You are on page 1of 5

Pt C, Ch 3, Sec 3

SECTION 3 COMPUTER BASED SYSTEMS

1 General requirements 1.4 System reliability

1.1 General 1.4.1 System reliability is to be documented as required in


Ch 3, Sec 1, [2.3.4].
1.1.1 The characteristics of the system are to be compatible
with the intended applications, under normal and abnormal 1.4.2 When used for alarm, safety or control functions, the
process conditions. The response time for alarm function is hardware system design is to be on the fail safe principle.
to be less than 5 seconds.

1.1.2 When systems under control are required to be dupli- 1.5 System failure
cated and in separate compartments, this is also to apply to
control elements within computer based systems. 1.5.1 In the event of failure of part of the system, the
remaining system is to be brought to a downgraded opera-
1.1.3 As a rule, computer based systems intended for ble condition.
essential services are to be type approved.

1.1.4 Programmable electronic systems are to fulfil the 1.5.2 A self-monitoring device is to be implemented so as
requirements of the system under control for all normally to check the proper function of hardware and software in
anticipated operating conditions, taking into account dan- the system. This is to include a self-check facility of input
ger to persons, environmental impact, damage to ship as /output cards, as far as possible.
well as equipment, usability of programmable electronic
systems and operability of non computer devices and sys- 1.5.3 The failure and restarting of computer based systems
tems, etc. should not cause processes to enter undefined or critical
states.
1.1.5 When an alternative design or arrangements deviat-
ing from these requirements are proposed, an engineering
analysis is required to be carried out in accordance with a 1.6 System redundancy
relevant International or National Standard acceptable to
the Society. See also SOLAS Ch II-1/F, Reg. 55. 1.6.1 If it is demonstrated that the failure of the system,
Note 1: As a failure of a category III system may lead to an accident which includes the computer based system, leads to a dis-
with catastrophic severity, the use of unconventional technology ruption of the essential services, a secondary independent
for such applications is only to be permitted exceptionally in cases means, of appropriate diversity, is to be available to restore
where evidence is presented that demonstrates acceptable and reli- the adequate functionality of the service.
able system performance to the satisfaction of the Society.

1.7 System categories


1.2 System type approval
1.2.1 The type approval is to cover the hardware and basic 1.7.1 Programmable electronic systems are to be assigned
software of the system. The type approval requirements are into three system categories as shown in Tab 1 according to
detailed in Ch 3, Sec 6. A list of the documents to be sub- the possible extent of the damage caused by a single failure
mitted is provided in Ch 3, Sec 1. within the programmable electronic systems.
Consideration is to be given to the extent of the damage
1.3 System operation directly caused by a failure, but not to any consequential
damage.
1.3.1 The system is to be protected so that authorised per-
sonnel only can modify any setting which could alter the Identical redundancy is not to be taken into account for the
system. assignment of a system category.

1.3.2 Modification of the configuration, set points or


1.7.2 The assignment of a programmable electronic system
parameters is to be possible without complex operations
to the appropriate system category is to be made according
such as compilation or coded data insertion.
to the greatest likely extent of direct damage. For examples,
1.3.3 Program and data storage of the system is to be see Tab 2.
designed so as not to be altered by environmental condi- Note 1: Where independent effective backup or other means of
tions, as defined in Ch 2, Sec 2, [1], or loss of the power averting danger is provided, the system category III may be
supply. decreased by one category.

112 Bureau Veritas July 2011 with January 2012 amendments


Pt C, Ch 3, Sec 3

Table 1 : System categories

Category Effect System functionality


I Those systems, failure of which will not lead to danger- • Monitoring function for informational/administrative
ous situations for human safety, safety of the ship and/or tasks
threat to the environment
II Those systems, failure of which could eventually lead to • Alarm and monitoring functions
dangerous situations for human safety, safety of the ship • Control functions which are necessary to maintain the
and/or threat to the environment ship in its normal operational and habitable conditions
III Those systems, failure of which could immediately lead • Control functions for maintaining the ship propulsion
to dangerous situations for human safety, safety of the and steering
ship and/or threat to the environment • Safety functions

