it ſelf, becauſe the Subttantivc; that it, conſider'd a:
Relation. of Subſtantives, at conſi a Thing. NOW in thit the Parti
der'd in Sentencer, it declar'd by ciple and the Adjective both a ree
Prepoſitions and not hy_A.djodl1ver-l at-'well in Sigm'fication at Can. Yf"
LL zr ction
'56 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
You may know this Part of Speech, by putting Thing aſ
ter it, which it will bear with good Senſe, as a good Thing, a
black flying, a white Thing, &e. nor has it any different End
ing to expreſi one and mony. And as it cannot be under
ſtood, or convey any ldea, or Notion by it ſelf, (as we can
not in Sc-nſe ſhy, a black, a white, &c.) without being join'd
to ſome Name, (as ahlack Horſe, a good Man, a white Houſe, &c.)
ſo it bears all Far-title: expreſſmg different Relation: of Name:
with the Name to which it belongs; for it can do nothing
nor ſignify any thing, without a Name expreſs'd or under
ſtood, as, to hit 'be whitei (Mark) is underſtood; to hond one
Green (Turf) is underſtood; refuſe the evil (Thing), and
chOOſe the good Thing), is in both Places ſuppos'd.
In ct ities'm different Number: are,
A: t eir un-unrj'd Endings ma] declare.
[a] Thoſe, who have imagin-'d ception of the Uſe-ofthe (:) where
that this (r) was pnt in the Placeof there is occaſion, yet we muſt deny
hiſ, (the firſt Part beingcut off-by that theretdr'e it ought almws to
ApÞere/ir) ,and that therefore the be done and toſ'gnifv thehbſenee
Note of Apo/iz'oj-be ought always of in), for it isjoin'd oftento the
to be expreſs'd or underſtood, are Names of XVomen, and to cPlurnl '
extremely out of the Way in their Namer, where hiſ cannot be (up-w
Judgment. or tho' we do not de pos'd to be without a palpahie Sole
ny, but
may the Note
juſtly lac'd cifln -,-and 'in the Words men, yonrr,
of the A lit:ſtrophe
(ibmetiin'en
their', ben, . where ſure no Body
n'ere,_to give a more difim pet con'd ever drawn them] ſhou'dtez:
11.; . man-e
'78 The Engliſh Grammar, niith Notes.
Mark call'd Hyphen, to incorporate it, as it were, into one
Word, and which is ſometimes done without that ſhort
Line.
Theſe are Perſonal Poſſcffives, and my, thy, her, our, your,
their, are us'd, when they are join'd to Names, as This zs ny
Her/i', This is my Hat. But mine, thine, hers, yours, theirs, are
us'd, when the Name is underſtood; as This Horfi is mine,
This Hat is thine; that is, This Horſe is m Her/le,- This Hat is
thy Hat, &e. Thus own cannot follow t e latter, but the for
mer, as we ſhy, not yours own, or ours own, but your own, and
our own. But mine and thine are moſt commonly us'd, when a
Name follows, that begins with a Vowel; as my Arm, or
mine Arm,- thy Aunt, or thine Aunt. We ſhall put them all in
one View, as we have done. the Perſonal Names.
without
the
the
with
Name Name
Sing. My Mine
Parſ: 1' ſi: Plur. z Our Ours
Sing. Thy Thine
Pan z' { Plur. i Tour Yours
His
Perſ- 3- g
si
Plfiz
. {
He'
Their
Hm
Their:
L
The Engliſh Grammar, with Noteſſs.
80
(A), (an), and(thc), we Qualities 'na name,"
Becauſe their Uſ: and Nature aret eſame.
Theſe Signs "of *Names (a) and (th-e), have the Nature of
Walities, for they are added to Names, nor ſubſiſt or convey
any Idea without them, and pay the ſame Attendance on the
Narues.
The Uſe of theſe Signs are worthy Remark; for (a) before
a Conſonant, and (an) before a Vowel, extend the Si nification
of a Name to any one, and ſo to all, one by one, o its Kind;
but (the) reſtrains it to ſome Particular, and by that Means
makes a Common Equivalcnt to a Proper Name.
But ſince theſe Sign: tlon't Individuals.ſhew,
The ne'er hefiare a Proper Name can go 5;
Nor hefare Pers'nalNames and Qualities, -
Nor when the Thing in general me. expreſt,
Nor hefore Names of Virtues, Herbs and Vice.
But theſe Signs, not denoting Individuation, are not fit be
fore Proper Nar'nes, as Peter, ſfohn, William, &e. Nor before
Perſonal Names or anlities. Nor are they us'd, when the
Name expreſſes the Thing in General; as we fay, Man being
mortal, ſhon ſade: away and diet; not the, or a Man, and we
ſay, Virtue conſiſt; in the Mean, not a, or the Virtue, &e.
Theſe Sign: ſignifying Particularity, we fry, the Juſtice of God,
ſince that is particular. Nor are they ſet before the particu
lar Names of Virtues or Vices, or Herbs, Metals, &c. as we
ſay, not a Temperance, a Sloth, a Hyſſh , a Th me.
(A) and (an) ſometimes ſignify one, as al to' a Man. [7]
The is a Demonſtrative, and ſignifies the ſame as that, but
leſs emphatically. It denotes the Determination 'of one or
. more,
thk ſort oanli'y orAdjecti-ve is to he King, 'tis an uncertain,wan
generally obſcure in Engliſh, and dring and undetermin'dWord z but
rather plac'd in the Word of Affir. if you add '(the) to it, and ſay,'ti: a
mm'on, which is generally plac'd 'Iſappineſt to he the King, it deter
with it -, hilt in 'the Latin we' agree mines it to be' the King o'fthe Peo
With Mr. Johnſonagainſt Sane le mention'd before. So that theſe
tiut,ThattheTime is ſignify'd pret ittle Signs contribnte much to the
ty lainly by the PArticiple. . clearneſs of Diſcourſe.
[2] Namtxs generally ſignify The Latin; have none of theſe
Things in a general and unli'nited Sign: or Ar-ticler, Whence Sea/i
Senſe, but Signſ, or A'm'clet (as ger filfly concluded, that they were
ſome call them) reſtrain and deter uſeleſs; butheis indeed a Critic
mine the Signification of Names, ehat very often is imthexwrong : i
and apply them to a particular And here 'tis plain from the In
"fling, lfwe ſay, 'ri-r a Hazþinep ſtances given, that they atenecefl'a
rr
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 81
more, to which the general Word is actually apply'd. Thus
We uſe the Word Earth, when we deſign the Species or Ele
ment; but the Earth, when we mean the Globe of the Earth
(which is a certain determin'd Individual) 'tis plac'd with
both in the Singular or Plural Number, becauſe we may ſpeak
determinately of one, as well as more lndividuals. .
As neither of theſe are fix'd to a Word of a general signifi
cation, or proper Name, ſo are they not us'd when any other
Wality is preſirnt, that virtually contains 'em; as, a Man, one
Man, ſbme Man, an] Man 5 the World, this Mrld, for here one,
flme, any, this, certainl imply a and the.
There are, beſides, ome particular phraſes, as man] a Man,
ne-uer a Man, which differ from man] Men, no Men, as wet]
Man from all Men,- the former ſ niſy man) Men, all Men,
no Men, ſeparately, or taken diſtinctye the latter conjunctl ,
or collectively. Nor are the followin ahſolute] unlike theiz,
when (after ſuch, and the Particles 0 Compari on, at, ſh, too,
and ſcarce any others) the Quality (n) is interpos'd between
the Name and its Quality, (which is uſually put after it) as,
Such a Gtfi is too ſmall a Reward for ſh great a Lahom', and a:
great a Beneſit. -
C H A P. VIII.
OfAFFIRMATION.S.
[r] E come now to that Part of Speech, which is the
Soul _of a Sentencg for without this a Sentence
cannot ſubliſt, ſince nOthin can be ſpoken, that is affirm'd
or deny'd, without it. T e Latin; call this Part of Speech
Verbum, from whence our Engliſh Grammarians very awkard
2' have borrow'd Verb, which all other Nations, that borrow
om the Latin, call in their own Tongue Word, for that is
the plain Engliſh of Verbum: The V'ard was us'd by way of
Eminence; but if our Grammarians had us'd V/ard inſtead of
Verb, tho' it would have been more eaſy and obvious to the
Learnſſs Memory and Underſtanding, yet it would require a
long Explanation of its Nature, as a Part speech, nothin .
of that being contain'd in its Name; but t ic very Eſſence o?
it is expreſs'd in the Term Affirmation, ſince all Words of this
kind do affirm Something of SOmething; as will be plain from
the Notes on this Head.
[a] An'
[i] We have thus far explain'd Subject, as round. And beſides theſe'
thoſe Words, which ſignify the two TCMI, there is in that Prepo
Objects of our Thoughts, towhich fition another Word, which is the
Indeed the Prepofitions andAdverhs Connection of thoſe tonerms, andx
belong, tho' the Order of the Text which is properly the Action of the
has poſtpon'd 'emz We now come Mind, which affirms- the A'ttrihute
te conſider thoſe Word', which ſig of the Subject. Men are therefore,
nify the Manner, as Verlu, or Affir under an equal Neceflity of invent
maxia'u, Canjunr'ham, or joining ing Words, that mark and denote
Words, and Imerjectiom. the Affirmation, which is the prin
The Knowledge ofthe Nature of cipal Manner ofourThoughts,as to
the Verb, or Affirmation, depends invent thoſe, which mark the Ob
Oſ' what: has been ſaid at the begin jects of 'em. And this third Con
ang of theſe Notes on Words, and ncctive Term is whan is generally
tout is, that the judgment we make call'd a Ve'b, but morejntelligihly '
PfThingsms when I ſhy, the Earth an AFFIRMATION, ſince its
'I round) neceſſarily implies two chiefUſe is to ſignify the Affirmati- t
Terms, one call'd the SUBJECT, on zthat is, to ſhew, at the Diſ
which is the Thing of which the conrſe in which this Word is us'd, is
Affirmarion is made, as the Earl/2; theDiſcom-ſe of aMan,who not only
and the other the ATTRIBUTE, eonceives Things, but mdges, and
Much is, what is affirm'd of the affirm; ſhmething of'em z in whils;
34, The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
the Verb, or Affirmation is diſtin Verb, without joining any pan'
ghiſh'd from ſome Names and Am cular Attribute, there Wou'd be no
litics, which ſi nify Affrmation need of more than oneVerb in each
likewiſe; as A rmam, Affirmntio, Language, which is that we call
becauſe they do not fignify,that the Suhſtautive.
Thing is become the Object of our _ zdly, They haue join'd the Sub
Thoughts, 'by the Rcfledion ot'the ject of the Propofition on certain
Mind, and therefore do not mark, Occafions, ſo that two Words (nay,
that he who uſes thoſe Words aſ even one) may make an intire Pro
firms, but only, that he barely con Kſition -, two Words, as ſum Home,
Ceives an Affirmation. cauſe ſum not only ſignifies the
We have ſaid,that the chichſt oſ A mation, but includes the Sig.
the Verb, is to ſignify the Affirma mfication of the Pronoun, or Perfo
tion, becauſe we ſhall ſee, that the naI Name, Ego, I; WlllCh is the
Verb is likewiſe made uſe oſ, to Subject ok'the Propoſition. And in
ſignify othchotions ofthe Soul, as our own Tongue we always expreſs
to de ire, ra pray, to command, &e. it, 1 am a Man. One Word may
likewiſe expreſs an intire Pro _
but lt is only by changing the ln
flcction, and the Made. We ſhall fition ; as, vivo fedea, &e. I'Egr
at preſent only conſider the Verb in theſe Verlu include both the Afflr.
its chief Uſe and Siguification, marian and the Arrribure, as we
which is that which it has to the have already ſaid; and being in the
lndimtive, or firfi State, Made or firſt Perſon, they inclurle the Sub
aner. 1e;t likewiſe, as, I am living; I
Accordingto this Senſe, it may am fitting: And hence comes the
be ſaid,'that the Verb or A rmation Difference oſ Perſons, which is ge
ought to have no other U e, but the nerally in Verhs.
marking the Connection we- make gaily, They hare alſo join'd a Re- *
in out Minds, between the Terms of lation to the Time with reſpect to
a Propoſition. Thus there is only the Thing affirm'd z ſo that one
the Verb eſſe, to be, (which is call'd Word (as cznaſ'i) ſignifies that I
a Verh Subſtantive) thatremains in affirm to him, to whom I the
this Simplicity: And further, wc Action ofſupping, not for the pre
may ſay,that even this Verb is pro ſent Time, hut the paſt, Tl-ou baſt
rly thus ſimple, only in the third fupp'd. And from hence the Verbs
erſon ofthePreſcntTenſe orTime, derive their Diverfity of Times,(or
eji, it, and on certain Occafions: as the Vulgar has it,Tenſes) which '
For as Men naturally incline to is alſo generally common to all '
ſhorten their Exprelſwns, they have Verhs, or Words oſ Affirmation.
always join'd to the Affirmation ThePiverfity of theſe Significa
other Significations in the ſame tions, yom'd in the ſame Word, is
Word. ifl, They have join'd that what has hinder'd a great many, '
of ſome Attribute, by whichMeans otherwiſe of very good Capacities,
two Word: then make a Pro ſi from rightly underſtanding the Na
zion; as when 1 ſay,Petm: vwir, ture of the Verb ; becauſe they have
Peter liver, becauſe theWord viviſ not conſider'd it according to what
(or lives) inclndcs hoththe Affirma is effi'ntial to it, which is the Affir
tion, and Attritute oſ being alive, mation, but according to the vari
ſmre it is the ſame thing to ſay, ous Relations accidental to it, as a
Peter liver, and tPeter ir living; Verh, or Word of Affirmation.
thence ariſes the great Diverſity of ThusA'ri lot/e, confining himſelf
.'Verhs, in every Language -, where to the thir Signification, added to
as it the generalSignifimtion ofthe that which is cſſerrtial to it, defines
4 Blrmation were only given to the! a Verb, Vax figmficanr cum Tem
- pore,
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. '7 3
pore, a Word, that ſignifie: 'with Verhr active, ſignify Actiont, and
Time. Others, as Buxtorfiut, adding thoſe oſVerbr paflive Paſſions, as
to it the ſecond, defines it, Vox much as the Verbr themſelves from
flexili: cum Tempore, (s Ter-ſone', which they are form'd, and there
a Word that hat divert Inflectiont is no Reaſon to pretend, thatfluent
with Time and Ter/in', does'not ſignify a Thing'that paffis,
Others have confin'd themſelves as well as fluit. To which may he
to the firſtsignification,added to the added againſt the two firſt efini
Bſſential, which is that of the At tions of the Verb, that the articl
tribute; and conſidering, that the pLels ſignify alſo with Time, there
Attrilmtet Men haile join'd to the 'nga preſent, aEaſt, and a future,
Affirmation in the ſame Word, are eſpecial y in the atin and Greek,
commonlyA ctives andPaffives,have &c. And thoſe who (not without:
thought the Eſſence of a Verb con Reaſon) believe, that a Yocarive
ſlſtsin ſignifying the Action! and Cafe is truly the ſecond Perſon,
'Paffiann And in fine, uliut Sca eſpecially when it has a different
liger thought,that he ha diſcover'd Termination from the Nominative,
a great Myſtery in his Book of the will find, that on that Side there
Principlet of the Latin Tongue, by wou'd be but a Different-e oſ the
ſaying, that the' Diſtinction of more, or the leſs, between the (Par
Thingsinto Permanente: 83 fluen titiple and thel/erh. And thus the
IPJ, Thingtpermaneht or Iafling, or eflkntial Realon,why a Participle
fix', and paſſingmrthar paſ: away, is not aVerb, is, that it does not.
wasthe true Original of the Diſtin ſignify the Affirmation; whence i'
ction of Name', or'Nount and Verbt comes, that to make a Propoſition,
or Affirmntiom; ſince Name: are which is the Property of the Verh,
to ſignify the former, and Vetlu the the Partici le muſt add a Verh,that
latter. But we maycaſily perceive is, reſtore t at which was taken a
that theſe Definitions are falſe, and way, by turning the Verh into the
do by no means explain the true Partitiple. For how comes it that:
Nature of the Verb. Term: 'tri-vit, Peter liver, is aTra
The manner ofthe Connection of poſition; and Term: tri-vent, Peter
the two firſt ſhew it ſufficiently, be living, is not ſo, unleſs eſt, it, le
cauſe 'tis not there expreſs'd what added, as Petru: eſt wit-vent, Peter i:
the Verb ſignifies, but only that living, - but becauſe that Affirmati
with which. it ſignifies, wiz. Cum on (which is in vivit) was taken a
Tempore, cum Perform; the two way by making the Particiþle oi
latter are ſtill worſe, having the eent ? Whence it appears, that the
two great Vices of Definitions, Affirmation, that is, or is not found
which is to agree 'regne amni, ne in a Word, makes it to be, or not
eſali. For therearel'erbtwhich to be a Verb. n
ignify neither Action: nor Pafliom, Upon which we may obſerve en
nor what paſſes away, as exiſtlit, paſſant, that the lnfinitivc Made ar
te tit, rivet, a] et, rape', m et, Form, or Mood, which is very often
glbetſ, wiſer: darest, &e. oſ which a Noun or Name, (as when we ſay
we may have occaſion to ſpeak elſe in French, [e Boire, le Manger) is
where. different from Participles, the Par
There are Words, which are not ticiples being Noun Adjectives, or
Verlu, that ſignify Actions andPaſ what we call Qui/Her: But the '
ſions, and even Things tranſient,ac lnfiniti've Moodt are Noun Sub
cording to Scaliger's Definition. flantivet, or Name: made by Ab- .
For 'tis certain, that Tarticiple: (traction of thoſe Adjecti'ver; in
(or (Lualities deriv'd from Verbs) the ſame manner as of Candiduſ, -
are true Noun', and yet thoſe oi Candor is made, and of "Wire, *"
I Witite
74 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
Whitenefr. Thus ruber,a Verb, fig tum De Ignatiane Perſoncc, (But a
nifies i! red, including the Affirma Word zgniffying the Affirmation of
tion and the Attributez rubem, the fame Attribute, wilb the Dejignn
Participle ſignifies only Red, with. tion of Perſon, Number and Time.
out Afiirmation, and Rubere taken We may likewiſe tranſrently ob
for a Noun, ſignifies Redneft. ſerve, that the Affilmation, (as
It ſhou'd, therefore, be allow'd a 'tis conceiv'd) may be the Attri
conſtantRule, that confideringflm hute of the Verb alſo, as in the
ply what is eſſential to a Verb, the Verb Affirmo, which Verb ſignifies
only truev Definition is oox figmfi Twa Affirmatiom, one regards
cam Affirmarivnem, a Word 'bar the Perſon ſpeaking, and the
ſ'gnifie: an Affirmation, ſince We other the Perſon ſpoken oſ, whe
can find no Word, that marks an ther it be of himſelf, or of ano
Affrmation, vbut what is a Verb; ther. For when we ſay, Term: aſ.
nor any Ver-II but what mnlks it (at flrmat, it is the ſame as to ſay, Pe
leaſt) in the Indicative, or firſt rrur eſt nflh'mam, and then e/i
Meed: And there can no manner of marks our Affirmation, and the
doubt be made, thatifaWord were Judgment we make concerning Pe
invented, as Eſſ wou'd be, which ter and qfi'z'rmam, that we conceive
ſhould always mark the Affirma and attribute to CPeter.
tion,without having anyDifl'erence The Verb NEGO (on the con
of Time or Perſon -, ſo that the Di trary) contains by the ſame Rea
verfity of Perſon ſhou'd le marlfd ſon an Affirmation and Ncgation.
only by Naum or Namer, and Pra Fc': it muſt 'be farther obſerv'd, '
ndmu or Terfmml Name', and the that tho' all Judgments are not
Dlverſity of Times by Adverln or qffirmativefind that there are ſome
added Wordr, (as in Engliſh) it Ncgatives, nevertheleſsI/'erbr never
wou'd however 'be a true Ver/7. As ſignify any thing of themſelves,
in the Propofitinns, which the Phi but Affirmations; Negations are
loſopheis call eternally true, as God only mark'd by Particles, or little
is infinite, Body is divgible, 'be Words, as non," ne, band, &e. on
'whole is greater than it: * art: 5 the by Nouns that imply it, as Nullur,
Vford (h) implies only the ſimple nema, &e. which being join'd to
Signification, without any Rela Verbr, change the Affirmation into
tion to Time, becauſe 'tis tme a Ncgation, as, no Man i: immar
to all Times, and without our ral, Nullum carf-uſ eſt indiwfibile.
Minds ſhipping at any Direrſity of Tho' mnch of' theſe Notes, which
Parſon. relntc to the Knowledge of the
Thus the Verb (according to what true Nature of a Verb, may
iseffimtial to it) is a Word 'but [ib ſeem to (and indeed in many
'u'fler Affirmaſion. But if we Things do) relate more to the dead
Would jorn its principal Accidents, Languages than the living, yet
it may be thus defin'd, Vox fi m'fi there is nothing advanc'd which
cam Affirma'ionem, cum De 'gna will not be uſeſul to the Student
tiqne Per-ſome, Numeri (5 Tempo of GRAMMAR, ſince by theſe
ris, a Word wlzichfignifie: Affirmet Ohſervatiom he will enter into the
tion wit/1 the Defignation of 'be very Eſſence oſ the Art, and ſee in
Perſon, Number and Time, which what it- is ſounded on the Nature
agrees properly with the Verb Sub oſ Things; and we are very cer.
fiami-ue. But for the others, in as tain, that great Part of theſe Note:
much as they differ by that Union are equally advantageous to our'
Men have made of the Affirma'ian underſtanding the Nature of our
with certain Anributer, they may own Words, and in what they are ,
be thus dcfin'd, oxfignificanr Aſ. ſounded on the general Reaſon of
firmationem altcuju: Attribu'i, all Languach. *
[2.] We
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 7 5,
[2.] An Affirmation (ar the Wbrd do's ſhow)
Something affirmr, and doe: Number know,
[3] And Time and Perſon; whether it expreſſ
Action, Being, Paffion; or their V/ant confefl.
An Affirmation is a Part of Speech (as the Word imports)
which affirms ſome Attribute, with the Deſignation of Time,
Number, and Perſon, expreſſmg being, doing, or ſuffiring, or the
Want of them, or the like.
Tn'o Times the Engliſh Language only know,
The the preſent, next the paſſing ſhow: :
And the h] diff'rent Ending: are made known
By addmg (d), or (ed), are moflly ſhown;
The preſent Love, the_paſſ1nglov'd do': make,
Or elſe flame other Affirmations take
Before it, which it: different Times declare,
And in the Rules of Affirmation ſhare.
All Affirmation: affirming in Time, this Time is exprefi'd
either by different Endings, as Low, Io-v'd, or loved,- burn,
burn'd, or burned,- or by putting other Affirmations before
them, which alſo expreſs the Manner of the Affirmation, as
have, ſhall, will, might, wou'd, ſhoa'd, &e. as will be ſeen in
the Sequel.
In Engliſh we have but two Times diſtinguiſh'd by the
different Endin s; the pro/int is the Affirmation it filfl as I
love; the ſecong is the pnffing, as I Io-u'd: All other Times are
expreſs'd by the 'foreſind Words.
The Perſonal Names the Perſians do expreſi,
As, l, thou, he, we, ye, and they conflfl.
With theſe their 'various Endings too agree,
A: me by love, loveſt, and loves may ſee.
The Perſons of the Affirmations are always expreſs'd by
thePerſonal Names I, thou, he, in the singular, and We, ye,
Pryou, and they, in the Plnral Number; the two firſt reach
ln only themſelves, the third all other Names, 'becauſe all
of er NAMES are of the third Perſon. They alſo vary their
Endings in theſſ ſecond and third Parſon Singularz as I love.
thou loweſt, he loves; me, ye, and they love, in the preſent
Time, and I loved, thou loved/t, he Io-uedin the paffing'Time;
the Soldier fighte, God prevails. I Io-ve, beſides the firſt Per
ſon, denotes the Time When I love, that is, the preſent Time
when I am ſpeaking,- but by. adding (d), it ſignifies the Time
PRffing, aS-I loved, lade, or didlo-ue. -
In. ' [4.]'1he
'76 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
[a] We have in the 'foregoing properly agrees only to rational
Notes obſerv'd, that the Diverſity oſ and intellectual Beings, and ſo is
(Perſanr and Number: in Affirma proper but to the Two former,
n'am or Ver-In, proceeds from the ſince the third is for all other Sorts
joining in the ſame Word the Sub of Things, and not for Perſons only.
ject of the Prnpofition, at leaſt on By that wc ſee, thatnaturally what
certain Occafions. to the Affirma we call the third Perſon ought to
zion oper to the Verb, to ſhorten bethe Theme of the Verb, as it is
the flpreffion, (tho' this will not alſo in all the Oriental Tongues;
hold in moſt Modern Tongues, at for it is more natural, that: the
leaſt in none which want Variety Vcrb ſhould ſignify properly the Af
of Terminations,to diſtinguiſh the ffirmationpvithout making any Sub
Perſons, (which we do by Perſonal ject in particular, and that aſter
Names) for when a Man ſ ks of wards it be determin'd by a new In
himſelf, the Subject of the ropoſi flection, to include the firſt or ſe
tion -.IS the Pronoun or (Perfonal cond Perſon ſor a Subject.
Name, of the firſt Perſon va, I, This Diverfity of Terminat ions
and when he ſpeaks of him to for the firſt Perſon ſhews, that the
whom he addreffes himſelf,the Sub AncientLanguages had a great deal
_ ject oſ the Propoſition is the Pro of Reaſon not to join the Pronau'u
noun or the lecond Perſon Tu, thou, ofthe firſt and ſecond Perſon to the
you. Verb, but very rarely (and on parti
" Now that he may not always be cular Conſiderations) contenting
oblig'd to uſe theſe Pronouns, it has themſelves to ſay, video, 'vide-r, 'vi
been thought ſufficient to give to demm, videlif, becauſe theſe Ter
the Word which ſignifies the Af minations were originally invented
firmation, a certain Termination, for this very Reaſon, oiz. to avoid
which ſhews that it is of himſelf a joining the Pronouns to the Verbs ;
'Man ſpeaks, and gthat is what is Yet allthe vulgar or livingLangua
rall'd the firſt Perſou of the Verb, ges, and ours eſpecially, always
as Video, I fee. pain tþem tob their Verbs; for we
The ſame is done with reſpect to ſee,ay, &c.ee,t
the (m ceſ', or
Reſaſon an ee,may
ofywhifch 'we
him, to whom a Man addreſſes him
ſelf; and this is call'd the ſecond he, or rather plainly is, that our
Per-ſon, vider, 'Pan ſeeſt, or you ſee. Verbs have no diſtinct Terminati
And as theſe Pronouns have their ons to expreſs the Perſons without
'PIm-a I', that ſignify more than one, them.
as when a Man talking of himſelf But beſides theſe two Numbers,
joins others, as ur, we; or of him, Singular and P/m'al, which are in
to whom he ſpeaks, hy 'oining o Verbs as well as Nouns, the Greek:
thers, as you, to two di erent Ter have a (Dual Number, which is
minations in the Latin, are join'd proper only to two, but this is not
to the Plural, as videmnr, 'we ſee, ſo Commonly made uſe of, as the
videtir, you ſee. other two.
But becauſe often the Subject oſ The Oriental Languages thought
the Propoſition is neither a Man's it &roper to diſtinguiſh, when the
ſelf, nor the Perſon to whom he A rmation related to the one, or
ſpeaks, 'tis neceſſary not only to the other, and to the Maſculine, or
reſerve theſe two Terminations to Feminine; for this Reaſon they
thoſe two Perſons, but that athird gave the ſame Perſon of the Verh
be made, to he join'd to all other two Terminations to expreſs the
Subje zts ofa Propoſition. And this two Genders, which indeed is a
is what is call'd the third Perſon, as great hel in avoiding Equi-vacah.
well in the singular Number, as [3] he Signification of the
Plnnlz tho: the Word Parſon Time, is another Thing, which we
have
775'e Engliſh Gi-ammar, with Notes. '77
have ſaid to be ioin'd to the Affir theſe Tenſes,with aRelation to an
mation of the Verb; for the Affir other by one Word, other Infle
mation is made according to diffe ctions have betn invented in the
rent Times, ſince we may affirm a Verbs or Affirmations, which may
Thipg iſ, waſ, or 'will be: whence he call'd the Compound Tenfu, or
other lnflectionsare given to Verbr, Timeſ. ,
figniſyingtheſe ſeveralTimes,which The firſt is that which marks
our Engliſh Grammnrians have by the Paſt, in relation to the Preſent,
a tarbarous Word call'd Tenſer. and 'tis call'd the Preterimperfect.
But there are but threeſimple Ten Tenſe,ur Time, becauſe it marks
fer, or Timer, thePrefent, as amo, not the Thing ſimply and properly,
I law), the Tafl, as amaw, l have as done, but as imperfect, and pre
loved; and the Furure, as amaba, ſent, with reſpect to a Thing which
I will (or ſhall) love. ls already nevertheleſs paſt. Thus
But becauſe in the Paſt one may when I ſay, Cum in'ra'oit carnabam,
mark, that the Thing is but juſt I war at Supper 'when he enrer'd,,
paſt or done, or indefinitely, that it the Action of Supping is paſt in
was done; it from this proceeds reſpect of the Time, of which I
that in the greateſt Part ofthe Vul ſpeak, but I mark it as preſent in
gar Languages there are two Sorts reſpect of the Thing, oſ which I
of Preterit: or Faſt Timer, one that ſpeak, which is the Enn'ance offucb
marks the Thing to he preciſely a one.
done, and is therefore call'd Defi The ſecond Compound Time, or
nite; as, I have written, 1 have Tenſe, is, that which doubly marks
ſaid; and the other that marks or the paſt, and on that Account iscal
denotes it done indcterminately, led the Preterpluyerfcct Tenſe, or.
and therefore call'd Indefinite or the Time more than perfectly paſt;
Awiſtur; as, I wrote, I waſ), I Ca-nawram, I budſupp'd 5 hy which
din'd ; which isproperly only ſpoke I denote my Action ofſupping,nor
of a Time, at leaſt oſ a Day's Di only as paſt in it ſelf, but alſo' as >
ſtance from that, in which we ſpeak. paſt in reſpect to another Thing,
But this holds truer in the French which is alſo paſt; as, I had ſupp'd
Language, than in any other, for wben be enter'd; which ſhews my
in that they ſay, Tecrivir bier, I Supping was before his Entrance;
'wrote Tej'ierdny, but not Y'ecrieir which is alſo paſt.
te' Ilium, nor TetriviI-cerre Nuir, The Third Compound Time is'
but jay ecrit ce Matin, fay ecrit thgt which denotes the Future with .
cene Nuit, &c. reſpect Io the Paſt, viz. the Futul'e
The Fumre will alſo admit of Perfect,- as Cwmwero, 1 ſhall have
the ſame Differencesz for we may ſupp'dz byiwhich Iv makay Adh
have a mind to denote or mark a on of Supping as Future it ſelf, and'
Thing that is ſuddenly to be, Pa'ſs'd in regard to another Thing
Thus the Greek: have their Paulu to comc,that is to follow, as when'
pof: future ,_ &Ar'yav (404va , [ſhall have fltpp'a', be 'will enler;;
which marks the Thing about to be which is to ſhy, That my Supper
done, as gfifinuzy, I am about (which is not yet come) will he paſt.
