CASE # 282 :Neri vs.

Senate
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the Senate relating to the
ZTE-NBN mess. However, when probed further on what he and the President
discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”.
In particular, he refused to answer 3 questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to Neri,

requiring him to appear and testify. Neri did not appear before the Committees. As a
result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in contempt and ordered his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE: WON senate contention that the grant of the executive privilege violates the
“Right of the people to information on matters of public concern” is correct

ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it

does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The right of Congress or any
of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the
people’s right to public information. The distinction between such rights is laid down
in Senate v. Ermita: There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to
information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual
citizen.
CASE # 283: AKBAYAN VS AQUINO

Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)

was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Gloria
Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new
chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).”
JPEPA is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as
well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. The complexity of JPEPA
became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on
Trade and Commerce. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy
projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of
environmental and trade activists who raised their very serious concerns about the
country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate
showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with
Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.

HELD: YES. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must
meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. In determining
whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. ‘Public concern’ and ‘public interest’ both embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident
that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its
execution are matters of public concern. Respondents claim that diplomatic negotiations
are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the
right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. 
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right
to information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant
consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. 
CASE # 284: LOVING VS VIRGINIA

FACTS: In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard
Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to
Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's
antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found
guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if
the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).

ISSUE: Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD: Yes. The Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally
"odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose
"independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument
that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and
found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief
Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."
CASE # 285: SSS EMPLOYEE VS. CA

FACTS: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s
demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action
for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging
an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of
the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.  Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case
involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are
covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They
are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners
from striking.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

HELD: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice
provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful
concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides
that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that  may be enacted
by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
CASE # 286: MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS VS LAGUIO, JR.

FACTS: There were mass actions by 800 Public School Teachers which was caused
by the alleged failure of authorities to act upon the teacher’s grievances. Even on Sept.
17,1990, the mass actions continued which was a Monday and a school day. Some of
the teachers who participated in the mass actions did not hold classes that day. The
Secretary of Education filed cases against those teachers who participated in the mass
actions on the grounds of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of
Civil Service Law, absence without official leave and the likes and placed them on a 90-
day preventive suspension.

ISSUE: WON employees in public service prohibited in conducting strikes

HELD: Yes. The SC held that the mass actions held by the teachers shall be considered
strikes because their main purpose was the stoppage of or absence from work.
Employees in public service do not have the right to strike because this constitutes a
disturbance in public service.
CASE # 287: United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) vs Hon. Bienvenido
E. Laguesma

FACTS:   On March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification on behalf of the
route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was
denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore,
ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code.

                Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its

contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code contravenes Article III,
Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:   Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from

forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the
Constitution.

HELD: Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution. The Commission
intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees
and security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar
absolute constitutional rights to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have
been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor is the guarantee of organizational
right in Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union. The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is subject to the
condition that its exercise should be for the purposes “not contrary to law.”  In the case
of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organization.  For the reason that these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes company-
dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.
CASE # 288: City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

FACTS: The City of Manila prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for
the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary
that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because
other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery
would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and
interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled in favor of defendants. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the
right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to
inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of
the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity
for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right
to inquire to.
CASE # 289: MODAY VS. CA

FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur
passed Resolution No. 43-89, “Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition
for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National
Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities. Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal
Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo but Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved commenting that
“expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan
for the establishment of the government center.” The Municipality of Bunawan
subsequently filed a Petition for Eminent Domain against Percival Moday before the
RTC and stated that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary
amount in accordance with the Rules of Court .The Regional Trial Court granted
respondent municipality’s motion to take possession of the land.CA upheld the trial
court. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the
subject property.

ISSUE: whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a

municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: YES. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised
in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It
is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national
legislature the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments,
other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation.
CASE # 290: REPUBLIC VS CASTELLVI

FACTS:  After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken
when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the
essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lessee.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4)
devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.
CASE # 291: CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. JUDGE ERICTA

Facts:

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the regulation of

establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of
the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang
Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is
not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police
power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:

No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation instead of
building or maintaining public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation
requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the
owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust
taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for
the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not
the police power of the state.
CASE # 292: NAPOCOR VS HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON,

FACTS: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued
by respondent judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due
process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way
easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and
transmission line for the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to
landowners affected with the expropriation process. However, both parties did not come
to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the eminent
domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the
expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of
the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, in
compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the
assessed value of said lands with the Philippine National Bank. Respondents land
owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too
low. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional and
ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order
while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order
which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered
petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner
assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent judge hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and
whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due process of law.

HELD: The court ruled upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain proceeding
and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of
the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held
by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge
failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the
petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law.
Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value
of properties without holding any hearing for both parties. There are 2stages in the
action of expropriation: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. 2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by
the Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by
the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)commissioners whose findings
are deemed to be final. Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted.
CASE # 293: NAPOCOR VS. SAN PEDRO

Facts: Petitioner for the construction of its Transmission Line and Tower negotiated with
respondent for an easement of right of way over her property. Respondent executed a
Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. The payment voucher for the residential portion of
the lot valued was then processed. However, the NPC Board of Directors approved
Board Resolution stating that it would pay only for easement over agricultural lands,
adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved. NPC filed a complaint
for eminent domain in the RTC against Maria and other landowners. According to NPC,
in order to construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project it
was necessary to acquire several lots for an easement of right of way. The RTC
rendered judgment, declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation
for the property. NPC appealed the amended decision to the CA, asserting that the
lower court gravely erred in fixing the just compensation for Respondents. the CA
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the CA denied, Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Right of way easement resulting to the deprivation of use of the
property is considered a taking.

