SECTION 2 Soliven v.
Makasiar (1988)
When is a search a “search”?
SJS v. DDB (2008)
 ―Reasonableness‖ is the touc hstone of the validity
of a government search or intrusion
 Criminal context requires probable cause,
administrative search do not
Requisites of a Valid Warrant
People v. Veloso (1925)
 John Doe warrants are void unless it contains
descriptio personae sufficient to clearly indicate
the person, also other circumstances like
occupation, appearance, peculiarities, residence,
etc.
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance (1937)
 Search warrant—order in writing, issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer to s earch for
personal property and bring to court
 Search warrant is void because applicant has no
personal knowledge (there should be another
witness)
Stonehill v. Diokno (1967)
 Objection t o unlawful searc h is purely personal—
juridical persons have the cause of action, not the
individual
 No specific offens e had been alleged—impossible
for the judge to found probable cause
 ―Exclusion Rule‖: abandonment of the Moncado
ruling
Central Bank v. Morfe (1967)
 Search warrant
 The law requiring compliance with certain
requirements before anybody can engage in
banking obviously seeks to protect the public
against actual, as well as potential, injury—the
case does not involve mere isolated transaction,
thus, no need to mention particular individuals
Bache & Co., Inc. v. Ruiz (1971)
 Search warrant
 Task to personally examine the complainant and
the witness cannot be delegated
 SW should be issued for only one offense
Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (1984)
 Search warrant
 Typographical error: executing officer is the affiant
on the affidavit for warrant, thus have prior
knowledge of the place
 Need not be owned, as long as the accused have
control or possession
 Supporting affidavits must include specification,
mere generalization would not suffice
 Arrest warrant
 Exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause:
1. Personally examine the report of the fiscal
with supporting documents and issue a
warrant of arrest
2. If no probable cause, may disregard fiscal’s
report and require submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid with the
determination of probable cause
Lim, Sr. v. Judge Felix (1991)
 Arrest warrant
 Judge may not issue a warrant of arrest my
simply relying on a prosecut or’s certification and
recommendation that probable cause exists
 People v. Inting:
1. Determination of probable cause is function of
the judge
2. Inquiry made by the prosecut or does not bind
the judge
3. PI for warrant of arrest different from PI which
ascertains whether the accused should be
tried or released
Silva v. Presiding Judge (1991)
 Search warrant
 Judge, being issuing SW, should determine
whet her there is probable cause by examining the
complainant and witnesses through searching
questions and answers (not merely
mimeographed, not leading nor broad)
Allado v. Diokno (1994)
 Search warrant
 Court was unable to see how the judge was able
to come up with the ruling—records show that
nothing supported the decision
Ortiz v. Palaypayon (1994)
 Arrest warrant
 Police investigator cannot conduct preliminary
investigation, thus cannot rely on the inquiry made
by it—should not resort to short-cuts
People v. Martinez (1994)
 Arrest warrant
 Discrepancy in the name cannot militate against
his positive identification by the poseur-buyer—
identity already established
 Rules on Criminal Procedure: can provide for
fictitious name if true name is unknown
Webb v. De Leon (1995)
 Arrest warrant
 Sec. 6, Rule 112 of Criminal Procedure: ―upon
filing of an information, RTC may issue a warrant
for arrest of the accused‖
 No law requiring the issuanc e of an order of arrest
prior to warrant of arrest
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
  Not measured by merely counting the minutes
and time
People v. Woolcock (1995)
Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (1996)
 Arrest warrant
 There should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the fiscal’s bare
certification—but here nothing accompanied the
information wit h the trial court, no affidavits or
transcript
th
20 Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals (1988)
 Search warrant
 Lifted the search warrant because the Court acted
upon the misrepresentation of the NBI that
infringement was committed (no personal
knowledge)
Ho v. People (1997)
 Arrest warrant
 Emphasized 3 vital matters:
1. Determination of the probable cause by the
prosecut or is different from that made by the
judge
2. Different objectives, thus, the judge cannot
rely solely on the report of the prosecut or in
justifying probable cause
3. Not required that the complete/entire records
of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted and examined by
the judge (sufficient supporting documents)
Gov’t of USA v. Purganan (2002)
 Arrest warrant (extradition)
 No requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest—judges
just have to have sufficient supporting documents
upon to make independent judgment
People v. Francisco (2002)
 Search warrant
 The controlling subject of the searc h warrant is
the place indicated, not the place identified
Sony v. Espanol (2005)
 Search warrant
 No personal knowledge: initial hearsay
information or tips from confidential informants
can be basis if followed up by personally
validating
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp (2004)
 Search warrant
 Probability, not absolute or even moral certainty
 Description need not be technic ally accurate or
precise
Yousef Al-Ghoul v. CA (2001)
 Search warrant
 Law does not require that the things to be seized
must be described in precise and minute details
Uy v. BIR (2000)
 Search warrant
 Description of the place: any description or
designation known to the locality that points out
the place and on inquiry leads the officers to it
Vallejo v. CA (2004)
 Search warrant
 Description of the place or thing to be searched
that will enable the officer with reas onable
certainty and particularity to locate the plac e or
thing is sufficient
People v. Nunez (2009)
 Search warrant
 Only personal properties described in the search
warrant may be seized
Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong (2010)
 Search warrant
 Probability and not absolute or moral certainty,
there were good reasons to believe that
respondents committed the crime
People v. Tuan (2010)
 Search warrant
Del Castillo v. People (2012)
 Search warrant: nipa hut outside permissible area
HPS Software v. PLDT (2012)
 Search warrant
 Only probable cause is needed: affidavits and
other evidences more than sufficient to support
that test was done by PLDT
Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Roan v. People (1986)
 Mala prohibitum: motive is immaterial but the
subjects may not be summarily seized—search
warrant is still necessary
MHP Garments, Inc. v. CA (1994)
 Unreasonable: Time bet ween the receipt of
information and raid was sufficient to apply for
judicial warrant
Spouses Veroy v. Layague (1992)
 Invalid: permission was given only to ascertain the
presence of rebels and not room-to-room search
People v. Aruta (1998)
 Invalid: no probable cause not lawfully arrested
 Lawful arrest must precede the s earc h of a
person and his belongings
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
People v. Racho (2010)
 No probable cause: must also perform some overt
act for commission of offense, indicative of
criminal design
People v. Aminola (2010)
 Valid: warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional
defect and any objection to it is waived when the
person arrested submits to arraignment without
any objection
INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST
Nolasco v. Pano (1987)
 Not incidental to lawful arrest
People v. Aminnudin (1988)
 Invalid: merely descending from M/V Wilcon 9 and
no outward indication that called for arrest
 Name known, vehicle identified and date of arrival
was certain
People v. Malmstedt (1991)
 Valid: crime was committed—transporting
prohibited drugs
 Probable cause: based on reports, failure of the
accused to present papers arouse suspicion
 Dissent: no other reasonable persuasive
indications; fact of illegal possession retroactively
established the probable cas e that validated the
illegal search
People v. De Los Reyes (2011)
 Failed to justify probable cause the in flagrante
delicto arrest and search incidental to such arrest
 Requisites:
1. Must exercise an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, actually committing, or
attempting to commit a crime
2. Overt act done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer
Luz v. People (2012)
 Invalid: when flagged down for traffic violation,
one is not arrested (only confiscation of license is
needed, not arrest)
AIRPORT SEARCH
People v. Canton (2002)
 RA 6235: holder of ticket of air carrier subject to
search and seizure of prohibited materials
 Less of expectation of privacy in the airports
ARTICLES IN PLAIN VIEW
Fajardo v. People (2011)
 Requisites:
1. Law enforcement officers has prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area
2. Discovery is inadvertent (accidental)
3. Immediately apparent that the item may be an
evidence of a crime, contraband or other
subject to seizure
MOVING VEHICLES
People v. Lo Ho Wing (1991)
 Valid: hard to describe with particularity and not
practicable as it can quickly move out
Aniag v. COMELEC (1994)
 Invalid: no probable cause, nothing to trigger the
suspicion
 Vehicle should neither be searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search and
inspection is limited to visual search
Mustang Lumber v. CA (1996)
 Valid: Seizure of the cargo was valid exercise of
power vested upon forest officer or employee by
Sec. 80 of PD 705
Asuncion v. CA (1999)
 Valid: situation demanded immediate action;
sought the permission of the petitioner to search
the car to which he agreed
STOP-AND-FRISK OPERATIONS
Posadas v. CA (1990)
 Determine the identity of suspicious individual or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police seeks to obtain more information
 Terry v. Ohio: investigating possible criminal
behavior and search for concealed weapon
Malacat v. CA (1997)
 Suspicion and hunch will not validate it but a
genuine reason must exist
 Reasons for stop-and-frisk:
1. Effective crime prevention and detection
2. Safety and self-preservation of the police
officer to assure that the person is unarmed
Manalili v. CA (1997)
 E ven though marijuana is not a weapon, SAFO
used also for drugs
 Valid: probable cause because of suspicious
behavior and characteristic of being high
Esquillo v. People (2010)
 Valid: saw in plain view, given their training,
instinctive to draw curiosity
 SAFO: Introduce himself, initial inquiries, restrain
a person with suspicious conduct to check the
outer clothing for concealed weapons
TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE
Papa v. Mago (1968)
 TCC does not require search warrant: search
land, enclos ure, warehouse, store or building, not
being dwelling house, to stop and search vehicles
reasonable suspected of holding/ conveying such
articles
People v. CFI of Rizal Br. IX (1980)
 Except in cases of dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
 may effect search and seizure without search
warrant for enforcement of customs law
EXIGENT AND URGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
People v. De Gracia (1994)
 Valid: had no opportunity to apply for warrant
(simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity
of the office—courts were obviously closed)
“of whatever nature and for whatever purpose”
Material Distributors v. Natividad (1949)
 Orders are issued by virt ue of Rule 21 of Civil
Procedure and cannot be confused with
unreasonable search in the Constitution
Oklahoma Press v. Walling (1946)
 No officer or other person has entered petitioner’s
premises against their will, to search t hem or to
seize or examine their books, records or papers
without their assent but pursuant to court order
authorized by law
 Valid 5(a): subversion as a continuing crime,
arrest is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense
Go v. CA (1992)
 Not Sec. 5 (a) nor S ec. 5 (b)—6 days after and no
personal knowledge
People v. Mengote (1992)
 Not Sec. 5 (a) nor Sec. 5 (b)—no personal
knowledge, based on hearsay information from
telephone caller
Miclat, Jr. v. People (2011)
 Valid Sec. 5 (a): caught in flagrante delicto—
exposed to the view of police