'ar/0 if: And we may alſo mark when his Entrancc (which is alſo
a Thing, that is ſimply to happen not yet come) will be preſent.
as, gon'qag, I 'will do It; amabo,} Thus a ſourth Compound Time
'will ſave. may be added, that is, tliaowliich
This is what-we may ſay of the marks the Future with Reiation to -
Times,orTenſes of Verbs, conſider. the Preſengto make as many-Com
ing 'em fimply in their Nature, as pound Futures as Com pound I'z etev
Preſent, "Faſt, and Future. But be rits, or Faſt Times, or Tenſes; and
cauſſ it hasbeenthought fit to man: perhaps the ſecond Future of the-
1 3 , Grec
'78 He Engliſh Gramm'ar, with Notes.
[4] The ollowing Nine are qf ma general Uſe,
An various Meam'ng: in t e reſt produce ,
Do, will, and ſhall, muſt, ought, and may,
Have, am, or be, this Doctrine will diffilayl.
For theſe Neceffity, or Pow'r, or Will,
And Time, or But] are expreffing ſtill.
Of Affirmations, the following Nine are moſt generally us'd,
being placed before all other Affirmations, to ſignify their
Time, Power, Will, Liberty, Neceffity, Duty, be. Of theſe
therefore, it is neceſſary we firſt treat.
Do does the Preſent Time with Force exPrefi, i
with (d) than (t), becauſe of the like Direction of the Breath
to the Noſtrils; as you may find in the Notes to this Gram
mar on the Formation of thoſe Letters; thus, liv'd,ſmil' raz'd,
belie-U'd, &c. from live, ſmile, nue, believe.
Except when the long Vowel is ſhortned before I, m, n, r,
or when (h) and (a) are chang'd into (p) or (f), and the ſofter
Sound oF (:) paſſes into their harder, as, felt, delt, dremt,
mew, left, bereft, &c. from to feel, deal,'dream, mean, len-va,
&erect-va, &c.
But
ſhe' Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 83
But whenſſ (d) or (t) go before, and are join'd by (d) 01
(z), (in this contracted Form), they incorporate with the
radical (d) or (t), into one Letter; that is, if (t) be the radi
cal Letter, they unite into (t), but if (d) be the radical Let
ter, then they incorporate into (d) or (e), according as this,
or that Letter is t e eaſier to be pronounc'd, as read, led,
ſpread, dread, ſhred, tread, bid, hid, chid, fed, bled, bred, ſþed,
ſlrid, ſlid, rid, &e. (which, doubtleſs, were originally, read'd,
bid'd, &e. as it were, read'd, bid'd, &c.) from to read, lead,
c'þread, ſhed, dread, ſhread, bid, hide, chide, feed, bleed, breed,
ſpeed, ſtride, ſlide, ride, &e. thus, eaſt, hurt, coſt, burſt, eat,
beat,ſweat, ſit, quit, ſmit, writ, bit, hit, met, ſhot, &e. (tho'
perhaps theſe Words wou'd for the Diſtinction of the paffing
Time from the preſent, be better ſpelt; eatt, heart, bin, hitt,
&c.as it were,.eat't, bit't, Kt't, &c.) from theſe WOR D S, to
uſ', hurt, cqſl, burſt, eat, beat, ſweat, fit, quit, ſmite, write, bite,
hit, meet, ſhoot, &c. thus, lent, fine, rent, girt, &e. for lend'd,
ſend'd, &c. from to lend, ſend, rend, gird, &C.
Tho' this Irregularity be ſometimes loſt, and the regular
Spclling obſerv'd, as plac'd, fiſh'd, &c. yet 'tis but ſeldom, and
in few Words. -
There are not a few other irregular W O R D S in the paffing
Time, but thoſe, which are more particular and ſpecial, may be
reduc'd to their Claffits; as,
1. Whn, ſpitn, begun, ſwam, ſlruele, ſung, flung, flung,
ning, wrung, ſþrung, ſwung, drunk, ſimk, ſhrunle, ſtank, hung,
wine, run, found, bound, ground, wound; many of them are
Eikewiſe ſpelt with (u), as began, ſang, rang, ſtrong, drank,
fame, ran, and ſome others, thq' not ſo often; from to win,
ſhin, begin, ſwim, ſlrihe, ſtir/e, ſing, ſting, fling, ring, wring,
ſpring,ſ1oing, drink, ſink, ſhrinh, ſtink, hang, come, .run, find,
find, grind, Wind, &ce. ' i * ' "
2. Foaght, taught, raught, ſbught, beſhught, raught, bought,
thought, thought, Wrought ,- from to ſight, teach, reach, ſeek, be
]Þeth, catch, buy, bring, think, Work ,- yet ſome of theſe ſome
times keep their Regularity; as reach'd, beſeech'd, eateh'd,
Work'd, &c. '
z. Took, ſhook, fbrſhok, woke, awoke, ſtood, broke, ſpoke,
bore, ſhare, ſwore, tore, wore, wort/e, aloue, ſtrove, thro-ve, dro'ue,
lime, roſe, 'at-tye, ſmote, wrote, bode, abode, roſe, choſe, trod, got,
"For, forgot, rod,- ſome likewiſe write thrive, riſe, ſmit,
Wit, abid, rid, &c. others from them by (a), as brake, ſpake,
[We ſhare, ſware, tare, ware, tlave, gar, begat, ſorgar, and per
l'APs ſome others; but this Way is ſeldom, and very uino
' tcz
84 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
lite, the preſent Times of theſe Words are, rake, ſhake, for
ſake, make, awake, ſtand, break, ſþeale, hear, ſhear, ſwear, tear,
wear, meam, olea-ue, (to cling to), elea-ue (to ſplit), [tri-ye,
dri've, ſhine, riſe, artſo, ſmite, write, bide, abide, ride, chaſe (or
chooſe) tread, beget, forget.
4.. Give, bid, fit, having their paſſing Times, ga-ue, bad,
ate.
ſ. Draw, know, ſnow, grow, throw, blow, crow, fy, ſlay, flee,
I), make their paſſing Times, drew, knew, ſhew, (or rather
ſnored) grew, than? ble-T, (or ratherflblow'dzl) crfiow, (or rather
erow'd5)
Theſe 2ijen', en', the
all,flor aw,mojſl't
a , jlzart
ee (orat leyaſt,flc:f
e) ,- theom go, Conſe
moſt went.
CHAP.
9
[4] In this Place we ſhall alſo Timey, making ſome ſerve for ſun
add what we have to ſay of the ple Affirma'iom', as 'o-ueor, lov'd ;
Meed: or Form: of Verbr, as Af and others for thoſe Affirma'ionr
firmatiom. We have therefore al which were modiſy'd, as, might
ready ſaid, that Verbs are of that have lov'd, 'would have lov'd -, tho'
kind of Words that ſignify the Man not conſtantlyobſerving the Rules,
ner and Form of our Thoughts, the they made uſe of ſimple Inflections
chief of which is Affirmation : to etſrP-uereor,
as, ex reſs modified
for erſ? Affirmatiom,
'vere-ar 3 and
And we have alſo obſerv'd, that
they receive different Inflections, 'tis oftheſe latterSort ofInflections,
aceordingas the Affirmarion relates that the GRAMMARIANS make
to differentTerſon: and Time: 5 but their Mood call'd the SubjunHi-ve :
Men have found, that it was proper Moreover (beſides the [Win-nation)
to invent otherlnflections alſo more the Action oſourWill may be ta
diſtinctly to explain what pa s'd in ken for a Manner of our Thought,
their Minds. For firſt they obſerv'd, and Men had Occafion to mark
that beſides fim le Affirmations,as what they would have underſt00d,
he lover, he lo-u d, &e. there were as well as what they thought.
others conditional and modify'd, as Now we may will a Thing ſeveral
Tho' he might have lov'd, tho' he Ways, of which three may be con
'would have lov'd, &e. and the bet ,fider'd as chief: t
ter to diſtinguh'h theſeAflirmariom
from the others, they doubl'd the ſir. We would have Things that
Inflections of the ſame Tenſer or do not depend on ourſelves,and then
' ' ' we
He Engliſh Gramm'ar, 'with Notes.
We 'will it only by a ſimple wiſh the Fnture, it thencehappens, that
95
which is explain'd in Latin by thethe Imperati-ve and Fu'ure are of
Particle Urinam, and incur-Tongue ten taken one for another, eſpecial
by 'would to God. Some _Langua
ly in the Hebrew, as non occider,
ges (as the Greek) have invented
particular Inflections for that t you 'ſhall not kill, for kill no' :
which has given occaſion to the Whence it comes to paſs, that ſome
GRAMMARIANS to call them GRAMMARLANS have plat'
the lmperaIi-ueamong the Futurer.
the Optati've Mood: And there's in
French, and in the SPanzfly, and Oſ all the Moods we have been
Italian, ſomething like it, ſmee ſpeaking of, the Oriental Tongues
have only this latter, which is the
there are triple Teiiſes; but in o-x
Imperative : And on the contrary,
thers, the ſame Inflectionsſerve for
the Subjunctive and Optatrve; and the Vulgar Tongues have no parti
for this Reaſon one may very well cular Inflection for the Imperativc,
retrench this Mood in the Latin but our way of marking it in the
Conjugations; for 'tis not only the
French, is to take the ſecond Perſon
different way of ſignifying, which plural, and even the firſt, without
may be very much multiply'd, but the Pronouns that go bcfore 'cm :
the different lnflections that ought us Van: aimez, Tau love, is a
to make Moods. ſimple Affirmation; aimez an Im
perative. Noiu aimonr, We love;
2.. We 'will ſometimes after ano
ther manner, when we content our aimdne an Impeiative: But when
ſelves with grunting a Thing, tho' we command by theSingular,which
abſelntely we would not do it; as is very rare, we do not take the ſe
when Terenee ſays, Trofnndar, per cond Perſon, Tu aimez, but the firſt,
dear, perear, Let him lov'ſt), ler/rim arme. "v i,
fink, let him periſh,&e Men might There's another Inflection of a
haveinvented anlnflection to mark bVerb, that admits ofneither Num
thisMovement, as well as they have er nor Perſon, which is what we
invented one in Greek, to mark a call Infinitive; as eſſe, e/t're, to be;
fimfle Deſire, but they have not be amare, aimer, to love. But it mufl:
done it, and make uſe of the Sub ohſcrv'd,that ſometimes the Infi
juncti-ve for it; and in French and nitivc retains the Affirination, as
Engliſh we add qu'e, Ier. Some when l ſay, Scio 'no/um eſſe fn
GRAMMARIANS have call'd giendum, l know the Evil is to be
this the Potential Mood, Mediu avoided; then often it loſesit, and
Porentialir, or Modnr Conee ionirl. becomesa Noun,cſpecially inGreek
and the Vulgar Tongues, as when
3. The third ſort of Willl'lg is, we ſay, Le boire, le manger, and
when what we 'will depends on'a
Perſon, ofwhom we may obtain it, alſo je 'vieux boire, volo bibere :
ſignifying to him the Deſire we for 'tis as much as to ſay, Volo pa
have rim: he 'will do it. This is tnm, or potmnem,
the Motionwehavewhen we coni his being fiippos'd, 'tis deman
mand or pray. 'Tis to mark this
ded what the Infinitivc is properly,
when 'tis not a Noun, bur retains
Motion, that the Mood call'd Impe
its Affirmation; as in this Exam
rati-vewasinvonted .- It has _no firſt
Perſon, eſpecially in the Smgulor, ple, Seio mit/um e e fugiendum s'
I know of no Body that has taken
becauſe one cannot properly com
'mond one's ſelf z nor the third in Notice of what I am about to ob
ſerve, which is, that we think the
ſeveralLanguages, becauſe we don't
properly command any but thoſe lnfinitives among the other Moods ,
to whom we addreſs and ſpeak. of Verbs, what the Rclative is a
And becauſethe Command or Deſire mong the Pronounsz for asthe Rc
lative has more in it than the other
in this Mood has always regard to Pronouns, thatit joynsthe Propoſl
K tion
"fi-l
CHA P. IX.
OfPARTICLES, or Manner-s of W o-r. os;
.'BCjircumſtance
PARTICLES and;theſe ſt-ueml
Manner Thing: are
of Words are ſhown,
done;
Il. Comparati-ueh.
Excefsz as, very, exceeding , taa- mach, more, miſfi
' as more hardly, ma
By '2. Defect; as almoſt, well nigh, little leſx, leaſt of all.
ſi Likeneſs, or Equality; as ſi', alike, as it were, as.
Unlikeneſs, or lnequalityz as, otherwiſe, dlflhrtntl/W.
4" far otherwiſe. III. Of
r ** '*_*'l
ro4. The Engliſh 'Grammar,' with Notes.
Ill. Of Place.
f
Preſence in a Place, anſwering to the (lueſtion
thWPas here, there, elſizwhere, every where, no
1. where, ſbmewhere elſe, oha-ue, below, within, with
out,- or to thc (lueſtioſh with whom? as, toge
ther, at once, apart, ſeveral'g,
Denote 2. Motion from a Place; as whence, hence, thence.
gMotion towards a Place; as V/hirherwonls, hither
3 worth, thitherwardx, otherwnnl, toward, upward,
backward. V
The Way to a Place-5 as Whither mony, thir, that, or
4 another may. Tho' theſe are ſcarce to be allow'd
Particles, _or Manners of Words.
' The Term or End of Motion, as whither, hither,
Lf' thither, whitherto, hitherto,
IV. Of Time.
Being in Time; as, when? either the Preſent, as
now, to do) 5 the. Paſt, as already, reſtenlay, before,
long ſince, heretofore, the Future, as Ta-morrow,
Denote not ye', afler, hereafler, hencefbrwnrd.
Duration and Continuance; how long ;? a long while,
2" Z ſlowly, quicklj, ſhortly, hitherto.
erciffitudc, or Repetition; how dam)- vften, ſinne
3. times, ſeldom, daily ,- yearly; by tnmr, alternately 5
once, twice, thrice, ten timer, &c.
Thoſe that are deriv'd- from &talk-in, which admit De ees
of Compariſon, dotthe lime; as hardl , more hordl , mo , or
'very hardly.
The ſtrond Sort, thar/hew of Word: the State,
And how th V/ord to Others door relare,
Yon in the flllawing Catalogne will find,
And how 'in Uſe and Meaning i: to each offign'zl.
OF] denotes Relations betwixt the Word that goes before,
and the Word that follows it, whether that Word be
Name, Quilt), or Affirmotion; as, the Son of Adam,
but this properly belongs to Conſtruction, to which we
refer you.
It ſignifies concerning, or the Objects, or Matter about
which you ſpeak or write; as, a Treatiſe of Virtue, or on
ex concerning Virtue. ' Th
e
The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes. 105
The Mette; as, a Cup of Gold.
The Means, (or WITH) to die if Hunger
al; ſignifies AMONG; as, of Five Horſts, Four were
in .
THRQUGH ; 'tis of God's great Merty: But this is a
Vulgariſm; and ſcarcc worth Notice.
FROM, South of Windſor.
OFF] ſignifies Separation and Diſtance, and has its Oppoſitc
in ON, which implies Continuation; as, to Put off; to
Put on ,- He put offhis Hat, he ſtood off to Sea. It ſigni
fies Delayz He put me offfrom Day to Day, he is off and
on with me. .
FROM] implies the Term from which, or Motion, and is op
pos'd to TO; as, He went from Hackney to London;
from Head to Foot, from firy'l to laſt, from hence to
thence, &c.
It ſignifies OFF; as, He took 'ne from the Ground', or
fiom off the Ground. Out of Sincerity, I ſpeak it from
my Heart.
TO (Unro, not much us'd) ſignifies Motion to, I go to Wind
ſhr 5 faithful to his Sovereign." ,
IN] to Day, i. e. in this Day, To-morrow.
FOR] ſhe had a thoaſhnd Pound: to her Fortune.
BEFORE] you promiſe me to my Face.
ABOUT, or concerning] speak to the Head va agreed
on.TOWARDS] ſiIXthanlc you fbryoar Kindnefl to me.
CHA P. X.
OfSENTENCEs.
Jt leaſt, Three Mind: a Sentenre muſt contain',
H/br'ch muſt ſhme Sentiment or Thought explain.
Sentencc comprehends at leaſt Three Words, by which
ple will render the Uſi: more plain; as, O! God! the Me
morial of thy Lo-ve to Son: of Men, fi'om the Beginnirzg of
the V'orld to thir Day, is recorded with Than/rfidneſt in the
Heart: of the Religiom. All theſe Particles in this Sentence
ſhew the Relation or Reference of Name to Name, and their
Connection, in that Manner with each other.
Between the Win-11: wheffe Ref'rencc they expreſſ',
Theye Particles demand the certain Plate.
Theſe Partielex, which denote the Dependance of one
thing on another, or the Reference or Relation of one Word
to another, muſt naturally be plac'd betwixt them whoſe
Relation
3. Ot
111. Sno
'l'
on,
126 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
III. Suhflitution, is the uſing one Word for another, or the
Mode, State, Manner, Perſon, or Number of a Word for ano
ther: And the Conſtruction indeed often lies in the Senſe, and
not in the Words; as The whole Nation were in an Uproar;
where the whole Nation is put for all the People of the Nation.
Part of the Men are Kill'dz Part and Nation ſignifying Num
ber, (tho' the Name be of the Number ſignifying one) it puts
the Affirmation in the Plural, or the Number ſignifying many,
but it may be in either.
CHAP XI.
Of Stops or Pan/'es in Sentences ; the Uſh of Mark:
in H/riting, and Ahhreviations of Mrds. r
ROM what has been ſaid of Sentences, 'tis plain, that in
a full Sentencc there may be Four Members, viz. Com
ma, (,) Semicolon (,) Colon (:) and Period, or Full-ſtop (,)
and theſe bear a kind of muſical Proportion of Time one to
another: For a Comma ſtops the Reader's Voice, while he
may privately tell one, the Semieolon, Two, the Colon, Three,
and the Period, Four.
The Uſe of theſe Points, Pauſes, or Stops, is not only to
give a proper Time for Breathing, but to avoid Obſcurity
and Confuſion oſ the Scnſe in the joining Words together
in a Sentence. After a Comma always follows ſomething
elſe which depends upon that which is ſeparated from it by
a Comma,- as,
IHS. Jeſus, The Three Let Fol. Folio, a Book ofthe lar
ter: of his Name in Greek. geſſ Size, or a whole sheet,
V.l).M. Verbi Dei Miniſter, 4to. Qui-to, a Quarta of a
Miniſter ofthe PVord ofGod. sheet.
Philom. Philomathes, a Io'uer 8vo. Octavo, having Eight
of Learning. Leave: to a Shoet.
P. S. Poſtſcript, after written. ramo. Duodecimo, Twelvet,
N. B_ Nota Bene, marle well. or a sheet divided into 12.
Sc. et, and. Partr, a: this Grammar.
Vid. Vide, ſee. A Column is half a Side of a
Viz. Videlicet, or Videre licet, Leaf, a: in the Notes ofthi:
ouma ee.
i. idemjljt-heſkme. Book.
al. Aulus, Aftemoon.
i. e. id eſt, that is. M. Menſis, a Month.
q. quaſi dicat, a: he ſhould Dies Dominicus, vel Solis, vel
a . Sabbati, Sunday.
Sc. Scilicet, or Scire licet, Dies Lunar, Monday.
you may know. Dies Martis, Tmfilay.
ctc. et cactcra, the rofl. Dies Mercurii, martyr/ay.
&e. et coetcra, and ſh fltrth, or Dies jovis, Thurſilay.
ſhun. Dies Veneris, Friday.
N. L. Non Liquet, z't appear: Dies Saturni, Saturday.
not. A. D. Annoq; Domini, in the
Dit. Ditto, theſame. Year of our Lord.
Cent. Centum, an Ham/rod; Georgius Rex, King
Per Cent. by the Hundred. George.
e. Exempli Gratia, Exam
G. R. Anno Regni, in the
e. ' Year of the Reign.
v. g. Verbi Gratia, upon my N. S. New Stile.
V/onl. . Fra. Francis, Frances.
Pag. Pagina, side, or Page. Cl. Clericus, a clergy-man, or
L. Linea, Line. Clerk.
lib, Liber, Book. Pr. Prieſt.
Deae. Deacon.
By;
>r 30 The Engliſh Grammar, with Notes.
Bp.BiſhoP. M. Manipulus, a Handful.
A. Bp. Arch-Biſhop. S. S. Semiſſis, half a Pound.
'Sacro - Sancta: q. quantum ſufficit, a ſaffl
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M. D. Medicines Doctor, Do ___._Penoe, and Far-thinge.
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F. R. S. Fellow of the'Royal So iſOne hundred Thouſand.
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779£Art of POETR Y.
Y
C H A P. I.
Of Accem: and Qaantities.
HE Art of Pronunciation is reckon'd a-partgof Gum;
mar, and is the true Uttcranceot' Words, according
to their fluentit and Accmt. unwit] is the Length or
shortneſs of Syllables, and the Proportion, generally ſpeak
ing, betwixt a long and ſhort Syllablc is two to one; as in
Muſic, two upper: to one Crotchet.
In Engliſh, as well as in Latin and Greek, there are not
only theſe long and ſhort Syllahles, but thole which are
either long or ſhort, as the Meaſure requiresz as, RErErd:
and RELErds.
[a] Accmr is the riſin and falling of the Voice, above
or under its uſual Tone, Eut an Art of which we have lit<
tle Uſe, and know leſs, in the Engliſh Tongue; nor are we
like to improve our Knowledge in this Particular, unleſs the
Art of Deliw'y or Ummme, were alittle more ſtudy'd.
Of
[a] There an: threeſorts of Ae could not be deliver'd in Writing.
cents, an Acute, a Grave, and an Some of our Modern: (eſpecially
Influx, which ii alſo call'd a Cir Mr. Bi/be, in his Art of Poetry)
cumflex. The Acute, or Mary, na and, lately Mr. Man-rife, in 'what
turally raiſes the Voice; and the he calls The Engliſh Grammzr, er
Grave, or Baſe, as naturally Falls roneoufiy uſe Accent for Vicinity,
it. The Circumflex is akind of one ſignifyin the Length or Short
_Undulation, bt Waving of the neſs of a yllable, the other
Voice; as in pronouncing aware, the raiſing or falling of the Voice
to love, you ſhould pronounce it as in D'ſcourje; which indeed moſt
if ſpelt aauaregiſing at the firſt a, People have naturally, except,
and falling at the ſecond. But ſuch who have the Misfortune of,
tho' theLan'm (in imitation of the a Monotony, or oſ Speaking al
Greeks) have ſome Signs to ex ways in the ſame Tone of Voice ;
preſs theſe Marks, yet the Uſe which is a great Vice in Utte
of them is not known, except in rance, and what few are guilty oſ,
the diſtinction of Adverbs: Nay, but ſuch as have a ſmall and
ſhould ſome old Roman ariſe acute Voice; for thoſe of a
from the Dead, if we believe roffcr Conſtitution ſeldom are
&Win-w, the Rules of them xt to one Tone.
N 4
ſſſſſſ'l
134. TheArtofPOETRY. l
Of this long and ſhort Syllable are all Poetic Feet in Eng
liſh (as well as all other Languages) form'd 5 and tho'
Horace himſelf makes uſe of no leſs than twenty-eightſeve
ral ſorts of Feet, yet do they all, and many more, ariſe
from the various Compofitions of long and ſhort Syllables.
Before we come to the different Feet that are in uſe in
o'ur' Mother Tongue, it will be proper to lay down ſome
Rules of Quantity, by which we may in ſome meaſure ar
rive at ſome Certainty in this particular.
In Wbrd: whoſe Letter: ſtill appear thefisme,
Bj diff'ring Smſe ſet gaining diſſ'rent Name,
The Senſe 'tis, ſtil diſtinguiſhes the Sound;
In Names that? ſhort, in Words which long i: finml;
3 In Words that differ in the Smſb, but not in the spelling,
the firſt Syllable of the Name is long, but the laſt Syllable
of the Affirmfltion is ſhort; as the following Examplcs will
ſhew; for no Words of different ſenſe are exactly ſpelt
alike, unleſs the Name, and the Affirmation.
Names. Words of Affirmation.
rAbſimt rAbſbnt
Accent ' Accent
The firſt Cement The laſt Cement
Syllable is Callect Syllable is< Collect
pronounc'd Cum/act 1pronounc'd l 2072qu
long. Conſhrr ong . on or
i Cum/eft
Can-pert
LContcſſ. LCanteſt.
', A very Learned and Ingenious e he no place for Aeeents: This
Author gives us this familiar and z plain Inſtrumcnt does indeed in
eaſ Diſiinction betwixt Kguntity one ſingle Tone tſhew what a
an Accent : ' I: may be obſtrv'd, * Power there i' in Mufical Num
* that theVariations of the Voice, * hers, and of the various Move
' hy high and low, [ons and flmrt, 5 ment of Paetia Feet, and bow
* laid or ſoft, (however they hap ' the Eri- is affefied with the
' pen to be confounded by ſome) * ſudden intermixrur'e of loud and
* are all of as different Nature and ' faſt Notes,- but ler the Trun
* Effcfls, as the Bears of a Drum 4 pet tell how far ſhort all theſe
' are from' the Sound: of a Trum ' are of wall-turn'd and ri htly
''ſi per,
variedor Tone
the Reading
is frominSinging.
one un * plaod Accents: In the e con
* ſifls the Life ofLanguage, theſe
" All.the poſſible Diverſities of ' being the Enehnntmenrs, which
* Poetie Feet together with the ' being juſtly apply'd to well
'Changes of loud and ſoft, the ' choſen Word', lend all the Paſſi
' Drum ex refl'es to a wonder: a. ons captive, and ſurprize the
' But wbi e yet there is pove * Soul itſelf in its inmoſt Re
' vnyte, in the Sound, there can ' eefl'es.
- The
The-Art of POETRY. m
Names. Affirmations.
' (Ferment ſFerrm-nt
Frequent l Frequent
Intenſe Incenfe
The firſt Ohject The laſt Ohject
Cyllable is< Preſent Syllable is Preſhnt
pronounc'd Project pronounc'd Project
long. l Record long. l Record
Suhject Suhjeu?
Torment Torment
LUnite. LUnito.
and ſome others. But the following Rules Of 'QumliTY
Will be of ſome Uſc', as,
* When Endings to One-Syllab'-Words are join'd,
Long the firfl Sjlluhle you alway: find.
(1-) When an Ending is join'd to a Word of one Syllable'
the firſt Syliable is lon z as, Peace-able, ſin-flol, ſelf-iſtx'
good-neſt, toil-ſinne, fair Jeſx, heart-1, god-ly, &e.
When (er), (T), (ure) two SyllabſiWords do and,
qt the Syllab* they the Sound extend.
1 . ,
(2..) In Words of two S llables which end in er, or, oT
rather our
Honour, and ure,
venture, &e. the
but firſt is long,
we muſt exce ast defer,
enter, refer,
Honor,Preſi"
01'
Some
._. ._.
TheArtcfPOETRY. 137
Some are of a doubtful Quintity, according to the Will
or Occaſion of the Writer or Speaker : as, acceptable, con
tribute, corruptihle, Confefliir, Succeffiar, &c. and indeed ſome
of the former.
Back' to the Vowel: non' convey your Eye,
And there the Rule: of Quflm'it you'll Yþ ,
In Wbrdr that many Syllable: my.
For Commanj moſt they ſhort, and long are ſound,
But thoſe that to ſuch Conſhnantr are homul }
A: cloſe the Lipr, tom ne'er extend their Sound.
Emphntic ſ/ler we juſtly ſtill produce; s
But every Sign is ſhorÞ by ſtirred Uſe.
The Rules of the Vowels will be found at the be inning
of the Grammar; and We here may add to theſe O ſerva
tions, that moſt Words of one Syllable are common, except
they end with ſilent (e), whoſe nature it is to lengthen the
'foregoing Vowel. All the Signs are ſhort, without an Em
phaſis, which they ſeldom have, as, a, the, an, for, by, ivith,
to, from, &e. but whatever Word of one Syllable ends witha
Letter that eloſes the Mouth, can never be lon 3 as all ſuch
as end in (or), or the ſound of (m), and in me Mutes. _
Two Syllahler our Engliſh Feet compoſe, X
But Wantities diſtinguiſh them from Preſſ, ,
By long and ſhort in 'variom ſtatiom plac'd,
v Our Engliſh Verſeharmonioxſly i: ng'd. -" . i
. V/ith ſhort and long Hernia Feet we raiſe, *- -'-'
But thzſe to 'vary i: the _Poet'.< Praiſe. 4 *'
For theſttme Sound: Perpetually diſguſt:
-, - DRYDEN to this Variety um:
Having given theſe Rules for ſanmiti-v in the Engliſh
Tongue, we muſt obſerve, that tWO Syllables makea Poetic
Foot, which hitherto will not admit a greater number, tho'
in the Lſiarin and Greek a Foot might contain fix, and thoſe
might be reſolv'd into_the ſimple Feet of two or three Sylla-.
bles. Heroio Verſer conſiſt of five ſhort, and five long SYlla
bles intermixt, but not ſo very ſtrictly as'never to alte'r't'hat
Order. Mr. Dryden has vary'd them with admirable Beauty:
he inning his Heroic Verie ſometimes yvith a long _Syllablc,
follow'd by. two ſhorn, and other Changes, which aMaſter.
only muſt venture on. ' e/ ' _ _
From hence 'tis lain, that the Learn can never "113ng
that any number ofPSyllablcs is ſufficient to make any kind
ofVerſe, for by that means there could be no Proſe; ſo
that to conſtitute adverb, Variety of Numbers is neceſiaiyj'j
. , .' . ' N 3 3'
433 'The Art of P_O.E T RY.
In Engliſh, the Metre, or ſorts of Verſe are extremely vari
ous and arbitrary, every Poet being at liberty to introduce any
new Form he pleaſes. The moſt us'd are, firſt the Heroic, con
ſiſting of five long and five ſhortSyllables generally ſpeaking;
Verſes of four Feet, and of three Feet, and three Feet and a
Ceſurepr one Syllable. Stimzn's have been endeavour'd to be in
troduc'd, but never yet have been able to eſtabliſh themſelves.
[12] To help the Learned to ſome Means or Examples of
forming new Feet in the Engliſh Tongue, we ſhall here ſet
down the Variations made by the Ancients, ofia long and
.a ſhort Syllable.
A Spondee, Two long Syllablcs. A.
Pirch, Two, ſhort Syllables.
Trorhee, A long and ſhort Syllable.
Inmbz'c, A ſhort and a long Syllable.
Theſe are of two Syllabler.
A Molofi, Three long Syllables.
Tribrnch, Three ſhort Syllables.
Daihl, One long and two ſhort Syllables.