Held: Yes, The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property

rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls
within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” While it is true that petitioner only after a
right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that
below said transmission lines. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property;
but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way.”
CASE # 294: U.S VS. CAUSBY

FACTS: Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North
Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used regularly by the United States
military. According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on
his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe
that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the
common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using
this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the
airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government
had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument,
and ordered the government to pay compensation.

ISSUE: Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm
constitute a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

HELD: Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the
Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern
world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid,
"every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited
reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled
that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive
control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a
specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation
of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low,
frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated
Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
CASE # 295: HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES

Fact:  The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated
in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, The defendants filed their respective
Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration, manifestation adopting the
answer.

In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use,
that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property
for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot
be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the
amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since
the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not
the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank,
Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders authorizing
PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of
possession.

Issue: Whether the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in the
taking of private property for the promotion of tourism?

Held: No, petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately
accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The expressions of
national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
Presidential Decree No. 564: 2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent
Domain. — To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation
proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the
following reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development
purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas declared as tourist zones,
(c) acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and
natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose expressly
authorized under this Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent
domain under its own name, which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law
and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation proceedings. The Authority may use
any mode of payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the land
owners: Provided, That in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions and
restrictions set forth in Chapter III, Section 8 to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall
apply.
CASE # 297: SUMULONG VS GUERRERO

Fact: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in
Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-
Balaoing.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived
of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however,
denied.

Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the
constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1224 is violative of the due process clause since “socialized
housing'' for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is not really for a public purpose.

HELD: No. PD 1224 is not violative of the due process clause since “socialized housing''
for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is really for a public purpose.

The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction,
the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: The taking to be
valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into
play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use.
CASE # 297 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS CA

Fact: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Petitioner passed Resolution authorizing

the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion, moved to
dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. The trial court denied the motion and authorized the Petitioner to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court. The trial court
issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990. The San Joaquins filed
a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Petitioner to take possession of their
property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were
denied in the order dated February 1990.

the San Joaquins petitioned before the Court of Appeals which allowed the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents’ lands.It also ordered the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Petitioner shall have
submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.

Issue: Whether the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose
or public use?

Held:  Yes, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public
purpose” or “public use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised.
Under the new concept, “public use” means public advantage, convenience or benefit,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The expropriation of the
property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and
advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center
would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on
agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution.
CASE # 298: MANOSCA VS CA

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI
to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners
moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was
not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a
religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution.

 Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid
and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was
felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking
is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the
constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is.
One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use.
CASE # 299: ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS PEZA

Fact: Respondent initiated before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three
(3) parcels of land in Rosario, Cavite. More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court
upheld the right of respondent to expropriate the land of the petitioner. Reconsideration
of the said order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot would only be
transferred to a private corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
utilized for a public purpose. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the said expropriation is for public purpose.

Held: Yes, the “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as the court has ruled
that the taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The term “public use” has
acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying
strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. the Court has also held that what ultimately emerged is a
concept of public use which is just as abroad as “public welfare.”
CASE # 300: REYES VS NHA

Facts: National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of
Sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the
expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to
accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The
trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of
just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. A few
years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public
purpose for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to
relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection
conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties
remain unoccupied and by entering into a contract for construction of low cost housing.
Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue
of the expropriation judgment and the Expropriated properties should now be returned
to herein petitioners.

Issue:

 Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of
respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a
totally different purpose.

Held:

No, the judgment of expropriation was not forfeited in the light of the failure of the
respondent NHA to use the property for the intended purpose but for a totally different
purpose. The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA and said petitioners
cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by
contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public
use.It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to
traditional purposes.The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with
"public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus,
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use."

CASE # 301: DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS VS GOZUN

FACTS:

This petition for prohibition and mandamus assails the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and of the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into by the Republic of the Philippines and
Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia
and owned by its nationals.  

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company
that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC).

Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and

indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community actually
affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas affected
by the mining activities of CAMC.  

ISSUES:  

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID
BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.  

HELD:

NO.  

The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the
foreign-owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the
specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on
behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to
proceed to fully implement the FTAA.  Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage
since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other than
expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of
the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.  

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and
regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties.
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment
of just compensation.   
CASE # 302: BARANGAY SINDALAN VS CA

FACTS:
On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner
Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain
Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for eminent domain against respondent spouses
Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan.

The subject are parcels of land owned by the spouses and shall be used, when
acquired, as a barangay feeder road for the agricultural and other products of the
residents, and just as inlet for their basic needs. Pending the resolution of the case at
the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value of the
property. The subdivision owner and the barangay captain, who was known to be an
agent of the subdivision, had proposed buying a right-of-way for the subdivision across
a portion of respondent’s property. These prospective buyers, however, never returned
after learning of the price which the respondents ascribed to their property. RTC – SAN
FERNANDO Issued Order of Condemnation. Brgy. Sindalan has a right to take the
property upon payment of just compensation. The COURT OF APPEALS reversed
lower court. Evidence show that Purok Paraiso, which is supposed to benefit from this
expropriation proceeding is in reality Davsan II Subdivision.

ISSUE:

WON the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public
purpose. 

HELD: (NO)

The intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has
not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando,
Pampanga will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of
respondents spouses.

Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot
owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-
of-way for them. However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an
access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive respondents of
their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his
obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is
patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of
an unlawful purpose.

CASE # 303: MANAPAT VS CA

FACTS:

Sometime in the 1960’s, RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace
Park property on condition that they would vacate the premises should the former push
through with the plan to construct a school in the area. The plan, however, did not
materialize, thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later,
as they could not afford RCAM’s proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves
as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc.,
petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into
home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price.

ISSUE:

Is the issue of “genuine necessity” a justiciable question?

