Succession

FULL TEXT CASE_ART. 796

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.  lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx     xxx     xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx     xxx     xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project
of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion
over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 
1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years,
and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning.
Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers
a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
 the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property
in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
 Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of
a question to the same system of law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed
two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-
laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court
of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by herein
private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C.
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed
an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a
will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and
was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on
July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined
and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging
among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury
to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to
verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his
daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the
questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in
her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent
 residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when
alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-
3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in
the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the
United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the
Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of
the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos
Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters
of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of
Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his
opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the
will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured
through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted among
the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that
the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special
proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several
motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice
of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in
the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable
Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the
case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called
for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of
adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order
dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally
has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null
and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament.
Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was
granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes Campos
merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic)
upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests
against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the
hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or
authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way
of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law
especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30
days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the rules of Court.
 3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was
adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to
afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a denial of the due process and a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the
time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court
of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No.
L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to
the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced to
support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means
and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of
the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that
the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion
was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case
and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner
cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of
filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing
the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
(Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the
law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent
judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the
Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
 Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear
the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was
the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is
no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished
the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing.
There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a
motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at
the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled
rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See
Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), took no part.
PCIB vs. Escolin – too long to copy paste.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000

NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, Petitioner, v. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Sharia
District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU
MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO
OMAL MALANG and MABAY GANAP MALANG, Respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the issue of whether or not the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted
marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, P.D.
1083 or Muslim Code). The question is raised in connection with the settlement of the estate of the
deceased husband.

Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons
named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai.
Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry (mahr or majar).
Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two
children when he married for the second time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis,
Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first
wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.

In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji
Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao
and soon they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that place
to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and selling of rice, corn and other
agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga,
Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.

Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia
Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato
City but they were childless. For a living, they relied on farming and on the business of buying and selling
of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City,
some of which were cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut
Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.

On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without
leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City a
petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the
name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.

Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his
three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of
land, five (5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng P. Malang, and a pick-up
jeepney.

On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition.[1 After such
publication[2 or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang (Hadji Mohammad, for brevity),
the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters that
his fathers surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang,
surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e)
oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as Teng Abdula, son; (f) Hadji Ismael
Malindatu Malang, also known as Keto Abdula, son, (g) Fatima Malang, also known as Kueng Malang,
daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad
Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped their
father in his business, then they were more competent to be administrators of his estate.3

On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang, Mabay
Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as their own
the written opposition of Hadji Mohammad.[4

On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued an Order appointing Hadji Mohammad administrator of
his fathers properties outside Cotabato City. The same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael
Malindatu Malang asint administrators of the estate in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required
to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.5 On April 13, 1994, letters of administration were issued
to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the required bond. He took his oath on the same day.[6 The
following day, Hadji Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence, they were
allowed to take their oath as administrators.[7

On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula
had outstanding deposits with nine (9) major banks.[8 Petitioner prayed that the managers of each of
those banks be ordered to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula.9 The
Sharia District Court having granted the motions,[10 Assistant Vice President Rockman O. Sampuha of
United Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding deposit of
Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five hundred twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight
centavos (P1,520,400.48).[11 The Senior Manager of the Cotabato branch of Metrobank also certified
that as of December 18, 1993, Hadji Abdula Malang or Malindatu Malang had on savings deposit the
balance of three hundred seventy-eight thousand four hundred ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos
(P378,493.32).[12 PCIB likewise issued a certification that Hadji Abdula had a balance of eight hundred
fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current account as of August 11, 1994.[13

During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure that required immediate
medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she filed a motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be
allowed to withdraw from UCPB the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that shall
constitute her advance share in the estate of Hadji Abdula.[14 After due hearing, the Sharia District
Court allowed petitioner to withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00).[15

On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court required petitioner and Hadji Ismael asint administrators to
submit an inventory and appraisal of all properties of Hadji Abdula.[16 In compliance therewith, Hadji
Ismael submitted an inventory showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven (7) residential lots
with assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00, an agricultural land with assessed value of
P860.00, three (3) one-storey residential buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential building.[17 All
these properties were declared for taxation purposes in Hadji Abdulas name.