Armpq/Z, Two ſhort and one long Syllable.
[b] But as many Ways as 'ſprightly nature, and reigns moſt
-\li_z:mtities may be varied by in our Engliſh Verſe. The Troches
Cumpofition and Tranſpofition, is quite contar to the Iambic, Et
ſo many different Feet have the to expreſs weai and langnid MO
Greek Ports contriv'rl, and that tion'; as all thoſe Meaſures are
'under diſtinct Names, from two which move From long to ſhort
to ſix Syllables to the number of ;
Syllables. The Pirric and Tri
114. But it is the Opinion o l bracb are very rapid, as the Moleſ;
ſome Learned dien in this Way, is flow and heavy.
that Poctie Number; may be ſuf The' Rhime has been (by the
ficiently explain'd, by thoſe of Ignorance of our Fore-fathers)
two or three Syllablcs, into which thou ht the onlyEfi'ential of Eng
the reſt are to be reſolv'd. liſh' litle, yet it it in Reality the
Of thoſe ei ht here ſet down, moſt ineonſiderable Part oſ it, and
theSFonde'e an the Dactyl are the may be left out without any Detri
the moſt conſiderable, as being ment 5 as is plain from the Great
the Meaſure: us'd in the Heroic Milton. But if you refolve to
Verſe by Hom'J'irgil, &e. Theſe write in Rhime, you muſt take a
two Feet are of equal Time, but peculiar Care of obſerving them
of different Motion .' The Han examy, for a Botch in this is un
le'e has an even, ſtrong, and fied pardonable. M Lord Roſcammon,
dy Pace, like a Trot, as I may tho' he was an nemy to Rhirne,
ſay; but the Duct I reſembles the yet was moſt exafi in it, when he
nimbler fitokes o a Gallop. An vouchſafed to make uſe of it.
inverted Dactyl is an Anffi/i, a This Nieeneſs muſt be obſerv'd in
very ſpritely Trot, anda otion double or treble Rhimes, which
roper to excite and enrage. yet are never properly us'd, but.
he hmbic is alſo of a light and in Mh rk ut CHAP.
The Art of P O E'T R Y. 139
l
. H Ainjz II.
MArt 'QfPOETR Y in General; andflrſt, of
Epigr'arn, Paſtoral, Elegy, end Lyric.
l *.
OfEPIGRAM.
The E igram in shortneſs take: delight, *
And t a' all Subjects are it: proper Right,
Yet each of one alone can only write.
'An Epigram is a ſhort Copy of Verſes treating of one on
ly Thing, with Beauty and Poinmt_ All Things are- allow'd be
to
- - . a. -
TheArtzffPOETRY. 14!
be treartd of in the Epigmm, provided that Ere-vity, Bean
ty and Point are preſerved.
Two Parts this little Whole ill c- ac
Recital of the Subject, make ciizizzz
To make thir Paem perfect, he your Care
TharBeauty, Points, and Brevity appear.
The Epigram Conſiſts of two Parts, the Recital aſ the
Subject, and the Could/ſon. Beauty runs through the whole,
but the Point is for the Concluſion only.
That you this needfid Brevity may tlaim,
_Let one Thing any he your careful Aimz
And in few Word: that only Thing expreſſ,
But I/Vard: that] Force and Energy confeſt.
To attain this Ere-vity, you muſt not aim at many Things
through the whole Epigram, and then take care to'expreſs
that Little as conciiEly as poſſibly you Can; that is, in ſuch
Words, as that to extend them into more, wou'd enervate
and loſe the ForCe and Strength of the Thought, and the
Point or Acamm. _ z,
Whic 'to
Beaut 'the Whole an
's harmoniau: Excelllence
Symmetr imports, ,
of Parts,
OfP-4ST0RAL.
The Paſtoml that ſing: of happy Swoim,
And harmleſr Nym h: that haunt the Wood: andPlar'nr,
I show'd through t e whole diſho'ver every where
i Their old Simplz'city and pious Air.
e : Am! in the character: of Maids and Youth,
Unprhctir'd Plainneſs, Innocencc, and Truth.
As every ſort of Pomj' is an Imitation of ſomething, ſo is
'the Pafloral an Imitation of a shepherd's Life, conſider'd un
der that Character, or rather an lmitation of rural Actions.
_F_or this Reaſon there ought to be an Air of Piety, on all oc
. ' caſions,
TheArt ofPOETRY.ſſ 14?
ceſions, maintain'd through the whole Poemz the Perſons
introduc'd being Innocent and Simple, without Corruption;
ſuch as shepherds, Goatherds, Cowherds, Prtmert, and the
like. The Characters therefore ſhou'd repreſent that anci
ent innocence, and unpractis'd Plainneſs which was then
in the World, and which is viſible in Theaeritu: and Virgil,
as may be ſeen in the Tranſhtions of thoſe Poets.
Each Paſtornl a little Plot muſt own,
Which a: it muſt he ſimple, muſt he one ;
.-.. With ſmall Digrefflom it willyet diſpen e,
Nor need; itaiwajx Allegoric Senſe.
Every Paſtarai Poem ſhou'd have a little Plot or Fahle;
which may deſerve the Titlc of a Puſ-'nal Scme; it muſt be
ſimple, and one, yet not ſo as to refuſeall manner ofDigreſ
lions, provided they belittle. Nor is the Poet oblig'd al
ways to make it Allegorit, that is, to have ſome real Per
ſims mtant by thoſe fictitious Shepherds which are intro
duc'd. ' This Rule of the Plot is every where obſerv'd by
Vir il, particularly in his firſt, which .is the Standard of
Pahomlx. The Plans, or Ar uments of this and two or is
three more, will make this pffainz Of the firſt 5
Meliboeus, an unfortunate Shepherd, i: introdue'd with Ti
tyrus, one more fortunate; the former addreſſ: his Complaint
of his'Suff'ring: and Baniſhment to the latter, whoenjg': his
Fiat/es mzdFold: in this Puhiit Calumity, and therefltre expreſſes
his Gratitude to the Benefltctor fiom whom this Fa-vour flow'rſ:
But Meliboeus ateuſhx Fortune, civil Vitr, &ce. bidding Adim
to his Nati-ve Home. This is therefore a Dixilogue-thc next
Is aPaſtoral Complaint without any Dialogue; for C O'
RYDON in u Courtſtzip wholly Paſtoral, complain: of the"
Qj/neſr of Alexis, recommend: himſelffor his Beaut , andskill
w playing on the rural Pipe; invite: him into t e Country,
Promffing him the Pleafitres of the Plate, with a Preſent of
Nuts and Apples. But finding all in vain, he reſhl-ue: to
quit his Amour, and hetake himſelf again to his Buſinefi.
Here is a viſible Plom or Deſt'gn, which makes every thing
depend upon the other.
In the third Men-alms, Damattu, and Palamon are intro
duc'd in this manner.-Damaetas and Menalcas, after ſhme
Country Railerj, agree to try which has the heſt skill at Song,
Md that their Neighbour Palaemon ſhall he judge of their Per-_
fi'rfflflnte; who, after hearing'hoth, detiare: himſelf unfi', For
decide the Contro'verſy, amijo leaves it undetermin'd.
FWng,
i
'
'144' TheArt ofPOETRY.
We need give no more Examples here of the little Plet
or Fahle of a Paſloral 5 you may confirlt Mr.Dr)-den*s Virgil,
and the ſeveral Tranflations of Th'acritm, by which you
will confirm the Rule abundantly.
Connections, and 'Il'ranſitionaſi pra] rake tare
a Of
TheAr'rſPOETRY. 14;
Of E L E G T.
'The Elegy demands a ſhlemn Stylc,
I: mourns with flowing Hair at Fun'ral Pile,
It points the Lover's Torment and Delights,
A Miſtrefl flatters, threatens, and in-Lites.
Ilegy was firſt made on Melancholy Subjects, as on the]
Death of Friends, (75. as O-uid on Tibullus, which is tran
ſlated. In Proeells of Time, Joy, Wiſhes, and almoſt every
Subject, was made free of the Elegy, as Complaints, Ex
poſtulations, Prayers, Love, Vows, Praiſcs, Congratulfi
tions, Admonitions, Reproaches.
The Madel of this Poem ſhow'd he made,
And every Step of all its Progreſt laid,
And all directed to ſinne certain End,
And Verſe on Verſe perpetually depend.
This and all other Poems ought to have a Plan madel'of
the whole Defign before a Line is written: Forſſ elſe the
Author will not know where to begin, and where to end,
but ramble in the Dark, and give us Vetſcs which 'have no
Relation to each other, or at leaſt have not any Depen
dance on each other. This is the Fault of thoſe who are
ignorant of Art, and are only Verſifyers. -
No glitt'ring Points, nor any nice Conceit
Muſt load the Elegy with Foreign Weight;
Paffion and Nature here avow their Right, -
And with Diſdain throw hat/e that mean Delight. r
,The Epigrammatio Point muſt never be here admitted ;'
'tis abominable; none of the fine things that ſome are ſo
fond of in all Places, no ConCeits, nor the like: Theſe give
place to the Paffions, which muſt here ſpeak with Nature.
Remember that the Diflion carry where
Be gentle, clean, perſpimoas, and clear,
Correct, the Manners all-long expreſs,
. 1
In ev'ry place the Paffion ſtill confeſs.
The Diction to the Elegy ſhould be ſtandard, correct,
clean, gentle, perſpicuous, clear, expreffive of the Man
nersi' tender, full of Paſſions, or pathetic; but never op
Prcfs'd or debauch'd with fine Sayinkgs and exquiſite Sentences.
It is wonderfully adorn'd with requent Commikrations,
Complaints, Exclamations, Addreſſes to Things or Perlons,
- e o Words
146 TheArtofPOETRY.
Words oſ feign'd Perſons, or Things inanimate made to
ſpeak, ſhort Digreffions, yet pertinent to the Subject; nor
_does it receive
Examplcs a little
not only from Beauty
the like,vſrom Allufions
but unlike, andtoContraries.
Sayings:
c H A P. In.
Of SATIR'E and COMEDY.
SAtire and Cometh' being both directed to laſh and ridi
cule Folly and Vice, may (we_ think) properly come
into one Chapter.
Folly and Vice of e-u' Soft' and Kind
That wound oar Rough, or dehaſe our Mind;
All that deſerve: our Laughter or our Hare,
To biting S A T I R E's Province do relate 5
The flothful Paraflte, affected Fool,
Th' Ingrat ul, and the pert loqaaciom' Tool,'
The Luſl , Drunle'ard, th' avaricioa: Sla-ve,
The noi Bra-vo, and the trio/zing Knave:
Satire, Z wholeſhme Leffimr, mou'd reclaim,
And heal their Vicer, to ſicare their Fame.
satire, like the old Comedy, takes Cognizance oſ, and hat
for its subject I'nrpitade, or ſuch things as are worthy our
Langhtcr, or our Hatred. Whatever therefore is not ridi
culous or odious, is not the Subject of Satirez as any thin
that is full oFGrieſ, Terror, th, or other Tragical Pa -
ſions. Satire derides and falls on the Slochful, the Paraſite,
Affectation, the Loquacious or Talkative, the Ingrateful,
LibidinOUs, Drunkards, the Avaritious Uſurers, Bravo's,
public Robbers, Adulterers, Go. He was in the Right,
that ſubjected the Diſtempers of the Mind to Satire, ſince it
is as much employ'd in this, as the Phyſician in curintoctjhe
. y..
TheArtofPOETRY. r49
Body. Both propoſe to themſhlves the Health of the Ps
tiertt, Satire by Diſcourſe, the Phyſician by his Potions and '
Pills. The Medicines of both are in themſelves uniavoury
and diſhgreeable to the-Palate of the Diſtemper'd on whom
they make Inciſions; whom they camerize and ſpare not. '
The Phyſician gilds his Pill, that it may go down glibly; and
Satiric InvectiVes muſt be ſweeten'd with the mixture of
Pleaſiintry and Wit, and agreeable Raillery, 'till both the Me
dicines are ſwallow'd, and in the Bowels perform their
Operation. The Raiiery and Bitin of Satire correct the
Perverſe, and deter others from fal ing into Folly and Vice.
But
The Modern Reader:Decen
Latin V/riter: chaglrnge more Rtſhect ,
neglect,
And at immozlqſl V/'ritings take Offence,
If clean Expreffiom cover not the Senſe.
Satire ſhou'd he from all Ohſreneneſi free,
Not impatient, andyet preach Made/ly.
The Satiric Pact ſhou'd not expoſi: Vice and Lewdneſs
as Horace and Juvenal have done, in Words and Expreffions
that maycorrupt the Innoccnt, whilſt they ſtrive to correct
the Guilty. He muſt, therefore, carefully avoid all obſcene
Words and Images.
Tho' Vice and Folly he keen Satire's Aim,
It maſt not on their Nature here declaim.
Tho' the Buſincſs of Satire be to call Men from Vice and
Folly, and invite them to Wiſdom and Virtue, yet it is by
no means to waſte it ſelf on Diſquifitions on the Nature of
*ert:uc and Vice , which is the proper Buſineſs of' Moral
Philaſhphj. In ſhort, this Pocrn requires for its Author, a
Man of Wit and Addrcſs, Sagacity and Eloquence ,* and a
Sharpneſs that is .not oppoſite to Mirth and Pleaſantry.
No Parts diſtinct doe: biting 'Satire knowt
And without certain Rule: m Comye nail go.
_ Inſinuation it Zzgms, s_
* And qfl abruptlyſfa s upon our zm;
But this 'Abruptne s muſt regard the Whole,
Which maſt it: I/les, and Manner too, confront.
Satire has no certain nor diſtinct Parts; ſometimes It
gins by inſmuatin itſelf by Degrees; blldlt Lnew-re comfnoniiy
Am uptly, and Wit* Ardou r. 0Butto'tc
z afrmmno'vea>
Þ WPG
I' &HÞ'MISAKW IU V E N A L.
150 TbeArtOfPOETRY.
rupt, yet it ou hr to have a Reference and Regard to thi
Compoſition o the whole, Body of the Poem. Example-s
you may ſee in javenal, tranſlated by Mr. Dryden.
Ofwell-choſe I/Vord: ſinne take not Care- enough,
And think they ſhould he (like the Subject) rough.
But this great V/orle i: more exact] made,
Andſharpeſt Thought: in fmootho V/ord: oon-vey'd.
Here, as well as. in all Poems, there ought to be Care ta
ken 0f the ſmooth flowing of theVerſc, which Mr. Dryden
in his Mac Fl'eckno has perfectly obſerv'd, and ought to be,
the Modcl of our Vcrfi: in all' Engliſh Satire: [51
OfCOMEDT.
We come now to the Dramatic Poetry, which is much
the moſt uſeful and difficult, as well as deli htful of any :>
We ran ſcaree except a juſt Epi: Poem, whic has not been
ſeen theſi: 1700 years; for tho' that be more difficult becauſe
of its Length and Variety, yet it is, beyond Controverſy,
leſs uſcful, and leſs capable of giving that ſtrong and lively'
Pleaſiire which is to be found in a juſt Tragedy: But we
begin with Cat/medy;
In Comic Seenes the common Life we draw,
According to it: Humours, Actionr, Law,
And Vice and Folly laughing, keep in awe.
But what i: et a nohler, jufler End,
},
To all the C arm: of Virtue doe: commend.
Conmly imitates common Life in it Actions and Humours;
laughmg at, and rendring Vice and Folly ridiculous, and
recommending Virtue. It is indeed an-Irnitation of Life.
the Mirrour of Cuſtom, and the Image of Truth; and
whatever Cornedy follows not thisTrack, is unworhy of
the Name.
To
[12] S'atire is alluw'd to be an ſtarts of Things or Subjects, with
urbane, jocoſe, and biting Poem, which it is as it were fill'd to Sa
&3me to xepreh'end corrupt Man tiety; ſo from Fulneſs or Sa
ners,., and. expoſe, Impmbity of tiety they draw Satire. Others
Life s But yet there is no certainty derive it from the Dances of the
'fil thn- Etymol'ogy of: its Name. Satyrs leaping from fide tofide,
Some.- draw' in from: aſort of; Plate ski ping
andl) that. and
Or jumping this way
perhaps from the
on Cli-I'Lgers, in, which the various
ſort ofi Firllhfraitr were offer'd ' to Satyrs themſelves, thoſe God'
Ceres ',<, dint, ſay; they, in Sati'c having of old been often intro
are handlsdl uriwa- and did-'sung due'd into thisſortoi Peel-'ry ,.x
fleſhtqf'POETRY, 13:
To fbur eſſential Things w'affign a Part
In e-ve Comedy that? writ with Art,
The FZle, Manners, Sentiments are theſe,
And proper Diction that muſt all expreſi.
. The Fable it the Plot that is deſign?
To imitate the Actions of Mankind.
But without Manners theſe cannot he drawn, . I
In them the Temper', and the Humour's ſhown,- }.
A: by the Sentiments theſe are made known. ,
The Diction is the- Language that does ſhaw
In words, the Sentiments that from them flow.
C O M E D Y has Parts of Qulity, and Parts of Qunthy.
Of the firſt kind there are four eſſential, the Fahle, the Man
ners, tthem'iments, and theDiction; to which two are ad-,
ded, which only relate to the Reþreſentation, viz. theMufic and
Decoration; without the firſt four Parts no Comedycan ba
written. For the Poet muſt neceſſarily invent the Matter,
'r Subjectl on. which he writes, and that is What we call the
FaHe orPlot: But ſince the Fahle imitates, there is aneceſ
ſity that it ſhould have the Manners, that is, nicely andjuſt
ly expreſs the Tempers, Humours, or Mannerr of the ſeveral
Dramatie Per/ons that are repreſented in Comedy. The Sen
timents are added, becauſe we muſt diſcover by them the
Senſe and Opinion ofthem in Words; and becauſe the Sen
timents are, and muſt be expreſs'd more plainly by Words,
the Diction obtains its place in theſe four Parts of Comedy.
The difference of the Perſhn much alters the Manners, and
differences them from one another. For theſe Manners
which are praiſiz-worthy in one, are far from being ſo in ano
ther, being not at all convenient to his Character, and there
fore to be diſprais'd. This we-ſind in Arts themſelves ,- for
one of the Vulgar gains Reputation by being a good Fidler
or Piper; but this in a King is ridiculous and diſagreeable
to his Dignity. A Mman has a juſt Praiſe for ſewing well,
and working finely with her Needle; but this being no Man<
ly- Aality, is deſpicable in a Man. The Manner: muſt there
fore be agreeable to every Man's Station, Vality, or Years,
and the like. And Life is the beſt Book to ſtudy theſe in,
when we are once Maſters of the Rules of Art. In the mean
while, learn theſe followingVerſesout of Horace, of what is
proper to the ſieveral Ages and Stations of Man, that you
may not err againſt them: They are found thus in blank.
Verſt, in my Lord Raſeommon's Trauſtationz
On'
TheArtaf'POETRI'
132. One that has newly learn'd to fiveak vand go,
Love: Childiſh Pity-s; i: ſhun. Prowk'a' and pleas'd,
And change: ev'r Haar his wavering Mind.
A Youth, that fl caſt: ofhis Tutor': Take,
Love: Horſer, Hoandr, and spurn, and Exerez'ſe 3
Prone to all Vice, impatient of Reproaf;
Proad, eareleſs, find, ineonflant, and profit/e,
Gain, and Ambieion rule our riper Tears,
And makeareſiuonly
Old Men m slave: to Intereſt
walking and Power.
Hojþitalr,
Where all Defects, and all Diſe'aſe: tread,
With reflleſt Pain, and,more tormenting Fear;
Lazy, more/e, fall of Delayþs, and Hopes,
Oppreſx'd with Riches, which the] dare not lefe ,
Ill-natur'd Cen or: aſ the Pre en' Age,
Andfimd o al the Follier of/the afl.
Thu; all t e Treaſare of ourflowzng Tears
Our Ehb of Life for e-uer take: away.
Boy: maſt not have th' ambitious Care: of Men,
Nor Men the weak Anxietie: Age.
obfiwe the character: of t aſe that jþeak,
Whether an honeſt Servant, or a cheat,
Or one who/'e Blood 'boils in hie Toathful Veins,
Or a grave Matron, or a bay Nmſe,
Extorting Tradeſ'nen, earefa Hmbandmen.
Theſe are the general Rules for thoſe Characters that fall
under them; but Humour being eſſential Go Engliſh Comedj,
we muſt ſee what that is.
>
Sabardinate Paffion We Humour name,
By which our Bard: have gain'd peculiar Fame.
Each Paffion doe: a double Face con efi,
The ſtrong i: Tragic, Comic is r leſs.
Here Affiectation fame to Humour add,
By that are ſinne ridiculouſy mad.
Whatever Humours you at flrfl beſtow,
Theſe to the end your Perſhm ſtill muſt ſhow,
Thoſe maſt he uppermoſt in all they do.
Humour is ſaid by the Critics to be a ſubordinate, or _a
Weaker Paffion, and that in Perſons of a lower degree than
duoſe who are fit for Tragedy; and it is more viſible in the
lower ſort of People, whoſe Characters are therefore fitter
(or Comeeiy. Every Paffion has tWO different Faces; one
that
vTheArtofPOETRY. is;"
that is ſerious, great, terrible, ſolemn, that is- for Tragedy-s
and another that is low, comical, ridiculous. r
Affectation is thought alſo to be a Character ſit for Co
medj, as being highly ridiculous, and capable of being cor
rected by it. Your Characters muſt always retain the (ame
Humour through the Play, which you give them at firſt,
or elſe 'tis abſurd and prepoſterous.
.'E'xpon no ſingle Foþ, hat la the Lead
More eZaallj, andſpread t e Folly broad,
Ihe ot er Why i: vulgar: Oft weſee
A Fool derided by a: great a: he:
Ill Poet: ſh will one poor Fop ale-vour;
But to collect, like Kees, from every Flow'r'
Ingredients to compoſe this precious felice,
Which ſerve: the Vhrld or Pleaſure, and for [Ya
Inſþight of Factian n'il our Few-vour find,
And meet with the Applauſe of all Mankind;
The Poet ſhould not pick out any one particular Fop he
may meet with in his Converihtion, but form the general
Follics from a Character that may be of Uſe to many, and
a Diverſion to all. _
All Fools in this ſpeak Sex, a: z' poffieff;
And each h] Iniþiration .ealrs is jeſt,
If once the juſtneſs of' each Part he loſt,
Vſe well m laugh, hut at- the Poet': effl
That ſill t ing Men call Sheer-Wit avoid,
With which our Ageſh naufeoaſþ is tly'th': '
Humour i: all, Wit ſhou'd he only brought
To turn agreeahly ſinne proper Thought.
'Tis ſia Breach of Character to make the Coxeombs ſpeak
Wit, and fine Raillery, and therefore goodfor nothing.
Humour is the true Wit of Comedy, ſithe fine Things, the
sheer-Wit is only for Epigram. '
The Entranlcte
Part: o The; theyCharacterJ/eleore:
Oaantit are likewie our;
Of 'T RfAG E D Y.
NAnd
L' an
ofbjhſtAction,
lengththan entire-mail
the 'Tragic grave,had'
Muſe muſt
The Ob'ect' of it: Mtful Imifatiqn,
. And t at without the help af_ the Narmn'on,
Billthe onA? Phffion perfectly
Paw'r of Terrourrefiner,
and Compaffion,
TheArtquOETRY. Iss,
(the moſt uſtſul and noble of all Poeſie) but what is grave
and &rious. This Action muſt be entire; it muſt have a
Begiming, Middle, and End. The Beginningr is that before
which we have no need to ſuppoſe any neceſſary Cauſe of
it; the Middle is all that this Begiming produces,- and the
End is that after which nothing is neceſſarily ſuppos'd to
compleat the Action. It muſt be of a juſt Length, that is, it
muſt not be ſo long as that dſ an Heroic Poem, nor ſo ſhort
as a ſingle Fable. The excluding Nun-tition, and the con
fining it to Terror and Compaffion, diſtinguiſhes it from an
Heroic Poem,- which may be perfect without them, and
employs Admimtian. By the refining the Paſſions, we mean
not Exrirpation, but the reducing them to juſt Bounds and
Moderation, which make: them as uſeful as neceſſary. For
by ſhowing the Miſeries that attend the Subjection to them,
it teaches us to watch them more narrowly; and by ſeeing
the great Misfortuncs of others, it leſſens our own, either
prefimt or to come.
There i: no Action that doe: not proceed
From Manners, and the Sentiments indeed.
And therefbre theſe, in this ſithlimer Art
Of Tragedy, muſt claim eſſential Part.
As Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action, not of lnclina
tions or Habits, ſo there is no Action that does not proceed
from the Manners and the Sentiments, and therefore the
Manner; and the Sentimentr are eſſential Parts of Tragedy;
for nothing but theſe can diſtinguiſh an Action. TheMan
ner: form, and the Sentiments explain it, diſcovering its Cauſes
and MotiVes. '
All Tragedies flmr Part: do claim,
Fable the firſt, and Principal we name;
The Manners and the Sentiments ſucceed,
The laſt Plate to Diction is decreed.
There is no Subject of a Tragedy where theſe following
Parts are not to be found,- the Fahle, the Manners, the Sed
timentr, and the Diction. Some add the Docamtian, becauſe
that denotes the Place; and every Action requiring ſome
Place, the Decomtion is, in ſome meaſure, the object of the
Poet's Care, that the Place may be proper for the lzepn
ſenmtion. The chief and much moſt conſiderable, lS the
Fahle, or the Compoſition of the Intidentr, which form the
Subject of the Tragedy. For Action being the Object oflſtnhie
z -
3-56 The Art afPOETRY.
Imitation of this ſort of Poetry, muſt be the moſt conſidev
rable; but the Action conſiſts of the Incidents and their Con
duct, which is the Fahle: The Fahle muſt be the moſt
conſiderable 5 and all the Beauties of Manners, DiEIion, and
Sentiments, can't make amends for the Defects oſ this. The
general End that Mankind propoſe, is, to live Happily, but
to live Happily is an Action; for Man is either Happy or
Miſierable by his Actions, not Manners. Tragedy only adds
them for the Production of Actions. The Fahle being there
fore the End oſ Tragerh, as being the Imitation of the Ae
tion, it muſt be of the greateſt lmportance 5 for ſo is the
End in all Things.
The Manncrs next, hy the Dramatic Law,
As they of Action are the Soarce and Cauſe,
Demand on' Stad , and ear utmoſt Care;
ly thoe the Pe'fflu their Deſigns declare, }
Andfhtm each other heſt diſtinguiſh'd are.
The Manners are the moſt conſiderable next to the Fahle.
For as Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action, ſo there are no
Action: without the Mannersz as no Effect without a Cauſh
The Manners diſtinguiſh Character from Character, and diſ
cover the Inclinations of the Speaker, and what Part, Side,
or Courſe he will take on any important and difficult Emet
gence, know how he will behave himſelf before we fire the
Actions. If Pride, Choler, Piety, or the like, be the Man
ners of the Hero, we may know that he will follow the
Dictates of the prevailing Paſſion of his Character.
The Sentiments obtain the next Degree,
Tho' leaſt in Excellence of all the Three ,
The Sentiments 'he Manners do expreſs,
Bat maſt with Truth and Likelihood confeſs.
The Sentiments' are next in degree oſ Excellence to the
Fahle and the Manners: For theſe are for the Manners, what
the Manner: are for the Fahle. TheAction cannot bejuſtly
imitated without the Manners, nor the Manners without the
Sentiments. In theſe we muſt regard Truth and Verffimilitade.
As when the Poet makes a Madman ſpeak juſt as a Madman
does; or as it is probable he wou'd do. For this ſee King
Lear in shake/pear.
__-1
TheArtofPOETRY.
The Diction or Lan ctuage of Tragedy, can demand but
157
the fourth Place in t e eſſential Parts, and is of the leaſt
importance of any of them; yet muſt peculiar Care be
likewiſe taken of this, that every Paffion ſpeak in ſuch
Words and Expreffions as is natural to it.
Having thus ſeen the ſeveral Parts of Tragedy, and their
Excellence in regard of eachother, we ſhall now proceed to
give Directions neceſſary to the making each of them per
ect, and to the knowing when they are ſo in what we read.
Firſt an a Plot employ thy careful Thoughtr,
And guard thy ſelf againſt its uſtcal Faultr,
Turn it with Time a thoufizndje-u'ral wayx; -
That (ar it ought) gi-ue: ſure Succeſt to Plays.
As the Plot, or Fahle, is the chief Thing in a Tragedy, ſo
our firſt and principal care ought to be employ'd in contri
ving this Part with that care, that each may produce and
depend upon the former. This Part being performed with
Skill, has given Succeſs to thoſe Plays which have been dc-z
fective in all the other Parts. -
Beſide: the 'm'ain Dejign compos'd with Art,
Each moving Scene' maſt have a Plot apart.
Contri-ue each little Turn, mark ev'ry Place;
A: Painters firſt chalk out the future Face.
Yet he n'ot fondly your own Slave for this,
But change hereafter what appear; ami/i.
As the main Plot, or'FahIe, conſiſts of many Incident: or
Stones, the Poet muſt v make a Draught of. theſe before he
begins to write; whichyvill appear more plainly when we
come to diſcourſe of the incident: In this Schemewemuſi:
mark all the fine Touches of the Paſſions, and all the admi
rable Turns that produce them. But _when we come to
write, we may diibover Faults in the firſt Draught, which
we i muſt correct.
Each _ :
TragiclAction muſt he hath entire, .
.And of that length which Tragcdies require. _
Beginning it muſt have, and Middle, and End,
. Each to produce the other ſtill muſt tend._
The Canfle of Undertaking and Deſt'gn
Of Action, to Beginning me confine;
All the Effl'ſls and Ohſtacles we find /
In th' Execution, to Middle are affign'd.
Th' 'wrap-'ling and diſſhl-ving of thefames _
With juſtice we the End do alway: name,
P EvEFY
ſſ
158 The Art of'POETRY.
Every Action, that is fit for a Tragie Imitation, ought not
only>to be entire, but of a 'aſt length; that is, muſt have a
Beginning, Middle," and End. This diſtinguiſhes it from
momentaneom Actions, or thoſe Which happen in an inſtant,
Þwithout Preparatibn or Sequel, which, wanting Extenfion,
may come into the Incidents, not build a Fahle on. The
Cauſe or Deſign oſ underſtanding an Action is the Beginning;
and the Effects of thoſe Cauſes, and the Difficulties we find
in the Execution, are the Middle.- The unravelling and
diſſolving theſe Difficulties, is the End.
An Explanation of this will beſt a pear by an Example,
which we will take From the Plot o the Antigone of So
phocles. On the Death of the two Brotherr, Eteocles and
Polynices; Creon, who ſin-ceeds them in the Kingdom of
Thebes, prohibits the hurying the Body of the latter, becauſe
he invaded his Natiw Country with Foreign Traops. This
Decree make: Antigone, who was hetrothed to Hzemon theSon
of Creon, hmy him, is diſcovered, and condemned to he
_ barſdalive: Creon could nor he brought to relent h Haemon,
or Tii'efias; and ſo Hazmon kills him/Þlf with er: This
makes Eurydice, his Mother, deſiro] herſelf',- and Creon,
in theſe Mifiries ſkeing the fatal Confiquence of his Decree,
repents 'too late, and becomes miſer-able.