RULING:

YES. In Lagcao v. Judge Labra, we declared that the foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. 
As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a
justiciable question.  However, when the power is exercised by the Legislature, the
question of necessity is essentially a political question.

In the instant cases, the authority to expropriate came from Presidential Decree No.
1072, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977.  At that time, and as
explicitly recognized under the 1973 Constitution, President Marcos had legislative
powers.  Perforce, the expropriation of the subject properties – identified with specificity
in the P.D. — was directed by legislation.  The issue of necessity then assumed the
nature of a political question.
CASE # 304: CITY OF MANILA VS ESTRADA

FACTS: The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its
improvements for use in connection with a new market at that time being erected in the
district of Paco. A complaint was filed setting forth the necessary allegations, answer
joined, and commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing the premises and
receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two reports to the court. The
court duly rendered its decision, confirming the majority report as to the improvements,
but reducing the price of the land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority
report, to P15 per square meter. Motions for a new trial having been made by both
parties and denied by the court, both parties appealed from that part of the decision
fixing the value of the land at P15 per square meter. The record was therefore elevated
to this court for a review of the evidence and assigned errors of the parties. This court
held that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land, and rendered its
decision accordingly.

ISSUE: WON P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land taken

HELD: YES. Compensation is defined as an equivalent fir the value of land or property
taken. It is said to be just if it conveys the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property taken is real, substantial, full and ample. The court justifies such action, first,
upon the ground that the great preponderance of the evidence submitted to the
commissioners showed that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land
taken, and, second, upon the power of the court to revise the report of the
commissioners when the amount awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive.

CASE # 305: MANILA RAILROAD VS PAREDES

FACTS:  the Railroad Company entered upon and took possession of a long, narrow
strip of land, running between the municipalities of Pagbilao and Lopez in the Province
of Tayabas, for use as a roadbed for a railroad which it was engaged in building under
its charter. The Railroad Company claims that it took possession of this strip of land with
the consent of the various owners and occupants claiming title thereto, and with the
understanding that it would pay the owners of all the lands thus taken a price to be
agreed upon thereafter, or to be fixed in condemnation proceedings; and that, not
having been able to agree upon a price with the owners of the land, it was later
compelled to institute proceedings for the condemnation of the land thus taken.
Thereafter, the land companies to be the owners and successors in interest of the
original owners of most of the lands in question, entered their appearance as
defendants in the expropriation proceedings, and acting jointly with the various
claimants whose lands had not been acquired by them, procured the appointment of
commissioners for the valuation of these lands. the respondent judge, then presiding in
the court wherein the proceedings were pending, after hearing the parties and
considering the evidence submitted at the hearing, and notwithstanding objection duly
interposed on the ground of his lack of jurisdiction to entertain the motion, issued an
order directing the Railroad Company to increase its deposit to P1,000,000.

ISSUE: whether the state may prescribed a procedure by virtue of which a railway
corporation may secure the possession of the lands it seeks to condemn, pending the
condemnation proceedings, without first paying the owners just compensation therefor,
on condition that it deposit with the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands the value of the
land

HELD: The validity and constitutionality of legislative enactments authorizing taking

immediate possession of lands involved in condemnation proceedings, without first
making compensation therefor, has frequently been challenged. But "According to the
weight of authority if the constitution or statutes do not expressly require it, actual
payment or tender before taking is unnecessary, and it will be sufficient if a certain and
adequate remedy is provided by which the owner can obtain compensation without any
unreasonable delay. According to this view the usual constitutional provision that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation does not require
that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land taken,
and does not prohibit the legislature from authorizing a taking in advance of payment.

CASE # 306: MUNICIPALITY OF DAET VS. CA

Facts:

The judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals, subject of the instant petition to
review on certiorari, "fixing the fair market value of the property sought to be
expropriated at P200.00 per square meter or of Five Hundred Forty three thousand Four
hundred (P543,400.00) pesos, and the value of the improvement thereon at Thirty six
thousand five hundred (P36,500.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, both amounts to bear
legal interest from and after the date of the actual taking of possession by the
Municipality of Daet, Camarines Norte until the full amount is paid, with costs against
plaintiff-appellant," must be affirmed in the light of the unusual, unique and abnormal
circumstances obtaining in this case where the complaint for condemnation was filed on
August 9, 1962 or seventeen(17) years ago but up to the present, the petitioner
Municipality of Daet has failed to make the deposit required to take possession of the
property sought to be expropriated.

Issue:

Whether or not the valuation is just, fair and reasonable.

Ruling:

For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the

government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value as
declared by the owner or administrator or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that laws shall
have only prospective effect. The provisional value of the property in this case having
already been fixed, the deposit on February 9, 1973 of the amount of P54,370.00
representing the assessed value of the land and the deposit on October 21, 1977 of the
amount ofP25,830.00 representing the assessed value of the improvement, both
pursuant to the said decree, are not sufficient. Nevertheless, said amounts should be
deducted from the total amount due to private respondent. To explain and clarify the
judgment of the Court in affirming the decision appealed, the demolition of the building
of private respondent standing on the land by the Municipal Mayor, Engr.Jose P.
Timoner on February 14, 1978 constituted the actual taking of possession of the
property sought to be expropriated by the Municipality of Daet. And from said date,
February 14, 1978, interstate the legal rate shall be paid by the municipality until the full
amount is paid.

