You are on page 1of 22
SEMIOTEXTIE) FOREIGN AGENTS SERIES Coptigh © 1997 Senior) (Copy ©2007 Senior) As ord a Al sighs reed. No par of thi bok my be sepa ‘teva temo anise by any mean, i, mechanical, pote copying: onling or other, withow pie pein a he publi abs by Semin) 2007 Wine Bh Suv 427, an Ange, CA 90057 Speci thanks Andsew eran, Mak Basu, Jin Bla, Careline Busts, Sade Cae, Jed Eins, Jos Rui Funes Peer Gente, Mary Kal Heid Pais Pal Rabo, Dominique Sead and Nichola Zar. Caner Arty: Googe Pe ‘AMan Oesings Docs, 205, print 2612" 39 94° (Coury of he artis and Mindat aly Longe Design Hedi Kok IsBW-10:158435-0393 ISBN-13:978-1-5845-0392 Dissibated by The MIT Prem, Cambridge, Mas nd Landon, England Pit in th United Sees of Americ, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH Michel Foucault Edited by Sylvére Lotringor Introduction by John Rajchman Translated by Lysa Hochroth & Catherine Porter What is Critique? HENRI GOUMIER: Ladi and Gentlemen, I would Rist like t0 thank Mr. Michel Foucault for having made time ia his busy schedule this yea for thie session, especially since we ae catching ‘him, not the day afer, but only about swo days afer his long ti ‘Japan, This explains why the invitation For this meeting was sather ces. Since Michel Foucault's paper is infact a suprise and, as we can assume, 2 good surprise wll not have you wait any longer for the pleasure to heat MICHEL FOUCAULT: Iehank you very much for having invited me to this meting before this Soci. I believe hat about cen years ago gave a ak here on the subject ented Whar an aucbor® For the isuesbout which I would like speak today, T have no file. Me Goubier hasbeen indulgent enough to say that che eason for this was my wip co Japan. Truly, chis is avery kind ater tion of the ruc, Ls ny, in fac, chat up uni a few days ago, 1 Jha hardly been able wo find ate: or eather cece was one that kept -bauocing me bur that Ids want to choose. You ae going to see ‘why: ie would have been indecent ‘Actually, che question about which I wanted ta speak and about which Tall wane wo speak iss Wha i etigue? I might be worth trying out afew ideas on tis projec thar keeps aking shape, being ‘extended and reborn on the our limite of philosophy very dose to it up agin it, a its expense, in the direction ofa Fase philso- phy and in ies, perhaps, ofall possible philosophy. And i eems thar beeween the high Kansan enterprise and the litle polemical profesional activites chat are called critique, ie seems to me that there has een inthe modern Western word (ating, more o les, empiicaly from the 15th tothe 16th centuries) a certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, cerain relationship to what exists, ‘a whae one knows, to what one dos, rlainship wo sci, 10 culture and also a reatonship to others that we could call, let’ ay the critical atnade. OF cours, you will be surprised ro hear that there is romething ike 2 erica aniude that would be specific ro modern civilization, since there have been so many cvtques, polemics, et, and since even Kant problems presimably have of ns which go back way before the 15th and 16th centutes, One will be surprised eo sce that one eis ro ind nity in this eique, although by is very nacre, by its funtion Iwas going cay. by its profession, ie sem to be condemned to dispecson, dependency and pure heteronomy. Afr al, ettique only eit in relation (0 something othe than el isan instrament, 2 means fora furure ‘or a truth chat ie will not know nor happen to be, it oversees a domain ie would want to police and is unable to regulate. All his ‘means that itis function which s subordinated in relation to what philosophy, science, plies, ethics, lw literature, et, postvely constinte. And at the same time, whatever the pleases oF com penaatons accompanying this curious actvey of equ, i seems that i tacher regula, almos alway, brings noe only some sil bic of ult itclaims to have, buc also hat ici supported by some kind of more general imperative gener sil han ha of eradicating ‘rors. Thee is something in critque which i akin to viree. And ina certain way, wha [wanted to speak to you about i this etal atsicude ae vere in geneal ‘There ae several routes one could take co discus the history of this xtc ast. I would simply like to suggest this one to you, which is one posible route, again, among many others. I will suggest the following variation: the Christian pastoral, or the (Christian church inasmuch asi acted in a precisely and specifically pastoral way, developed this ides—singular and, I believe, quite oreign to anciene culture that each