For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji Abdula married to Neng Malang had
seven (7) residential lots with a total assessed value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up
jeepney valued at P30,000.00 and bank deposits.[18

In the Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court, petitioner asserted that all the
properties located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in
accordance with Article 160 of the Civil Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located
outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the decedent.[19

On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that all the properties left by
Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties for various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal
partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim
women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal
partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship.
Second, the decedent adopted a complete separation of property regime in his marital relations; while
his wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedents
properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed funds for the acquisition of such
properties. Third, the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties
is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent was married to four (4)
women. Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties
were titled in the name of the decedent married to Neng Malang because such description is not
conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her
verified petition that the properties belonged to the estate of decedent, she was estopped from
claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because some
of the properties were titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng Malang. Fifth, if it is true that the
properties were conjugal properties, then these should have been registered in the names of both
petitioner and the decedent.[20

In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held
that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because
the latter married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if
there is more than one wife because conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural
marriage or a common-law relationship. The court further found that the decedent was the chief, if not
the sole, breadwinner of his families and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the
other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The description married to Neng Malang in the titles to
the real properties is no more than that -- the description of the relationship between petitioner and the
decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership
of gains. The court stated:

In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the properties in question. To
sustain the contention of the petitioner that the properties are her conjugal property with the decedent
is doing violence to the provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of the marriage of the
petitioner with the decedent, there were already three (3) existing marriages. Assuming for the moment
that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the property regime between them will be governed
by the regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null and void for it is against the law,
public policy, public order, good moral(s) and customs.

Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the
absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract (Article 38,
P.D. 1083). There being no evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it
had begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not conjugal, but rather,
exclusive property of the decedent.[21

Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the
estate of Hadji Abdula and accordingly disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:

1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses in the amount
of P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the amount of P2,040.80;

2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and
in Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be distributed and adjudicated as follows:

a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64 of the estate

b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -

c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -

d) Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang ------------------- 2/64 - do -

e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang-------------------------14/64 - do -

f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------14/64 - do -

g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do -

h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -

i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -

Total------------------------ 64/64

3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang by way of advance be charged
against her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the excess; and

4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition for approval, not
later than three (3) months from receipt of this order.

SO ORDERED.

On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors
objected to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[22 Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.[23 However, on January 19, 1995,
she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal on the strength of the following provisions of
P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from the
Sharia Circuit Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.

Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing an original action of certiorari with the
Supreme Court.[24

On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. She contends that the Sharia District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she
married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo
Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the properties acquired during her marriage
could not be considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said properties are not conjugal because under
Islamic Law, the regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of stipulation
to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other contract.[25

As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code,
under which all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia
Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural
marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and held the applicable property regime to be complete
separation of property under P.D. 1083.

Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is one of first impression ---
this is a singular situation where the issue on what law governs the property regime of a Muslim
marriage celebrated prior to the passage of the Muslim Code has been elevated from a Sharia court for
the Courts resolution --- the Court decided to solicit the opinions of two amici curiae, Justice Ricardo C.
Puno[26 and former Congressman Michael O. Mastura[27. The Court extends its warmest thanks to the
amici curiae for their valuable inputs in their written memoranda[28 and in the hearing of June 27, 2000.

Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates of
birth, death, marriage and divorce are established by the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims
do not register acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil status.[29 It also explains why the evidence
in the instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.

What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the three
which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji Abdula divorced four wives --- namely, Aida, Saaga,
Mayumbai and Sabai --- all divorces of which took place before the enactment of the Muslim Code; and,
Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took effect, survived
by four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and
one with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in force, at some point or other, during the
marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394
(R.A. 394), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969; the
Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.

Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the case is simply
inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. To our mind, any
attempt at this point to dispense with the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us
could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well as cast profound implications on Muslim
families similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein. Justice and accountability dictate a
remand; trial must reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in Congressman Masturas words,
missing links, that would be the bases for judgment and accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve
the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on our part to set out certain
guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent
court.