CASE # 307: EPZA VS DULAY

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case are where the Mactan
Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private
respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which
these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent
Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by
the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair
and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just

compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in

PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment

to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under
the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree
may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

CASE # 308: MADDUMBA VS GSIS

Facts:
GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties, including a house
and lot. The petitioner participated and submitted his bid. It bid was subject to a down
payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the
remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt of the notice of award or acceptance of the
bid. Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's and cash to
complete the proposal bond. Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered
to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds were
issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland acquired by the Government from him.
However, the GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner
then offered to pay in cash the balance of the required down payment. When the
second monthly installment became due, petitioner sent a letter to the GSIS Board of
Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay with his Land Bank bonds. Petitioner
invoked the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 251. The GSIS Board of Trustees denied petitioner's offer and
"resolved to reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment
only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at maturity." The petitioner asked the
Board to reconsider and them submitted an opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
wherein it was stated that "if the GSIS accepts the Land Bank bonds as payment
thereof, it must accept the same at par or face value.

Issue:
Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 251, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land
Bank bonds at their face value in payment for a residential house and lot purchased by
the bondholder from the GSIS.

Held:
Respondent Government Service Insurance System is ordered to accept the
bonds issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at their par or face value. A
government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is compelled to
accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets. As a matter
of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to
preference. Respondent's arguments disregard the fact that the provisions of
Section 85 are primarily designed to cushion the impact of dispossession. Not
only would there be inconvenience resulting from dispossession itself, but also
from the modes of payment in financing the acquisition of farm lots. Acceptance
of Land Bank bonds, instead of money, undoubtedly involves a certain degree of
 sacrifice for the landowner. “The value of these bonds cannot be diminished by
any direct or indirect act, particularly, since said bonds are fully guaranteed by
the Government of the Philippines.” Respondent cannot rely on the deletion by
Presidential Decree No. 251 of the provision in Section 85 that the bonds shall be
accepted in the amount of their face value, and wrest therefrom an interpretation
in support of its thesis.

CASE # 309: MERALCO VS PINEDA

Facts:

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of Philippines. On October 29, 1974, a complaint
for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants
with the CFI Rizal. The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV
Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs
portions of the land of the private respondents. Despite petitioner's offers to pay
compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to
reach an agreement.

The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and
ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal
presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property
constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just
compensation.

Ruling:

In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination
of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the
parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the
submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent
persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be
taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the
findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons. Moreover, in such
instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court
may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered
from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent
judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent
to determine just compensation.
All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of
determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a
Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due
process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules
of Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.

CASE # 310: NPC VS CA

Facts:

At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat
Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents
blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by
petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam.
Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe
level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in
the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It
further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and
the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near
the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of
damnum absque injuria.

Issues:

Whether or not a notice was sent to the residents

Held:

The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one to be
of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take
precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to
responsible officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated the
warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it
happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which
are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not
receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent
the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their
second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from
liability.

CASE # 311: ANSALDO VS TANTUICO

Fact:   The lots belong to the petitioners are covered by title in their names. These lots
were taken from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Work
Transportation and Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street
and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila. Petitioners wrote to
ask for compensation for their land on January 22, 1973. Their claim was referred to the
Secretary of Justice who in due course rendered an opinion that just compensation
should be paid in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 76. The Decree provided
that the basis for the payment of just compensation of property taken for public use
should be the current and fair market value thereof as declared by the owner or
administrator, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever was
lower. The Secretary of Justice thus advised that the corresponding expropriation suit
be forthwith instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to the Ansaldos.

Pursuant to this opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial
Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos’
property in accordance with PD 76. 6 The new valuation was made, after which the
Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the Ansaldos’ claim to the Auditor
General with the recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the “current
and fair market value, . . . and not on the fair market value at the time of taking.

Issue: Whether the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be

determined as of the time of the taking of the subject land?

Held: Yes which is in 1947. there is a “taking” when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. There is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator enters private property
not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of
devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and
beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is
taking within the Constitutional sense. Under these norms, there was undoubtedly a
taking of the Ansaldos’ property when the Government obtained possession thereof and
converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public use. Clearly, then, the value of the
Ansaldos’ property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken,
and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be
done.

CASE # 312: NAPOCOR VS TIANGCO

Facts:

Herein respondents are the owners of a parcel of land in Rizal and registered in their
names. Petitioner NPC requires the respondents’ aforementioned property, across
which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPC’s
Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through
the respondents’ land. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents,
NPC filed with the RTC a complaint for expropriation against them which the RTC
issued Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of the area
sought to be expropriated. Which RTC subsequently ordered directing NPC to pay and
deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer an amount representing the temporary
provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the possession. The
respondents moved for reconsideration. NPC and the respondents went on appeal to
the CA whereat the separate appeals who modified the decision of the RTC that the
compensation awarded is increased and the reasonable compensation for the
improvements thereon is likewise increased .

Issue: Whether the Just Compensation Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993
valuation?

Held: Neither of the two determinations made by the the CA and RTC is therefore
correct. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s fair
market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, or “that sum of money which a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” The measure is not
the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the
property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city
appraisal committee; these values consist but one factor in the judicial valuation of the
property. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal
criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner
All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

CASE # 313: WYCOCO VS JUDGE CASPILLO

FACTS: Wycoco is the registered owner of unirrigated and untenanted rice land in
Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to the CARP, Wycoco offered to sell his land to DAR. He
rejected the offered price of DAR because it is way too small from what he intended to
be the price of his land. He then filed a case before the RTC for the determination od
just compensation.The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the
compensation for the entire 94.1690 hecatre land at a total of 13,428,082.

ISSUE: WON the just compensation determined by RTC was valid

HELD: No. While market value may be one of the bases if determining just
compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors
to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value. Since these factors were not
considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary.

CASE # 314: MACTAN VS URGELLO

Facts:

            In 1964, respondent Milagros Urgello and Bureau of Air Transportation [BAT],
entered into a compromise agreement (which stemmed from an expropriation case filed
by the CAA) wherein the CAA agreed to purchase Urgello’s Lot to be used in the
expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, subject to the resolutory condition that in
the event that the Republic of the Philippines would no longer use it as an airport, its
title or ownership would revert back to respondent or her heirs upon reimbursement of
the purchase price.