Camara v. Municipal Court (1967)

 Housing inspection requires warrant: way of
knowing the lawful limites of the power to search
and whether or not the inspector is acting under
proper authorization
 Determination of probable cause:
1. Focus upon the governmental interest which
allegedly justifies official intrusion upon
private citizen
2. If reas onable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area ins pection
are satisfies with res pect to a particular
dwelling
 Exception: citizen complaint or satisfactory reason
for securing immediate entry

Warrantless Arrests
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago (1988)
 Arrest was based on probable cause determined
after close surveillance for 3 mont hs—not caught
in the act but found with young boys in their
respective rooms, the one with Sherman being
naked (reasonable grounds to believe that
committed pedophilia)
 ―The requirement of probable cause, to be
determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings‖

People v. Burgos (1986)

 Not 5(a): not in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive doc ument, neither committing any
subversive acts
 Not 5(b): requisites—
1. Reas onable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a crime
(personal knowledge)
2. Crime must in fact or actually have been
committed (essential condition)

Umil v. Ramos (1990)

JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS

Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
 SECTION 3
People v. Marti (1991)
 In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invok ed against the State – came into possession
of the government without government
transgressing appellant’s rights
People v. Damaso (1992)
 Immunity, being a personal one, cannot be
waived except by the person whose rights are
invaded
Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA (1994)
 Tape recordings made by the military through
wire-tapping the telephone homes of the private
respondents
 RA 4200 (prohibit and penalize wiretapping and
other related violations of the privacy of
communications) makes it inadmissible as
evidence
Zulueta v. CA (1996)
 Section 3 applied to private individuals (husband
and wife)
 Inadmissible as evidence: a person by cont racting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or right
to privacy and constitutional protection is always
available to him
SECTION 4
Prior restraint
Near v. Minnesota (1931)
 Object of the statute is not punishment but
suppression of offending newspaper—
suppression would follow unless there is evidence
that it is true and published with good motives and
justifiable end (putting the published under
effective censorship
 Protection from previous restraints is not
unlimited:
 When nation is at war—t he government
might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the
sailing dates of transports or the number
and location of troops
 Primary requirements of dec ency may be
enforced against obscene publications
 Incitement to acts of violence and
overthrow by force of orderly government
Freedman v. Maryland (1965)
 Requirement of prior submission of a film to a
censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it
takes place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the danger of censorship
system
1. Burden of proving that the film is unprotected
must rest on the censor
2. Cannot be administered in a manner which
would lend an effect of finality to a c ensor’s
determination whether a film constitutes
protected speech (only judicial determination)
3. Prompt final judicial decision to minimize
deterrent effect
Alexander v. US (1993)
 The RICO forfeiture order in this case does not
forbid petitioner from engaging in any expressive
activities in the future nor does it require him to
obtain prior approval
Newsounds v. Dy (2009)
 Cont ent-neut ral: concerned wit h incidents of
speech, time, place or manner
 Cont ent-based: based on the subject matter of the
speech (higher scrutiny)
 Circumstanc es of the case view it as cont ent-
based
Subsequent Punishment
People v. Perez (1923)
 Criticism, no matter how severe, on the executive,
legislature or judiciary is within the range of liberty
of speech, unless the intention and effect be
seditious
 Dangerous tendency rule: there is seditious
tendency in the words used which could produce
disaffection with the government
Dennis v. US (1950)
 Justice Holmes: ―question in every case is
whet her the words used in such a circumstance of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that will bring substantive evil‖
 Overthrow of the government by force and violent
is certainly a substantial enough inte rest for the
government to limit speech
Gonzales v. COMELEC (1969)
 Acceptable criterion for restriction of freedom of
speech:
1. Clear and Present Danger Rule: real and
imminent evil consequence of the comment
2. Dangerous Tendency Rule: nat ural tendency/
effect and probable effect to bring evil
3. Balancing-of-interest Rule: take conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in given situation (used
in this case)
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. (1985)
 The Court issued guidelines with regard to
broadcast media:
1. Requirements laid down by Ang Tibay v. CIR
should be followed before a broadcast station
may be closed.
2. Due process is an unavoidable standard to
which government action must conform
3. All forms of media—print or broadcast—are
entitled to the broad protection of freedom of
speech and expression clause
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
 4. Freedom of television and radio is somewhat
lesser in scope than that of newspaper and
print media
5. Clear and Present Danger Test must take
circumstances of broadcast media into
account
6. Freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to vitality of representative
democracy
7. Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the
due process and freedom of expression
clauses
Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. v. Judge Capulong (1988)
 No clear and present danger of any violation of a
right to privacy as the film was uncompleted and
not yet exhibited to any audience
 Enrile as a public figure: ―a person who by his
accomplishments, fame mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public legitimate interest in his doings‖
Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui (2007)
 Abuse of right to free speec h: free expression
must not be used as vehicle to satisfy one’s
rational obsession to demean or destroy the court
and its magistrates
Speech and Electoral Process
Adiong v. COMELEC (1992)
 Balancing-of-interests: when faced with borderline
situations where freedom to speak by candidate
or freedom to know on the part of the electorate
are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the
COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom
 No substantive evil under clean and present
danger test
 Regulations strikes at the freedom of an individual
to express his preference by displaying it on his
car to convince others to agree with him
SWS v. COMELEC (2001)
 Test for content-based regulation (based on US v.
O’Brien case):
1. Within the constitutional power of the
government
2. Furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest
3. Government interest is unrelated to
suppression of free expression
4. Incidental restriction on freedom of speech is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of interest
Commercial Speech
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network (1993)
 The distinction bears no relationship to the
interest that the city asserted (i.e. beauty and
safety)
 Cont ent-based because the ban is only for
commercial handbills
City of Ladue v. Gilleo (1994)
 Interest not compelling enough to foreclose
medium to political, religious and personal
message
 Not proper time, place and manner regulation
since no adequate substitute exists
 Importance of location: provides for the identity of
the speaker and the individual freedom in the
home
Rubin v. Coors Brewing (1995)
 Cent ral Hudson case identified several factors for
commercial speech to come within the First
Amendment:
1. Must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading
2. Whether the asserted government interest is
substantial
3. (If 1 and 2 yields to positive answers)
Whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted
4. Whether it is more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest
Unprotected Speech: Libel
Policarpio v. Manila Times (1962)
 To enjoy immunity, a publication containing
derogatory information must not only be (1) true,
