G.R. No.

142820 (2003)
Quisumbing, J.
Effects of Foreign Judgements or Final Orders

PARTIES:

Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr

Respondents Maria Carmen Rodriguez, Hon. Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga (RTC-Makati)

SUMMARY:

Petitioner Wolfgang and Private Respondent Carmen got married on 1980. In 1996, Carmen filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC-Makati. During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner
obtained a decree of divorce from the CFI of Hamburg-Blankenese. The divorce decree awarded custody of
their two children to petitioner. In view of the said decree, petitioner filed a MTD to the declaration of nullity
case. Respondent judge initially granted the MTD but upon Carmen’s MR, partially reversed such that the
hearing of the case may proceed in so far as the custody to the children may be determined. Hence this appeal
by certiorari by the petitioner. ISSUE: WON respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a
divorce decree from a German court. (NO)

DOCTRINES:

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as
the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court.

In this case, Carmen was not given ample opportunity in the German Court to oppose the award of custody to
their father. The proceedings in the German court were summary. Unlike petitioner who was represented by
two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings

FACTS:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified
on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
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In 1996, Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati City. Husband
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied by the trial court. Petitioner filed an MR which was also
denied.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese.
In this foreign judgement, the custody of the children was awarded to petitioner.

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and Carmen. Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s
motion to dismiss.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and
private respondent.

Respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order granting the second MTD for the
purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their
children. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

WON respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the
present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court. (NO)

RATIO:

ON THE CUSTODY ISSUE:

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as
the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48). In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

As applied in the case: The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The
divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion
to the Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had

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no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner
by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years,
the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending
spouse was.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct
in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education
mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth
Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his
care and custody.

ON THE ISSUE OF PROPERTY RELATIONS:

Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for,
respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in
controversy.

DISPOSITIVE:

RTC Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial
court for continuation of appropriate proceedings.

RECTO v. HARDEN
G.R. No. L-6897 November 29 1956 Concepcion Hermosisima
petitioners Esperanza Harden (appellant)
respondents Claro M Recto (appellee)
summary Mrs. Harden availed of the service of Atty. Recto to protect her share of the conjugal
partnership against dispositions made by her husband James (joke lang, Fred talaga) in
contemplation of the divorce suit she plans to file in California (California! In the
cityyyyyyy). Recto was successful in having the court order that properties alienated be
returned to an account from which Mrs. Harden could get her monthly support as well as
her share in the conjugal partnership after her marriage is dissolved. However, Mrs.
Harden and Mr. Harden suddenly entered into agreements waiving the judgment, which
in the opinion of Atty. Recto were made to defeat his claim for attorney’s fees. Court
agreed with Recto. The court 1st discussed that the Contract of Service is valid because it

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a) does not give Recto a share in the conjugal partnership because it only make the half of
such as basis for his fees and b)[PRIL] it wasn’t entered into so that Recto could obtain
divorce in the PH which is not allowed by our laws. It was merely a contract to protect
Mrs. Harden’s share in the partnership in contemplation of a divorce suit which is allowed
in the US. Moreover, both Mr. and Mrs. Harden are US citizens so the dissolution of their
marriage (according to Article 15 CC) will be governed by US laws, which allows divorce.