individual, whatever his ge of stars, from the beginning to che end of hs life and in his every action, had to be governed and had ole imal be governed, chat istosay directed towards his lation, by someone to whom he was bound by 4 tor meticulous, deuiled teatonship of obedience. And this salvation oriented operation in a lationship of obedience to someone, has to be made ina triple relationship to che eth: uth understood as dogma, eh also 0 the degree where this entation implie special and indivdualzing knowledge of indi- viduals and finally, in tha this direction i deployed lke a refctve technique comprising general ules, particular knowledge, peceps, methods of examination, confessions, interviews, ete Afterall, we must nt forget what, for cenure, the Greek church called teh techni ad what the Latin Roman church called ars arsum, Ie was precisely the dizerion of conscience the art of governing men. OF ‘course, this ar of governing for long time was linked to reaively limited pracce, even in medicralsocery, to monastic life and cepecaly to the practic of elatvely rected spiel groups. But live that fom the 15th ceneury on and before the Reformation, ‘one can say that cere was veritable explosion of dhe ar of governing men, There was an explosion in wo ways: fis, by displacement in Waist ‘elation to che religious center, es say ifyou wll selrzation, the expansion in iv socery of this theme of che at of governing men. and the methods of doing i; and then, second, the proliferation of ‘this ar of governing into a variry of aeas—hov ro goin children, hhow co govern che poor and beggars, how to govern a fail, a hhous, how ro goveen armies, diferent groups, cites, States and also how ro govern onc’ owe body and mind. How to govern ws, | elieve, one of che Fandamental questions about what ws hap- pening in the 15th or 16h cencuris. Ie is fundamental question ‘hich was answered by the multiplication ofall che are of govern- ing-the ar of pedagogy the art of pois, the arto economics if you wll~and ofall he inmtusions of government, in the wider sense the term government had atthe time. So, this governmentaliztion, which sms 9 me tobe rather characterise ofthese societies in Western Europe in the 16th cen ‘uy, cannoc apparently be disocated fiom the question “how noe to be govemed?” Ido not mean by that that governmentlization, ‘would be oppased in a kind office by the opposite afirmation, “we do not wan tobe governed and we do not want tobe governed call” I mean tha, in thie great preoccupation about the way to ‘govern and the search forthe ways to govern, we deny perpetual ‘question which would be: “how not to be governed lke th, by that in che name of thos principles, with ich and sch an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, nt fo tha, not hy them” And if we accond this movement of gover ‘mentaization ofboth society and individuals che hisoric dimension and breadth which I believe ie has had, it sem that one could approximately locate therein wat we could cll the eral ative, Facing them head on and as eampensation, oF ther, a both partner and adversary o cheats of governing, at an ace of defiance, at 3 challenge, 8 a way of Hiniting dese arts of governing and siing them up, ransforming them, of finding a way to esape from chem ‘ot in any case, a way to displace her, with abasic dscrst, bu also and by the same token, a in of development ofthe at of gov ming, there would have been something born in Europe a that ‘ime, 4 kind of general cultural form, both a poliieal and moral stctude, away of thinking, ce. and which T would very simpy call the arc of not being governed or bese, the ar of ot being governed like dae and a dat cost. I would therefore propa, a: avery ist definition of critique, dis general charsceization: the art of not bing governed quite so much, ‘You will ell me tht this definition is both very general and very ‘vague of uid Well, of course i iat Bur I stil believe that ic may allow us oie some precise poins inherent co what try 0 call the critical atitude. These are historical anchoring points, of course, ‘which we an determine asfllows 1, First anchoring point: during period of ime when governing men was esentally a spiritual art, o an esentally religious prac tice linked to she authority of s Church, ro the prescription of a Scripture, not to wane ro be governed lke chat essentially meant Finding another function for the Scriptures unrelated 10 the teaching of God. Not wanting to be governed wat 3 certain way of efusing, challenging limiting (ay it as you like) ecelsiasticl rule, It meant eecuing to the Scriptures, secking our what was authentic in chem, what war really weiten ia che Seripeures I ‘meant questioning what sort of uth the Seriprures told, gaining acces to this tra ofthe Sexipetes in che Serprures and maybe in spite of what was waicen, co the point of finaly raising the ‘ery simple question: were the Seripeures rue? And, in short, fiom Wylife wo Pierte Bayle, crique developed in part foe the most part, but noe exclusively of course, in relation to the Sripurs. Lee us say that citique i biblical hisorcally. 