By letter of July 8, 1985, respondent Urgello requested the BAT for the reconveyance to
her Lot. The BAT received the draft, but it did not reconvey the lot, prompting
respondent to file a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages against it before the
RTC of Cebu City. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Urgello. The ruling was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The MCIAA elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.  MCIAA claims that since ATO/BAT never turned over Lot No. 913-E-3 to it, it
cannot be compelled to assume BAT/ATO’s obligation to reconvey the same.

On July 31, 1990, Republic Act No. 6958, the Charter of herein petitioner Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA), was signed into law. R.A. 6958 created the
MCIAA and transferred to it all the assets of the Lahug Airport.

Issue: Has MCIAA assumed ATO’s obligation to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to Urgello by
virtue of RA No. 6958?

Ruling:   Yes. Since respondent’s cause of action against the ATO with regard to Lot
No. 913-E-3 refers to its retention of title thereto despite the occurrence of the resolutory
condition stipulated in the Conditional Deed of Sale, MCIAA’s liability would depend on
whether it is ATO’s successor-in-interest with respect to the said lot.

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6958 is clear, however, that upon its passage, all
existing airport facilities and other properties were thereby transferred to MCIAA

Thus, Republic Act No. 6958 transferred Lot No. 913-E-3 to MCIAA. MCIAA is thus
bound, as ATO’s successor-in-interest, to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3. And it is solidarily
liable with its co-petitioners to pay rentals in arrears over the said lot.
CASE # 315: DE KNETCH VS. BAUTISTA

FACTS: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas boulevard to be ultimately linked to the
Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along
Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways
decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human
Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the
new route which save the government 2 million pesos. The government filed
expropriation proceedings against the owner of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets,
among whom was petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the expropriator can choose any property it wanted

HELD: No, The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or

reason. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature
has delegated a power of eminent do-main, the question of the necessity for taking a
particular fine for the intended improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power
subject however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of
discretion. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or
capriciousness and due process determination as to whether or not the proposed
location was proper in terms of the public interests.
CASE # 316: MANOTOC VS NHA

FACTS:    Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting
Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in
two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners
contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal
protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated
and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without
being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on the other
hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the
legislature or the President through his law-making powers exercises this power, the
public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision.

ISSUE: WON the 2 decrees are unconstitutional and shall be declared null and void

HELD:  The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers
given to the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area
and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No deposit before the taking is required.
There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are
the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the
amount of payments fixed by the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly
declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional.

CASE # 317: REPUBLIC VS DE KNETCH

FACTS: On February 20, 1979 The Republic of the Philippines filed an
expropriation proceeding

 Against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
among them Cristina De Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some fifteen
other defendants ( docketed as Civil Case No. 7001).De Knecht filed a case to
restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied
by the lower court on the ground that the government had already made the required
deposit with the PNB of 10% of the amount of the compensation written in the
complaint. Meanwhile, De knecht filed petition for certiorari and prohibition was granted
setting aside the order to take possession of the property, the SC reversed the lower
court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation
was arbitrary.The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken
despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for
the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has enacted BP P 340
expropriating the same properties for the same purpose.

ISSUE: whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of

this Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

Held: Yes, While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject
becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the
petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation
proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with
the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

CASE # 318: MILITANTE VS CA

Facts: NHA revalidated the demolition clearance to eject the squatters on P’s land. X,
the NHA Project Manager, however, refused to implement the clearance to eject the
squatters. P filed with the Court of Appeals, among other things, a petition for
prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not Militante is entitled to a Writ of Prohibition

Held: No. Prohibition is a prohibitive remedy. It seeks for a judgment ordering the

defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be
illegal. In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that X should be ordered to desist
from relocating the squatters. What petitioner challenges is X’s refusal to implement the
demolition clearance issued by the administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to
discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.

CASE # 319: CITY OF BAGUIO VS NAWASA

Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public
corporation, created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include
within its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is
unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said
water works without just compensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power
and eminent domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file an
answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private
property and cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383
provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works
system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just
compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.

Held: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not
confiscate, destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It
merely directs that all water works belonging to cities, municipalities and
municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is
placing them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting
their efficient management, but in so doing does not confiscate them because
it directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.

The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public
property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a
property of a municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public
use and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.

CASE # 320: ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE VS CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga Del Sur), R.A 3039 was passed providing that, “All buildings, properties,
and assets, belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City
of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of City of Zamboanga”.
Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional
because it deprived the sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school
playgrounds.

ISSUE: WON RA 3039 is unconstitutional

HELD: The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the
properties in dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by
the province in its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use
remain as patrimonial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as
the properties that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its
governmental capacity and thus must retain its public purpose. Hence these
governmental properties need not be paid by the City of Zamboanga. 

With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039
cannot be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial
properties that are not devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall
pay just compensation to the Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial
properties. 
CASE # 321: RUTTER VS ESTEBAN

FACTS:

Rutter sold to Placido a parcel of land through full payment of the half and two
installments of the other half of the agreed amount. The first half was paid then war
came through Japanese occupation. Rutter filed an action to claim to recover the
balance due to the CFI. Esteban set up the defense of moratorium clause embodied in
Republic Act No. 342. The CFI dismissed the case upholding the moratorium of 8 years
had not yet lapsed. In Rutter’s motion, he raised the constitutionality issue for the first
time, but said motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 342 is unconstitutional being violative of the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts (Article
III, Section 1, 1935 Constitution).