The Beginning of this Action has no neceffiiry Conſequence
of the Death of Palynites, ſince that Decree might have been
let alone by Creon, tho' it could not have been without that
Death; ſo that the Action naturally begins with that De
' cree. The Middle is the Effects produced by that Decree,
®the Death of Antigone, Hemon, and Eurydire, which pro
'duce the End by breaking the Obſtinacy of Creon, and
v making him repent, and miſtrable. Thus the Poet cannot
'begin or end his Action where he pleaſes (which is the fault
'of moſt of our old Plays) if he would manage his Subject
vwith true Oeconomy and Beauty. For there muſt be the
Cauſe or Beginning; the Eflkct of that Cauſe, which is
naturally the Middle,- and the unravelling or finiſhing- of
it, which is the End produced by the Middle, as that by
the Beginning; the Middle ſuppoſes ſomething before it, \
as its Cauſe, and following, as its Effect; ' the Beginning
ſuppoſts nothing before, and the End nothing to follow,
to make the Action compleat. \
The Unities of Action, Time, and Place,
If well ohſbr'v'd, give Plays a perfect Grave.
X . , The
_ .
The-Art , _ .
ofſſPctOETRY. , .
159
The Subject of a Tragedy ſhould be of a juſt extent,
neither too large, nor too narrow, but that it may be ſeen,
viewed, and conſider'd at onc'e, without confounding the
, Mind, which if too little or narrow, it will do ,- 'normake
it'wander to diſtract it, as it will do if it be too large and
* exrenſiſſve. That is, the Piece ought to take' up 'juſt ſo much 'l'
Time as is neceſſary or probable for the introducing the
Incidents with their juſt Reparation. For to make a good
Trngeobl, that is, ajuſi Imz'zntt'o'n, the Action imitated ought
' nor, in Reality, to be longer than the Repreſentationz for
this makes the Likenej? greater, and by conſequence more
perfect. we
ſ Hours, Butmuſt
ſince there
bring areofAction:
ſome of ten into'th'e
the incidents or twelyc
ſiIn
tervals of the-Acts, the bettet to deceive the Audience. _
Nexr, the Unity'of Action'is ſuch, that it can never b: _
broke without deſtroying the Poem. This Unity is 'not
preſerved by repreſenting of ſeveral Action; of One M/M;
as of Julius Coſnr, ol- Anthony, or Brutus; for then the
Poet has no Reaſon to begin at any certain place; and
' Shakeſpenr might have brought his Play down to the laſt
Emperor of Rome, as well as to the Death of Brutux.
But this Unity of Action does not exclude the various *
Under-Actiom, which are perfectly dependent on, and con
tribute to, the chief; and which withOut it are nothing.
Nor-does this Exception make for our ſilly Under-Plane,
which have nothing to do with the main Deſign, but is v
another Plot; as Admflm and Emydiee in Dryden's Oedipm,
which are abominable. In the Orphan the Affian is One,
and every. Part or Under-Action carries on and contributes
to themuin Action, or Suhj9i3.\ Thus the different Actions
of different Men are not more diſtinctly different Actions,
than thoſe of One Man at dike-rent Times. Whatever can
be tranſpoſed, or left out, without a ſenſible Maim to the ſi
Action, has nathing to do there. '
7 ,
(171 )'
R O R I C-s,
The ART 0]'ſi_-P,ERSUASION£
theThe Manner:
Alodierſſlce re ard either
to _w%10m the Perſim
he ſpeaks, himſelf'
or' ithe wholewho
City ſpeaks."
or Na
tion in which he delivers his Diſcourie. ' v ,
The Manners, which ought t0> be'conſþicuous in,the
Speake', are threefold; Prudence, Prolitj, and Benwoleme.
,T_he,Ma_mzers
the 'Government'zvof _the_ thim
Liberlyſſ is in are known by the
a Demacrflcjz. the Difiiplioe
Form of
a -' The
Rhetoric; or, the Art of Perſuaſion. 18:
The Method of Beginm'ng: is not the ſame in the three
ſorts of Subjects, on which we may ſpeak.- For in Praiſe
and D'z'jþm'iſe it muſt be taken from the five Head: or Ar
guments proper to that; from the Praiſe orvbiffimiſc 3 from
.Perfimſion or Diſfinſſon; . and from thoſe Things which re
late-to theHezren. v
In Accuſatian and Defence there are four Headx, from
which the Beginning is taken: For the Mind of the Homer
is prepar'd, as it *wer_e, by certain Medicines, taken either
from, the Speake' himſelf, or from the Anuſedz or from the
Hem-er 5 or from the Accuſhrj or' from the Things.
, They are taken from the Accuſcd, 0r_ the Adrerſhny, by
objecting or diſproving a Crime; ſijom the Heare', by
rendring him our Friend, or angry, attentive, or not atten
tive, Or willing'to be inform'd: Laſtly, 'from the Things,
by .declarin its Nature.
- .S. 2.'7. T e_Narratian is a Recitai of the Things done, or
that ſeem to be done, adapted to Perjhaflbn.
This We make uſe of in Accuſationand Deflence, when we.
do not agree with the_Ad*v"£/hry about the Manner of the
Fact: But when,,we perſuade- or dzffimdgthere is ſeldom
any Occa'ſion forthis Part; nor- is there any in Praiſe on
Djflemzfi, but What 'has its place in the Confirmdtian. ..
The Narmtion ought to be perſhicmm, that it may he un
derſtood; likely or probable, that it may be believ'd; diſtin
guiſh'd by the Manna-s, that it may be heard with the
greater Willingmzſn. But to be ſo, it ought to expreſs thoſi:
Things which reiate to the Proof ofzour own Virtue, and.
the Improbity of the Adve'ſh'y. 1' . - V ;-. ,- þ .
.=Care--rn,uſt likewiſe, be taken, that what is ſai Amaybe
'A-a'1u--7'-
'3.
pleaſing to the judges; and it ought,_ beſides al, thisytor
move the Pafflam. . t _ ,
This Part does not always follow. the Beginning, but is
ſometimes deferrfd to another place, and muſt always be
ſho'rter for the Defendant than Plaintiff. We ſometimes
ſupport the Narratian, by giving it on the Credit of others,
which PromOtes Securit . Sommimes. we make uſe. of
Affi-Uernjam, which *l procure Relief much. ſtronger,
and ſometimes'we make uſe of botht _
z s, 28.- The Narmtim being' over,. we propoſe-the State
of thejspeecb or Diſcomfl; and divide the Cauſe into cer
tain Parts,v if it conſiſt of man] Staten
This Diviſion is made either 1 by Separation or Eriume-Z
ration.
, i ſſ , . 1 R
, ' ' ' t In.
==
182 Rhetoric ; or, the Art of Perſuaſion.
In the Separation we lay open in what 'me agree with our
Adverſary, and what is yet remaining in Contro-uor/j'.
In the Dmmeration we ſum up the ſeveral Heads, and
Kinds of Things, of which we are about to ſpeak.
The Beauty of the Partition or Diwfion is, that it be fidl,
and perfictz plain and perſþicaom; ſhort, and certain s con
taining not more than three, or at moſt more than four Parts.
549. The Canfirmation, and Confutatian, are ſometimes
plac'd under the Head or Title of the Cantentian. The
firſt confirms our own Cauſe by Arguments; the laſt
deſtroys or conſutes thoſe of the Adverſary. We muſt
in the Canfirmatian have Regard to the Diſpoſition, as
well of the Arguments, as Reaſiming or Argumenta
tion.
The-ſtrongeſt Arguments are to be plac'd in the Front,
or Beginning; when the Hearerr, being fir'd by the Nar
ratiim, are deſirous to know what we have to offer for the
Proof or Deſence of our Cauſe. And we muſt take care
v to place a Part of the moſt ſorcible Arguments at the end,
becauſe what we hear laſt makes the ſtrongeſt Impreflion:
But thoſe Argnments which carry the leaſt Weight, are to
be rang*d in the middle, that thoſe which by their Weight
may be inconſiderable, may by their number ſeem of
importance, -
Farther, If the Strength of our Cauſe depend on an
'Argument that is alien to it, we muſt introduce it in ſuch
a manner, as may make it appear to be proper to the
Cauſe; '*but*we muſtflew, thar What is offer'd by our Ad
lverfiuies is indeed foreign to it. >
'But we muſt take hee'd that we do n'ot throng our Ar
guments, 'for when the 'Paſſions are mov'd, Sunne's are'
more taken notice of than Argummts.
If the End and Aim of the Argumeata'ion, or Ruſhniag,
be more to mm than Worm, it is call'd Amplzfauim, or
Enlargiag. And-ſince this is implore! partly in lengthning
or drawin out the Spncb, 'and partly in exaggeratin'g the
Matter,- t' e latter is 'the Chief or Principal inifhis Place.
And this is done by Agnmfltdtion, Comparifim, Ruſmbzg
on the Magnitude or Qiantit-Y of! the Thing: or'Gailr, &c.
The Confutation is not always-made in'the-firne manner,
_ſonretimes We ſhew, that ral/head: are taken for Truth;
tometimes allowing the'PremiflEs, We deny-'the Conſequence
drawn from them', ſometimes againſt a firm and ſtron Ar
gumcntauon we oppoſe another, it leaſt of equal, or; we
th,
Rhetoric ; or, the Art Qf Perſuaſion. 18;"
can, of a ſuperiour Force and Energy; ſometimes we de
baſi: a Thing, and laugh at the Arguments of the Ad-uerſmy.
But in General, we firſt attack the moſt firm and valid
the reſtAdverfiir
of the may fallvof courſe.
's Arguments; that having deſtroy'd them,
Cirj
Rhetoric; or, the Art qf Perſuaſion. 19:
Circumlamrim is uſed, to avoid ſome Words whoſe Idea:
are unpleaſant, or to avoid (flying ſome thing which may
have an ill Effectz as, when Cicero is forc'd to confeſs that
Clodim was flain by Mila, he did it with this Addreſs:
" The Servants of Milo (ſays he) being hinder'd from afliſting
" their Maſter, whom Cladiu: was reported to have kill'd,
" and believing it true, they did in his abſence, without
ff his Knowledge or Conſent, what every body would have
'3 expected from his Servants on the like Occaſion. " In
which he avoids mentioning the Words kill, or put to Dear/1,
as Words ingrateful or odious to the Ear.
Thus much we have thought fit to ſhy of the Figurative
Expreffions of the Pafflamz but they are indeed almoſt infi
nite, each being to be expreſſed a hundred ways. we ſhall
conclude this Diſcourſe of the Art ofPerfimſion with afew
ReflectiOns on Style, and fewer Remarks on Other Compo
ſitions, in which the Leamcr ought to be eXerciſed.
5. 35. What we mean by Style, is the Manner oſ expreſ
fing our ſalves, or of cloathing Our Thoughts 'in Wards:
The Rules already given, as to Elotutim, or the Langmgc,
regard (as we may lily) only the Members of Diſcourſe, but
Style relates to the entire Body of the Compoſition.
The Marm- ought to direct us in the Choice of thesryle.
Noble Expreſiions render the 8'er lofty, and reprefint
Things great, and noble; but if the Subject be low and
mean, timorous Words and pompous Expreflion is Bombaſt,
and diſcavers Want of judgment in the 'Written Figure:
and Trape: paint the Motions of the Heart, but to make
them juſt, and truly ornamental, =the Paſſion ought to be
reaſonable. There'smothing molre ridiculous than to be
tranſported withoutCauie, to put one's ſelf in a-'Þieat for
what ought 'to be'argued coolly: Whence 'tis plain, that
the Marm- reguhtes the Style. When the Subject, - or
mue', is great, the Style ought to be ſprightly, full of
Motion, and enrieh'd with Figunr, and Paper; if our Sub
ject contain nothing extraordinary, and we can conſider it
without Emotion, the Styla muſt'bc pln'n.
The Subject: of Diſcourſe being extremely variousrin 'their
Nature, it follows, that there-muſtrbe- as great a Variety in
the Stylr: But the Ma'flers or this Art have reduc'd-thern
all to 'time Kinds, which they call the Sublimp, the Hem,
or 'the Imfiſmnr.
5-36: w
19: Rhetoric; or, tbeAr't of Perfuaſion.
. 36. Let the Subject of which wc deſign alofty Idea be
never ſo noble, its Nobleneſis will never be ſeen, unleſs we
have Skill enough topneſimt the beſt of its Faces.tothe
View. The beſt of Things have their Imperiections, the
Leaſt 'of which diſcover'd, may leffizn tour Eſteem, if not exs
tinguiſh it quitcz- We muſt therefore take care not to ſay
any thing in one place. Which may contradict what wc
haveſaid in another. *We oughmo pick out all that is moſt
teat and noble -_in our Subject, and putthat in its beſt
ht,, and then; our Exprefiioh muſt. be noble and ſublime,
capable of raiſingloſty Jdeasz. And Ftisnu'? Dutjr to obſerve
a certainUnifotmity in- our Sg/Ia; tho'all we ſhy havenot
an equfil Magnifiqfficqw ſo afar at: leaRLas to;make all the
Parts. of a piece, bear -a. Correſpoudencez with the
whole. r - '. r -,_- _ . :
- The Danger..here is" leſt you fall into a puffy sly/le.
which ſome call Inflation, or ſwell'd; for if you ſtretch
Thitfs beyond their. Nature, and hunt only after great and
ſoun ing 'Wot-ds, you ſeldom mind their.A eeablencſs to
the Nature of theSubject. And this has n the Fault
of many: of our modern Tragic Writers, who yet with the
_Vulgar have gain'd, Applauſetiand vſettled a Reputatiou.
s.- 37. <We come next to xhe plain Stylez and this ſimple
and plainCharacter of Writing is not without its Difficul
xies, not in the Choice of Subjects, thoſe being 'always or;
dinary and common, but becauſe there is wantin in this
-Sty-le that-,Pomp-and,M
-Faults ificenee
of the Writer, at 'eaſt which
vfrom the oftenReader
general 'de the
of
Hearert v But on common and ordinary Subjects thcrc_ 16
little room for Eight-'s andJÞ-oper, ſi) we' muſt make showe
of Wonds Fha't are proper-and; obvious;r.r - tvv
When we call this Stjlt- ſimple. andylain, we intend not
Meamſs if Exp'efflon; 'that is. never. good, and ſhould
wa s beavoided: For tho' the Matter 0158an Ohhls
Stye have nothing of Elevation, ryct. ought mathem
guage to bez vile and coutemptihleþv .Mpb.,Expreffi0n% Mi
Vulgariſms, are to lad-avoided; and yet-all muſt be Clean
ffld-'Mtumi- it) a' ' -?'ct A. zt 5 AN?" _ _ \
5.;8. Theme'nor- middleffltyienonflſts ofi-aparmw'
tion of the Sublimron one ſilie, and of the simplieiry- of the
Plain, on the other. Vir'gil fumiſhes' us with Exaffiiflcs 9
all the three; of the Sublime in the Eneids, thelfwm
his Pnflorah, andlthe Meim (or Middle) in his Georgltf- ,
4
2. * 5. 39. Tho.
-_ i, [i ,
c H A P. I. T
Of Particular I D E A S.
O'GIC is the Art of Reaibning. The Art is diviL
ded into four Parts; the firſt treats of Idus; th'
ſecond of judgment-r; the third of Method; and
the faurth of Reaſoning, or Argumematian. _
An Idea; in General, we define _172e immediate OZ'ct-'f
of 'be Mind; or that Though: or Image of my Thing w zch
it immediateþ ſet &gin-e the Mind. * _
All Idea: becomezthe Objects ofour Mind, or are pra
ſented. ſivlfe
which to 'chil-'Senſatianz
the Judgmentorbybythe
thePerception
Meditationof
ofthe
theSenſcsh
Mind ;*
Which we 'are
1', Ideaſi: call Reflection. -
either Simple or Compound. ' We call rthoſe'
simple, in which
itſiſelf cannot the any
diſcover moſt'Parts,
ſubtle orPenetration
Plurality ,- ofandtheweMind,
call"
thoſe Compounded which are made up, or compos'd ofhvo
or more of thoſe which are Simple. Examplcs of both we
ſhall ſee hereafter; '
2.. There are Idea: ofSubſtance-e, we know not what oh.
flute Subject, in which there are the Properties of Things
which we know; and him: of Made: or Manners, which are
the anlitie: or 'At-tribute: of Subflantes, which we cannot
conceive capable
. There of ſuhfiſting
are vcertain alone between
Relation: without theirSnbſlamer.
subſtance: and _
SuZſtnntes; Made: and Moder; and Made: and Subſtamey; the
Confideration of one including the Cſſonſideration of the o
ther; from whence theſe Relation: derive that Name; _
4.. There are Idea: which are to he conſider'd as the le.
mages of ſomethingExiſtent, sand which convey themſelves
2- to,
'196 Logic; er, ill! Art of Reaſomng..
10, and fix themſelves in the Mind, without an Operation
or' its own. But there are other; which by the Miadara
join'd to new Idea: at Pleaſure, and ſeparated from them
by Abſtraction. '
ſ. Farther, there are Idea: of a larger, or leſi extent, or
join'd to more or fewer Idear, whence we call them Sin-
gular, Particular, or Unl-unſal.
6. There are ſome Idea: that are 'len and plain, and o'
thers that are obſhun. All clear Idea; are ſimple, as are thoſe
of the compounded, all whoſe Parts are diſtinctly plac'd be
fore, or repreſented to, the Mind. _
7. There are ſome Idea: that are pea/act, or adequatez and
Others that are inadequate, or imperfect. Thoſe we call per
fect, or adequate, which contain all the Parts of the Things'
whoſe Images they are, and offer them ſo to the Mind; thoſe
are inadequate, or imperflct, which only contain and offer
'ſome Parts of the Thin s of which they are the Images.
We callIdea: Images of t e Things, becauſe there are ſome
"Things without us, which are like, and anſwer to them.
To theſe particular Head: of Idea: all others may be teff
fer'd. ) Theſe therefore we ſhall particularly examine.
A; "-
2- C'HA
Offlmple P. II.
Wound IvEAſis.1
1. ERY manyof theſimple-Idea: we have ficm, or b our'
Suffer, and very many from the Attention 0 the
Mind turn'd
2..,,To inwards
the firſt on it refer
We muſt ſelf, without re d to Senſhtim
all our Stagnation-r; 'the chieE
of whiCh may be reduc'd to five Clafl'ee, arms, or Heads.
according to the fi-ue Parts of the Body, 'which are affected
by them. For they come to us bythe Means of our Eyeſ,
our Earr, our Noſt, our Tongue or Palate, and by the Tour/7,
or Fat-ling of all the other Parts of the Bod . Colours arc
ſimple Idea: (we mean Colours themſelves, and diſtinct from
colour'd Bodies which have Parts) as Blue for Example, Of
which the Mind can diſcover no Manner oſv Parts.
3. The Idea: of Sounds are likewiſe ſimple, as well as
thoſe of Smell, Taſte, Touch. We ſþeak here of'an fwþle
particuIar Senſation conſider'd diſtinctlzy Horn 'the Varicty
of Sounds, Smellr, Taſtes, and dem. Thus-if anYOl!e
ſmell to a Roſe without mixing any other Scent he will
have a Senſatian in which be can diſtinguiſh no Parts," an
this holds of the other Sergſativm.
' 4.. Pain
i
Loglc; or, the Art of Reaſomng. 197
4. Pain and Pleaſhre are the chief, and moſt eminent-fen
atian: we have, whoſe Kinds and Sorts vary according to
the Part or Member affected; but there are no Parts to be
diſtinguiſh'd in Pain and Pleaſare, which we can conceive
to be ſeparated from each other. We ſpeak not oſ the Dus'.
ration of Pain or Pleaſure, which evidently has Parts, but
oſ the ſimþle Senſation qf a prick with a Needle, for Exam
le none can conceive any Parts of it, the concourſe of
which ſhould produce Pain.
ſ. In the Idea of Motion, which comes to us by out:
Senſes, when conſider'd in general, we can conceive no Parts,
tho' we may of its Dararion, of the Line it deſcribes, and
its Quickneſs or Slowneſs.
6. Thus in many ſimple Meat, which ariſe From Rcfleffion,
we ſhould in vain ſeek for Parts, as in Valitian, or W'z'llizzg,
&c. The ſame may be (hid of Exi/Zence conſider'd in gene
ral ,- tho' there are viſible Parts in the Dararion.
7. Compound Ideax, we have ſaid, contain or comprehend
ſeveral ſimple Idus, which may be diſtinguiſh'd and Repa
rately conſider'd. Thus the Idea: of all Bodies are compound;
becauſe in them we can conſider ſome Parts without the 0
rhers, or diſtinctly from the others. If we conſider aBody,
we clearly and plainly diſtin uiſh the big/yer- and lower, the
fbre and hind, the lefl and rig t Paft of it; and can diſtinct
ly think of one without the others. If we conſider the Idea
of Pity, we find that it conſiſts of the Idea: of Miſe'y, oſ a
miſerable Perſon, and of one who grieves for him. Such
are the Idea: of all Virtue: and Vieex, tho' they come to us
by Reflection of the Mind.
8. Tho' we ſhall not, in this Part of Logic, or theArt of
Reaſhning, treat of thoſe Judgment: we paſs upon Ideas, yet
it is of importance to remember never to pretend to deſine
what cannot be defin'd without making it more obſcurez For
a Definition ought always to be made uſe of to make the
Subject of our Diſcourſe more plain_ and clear, than-the
bare Nameof the Things wouldamake it; but in ſimple Ideax,
we cannot better explain them, than by their very Name,
or ſome Synonymous Words, the Knowledge o_t which de
pends on the Tongue we uſe, and the Senſe of h1m_ we ſpeak
to. The contrary Method has made the Arifletelzam fill us
with unintelligible jargon; as defining ofMotxon. they fly,
'tis an Act of a Being in Pomr,- a: in Power,- nor have the
Modern: much mended the Matter, by defimng, it the Change
Qf simmz'm, The firſt labougs with inexplicable Obſcurityi.
4 3
198 Logic; or, 'be Art lffReaſoning.
* and the Terms of the latter are not more clear or known,
than the Word Motion it ſelf.
9. Definition, indeed, has only to do with compound Idea:
for it's an Enumeration, or reckoning up of the ſeveral firm'
ple blew, of which that conſiſts. þ
C H A P. III.
Of I D e A s of Subſtances and Medes.
t. ANorher ſort of Idea: are thoſe of Such/Lente: and Made-r,
for we conſider all Things ſcparately, and by them
ſizlves, or elſe as exiſting in other Things ſo much, that we*
can't allow them Exiſtence without 'em. The firſt we call
Subſta'zcer and Subjects, the latter Made: and Accident-5; as
when we reflect on I/Vax and ſome Figure, as- Roundneſs, we
'Conſider theV/ax as aThing which may ſubſiſt without that
Roundncſs, or any other particular Figure, we therefore
call th ASubſtame. On the contrary, we conſider Round
rieſ: ſo inherent to the When or ſome other Subſtanee, that
it can't ſubſiſt without it, for we are not capable of con
ceiviug Roundnefl diſtinctly and ſeparately from a round
Body. This therefore we call a Made, or Acridmt.
2.. We always conſider Bodies cloath'd. as I may ſay, in
ſome certain Medes', except when we reflect on the Abſtract,
or General. The Subſtancer the Grammariam expreſs by
the Name; the Made: may be render'd by the Qulin'm,
as Vſax and Roundngfl is expreſs'd by round Mx.
3. We have beſides, certain compound Idem, which con
, ſiſt only of Made-s; and Others which are compounded, or
made up only with a ſort of Species, or kind of Moles.
As a Furlang, as far as it expreſſes a Menſuration of the
Roadz for it comprehends uniform Medes, as Face: or Feet:
Others conſiſt of ſeveral ſorts of Medes; as the Idea of Pity,
which has been already defin'd, and of the other Paſſions,
and Virtues and Vices.
4.._ We have, farther, Idea: com ounded of a Collection
of SubſtanCes of alike Nature, ſu is the Idea of anArmy,
of a City, of a Flee/25 confiſting of many Soldierr, citizens,
or. Sheep, &te. or they are compos'd of a Collection of Idea:
ot' unlike Subſtances, ſuch is the Idea.- of the Matter of
which a Horſe, a Ship, or a Deſhrt is compounded. And
in theſe Idea: we conſider not only Subſtances, as they are
Iluch, but alſo as attended with-certain Medes, which pra
iucc Idea- xhn an: YFFY WEIZ' sempouujfl- * w
r- I?
Logie; or, the Art qf Reaſoning. 199
5. We define Subſtance in general, fling: ſubflfling 5]
themſelves, but then they are conſider'd abſtractly, or with
out regard to any particular Subſtance actually exiſtin 5
and in that Senſe it is ſufficiently plain what is meant iy
the WordSubſtz-meez but ſince there is no Subſtance conſi
der'd in general which has any Exiſtcnce, but in our Iduu,
where we conſider exiſting Sad/fanne, the Matter is alter'd.
The Idea: of ſingle or particular Subſtances, are very ob
' ſcure; nor do we [underſtand any thing by their ſeveral
Names, but certain we know not what unknown Subjects,
in which there are certain Properties which conſtantly co
exiſt'. Thus if any one ſhou'd ask what that Subſtance is
which we call Body, we can only ſhy, that it is an unknown
Subject,
ty, in which we always diſcover Extenſim, Diviſibfli ct
and Impenetmbilitj.
6. 'Tis plain, that nothing more obſcure 'canct be meant;
than what is expreſs'd by theſe Terms, extended Subflanees.
For all that is here meant, is, that there is an unknown Sub
'ect, one of whoſe, Properties is to conſiſt of other unknown
Subjects, or Subſtances plac'd cloſe to each other, and of that
Nature,
of whichthat
We we
ſay ahave
Bodnoconſiſts.
Idea of any
Foroneweofcannot
thoſe Subſtances
affirmſi of
any Idea, that it is the, den of any one Subſtance, of whiche
Body is compos'd, ſince we have no Idea of corporeal Sub
ſtances, which does not comprehend or contain innumerable
Subſtances. If therefore we expreſs what we underſtand by
the Name of corporeal &ib/fame, we muſt ſay, that it is a Com
pqſition afun/mown Beingr, flame of whq/e Propertie: 'me know.
7 . The ſame we may ſay of other Subſtances, as of the spi
ritual (we examine not here whether or not there be an
more) as whoever will conſider with Attention, and no: ſtif
fer himſelf to be amus'd and deceiv'd by empty Words,
will experience. We find in our Mind various Thoughts,
whence we form the Idea of Spirits; but we are ignorant
of what that Subject is, in which theſe Thoughts are;
8. It will be of great Uſe to as perfect a Knowledge of
Things as we are capable of obtaining, to diſtinguiſh inv
thoſe Subjects which we call Subſtances, thoſe Things, with
out which we can conceive thoſe Subjects or Modes from
thoſe without which we cannot conceive them. For when
we think with Attention on thoſe Subjects, we ſhall find
that there are ſome Thin s ſo eſſential to them, that we
can't deprive them of, wit out changing their Nature; and
otherflew'
as Thingsitswhich
Haut:may be" raisen
' ' away
M from
' the awe-'t
Subject,
zoo Logie; or, the Art d'Reaſonin'g.
9. Made: are commonly divided into internal, which we
conceive, as it were, inherent in the Subſtance; as, Round
'a 5, &e. Or external, as when we ſay any Thing is deſir'd,
lov'd, beheld, and the like; which we call Relations.
10. There are likewiſe Modex, which are alſo Subflancex;
as, Apparel, Hair, &ce. without which the Squect can ſub
fiſt, and they can likewiſe be without the Su ject. As for
theſe Ideaz, which are compos'd of Made: and subſtance,
varioufiy join'd together, ſome are call'd real, as being the
Idea: ofThings that either really do, or are at leaſt believed'
to exiſts others rational, that is, when the Mind compound:
various Idea: together; as when we conſider a Stick reach
ing up to the Stars themfilves.
ll. In compound Idea: we ought carefully to obſerve
how manifold, and of how many Idea: they conſiſt 5 as
we ſhall more plainly ſee upon the Head of the Obſcurity
and Perjþimitj of IdEM'.
CHAP. IV'.
OfREI-ATlONS.
o
1, Here are, beſides Snbſtames, and Made: which are
inherent in Subflances, certain external Denomina
tions, which tho' they add hething to the Subſtance, yet
depend on ſome Mode or Manner of it; and theſe we call
Relations, by which the Conſideration- of one Thing in
cludes the Conſideration of another. Thus when we call
an one a Father, on this Expreſſion depends this, that he
w om we call- ſo has begot Children, and ſo comprehends
and includes the Conſideration of Children.
a. Every Idea,-confider'd in a certain manner, may be
the Foundation of aRelatizm, that is, may lead us by ſome
Property of its own to the Confideration of ſome other Idea.
So that all Exiſtence may be divided into the Creator and
the Creamre; for the Name of the Creator includes the
Thought of the Creaturez and ſo on the contrary.
3. Relation: are innumerablez for they may be between
Subſtances and Subſtances, Modes and Modes, Medes and
Subſtances, Relations and Subſtances, Relations and Medes,
Relations and Relations; for there is nothing that cannot
excite our Thoughts on ſomething elſe, ſince we can com
pound or join our Id'u together as we think fit. But avoid
ing too nice a Sgrugny, we only Wake our Obſerva
'\ '\ < - tions.
Logic ;- or, the Art qf Reaſonmg.
ſi 'ſons on thoſe oſ the greateſt moment, which regard Re
apt,
lations conſider'd in general. - ' 4
4.. We very often conſider Idea: as ab alnre, or including'
no Relations, which yet have neceffiri y a Reference to o-.
thers. Thus we cannot call any thing Great or Large, but
that the Idea which anſwersthat Word,muſt be relative. For
we call thoſe Things great, in a certain Kind, which are the
greate/i among thoſe Things of the ſame Nature, which we
have known. We call that Hill or Mountain great, which is
as great as any Hill that We have ever ſeen. That Kingdom
is large, which exceeds the Bounds of our own Country, or
of thoſe Countries we have known, &a. That Tower we
call high, which is higher than moſt of the ſame kind that
we have known. In Number we call that great, than
which there is not many greater in the ſame Kind: Thus
ſixty Thouſand Men in Arms in Greece We call a great Ar
my, becauſe Greece ſcarce eVCr had a greater; but it had
been little in Parſ', where much larger were aſſinnbled.