2. Not to want tobe governed, this isthe second anchoring point. Not to want ro be govemed like that aio means not wanting to accep these laws because they ate unjust because, by vetue of their anciquity or the more or less cheatening ascendancy given ‘hom by todays sovercign, they hide a Fundamental illegitimacy. "Therefore, rom this perspective, confronted with government and the obedience i ipulates, critique means putting forth universal and indefeasible rights to which every government, whatever it may be, whether a monarch, a magistrate, an educator or pater Familias, will have to submit. In brit if you lke, we ind here again the problem of natal law. [Natural law is certainly noe an invention of the Renaisance, but from the 16th century on it rook on acta function that i sill ‘mains to this day. To the question “how not ro be governed?” it answers by saying; "What ae the limits ofthe right wo govern?” Let vs say chat here extgue i baselly loa oe 3. And finaly “to noc 19 want w be governed” is of couse not accepting 38 ve, here Iwill move along quickly, what an autotiy tel you is ru, or tase not accepting i because an authority tel you tht is tue, bat racer accepting it ony if one considers valid the reasons for doing so. And this tim, ertique finds its anchoring poi inthe problem of cerinry in ix conionrsion with autoti. “The Bible, jurisprudence, scence, writing, nature, the relationship ‘to oneself che sovereign hel the authority of dogmatism. One ses how the interplay of goveramentalization and critique has ‘brought abour phenomena which ae, I beiee, of capital impor- tance in the history of Western cleure whether in the development ‘of philological sciences, philosophical thought, Igal analysis or rethodologicl reflections. However, above all, one sees thatthe core of eritque i basically made ofthe bundle of relationships has are tied tone another, or ane to the swo others, power, ruth and the subject. And if governmencalzation is indeed this movement through which individuals are subjugated in che reality of social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere co a ruth, well, thet I wil sy that eitiqu sche movement by which the subject ves himeelehe right 1 question uth om its effects of power and ‘question power on is discourses of truh. Well then critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected inractabilsy. Cetique would esenilly insure the dsubjugation ofthe subject in the contort of what we could all, ina word, che pols of ruth T would have the arrogance to think that this definition, however ‘empirical, approximate and deliciouly ditane its character in ‘elation tothe history it encompasses, is not vey diferent fom the ‘one Kane provided: no co define itque, bur preciely co define something ele. Is 90 very fa oF in face fom the definition he vat giving of che Auflirang Ie is indeed characteristic that in is text fiom 1784, What ithe Auflanag? he defined the Auflirang in elation ro a certain minoriyy condition in whic humanity was ‘maintained and maineined in an auchoritave way. Second, he defined thie minority as characterized by a cern incapacity in hich humanity was mainained, an incapacity 10 we its own tundertanding precisely without something which would be someone ele’ direction, and he uses itn, which has a religous reaning, wel-dfind historically. Third, I think cha ci ling ‘hae Kane defined chs incapacity by 4 certain corelation berween the exercise of an authorey which maintains humanisy in chs minority condion, the corelation beeen this exces af auhority snd, on the other hand, something that he considers, that he ells lack of decision and courage. And consequent, this defiiion of the Aaftirung i not seoply going to be 2 kind of historical and speculative definition, la his definicon ofthe Auftliran, there wll ‘be something which no doube ie may be a ie ridiculous to cll «sermon and yee i is very much ell for courage that he sounds in this description ofthe Auflirang. One should not Forget dat it war a newopaper antic. Ther i enuch wodk tobe