but also (2) fair and it must be made in (3) good
faith and (4) without any comments/ remarks
 Rectification does not wipe out responsibility
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964)
 A rule compelling t he critic of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all his facts leads to ―self-
censorship‖
 Prohibits public official from recovering damages
for defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made wit h actual malice—(1) with knowledge that
it was false or (2) with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not
Lopez v. CA (1970)
 For liability to arise then without offending press
freedom: statement made with actual malic e—(1)
knowledge that it was false or (2) with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not (no
pressure of daily deadline since it was published
weekly)
Rosebloom v. Metromedia (1971)
 First Amendment extends to myriad matters of
public interest—New Y ork Times standard was
made to apply
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974)
 State interest in compensating injury to the
reputation of private individual requires different
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
 (stricter) rule since they are (1) more vulnerable
and (2) relinquished to the public no part of his
interest
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988)
 Political cartoon is oft ern based on exploitation of
unfort unate physical traits or politically
embarrassing events—calculated to injure the
feelings of the subject of the portrayal (The Court
said that the political discourse would have been
considerably poorer without them)
 May recover damages only if it contains false
statement of fact which was made with ―actual
malice‖
In Re Emil Jurado (1995)
 Liability for published statements demonstrably
false or misleading and derogatory of the courts
and individual judges
 Criticism against the judiciary (esp. the Supreme
Court) must be respectful
Borjal v. Court of Appeals (1999)
 Absolutely privileged: not actionable even if in bad
faith (e.g. parliamentary immunity)
 Qualifiedly privileged: not actionable unless found
to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive
1. A private communication made by any person
to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty (Art. 354 of RPC)
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public offic ers in the
exercise of their functions (Art. 354 of RPC)
3. Fair commentaries of matters of public
interest
Unprotected Speech: Obscenity
Miller v. California (1973)
 Basic guidelines for the triar of fact whether
obscene or not:
1. Whether the average person, applying
contemporaneous community standards
would find that work taken as a whole,
appeals to the prunient interest
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual c onduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law
3. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value
Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak (1985)
 Motion picture can be limit ed if there be a clear
and present danger of substantive evil that the
State has a right to prevent
 To avoid constitutional taint—limited to
classification of films
Pita v. Court of Appeals (1989)
 Respondents have no proof t o justify the ban to
warrant confiscation
 The need for warrant:
1. Apply for search warrant if obscenity raps is in
order
2. Convince the Court that the materials are
―obscene‖ and pose a clear and present
danger of an evil
3. Judge would determine whether or not it is
obscene
4. If probable cause exists, judge would issue
warrant
5. Proper suit should be brought under Art. 201
of the RPC
6. Conviction subject to appeal
Assembly and Petition
BAYAN v. Ermita (2006)
 Freedom to assembly and petition may be
restricted by virt ue of police power if there is clear
and present danger
 BP 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes v.
Bagatsing
 Calibrated Pre-emptive Response serves no valid
purpose sinc e it is the same thing as Maximum
Tolerance
Obscenity
Barnes v. Glen Theater (1991)
 Applying the O’Brien test: statute justified despite
its incidental limitations on some expressive
activity
nd
 2 criteria: furthers a substantial gov. interest in
protecting order and morality
rd
 3 : unrelated to suppression of free expression
 ―makes the message slightly less graphic‖ –
merely combined with expressive activity
th
 4 : incidental restriction not greater
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978)
 Different treatment of broadcast media: (1)
established uniquely pervasive presence, (2)
uniquely accessible to children
st
 1 Amendment does not deny the gov. any power
to restrict the public broadcast of indecent
language in any circumstance
Renton v. Playtime Theater (1986)
 Cont ent-neut ral: justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech
 It is the secondary effect which it attempt ed to
avoid: serve substantial governmental interest
and allows for reasonable alt ernative avenues for
communication
JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing (1983)
 Only justification for limitation: danger of grave or
imminent danger of serious evil to public safety
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
  As to public places, especially so as to parks and
streets, there is freedom of access
SECTION 5
Non-establishment of Religion
Aglipay v. Ruiz (1937)
 Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose –
not issued and sold for the benefit of the RCC
 ―incidental benefits to religion‖
School District v. Schempp (1963)
 ―strict neutrality‖
 Double aspect of freedom of religion:
(1) Freedom to believe: forestalls compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or religion
(2) Freedom to exercise: Free exercise of chosen
religion
 Establishment Clause—prohibits dependency of
one upon the other to the end that official support
would be places behind the tenets of all
orthodoxies
o Prohibits use of state action to deny the
rights of free exercise of anyone, but it
was never meant that a majority could
use the machinery of the State to practice
its beliefs
 Free Exercise Claus e—value of religious training,
teaching and observance and freely choose and
free from compulsion
 Valid intervention: (1) secular legislative purpose,
(2) primary effect that either advanc es not inhibits
religion
Board of Education v. Allen (1968)
 Test for allowable aid: (1) s ecular legislative
purpose, (2) primary effect that either advances
not inhibits religion
 Financial benefit to students and parents not to
the parochial school (lending of text books)
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)
 3 main evils which the establishment clause was
intended: (1) spons orship (2) financial support (3)
active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activities
 NON-ESTABLISHMENT TEST
(1) Secular legislative purpose
(2) Primary effect that either advances not inhibits
religion
(3) ―Must not require entanglement with recipient
institutions‖
 Teachers have substantially different ideological
character from books—inspection as
entanglement
Islamic Da’wah v. Executive Secretary (2003)
 Classifying a food product as a halal is a religious
function becayse the standards used are drawn
from Quran and Islamic beliefs
 Only prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom
UCCP v. Bradford UCC (2012)
 Ecclesiastical affair—concerns doctrines, creed or
form of worship of the church of the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the government
of the membership
 Secular matter with civil court’s purview
Free Exercise of Religion
Victoriano v. Elizalde (1974)
 Free exercise of religion is superior t o contract
rights
 Introduced an exception to closed-shop
arrangement by virtue of one’s religion
American Bible Society v. City of Manila (1957)
 Ordinanc e imposing licens e fee cannot be applied
because it would abridge free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent (1993)
 Exemption did not create privileged few, it is
religious equality, not civil immunity
 Freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not
freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma
 Strict scrutiny: would not create a clear and
present danger of substantive evil
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)
 State’s interest in universal education is not totally
free from a balancing process when it infringes on
the fundamental rights and interests
 To have protection of the religion clause, the
claims must be rooted in religious belief
German v. Barangan (1985)
 Circumstanc es case serious doubts on the
sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking
their rights
 Freedom to act can be limited—in the interest of
national security in this case
Centeno v. Villaon-Pornillos (1994)
 Exercise of religion may be regulated at some
slight inconvenience in order that the state may
protect its citizens from injury (fraudulent
purposes)
Church of Lukumi v. City of Hialeah (1993)
 Laws that is (1) neutral and of (2) general
applicability need not be justified by compelling
governmental interest even if has incidental
effects of burdening particular religious practice
 Failure to satisfy both needs that it should be (1)
narrowly-tailored, and (2) compelling gov. interest
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
Estrada v. Escritor (2003)
 Strict neutrality—separation: protect the state
from the Church; neutral to all relations, does not
require that it be adversary; state should base
public policy solely on secular considerations
 Benevolent neutrality—accommodation: permits
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference
 Compelling state interest test—applicable where
conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state’s
interests
 Benevolent neutrality may accommodate morality
based on religion provided it does not offend
compelling state interest
Lamb’s Chapel v. School District (1993)
 Cont rol over access to a non-public forum can be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so
long as the distinction drawn are reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum and are
viewpoint neutral
In Re: Request of Muslim Employees (2005)
 The performance of religious practices should not
prejudice the courts and public
SECTION 6
Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
Villavicencio v. Lukban (1919)
 Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient—deprived of locomotion just like
being imprisoned
 No official, no matter how high, is above the law
Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)
 Right to return to one’s count ry is not among the
rights granted by the Bill of Rights which only
includes liberty of abode and the right to travel
 BUT can be considered as part of t he generally
accepted principles of international law: have
different protection: ―arbitrarily deprived‖
Yap v. Court of Appeals (2001)
 Right to change abode and travel within the
Philippines are not absolute rights
 Order of the CA constitute ―lawful order‖
contemplated by Sec. 6
OAS v. Macarine (2012)
 Circular does not restrict (means to restrain or
prohibit) but merely regulate (govern/ direct) by
providing guidelines to be complied
SECTION 7
Information and Access to Official Records
Legaspi v. CSC (1987)
 Gov. agencies are without discretion in refusing
disclosure of or access to information of public
concern
 This is not to lose eight of the reas onable
regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public reco rds on the
manner in which the right to information may be
exercised by the public
 Authority to regulate the manner of examining
public records does not carry with it the power to
prohibit: may regulate to prevent damage, loss
and undue interference with the duties of said
agencies
 WON within the ambit of constitutional guarantee:
(1) Being a public concern or public interest
(2) Not being exempt by law from the operation of
constitutional guarantee
Neri v. Senate (2008)
 Executive has right to withhold documents that
might reveal:
o Military or state secrets
o Identity of gov. informers in some
circumstances
o Information related to pending
investigations
o Foreign relations
o Presidential communications privilege
 Right to information limited by ―as may be
provided by law‖
 Right to information not the same with right of
Congress for information in aid of legislation
 Limitations under Chavez v. PCGG:
o National security
o Trade secrets and banking transactions
o Criminal matters
o Other confidential information
Akbayan v. Aquino (2008)
 JPEPA is a matter of public concern
 Offers exchanged during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published because of Japan’s ―historic
confidentiality‖
 Diplomatic negotiations privilege
 Under executive privilege? S how that information
is vital by sufficient ―showing of need‖
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel (2008)
 MOA-AD is a matter of public concern—involving
sovereignty and territorial integrity
 Sec. 28 Art II splendid symmetry of Sec. 7 Art III
o Sec. 28 Art II—duty to give information
even if nobody demands
o Sec. 7 Art III—right the people to demand
information
 Cannot invoke executive privilege because
contrasted with EO No. 3’s mandat e of continuing
consultations
Antolin v. Domondon (2010)
 National board exams are matters of public
concern
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
  BUT there are public reasons to limit access in
order to properly administer the exam —its
inherent difficulty need it to be confidential
Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board (2010)
 Most commercial contracts including finance-
related project agreements carry confidential
clause to protect proprietary data and intellectual
property right
Initiatives v. PSALM (2012)
 Constitutional right involves on-going negotiations
before a final contract
SECTION 8
Right to Association
Standard for abridgement: Clear and Present Danger of
Substantive Evil
UPCSU v. Laguesma (1998)
 Rout e manages are managerial employees as
determined by the DOLE—business
administrators in their own right, more than make
recommendations
 Comm. Lerum (during Constitutional Convention)
restore the right of (1) s upervis ory employees (not
managerial), (2) gov. employees and (3) security
guards
PADCOM v. Ortigas Center (2002)
 Never forc ed to join—it could have avoided such
membership by not buying land from TDC
 Voluntary agreed to be bound
SECTION 9
Bardillon v. Calamba (2003)
 Expropriation suit does not involve recovery of
sum of money but exercise of gov. authority which
is incapable of pecuniary estimation
Republic v. Holy Trinity (2008)
RA 8974
- National gov infrastructure project
- Immediate payment of 100% zonal valuation
(initial payment) AND difference after
determination of just compensation (final
payment)
- Current zonal valuation
Rule 67 of Rules of Court
- Other infrastructure projects
- Required only initial deposit with an authorized
gov. depository
- Assessed value for purposes of taxation
Expropriation in General; Reversion
Mactan v. Lozada (2010)
 2 requirements of power of eminent domain:
1. For a particular public purpose—nature of an
implied condition to keep the property for that
purpose, otherwise, incumbent upon them to
return the property
2. Just compensation
 Respondents to return the just compensation plus
legal int erest, expenses for the services in
managing to the extent they were benefited
Vda. De Ouano v. Republic (2011)
 Always conditioned on its continued devotion to
its public purpose
Elements of Taking
US v. Causby (1946)
 There was taking: the owner’s right to possess
and exploit the land—beneficial ownership—was
destroyed
 It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain which is
the measure of the value of the property taken
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi (1974)
 Elements:
o Expropriator enter private property
o More t han a moment ary period—
permanent
o Entry under warrant or color of legal
authority
o Devoted to public use or informally
appropriated or injuriously affected
o In a way that oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property
 When does taking c ommence in an ex propriation
proceeding? Filing of the complaint (also basis of
compensation)
OSG v. Ayala Land (2009)
 Power to regulate does not include power to
prohibit nor confiscate
 Mandate to give public access for free: more of
eminent domain—regulation which deprives any
person of the profitable use of his property
constitutes taking and entitles him to
compensation
NPC v. Heirs of Macabangkit (2011)
 NPC’s construction of the tunnel constituted
taking of the land—prevented owners from
introducing any developments on the surface and
from disposing of the land
 Includes destruction, restriction, diminution or
interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the
property in lawful manner
Public Use
Sumulong v. Guerrero (1987)
 Public welfare is what ever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use
 Social services include housing
City of Manila v. Tan Te (2011)
 Socialized housing has already been included in
the expanded definition of public use or
purpose—indirect public benefit or advantage
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)