Table 2 : Examples of assignment 3 Software


to system categories
3.1 General
Category Effect
I Maintenance support systems 3.1.1 The basic software is to be developed in consistent
Information and diagnostic systems and independent modules.
A self-checking function is to be provided to identify failure
II Alarm and monitoring equipment
of software module.
Tank capacity measuring equipment
Control systems for auxiliary machinery When hardware (e.g. input /output devices, communication
Main propulsion remote control systems links, memory, etc.) is arranged to limit the consequences of
Fire detection systems failures, the corresponding software is also to be separated
Fire extinguishing systems in different software modules ensuring the same degree of
Bilge systems independence.
Governors
3.1.2 Computer based systems are to be configured with
III Machinery protection systems / equipment type approved software according to Ch 3, Sec 6, [2.3].
Burner control systems
Electronic fuel injection for diesel engines 3.1.3 Application software is to be tested in accordance
Control systems for propulsion and steering with Ch 3, Sec 6, [3.4].
Synchronising units for switchboards
3.1.4 Loading of software, when necessary, is to be per-
Note 1: The examples listed are not exhaustive. formed in the aided conversational mode.

3.1.5 Software versions are to be solely identified by num-


2 Hardware ber, date or other appropriate means. Modifications are not
to be made without also changing the version identifier. A
2.1 General record of changes is to be maintained and made available
upon request of the Society.

2.1.1 The construction of systems is to comply with the


requirements of Ch 3, Sec 4.
3.2 Software development quality
3.2.1 Software development is to be carried out according
2.2 Housing to a quality plan defined by the builder and records are to
be kept. The standard ISO 9000-1, or equivalent interna-
tional standard, is to be taken as guidance for the quality
2.2.1 The housing of the system is to be designed to face procedure. The quality plan is to include the test procedure
the environmental conditions, as defined in Ch 2, Sec 2, for software and the results of tests are to be documented.
[1], in which it will be installed. The design will be such as
to protect the printed circuit board and associated compo-
4 Data transmission link
nents from external aggression. When required, the cooling
system is to be monitored, and an alarm activated when the
normal temperature is exceeded.
4.1 General
4.1.1 These requirements apply to system categories II and
2.2.2 The mechanical construction is to be designed to III using shared data communication links to transfer data
withstand the vibration levels defined in Ch 2, Sec 2, between distributed programmable electronic equipment or
depending on the applicable environmental condition. systems.

July 2011 with January 2012 amendments Bureau Veritas 113


Pt C, Ch 3, Sec 3

4.1.2 The performance of the network transmission 4.3 Transmission software


medium (transfer rate and time delay) is to be compatible
with the intended application. 4.3.1 The transmission software is to be so designed that
alarm or control data have priority over any other data, and
4.1.3 When the master/slave configuration is installed, the overloading is prevented. For control data, the transmission
master terminal is to be indicated on the other terminals. time is not to jeopardise efficiency of the functions.

4.3.2 The transmission protocol is preferably to be chosen


4.1.4 System self-checking capabilities are to be arranged among international standards.
to initiate transition to the least hazardous state for the com-
plete installation in the event of data communication fail- 4.3.3 A means of transmission control is to be provided
ure. and designed so as to verify the completion of the data
transmitted (CRC or equivalent acceptable method). When
4.1.5 The characteristics of the data communication link corrupted data is detected, the number of retries is to be
are to be such as to transmit that all necessary information limited so as to keep an acceptable global response time.
in adequate time and overloading is prevented. The duration of the message is to be such that it does not
block the transmission of other stations.

4.2 Hardware support


4.4 Transmission operation
4.2.1 Loss of a data communication link is not to affect the 4.4.1 When a hardware or software transmission failure
ability to operate essential services by alternative means. occurs, an alarm is to be activated. A means is to be pro-
vided to verify the activity of transmission and its proper
4.2.2 The data communication link is to be self-checking, function (positive information).
detecting failures on the link itself and data communication
failures on nodes connected to the link. Detected failures 4.5 Redundant network
are to initiate an alarm.
4.5.1 Where two or more essential functions are using the
The data communication link is to be automatically started
same network, redundant networks are required according
when power is turned on, or restarted after loss of power.
to the conditions mentioned in [1.6.1].