done on the tela Vioaship bewven philosophy and journalism from the end ofthe 1th century on, a study... Unless i he already ben done, but 1 as not sure ofthat. I i very interesting to see from what eine ‘on philosophers intervene in newspapers in order to say something that efor them philosophically ivereing and which, nevertbles, is inscribed in a cerain relationship to the public which they inend ‘0 mobile, And finally it ix characeritic that, in thi tet om the Aufairang, Kane precisely gives religion, law and knowledge as examples of maintaining humanity in the minority condition and consequendy a examples of points where che Aline mus i ‘his minority condition and ia some way majorize men. What Kane was describing sche Aufdrang i very mich whac was yng. before to deste a crigu, this cvcl ative which appear af ‘specific atiude inthe Westen world seating with what was hie torical, elev, the grat proces of seit’ governmentalization. And in relation wo this Auftrung (whose moto you know and Kent send us is “per anh," to which Frederick If countered: “Lex chem seson all hey want 103 longs they obey" in any case, in relation o chs Aufleran, how will Kane define evitigue? Os, in any cate, since Tam not attempting to recoup Kant’ entire critical project in ales philosophical rigor. would not allow myself to do so before such an audience of philosophers, ince I myself am nota philosopher and burl ct... erms ofthis Aufelrang how is ‘one ging co ate what is understood by ertque IF Kan actually cals in this whale crcl movement which preceded the Ayflirung, how i one going co situate what fe understands a critique? I will say and dese are completely childish chings, tha i elation tothe Auflirang, in Kans ees, csgue willbe what he i going sy to knowledge do you know up ro wha poine you can know? Reason as much as you want, bu do you reilly know up o what point you ‘an featon without it becoming dangerous? Criique will sy, in shor, cat ie noe so much a mater of what we are undertaking, move of les courageously, than itis the idea we have of our knowledge and its iis. Ou ibery isa stake and consequently instead of letting someone ese say “abe,” i i this point, once fone has gotten an adequate idea of one’s own knowledge and its limits, tha she principle of autonomy can be discovered. One will ‘then no longer ave to hear the bey: or rather, the obey will be founded on autonomy iself Tam not atempting co show the opposition there may be beeween Kant’ analysis ofthe Auflirang and his cial project. think ic would be easy to show thar for Kane hime, this rue courage co know which wat put forward by the Auflirang, eis same courage to know ivolsed recognizing the limit of knowledge. Tr would alo be easy to show that, for Kant, autonomy is nota all, ‘opposed 0 obeying the soverign. Neverthe, in hit atempe ro Aesubjugate the subject in the context of power and tuth, as a prolegomena co the whole presen and furureAufblrung, Kant se forth exique’s primordial responsibly, know knowledge. I would not like rinse any further on the implications ofthiskind ‘of gap beeen Auflarang and sigue that Kant wanted to indicate. | would simply ket insist on this hisovical aspect of the problem whichis suggested ous by whar happened in che 19th century. The hiscory of the 19eh century offered a grower opportunity to pure ‘the crscal enterprise that Kant had in some way sre aa distance from the Auftlarang, than it di for something lke the Auflirang itself In other words, 19th century history~and, of course, 20th centy history even more stem to have to side with Kanto at least provide a concrete hold on this new eiialatvude, chit critical attieude set ack from the Auftlirang, and which Kane had made posible. ‘This historical hold, seemingly forded much more eo Kantian critique chan to the courage ofthe Aufblrung, was charcterined very simply by che fllowing duce basic features first, positivist, science, that isto say, it basically had confidence in ivf, even when ie remained carefully critical cach one ofits tests; second, the development oF State ora state sytem which unified itself as the reason and deep rationlcy of history and which, moreover, selected as ts instruments procedures to rationalize the economy and society and hence, the third feature, this tching together of scientific poscvsm and the development of Sates, a science of the Sate, of a statism, iF you like. A fbeic of sight relationships i ‘woven berwen dem such ha sciences going to ply an incresingly eterminane passin the development of productive forces and, such tha. in addition, stareype