Just Compensation
City of Manila v. Estrada (1913)
 The market value of the land taken is the just
compens ation: price which it will bring when it is
offered for sale by one desires but not oliged to
sell it, and is brought by one who is under no
necessity of having it
 ―just‖—real, substantial, full and ample, fair and
full equivalent of the loss sustained
EPZA v. Dulay (1987)
 Court still has the power and authority to
determine just compensation, independent of
what is stated in the decree
 Only serve as guiding principle, but must not
substitute court’s judgment
 Determination of just compensation is a judicial
function
Judicial Review
De Knecht v. Bautista (1980)
 Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily
choose what private property should be taken
 Expropriation by another government agency or
municipal c orporation—court can come in to
enforce the provisions
o Adequacy of compensation
o Necessity of taking—requires evidence
o Public use character of the purpose
Republic v. De Knecht (1990)
 Former decision not an obstacle to the legislature
to make is independent assessment of the
circumstances and propriety of undertaking
expropriation
Manotoc v. NHA (1987)
 At least notive and opportunity to be heard are
given to protect property rights
 Basis of eminent domain is necessity—no
showing why it is singled out
SECTION 10
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934)
 Obligation of contracts includes validity and
remedy
 Remedy may be modified by the State provided
no substantial right is impaired
 Impaired by law which renders them invalid or
releases or extinguishes them or derogate from
substantial contractual rights
Rutter v. Esteban
 Limitations for impairment:
o Should refer to remedy and not
substantial right
o Must be with restrictions/ conditions
o Justified by emergency
o Temporary
SECTION 13
Right to Bail
Yap v. CA (2001)
 Imposing bail in excessive amount could reneder
meaningless the right to bail—liberty would be
beyond reach
 Bail not intended as a punishment nor answer for
the civil liability of the accused
 Purpose: guarantee appearance at the trial
Govt of Hong Kong v. Olalia (2007)
 Extradition is sui generis, not determination of
guilt, administrative only
 BUT employs deprivation of libery and machinery
of criminal law
 Right to bail upon proving by clear and convincing
evidence that he is not a flight risk
Excessive Bail
Dela Camara v. Enage (1971)
 When the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive, otherwise it is meaningless
SECTION 16
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
Binay v. Sandiganbayan (1999)
 The right to speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the acused in criminal proceedings but
extends to civil, administrative, judicial and quasi-
judicia
 Violated only when proceedings is attended by
vexacious, capricious and oppressive delays
 Balancing test:
o Conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed
o Length of the delay
o Reasons for the delay
o Assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused
o Prejudice caused by the delay
 Not only time but also facts and circumstances
peculiar to the case
 The case was sufficiently complex, thus, justifying
the length of time for their resolution
SECTION 17
Right Against Self-Incrimination
US v. Navarro (1904)
 Forcing the defendant to become a witness in his
own behalf or take much severer punishment
 No one is bound to incriminate himself: would
place the wirtness under the strngest temptation
to commit the crime of perjury and prevent the
extorting of evidence by duress
US v. Tan Teng (1912)
 Substance emitting from the body of the
defendant
 Prohibition is simply against legal process to
extract frim the defendant’s own lips, against his
will, an admission of guilt
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
  Inspection of te bodily feautures by the cour or by
witness, can not violate the right because it does
not call upon the accused as a witness, it is not
testimonial responsibility
US v. Ong Siu Hong (1917)
 Discharge morphine from his mouth
 Prohibit only testimonial compulsion by oral
examination to extort unwilling confessions
Villaflor v. Summers (1920)
 Pregnancy test
 Limited only against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination—ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible
Beltran v. Samson (1929)
 Take dictation in his own handwriting
 Writing more than moving the body, or the hands,
or the fingers, writing is not purely a mechanical
act, because it required the application of
intelligence and attention
 Compelled to create by writing evidenc e which
does not exist, which may identify him as the
falsifier
Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr (1962)
 Accused in criminal cases may refuse to not only
answer inc riminat ory questions but also to take
the witness stand
 Technically civil proceeding in substance but an
effect a criminal one—t ry and punish persons
charged with commission of public offenses or
public wrong, not redress of private grievance
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (1969)
 Malpractice case
 The nature of the penalty should be considered
(e.g. revocation of license)
Standard Chartered v. Senate (2007)
 They are not indicted as accused in criminal
proceedings but summoned respondent as
resources persons or as witnesses in legislative
inquiry
 Ordinary witness—compelled to take the witness
stand and claim the privilege as each question
required incriminating answer
 Accused—may altogether refus e to take the
witness stand and refuse to answer
SECTION 19
Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment, Excessi ve
Fines
People v. Estoista (1953)
 To be unconstitutional, it should be:
o ―flagrantly or plainly oppressive‖
o ―wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the offenses as to shock the moral sense
of community‖
People v. Echagaray (1997)
 Deat h penalty was not complet ely abolished but
merely suspended and gave Congress the
discretion to review it based on future
circumstances
 Power to re-impose death penalty entails:
o Congress define what is meant by
heinous crime
 By reason of its inherent or
manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity or perversity
is repugnant and outrageous to
the common standards of
decency and morality in a just
and civilized society
o Penalize by death only crimes that qualify
as heinous based on the law or with
qualifying circumstances
o Motivated by ―compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes
SECTION 20
Imprisonment of Debt
Lozano v. Martinez (1986)
 The gravamen of the offense is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check
 Not designed to coerce debtor to pay his debt
SECTION 22
People v. Ferrer (1972)
 Anti-subversion Act
 Bill of attainder—legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial
 It does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines—merely declared it as an organized
conspiracy
 Their guilt still has to be judicially established
 Bill of attainder must also apply retroactively and
reach past conduct
Virata v. Sandiganbayan (1991)
 Not bill of attainder: it is for Sandiganbayan to
determine
 Not ex post facto law: nothing has been altered in
terms of the quantum of proof required for an
adverse judgment against the defendant or a
judgment of conviction against accused
Lacson v. Exec. Secretary (1999)
 Ex post facto law when: (CAPEDCP)
(a)which makes an act done criminal before