Thus likewiſe as to Time', we call it lon or ſhort with Re-
ference to anotherp We cal] a hundre Years Life, al
Life; fame calls his E r o) ſhort, becauſe his Anoeſtors
liv'd ſo man lo er; ichneſs, Pain, and Expgctation, make
that Time eem ng, Which to one in Action, Health, or
Pleaſure,
weak ſeems "an"
Woman, ſham- That- Burthen
cleſ Manjtlie isheavy
Sickly, to a Child,
whichſiislight a;
to a,
Man in Health and Vigour. Thus in the Ornaments of
the Mind, we call. that Wit' great, that Learning profound,
that Memory tenacious, that Ptudenee conſummate, which
we find excel, aſter the Manners of our Countr , all than.
we know among'us; tho' by 'Foreigners they may thought'
but ofi a moderate fine. Thus' Great Learning has awry
differeht
and of an Sigm'fieation-in
ignorant Perſon z-the
it isMouth'of. a Man
of a much largerofextentctin
Letters
the former, than in the latter. ſ
5'. In ſhort, all the Modes both of Mind and Body that
admit of Encreaſe or Diminution, are the Prototypes of
Relative Hem. But this is to be obſerved with the utmoſt
Attention, becauſe their Number is very large, which if
conſounded with ab alau Ideas, will 've riſe to great Er
rors, and render us incapable of und'erfliding the Diſcourſe.
of others. '
6. Here we muſt," in ſhort, remark, that the Jud ments
that we make are only the Perceptions of the Relation: be
tWeen various Idea: 5 in which Relation: our Mind does ac-j
guieſce,
zoz Logic; or, the Art of Reaibning.
uieſce. Thus when we judge that two times two make
tour, or that two times two do not make five 5 our Minds
obſerve the Relation of Equality which is between two
. times' two and Four, and the Inequality which is between
two times two and five; which Perception, as evident, the
Mind does ac uieſce or is beſt fitisfy'd in, or gives it ſelf no
farther Tr0ub e to ,conſider of' its Truth. But of this more
at large in the ſecond Part.
7. Reflſming alſo is a like Perception of' the Relation:
join'd with that
act Perception of Acquieſcence
the Relations of the Mind.
which But it various
are among is not
CHAP. Vl.
Of Indi-vidualr, Particular and Univerſlzl
I 0' E A s.
r. . HAT we have ſaid of Abflractiom leads us to the
Conſideration of Idus, as they are individual,
particular, and univerſal, for they are made particular.
and univerſal from individual, by Abſtractionz in which
matter We proceed in this manner.v When we conſider
ourſelves, in onrv Mind, or any one Man before us, then
- We have th'e Idea of an Indi-uidual, or an Indi-uidual Idea.
But if we omit thoſe Things which are peculiar to us, or
that one Man, and conſider what is common to us and
many others, ſuch as to be born in the iame Country, to
be or the ſame Party, and the like, then is the Idea of ſome
Particular Nation, or Family, &I. plac'd before us: But,
laſtly, if omitting theſe particular Diſtinctions common to
us and a certain Number of Men, we conſider what is com-_
mon to us and all Mankind, we have then an Uni-uerſal Idea.
2.. The Names that ſignify individual Ideas, are call'd
proper,- as, Alexander, Ceſar. But thoſe which ſignify
particular and univerſal Idear, are call'd Appellatiee, or_
Common,- as, a Briton,
3 . Farther-We a Chriſtian,in athoſe
may diſtinguiſh Man.Idea: certain Pro-ſi
C H A P. VII.
Of the Perſþiruityand Oiſiurity Qfſſ I o E A s;
C H A P. VIII.
Of Adeguate and Inadequate, or Perfefl and Im
perfect I D r; A s.
1. E have obſerv'd in the firſt Chapter, that Idea:
are the Images of Things which 'are without us,
by the Force or Occafion of which they are excited in us,
but they may be the Images of the whole Thing that ex
citcsthem, or only of a Part. When they repreſent the whole,
they are call'dAdeune, or perfect; when but a Part, they are
call'd Inadequate, or imperfect. Thusif we ſhe onlythc ſquare
Surface of a Cube, then the Idea of a ſquare Figure, not
T a - of
208 Logic ; or, the Art Of Reaſoning."
or' aCube, is inour Mind; which, therefore, is callid an imit
qume or imperfect Idea. On the contrary, if we behold a Tri
angle drawn on a Piece of Paper, and think of a Triangle in
Plane, we have an ndequme or perfect Idea in our Mind.
2.. All ſimple Idcas are adequate or perfect, becauſe the Fa
culty (heit what it will) that excites them, repreſents them
entire. Thus the Pain that we feel ſignifies, that there is ſome
Faculty of ſome Being without us, which excites that ldea in
us againſt our Will. But we muſt proceed no farther, For a
jImpIe Idea repreſents 'ſimple object, but it does not inform
us where it is, or whether that Faculty be united to any
others. We may therefore, without Fear of Error, gather
from any Senſation, that there is ſomething out of our Mind
which is by Nature adapted to excite it in us.
3. The Idea; of Made; are alſo ndequa-te or perfect, except of
thoſe Made: which are likewiſe Subſtances. For when we un
derſtand noMode: ſeparately exiſting, they are only conſider'd
by us ſeparatcly from the Subſtances by way of Abflmctiw 5
but all abſtract Idea: are ndequan or perfectdſimce they repreſent
all that Part ofthe Subject which we then conſider. Thus the
Men of Rounds-ſir is Perfect or adequate, becauſe it offers to our
Mind allthat is in Roundmſr in general. The Idea of aTriangle
inv general is Me nate or perfect, becauſe when it's before my
Mind, I ſee all rim is common roTriangles that can be.
4. Of the ſame kind are allIdezu, of which we know no
original or externalObject really exiſting out of' them, by the
Occaſion or which thoſe Idea: are exeited in us, and ofwhich
we think them the Images. Thus, when a Dog is before
us, it is the external Object without us, which raiſes the
Idea in our Mind; but the Idea of an Animal in general,
has no external Object to excite it, 'tis created by the Mind
it ſelf, which adds to, and detractsjrom it whatever it
pleaſizs; whence it muſt of neceſſity be adequate or perfect.
> 5', But here again, we muſt take heed of what we have
before caution'd, that is, that _we do not ſuppoſe that there
are any ſuch Objects really exiſting without us, becauſe the
Mind has been pleas'd to entertain it ſelf with the Idea: : For
that wou'd be as if a Painter that had drawnzaCe'mm', or
Hundred-handled Eunlades, ſhou'd contend, that there were
ſuch Being: really exiſtent in Nature.
_ 6. The
which are Idus oſ-allrSubflances
not formid are imdrquate
at the pleaſure or imperfect,
of the Mind, but ga-ct
ther'd from certain Properties which Experience diſcover-s in
them. This is ſufficiently evident from what we have ſaid
. of
Mad m
WJUDGMENTQ'
c H A P. I.
Of Judgment in the Mind, and expreſr'd in
- ords.
A V I N G conſider'd Idea: andtheir Properties par
ticularly, we come now-to-trert ofjudgments, in
which various Idea: are Compar'd with each o
ther. We, muſt firſt acc'urately diſtinguiſhv the
'judgment as it is in the Mind, from theWords in which it
is expreſs'd, if we wou'd know what it is.
. 2.. judgment, as it is in the Mind and unwritten, is a Percep
tion oi the Relation that is betWeen two or more Idus. Thus
When We judge that the Sun is greater than the Moon 3 having
compar'd the two Idea: oſ the Sun and Moon, we find that
the Idea of the Sun is greater than thatof the Moon, and our
Mind perfectly acquieſces in-this Perception, nor makes any
farther Enquiry into the Matter. When we judge two Mem
bers to be unequal, by having obſerv'd the Ine uality of their
Ideas, our Mind gives it ſelf no further Troub e in their Ex
'mination in that reſpect, but only confines to its Memory,
that thoſe two Members were found to be unequal.
3. We muſt here obſerve, That our Mind can ive its Aſ
ſent to obſtare Idear, as Well as to thoſe which are c ear; or ac
quieſce in a Thingasperfectly diſcover'd, which yet it has no
perfect Knowledge of, and can commit this to the Memor
as a Thing perfectly known. Thus we may judge the fix'd
Starsleſs than the Moon, by comparing the obſtareldea: ofthoſi:
Stars and the Moon, and then take it for aPoint not to be
arzu'd.
Logic; or, the Art Of Reaſoning. 21 1
ar u'd a ainſt, as clear and evident. The Mind has alib a Fa
cu ty o ſuſpending its Affimt, till by an accurate Examen of
the Irlem, the Subject becomes clear and evident; or if it be of
ſuch aNature that we cannot arrive'at ai perſpicuousPercep
tion, we continue in Doubt or Suſpencc, and commend it to
the Memory as a dubious Matter. UI'his Faculty which we
obſhrve in our Mind, of giving our Aſſent to obſmre Ideas,
or denying it, is call'd Liberty. ' _ \ '' i -
4.. But we cannot make uſe of this Faml when the Subject
of our Thoughts hAs the laſt and greateſt erſpicuity that can
be. For Example, we can by no means in the World per
ſuade ourſelves, that twice two-do notmake four, or are
equal to four; or that the Part is Hotlefs than the Whole, and
the like Maxims of the moſt evident Truths; for as ibon as
ever we hear them, the Mind cannot deny its Aſiimt, butneceſ
ſinily acquieſites, without finding in itſelf the leaſt Deſire or
Iuclination of making any farther Enquiry into the matter.
5'. This is ajudgmant as it is in the Mind, which when ex.
preſs'd in Words. we call a Propojition, in which ſomething
always is affirm'd or deny'd. That part of the Propoſition of
which ſomething. is affirm'd ordeny'd; is call'd the Subject;
the other Part, which is'ſaid b the Negati'onor Affirmation,
is call'd the Amibute. Thusw nwe ſay that Poverty i.- to be
reliw'd, or Povert is 'w Vice,- the Word Pmrty is the Subd
ject 5 to be relic-w' , and Vice, are the Ann'butes. But beſides
- theſe two Parts, we muſt conſider the Cap-la, or cannecti-ve
Word, by which, when 'tis alone, 'tis affirm'd that there is ſome
Relation between the Subject and the Amibm, but by addin
a negative Particle, that ſame Relation isdcny'd: In the preſent
Inſtances we affirm in the firſt, that there is a Relation be.
tween the Idea of Poverty, and the Idea oi Relief, ſo that the
Idea of Poverty in our Mindincludes the Idea of Relief; and in
the latter Inſtance we deny that the Idea of Poverty excites
in us the Cenſideration of any thing baſe or wicked.
6. Propoſitiom are ſometimes expreſs'd in many Words, and
ſometimes in few. Henry ragcs, is an entire Propofition, for
*tis the ſame as if we ſhou'd ſay Henry i: raging.
7. Prapoſitims are either ſimple or compound, theſimple are
exprefi'd in one Word, as, God is good: The Cempomzd in
many, as God who i: good, cannot Might in tb'MIſcr] afan
QEAE.
'2 r 2 Logic; or, the Art of Reaſoning.
C H A,P. Il.
Of Uniwrſal, Particular, and Singular
Propoſit'ions.
c H A P. ſſm.
Of 'what- ir 'Truth and Falſhood, and whether
there be any certain Differeme between them.
1. BY Reaſoning to find out the Truth, being the juſtAim
of this our Art, we ſhall paſs over the ſeveral Claſſes
of Propoſitions ſirt down by the common Logieians, and
which are of little Conſequence in any thing, but of no'
man
a 14 Logic; ar, the Art of Reaſoning,
manner ofUſitto this more important End. We ſhall there
fore here treat of the Truth and Falſhood in general of all
Propoſitions, that we may learn to diſtinguiſh the one from
the other.
a. That Propoſition is true which is agreeable, or anſwers
to the Nature of the Thing, of which any thing is affirm'd
or deny'd. Thus when we ſay that 4. is the one fourth Part
of twice 8,- that Propofition is true, becauſe agreeable to
the Nature of theſe Numbers. If we ſay twice 4. is equal
to twice 3, the Propoſition is falſe, becauſe it is not an
ſwerable to the Nature of thoſe Numbers.
z. Whoever will ſpeak ſeriouſly what he thinks, will
confeſs, that he neceſſarily believes that there is no Medium
between Truth and Falſhaod. _It is certain, that all Propoſi
tions, conſidefd in themſelves, appear to us either true or
falſe; for 'tis a Contradiction to be agreeable or canflntangom,
and not conſentamom and agreeable to 'In Things. There
are indeed ſome probable Propoſitions, or ſuſpected of Falſi
firy, but this has nothing to do with the Nature of Pro
' poſitions, which is in it ſelf determinately true or falſe; but
to our Knowledge, which is not (in reſpect of theſe Pro
pofitions) ſufficient to enable us to determine with Cer
tainty. Of which hereafter.
4.. There have been ibme who have aſſerted, that this
only Was certain, thar nothing war certain, and that Truth
had no Criterion or certain Mark. to be known from Taſſ
Izood in any thing elſe but that one Maxim. But ſince they
cou'd not deny but that they held this Maxim for a certain
Truth, there muſt be, even according to them, ſome Mark
of Truth, Joy'which they excepted that Maxim from the
Uncertainty of all other Propoſitions. And they were of
OpiniOn, that they had found the Marks of Uncertainty in
all theſi: Thin s, which the other Philoibphical Sects held
for undoubt Truthr. They therefore determin'd poſitively
of all Things at the ſame time that they pretended to doubt
of all Things, while they aſſerted, that all that was find' by
others, was uncertain. We cannot thereforezcondemn the
Pjrr/ronianr and Acaden'icr, as denying that Truth was not
at all known to us, while they thought they' did truly judge
of the Uncertainty of all Thin s, in which they were as
dogmatic and poſitive as any o the other Philoſophers.
y. But that We may ſatisfy our ſelves, we muſt make it
the Object of our Enquiry to know, that what we affirm of
_Tlungs is conſentaneous or agreeable to their Nature. If we
will
Logic ; or, the Art of Reaſoning. 215
will give our ſelves the Trouble to look into our own Minds,
we ſhall find, that there are ſome Things which compel
our Affint; but other Things of which we can ſuſpend our
judgment. When We clear yand diſtinctly diſcover the cer
tain Relation between two Ideas, we cannot but ac uieſce
in that Perception, or think our (clves oblig'd to ma e far
ther Enquiries about it. Thus the Relation of Equality be
tween twice 4. and 8, is R) manifeſt and evident, that we
cannot entertain the leaſt Doubt of the Matter.
6. But ſhou'd an Man affirm, that there were Inhabitan':
in the Moon, after a hang Conſideration of this Propoſition we
ſhall find that we are by no means compel'd to give out Aſ:
ſent to it,- thc Reaſon of which is, that we do not diſtinct
1 and plainly diſcover any neceſſary Relation between the
gloon, and any manner of Inhabitants, but that we can
doubt of that Relation, 'till it be made evident to our Un
derſtanding.
7. Hence we ma gather, that Evideme alone can remove
all our Doubts. 'W at remains is, that we en uirc, whe
ther it follows, that that Propofition is true, o lwhich we
have no reaſhn to doubt?
8. We muſt firſt, in this (Deſtion obſerve, that it is en
tirely ſuperfluous among Men, becauſe whatever Judgment
we make of it, we cannot change our Nature. We ne
ceſſarily give our Aſſent to thoſe Things which are evident,
and we ſhall always preſerve our Faculty or Power of doubt-_
ing in thoſe Things which are obſcure.
9. Secondly, If Evidence ſhould be found in Propoſitions
that are falſe, we muſt neceſſarily be compell'd- into Error,
ſince we neceſſarily give our Affimt to Evidence. Hence
wou'd follow this impious Poſition, That God, who made
us, is the Author of our Errors, ſince he has thus put us
under aNeceſſity of falling into 'em. But it is only conſiſtent
with a wicked Nature to oblige us to be deceiv'd, of which
in the leaſt to ſuſpect God, wou'd be the Height of Impiety.
io. Third! , We neceſſarily love Truth, and hate Error;
for there is no body who is not deſirous of knowing the
Truth, and no body is willin ly deceiv*d. But who can
prevail with himſelf ſo mue as to ſuſpect, that we are
made in ſuch a manner by a Beneficent Deity, that we
ſhou'd love that with the greateſt Vehemence, which w'e
either cou'd not obtain, or not know whether we obtain'd
it or not; which is much the ſame.
1 x . Form/fly;
216 Logic; or, the Art of Reaſonmg.
as iWell
1..Fourtbly, Iſwewhich
as in thoſe ſhou'dareerrnot
in ſiſo,
Things that are
we ſhould evident,
ſometimes
in the evident Propoſuions find Contradictions, which are
commonly found ,in A thoie which treat of Things that are
obſcure. On the'contraty, evident T ' s are always a
greeable to each other, when frequenty evident Things
diſagree with thoſe that are vobſcurez- Whence we may
conclude, that Evidence cannot deceive, but Error is con
fin'd to Obſcurity. .
. u. Evidenu is', therefore, the Criterion or Mark of Truth;
and, thoſe Things we ought to think true, to which we
neceſſarily ive our Aſſent. For this is likewiſe the Markor
Characteri ic of Truth, that it neceſſarily oompels our Aſ
ſent. Whatever, therefore, we ſee evidently agreeable tothe
Things of which we ſpeak, that we muſt think true. On
the other hand, when we find any Propoſition evidently
contrary to the Nature oſ the Thin under our Conſide
tation, we may juſtly declare that to e falſi.
_.. 13. But to decideperemptorily in a Matter' that is obſeure,
is very raſh and inconſiderate, as we have obſerv'd in the
Firſt Part, of the clearneſs or Obſturitj of Idus, which we
ſhall not repeat. But ſince thole Things which are really
obſcure, are often aſſerted to be evident, whoever wou'd
avoid that Error, ought as much as he can to ſuſpend his
udgmentz and nieely to examine whether he be not in
fluenc'd by ſome Inclination, or Paffion, or Party, when
the finding out the Truth ought to be his whole Aim;
and then he will neVer give his Aſſent to Things that are
falſe and obſcure.
CHAP. VI.
Of the fiweral Step: or Degrees of Perjþicuity in
Propqfltions, and ofVeriflmilitude, or Prabalility.
r. Ecauſe all that welbelieve is not built on n '
KBI (IICnovyledgeſ gie Philoſophets have obſe:v'z
nowe togetheſe
reduc'd evera egrees, and
two, Science all Opinion.
which howcver may be
Science is a Knowledge deriv'd from the Introſ ect'
looking into the Thing it ſelf of which we diſcoiirſhlonagd
which
Lo'gic ; o'r, the Art qfv Reaſoning. 217
Which exclude all manner' oſ Doubt. But it may ariſefrom '
a ſimple'lnt'uition or' View of the Ideas; as, , when we conſi
der this Propoſition _'lee Vſlzale irgrefflter than-a Part,
and the like; 'whoſe Truth is known by Evidence-alonc,
without any'Reaſoning on the Point. Or by dedueing cer
tain COnſequencoes, and' thoſe r'nore remote from evident
Principles, ſtich as are innumerable Gcomctrical Demon-_
ſtrar'ions, neceſſarily deduced by a long Chain of Argumentsv _
from-their firſt Principles. _l_ ' - X ' I
'3. Opinionlis the Aſſcvnt of' the Mindſi to Propoſitions not __
evidently true a't the fii-ſt'iight, nor dCdLlC,'\i. by neccilhry r
Conſequence'from thoſe which are evidfflnLTy true, but Iiich _
as ſeem to_ _cai-ryche Faice 'of Truth. Thus "tis pxobaole
that the Writers-'of the Life of Alexander magnify'd _too
much his Exploits. 'Tis not probable, or likely, that he
ever receiv'd the 'Been oi the Amazom, or paſs'd the
Mount'ain Cuuraffls. _ ' I _
4.. Some here 'add Faith or Relief which _is' an Aſſent z
given to anyone that fells any Thing which we have not _
teen our ſevaS,
cination.v 'nor Faith
But that foundOroutBelieſ
by any Argument,
depends either or
onRatio-
ſome ,
neceſſary Concluſion'dcdue'd from evident Arguments, or_
only'on a. probable' Oþ'mion, and ſo may be referr'd to one _\
of the two Heads already mention'd. A
f. To theſe _we might add Daubting, or a doubtfld Aſiffimt,
tho' this be likewiſe a Species or Sort/of Opinion, and uſes to U
heICOni-aiffid under' the general Name of Opinion. ct .For the .
Affintisdoub'tful when _'the Probahility is Weak, which when .,
ſtrong, produces firm opinion. But to (make theſe clearer .
to the Underſtanding, we will make agradual Riſing from ,
Pr'obability to Evic'ience.v i . ,,
6. Since, as we haVe [ben in the former Chapter, thoſe
are call'd true Propoſitions, which' agree- with theNature v
of'the Things of'which they are ſpoken,- and thoſe proba-. _
ble, Which only ſeem t-'o 'agree to the Nature of the Thin
under Gonſideration'ſthat Probability may be greater or leſsg,
and ſo produces either a ſtronger or weaker Opinion. _But
it is built, ſummarily conſider'd, on our Knowledge and
Experience, 'whether True or Falſe. '
7. But to riſe from the loweſt to the higheſt Probabiliry,
we muſt firſt obſerve, that the loweſt Degree of Probability
is built on the Relation of another where 'that is the onl
Morive or Beliefz in which yet many things are to be con
ſider'd. ' ſſ ſſ '
U_ s. If
218 Logic; or, the Art of Re-aſoning.
8. If the Perſon who gives the Relation be wholly un
knOWn to us, altho' what he tellsris not incredible, yet we
cannot give an entire Credit to him, when there are no other
Circumſtances to add a Weight to his Narration, becauſe we
have had no other Experience of his Credibility; or whether
he be worthy of Belief or not. But if we have ſome flight
Knowledge of him, we are the more ready to believe him,
eſpecially it' he be a noted Man of great Authority with map
my, tho' we know not whether he has gain'd that Fame and
Authority b his Merits or not. Nay, we rather believe a
rich Man o indifferent Ogalifications, than a poor Man, be
cauſe we ſuppoſe the former more converſant with Perſons
ekilljd in Affairs,
and Diſcourſe full than the latter.
of Probity, eaſily An
winhoneſt Countenance.
our Aſſent. ſ
9. If any one with whom we are better acquainted, tells
us any thin , the more known that is, the more Inſtances
we- have o his 'Veracity, the more ready he finds us to have
_AſſuranCe in the Truth of what he tells us, tho' he may de
ceive us even in that very Narration. 'Tis with difficult,
we can perſuade our ſaves, that we are deceiv'd by a Perſon
whom we have known generally to be a Man ot Veracity,
ſince-Men who have got a Habit of ſpeaking Truth, orany
other Habit, ſeldom act contrary to the conſtant Diſpoſition
pf their Mind.
to._'There are beſides, various Circumſtances which add
Force to the Teſtimony of others; as if it were a. Thing of
that kind in which he cou'd ſcarce _bedeceiv'd, as if Men
ofVSobriety and Temper ſhou'd tell us, that they had ken,
-touch'd, and accurately examin'd ſome particular Thin , and
not with a tranſient curſory View, The Probab' ity is
heighten'd, if the Belief of their Hearers be of no advantage
to them; or iſ they incur a conſiderable Danger by telling
it, which they might avoid by ſaying nothing oſ the Mat
ter; if to theſe the Number of Witneſſes be encreas'd, the
Probabilit] will be ſo ſtrong, that unleſs the Narration be
oppoſite to the Nature of the Thing, we can ſcarce be able
to deny our Aſſent. _ A ' '
11. Snow/ly, What here affects our Minds, is drawn from
the very Nature of the Thing, and our own Experience.
Whoever will tellus Stories that are impoſſible, can never
gain our Belieſ, as long as the Narration labours under that
Character; for that is the Mark of Falſhood. '
12.. 'Tis
Logic 3 or, the Art of Reaſoning. 219
12.. 'Tis firſt of all things neceſſary, that what is ſpoken
ſhou'd be thought poſſible: If we have never ſeen it, nor
heard that any other has experienc'd the like, tho' the Mar
rer it ſelf be not actually impoſſible, yet it will find but lit
tle Credit with us: For Example,-Iſ any one ſhou'd tell
us, That he had ſeen in the Indie: a Brilliant Diamond as
big as a Man's Head,- tho' in this our Mind can diſcover
nothin plainly impoſſible, or contradictory, yet ſhou'd we
ſcarce iclieve it, becauſe we never our ſelves ſaw one ſo
large, or ever heard of any one elſe who had.
13. When we our ſelves have ſeen any thing like it, or
have known others who have ſeen the like, we then conſi
der how ſeldom,' or how often it has happen'd,- for the more
frequent a Thing has been to our Eyes, or thoſi: oſ' others
-to our Knowledge, the eaſier Credit it finds with us; and
on theifcontrary,
ſiThus the us,
any one tell ſeldomer,
that he the
has more difficultly
ſeen aStone believ'd.
Bridge over
a River one or 'two hundred Paces long, he will find no
difficulty in gaining our Belief: But we give Credit more
hardly to himctfour
iblid Marble whoMile
ſhallintell us, thatover
Length, he has ſeen aofBridge
an Arm of
the Sea,
and 'another Bridge of four hundred Foot in Length, of
only one Arch, as they ſky there are in China.
i4.. By the Tcſt ofthe ſame Experience we examine the Cir
cumſtances of the Manner-of doing any thing, the Circum
vſtanees of the Perſons, Place and Time 5. and if theſe agree
with what we know, they add a Force to the Relation. We
farther are apt to conſider and weigh theCauſcs or Motives
which mov'd him to whom the Action is attributed to doit.
For if the Thing be ſingular, uncommon, and out of the way,
we can ſcarce believe that it ſhou'd be done without ſolid and
weighty Reaſons, ofwhich, while we are ignorant, the Mat
ter of Fact muſt at leaſt remain dubious in our Minds. Butif
theſeſolid and cogent Reaſons are known, we ceaſe to doubt,
or at leaſt, we eaſily believe the Matter of Fact, iſ withal it
appear, that the Agent knew theſe Reaſons and Motives. Thus
we eaſily believe the many Prodigies or Miracles of the Old
Teſtament, done by God, becauſe they were of the moſt m0<
mentous Importance to preſerve, at leaſt, one Nation uncor
rupted by Idolatry, which cou'd not have been done without
thoſe Miracles. But we can ſcarCe perſuade our Minds to
believe, that God, after the Chriſtian Religion was eſtabliſh'd,
ſhou'd work Miracles on every trifling Occaſion, as the Le
gends of the old Monks and modern Papiſts pretend.
. U a lj'. We
220 Logic; or, 'be Art ry" Reaſonirrg.
ſly. We muſt ſeek the third Motii/e of our Belief in our
ſelvcs: For there are ſome Events, the Truth of which canu
not appear to any, but ſuch whoſe Minds are firſt qualify'd
by ſome certain Knowledge : As for Example, theſe are ſome
Events of Ancient Hiſtory. There was a King ff Macedon,
'whoſe Nan'ze was Achander, who filbi-Iu'd Aſia, having 'van
quiſh'd King Darius. 'Theſe are ii) well known to thoſe Who
arc conrvcrſant with the Greek and Roman Hiſtory, that they
can have no doubt of the Truth: but it is not ſo evident
to a Man who is wholly unacquainted with Hiſtory; for the
former has read many Writers of various Nations and Times.
all concurring in the ſame Account,- he knows the Series of
the whole Hiſtory with which theſe are connected, and came
to that Knowledge by degrees, by much reading. To ſatisfy
another in this Point, he muſt. lead him up the ſame Steps
by which he mounted, elſe he will find it difficult to make
one obſtinate believe him.
_r6. In- this Probability of Relations, the fewer or more
of theſe Circumſtances occurring, makes it the weaker or
ſtronger. Nay, When they all, or the greateſt Part meet,
ſo great is the Force of the joining of thoſe Circumſtances,
-that they affect our Mind like the higheſt Evidenn. For
Example; he Who reads the Roman Hiſtory, can no more
doubt, but that there was ſuch a Man as fall'n: Caſhr, and
that he vanquiſh'd Pompey, than that two Lines draw'n from
the Cenrre to the Circumference are e nal.
' 17. AsE-uidenceisthe Criterion, orC aracteriſtic of Truth
in Things of Speculation, which depend on Reaſoning, ſo
in Matter; qf Fat? the Concourſe of ſo many Circumſtances
' - is an undoubted Ptoof and Mark of Truth. 'Tis certain,
that we can no more deny our Affiznt to theſe 'concur
ring Circumſtances, than to the higheſt Evidence; they there
'fore either perſuade and recommend the Truth,. or (which
is abſurd) God has ſo form'd us, that we muſt neceſſarily
be 18.
deceiv'd. '
There is likewiſe a Probabz'liiyw which depends only
on our own Reaflming, or Experience, without the Interven
tion of any elſe, and omitting thoſe Circumſtances, which we
have enumerated. And here we may diſtinguiſh ſuch va
rious Steps and Degrees of Probabilitj, that whenwe come
to the higheſt, it is no longer a mecr Pradability, but ma
nifeſt Truth, and compcls our Aſient without any Reſervc
or Doubt. ' ' z.
r9. I. When
. Loglc; or, the Art ty' Reaſoning. 22:
19. I. When we conſiderThings, of whichwe haveſome
manner ofKnowledge, but not a c ear and perfect one,we may
make a probable Judgment of them, better than if we were
wholly ignorant ot the Subject; but this Probability is ſi) weak,
that we may be perſuaded we have been in an Error. But
when the Subject is perfectly known to us, by Experiment,
we may make more certainſludgment of ſome Property of
that Subject, which is not 0 thoroughly underſtood by us.
Thus aGoldſmith, or Refiner, who has often melted Gold,
and work'd in it in diverſe Ways, can make better judgment
of ſome things which belong to that Metal, than aMan who
has never been employ'd about it.
zo. II. He who has ſome time doubted of a Thing, and
judges not of it, but after a ſerious and long Scrutiny, will
make juſter Judgment of it than he who (without Experi
ence) gives a raſh and precipitate judgment. 'Tis certain,
we believe our ſelves more, after we have made a thorough
Enquiry into it, than when we are obliged to make a haſty
and unpremeditated Judgment. We call not that adiligent
Enquiry or Scrutiny, which leaves us in no manner of Doubt;
for the Nature of the Thing of which we judge, does not
always allow ſo nice an Introſpection, as to free us from all
manner of Doubt, but ſuch an Enquiry wc call dili ent,
which is all that the Nature of the Thing will a mit.
Thus we can examine few, or rather no Subſtances, ſo far,
as to aſſure our ſelves that we have a certain Knowledge
of moſt of its Properties. This makes all Natural Philolo
' phy (which is not built on Experiments) a meer conjectural
Amuſement.
21 . III. If we have been uſed to ſuch Experiments before
we give our Zludgment, and have frequently given the like
Judgments o other Things which _have been approved by
Experiments, taking thence a certain Aſſurance of a parti
cular Faculty of finding out the Truth, we hope that with
little Pains we have hit the Point,- yet this aſſurance is often
very fallacious, and leads us into Errors.
22.. IV. Our Judgments of Things are either mone cer
tain or uncertain, as the Experiments were made a ſhorter
or lon er time, ſi'om that in which we call them to mind.
For w en our Memory of any Experiment is freſh, as well
as the whole Courſe and Rcaſons of the Operation, our
Judgments then ſeem more probable to us. But when we
retain but a faint Memory of the Enquiry, then we arc apt
to entertain Doubts of our Diligence in the Courſe of the
U z Ope
zzz Logic; or, the Art ofReaſoning.