4
facts of the case
- Sometime in July 1941, Mrs. Esperanza Harden (Mrs. Harden) and Claro Recto executed
a contract of professional services (Contract of Service), the contents of which are
summarized below:
o She engaged the services of Atty. Recto for the purpose of securing an increase
in the amount of her support from her husband Mr. (James) Harden and for the
purpose of protecting and preserving her right in the properties of the conjugal
partnership, in contemplation of a divorce suit which she intended to file in the
Court of California
o Since she isn’t currently able to pay Recto’s retainer fee she agrees to pay Atty.
Recto
 25% of whatever increase in support she will get from Mr. (James)
Harden
 Attorney’s fees charged as expenses of litigation
 20% of her share and participation which he may receive in the funds and
properties of the conjugal partnership
- In compliance with the contract, Atty. Recto commenced a case in the CFI Manila
entitled “Esperanza Harden v Fred Harden and Jose Salumbides” wherein he prayed that
o Mrs. Harden be given the exclusive administration of all businesses and property
of the conjugal partnership OR that defendants inform Mrs. Harden of
everything pertaining to the businesses and property of the conjugal partnership
o That Mr. Harden account and return to the PH sums of money he withdrew and
sent to HK
o That transfers of shares of stock in the name of 3rd persons and the administrator
Salumbides be cancelled and returned to the conjugal partnership
o That a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant to prevent
them from disposing of the property and businesses of the conjugal partnership
- A writ of preliminary injunction was thus issued by the CFI. Such injunction was modified
upon an agreement of the parties to put up a separate bank account in the Chartered
Bank of India, Australia and China. The funds of the conjugal partnership, as well as
those that will be ordered returned to the conjugal partnership will then be transferred
to such bank account.
- The Japs invaded the PH. After the liberation, records of the case were destroyed. Atty.
Recto then asked that the records be reconstituted. On October 31 1949, the CFI
rendered a decision
o Declaring the value of the conjugal partnership at around P4Million.
o Ordering that a conjugal lien be annotated in the TCT of a parcel of land in QC, of
certain shares of stock, which will say that any alienation of Mr. Harden will be
invalid for lack of consent of Mrs. Harden
o Increasing the allowance of both Mr. and Mrs. Harden to P2500 from the
previous P1500/month
 o Ordering Mr. (James) Harden to inform Mrs. Harden of all property and
businesses belonging to the conjugal partnership
o That a receiver be appointed to prevent Mr. Harden and Salumbides from
disposing of the property despite the writ of preliminary injunction
- Of course Mr. Harden and Salumbides appealed the case. While the appeal was
pending, Atty. Recto filed a manifestation and motion stating that Mrs. Harden
suddenly instructed him to discontinue all proceedings relative to the case above as
well as all judgment obtained, since she executed certain instruments with Mr.
Harden:
o A settlement agreement between Mister and Missus for the sum of P5,000
o That a trust fund was created by Mr. Harden from which a monthly pension of
P500/month would be taken
- According to Atty. Recto, such documents were executed merely to defeat his claim as
attorney’s fees. Thus he prayed in his motion that:
o The receiver appointed continue his functions
o He be declared entitled to the sum of P400,000 a his fees for services rendered
o That the cases above continue since the receivership is based on these cases,
and that such cases are important to safeguard his attorney’ fees
- A commissioner was appointed who reported that Atty. Recto was entitled to 20% of
Mrs. Harden’s share of the conjugal partnership considering the time and effort the
Attorney has given to her case. CFI adopted the finding of the commissioner and found
Atty. Recto entitled to the sum of P384,110. Thus both Mr. and Mrs. Harden appealed
such order to the SC.
- Their arguments are
o That Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership by the said Contract of
Service without Mr. Harden’s consent
o That Article 1491 of the CC prohibits contingent fees
o [TOPIC FOR PRIL] That the Contract of Service has for its purpose securing a
decree of divorce allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352, and 1409 of CC.
o Terms of the said Contract of Service are harsh, inequitable and oppressive

issue
Whether Atty. Recto was entitled to P386K YES

ratio
1st Contention: The Contract of Service does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership
- By virtue of the Contract of Service, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself to pay, by way of
contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives nor
 purports to give to Atty. Recto any right (personal or real) to her aforesaid share in the
partnership. The amount of her share is simply made the basis of computation of Atty.
Recto’s fees
2nd Contention: It has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the
Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by the Philippines’ Cannon of Professional Ethics.
- Moreover, no proof was presented that Atty. Recto wanted to take unfair or
unreasonable advantage of Mrs. Harden

3rd Contention: They are both US citizens, so divorce is allowed

- 1st off, the contract didn’t say that Atty. Recto will procure a divorce or facilitate the
procurement of a divorce. The Contract of Service merely sought to protect Mrs.
Harden’s interest in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she
intends to file in the US.
- Moreover, since both Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly US citizens, their status and
dissolution of their marriage by the laws of the US which sanctions divorce. [pursuant
to Article 9 of the civil code of Spain (which was in force in the PH at the time the
contract of service was executed) and Article 15 CC)
- Thus the contract was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy

4th Contention: One who ask for equity must come with clean hands as well
- In this case, Atty. Recto has won for Mr. Harden P2Million since the conjugal partnership
was found to value around P4M
- After securing such a judgment, it was inconceivable then for Mrs. Harden to waive such
judgment for only $5,000 and $20,000 to be paid in installments. Records also show that
the situation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden has worsened since Mr. Harden already
filed a divorce suit in Joysi (New Jersey) allegedly for repeated acts of infidelity by Mrs.
Harden
- Considering the services rendered and judgment obtained by Atty. Recto for Mrs.
Harden, it isn’t fair to award to him 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership
- Appellants then argue that it was impossible for the lower court to determine an
amount of P386K since the amount of Mr. Harden’s share can only be effected until the
dissolution of the marriage between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. The SC countered that
considering the agreements entered into between Mr. and Mrs. Harden after the
judgment in the CFI (which were made to defeat Atty. Recto’s claim for attorney’s fees),
Mrs. Harden cannot now avail of such conditions.
Tenchavez v. Escano

G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965

FACTS:

Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948,
before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they
were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a
verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of
“Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was
issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California,
had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband,
and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced
their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the affections of their daughter and
influenced her conduct toward her husband.

RULING:

1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under
the Philippine Law.
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.

Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to
which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to
secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute
a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law
on the basis of adultery.

2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce.

A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest
himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a tranger to intermeddle in
such affairs. …A parent is liable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious
conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he
is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives.

Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s independent decisions, certainly cannot be

charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives.
 Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier Jr. v. Alfredo Javier | GR No L-6768 | July 31, 1954

Nature of the Case

Petition for Certiorari on the decision of the CFI granting the P60.00 monthly allowance
for the Petitioner herein.

Facts:

- Salud and Alfredo got married in 1937, solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the
Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of marriage, Junior was already born. Alfredo left
for the US in 1938, and at the time of their marriage Alfredo was already an enlisted
Navy armyman.

- When Alfredo left, Salud moved in with the former’s parents. Due to friction, Salud went
back to her hometown. Eventually the couple’s relations soured, wherein Alfredo filed
an action for divorce against Salud before the Alabaman courts.

- In response to the complaint, Arca alleged that Javier was not a resident of Alabama,
but of Naic, Cavite, and that she alleged that the reason for their separation was that
Alfredo was in the US-Navy, thus leaving her behind in the Philippines, and that he has
always supported them. Their separation was due to physical impossibility (also, the
Civil Code stated that the wife is not bound to live her with her husband if the latter has
gone to marine colonies). Salud then prayed for the complaint for divorce to be
dismissed, contesting the jurisdiction of the Mobile County courts.

Issue: Whether the divorce decree is recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.

Holding: The divorce decree has no valid effect in Philippine jurisdiction

Ratio: In order to determine whether a country has jurisdiction over valid decree of divorce,
plaintiff must have been domiciled in good faith in the State in which it was granted. It is true
that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of
the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as
placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim
of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show
that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be
considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the
court over the case.

It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of
the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce
granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of
the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. It follows that,
to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of
the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and
goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of
remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State.
This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State
of his own domicile. But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court
had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is
not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of
Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by
publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel,
did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. At all times the matrimonial
domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the
State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of
matrimony.

It cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction
over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was
then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile
County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in the service of
the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore
leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that
after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house
and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he
returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since.
It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the intention of
permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the
sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court.

It is a well known principle of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a
foreign judgment, or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental
policy of the State of the  forum. It is also in keeping with our concept or moral values which
has always looked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually crystallized
in a more tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided
to eliminate altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but
react adversely to any attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in
consonance with our customs, morals, and traditions.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470              October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts: 
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established
their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the
petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.

Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. The
divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control
over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116     June 30, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They
lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila
on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter
had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.

Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings.
Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already
issued.

Held:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

Llorente vs CA
GR 124371 November 23, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Divorce

Laws Applicable: Art. 15,  Art. 17, Art. 26 FC

 FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife) ß Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1ST wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)
 Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March
10, 1927 to September 30, 1957
 February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur
 Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home
 November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate
of Naturalization
 1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines, He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente
 December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as Crisologo Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate
and the line for the father’s name was left blank
 Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
 February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was witnessed
by Paula’s father and stepmother to the effect that
1.    all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all
other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended
2.    they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3.    they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their
marital life; and
4.    Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. 
 November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego
 December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final
 January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as
husband and wife and bore 3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
 March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children
 December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia
be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate
 January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive
 January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to
probate
 June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died
  RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzo’s estate
contending that she was the surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate
proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s petition
 divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in
the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is
void
 Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½ conjugal estate
 illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
 RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz Llorente
are not children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles
her to 1/3 of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
 CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination
of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall
proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework
of the Rules of Court.

 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:

o    nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality
o    Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law
 Quita v. Court of Appeals:
o    once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable
 Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.  Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession
to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
 The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by
her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.  We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity.
 Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. 
  Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law.  In fact, the will was duly probated.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the Philippines.

HELD:

YES. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence,
when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.

 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.

Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status
are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be
respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law.

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the
effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

Regarding on the issue of Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected because he is

an alien and is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to
our courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law
must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the will.

Garcia – Recio vs Recio

GR 138322, October 2, 2002

Lessons Applicable: divorce

Laws Applicable: Art. 15 and Art. 26 par. 2 FC

FACTS:
 Grace J. Garcia-Recio (2nd mariage) ----- Rederick A. Recio à Editha Samson (Wife)

 March 1, 1987: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal
 May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
an Australian family court
 June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government
 January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j. Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan City.  Recio
declared himself as "single" and "Filipino."
 October 22, 1995: Recio and Grace J. Garcia ak.a. Garcia-Recio begun to live separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage
 May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided
 March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage  on
the ground of bigamy claiming she only learned of the prior marriage in November,
1997
 Recio prayed in his answer that it be dismissed for no cause of action
 RTC: marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven

HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy

 Divorces:
1.    A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. 
2.    In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
3.    A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it
o    legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned
o    A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself
§  The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country
o    Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
1.    an official publication; or
2.    a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
1.    accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and
2.    authenticated by the seal of his office
 Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him
 In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types:
1.    absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage
2.    limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force
 Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce
o    On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."

ISSUE:

Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal
capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

RULING:

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines,provided it is consistent with the irrespective nation allows.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely ofthe divorce decree is insufficient.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the
consul/embassy of the country where it will be used.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacityto marry
petitionerand thus free him on the groundof bigamy.

CASE DIGEST: ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

AND SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents. (G.R. No. 193902; June 1, 2011).

FACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed
again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of
their marriage was confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree of Divorce.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first
nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the
Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter,
in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their
marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was
blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum
escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and
Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in
the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal
and disbarment from the civil service.

Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold
Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against
Zamoranos before the RTC.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a
decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at
the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?

HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of

judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a
bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
declared that it was the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof. 
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a
Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under
Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman
validly severed their marriage ties.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman,
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are
governed by P.D. No. 1083.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was
governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim
status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the
CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated
the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation
of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs,
traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over
the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and
the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,
entitling one to remarry.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an

Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid,
and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. GRANTED.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization and was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part
of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.

Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s
Office informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists
under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of
1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition
of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according
to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

No, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Republic v. Manalo (Case Digest)
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018  ~ PINGTHINGLAW
Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a
case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011,
was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from
the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce
instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the
former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as
to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also,
even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding
should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since
doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that
even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be
allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals
whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection
clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by
the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and
Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce
proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards
to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly
discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino
family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all
forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The
State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited
to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that
the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven.
Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.