4.2.3 Where a single component failure results in loss of 4.5.2 Switching of redundant networks from one to the
data communication, means are to be provided to automat- other is to be achieved without alteration of the perfor-
ically restore data communication. mance.

4.2.4 The choice of transmission cable is to be made 4.5.3 When not in operation, the redundant network is to
according to the environmental conditions. Particular atten- be permanently monitored, so that any failure of either net-
tion is to be given to the level characteristics required for work may be readily detected. When a failure occurs in one
electromagnetic interferences. network, an alarm is to be activated.

4.5.4 In redundant networks, the two networks are to be


4.2.5 The installation of transmission cables is to comply
mutually independent. Failure of any common components
with the requirements stated in Ch 2, Sec 11. In addition,
is not to result in any degradation in performance.
the routing of transmission cables is to be chosen so as to be
in less exposed zones regarding mechanical, chemical or 4.5.5 When redundant data communication links are
EMI damage. As far as possible, the routing of each cable is required, they are to be routed separately, as far as practica-
to be independent of any other cable. These cables are not ble.
normally allowed to be routed in bunches with other cables
on the cable tray.
4.6 Additional requirements for wireless
data links
4.2.6 The coupling devices are to be designed, as far as
practicable, so that in the event of a single fault, they do not 4.6.1 These requirements are in addition to the require-
alter the network function. When a failure occurs, an alarm ments of [4.1] to [4.4] and apply to system category II using
is to be activated. wireless data communication links to transfer data between
Addition of coupling devices is not to alter the network distributed programmable electronic equipment or systems.
function. For system category III, the use of wireless data communica-
tion links is to be in accordance with [1.1.5].
Hardware connecting devices are to be chosen, when pos-
sible, in accordance with international standards. 4.6.2 Functions that are required to operate continuously
to provide essential services dependant on wireless data
When a computer based system is used with a non-essential communication links are to have an alternative means of
system and connected to a network used for essential sys- control that can be brought in action within an acceptable
tems, the coupling device is to be of an approved type. period of time.

114 Bureau Veritas July 2011 with January 2012 amendments


Pt C, Ch 3, Sec 3

4.6.3 Wireless data communication is to employ recogn- The user is to be provided with positive confirmation of
ised international wireless communication system protocols action.
that incorporate the following: Control of essential functions is only to be available at one
a) Message integrity: fault prevention, detection, diagnosis, control station at any time. Failing this, conflicting control
and correction so that the received message is not cor- commands are to be prevented by means of interlocks
rupted or altered when compared to the transmitted and/or warnings.
message
b) Configuration and device authentication: shall only per- 5.3.2 When keys are used for common/important controls,
mit connection of devices that are included in the sys- and several functions are assigned to such keys, the active
tem design function is to be recognisable.
c) Message encryption: protection of the confidentiality If use of a key may have unwanted consequences, provision
and or criticality the data content is to be made to prevent an instruction from being executed
by a single action (e.g. simultaneous use of 2 keys, repeated
d) Security management: protection of network assets, pre- use of a key, etc.).
vention of unauthorised access to network assets.
Means are to be provided to check validity of the manual
4.6.4 The wireless system is to comply with the radio fre- input data into the system (e.g. checking the number of
quency and power level requirements of International Tele- characters, range value, etc.).
communications Union and flag state requirements.
Note 1: Consideration should be given to system operation in the 5.3.3 If use of a push button may have unwanted conse-
event of port state and local regulations that pertain to the use of quences, provision is to be made to prevent an instruction
radio-frequency transmission prohibiting the operation of a wire- from being executed by a single action (e.g. simultaneous
less data communication link due to frequency and power level use of 2 push buttons, repeated use of push buttons, etc.).
restrictions. Alternatively, this push button is to be protected against
accidental activation by a suitable cover, or use of a pull
4.7 Protection against modifications button, if applicable.