Operation, and we dare not maintain our judgments with'
'any manner of Confidence. ' > -'
23. V. When Experience has diſcover'd certain Proper
ties in the Thing which we examine, which are commonly
unknown, and only can be found out by Rariocination; our
Gueſsxſeems to us the more probable, or likely, the more it
agrees with thoſe known Properties. If our Enquiry be
thich of the three Hypotheſes of the Diſpoſition of the Solar
Vortex in which our Earth is, be moſt probable, that of
Ptolem , '_ijha, or Coþemicm, that of the laſt is preferr'd to
the or 1er two, becauſe it accounts for all the Appearances
in ,the Planets and fix'd Scars about us; whereas the other
two leave many unaccounted for. In ſuch Enquii ies as theſe,
theSimplicity oſ the Hypotheſis is of very great-Weight,
for the fewer Thingswe are obli 'd to ſuppoſe,- for giving
an Account of the Appearances, o much the more plauſible
isthe Hyporheſis, provided that by it we are able to ac
countſor all things relating to it. '
24.. VI.. When the Subject-oſ our Enquiry is the object
of our Senſes, when- we have apply'd our Senſizsrightly diſ
sfd, then it is no longer a ſimple Probability, but an iri
dubitable Truth. There are ſcveial Cautionsto be us'd
in-xhis-Affair,. which are to-be learn'd in Natural Philoib
pþy. We, muſt further obſerve, that our Senſes were given
_us, not- to arrive at a perfect Knowledge oſ the Nature of
Objects, but only of What is neceſſary to the Preſervation
- of, our Lives.
25'. But We give more Credit to ſomeoſ our Senſts, than
.to others; thus we confide more in our Sight. than our
Hearing, becauſe the Objects of our Eyes ſtrike ſtronger on
them, than thoſe of 'the Hearing on the Ears. But when
ſeveral Senihs concur in the Diſcoveryof any Thing, as when
we not only ſee, but: hear and touch, then there can be no
other Doubt remain of the Truth. Thus if we ſee, hear,
and embrace our Friend, We cannot have the leaſt Doubt of
the Truth or Reality of what we do. Therefore, this Con
viction of the Senſhs is no more to be reſiſted, than the Evi
dence ariſing From Reaſom'ng. _
26. From all that we haveſaid it is plain, that thereis this
difference between a flight or weak Probability, and its
ſtrongeſt or higheſt Degree; that we cannot deny our Affirnt
to this, but we may _in that ſuſpend our judgment, or give
It.
27. But
Logie; or, the Art of Reaſoning; ar;
27. But the Uſe of theſe probable Propoſitions is different
in common Life, and in Philoſophical, and meerly Specula
tive Enquirics. For in common Liſc we very rarely depend
' on evident Arguments, but eſteem it a ſufficient Warrant of
ſiour doing any thing, iſ back'd'by no contemptible Proba
bility, For ſhou'd we not undertake any-Action 'till we had
the utmoſt Evidencc of what we ought to do, we might
ſoon periſh; and. yet common Prudence will not allow us
' always to act on the lightcſt Probabilities. We ought, as
much as poſſibly wc can, diligently to examine all Things,
and to contract ſuch a Habit of judging rightly, that we
may judge with all the Diſpatch'and Addreſsimaginable'. We
ought to chooſe, of two Things that are notcertain, that
which may do us the leaſt'Damage, iſ we ſhou'd be deceiv'd.
28. But, in Philoſophical Things, we proportion our Aſ
' ſent to the Degree of Probability 5 ſo that to a Weak Proba
*bility we give a weak Aſſent, a ſtronger to one that is of
greater Force, andaſull and perfect one to that which comes
up to Evidencc. For to ac uicſce entirely, as in Truth,
in a Propoiition which is ob cure, by reaſon of flame A'p
' pearance of Truth, is to throw
ger of Error. " our ſclvcs into maniſeſt r Dan
C H A P. V.
Of-doulztful, ſuſpefled of Falſity, and falſe . 4
Propqſitiom.
1.- I-Ioſe Things are dubious in general, in which there
are no evident Marks of Truth or Falſhood. We
ſometimes diſcover ſome few Circumſtances in Things
which uſe to produce Probability, without being join'd to
any others which may excite any Suſpicion in us. Such are
many ancient Hiſtories, which we' cannot reject, becauſe we
find in them ſome things which have the Appearance of
Falſhoodz nor yet admit as undoubted, 'becauſe they hav 'not
, Evidenc: enough ofſ Truth.
V Thus the' chide/e Hiſtory oft...*ir
moſt
224' Loglc; or, the Art queaſoning.
moſt ancient Kings, eſpecially of Foin', who liv'd ſoon' after
Noah, we cannot be certain of its Truth, nor accuſe them of
Falſhood. In like manner, we cou'd neither condemn as falſe.
or aſſert as true, that there are in the Univerſe many Inha
bitants more than Mankind, and that ſome Planets are the
Refidence of happier, and others of more unhappy Natives.
2.. There are ſometimes certain Circumſtances which ufi:
to attend aFalſhood mixt with others, that are not impro
bable; but in ſuch a manner, that the latter are either more
numerous, or of greater weight. There occur in the Fa
bles of the Greeks, the moſt ancient Account or Reports of
that Nation; there are many maniſeſt Lyes or Falſhoods,
yet if we narrowl enquire into them, we ſhall obſerve many
Circumſtances w ich ſhew, that it is highly probable that
moſt of thoſe thin s happened to the old Inhabitants of an
cient Greece, whic gave occaſion to the Riſe of thoſe Fa
bles; ſo that thoſe Things which are told by the Poets are
not all Falſe, but that it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh the
Truth from the Falſhood.
3. There are other Things in which the Reaſons for our
believing the Truth or Falſhood are equal. Many Authors
paſs this Judgment of the Gia'm and Gigantic Bones, which
are ſaid to be found in many Places. Of the ſame Kind
are moſt of th0ſe Stories of the Apparitions of Evil Spirits,
c.
4.. Secondly, Thoſe Propoſitions are ſuſpected of Falſ
hood, in which there are more and more weighty Marks
or Signs of Falſhood than of Truth, tho' even thoſe Signs
be not forcible enough, to compel our Aſtient. Theſe Signs
are op oſite to thoſe of Probabiiity, from whence they may
be eaſ y gather'd.
5. We muſt obſerve here the ſame Cautions, which we
have deliver'd about the probable Propofitions: That is, that
we doubt of the Doubtful, and maintain our Suſpicion of
theſe 'which are ſuſpected of Falſhood. It wou'd be equally
raſh andareinCOn-ſiderate
which to confound
evidently ſalſt, themtrue.
or evidently either Norſſ
withought
thoſe ſ
-C H A P. VI.
'of Faith, or Relief
t. E have ſaid that _Fnit/a or Bel-itſ may be reſerr'd to
Science or Opinion, ſo that what we have ſaid of
thele two. may likewrſe be apply'd to Faith.
2.. Faith or Belief in general, is ſaid to be that Aſſent we
give to a Propeſition advanc'd by another, the Truth of
which we gather, not from our own immediate Realbning
or-Experience, but believe it diſcover'd by another. It ma
be diſtinguiſh'd into blind and ſeeing. That we call blind
Faith, by which we give our Aſſent to a Propoſition advanc'd
by another, oſ whoſe Veracity we have no certain and evident
Reaſon or Proofz and this Belieſ or Faith, is altogether un
worthy of a wile Man. The ſeeing Faith is that by which
we give our Aſſent to a Propoſition, advanc'd by one who
can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd; but the more evident the
Proof of this is, ſo much the more ſtrong and vigorous is
the Faith ochlieſ.
3. 'Faith has likewiſe been diſtinguiſh'd into Divine and
Human. By the firſt we believe what is affirm'd by God;
by the latter, what is told us by Man. When we are equally
convinc'd they are the Wordsof God, as of Men, the Di
vine Faith is ſtronger than the Human; becauſe we have
vaſtly ſtronger Reaſons to believe. that God can neither de
ceive, or be deceiv'd, than thoſe which wou'd perſuade us
the ſame oſ any Man. But when there is any Doubt, whe
ther or no any Propoſition is declar'd by God; or that God
has commanded, that we ſhou'd believe ſuch a Thing, the
Faith can be noiſtronger than the Reaſons on which it is
founded. Yet ſometimes the Reaſons, or Motives oſ believ
ing Men, are of ſuch Weight and Force, that being perfectly
underſtood, they equal a Mathcmatical Evidence, and then
the Human Fair/2 is as ſolid and unſhaken as the Divine,
becauſe, on both ſides, we find an equal neceſſity of giving
our Aſſent.
4.. But ſince that whichis properly call'd Divine Faith is
immediately directed to God hjitcnſelf affirming ſomething,
no
w "41 _,
C H A P. VII.
Of Diwiſion.
1. ch we diſcourſi: of any compounded Thing, or
Idea, we ought to conſider its Parts ſeparately, elſe
while we confound the diſtinct Parts and Properties, we pro
duce Ohſl'urity: But this is avoided by Diviſfon, which enume
rates the diſtinct Parts of the Thing that is the Subject of
our Conſid eration.
2.. Diviſion is defin'd, The Diflrihution of the Whole intaall
it contains; but the Whole has a double Signiſication, whence
alſo' Di-uiſi'on isdouble.
3. That is a Whole, which conſiſts of integral Parts; as
thoſe Subſtances which are compos'd of various Parts, ſuch as
the Human Body, which may be divided into its ſeveral Mem
bers ,- and this Di-vzſion is call'd Partition.
4.. But there is another Who/e, which is properly a cer
tain abſtract Idea, which is common to more Things than
one, as the Univerſalr: or a compounded Idea, which com
prehends the Subſtance and its Accidents, or at leaſt moſt of
its Accidents. The Parts of this Whole are call'd Subjectiw,
or Inferiour.
_ 5. This Mole has a triple Di'viſian. The firſt is,when the
K'ſ'd or General is decided by its Species, or Particular, or *
D'fl'mwi as when Suhflam'e is divided into Body, and *
spirit
_ _ ._l
Logic; or, the Art of Reaſoning. 2 31
Spirit into Extended and Thin/cing. The ſecond, when any
thing is divided into ſeveral Claſſes or Forms, by oppoſite Ac
cidents, as when the Stars are divided into thoſe which give
their own proper and unborrow'd Light 5 and thoſe of o ake
Bodies, which reflect the Light of the Sun. The third is
when the Accidents themſelves are divided according to the
Subjects in which they inhere; as when Goods are divided
into the Goods of the Mind, Body and Fortune.
6 . There are three Rules of a good Di-vzfion: The firſt is,
That the Member: of the Divifion entirely exhauſt the whole
Thing that i: divided. Thus, when all Numbers are divided
into equal and unequal, the Diviſion is good.
7. The ſecond Rule is, That the Member: ofthe Diviſion
ought to be oppoſite 5 as the Numbers equal and unequal are.
But this Oppoſition may be made by a ſimple Negation; as.
corporeal, not corporeal 5 or by oſitive Members 5 as, extended,
thinking. And this laſt DZ-vi ran is eſteem'd the better of the
two, becauſe by it, the Nature of the Thing is better made
known.
8 . The third Rule is, That one Member aff the Diviſion ought
not to bcſh contained in another, that the other can be affirm'd
of it; tho' Otherwiſe it may be in ſome manner included in
it, without any Vice or Fault in the Di-uiſion. ThusExten
ſian (Geometrically conſidefd) may be divided into a Line,
Surface, and Solid z tho' the Line be included in the Surfare,
and the Surface in the Solid ,- becauſe the Surface can't be call'd
the Solid, nor the Line the Surface. But Numbers would
be very faultily divided into equal, unequal, and the ſixth,
becauſe ſix is an equal Number.
9. For the ſake of Order and Perſpicuity, when we have
found the Di-uz'ſz'on, we muſt take care to conceive it ſo, that
it do not produce Confuſion and Obſcurity. When we exa
mine into the Nature of any thing,-The Diviſion muſt not
be made into too man), or too general Member-r, for by this
means diſtinct Things would be confounded together. Thus
ſhou'd any one, who was about to enquire into the Nature of
all the Bodies which are known to us, divide them into thoſe
which are in this our Earth, thoſe without it, and then, with
out any other Subdiviſion, proceed to his Enquiry intotheir
Nature, he muſt without doubt find himſelf confounded.
lo. TheMemher: ought by no-m'am, unlefr the Subject ne
ceſſarily require it, ta he too unequal. Such a Diviſion lS theirs
who divide the Univerſe into Heaven and Earth, for the Earth,
in compariſon ofthat vaſt Expapiſe 'n which thePIanets and fixt
- 2.. Stzrs
232 Logic; or, the Art of Reaſonin'g.
Stars are contain'd, which is call'd Heav'n, is leſs thanaPoint:
For 'tis plain, that ſuch a Diviſion wou'd diſturb the Mind,
whether we were ſearching after Truth, or teaching Truth
diſcover'd to another.
1 r. But we muſt take heed on the orher hand, IeſZ, while
'me endeavour to make the Part; e nal, me do not, a: wemny
ſo), offerI/iolenze-ta-t/ye-szture oft ings, byjoining thoſe which
are really ſeparate, andfiepamting thrflw zch are reallyjoin'd
together. We muſt, therefore, have a nice Regaird to the
Connection of Things, leſt we violently break aſunder thoſe
Thin s which are cloſely united 5 and join thoſe to ether
which have no manner of Connection with one anot er.
12.. We muſt farther take care not to make our Diviſion
too minute, leſt the Number of the Parts burthen the Me
mory, and deſtroy the Attention; which is a Vice utterly to
be avoided by thoſe who wou'd reaſon well.
1-3. Another Fault of Di-uiſion is, when inſtead of dividing
real Parts of a Thing, we only enumerate the different Sig
nification of Words. .
. c H_ A P. VIII.
Of Definition-s and firſt, of the DefinitiOn aſ
the N A M E.
1. Efinitim is double; one of the Thing, and one oſ the
Name. The firſt we eſteem the Nature of the
Thing 5 the ſecond explains what Signification we giva to
any Word or Name; of the laſt here, referring the firſt tothc
nexr Chapter.
2.. Since we do not always think to our ſelves only-,_but
are oblig'd frequently to convey the Sentiments of ourMmqs
to others, either in Words ſpoken or written, or be informd
in the ſame manner of thoſe of other People, which other
wiſi: we know not ,- we may lead others, or be led ourſelves,
by others, into Errors, by the ambiguity of the Terms 9?
Words that are made uſe of by either, unleſs we explain
what we mean by ſuch ambiguous Words, by others [hit
are not ambiguous. \ '
3 . We mean not here by Definition of the Name, the dffia'
ring the Uſe, or Signiſication of Words according to Cuſtomi
We ſeek not in what Senſe others uſe any Word, but m wint
Senſe we ſhall make uſe of it in our future DiſcourſC
r 4-
Ingic'; if," the Art of Reaſonmg. 233
4;'. We ſhall obſtrve, thatthe Signification whichwe deſign
th give any Word, depends entirely on our Will and Pleaſure s
For we may affix what Idea we pleaſe to any Sound, which
in it ſelf ſignifies nothing at all. But the Definition of the
Thing ſignify'd by any Sound', has not this dependance on
our Will and Pleaſure; for ſince its Nature is certain and de
termin'd in it ſelf, our Words cannot make any manner of
Alteration in it.
5. Secondiy, ſince the Definition of the Name is entirely at
our Will and Pleaſure, it cannot be call'd in queſtion by any
one elſe. But then we are to give always the ſame Senſe to
the ſame Word, to avoid Miſtakes, for which End we define
our Terms. '
6. Thirdly, Since the Definition of the Name is not to be
call'd in queſtion, *tis plain, it may be made uſe oſ, like an
undoubted or ſelf-evident Maxim, as the Geometritianr do,
who, morethan all Men beſide, make uſe oſſuchDefinitions;
but we muſt rake care, leſt we think, therefore, that there is
anything in the Idea affix'd to that defin'd Term which may
not be
one hascontroverted, It is aninundoubted
defin'd ſome Wordv Principle,
ſuch a manner; butthat
whatſome
he
thinks of the thing, is no undoubted Principle. Thus, if any
one ſhou*d define Hearra be that which ir in thoſe Bodies which
beat m, and that it i: like that Heat which we feel; no Man
could find fault with the Definition, as far as it expreſſes what
he means by the Word Heat ; but this does not hinder us
from denying, that there is any thing in the Bodies that warm
us like what we feel in our ſelves.
7. From what has been ſaid, 'tis plain, that the Definition
of the Name, is of great Uſe in Philoſophy; yet we cannot
conclude from thence, that all Word: ought, or indeed £can
poffibly be defin'd; for there are ſome ſo clear (to ſuch who
underſtand the Language we uſe) and of ſuch a Nature, that
they cannot be defin'd; as the Names ofall ſimple Ideas, as we
have ſhewn under that Head. v
8. Moreover, where the receiv'd Definitions are ſufficiently
clear, they ought not to be chang'd, becauſe thoſe who are
accuſtom'd to the receiv'd Uſe, will underſtand us better,
and we our ſelves run not ſo great a Riſque of Inconſtancy
in nor preſerving our Definition. It is manifeſt, that thoſe
Words are better underſtood, to which wc have been long
us'd to affix certain Ideas, than thoſe to which new ones are
to be join'd, andwe better remember the Senſe of One, than
of Two.
X 3 9. From
234 Logic; or, the Art of Reaſoning.
. From hence likewiſeit follows, that weſhould, as little
as poſſible, depart from thereceiv'd Scnfie, when we are necefi
ſarily obliged to forſake it in ſome meaſure; for we ſooner,
and with more calle, accuſtom ourſelves to Significations of
Words which are near, or related to thoſi: which are already
admitted, than thoſe which are plainly remote, or us'd in
a quite contrary Senſe.
10. But this, as we have hinted, muſt be obſerv'd above
all Things, that we always keep to the Definition which we
haveonse madirzclſi: we confound our Hearers or Readers,
and fall into ſeeming Contradiction, which renders our Diſ
courſe unintelligible. -
C.H TA_-P.J DC
Ofthe Definition ofthe T H IN' Gſi
1. HE Definition of the Name depends entirely on out
Will and Pleaſure, but the Definition of the Thing
we haveno Power over; for we can by no means affirm
that to be in a'I-'hing or Idea which we conſider, which is
not in it. Definition is uſually-divided into accurate, and
leſt accurate, the firſt is properly Definition, the ſecond De
ſcription.
2.. A Definition, properly ſo call'd, explains the Nature
ofthe Thing defin'd by an Enumeration of itsprincipal
Attributes; of which thoſe that are common to others,
with the Thing defin'd, is call'd the Kind. or General 3 but
thoſe. which are peculiar to the Thing defin'd, the Different.
Thus aCircle may be defin'd, a Figure whoſe Circumference
is every where 'qui-diſtant from the Centre 3 the Word Big-me
is the Kind or, General, as being a Name common to allother
different Figures, as well as to a Circle; the reſt are the Dff
fereme, ſince they diſtinguiſh a Circle from all other Fi
res.But Deſcriptiim is an Enumeration of many Attributes,
guz.
and even thoſe which are accidental. Thus,, if any one is
deſcrib'd by! hisDecds. or Actions, or. his Sayings or Wri
tings ,- as if we ſhou'd, inſtead of naming Ari/lotle, ſay, The
Philflbpher, who obtained, Mortar-thy among the School-men
without a Farther.
4._Individuals cannot be deſin'd, becauſe tho' We know
not theireii'ential Properties by whichthey differ from mild?
o
Logic; or, the Art of Reaſonmg. 23;
of the ſame Species, we muſt remember likewiſe, that the
in'moſtNatureof Subſtances is unknown, and therefore the
cannot be deſin'd. Hence'tis plain, that only the Modes who e
Whole Nature is known to us, can only beexplain'd by acer
tain and properly-call'd Definition.
ſ. There are three common Rules of a Definition ,- the
firſtis,tharthe Definition ſhould he adequate to the 'Thing da
fizzed z that is, agreeto all thoſe Things which are contain'd
in the Species which is defin'd. The ſecond, That the De
finition ſhould he proper to the Thing deſin'd; for when the
Definition makes us know the Thing defin'd from all other
Things, it muſtbe proper and agreeable-to the Thing de
fin'd. The third, ſince we make uſe of a Definition to make
known a Thing toanother, which he knew not before, The
Definition ought to he clear, and more eaſy and obvious than
the Thing deſin'd.
6. Here we muſt ſiagain admoniſh the Reader, not to con
found the receiv'd Definition-of the Name with the Defini
'tion of the Thing. For this Reaſon the Definition of the
Thing cannot be expreſſedin Words plainly ſynonymousz as if
any one ſhould ask what is the Supream Deity P And we
ſhou'd anſwer, the Supream God : ſince the latter exPlain-s no
more the Natureor At'tributes of that God,than*thc former.
7. From theſe Obſervations we find, that Definition can
only have place in compound Ideas, and is only the Enume
ration of the chiefſimpleldeas ofwhich they are compound
ed; but ſimple Ideas cannot be defin'd, becauſe there can be
no Enurnerazion. He who knowsnot what that is which we
call Heat, will only learn it by Experience, or ſome ſynony
mous Words, or ſome Word ofanother Language, orby Cir
cumlocution, bywhich the Thing is ſhown, not defin'dzasif
we ſhould fiy, That it was a Senſinian, which me find when
me fit by the Fire, or walkin the Sunſh'ine .- By this we ſhou'd
ſhew what Thing it was to which we gave that Name, but
never explain its Nature; For, ſhou'd any one want that Senſi:
by which we haVe that Senfiition, he wou'd no more under
ſtand what we meant, than a Man born- blind what was a
Green Colour, by telling him it was that Senſation we have
when we beholdthe Graſsin the Fields.
(236)
THE
Third Part of LOGIC;
OR,
CHAP. I'ſi.
fJ-l
____l
[Logic ; or, the Art tfReaſonmgr 2'37
'4. In rhe Method of Reſhlution we proceed from ſome
Particular known Truth, to others which belong to ſome
particular or ſingular Thing. In the Method of Compqfl'tion
we propoſe ſome certain general Truths, from' which we
deduce particular Truths.
7. If in the Method of Re/blutian we propoſe any'Maxims;
it is not immediately in the beginning, and all together, and
* but once, but only as they are neceſiary for the finding out
the Truth z on the contrary, in the Method of Campofition'
they are propos'd all together inw the beginning, before there
i's any need of them.- _
6. Theſe two Methods differ from each other, as the Me
thods of ſearching our Genealogy, -deſcending from' the An
' ceſtors to their Poſterity'; or on the contrary, by aſcending
fi-om the Po'ſteriry to the Anceſtors. Both 'of them have
this 'in- common', that their Progreffion is' from- a- Thing
known, to that which is unknowa : 'Thoſe Thingswhich are
known, by both are ſet in the Front, or firſt Place, that by
them we may (by certain Conſequences deduc'd from them)
'be able to arriVe at thoſe which are not known; and then
all this Chain of Conſequences in both, Confiſt of Propoſi
tions connected with each other.
7'.' And theſe following Things are ſummarily requir'd in
B'oth, that Error may be avoided. Firſt, That no Propofi
tion be admitted as true, to which you can deny your Aſ
fiznt, or which is not evident. Next, the Connection of the
following Propofition to the foregoing, in every Step of the
Progreffion be likewiſe evident or neceffizr ,- otherwiſe, if
in a long Chain of Propofitions we admit but one Propoſi
tion or Conſequcnce that is doubtful or falſe, whatever was
directly deduc'd from thence, muſt- of neceſſity be either
dubious or falſe. '
8. To make this plainer, we ſhall firſt propoſe an Exam
ple of the Method ofRefllutian, and then one of that of Com
I poſition. Let us ſuppoſe this to be the Queſtion, Whether on the
. Suppoſhian of Marſ: Exiſteme, we mn prove, that God doe:
. exiſt? To reſolve this, our Method muſt be thus: (1.) Hu
z man Kind, which now inhabit the Earth, did not always
r exiſt, all Hiſtory whatever ſtill fixing a Beginning to Man-z X
kind 1' This they do not only aſſert in expreſs Words,vbut by
the-Whole Series and Courſe of what they treat, make it-ma
nifeſt, ſince there is nov-Hiſtory which pretendsto iveus-an
Aecount of 'more than a'bout 6ooo Years. (1.) I Human
Kind did not always exiſt, but hada Begirming, therekiſse
e
'238 Loglc ; or, t/ae Art of Reaſonmg.
Neceffity that there ſhou'd be ſome other Cauſe of its Exi
ſtencez for from nothing, nothing can ariſe. (z.) What
ever that Cauſe is, it muſt have at leaſt all thoſe Properties,
which we find in our ſelves; for none can give what he has
not himſelf. (4.) Farther, there is' a Neccffity that there
ſhou'd be in this Cauſe Properties which are not in us, ſince
he cou'd do that which we cannot do; that is, make Man
exiſt, who before had no Being, or that the Mind and Body
of Man ſhou'd begin to exiſt, which Power we by no means
. find in out ſclves. (5.) We find that we have the Poweror
Faculty of Under/binding and Willz'ng, and a Body which can
be mov'd various ways. (6.) Therefore, there muſtbethoſe
Properties, and many far more excellent in the Cauſe of
Human Kind, ſuch as the Power of drawing out of nothing
or making ſomething to exiſt, which had before no Exi
ſtence at all. (7.) But this Cauſe either exiſts ſtill, or has
ecas'd to be. (8.) If he does not ſtill exiſt, he did not exiſt
fi'om Eternityz for whatever exiſted from Eternity, can
neither by it ſelf, or by any other Cauſe, be reduc'd to No
thing. (9.) If it did not exiſt, it muſt have been produc'd
by ſome oſharz for whatever has a Beginning, muſt be gene
rated by ſome other. Then wou'd the ſame Qieſtion re
gurn of the Producer, which may be thus generally reſolv'd:
All things, that are, had; a Beginning, or they had none.
Thoſe which had a Beginning, were produc'd by Cauſcs
which had none 3 therefore, if there be any Thin that does
will, there are eternal Cauſts. (lo.) lt muſt t refore by
confirſſd, that there is ſome eternal Being, which has in it
ſelf all thoſe Propertics which we find in our ſelves, and infi
nitcly more, Whether- he immediately created us by himſelf,
or by any other Nature; which is not here the Queſhon.
( 1 1.) If this Cauſe of Human Kind do ſtill exiſt, the ſame
Reaibning wou'd return which we us'd in the 9th and loth'
Steps of our Progreſſion. (rz.) Therefore, it neceffilflly
follows from the Exiſtence of Human Kind, that God do?s
exiſt, or ſome eternal Cauſe, which mediately or immedi
ately created Mankind. '
9. Thus by the Method of Reſblution we prove, or rather
find out the Exiſtence of a God. And we may teach or
convey this Truth thus found out to others, by the Method
of Compqfltim, in this manner. (1.) All Beings have a Be'
ginning of Exiſtence, or they have none. (2..) Nothing call
come out of nothing, or begin to exiſt by its own PoWUv
when it had no Exiſtcnce. (3.) All thoſe Things, rifierc
are,
Logic; or, the Art qf Reaſoning. 239
fore, which had a Beginning, muſt bcproduc'd by ſome Being
that had no Beginning. (4.) Human Kind had a Beginning.
(;.) It was therefore produc'd mediately, or immediately by
ſome eternal Cauſe. (6.) That Cauſe we call God ,* and, there
fore Human Kind were created h] God.
to. All theſe Propoſitions, as we have obſerv'd, ought in
bath Methods to benicely examin'd, that none bcadmitted as
certain and known, which is not ſo; and that no Conſequence
be ſlid in, which is not neceſſary. Having ſo done, we may
know that we have found the Truth, or are taught the ſame
by others.
1 1 . There are ſome Helps to be had for the more eaſy per
formance of this Task, and which are to be taught more di
ſtinctly, or with greater Care and Conſideration, becauſe on
them depend the whole eatineſs and certainty of ſuch Rea
ſons or Arguments as are alledg'd. Firſt, what ought to be
the Diſpoſitionof the Mind for the more happy diſcovery of
Truth: Secondly, we ſhall deliver the Rules of the Method of
Rcſalution 5 and Thirdly, thoſe which belong to the Method
of CampaJ/t'tiaa.
C H A P. II.
Of the Neceffity of Attention, and the Means qf
obtaining it.
x. E have more than once affiartcd, thatEvidence is the
Main, or Criterion of Truth. But this Knowledge
is not enough to direct our Enquiry after Truth, becauilr chat
Evidence is not always to be had, nor does the Mind diſcover
it ſometimes, without a long Labour and Fatigue. We maſt,
therefore, enquire by what Means we may obtain this Evi
dence in our Thoughts.
2. It is not enough that We can form Ideas of all Things,
which we can conceive in our Minds to come at the Know
ledge ot Truth, but the Mind muſt conſider them with the
greateſt and moſt lively Attention, if we wou'd obtain a tho
rough Knowledge of them .
z. We have ſhewn, that our Judgments are the Perceptions
of certain Relations, in which the Mind does acquieſce, and
that our Errors of Judgment ariſe from it, when it does
acquieſce in obſcure Perceptions, as if they were clear, be
fore it haswith ſufficient Care examin'd into their Nature.I
4. n
'240 Logic; or, the Art of Rea ſoning.
- 4. In Judgments of the Mind we ſhou'd uſe the lame Me
thod as in judgmentsof the Eyes, which a proach the ob
ſcurer Objects nearer, and employ 'the help o artificial Lights,
narrowly looking into them," ſoſhou'd the Mind in judg
ments reſtrain its Aſient, till it has with thetutmoſt Atten
tion conſider'd according to the Nature ,0f the Thing into
which it enquires. Hence it appears of how great and ne
ceſſaryuſev Attention is, which is only a long and uninter
ruptedConſideration of. any one Idea, Without the Interpofi
tiOn of any others.
ſ. We-find that we are much more attent, and with grea
ter eaſe apply our Thoughts to the Conſideration oſ thoſe
Things which affect us by the Intervention of our Senſes,
certain Images of which are before the Mind, and ſuch as
excite ſome Affectionor Paffion, than to thoſe which came
into the Mind without any of theſe Things. Thus we are
attent in the Confideration of any enlighten'd Body, in
ſome Image of a corporeal Thing offer'd to the Enquiry of
the Mind,- and in the Conſideration of a _Thing that may
bring us Advantage or Damage, which ſtrikes us with Fear,
or Deſire.
6. Every one who has try'd it before Uſe has bred a ſa
cility, knows, that 'tis much more difficult to fix the Mind on
ahſtract Ideas for any Time. The Reaſon of the difference is
plain, becauſe the Mind in other Things finds Affiſtance from
the Intervention of the Body, as 'tis affected with more ſpright
l and lively Senſatious and Images, which will thruſt them
elves on it whether it will or not: On the contrar , in ab
ſtract Contemplations, and which derive nothing rom the
Body, corporeal Motions obſtruct the Attention while they
perpetually recall the Mind to Bodies, at the ſame time that
the Object of the Mind has nothing in it ſelf that can much
affect it, or entgage the Attention; nay, when the Mind is em
ploy'd in the e abſtract Confiderations, it muſt with all its
Force baniſh all corporeal Images which croud perpetually
upon it. Nor can this be perform'd without Pain, ſince the
Law of Nature has oblig'd the Mind to be in Pain, when
Force is offer'd to the Body.