the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such
action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed,
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
 (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence
and receives less or different testimony than
the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict
the defendant
(e) Every law which, in relation to the
offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights
and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
 RA 8249 is not a penal law, but substantive law or
jurisdiction, procedural statute
ARTICLE IV
SECTION 1
Children of Filipino fathers and mothers
Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners (1991)
 Gatchalian is a citizen of the Phils at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution
 Res judicata for citizenship cases:
o A person’s citizenship must be raised as
a material issue in a controversy where
said person is a party
o The Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the
resolution thereof
o The finding or citizenship is affirmed by
this Court
Tecson v. COMELEC (2004)
 ―those whose fathers are citizens of
Philippines‖—no distinction as to legitimacy
Paragraph (3)
Co v. Electoral Tribunal (1991)
 Before: those born of Filipino mot hers but alien
fathers who would elect Philippine citizenship who
were not a natural-born
 Election of citizenship: formal or informal
 Participation in suffrage—positive act of election
Republic v. Sagun (2012)
 CA 625 provided for procedure of election of
citizenship
o Statement signed and sworn to by the
party
o Filed with the nearest civil registry
o Oath of allegiance
 Not within ―reasonable time‖—within 3 years
 Cannot assert positive acts since the law clearly
provides for the requirements
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago (1989)
 Such acts constitute, considered together, or
express renunciation of petitioner’s Philippine
citizenship (e.g. passport)
 Phil citizenship is not a commodity to be displayed
when required and suppressed when convenient
Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)
 Citizenship may be reacquired:
o Direct act of Congress
o By naturalization
o By repatriation
 Repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application
o Curative, remedial, creates new rights
 Not dual citizen but stateless during the interim
period
Labo v. COMELEC (1992)
 In the absence of any special action by the proper
authorities, a mere application for repat riation,
does not and cannot amount to automatic
reacquisition of applicant’s citizenship
Mercado v. Manzano (1992)
 Dual citizenship—result of concurrent application
of different laws of 2 or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered national by said states:
INVOLUNTARY
o Filipino parents + born in a state under jus
soli
o Filipino mother + alien fat her if considered
citizen under such laws
o Marry aliens if by the laws of the
husband’s country, the woman is
considered citizen
 Dual allegiance—person simultaneously owes by
some positive acts, loyalty to 2 or more states—
result of an individual’s VOLITION
 The phrase ―dual citizenship‖ in LGC must
the understood as referring to ―dual allegiance‖
o Upon filing of their COC, they elect Phil.
citizenship to terminate their status as
person with dual citizenship
SECTION 2
Bengson v. HRET (2001)
 Repatriation: loss citizenship due to:
o Desertion of the armed forces
o Service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in the WWII
o Service in the armed forces of the US at
any other time
o Marriage of Filipino women
o Political and economic reasons
 Only have to take allegiance and
register t he fact to the civil
registry
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
  Recovery of the original nationality—ret urn to his
original status before his loss of Phil citizenship
SECTION 5
AASJS v. Datumanong (2007)
 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act:
those who lost citizenship
o Before RA 9225—needs only allegiance
o After RA 9225—shall remain citizen
 Allows dual citizenship, not dual allegiance
 Dual citizenship: problem of the foreign country
since the latest oath is allegiance to the
Philippines
ARTICLE V
Macalintal v. COMELEC (2003)
 Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
 An absentee remains attached to his residence in
the Phils as residence is considered s ame as
―domicile‖
 The qualifications of voters as stated in S ec. 1
shall remain except for the residency requirement
 They should not have applied for citizenship in
another country
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC (2006)
 Those who ret ained/ reacquired their citizenship
under RA 9225 may also vote as absentee voters
ARTICLE XIII
SECTION 1
Policy to Remove Inequities
International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing
(2000)
 Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries
 Salary should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires
SECTION 4
Agrarian Reform
Assn of Small Landowners v. Sec. of DAR (1989)
 CARP both police power and eminent domain
o Police power: merely prescribes retention
limits for land owners
o Eminent domain: necessary to carry it out
is to deprive such owners of what ever
lands as they may own in excess of max.
amt allowed
 Not traditional eminent domain, but revolutionary
kind of expropriation
Luz Farms v. Sec. of DAR (1990)
 RA 6657should not include commercial livestock,
poultry and swine raising in the definition of
―commercial farms‖
Hacienda Luisita v. PARC (2011)
 Stock Distribution Option constitutional: allows ―to
own directly or collectively the land they till‖—
allows direct and indirect ownership
 Collective ownership done through medium of
juridical entities composed of farmers becoming
stockholders/ members
 Art. XIII not self-executory
SECTION 10
Urban Land Reform and Housing
People v. Leachon (1998)
 E viction is illegal or unlawful if not done in
accordance wit h law and not in a just and humane
manner
o Due process
o Opportunity to controvert allegations
against him that he is illegal occupant
o Sufficiently notified before the eviction
o No loss of lives, physical injuries or
unnecessary loss of or damage to
properties
 BUT not dependant on existence of a
resettlement area designated by the government
SECTION 17 (4)
Budget (Human Rights)
CHR Employees v. CHR (2006)
 Automatic release is just one of many matters of
fiscal autonomy (freedom from outside control)
 Fiscal autonomy only to: (1) judiciary, (2)
Constitutional Commissions (3) Ombudsman
 Reorganization must be based on S alary
Standardization Law—required DBM approval
SECTION 18
Powers of CHR
Carino v. CHR (1991)
 No adjudicatory powers, only investigatory—
receive evidence and make findings of facts as
regards claimed HR violations involving civil and
political rights
 Not a judicial function like a court of justice
Simon v. CHR (1994)
 6 areas of CHR
o Protection of rights of political detainees
o Treatment of pris oners and the prevention
of tortures
o Fair and public trials
o Case of disappearances
o Salvaging and hamletting
o Other crimes committed against the
religious
 Political rights, civil rights, Congress may provide
for other cases
 The order to desist is not investigatorial in
character but an adjudicative power which it does
not possess
 Social and economic rights not under CHR
JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS
Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)
 ARTICLE XIV