4.7.1 Programmable electronic systems of categories II and


5.4 Output devices
III are to be protected against program modification by the
user. 5.4.1 VDU’s (video display units) and other output devices
4.7.2 For systems of category III, modifications of parame- are to be suitably lighted and dimmable when installed in
ters by the manufacturer are to be approved by the Society. the wheelhouse. The adjustment of brightness and colour of
VDU’s is to be limited to a minimum discernable level.
4.7.3 Any modifications made after performance of the When VDU’s are used for alarm purposes, the alarm signal,
tests witnessed by the Society as per item No. 6. of Ch 3, required by the Rules, is to be displayed whatever the other
Sec 6, Tab 2 are to be documented and traceable. information on the screen. The alarms are to be displayed
according to the sequence of occurrence.
5 Man-machine interface When alarms are displayed on a colour VDU, it is to be
possible to distinguish alarm in the event of failure of a pri-
5.1 General mary colour.

5.1.1 The design of the operator interface is to follow ergo- The position of the VDU is to be such as to be easily read-
nomic principles. The standard IEC 60447 Man-machine able from the normal position of the personnel on watch.
interface or equivalent recognised standard may be used. The size of the screen and characters is to be chosen
accordingly.
5.2 System functional indication When several control stations are provided in different
spaces, an indication of the station in control is to be dis-
5.2.1 A means is to be provided to verify the activity of the played at each control station. Transfer of control is to be
system, or subsystem, and its proper function. effected smoothly and without interruption to the service.

5.2.2 A visual and audible alarm is to be activated in the


event of malfunction of the system, or subsystem. This
5.5 Workstations
alarm is to be such that identification of the failure is simpli-
5.5.1 The number of workstations at control stations is to
fied.
be sufficient to ensure that all functions may be provided
with any one unit out of operation, taking into account any
5.3 Input devices functions which are required to be continuously available.
5.3.1 Input devices are to be positioned such that the oper- 5.5.2 Multifunction workstations for control and display
ator has a clear view of the related display. are to be redundant and interchangeable.
The operation of input devices, when installed, is to be log-
ical and correspond to the direction of action of the con- 5.5.3 The choice of colour, graphic symbols, etc. is to be
trolled equipment. consistent in all systems on board.

July 2011 with January 2012 amendments Bureau Veritas 115


Pt C, Ch 3, Sec 3

5.6 Computer dialogue 6.1.4 Alarm messages for essential functions are to have
priority over any other information presented on the display.
5.6.1 The computer dialogue is to be as simple and self-
explanatory as possible.
7 Expert system
The screen content is to be logically structured and show
only what is relevant to the user.
7.1
Menus are to be organised so as to have rapid access to the
most frequently used functions. 7.1.1 The expert system software is not to be implemented
on a computer linked with essential functions.
5.6.2 A means to go back to a safe state is always to be
accessible. 7.1.2 Expert system software is not to be used for direct
5.6.3 A clear warning is to be displayed when using func- control or operation, and needs human validation by per-
tions such as alteration of control condition, or change of sonnel on watch.
data or programs in the memory of the system.
8 System testing
5.6.4 A ‘wait’ indication is to warn the operator when the
system is executing an operation.
8.1
6 Integrated systems 8.1.1 The system tests are to be carried out according to Ch
3, Sec 6.
6.1 General
8.1.2 All alterations of a system (hardware and software)
6.1.1 Operation with an integrated system is to be at least are to be tested and the results of tests documented.
as effective as it would be with individual, stand alone
equipment. 9 System maintenance
6.1.2 Failure of one part (individual module, equipment or
subsystem) of the integrated system is not to affect the func- 9.1 Maintenance
tionality of other parts, except for those functions directly
dependant on information from the defective part. 9.1.1 System maintenance is to be planned and docu-
mented.
6.1.3 A failure in connection between parts, cards connec-
tions or cable connections is not to affect the independent 9.1.2 Remote software maintenance may be considered on
functionality of each connected part. case by case basis.

116 Bureau Veritas July 2011 with January 2012 amendments

You might also like