7. Having laid down this, we muſt try whether or nowe
cannot encreaſe the Attention by the help of the Senſes and
Imaginative Faculty, even in Things that are merely incor
poreal. By what Art this may be done, we ſhall ſhew here
after 5 but above all Things we ſhou'd takeicare that the
InconVenience do not ariſe, which uſually follows the Com
motions
Logic ; or, the Art of Reaſoning. 24:
motions of the Mind by the Senſes, Imagination, or Paſ
ſions; that is, when the Mind is ſomething more vehc*
mently affected, it is turn'd in ſucha manner to the Object:
which affects it, that it takes notice of nothing elſe. Then
is this Motion ſo far from aſſiſting the Attention to Idea'
of incorporeal Things, that on the contrary it proves an
obſtacle to it.
8. Hence this important Conſequence in our Enquiry af
ter Truth is drawn, that they, who would ſerioully apply
themſelves to the ſearch after Truth, ſhould avoid, as much
as they poſſibly can, all the more ſtrong and vehement Sen
fitions; ſuch as great Noiſes, Light too ſtrong and glaring,
Pain, Pleaſure, (9117. They ſhould likewiſe take care that:
their Imagination be not too vehemently mov'd by any Ob
ject, which ſhould infect it ſo far, as to make them think of
it whether they will or not 5 for by this means the Atten
tion will frequently be interrupted. Firſt, they ought not:
to be accuſtom'd to the ſtronger Emotions of the Paſſions;
for thoſe who experience frequently theſe Perturbations,
contract ſuch a Habit of Mind, that they can ſcarce think
of any thing elſe but the Objects of the Paſſions, or thoſe
things which have ſome Connection with them; but ſince,
for Reaſons which we ſhall not touch on here, no Man can
be entirely exempt from them, they muſt make it theirEn
deavours to ſeek ſome Affiſtance from thoſe unavoidable
Evils to their Enquiries after Truth.
9. The Senſcs may be of ad vantage to the promoting the
Attention, if we make uſe of them as the Geametriciam do,
who expreſs inviſible Wantities by Lines, Numbers, and
Letters; for by this means the Mind more eaſily adheres to,
attends, and is fix'd to the Thing which it inquires after; for
while the Eyes are fix'd on the Figures, the Mind contem
plates the Thingwhoſe Signs they are. And this is done with
the more ſafety, becauſe there is no danger of confounding
the Figures with the Thing he ſeeks, there being no Relaq
tion between them, but what he makes. Thus the ſwiftneſfi
and duration of any Motion can be examin'd by the Deſerip
tion of certain Figures, which the Gtametrici'm can never
believe to be the Thing that is the Subject of his Enquiry.
10. By this means we may, without danger, make uſe of
our Senſes in Ratiocination. That is, that we may not be
oppreſs'd by the multitude of the Relations that are to be
conſider'd, they may be expreſs'd on Paper by certain
_Words. Beſides, we give BITE eaſy Attention to Propoſi
_ tions
242. Logic; or, the Art of Reaſoning.
tions already expreſs'd, and let down on Paper, than to their
Ideas. We can review more often, and with more eaſe our
Marks in long Arguments, when we have fix'd the Signs of
them on Paper, than when we have 'them only in our Minds.
r r. But theſe ought to be look'd on as Helps, which may
be made uſe of by youn Beginners, but ſhould not be of
fend to thoſe of riper nderſtanding, leſt they ſhould ac
cuſtom themſelves too much to them, ſo that it render
them incapable of underſtanding any thing without the
Affiſtance of ſome corporeal Image.
12.. The Faculty which brings the Images of corporeal
Things to the Mind, is moſt ſtrictly united to the Senſits;
and therefore belongs to what is ſaid of the Senſes, and yet
affords a particular help to affiſting the Attmtim. For ex
ample, when we in ſilent Contemplation compare the Ideas
with the external and corporeal Objects, we may obſerve
the like in the Operations of the Eyes, as in the Actions of
the Mind. *
13. If we are to explain to others what we have f0und
out, they will give more, attention to a Compariſon, than
to a bare and naked Expofition of the Thing; they will
ſooner apprehend and underſtand us, and remember it bet
ter. Hence aroſe the manner in the remoteſt Antiquities of
uſing Fables, which was long in vogue among the oriental
Nations.
r4. vBut here we muſt beware of the Error of the An
cients in this Particular, which _was, while they with too
much 'Zeal ſought the Attention of the Unskilful, they had
recourſe to ſo many Figures and Phraſes drawn from cor
poreal Things, that they offer'd to their Minds ſcarcc any
Thing but the Ideas of corporeal Beings: So that theTruth
being overwhelmfi with thoſe Figures, was perfectly hid,
and cannot, without the utmoſt difficulty, be freed from
them by the Learned themſelves.
. 1 ſ. We muſt, farther, be very cautious of avoiding an
Error too common to the Ancients and Moderns, who fan
cy'd the Compariſon, or ſome other Figure, which was only
to illuſtrate the Things, was really an Argument to prove
them.
16. That the Paſſions often are Enemies to the Know
ledge of Truth, no body can doubt, and we have ſhown;
many have made a doubt, whether they are ever of any uſe
to it 5 yet fincc they are not evil in their own Nature, they
may, by good Management', be of great help to the encreaſing
the
LOglC ; or, the Art of Reaſoning. 24;
the Attention; nay, perhaps we may ſay, that this is never
extremely ſharp without ſome Paſſion. Thus we may make
a happy Uſe of the Deſire of Glory, if we keep it within its
due Moderation. When this Paſfion is alone, it is dange
rous, other' Paſſions are therefore to be excited in us, which
ſhould hinder us from ſuffering ourſelves to be borne down
by the Deſire of Glory: And this is the verydefire of know
ing the Truth, which is in the Minds of all Mankind ,- for
there is no Man that loves to be deceiv'd, nor any Man that
is pleas'd with Ignorance.
17. But we muſt, even here, take care that the defire of
finding out the Truth be not the only cauſe of our judg
ments,- for the Paſſions never give any Light to the judg
ment, but only excite our Enquiry after what is advanta
geous for us to know: But the judgment ought not to be
given as long as we can with-hold it, in things of which we
can have an evident Knowledge. -
ct-- Of 'be
' Capacity
- CHAP.III.
of the Mind, and the Means if
. enlarging it.
i. E call that Mind mþaeiom that has many Ideas be
fore it at once; and the more of thoſe it can
have a diſtinct Perception of at once, the larger, or more
capacious is the Mind 3 and the fewer, the more narrow we
eſteem it. The Capacity therefore of the Mind is enlarg'd,
by contracting a Habit or Cuſtom of conſidering many Ideas
at once, without Confufion. We mean not all together, and
at ame, that in one numerical individual Moment, and one
only Perception of the Mind, many things can be diſtinctly
underſtood, ſince 'tis certain that few Things can be di
ſtinctly view'd together. But this Expreſſion is to be al
low'd the Latitude of meaning a very ſhort Time; and the
Reaſon we uſed the Term together, is, that there is no ex
ternal Menſurarion of Time, to divide the Rapidity of the
Mind's Motion from one Thought to another.
2. If any one ſhould demand, whether the Minds of all
Men were alike, except what difference is made by Educa
tion? we ſhould only anſwer, That we do not certainly
know, but that Experience gives us a certain Confirmation
of two Things.
Y 2 3. That
244 Logie; ar, the Art of Reaſoning.
3. That ſome have ſo unhappy a Genius, that it is with
difficulty they conceive the Connection of two Propoſi
tions, unleſs they fall on Subjects with which their Experience
has been converſant, but are perfectly blind in Contempla
tion, nor can in the leaſt diſcover any difference betwixt a
good and bad Ratiocination. Others again have a Mind
ſomething larger than this, and can by one View of the
Mind comprehend more than one Connection of Propoſi
tions 3 but if the Deduction of Conſequences be ſomething
longer than ordinary, they cannot extricate themſblves. But
then there are ſome happy Genius's which can with eaſe, if
not at one view, yet in a very little time, and few Thoughts,
comprehend a long Chain of Propoſitions. They are nei
ther ſatigu'd nor diſturb'd with that Number of Propofitions
which would abſolutely confound ſome others.
4.. It is apparent from Experience in the ſecond place,
that the Capacity of the Mind can be enlarg'd by a frequent
uſe of thinking' of many Things at once. 'Tis ſufficiently
known, that the young Leamers of Gumm-7, Arithmetic.
or Algebra, are at firſt diſturb*d with the number of Ideas to
be conſider'd together, nor can they, without a very ainful
Attention, underſtand what they read, or are taug t, by
reaſon of the number of Ideas which are to be confidefd:
As for Example, Thoſe who at firſt endeavour to learn
the Rule of Di-ui ran, are confounded or puzzl'd by the mani
fold compariſon of the Diviſar and Di-uidmdz and they are
ſurpriz'd to conſider how the Maſter that teaches them ſhall
be able at one View,*or at leaſt with very few, to compre
hend the Connection of ſo many Pro fitions as are form'd in
a long Arithmetical Operation 5 yet t e ſame Students of this
Art, after they have apply'd themſelves to the Study of Ac
counts for ſome Months, comprehend many Operations with
eaſe in their Mind, when before they could not take one.
Whence 'tis evident, that the Capacity of the Mind will ad
mit of an Encreaſe.
If it ſhould farther be ask'd, whether the Capacity of all
Men could be improved by the ſame Method .> we may an
ſwer, That ExPerience has ſhown us, that all ſuch who can
that way improve their Minds, have by it enlarged their Ca
pacity; for there are ſome, who, from their firſt Application,
could never make any Progreſs in theſe Studies ,- but among
thoſe who are not wholly incapable of theſe Studies, ſome
make a ſwifter and greater Progreſs than others, even from
the beginning, whether this be the effect of the Nature of
the Mind or the Body. 6, To
Logic; or, the Art of Keaſonmg. 24;
6. To come to the point it err, whoever has a Deſire to
enlarge the Capacity of his Mind, muſt make it his endea*
vour to have his Attention at his Command, ſo as to apply
it when, and to what he pleaſes, which may be obtain'd
by the Means propos'd in the former Chapter. For he that
cannot be attentive to a. few, will much leſs be capable of
underſtanding many together, and not be confounded by
the Multiplicity of the Objects. ,
7. But ſince the Capacity of the Mind, as we have ſeen,
is a Faculty within us by Nature, whatever we do to ac
quire it, as we have expreſs'd it, comes only to this, that
by frequent EXerciſi: we render its Uſe eaſy to us. We
muſt only examine on what Objects it is chiefly exercis'd.
8. Objects are of two kinds; one are Mathematical, the
other cannot be treated Mathematically. Whatever can be
examin'd in a Geometrical Method (which we ſhall deliver
when we ſhall treat of the Method of Compoſition) are Ma
thematical; and of this kind are all things of which we
can have a perfect Knowledge, that is, whatever belongs,
or relates to Moder.
9. All who have apply'd themſelves to the enlarging the
Capacity of the Mind, tell us, that it is acquir'd by the
Conſideration of theſe Things. And *tis certain, that in
Aritbmetit (to inſtance one part of the Matbematicr for all)
the manifold Parts of the Object are ſo diſtinctly noted, and
ſo clearly perceiv'd, that provided the Attention be apply'd,
there is no manner of danger of our being confounded. In
Computation or Accompts, there are, firſt, as manyObject:
as Unirsz next, certain Name: are impos'd (for Brevity's
ſake) on certain Collections of Um'N, without producing
any Confufion, how great ſoever the Collection of Units
may be', as one Hundred, a Thou/hard, an Hundred thazq'and,
a Million, &ce. Laſtly, there are long Compariſons of
Numbers made in the groſs, without coming to any one
particular, or alone, but of many collectively together, and
at once. For whether we add or ſubſtract, multiply or
divide, to which all Aritbmetic is reduc'd, many Numbers
are conſider'd at once, except only theNumber Two, which
conſiſts only of two Unitr; but in the Compntation of that,
vthere is not- any need of Art.
lo. In Computation therefore, we. exerciſe theFaculty of
diſtinctly underſtanding many Thingstogether, which we
call the Capacity off Genimg for we ſhou'd ſtill remember,
_that this Capacity we ſpeak of, ought always to be join'd
* ' ' ' ' Y z _with
246 Logic; or, the Art of Reaſoning.
with this diſtinct Perception, ſince a confus'd Underſtand
ing of Things is of no Uſe to the finding out of Truth.
n. The C ſideration of Subſtances cannot be Mathe
matically ' cuſs'd; and we ſhou'd in vain imagine, that in
theſe the Capacity of the Mind cou'd ever be acquir'd; for
ſince we have no clear Knowledge of particular Subſtances.
much leſs can we know with Perſpicuity a Collection of
Subſtances together 5 we can only conſider their Properties,
and the Relations that there is between them.
12.. Hence we may ather, that the Mind cannot be
render'd more capacious y _the Conſideration of Genu; and
SPecier of the old Philoſophers, who rang'd all Subſtances
under thoſe Heads, becauſe it is an uncertain Diviſion of
unknown Objects. .
c H A P. IV.
' Of the Law: of the Method of Reſolution.
r. Efore we proceed to the Laws of the Method of
szalntion, we muſt recal to our Memory certain
Maxxms on which they are built. The firſt is what We
have more than once taken notice of, viz. That me muſt
conſider E-uideme in every Step or Degree of on' Progreffiom
in our Reaflming or Arguments, unleſs we wou'd run the
Riſque of falling into Error.
a. The next is the Conſequence of this, That we ought
to redſim on tho/i? Thing: only, of which we ha-ue clear and
perſpimom Idea: 5 or on ohſture things. only ſo far a: we know
them. Whence we may gather, that our Reaſoning ought
to be only converſant about the Properties and Modes of
Subſtances and abſtract ldeas, and not about the inmoſt Na
ture of Things extremely obſcure.
z. The third Maxim is, That me ought alway: to begin
from the ſimple and Mfl, and to dwell on them a while, before
we proceed to thing: compounded and more difficult :. For we
ought firſt to have a clear Perception of ſimple ldeas, elſe
-we can never have a ſufficient Knowledge of the Corn
pounded. {
4. Theſe general Maxims are the common Principles of
both the Method of Refilution and Compqfition. For in both
*Methods are equally requir'd Evidence in the Degrees or
Steps of Progreſſion, Choiceof the Subjectof our En uiries,
and the Knowledge of Things ſimple before thoſe t at are
corn
- 11 - v a'
CHAP. V.
Of the three Muximr on which all Method i;
' built.
s
r. ſ E ſhall ſay nothin more than We have already on
the firſt Maxim a out preſier'uing Evidence in every
Step or Degree of Knowledge; but we cou'd nor but take
notice of it in this place, both to make appear the Con
nection of thoſe that follow 'with it, and alſo becauſe it
cannot be too much inculcated to Men who have been uſed
to give their Aſſent to Things that are obſture.
L- The
Logic ; or, the Art of Reaſonmg. 249
a. The next, which is the Conſequence of the former, is,
That we ought not to reaſim on Thing: of which me have no clear
Idus, or of obſhnre Things, a: far a: the] are abſcure. We
muſt not take this Maxim in a Senſe that ſhould exclude
the Nature of all Things which are yet unknown to us From
our Enquiries; for this would be directly oppoſite to our
Defign, by which we aim to open a way to the Diſcovery
of Truths unknown to us.
3. But we are of Opinion, that a Philoſopher ought not
to reaſon on obſcure Things, in adouble Senſe: the firſt is,
That he ought not to chuſe ſuch Objects of his Contempla
tion, which it is plain cannot be diſcovered by evident De
monſtrations. (i.) Thus, as ſeveral Geomem'u'am have de
monſtrated, the ſqudring of the Circle, and the depicting 'be
Cube, cannot be found out. (2..) Thus we cannot diſcover
what is the inmoſt Nature of Things; all we can know of
that, is, that Experience has ſhown us, that there do co-_
exiſt in Subſtances certain Properties: We ſhould therefore
reject the Enquiry into Subſtantes, and only conſider their
Propcrties. (z.) If we cannot find out the inmoſt, or whole
Nature of any one created Subſtance, much leſs muſt we
pretend to diſcover the Subſtance of that, Sup'reme' Nature
which created all the reſt, We may gather,*as it were by
Experience, from thoſe Properties which we ſte intthrea
tures,
what hethat
hasthey
not;areyetinwe
the cannot
Creator,conceive
ſince nohow
bodyailſſthe
can give
real
Properties of all Creatures can co-exiſt in God.
4.. The other Senſe of this Maxim is, That no certain
Conſequence can be drawn from a Principle that is unknownv
or uncertain. Tho this bea Maxim allowed by all Philoſo
phers, both ancient and modern, yet have they all offended
againſt it, erſuading themſelves that they do know their
Principles to be clear and certain, which yet are often very
uncertain, and many times not known at all. Thus all that
we have any clear Perception of in out Minds, is the Pro
perty of Thinking; and therefore we cannot poſitively af
firm, that there is any other in it; nor on the other ſide,
can we deny that there is, becauſe there may be ſome, of
which we are ignorant.
5. But it is here neceſſary to take notice (leſt any one
ſhould wreſt what we mean by our Mind into another
Senſe) that what we ſay is not to be underſtood as if we could
not deny Contradictions. For 'tis one thing to deny that
any Particular is not in a Subject beſides what wc ſee, and'=
ano
ago Logic; or, the Art of-Reaſoning.
another to deny that the lime thing can be, and not be," in
the (Lime Subject at the ſameTime, Thus we cannor affirm,
that there is nothing elſe in our Mind beſides the Faculty of
Thinkin , becauſe we diſcover nothing elſe in it; but We
may wit out danger of Error, deny that the Mind, Whilſt- it
is thinking, is deſtitute of Thought, ſince we clearly perceive
that one of theſe two Propoſitions is neceſſarily falſe.
6. To obſerve the ſecond Caution which we have men"
tioned, we muſt neceſſarily examine with our utmoſt Dili
gence into the Principles laid down, before we proceed to
the ConſtquenCes of them. We are taught by the third
Maxim, That me muſt hegin 'with the ſimple and caſ] Things,
and dwell on them ſinne time, hqfore me proceed to the term
pounded and difficult. Thus we learn Arithmetic, the Stu
dent m'uſt be.perfectly acquainted with, and fix in his Me
mory the firſt four Rules of Addition, Suhflraction, Multi=
plication and Dimſion, before he can to any purpoſe proceed
to'the Rule ofi Ihree, and the following Rules.
r C H A P. VI.
7 Of the firſt Rule (yf thngethodqf Reſolution)
t. ALL our judgments being only the Perceptions of
* Relations, in which Perceptions we acquieſce, it
is manifeſt, that when we enquire into any thing which is
unknown to us, 'we only ſeek after an unknown Relation.
When therefore we ſay in the firſt Rule, that we muſt per
fecty and clearly know the State of the flee/lion prepar'd; 'tis
the ſame thing as if we ſhould tell you, that you are to take
particular Care leſt you ſuppoſe that Relation the Object' of
your Enquiry, which does by no means come under our
Confideration; for unleſs the ſought Relation be marked
.With ſome certain Note, we ſhall neither know what we
ſeek, nor know it when found out.
2.. But _if ſuch a Relation be plainly and clearly known,
you may ſay, How can we then make any farther Enquiry
about it? But then ſay we, can there be any Deſireof know
ing any thing of which we have no manner of Knowledge?
None at all. That which is ſought, therefore, ought neceſ
'flarily to be diſtinguiſhed from all things elſe, that we may
know it when we find it, and ſo-far know it, before we make
anK Enquiry about it; No Queſtion can ever be ſolv'd,
_W Oſiz Terms are not in ſome meaſure known to us. Thus
for
Logic; or, the Art of Reaſoning. 25:
for Example, we enquire, When thoſe two Number: are, he
tween which there is ſuch 4 Relation, a: you take a Unit
from one, and add it to the other, they ſhall he equal; but on
the contrary, you add the Unit taken rom the other, to
thatfi-om which you ſuhtracted, the Num er ſhall he double
to the other! Tho' the Numbers between which there is
this Relation' be not known, yet are they ſo far known,
that that Relation ought to be between them, whence they
are acknowledged as ſoon as ever they are found out.
3. When a Weſtion is conceived in Words, thoſe Words
ought to be diſtinctly underſtood 5 or the Ideas which are
fignify'd by every Word ought to be throughly known to
us. All Equivocation in the Terms muſt therefore be en
tirely removed, leſt, for one Queſtion, as many ariſe as there
are different Senſhs of the Propoſition; nor can we appre
hend what Senſe he that propoſts it (if propoſed byanother)
gives his equivocal Propoſition.
4.. If we cannot underſtand all the Senſes of the Words in
which aneſtion is conceiv'd, we can never know whether
we have given it a Solution in the Senſe in which it was pro
poſed, which often happens in general Weſtions, and the
occaſion of which isnot ſufficiently known; Thus we can
only gueſs at the Places in old Authors, which cannot be
ſolyed but by the Series of the Context.
5. When we have rendered the Terms in 'which any
Weſtion is conceived as plain and clear to us as we can, we
muſt applky our Attention to the Confideration of the Con
ditions, i there be any in it. If we underſtand not them,
the Aeſtion remains obſizurez for they often ſhew us the
way to ſolve the Weſtion. If there be none expreſſed or
underſtood, then is the Aeſtion general, in which we muſt
obſerve thoſe Things which we have already delivered on
that Head: But if the Conditions are not expreſſed, but un
derſtood, tho' neceſſary, it can never be ſolved, if we have
not 'the Opportunity of asking the Propoſer of it what they
are. If the Conditions added to the Qxeſtion be ſuperflu
_ous and of no uſe, they muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from thoſe
which are neceſſary, for without this, we often run after
things of no moment, and leave thoſe which are of imporz
rance and neceſſary, without any Notice.
6. This Weſtion may be propoſed-To find out two Num."
hen, on; ofwhich deſigned by the Letter A, ſhall he two Um'n
greater than another deſigned by the Letter B ,- jþ that taþihga
Unit from B, and adding it to A, A ſhall he doubled. The
. .1 Can;
252. Logic; or, the Art Qf Reaſonina.
Condition of theQxeſtion is Conceived in theWordsſa that,
&c. thoſe therefore muſt have our Attention, becauſe with
out them the Aeſtion is not underſtood. For the Veſtion
is nOt ſimply, how a Number may be found out greater by
two Units than another, but ſuch Numbers in which that
occurs which is in the Condition, which are 7 and ſ.
7. The neceſſary Condition would be omitted in this
Weſtion, Whether a Man, by putting his Finger in his Ear,
could be rendered ſi: immoveable, as not ra be able to wall' till
his Finger he taken out ofhi: Ear! AO\ueſti0n propoſed in
theſe Words would be deny'd, becauſe the putting the
Finger in the Ear cannot tender any one immovcable. But
this difficulty is removed by adding, That the Manſhall he
ſi placed, that hiſ Arm ſhall embrace a ſhlid fixt Filler,
when he put: a Finger qf that Arm into his Ear.
8. Farther, ſometimes there are idle Conditions annex'd to
the Veſtion propoſed, which conduce nothing at all td the
Matter, as if we ſhould propoſe, To make a Man, anointed
with ſweetheOil,
flill, tho' andany
ſee not crown'd
thingwith
thata tun
Garland, not ableShctou'd
'no-ye him. to lie
CHAP.
Logi-c 3 er, the Art qf Reaſonino. a 253ct
C H A P. VII.
The Explanation of 'be ſecond and third Rule: if
'be Mtbad qf Reſolution. '
*'. L L (Lueſtions may be referred totwo Kinds, or Salts I
that is, Simple or Compounded. All that is nccclſi
firily' required to theSolution ot the firſt, is a diligent com
pariſon of the ldeas of which they are compoſed. Thus
when 'tis ſaid, that a Circle has this Proper-ty," that all the
Lines that are drawn from its Cenere to its Circumference,
are e ual: if any one doubt of the Matter of Fact, and
won] enquire into the Truth or Falſhood of that Maximi
he need only compare the Idea of a Circle, with the Idea of
this Property.
2.. But a Compounded O_ucſtion cannot be ſolv'd without
comparing the ldeasof which 'tis compoſed, with ſome third
Idea, or many Ideas; for nd Man can find out the un
known Relations, which are the Subject of his Enquiry, by
an immediate (lompnriibn of the Ideas of the Qieition pro-ſi
poſitd. There is, therefore, a Neceſiity of findin out ſome
third Idea, or more, with which the Terms oft cQueſtion
muſt be compared; but theſe Idens ought to be clear and
perſpicuous, at leaſt, as to their'Rclation by which they are'
compared with Others. And hence is'drawn the ſecond'
Rule of the Method of Rqſhlution.
3. Example: will make this Matter more plain. If this
O_ueſtion was propoſed,v Whether a Thitfought to ſuffir Dear/2?
Since the Idea bf a Thiqf cannot be immediately compared
with the laſt Puniſhment, no Natural Connexio-n being be
tween thoſe two Ideas; ſo that the ldea of a Thief ſhould
neceſſarily excite the Idea of that capital Puniſhment: We
can't ſelve thar Queſtion without the Intervention of ſome
third Idea, with which bath the others ſhould be compared;
and that is of Vindicati-ue Juſtice, or the Knowledge of the
an. And when we have made this Compariſon, we ſhall
fixy, 'tis juſtice, for the good of the Commonwealth, that
the Thick' be put to death, or undergo ſome milder Puniflc
ment.
4.. If again we vput the Queſtion, Whether 'B o tem
beinggcjlt] if Thfft, ſhould He put to Death .P TZe 'izfmen
Qeſtion is contained in this: ſ;-
___ we muſt firſtenquire,
ſſ" whe
they
i
254 Logic 3 or, the Art ofReaſoningfl
ther an Thief deſerve Death, before we ſee whether ſuch
a Thie ſhould ſuffer in that,m:.nner, For unleſs the firſt
Weſtion be ſolv'd, the latter never can. But having found,
by the Laws, that a Thief at Man's Eſtate, by the Law, it
to be put to death, we 'muſt farther enquire, whether a
Thief of fifteen bevliable to the ſame Puniſhment. Here,
therefore, would be another Compariſim, not of the Boy
with thclPuniſhment, but of the Puniſhment that is-to be
inflicted, with juſtice, or the Law.,- , . t,
. ſ. There may, in this very ſame Weſtion, occur ſeveral
other Ideas, which muſt-be compared, becauſe the Bencfit
of the Commonwealthis not a ſimple Thing; but here', fori
the ſake of Inſtruction, we makezthe Idea of juſtice aſim
ple Idea, and of the higheſt Clearneſs and Perjþicuity. iWe
farther ſuppoſe, that there is no Enquiry into the Circum
ſtances of the Fact, which yet moſt commonly come into
the Conſideration of the Thing. .
6. But if the Þeſtion was, What Pmiſhmeut ſhould he in
flicted on Peter, w o, withevtthe Award of Law, had by fort'
taken away what he pretend: i: hisdue ,? Then, at firſt hearing
very many Things offer themſelves to our Conſideration.
(_'.) We muſt nicely examine, whether he were really the
Crediror or not, of him from whom he had taken this Thing;
in which Enquiry his Affirmation is to be compared with
the Bond, Writing, or other Inſtruments, if there be any, or
with the Affidavit, or Oath, or Witneſiſes, Or. (z_.) Next,
we muſt examine, whether the sum he lent be as great as
he pretends, which is by comparing his Oathwith'the Words
of the Decds, or Inſlrument, or'of the Witneſſes, be. (3.) We
muſt enquire, whether he took it away, or not. - (4.) Whe
- ther by Force, where we muſt heat Witncſſes, whoſe Evi
dcncc muſt be compared with manifold Ideas to make out
the Truth. (;.) We muſtexaminc, whether the Lawscon
demn all manner of Force on ſuch an Occaſion, where we
muſt compare the Fact with the Words of the LaWs. (6.) What
Puniſhment the Laws inflict on that Force, which we here
ſuppoſe to have been uſed, without the Intervention of the
Sentence of the judge. Before, therefore, we can ſolve this
Queſtion, V/hat Paniſhment Peter muſt undergo? we muſt
many ways compare the middle Ideas with the Terms of
the Qgcſtion,
7. But if in this Compariſoh we take in Ideas that are
not very clear, there is the greateſt-Danger imaginable of
Effort of if any oneflip in, an the following Prope
' '-'. ſitions
-__,_1
'C H A P. VIII.
'An Explanation ofthefbnrth,fifth,ſixth andſZ-wnh
' Rule: if the Method of Reſolution.
1. HEN we have taken away from the Weſtion ro
poſtd all that did not, or appear'd not nece arily
to belong to the Thing enquir'd after, if it yet remains com
pounded ſo ſar as to fall under two or more Heads, ſince
we cannot with Attention examine ſeveral Things at once)
by the fourth Rule we areobliged, (1.) To divide the fine/77'
on into it: ſeveral Heads. (2..) To examine thoſe Head: ſe a
mteby, inſach a manner, a: to begin with thoſe which conſiſt of
the more ſimple Ideas. (3.) And never to proceed to theſe Head:
which are more compounded, Will we have by oar Conjzderatz'on
made them more ſimple, perſpioaoar, and ea to on' ſel-ver.
a. The Neceffiry of this Rule is mani eſt in the ſolution
of compounded (Deſtionsz for, firſt, if we confound their
ſeveral Heads, we can never have diſtinct Ideas of them;
for Diſtinction and Confuſion are inconſiſtcnt. By that
means we can never compare the Ideas with each other, as
they on ht to be compared to find out the Truth ,- which iſ
we ſhou d otherwiſe hit on, it would be more the Effcct of
Chanee, than our Skill or Underſtanding.
Zz 3.Wc
256 Logic; or, the-Art of Reaſoning.
3.. We ſomctiines give the ſame Judgment of ſweral Ideas;
tho', generally ſpeaking, the ſame ju gment will not agree
to ſeveral. But if we form a Judgment of various Things
mixr together, without conſidering each fingly, we give a
general judgment of different Things, which is ſeldom free
from Etror in ſome thing or other. We may diſcover that
an Author has neglected his Rules, when, upon a diligent
peruſal of his Works, we cannot (tho' the Argusneut he
writes on be not unknown to us) reduce what he ſays to
certain Heads: And this we may find in ſeveral' of the An
cient aa well as Modern Writers 5 who for that Reaſon are
not read without difficulty and pain.
4. The ſame lnconveniencies ariſe from the neglect of the
ſecond and third Cautions of this out fourth Rule. Having
ſaid ſomething of this in the fifth Chapter, we ſhall only add
here, that when we are grown familiar and achainted
with the more ſimple Principles of the Qgeſtion propoſed,
ſo far as to have them diſtinctl in our Minds, we never, in
the leaſt Conſequences draWn tom them, affirm any thing
contrary to them. On the contrary, when we take but a
tranſrent View of the more ſimple, and paſs on ſo ſwiftly to
the more compounded, we ſurely forget them, and the laſt
prove often contradictory to the firſt.