It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition --- concerning the property regime
applicable to two Muslims married prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was interposed in
relation to the settlement of the estate of the deceased husband. Settlement of estates of Muslims
whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result in the application of the
Civil Code and other personal laws, thus convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the
issue squarely presented and identify such collateral issues as are required to be resolved in a
settlement of estate case. As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts it, the Court does not often
come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a discussion of the
watershed of collateral issues that this case presents.[30

The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present in question form: (1)
What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity
of the Muslim Code? (2) Are multiple marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code
valid? (3) How do the Courts pronouncements in People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs.
Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim
Code? (4) What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple marriages celebrated before
the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim who died after the
Muslim Code and the Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the dissolution of property
regimes in the cases of multiple marriages entered into before the Muslim Code but dissolved (by the
husbands death) after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim divorces effected before
the enactment of the Muslim Code valid?

The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice Puno, are
hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of respondent court, and for the direction of the bench
and bar:

First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim
Code

The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated was during the effectivity of
the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code[31 recognized the
right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that ---

Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be
performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites
shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article
92.

However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or
other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the
President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at
any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to
the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.

Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize
their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law.
The enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of
Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years after the
approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code.

Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the
Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo

Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple
marriages.32 It is also not to be disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.

The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codification[33 of Muslim personal laws,[34 also
provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the
contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;[35
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive opertion of laws.[36 Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively,
and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code --- in
respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.

Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code
contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. Bigamous or polygamous marriages are
considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance.[37 The Family Code which
superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated
before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void.38 These
provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and
that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is subsisting is by no
means countenanced.

Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code
was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only
one valid marriage can exist at any given time.

In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide, since ---

(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three
wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is
approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage
Law[39, which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the
lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide.

In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro
Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the
ground that it was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to
make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it appears that the consent of the
brides father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as Mora Dumpos
father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court
held that such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first
one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.

The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the second marriage contained all
the essential requisites to make it valid, a conviction for bigamy would have prospered. 40

Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the
Muslim Code

This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity of
the marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that
determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the
time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage
relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as
the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some
of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.

Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived
together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired.
Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during the
marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.

Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.

Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.

The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil
Code to require that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry.[41 Situating these
rulings to the instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage,
since from the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the
wives in such marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation
with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively.[42 Absent such proof, however, the
presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage --- and in the Civil
Code, there can only be one validly existing marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property of such
subsisting marriage. 43

With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code are
pertinent:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by theirint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributedintly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of the cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actualint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply toint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties live together as husband and
wife the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife. Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the
Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-
existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their actualint contribution of money, property,
or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose,
89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases are embodied in the second
paragraph of Article 148, which declares that the share of the party validly married to another shall
accrue to the property regime of such existing marriage.

Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes

Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine
the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.

Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into
each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of
the marriage rite.

The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of
conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the
governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code provides:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of
the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Muslim Code, i.e.,
from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code
determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code:

Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of valid
marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child.

Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---

(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy
of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation.

(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two years after the
dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence
shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of access between the parents at or about the
time of the conception of the child.

Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts
another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution
of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born
thereafter, during the latter.

Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is
pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she became aware of her
pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the
court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth.

Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions
on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an
inheritance include:

(a) The husband, the wife;

(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;

(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;

(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.

When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to one-
eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the
estate.[44 The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided
for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.

Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code

R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance
with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to
June 13, 1969.[45 Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to
June 13, 1969.

From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary issues as to further situate
the points of controversy in the instant case for the guidance of the lower court. Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the
succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that
marriage which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing
undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the marriages were celebrated during
the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.

Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame
and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949
to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969. 46

2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the
children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who
are illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the
first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof
or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law.

3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18,
1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following:

a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first corollary issue
are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim
Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death.

b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period
August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided
between the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as
determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence to prove that any of
such property is theirs exclusively.

c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during the
period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership.

d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the
exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.

4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are
Hadji Abdulas legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the
children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force
at the time of Hadji Abdulas death, will govern the determination of their respective shares.