HELD:

Yes. R.A. No. 342 was declared unconstitutional. Consistent with what [the Supreme
Court] believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness,
[the Supreme Court] feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances
is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and,
therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect.
CASE # 322: ORTIGAS & CO. VS CA

FACTS:

Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision,
San Juan with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used
exclusively for residential purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a
zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as
commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso
and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed
car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the
Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the
Court of Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD:

Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over
any standing contract. Hence, petition is denied. A law enacted in the exercise of police
power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive
effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation
is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the
superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every
contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme
Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.
CASE # 323: TIRO VS HONTANOSAS

FACTS:

Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Superintendent Tiro because the latter forbade the
former’s collection of salary checks of school teacher from division office, following the
issuance of Circular No. 21 series 1969 by the Director of Public Schools. Zafra sought
to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney and to declare Circular No. 21 as
illegal. The trial court ruled in favor of Zafra. Tiro sought a petition for review and
reversal of trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Circular No. 21 s.1969 is invalid for being violative of the non-
impairment clause under the Constitution.

HELD:

No. The circular is valid and enforceable, and is never invasive of any contract. Petition
is granted. The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher
does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check
belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check,
the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the
Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.
CASE # 324: PRESLEY VS BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

FACTS:

A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was filed
by Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against Teofilo Almendras and
Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendant-appellant Enedina
Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject
house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes and for
non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA. Presley, as lessee of the property, is
the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de Sal Store' located in the same address. At the
time the Almendrases bought their property in question from Makati Development
Corporation, the Deed Restrictions was already annotated in their title providing (among
others) 'that the lot must be used only for residential purpose'

When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan de sal' store, it sent a letter to
the defendants asking them to desist from operating the store.

ISSUE:

Ø  Does the Deed of Restrictions entirely wrong?

HELD:

               

The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the
Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of
the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into
by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner.
However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions
are annotated on the Torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the
legitimate exercise of police power. (Ortigas& Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and
Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 [1979]).
CASE # 325: CALEON VS AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.

FACTS:

Agus Development Corporation leased to Rita Caleon its lot for P180.00/month. Caleon
built a 4-door apartment and sub-leased it at P350.00/door/month without Agus’
consent. Agus’ filed an ejectment suit under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 25 after
Caleon refused to vacate the lot. Caleon argued that B.P. Blg. 25 cannot be applied
because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition on
subleasing. The MTC ruled in favor of Agus. It was appealed to the RTC but was
dismissed outright. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not B.P. Blg. 25 is unconstitutional for being violative of “non-impairment

clause” on the ground that it impaired the lease contract.

HELD:

No. B.P. Blg. 25 is valid and constitutional. The lease contract is subordinate to the
police power of the state. Petition is denied. B.P. Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20
which has been declared by the Supreme Court as police power legislation so that the
applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied. The constitutional guaranty
of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of
police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general
welfare. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.
CASE # 326: MERALCO VS PROVINCE OF LAGUNA

FACTS:

MERALCO was granted a franchise by several municipal councils and the National
Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the
Laguna. Upon enactment of Local Government Code, the provincial government issued
ordinance imposing franchise tax. MERALCO paid under protest and later claims for
refund because of the duplicity with Section 1 of P.D. No. 551. This was denied by the
governor (Joey Lina) relying on a more recent law (LGC). MERALCO filed with the RTC
a complaint for refund, but was dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the imposition of franchise tax under the provincial ordinance is violative
of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and of P.D. 551.

HELD:

No. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause for the same must yield to the
inherent power of the state (taxation). The provincial ordinance is valid and
constitutional. The Local Government Code of 1991 has incorporated and adopted, by
and large, the provisions of the now repealed Local Tax Code. The 1991 Code explicitly
authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding “any exemption granted by any law
or other special law, . . . (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise.” A
franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.   Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution,
like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except under the condition
that such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as
and when the common good so requires.
CASE # 327: MIRANDA VS ARIZONA

FACTS: This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the
defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques
without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation.

On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the
police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a
kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a
written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into
evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the
police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an
attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s
constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request
counsel.

ISSUE: Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their
Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate
the defendants?

Held. Yes. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth

Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation
that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and
their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this
notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in
court.
CASE # 328: PEOPLE VS LUGOD

FACTS: A case of rape with homicide was filed against the accused, Clemente John
Lugod, for allegedly raping the eight-year old victim, Nairube Ramos and dumping her
dead body in the grassy coconut plantation area. On sept. 15,1997 at around 7:00pm,
Helen Ramos, the victim’s mother, was sleep in the house together with her husband
and their children. At around 12:30 am, they noticed that NAirube was gone. The
backdoor of their house was left open where a pair of slippers that did not belong to the
family was found. In the morning, the police began their search and a panty belonging
to the victim was found, as well as a black collared shirt belonging to the accused,
Lugod. Witnesses testified that both slippers and the shirt were worn by LUgod. Lugod
was then brought to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. Although
he admitted to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed NAirube, Lugod refused to make
a statement regarding the same. Four days after, the Vice-Mayor visited the accused in
his cell. In the course of his conversation with Lugod, the latter allegedly confessed to
the commission of the offense. Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. After trial,
Lugod was found guilty and was sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic review.