power are going tobe increasingly recited through refined sechaiques. Thus, the fact char the 1784 question, Whar i Aufblrung? oF rather the way in which Kant, i terms ofthis question and che answer he gave it tied to situate his ital enterprise thi quesioning shout che eelasionships berween “Aufilirang and Critique i ging (0 legitimately arouse suspicion for in any ease, more and more skeptical questioning: for what cxceses of power, for what governmenclizaton, all the more impossible to evade a itis reasonably justified, i eason not icself Iistoically responsible? ‘Mowcover, I thin thatthe ura of this question was noc exactly the sume in Germany and in France for historical reasons which should be analyze because chy are complex. Roughly one can say this it ies perhaps because ofthe recent evelopment of the bss all-new and rational Sa in Germany than due to a very old attachment of the Universicies co the Wasenschaft and vo administrative and state structures, that theres ‘his suspicion that something in rationalization and maybe even in reason ies responsible for exec of power, well, then! eseems| to me that this suspicion was expecially well-developed in Germany and lec us say co make it shore, cha ie was especially developed ‘within what we could cll the German Lef. In any ease, from the Hegelian Left co the Prankre School there has heen 2 complete critique of postviem, objecivism, rationalization, of techn? and technicalization, a whole eriqu ofthe relationships berween the Fundamental projec of science and echniques whoe objective was to show the connections berwen science’ naive presumptions, on ‘one hand, and the forms of domination characterise ofcontempor rary society on the ater. Ta ite the example presumably the most dlisane from what could be called a Lefiseerique, we should seal hat Husel, in 1936, referred the contemporary tise of aropean humanity to something that invalved the elatioships bbeween knowiedge and technique, from épistm® to tent. In Francs, the conditions for the exerie of philosophy and politcal reflection were very different, And because of thi, the ciique of presumpruous teaon andi specific effets of power do ‘not scem to have been directed in the sme way. And it would be ‘think, aligned with a certain kind of thinking on the Right, ding the 19th and 20th centuties, where one cin agin find tie same bistorcl indictment of son o rationalization in the name ofthe fleas of power that ie cares long with it In any case, the block constinted by the Enlightenment and che Revolution has no doubt prevented usin a general way foe rly and profoundly questioning thie eelaionship berween rationalization and power. Pehaps itis leo because the Reformation, that st say, what believe was very deeply coored, fre critical movement of the att of nor being governed, the fice thatthe Reformation did noc have the sime degree of expansion and success in France as it had in Germany, clesly shows that in France thie notion ofthe Ayflang, wih ll the problems ic posed, was not as widely acceped, and moreover ever became a influential « historia reference a it did in Get ‘any. Let us sy that in France, we were satisfied wich 2 cevain politcal valorization ofthe 18th century philosophers even though Enlightenment thoughe was diquaifed as a minor eptode in che history of philosophy. In Germany, onthe contrary, che Auftlérang ‘was certainly understood, for beter or worst it dest mate, san important episode, sor of briliant manifestation of the profound destination of Weseen reason. Inthe Auftlarang and in the whole petiod thac runs from the IGth ro he 1h century and serves asthe 2) The Panes an | i | reference for this notion of flirang, an arempt was being made to decipher and recognize the most accentuated slope of this line of ‘Western reason whereas i was the polities ro which it was inked that became the object of supiions examination. This i iF you ‘vill, roughly the chasm benween France and Germany in terms of| the way the problem of dhe Aublrang was posed during the 19th and the Bist half ofthe 20eh century. 1 do believe that the station in ance has changed in recent yeas Te scems tome dat in France, in ic, Gust as the problem of| the Aufiirung had been so important in German thought since “Mendelsohn, Kant, through Hegel, Niewsche, Huse the Franke fart Scho, ee...) atest has arrived where precisely his problem | ofthe Auftlarang canbe reapproached in sigaiiant proximity to ‘the work of the Frankfurt School. Let ws say once again to be brie and ic comes as 0 suprse—that the question of what the

You might also like