As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety the main,
collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly,
evidence should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages
performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of the dissolutions of the
marriages terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus
indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by the first,
second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact periods of actual
cohabitation (common life under a common roof) of each of the marriages during which time the parties
lived together; (4) the identification of specific properties acquired during each of the periods of
cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of acquisition, indicatingint
or individual effort, thus showing the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5)
the identities of the children (legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the dates of
their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby indicating their
status as lawful heirs.

Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of petitioner to decedent took place
in 1972 the Civil Code is the law applicable on the issue of marriage settlement, 47 but espouses that
customs or established practices among Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of law
to the instant case.[48 Congressman Masturas disquisition has proven extremely helpful in impressing
upon us the background in which Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted, particularly
the interconnectedness of law and religion for Muslims49 and the impracticability of a strict application
of the Civil Code to plural marriages recognized under Muslim law.[50 Regrettably, the Court is duty-
bound to resolve the instant case applying such laws and rights as are in existence at the time the
pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable to supplant governing law with customs, albeit
how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning
the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon one of the spouses death.51

WHEREFORE , the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of Cotabato City
in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is REMANDED for the reception of
additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the
1 

Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
2 

(herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25)
years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. 3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula")
were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in
the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that
7 

his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua
as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for
the father’s name was left blank. 9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a
written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy
as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would
be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their
marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by
counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to
be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no
13 

knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation. 14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five (25)
15 

year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and
their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,
located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties
and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever
and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located
in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in
Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of
the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only
be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age,
if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side
should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my
children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each
one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament." 17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition
for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was
still alive.
19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over
22 

Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that
the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
property.23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary. 24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to
Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888. 25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". 26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to
receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo
having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares
the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to
partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo
Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a
bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within
three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate
which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and
from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of
her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court
and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED." 27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its
earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the
29 

trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third
(1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED." 32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, denied the motion for lack of merit.
34 

Hence, this petition. 35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, the issue is
36 

simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for
ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time
of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign
law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case
was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows
the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. 38

First, there is no such thing as one American law.  The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the
1ªwph!1

Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the
law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the
39 

application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving
Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as
duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
40 

the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
41 

respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from
him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
42 

Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold
43 

that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed
in their execution." (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." 44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's
national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as
VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity
of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the
estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088             July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Sison and Aruego for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will
and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate
left by the deceased is more than P50,000.

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines
and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano,
and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian
who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
(special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio
Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15
October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will
after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence
to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the
will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will
and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63
Phil., 793). In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937
for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the
probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the
surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will
and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and
that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien,
China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will
executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien,
China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).

There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria Natividad
Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of
the transfer or assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B.
Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño and the
subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico
C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in this
proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament executed in the
Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931
and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien province,
Republic of China.

As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no bar
to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.

As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:

No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the
same be established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the
death of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the
lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions
thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and
the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.

The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness,
Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will,
was dead at the time of the hearing of this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that
he was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B.
Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of Alberto Barretto,
Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the attesting witnesses signed
and each of them signed the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the presence
of the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th, 55th and 63rd
interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof (answer to the 11th
interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little
of that language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.)
and all he knows about the contends of the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the
time it was executed (answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-
interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of
the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he
saw in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the
69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B.
Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction" (answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd
interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the
original signed and executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-
interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and
he read the translation (answers to the 67th interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did
not compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-
interrogatories, Id.).

Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio Suntay
she learned that her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was
bringing along with him certain document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our
father Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February
1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document in her presence and of Manuel
and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his
children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and
Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he turned
over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination, she
testifies that she read the part of the will on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir
(pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her father, Go
Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).

Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January
1948), before the last postponement of the hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law
office in the De los Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p.
32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit
A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same
as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).

If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned by
the latter to the former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to
the latter's office straight from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him
to the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.),
then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her brother Apolonio Suntay read the will
sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948), must not be true.

Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest,
still the fact remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1,
542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel
Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination that she
read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony in chief that after Apolonio
had read that part of the will he turned over or handed the document to Manuel who went away (p.
528, t. s. n., Id.).

If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929
when the will was signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to
Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that "after
checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed"
cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the will, because it must have been
corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must have been inserted and
copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the draft
(Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At any rate,
all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because
he came to know or he learned to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from
reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.

Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the
supposed will or the alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviving widow, according to
the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p. 229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness
testified to oppose the appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had
acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her deceased husband but also
in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the original will or
just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired all
the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only child by the second
marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony that under the will the
surviving widow would take two-thirds of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with
Exhibit B and the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict legitime
is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and
the third for free disposal is for the surviving widow and her child Silvino.

Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope
(Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the
testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the
lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses
mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither
competent nor credible witnesses.

On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up two
mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the first will was in his own
handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after
checking up the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel Lopez; that
this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n., hearing of 21
February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the
former asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the
rough draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t.
s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from the
typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the handwritten insertions or additions in lead
pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the first will
made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three months
after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu
Portland Cement in the China Banking Building on Dasmariñas street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel
Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion
they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following words were written: "Testamento de Jose
B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was placed inside the
envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the envelope
was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441, 443,
461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later
part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2,
t. s. n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his law office bringing along with him the
envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee
for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in
his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no
occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).

The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit
A), corroborates the testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose
B. Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as
attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the same assistant fiscal that he
did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting
his own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was
signed. I have to bring that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the
point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides:

When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a
petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the
court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall
so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of
the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the
clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law
of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions
propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in
Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from
the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an
expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse
party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the
municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to
probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in
the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in
our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal
notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the
case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received
by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24
February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened
toe or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all
interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:

ORDER:

SEE BELOW

The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare
that there are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the
court.

Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the
Republic of China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.

HUANG KUANG CHENG

Clerk of Court

CHIANG TENG HWA

Judge

(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance
with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and
recorded by a competent court of this country.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 139868             June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill
(Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to
Richard’s renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 As
administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the
following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili
Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current
account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A,
and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William
Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator
on July 24, 1986.8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard
and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of
Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property,
48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the
¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in
cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated
February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of
Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest);
directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97
to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of
partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard
left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in
accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard,
then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since
Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to
respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in
good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625,
as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession.
Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that
Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the
orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED
and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of
W. Richard Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and
the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated
August 27, 1999.19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that
the CA gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE
WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND
HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE
ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT

COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April
7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the
administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time
and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein
determined," and the same has already been executed.21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware
of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with
Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the
terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents
of the will and how the estate will be divided.22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of
Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to
follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot
stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the
relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition
because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing
entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding
No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in
the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v.
Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be
based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was
obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found
that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good
faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the
national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s
estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to
distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and
Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as
1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint was filed
only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that
she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding
No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another
counsel to protect her interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic
fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s
knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained
of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland
that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against
respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s
discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition
thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse
into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend
the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the
circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993,
clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the
Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to
fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the
effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case
to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the
manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other
words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is
extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of
a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the
highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire
good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of
the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment
which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own,
serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.36

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of
her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During
the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the
time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her
Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s
Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of
Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the
Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the
Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are
her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to
such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as
is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was
duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on
wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally
disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of
the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot
accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply
when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought
to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by
respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large
library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him
to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the
trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to
the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived
her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence
or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a
great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of
Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by
his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The
CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign
law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law
(Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing
principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility
as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey
O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without
saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the
matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey
O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in
distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put
his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx

It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was
prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the
plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached
his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of
duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the
decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the
latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of
the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of
the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon
petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus
is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no
fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no
position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she
realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases
like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived
of their rights.42

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law
of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of
decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold
the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless
a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of
the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on
the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the
general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the
will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is
reasonable under the circumstances".43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s
conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon
Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard
subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of
course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass
to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was
sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice
thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the
law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was
introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for
the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision
of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold
that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925,
can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of
the project of partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before
the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in
disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or
any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law,
then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not
according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
belongs to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect
in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by
word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of
the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and
the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved
in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail
over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the
Guerseys acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit
lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public
utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v.
Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to
American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain,
the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does
not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against
acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV,
Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the
transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now
stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already
passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition
by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of

the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.