ISSUE: WON Lugod’s alleged confession can be used against him

HELD: No, the admission of the accused is inadmissible considering that it was made
in violation of the rights of the accused. At the time of his apprehension, accused-
appellant was already placed under arrest and was suspected of having something to
do with the disappearance of the victim which would put him under custodial
investigation. Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to
remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice,
he would be provided with one. Also, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to
waive these rights and even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver
must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel, none of which were present
in the present case.
CASE # 329: PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO

FACTS: The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and
sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony of a
tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which
the suspects used as their getaway vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police
arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of
some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precinct
where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However, this was only subscribed on
May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the
presence of ex-judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through
all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities’ belief that the
accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

ISSUE: WON the mIranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated

HELD: YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course of the
investigation. The court held that the accused should always be apprised of his Miranda
rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of
custodial investigation. In fact, the court included ‘invitations’ by police officers in the
scope of custodial investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited
the accused-appellant to the station he was already considered as the suspect in the
case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an
unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the
crime. However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is
voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.
CASE # 320: PEOPLE VS BOLANOS

FACTS: Accused-appellant was apprehended in connection with a murder case. When

asked by the policemen while in the vehicle on the way to the police station, he admitted
to killing the deceased.

ISSUE(S):Whether or not the extrajudicial admission is admissible in evidence.

HELD:NO. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol
jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been
conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights. Accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED.
CASE # 331: PEOPLE VS MAHINAY

Facts:  Appellant was charged with rape with homicide for the sexual assault and death
of Maria Victoria Chan, 12 years old.  Evidence disclosed that Maria, on that fateful
afternoon, went to the second floor of the house where appellant was staying. 
Appellant pulled her hand and her head hit the table causing her to become
unconscious.  At this stage, appellant, who was then drunk, had sexual intercourse with
her.  He then dumped the still unconscious victim inside the septic tank and thereafter
took flight.  The body of the victim was retrieved the following day wearing only a blouse
without underwear.  Recovered in the unfinished house where accused slept on the
night of the incident was the victim’s pair of shorts, brown belt and yellow hair
ribbon.  Weight was given to appellant’s extrajudicial confession containing details
consistent with the post mortem findings on the victim that she was raped.  The trial
court, notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence relative to the commission of the
crime, rendered judgment of conviction. It based its judgment on circumstantial
evidence.

ISSUE: WON the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in
accordance with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights

HELD: The Court ruled that the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken within the
ambit of the law as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted,
warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and
custodial rights. The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.
CASE # 332: PEOPLE VS JUDGE AYSON

FACTS: Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), was
charged with estafa for irregularities in the sale of plane tickets. Respondent judge
admitted all evidentiary and testamentary evidence offered against Ramos except for
the latter’s handwritten note expressing his willingness to settle the irregularities alleged
against him as well as his statement during an administrative investigation where he
admitted to the offense.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence

the admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under
custodial investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of
the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self- incrimination and
custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial
inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is
taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were
obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted
in court.
CASE # 333: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS SUMILANG

FACTS: An on the spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal audit Division of
OCA, several anomalous transaction were discovered during the time of court
interpreter MAlla, who then resigned when the audit was done. It involved manager’s
check in connection with a civil case which was entrusted to Malla instead of being
handed over to the Clerk of court. Upon further questioning, Malla admitted that she lent
it to steno-reporters, Lagmay, Mercado and Sumilang, and the remaining balance she
used for her husband’s hospitalization and for personal purposes. Later on, she
executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and Mercado borrowed. Judge Sumilang,
Malla, Lagmay and Mercado, court employees of Metropolitan trial court were charged
in a report by the OCA for misappropriating funds. The SC issued a resolution treating
the memorandum as an administrative complaint.

ISSUE: WON Malla’s constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit
before the OCA, where she admitted her misdeed

HELD: No. The constitutional provision under Sec 12, Art 3 of the Constitution may be
invoked only during “custodial investigation. Such investigation is defined as an
“investigation conducted by the police authorities who will include investigation
conducted by the PNP and the NBI and such other police agencies. Thus, the OCA can
hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated in the
constitutional provision. During the investigation, Malla repeated what she basically
stated in her affidavit i.e, that she used a substantial amount for her personal needs.
This effectively refutes whatever pressure and coercion she claims was employed
against her.
CASE # 334: PEOPLE VS UY

FACTS: The accused, Uy et al., public officers being employed by the NAPOCOR, was
charged for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corp.
intended fir the purchase of US dollars from United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) was
indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of malversation through
falsification of commercial documents for conspiring, confederating with the private co-
accused where they falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for the
manager’s check with PNB. Sandiganbayan acquits Uy and Ochoa and is ordered to
pay the equal amount malversed solidarily. Ochoa then appealed, he claims that his
conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript notes of a
supposed interview with appellant NPC personnel and the report of NBI. Appellant
maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Heart Center and
upon assurance it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor
was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit.

ISSUE: WON the constitutional rights of the accused were violated

HELD: No.The decision of Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Considering that his

statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team
and before he was taken into custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry
into an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot claim that he is in police custody because
he was confined at the time at Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC
personnel, not to police authorities. The interview where the sworn statement is based
was conducted by NPC personnel for NPC’s administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a separate proceeding, distinct and independent
from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.
CASE # 335: GAMBOA VS CRUZ

FACTS:

Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police station because of
vagrancy. The next day, the petitioner and with other 5 detainees were ask to line up.
The complainant, meanwhile, during the line up pointed to the petitioner herein as a
suspect of robbery. After that, he was asked to sit in front of the complainant while the
latter is being investigated. An information of robbery has been filed against the herein
petitioner.

During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its evidence. While on
the other hand, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for
his evidence, file a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed this
motion on the ground that the conduct of the line up, without notice, and in the absence
of his counsel violated his constitutional right to counsel and to due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s right to counsel and to due process was violated during
the lineup.

HELD:

No. The Rights to counsel and to due process is protected by the constitution whether it
be 1973 or 1987.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or when the
investigating officers tries to elicit or ask information from the accuse,even though the
questions appeases to be innocent. At this point of stage, the assistance of the counsel
is needed in order to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips fo the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.