.The fifth, fithl, and ſeventh Rules ſeldom come into
Uſe in any Art but Algebm, Examples taken from whence
would ſoon and clearly declare their Uſe :, But they bein
too difficult ſtir thoſe who are unac' uainted with them, and
becauſe we are of Opinion that t e ſame Rules can bene
ficially bſic adapted to other Arts, we ſhall draw our Example:
elſewhere. .
' 6. when we go about the ſhlution of any propoſed Queſti
on, and to ſet down in Writing what ſeems to us may be
anſwered to it, it will be of the greateſt uſe imaginable to
write the Heads of the Queſtion down in the feweſt Words
that may be, eſpecially if they arc many, leſt, while we con
ſider of one, the reſt, as it often happens by the multiplicity
of the Qicſtions, flip our of our Mind. By this means even
a happy Memory, which with difficulty retains many Heads,
would find a great Aſſiſtance; and the Mind unincumbercd
with other Things. with leſs Pain attends the Conſidera
tion of Particulars. 'Tis very ſeldom that all the Parts of a
compounded and difficult Weſtion, which muſt be conſi
deted, offer themſelves to ether, and at once. Moſt com
Jnonly we muſt conſider orne time before we diſcover all,
and
Logic; or, the Art of Reaſomng. 257
and then if we Write not all that down whichwe have firſt
found out, while we ſeek others, that (lips out ofour Memo
ry. But becauſe it would be very troubleſome to write down
many things, therefore the various Relations which are to be
conſidered, may be expreſſed by ſome certain Words.
7. Hence ariſe two Advanta es which are not by any
means to be deſpiſhd. The ſir is, that before we write
down more fully what we have found out on any Weſtion,
either by Conſideration, or that help'd by Reading, by this
Art we eaſily conceive the Order of the things to be writ
ten, and change it with equal Eaſe, if perchance we find an
thing amiſs in it: The other is, that both the Order and
Parts of our Treatiſe are ſo fixt in our Memory, by reading
over ſometimes what we have written, that when we come
afterwards to ſet down our whole Diſſertation, wedo not de
part from that Order, nor omit any thing which is worthy
of our Conſideration. Otherwiſe, by having too greataCon
fidence in our Memory, we ſit down to write with our Or
det and Heads of our Diſcourſe only in our Mind, many
things which occur to us while we are writing, like thoſe
which we have thought, inſcnſibly divert us from the right
Track which we deſigned to purſue, and make usomit what
we ſhou'd have diſcourſed of, and meddle with thofl: things
which have nothing to do in the Queſtion before us.
8. When we have, according to the fifth Rule, expreſs'd
the Order we have conceIVed with certain Marks and Signs,
then, according to the ſixth Rule, we diligently conſider
every Propoſition that is to be examined. There are never
more than two Terms of one Propoſitiou to be compar'd, be
fore we find what Relation is, or is not, between them. This
thus found out, ſhould in few Words be written down, that
the MemOry be unburthened ofit, and that we may without any
Pains read over our Traces, and ſee what we have found out,
and what is the Connection of our Ar uments.
9. When we have written down al the Propoſitions that
were to be examined, and have not, however, found out
what we ſought; the ſeventh Rule ordains, that we with
greater Application peruſe what we have written, and cut
v off whatever we find of no Uſe to the ſolution of theQieſti
on; and commands us then to examine any thing that may
_ ſeem of Uſe, according to the former Method: For we
often, on the firſt View, imagine ſeveral Things to beplainly
neceſſary to the ſolution of the Queſtion, eſpecially in theſe
which are intricatc, which afterwards we find on our Ex.
7- z perimcms,
258 Logrc; or, the Art of Reaſoning.
Periments, by an accurate comparing of the Ideas, to'be of
no manner oi' Uſe; and on the contrary, that ſome things,
which at firſt ſeem'd of no Importance to the Qieſtion, an
a repeating the Examination, to be of that Uſe, as to open
the Way to our diſcovery of Truth. And this every one
will better know by Experience, than by any Examples
brought from others. '
10. Laſtly, If on a frequent Repetition we can diſcover
no way of iblving the Queſtion propoſed, we ought to daſh
it out with our Pens, as beyond-Mr Power. Or, if in our
Enquirics we have diſcover'd, that there are no I'deas in it
by which it can be ſolv'd, we ought to ſhe-w, that it is in
ſOiVabic in its Nature, that no body throw away their Time
any more about it.
rt. Perhaps ſome may object to this Method, that it is
difficult: But then they muſt reflect that there is no eaſier,
and that all theſe Rules are not made uie of in T'ruths more
eaſy to be diſcovered, but only in thoſe which are more dif
ficult and intricate. But it is much more difficult without
this Method to find out the Truth, and to know it when
diſcovered, than to uſe this Method, and gather the Cerz _
taintcty of our Diſcoveries.
c H A P. IX;
'1724- Rule: of the Method qf compoſition;
1, - E hope 'tis plain from the Compariſon we made
- between the Methods of Reſhlutitm and Campqfi
tion, in the firſt Chapter of this Part, what we mean by
Compgſz'tion. That is, that after we have found out the
Principles of any Truth, or whole Art or Diſcipline, we
muſt ſeek ſome Order, by which the Connection of its Parts
may be eaſily underſtood, and the Thing it ſelf ſo prov'd,
'hat having granted the Beginning, you muſt of neCeflary
'conſequence grant alſb all that follows.
2. There has been no better Way found out than, that
the general Principles be firſt propoſed, and if Neceſſity re
quire, to be proved, _and that their Conſequences be ſo diſ
poſed, that thoſe which follow, fiem to fiow as much as poſ
ſrbly they can from thoſe which went before. Beſides the
gaining by this means the Order and Force of a Demonſtra
tion, we avoid a great Inconvenience in teaching or convey
ing any Knowledge, which is the Neceffity ſi' of Repetition:
For
Logic; or, the Art of Reaſonmg. at;
Forif we ſhould begin from Particulars to come at laſt to
\the Generals, we muſt be forced to repeat what We know
'of its General, when we ſpeak of every Particular, becauſe
Without the Knowledge of the General, xou can never have
a certain Knowledge of the Particular.
3. But we muſt here put you in mind, that this Method
can only be preſerved in thoſe Things whoſe Principles we
perfectly know; as for Example, Geometr , which is wholl
employ'd in the Conſideration oſ abſtra Moder, of which
our Mind
vquirvy hasSubflancet,
is into clear and asadequate Ideas;
in Natural but when
Philoſophy, wethe En
cannot
make uſe of the Method or Compqfltion, becauſe the Kinds
ofSubſtanter are not known to us, no: can we find out their
inmoſt Eſſences. '
4. This Method of Gumm/[tion has beenby none ſo juſtly and
accurately obſerv'd hitherto, as by the Mathematicimzs, whoſe
Principles are perfectly known; we can therefore draw its
Rules from none better, than from the T'eachers of Geamet'y.
5', Since they deſign'd to propoſe nothing that could be
contradicted, they thought they could obtain this chiefly h'y
three Ways. (r .) By offering nothing but what was couched
in Words or Terms perfectly underſtood, and for this Rea
ſon they always careful! deſine the Words they make uſe
of; of which we have poken in the Second Part. (2.) By
building only an evident and clear Principles, ſo that they
could not be controverted by any one who underſtood them.
They, therefore, firſt ofall propound their Maxims or Axiomsz
which they demand to be granted them, as being ſelf
* evident, and in need of no Ptooſ; (z.) By pro-ving deman
flrati'uel] all their Conſequences, and for this Reaſon they
only makeuſe of in their Arguments or Proofs of Definitionr,
Axiom: that have been granted, and Propoſitiom which they
have already proved. which are Principles to thofi: Things
that come laſt.
6. To theſe three Heads may. be referred- all. the Obſerva
tions of the Geometriciam, in the Demonſtration of thoſe
Truths which they have diſcovered.
7. Theſe are the Laws or Rules of Deſinitions: (r .) Never
to uſe any Win] doubtful, or 'be leaſt obſture, without a De
finition. (2..) To 'me/ce uſ? of no. Word; butſucb a: are Aſ a
'ver known Sigmffiution, arfiuh a: have been already explained.
g. The Rule of their-M'nxims or Axioms, is, To allow nothing
flr a Maxim or Axiom, but what it moſt evident.
9.Theſi:
--* . p - m' i .'
260 Loglc; or, the Art ochaſonmg;
9. Theſi: are the Laws or Rules of their Demonſtmtions?
(i.) To Have aZlPropoſz'tz'on: that have the leaſt Ohſtnrig, and
to admit nothing to the Demonflratiam of them hat conſtituted
Definition', granted Axiams, Propoſition: already pra-ved, or the
Canflraction of the Figure which i: under Conſideratian, when
aryſueh thing happen: to he done. ( 7..) Never to abuſe the Am
bigaity of a Word, 5] not affixing thoſe Definition: 5] which
they are explained. *
10. Theſe are Rules which the Geometrician: have thought
neceſſary to be obſerved, to give thoſe Truths which they de:
figncd to prove, the laſt and greateſt Evidence.
' C H A P. X.
'I'he' Explanation of the Rule: if Definition.
"1, E have already diſcourſed of the Definition of
Names, but it being a thing of no ſmall Conſe
quence, and without which the Geometrz'cal Method cannot
be underſtood, we ſhall add ſome few things on the ſame
Subject, avoiding as much as poſſible a Repetition of what
we have ſaid.
a. The firſt Rule forbids us admitting any Whrd that is
the leaſt ohſmre without a Definition. , The Neceffity of this
Rule is built on this Foundation: I. That to pro-va an] thing
with Evidence, there it a neceffi't] that what weſhj he perfectl)1
underſtood. For how can that Demonſtration be evident,
which we do not ful-ly underſtand? But there are a great
many Words which cannot be perfectly underſtood, unlefi
they are defined, ſince the Uſe of the Tongue from whence
they are taken, has not fixt any certain and determinate Senſe
upon them, and ſo leaves them obſcures as wemay find in
fiudying the Art of Criticiſm. But when Words of this Na
ture are made uſe of in the' delivering, eſpecially the Princi
ples of Arts or Sciences, we underſtand neither the Princi
ples themſelves, nor the Conſequencesþdrawn from them,
'nor the Order oi' the Argumentation, or the Connection of
the Propoſitions; whence it follows, that we cannoteer
tainly conclude, whether what is ſaid be true or falſe.
3. II. The Deſinitions of Words has this Effect on out
ſelves, that it makes us moreconſtant and conſiſtent with
our ſelves, by giving always the lime Senſe to the ſame Word.
For when we have not a diſtinct Nation of that Signifioa
tion which we have at firſt given to a Word, we are apt,
by Inadvertenee, to recede front it, eſpecially in long Diſ
putes,
' ' -- ' -' '*"" 'I
Logic ; or, the Art ofReaſomng. 26:
"purest, and when the Diſcourſe is of things of differ-'ent
v Kinds; for on theſe Occaſions we our ſelves are not ſufficii
ently conſcious of what we mean, and of the Order of our
Argumentation, much leſs can another underſtand us. But
i'f we deſme our 'Terms or Words, their Signiſication makes
a deeper Imgeſiim on our Minds, and by that we are the
more eaſily ought into the right Path, if in our Diſcourſe
we have by Accident ſtray'd from it.
4.. The ſecond Rule of Definition: forbids a: to make uſe
of an] Word: in them, whoſesignifiratim is not diſtinctl] known,
or already explained. The Reaſon of this is plain; for how
can that which is obſcure be explained by what is obſcure? '
z'. But to avoid too great a multiplicity of Deſinitions we
muſt never make uſe of obſcure Words but when we can
not find any others; elſe we ſhall be oblig'd to make Defig
nitions of Definitions. -' \ -
CHAP.
'An Explanation oft/ne XI. orAxiomſis.
Rule: of Maxims, ' '- O
r. Here are ſome Propoſitions of ſi) great Perſpicuity
and Evidence, and ſo univerſally known, that as ſoon
as we hear the Words that expreſs them, we perfectly know
and allow their Truth, as, That nothing cannot produce Some
thing. No Caaflz can give what it has not it ſelf. Theſe,
and others of the lame Nature, have no need oſ Demonſtra
* Xſithey
tion, are.
becauſeAndno whatever
Demonſtration canthis
has not be Evidence,
more evident
is notthan
to
be admitted as a Maxim.
a. But we muſt be cautious of believing, that there are
_ none clear and evident, but thoſe which have never been
deny'd, becauſe there are ſeveral that have been of old deny'd.
by the violence oſ ſome of the ancient Sccts, eſpecially the
.Pjrrhoniam and Atademicr, which are now beyond- Con
Atrovei'ſy. For, ſhould the majority of Mankind conſpire to
deny that One is leſs than Two, no Man in his Senſes can
deny that Truth. -
_z. There are two Rules of Maxims or Axioms, which con
tain all that belongs to this Matter. The firſt is, Whenne'
are plainly and evidentbi ce that my Attrihate agree: with any
Subject, as weſee that o the Whole being bigger than it: Part,
ye have not need afany langConfideration of the Attribate and
Subject, for the Mind to diſcover that the Idea of the Attrihut'
ha: a Connech'on with the ldea aſ the Subject; we may well,
WHEN"- gi-ve the Name of a Maxim to ſuch a Propoſitim.
But'
26;" Logic ;' or, the Art of Reaſoning:
But this may be put into fewer Words. Whatever P'ap'ſi-_
lum expre e: the immediate clear Comparijim of two Hem',
without t e help of the third, i: un Axiom.
4. The other Rule, oppoſite to the former, is thus ex.
preſſed. When the hure Conſt'derution of the Idea: of the Suhjeil
and the Atm'hute are not ſufficient to diſcover the Agreement of
the Attrihute to the Subject, ſuch aProPQ/ition i: not to heal/mit-v
'ed a: an Axiom, but muſt bedemonflruted 5] the help of other
Ideu:.- In fewer Words, thus: Eve Propafition, the Proaf
quvhich require: ſhme third Idea, heſt e: the Attribute and the
Subject, i: not unAxiam. Or ſhorter yet: A Truth which doe:
notariſefram un immediate Compariſon gſtm Ideus, i: no Axiam.
, CHAP. XII. _
An Explanation iſ the Rule: of Demonſtrariont
1. Here are two things requir'd in a right Demanflra
tion; firſt, 'that every Propoſrtion of which it conſiſts,
conſider'd ſeparately, be true ,- the ſecond, that the Conſe
uences drawn from other fore oing thin s, neceſſarily flow'
om them 5 or that all the Conſequenees e eontain'd in the
Antecedents, or Premiſis 5 both which will be certainly gain'd,
by following ſtrictly the two Laws delit-cr'd in the gfh Chap.
a. All the Propofitions will be true, if none are admitted
except Definition: which can be call'd in queſtion; or Max
ims or Axioms, which muſt always be evident,- or Propoſi
tions already demonſtrated, which by Demonſlrution are freed
from all Doubts, or the Conſtructiori of Figures, ii we make
uſe of any. be therefore we reduce the former Rule to Pra
ctice, all the Propoſitions ofwhich Wemake uſe, will be free
fi'om any manner of Doubt, ſince we can by that Rule make'
uſe of only thoſe things which we have reckoned up.
3. The Conſequences likewiſe will be truly drawn, if we
ſin not againſt theſecond Rule, which orders us to avoid an
manner of Ambiguity in our Words: For no Man in his
Wits can believe falſely, that any Pro ſition follows from a*
nother, or is contain'd in another, if Khave aperfect Know
ledge of both: Almoſt all the falſe Conſequences that are
made, depend on Words ill underſtood z thoſe. that are not
ſo, are ſo evident and obvious; that no Man of a ſound
Head can Fall into them. p
4.. To avoid ſome Errors, we muſt remember, I. Not to
pro-ac uthing to he true, without giving the Reuſbn qfthut Truth.
II.Not to pro-ne that which doe: not needu Proaf. IIl.Nat to argue
from Impoffihiliy. IV.Not demanflrate by Reuſom too fur fercg.
c
_ _ I 2332')
i, luce 'tis eertnin, that the Aim oſ every honeſtMau is to' ſin)
out the Truth, and to convey the Truth thus ſound out to
_others; and not to make a vain ſhow oſ his own, and expoſe
che flow/neſt oſ Apprehenſion eſ another: I' follows, that the Art
of S uabling, which has ſo long obtain'd in the School', and which
on] r. Luke condemns under the Name of Logt'c, and which has'
'or in in it but an emptv Oſtentation ofWit, is abſolutely unworthy
of a an oſWiſdom. But ſince Truth cannot be diſtinfily known
m- .prov'd Without Art, it is neceſſary, to do this rightly, that we
npply our ſelve' to the ſtudy oſ this Art. 'Tis often, likewiſe, ne
ccffny to ſilence the Saþhrflers, who boaſt their Knowledge of that,"
'ſ which they are really ignorant, to make uſe of a great deal of
Diligence, that by making them ſee their Ignorante, they may be
better inſorm'd.
2. Greece, which always was peſter'd with abundance oſ theſe
Sophiſts, was never more plagu'd with them than about the Time
of Socrates, when Philoſophy began to find a more than uſual Cul
givntion. This great Man, form'd by Nature For the confounding
the Pride of this ſort of Men, has flrewn us a Way, by which
'we may attain the ſame End againſt them in our Times, iſ they
happen to fall in our Way : And though this Way ought to have
been purſu'd by former Ages, et has it been entirely neglected;
perhaps becauſe this Pride of cerning to know more than we really
do, had got the Aſeendant of the Followcrs of Soap-ate; themſelves,
Which made them take to the ſubtile Arts oſ the Sopbills, and
jej'fl: the moſt admirable Method oſ a Man oſ that conſummace
Wiſdom.
3. But we deſign to revive with ſome ſhort Explanation this
Method, both in Conſideration of the Reaſon we have given, and
ali'o becauſe it is moſt agreeable to that Candour and Sinceriry
which every honeſt Man ought to pro oſe. 'Tis true, this Me
gþod requires a Genius, and Acuteneſs 0 lVit; but without theſe
Valiiies, the Mind cannot in any other Art be provided for ex
xempnre Diſputes.
. 4. The firſt Rule oſ this Method orders the Man who is to
make uſe of it, 'Ib conduct himſelf in ſuch a manner, as be de
fir'd to learn [drinking of' him Wilh whom b: argues. And indeed,
every one of us ought to have a Diſpofition to hear and 3110.; die
rut ,
264 Logxc; or, the Art of Reaſomng.
Truth, let it come from what Hand ſocvcr. Nor ought any Man'
'o think ſo well of himſelf, as to imagine he cannot be inſormcd by
nother, or ar leaſt be excited'ro think of a Thing of which per.
haps he thought not before. But beſide' that, every Man owe'
this Dury to himſelf, ſuch aDiſpofition of Mind, which appear' i'
the Countenance and Word', is moſt adapted to create in 'he Mind'
oſ thoſe who hear us, an Opinion oſ our Modcſty, which goe' a
great and ſure Wa to perſuade them.
' z-e Secondly, or: we proceed to any Objection, Iſ'e oughtn'f
'be Perſe' 'with whom we argue, make uſe of any ohſeute a' doubtfxi
Win-ds, to ask kin' to exflarn ubat be 'grant by the' : For it after
happens, 'bar Men have. uſcd themſelves to ſome Words which
they do not perſcflly underſtand themſelves; and then they will,
By ſuch modeſt Qcflions, diſcover their I norance much better,
an by a dircfl Oppoſrtion, which often 'aiſfs 'he Paſſions. iſ the
Perſon happen to be a Man of Sincerity, and Lovcr of Truth,
he will own, that he did not ſufficiently underſtand the Matter,
and then the Diſpureir at an end. But iſ 've meet with a pertin
jons and obſtinate Puſon, who will ohtrude his Word: u n na
without defining them, we ought to proceed no farther in r e Diſ
ute, till he has made plain what it is he means. We ou ht 'a
xreſs him with little ueſtions, not as the cffca oſ his want o Skill
'a Arguing, but our du neſs of Apprehenſion of what he underſtand'
and delivers in his Speechr In the mean while, 're muſt not admit
any one thing that is obſcure, rho' it: flir up his Anger; which yet
may be done bya harry Addreſs, of telling him, that we are ready
to yield to ruth, but that we firſt ought to know it; ſince no
Lia-o in his Senſes can give his Alſent to a Propoſirion which he
does not underſtand. But iſ we can by no means prevail with him
'a ſpeak plainly, we muſt Puſ an end to the Diſyu'ez for 'hence 'ri'
evident that he knows not what he would he at. By this meam.
'hoſe that hear us o-ill'diſtovcr the Man's Vaniry who talk' oſ
things which he does not underſtand, and many Times leaves a Sting
in the Mind oſ a Man mhczwiſe too perrinacious.
6. Thirdly, If we bring him at laſt to ſpeak plainly and clearly
what he means, fl'e mzdl' ask him Qrdiiom on the Partrculars of all
the fart: of the Dnflrine be advances, and their Canfzguencers not
n "Po-ving them, but Pr- 'fuller and more clear Injormatian of 'be
Matter; Je that be hou d apyenr the inſtructor, and we the Leamers.
The Abſurdi of t e Doctrine will 'inn-ar from theſe Auſtiuns, iſ
it labour wit any, much better than by an open Opponrion, yro
vided it be done with Dexterity, and the Vcſtious Pretty numerous,
and he obliged ſeveral Times to repcat the ſame thing, leſt he
ſhould afterwards deny thar he had ſand ſo.- Here, that the Expla
nation may be the more ample, it would not be amiſs to make uſe
oſ Example: and Similitudes, and azh him, whether he means this,
or that i The make copious we arein this Particular, the more evident
will the Falfiry of the Opinibn appear.
7. The perſpieuous Expuſirion of any Doſhine, with its Conſe
gdocnees, if it be not true, ſhewe generally its Abſnidiry: But iſ
a ic be not ſufficient, then we muſt ask him," on what A' n'am o'
Irouſ' be build: bia Oginio'ri and wc Duct uſeth: (me &undufliz
rczar
Logic ; ar, the Art of Reaſomng. 36;
'regard oſ the
ſſhim with whomArguments as toas the
we diſpute, iſ other-Parts. We toarebetoinſorm'd
we were by him enquire of
of
41 Point of which we are ignorant; but we muſt not allow him th!
'leaſt Obſcurity. In ſhort, we muſt hear the whole Series eſ his
,.A.rgumentation in ſuch amanner, that there remain no Difficulty
either in underſtanding his Doctrine, or the'Foundation on which it
'is built.
8. When we have done this with diligence, the Perſon who pro
ſes his Doctrine, muſt plainly ſee in Falſity, or on what Prooſs
't depends, 'If Paffion blind his Eyes, yet the Hearers wrll excuſe
any farther Diſpute with a Man who is angry, that we receive no:
ffiis Opinion tho' labouring with Abſurdity.
9. We 'ſhall give one Example of this Method on a Modern
Uontroirerſy, by which it will he better explained, betwixt a The
mtſia' and another, diſputing upon the Efficacy of the Divine Pro
widenu.
m. A. I 'wonder you are ſo ohflinate, a: to deny that God has an
Efficaciuus Operation in the Sin: of Men, 'which the Serzftures in many
places ſo openly andtplainly tejiiſy.
B. Ionl deny' that I underfiood how this is &one. Perhaps
my Dulne s makes that a Difficulty to me, which is obvious to
another. But I would willingly be inſorm'd by you, becauſeI can
neither believe, nor condemn what 'I do not underſtand; what, there
fore, do you mean by an Eflicaciom Operation in the Sins of Men 2
do you mean that he makes them ſin .7
A. Far he itfra'n me, for ſo God would he the Author of Sin. 'I'z's Man
commit: Sin, not God.
Do you mean, that God make: Men to commit Sin, or forces
Men to commit Sin?
A. 1 would not have cap-eſt'd this in ſo rude a manner; but God,
in a dark and unknown manner, ſo permit: Sin, that it muſt neceſſarily
he committed.
.B. You us'd before the Word OPeration, now you uſe Permit ; pray
do they mean the ſame thing P '
A. Theſe Mrds do not ahſoluteſy mean the fame thing, but they mld?
be jain'd together, ji' that what God doesſhonld he called an efficacious
Permiffion; for God neither make: Sin, nor does hefimply Peru/'t it.
B. You, therefore, mean that God permits ſomething, and doe'
ſomething, ſo that Sin neceſſarily follows 3
A. That is what Irn-ran.
B. Perhaps then God does, in this, what he does who cutting down
the Dykes, lets the Waters in to overflow the Fieldi. For he doe'
ſomething in breaking the Dyke, and he permit; ſomething in ſuffer
ing the Sea to paſs through the Breach.
I. AIy Mind could not have been exyrcji'd by a more happy Simi
, ztn e,
B. But according to our common way of Speaking, we ſhould ſay,
that he who made a Breach in the Dyke, had let in the Waters;
nor would any one accuſe the Dyke or the Sea of any manner of
Fault; but you, ifI miſtake you not, accuſe Man oſ the Fault, and
ſay Man, not God, committed the Sin. Wherefore, your Weeping;
Iwmiffion ſeems unintelligible to me. *
Aa an,
266 Logic 3 or, the Art ochaſoni-ng."
A. Do you nak,oi[erve,.thzt as to the Things themſelvgs, there is roof!
difference betweenthhiffi? For Men are endowed with Wdediandin and
V/ill, which the Dyke and the Sea have not 5 and far-that Reaflm, Lot is
a Crime in Man, which is notfo in the Sea and the Dyke.
B. But I ask of you, whether that which God does or permit',
zhas that Efficaty (For that Word you have likewiſe uſed) that Men
ean no more not ſin when that has ordered it, than the Sea not
overflow the Fields through the Breach which affordi a free Paffage 2
A. Tou have my Meaning.
B. According therefore to you, there is the ſame Relation in thze
Senſe between God and Sin, as there is between the Man who madea
Breach in the Dyke, and the Deſtrufiion of the Fields.
A. There is, as to the Event, for both are equally neceſſary.
B. The Action therefore of both, according to the Cuſtom of
Speech, may be expreſſed in the ſame manner :_ That is-- as
he who broke dowrt the Dyke is called the Cauſe of the Loſs of
zhe Fields, becauſe he did that which - neceſſarily produe'd that
_Loſs; ſo God is the Author of Sin, ſince he has put Man under a
nCCCffity of Sinuing- '
A. I told you before, that I will not make uſe of thoſe rude Ex
Preflom.
B. But either I do not underſtand what yo'- ſay, or it comes
10 that Point; for v'e muſt not regard the empty. Sounds of
Words, which ſignify nothing, but mind the Ideas to which they
are annex'd. ' -
_A. thli- you'll Prefcrihe Rules to me aſ spelling, as if I did not
know how to hold a Dzſcourſe ?
gr. Iſ the Dialoguc once comes to this, there muſt bean end
of it; and hence it will appear, that he (deſigned by the Let.
ſer A) either knows not What he means, or elſe has a greater regard
zn Word: than Things- That O}\inion is look'd on as ſufficiently
confuted, which its Deſender is aſham'd to expreſs in clear and in
ulligible words. Having in the former Dialqgue Cufficiently ex
plai'n'd the firſt and ſecond Rule, to explain 'the third, we ſhall
[uppoſe the ſame Diſpute again.
k 17., A. Tonſufficiently underſtand, that my Opinion is, that God has to
do with Evil 5 that he is not a 'member-e Spectator, but is ſo far an
Agent. that onþis acting Man commits Sin.
B. If God did nothing before the Sin, would not the Sin be
lcommitted? '
A. No, ſo' nothing'is done without the Eflicacy of the Divine Pro
vidence.
' B, What 7 do you believe that Man alone cannot violate
am? ' ,
That he an, Iffleny, 'when I deny that any thing can be done
_Jwithout 'the E cacy of the Divine Providence. '
_hF p.helGod, therefore,
s u>.mſſdo helps us__ to' 'do wickedly
well? , in the ſame manne', as
A. Iiiu miſtake, for in Evil tue _mufl diflingmſh the Action, and the
Viciouſneſs of the Action. God helps as to the doing the Action, but
mit to the Vice But in good Actions he helps us lu- 'be Good that is
in' the Affiop. * _ B '
* . I
53
Logi'c; or, the Art of Re'aſom'ig. 26 7
B. I begI you, inform me, what you mean by the Words anActio-z,
lnd what y the Viciowfnrſr ofan Action?
A. I will make il plain to you by this Example : In the Hatred of
our Neighbour, there is the Action of the Hatred, which in it ſelf is in
different, and is only call'd bad, when directed to an unlz'wſul Object,
and good when to a lawful. Next, there is the Relation of that Action'
to the Object, which is Evil. God does not concur to this Relation, tho'
there is a neceſſity of his concurring to the Action, wirhoxt ivhich it
could not he done.
B- By what youhave ſaid, l ſuppoſe you mean, that God firſtgenerates
in the Mind of Man, Hatred in genernl; which is in it ſelf nei
ther Good nor Evil: Then there cumes another Relation of the
Hatred to the Objcct, as in the Example to our Ncighbour. Do I
underſtand you 2
A. Partly you do, h'rt not entirely z> for Ido not think there is any
ſugh Exilience as Haired in general, 'which ſhe/4" afterwards h defer-ex
mmed to a certain Objeflz th r is co-itrm'y to ExPen-ience.
B. Does God then create that very Hatred that is direfled againſt
our Neighbour 7
A. Moſt certainly the Ham-ed, but nal the Relation.
B, But does that Hatred exiſt without that Relation?
A. Not at all e for-the very moment that it is created in our .Mind5,
Hi: the Hatred of our Neighbour.
B. According, therefore, to you, God creates ſuch an Hatred which
eo-exiſts in ſuch a manner with a vicious Relation, that it cannot be
ſeparated or diſtinguiſh'd ſrom-
A. He d'eefo; \' it' but'\ by Abſtraction.
ſi
B. Ca'thfſs Horn-ed, tho: generated in the Mind of Mdn, be by
'he Man directed to a lawful Objefl, 's T'ice, for Example 3
A, It cannot ; for the Action of God being paſt, the certain Event
'nujl' neceſſarily follow.
B. I beſeech you, Sir, if a Man ſhould put a Burthen on another"
Shoulder, which he that bore it could not afterwards throw off, and
by that means he ſhould break his Ribs, would not he that put on
ſuch a Burthen be look'd on as the Breaker of his Ribs, if he had
known the Event of his Action?
A. Mq/l certainly.
B. Should a Man puſh another, walking by a River-'lide, into the
Wirer, 'who-ſhould there be drown'd, ſhould we not ſay' that' li'
who thruſt him in drown'd him 3
A. Certainly.
B. Yet there arc ſome Men who would ſay, that you are in an Er
ror in this particular; that the impofing, and the thrufling was pro
duced by both ,- but not the breaking the Ribs, and the drowning,
as God gcnerates the Hatred which is directed againſt our Neighbour
without that evil Relation.
A. 'Tis indeed may? evident, that the Men inflamed, were guilty >
of the Fracture and the Drowmſing 5 but the matter iſ otherwiſe with
God, who is. not obliged to give an account to poor miſerable Man
his Adminiflration.
B. But if he did, what you would wickedly perſuade us, either all
Sinncrs muſt be acquitted of any Crime, or God himſelf, who cum
pels the Sins, cogdcmn'd.
A a a. A. Don't
a
-_T7o<EndofLO_GIQ
( 269 )
T H E
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