SECTION 1
Natural and Primary Rights of Parents
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
 Prohibition of teaching of other language than
English
 Right of the plaintiff to t each and t he right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children
 No emergency or danger wit h knowing other
language

Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

 Compulsory Education Act
 Unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
to direct the upbringing and education of their
children

Ginsberg v. New York (1968)

 Merely adjusts the definition of obscenity
 The power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches bey ond the scope of its authority
over adults
 2 interests to justify limitations:
o Parent’s claim to authority in their o wn
household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our
society
o State’s interest in the well-being of youth

Quality and Accessibility of Education

DECS v. San Diego (1989)
 NMA T as valid police power to limit the admissios
to medical school only to those who have initially
proved their competence and preparation
 It is for the appropriat e calling that he is entitled to
quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials

SECTION 3
Duty of Institutions
Mirriam College v. CA (2000)
 Academic freedom—freedom to determine:
o Who may teach
o What may be taught
o How it shall be taught
o Who may be admitted to study (includes
whom to expel or suspend)

SECTION 5
Academic Freedom or Institutions of Higher Learning
Garcia v. Faculty Admissions (1975)
 Respondent has no clear duty to admit the
petitioner due to academic freedom

University of San Carlos v. CA (1988)

 Granting honors is part of academic freedom, its
discretion cannot be disturbed by the court unless
there is GAD

JEWELLE ANN LOU P. SANTOS

Ateneo de Manila Law School (1B)
Constitutional Law II (Atty. Ingles)