EDI-Staffbuilders vs NLRC

GR 145587 Oct 26,2007

Facts: Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs). ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to process the documentation
and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia. Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited
by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The faxed letter
stated that if Gran agrees to the terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which was a
monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate
dispatch.
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract that granted
him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. After Gran had been working for about five
months for OAB, his employment was terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter. On July 11, 1994,
Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final pay, and on the same
day, he executed a Declaration releasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994, against ESI/EDI,
OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC,
National Capital Region, Quezon City
Issue:  Whether Gran was not Afforded Due Process
Ruling:No. Gran was not afforded due process. In the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor
laws and regulations shall govern the relationship between Gran and EDI. Thus, our laws and rules
In Agabon v. NLRC, this Court held that:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must
give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes
under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor
and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner of dismissing Gran fell
short of the two notice requirement. While it furnished Gran the written notice informing him of his
dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran the written notice apprising him of the charges against him, as
prescribed by the Labor Code. Consequently, he was denied the opportunity to respond to said notice.
 Phillippine National Construction Corp vs Asiavest Merchant Banker Berhad

Facts: PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an
associate company known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered
into contracts to construct rural roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia.In connection with
this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty
stipulate that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due
performance by PNCC of its construction contracts and the repayment of the temporary advances given
to PNCC.These contracts were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.

There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of
Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. The
Parties entered into a compromise agreement with the State of Pahang by paying the reduced amount of
Malaysian Ringgit.On April 12, 1994, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for
recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on
Malaysian laws. Specifically, it invoked Section 98 of the Malaysian Contracts Act of 1950 and Section
11of the Malaysian Civil Law Act of 1956.

Petitioner contends that under Item 6 of the Malaysian Limitation Act of 1953 (Act 254), "actions founded
on contract or to recover any sum by virtue of any written law shall not be brought after the expiration of
six years from cause of action. It contends that the Complaint was filed on April 13, 1994. Thus, six years
already elapsed from 1988.

Issue: Whether the action was prescribed.

Ruling: Prescription is one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss, but petitioner did not avail itself of this
remedy. Petitioner invokes Malaysian laws on prescription, but it was not able to prove these foreign law
provisions. Our courts follow the doctrine of processual presumption.It is hornbook principle, however,
that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the
doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.

Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law
is the same as ours.The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not
only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.Our provisions on
prescription are found in the Civil Code. Specifically, Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code states that actions
upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the accrual of the right, and not six years.

Strickland vs. Ernst & Young LLP

G.R. No. 193782, August 1, 2018

Facts:Strickland was a partner of Ernst and Young, LLP (“EYLLP”) and was assigned as Lead Due Diligence Partner in the liquidation of National Home Mortgage Financing

Corporation’s (“NHMFC”) Unified Home Lending Program (“UHLP”) in the Philippines,PA, as EYLLP’s Philippine Member. As the parties transactions went awry, Strickland filed a

complaint for sum of money and damages against, among others, EYLLP, PA, NHMFC and for equitable compensation for services rendered as Lead Due Diligence Partner in

relation to the Financial Advisory Services Agreement (“FASA”) with NHMFC.By May 23, 2005, counsel for Strickland wrote PA asking for "equitable compensation for professional

services" rendered to NHMFC on the UHLP Project from the time of his separation from EYLLP and/or EYAPFS in July 2004 "up and through the recent Signing and Closing

Ceremony held on 22 April 2004 and his continued provision of services as the final closing approaches.

In annulling the January 2, 2007 and January 16, 2008 Orders of the RTC, the CA ruled that: (1) EYLLP substantially complied with Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of

Court o setting forth actionable documents in a pleading; (2) the Partnership Agreement indeed contained a valid arbitration clause; and (3) applying processual presumption, albeit

EYLLP failed to prove the applicable foreign law, the dispute between EYLLP and Strickland falls under the category of international commercial arbitration.

Issue: Whether the dispute between Strickland and EYLLP based on Strickland's complaint is arbitrable.

Ruling: Yes. The case have a foreign element involving foreign parties and international transactions, the parties do not question the jurisdiction of our courts to hear and decide the

case. The parties quibble only on whether the dispute between Strickland and EYLLP should be referred to arbitration despite Strickland's alleged causes of action based on tortious

conduct of the parties in refusing to compensate him for services rendered. Moreover, in relation to the other defendants, specifically respondent PA, the issue pertains to the

suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 05-692 pending resolution of the arbitration between Strickland and EYLLP. SC affirmed that commercial relationships covered by our

arbitration laws are purely private and contractual in nature. Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides for autonomy of contracts where the parties are free to stipulate on such terms and

conditions except for those which go against law, morals, and public policy. In our jurisdiction, commercial arbitration is a purely private system of adjudication facilitated by private

citizens which we have consistently recognized as valid, binding, and enforceable.

Thus, SC agree with the CA's ruling on the nature of the contract between Strickland and EYLLP, and its application of our commercial arbitration laws to this case:

x x x "[T]he International Law doctrine of presumed identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded, or, even

if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours."

In this jurisdiction, one of the laws governing arbitration is the [Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)] Act. Under this statute, international commercial arbitration shall be

governed by the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration ("Model Law") adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Meanwhile,

domestic arbitration is governed by the Arbitration Law as amended by the ADR Act.

Nullada vs Civil Registrar of Manila

GR No. 224548

Facts: Marlyn claimed that on July 29, 1997, she and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of Marriage that was issued by the

Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil

Registry Division.The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to

obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan.

Marly sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines, Marlyn filed with the RTC the petition recognizing the divorce obtained by Marlyn and Akira, which was validly

decreed in Japan thus dissolving their marriage, to be likewise valid and effective in Philippine jurisdiction.

RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition.Under the third paragraph of Article 1723 of the New Civil Code is a policy of non-recognition of divorce. For the trial court, the fact that

Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed

a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had validly obtained a divorce.While the intent of the law is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner spouses who are free to marry

again after the divorce, the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of equity behind the law when he or she is an initiator or active participant in procuring the divorce.
Issue:Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her

alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

Ruling: Yes.Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce

must then be sufficiently proved. "Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the

national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which read:Sec.

24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official

publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,

with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy

or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the

record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office. Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose

of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, under the

seal of such court.Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan. This clearly does not

constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan's law on divorce.

Cuartocruz vs Active Works

G.R. No. 209072, July 24, 2019

Facts: On June 4, 2007, Arlene A. Cuartocruz and Cheng Chi Ho, a Hong Kong national, entered into a contract of employment whereby petitioner shall work as the latter's domestic

helper for a period of two years. Petitioner was tasked to do household chores and baby-sitting, among others, for a monthly salary of HK$3,400.00 and other emoluments and

benefits provided under the contract. Respondent Active Works, Inc. (AWI), a Philippine corporation engaged in the recruitment of domestic helpers in Hong Kong, is petitioner's

agency, and respondent Ma. Isabel Hermosa is its Branch Manager.On August 11, 2007, petitioner received a warning letter from her employer, stating that she is required to improve

her attentiveness in performing her work within one month, failing which the letter shall serve as a written notice of the termination of her employment contract effective September 11,

2007. On the same day, petitioner wrote a reply, apologizing for giving false information by stating in her bio-data that she is single when in fact she is a single parent. She also asked

for a chance to improve so she can continue with her work.However, in a letter dated August 16, 2007, Cheng Chi Ho informed the Immigration Department of Wangchai, Hong Kong

that he is terminating the contract with petitioner effective immediately for the following reasons: "disobey order ,unmatch the contract which she submit before and refuse to care my

baby.

The Contention of Active Works, Inc. was that the termination of her employment contract was in accordance with Hong Kong's Employment Ordinance Chapter 57,

Section 9 of which states that "an employer may terminate a contract of employment without notice or payment in lieu x x x if an employee, in relation to his employment x x x wilfully

disobeys a lawful and reasonable order; x x x misconducts himself such conduct being inconsistent with the due and faithful discharge of his duties; x x x is guilty of fraud or

dishonesty."This provision being part of petitioner's employment contract, it must be respected as the law between the parties.

Issue: Whether Hong Kong law governs petitioner's employment contract.

Ruling: Philippine law applies in this case. Although the employment contract is punctuated with provisions referring to Hong Kong law as the applicable law that governs the various

aspects of employment, Hong Kong law was not proved.Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms

and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,

public order or public policy. It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law. The foreign law is treated as a

question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of it. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.Here, respondent
did not prove the pertinent Hong Kong law that governs the contract of employment. Thus, the international law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption

applies. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Consequently, we apply Philippine labor laws in

determining the issues in this case.

Arreza vs Toyo

G.R. No. 213198, July 01, 2019

Facts:Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo, a Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City.After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by

Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi's family register as certified by the Mayor of

Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.

On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.In support of her Petition,

Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's Family Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce.

On February 14, 2014, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment denying Genevieve's Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved that

their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government of Japan,she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan's law.

Petitioner asserts that she submitted in evidence the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication printed "under authorization of the Ministry of Justice. She contends that because it

was printed by a public authority, the Civil Code of Japan is deemed to be an official publication under Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court and, therefore, is a self-

authenticating document that need not be certified under Rule 132, Section 24.

Issue: whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry filed by petitioner Genevieve

Rosal Arreza.

Ruling:No, settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment granting

the divorce, but also the alien spouse's national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.

any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his [or her] claim or defense.44 (Citations
omitted)
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law, purported to be official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of Rule
132, Sections 2445 and 2546 of the Rules of Court:cralawred
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.47
(Citations omitted)
Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25.48
However, it found the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that these documents were not duly authenticated
by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs
 Cadalin vs Poea

G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994

Facts: It appears that the complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on

various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia,

Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the

Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard overseas employment contracts .

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended

Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN &

ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) .The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated

prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary

differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing

prohibited practices.

The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of

Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labor Law for the Private Sector

Issue: WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties

Ruling: Yes. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a

simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater

benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and

beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator

that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.The

overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if

they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the

compensation of the employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation”

therein agree,’ another part of the same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and

custom.”

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines provides: ‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”

We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a

contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including

questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of

the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such

reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a

statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.

Pakistani International Airlines Corp vs Ople

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

Facts: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in

Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig.The

contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as the agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual

consent of the parties, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the

intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary and the agreement shall be construed and governed under and

by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.

On 2 August 1980,PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private

respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b)

of the employment agreement [they had) executed with PIA."On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint for illegal

dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE").

Issue: whether or not the Pakistan Courts have jurisdiction over the matter?

Ruling: No.Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the

agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan". The first

clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-

employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that

the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither

may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties.

Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the

one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially;

private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business)

and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the

above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these

circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by

Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be

presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation

GR 133876 December 29, 1999

Facts: The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a real estate mortgage by the respondent.As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the

Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations. Upon the loan maturity, the

corporation debtor failed to pay and the petitioner bank filed 4 collection cases in the foreign courts (England and Hong Kong) against the corporation debtors. At the same time it also

filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in the office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said was sold in a public auction.

Petitioner contends that the respondent is not made a party on the collection case before the foreign courts for being a third party mortgagor and such actions were filed in foreign

courts and thus decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action is filed in the Philippines to enforce such judgment and that under

the English law which is the law governing in the principal agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil action for sum of money.

The court rendered judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on collection of a sum of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the security of the

mortgages.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of

foreclosure.
Ruling: No.In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly

pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or

internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.Thus,
when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.Additionally,
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.