When the petitioner was asked to line up with other detainees, he was not asked any
question nor to answer. The police line up is not wart of custodial inquest, hence the
petitioner was not entitled to right to counsel.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to counsel attaches at the start of the
investigation against the respondent, and even before the adversary judicial
proceedings against the accused begins.

While the court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a
police line up, the moment there is a move to elicit admissions or confessions, even a
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said
suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right,
but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of the counsel.

CASE # 336: PEOPLE VS ESCORDIAL

FACTS: The complainant, Michelle Darunday, was blindfolded by the assailant and
began to rape her. Accused then warned the women not to report or else they would be
killed. The complainants told their neighbor and their boarding house owner of what
happened who then told the police. Physical description of the assailant was given and
it was found out that the description fit of that worker in a Coffee Break Corner. The
police arrested the accused without warrant and proceeded to the police station where
he saw the complainant and inadvertently blushed. Complainant then identified him
based on the marks on the neck and matched other physical descriptions. CFI then
ruled that the accused is found guilty of robbery and rape and is sentenced with
maximum penalty of death.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest was valid

HELD; No. The accused-appellant was watching a basketball game when he was
seized therefore he was not: 1) in flagrante delicto; 2) he was not an escaped convict; 3)
the arrest was not after direct consummation of the crime.

CASE # 337: PEOPLE VS PIEDAD

FACTS: Accuses Niel Piedad et al., were charged with murder. Upon arraignment, all
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued thereafter. The trial court
rendered a decision finding Piedad guilty. His conviction was founded upon a testimony
of the widow of the victim identifying Piedad’s group as the suspect in beating up her
husband causing his death. In the instant appeal, Piedad argues that the way that he
was identified by the prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally flawed. Piedad
claims that he should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shriveled in to a
“confrontation” with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by the police as
suspects. He further claims that he was denied his right of counsel during the most
crucial stage of the police investigation-that is, his identification as one of the assailants
by eyewitnesses.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated

HELD: No. Lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process did not violate the
accused-appellants right since accused-appellants were not under custodial
investigation. Accused-appellants did not make any extrajudicial confession or
admission with regard to the crime charged. While defendants may have been
suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less
forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Accused-appellants were not
under custodial investigation. In fact, Piedad averred during cross-examination that the
police never allowed them to say anything at the police station on the day they
voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.

CASE # 338: MAGTOTO VS MANGUERA

FACTS:

Petitioner Clemente Magtoto contended that the confession obtained from a person

under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his
right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with Article
6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution.   Petitioner Magtoto stressed that since
Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution favor the accused it should be given
retroactive effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be given

retrospective effect

HELD:

Supreme Court holds that Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be

given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained
from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been
informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same
had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no
law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.
CASE # 339: PEOPLE VS BANDULA

Facts: The accused was charged of robbery with homicide. During investigation he was

investigated and made an extrajudicial confession during the interrogation in the
absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that he was provided with one in the person
of Atty. Zena, a municipality attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement
admitting the shooting of the victim.

ISSUE: WON the accused was accorded with due process of custodial investigation

HELD: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated since the
authorities failed to provide him counsel during the interrogation and he was not
informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel. Furthermore, the counsel to
be provided to the accused should be one who is impartial, independent and of his own
choice. If the accused cannot afford to have his own counsel the he will be provided by
the authorities with one. Providing the accused with municipality attorney as counsel
would be prejudicial because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of duty of
said counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure to meet the
requisites of due process for conducting custodial investigation.

CASE 340: PEOPLE VS QUIDATO

FACTS:

Accused Bernardo Quidato Jr was accused of parricide.  He and two co-conspirators

allegedly attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and stab the victim, Bernardo Quidato
Sr., appellant’s father and namesake, which caused the victim’s untimely demise. 

Among those presented as witness were accused’s wife and brother.  Also presented
were the extrajudicial confessions of appellant’s two other co-accused.  Appellant’s wife
testified that while the accused were drinking tuba she overheard them saying that they
were planning to go to the victim’s house on the night of the incident in order to “get
money” and that she had no idea of what later transpired. Appellant objected to his
wife’s testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on marital disqualification.  Appellant
likewise denies the allegations of his co-accused who in their extrajudicial confession
pointed to the participation of appellant.

ISSUE : Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions should be given credence as they
were obtained in violation of the constitutional right of appellant to confront witnesses.

HELD:
NO. They should not be given credence, and indeed, appellant should be
acquitted.  The prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-accused’s
affidavits.  However, the failure to present the affiants in the witness stand gives these
affidavits the character of hearsay.  It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants
themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the
affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay.
“The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in
evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to
hear him testify and cross-examine him.”

Section 30, Rule 130 is not applicable in this case because it refers to confessions
made during the existence of the conspiracy.  In this case, the conspiracy had clearly
ended by the time the confession was made.
Given the inadmissibility of accused’s wife’s testimony and the extrajudicial confession
of co-accused, the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.

CASE # 341: PEOPLE VS JANUARIO

FACTS: Defendants were charged in violation of RA 6539 otherwise known as the

Anti-Carnapping Law. During their custodial investigation led by NBI, defendants stated
what ascribed during the carnapping incident including their confession of guilt in the
presence of their apparent counsel, Atty. Saunar, who was then an applicant for a
position in the NBI.

ISSUE:WON the extrajudicial confessions of defendants admissible as evidence

HELD: No. Atty Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation
counsel. Even if he can be considered as competent counsel, he is not independent
because at that time, he was applying for a position of the NBI, so his loyalty would not
be to the accused but to NBI. Therefore, Atty Saunar is not an independent counsel so
confessions of defendants are inadmissible as evidence. For an admission of facts
related to a crime must be obtained with assistance of independent and competent
counsel.
CASE # 342: PEOPLE VS LABTAN

FACTS:

ISSUE: WON the sworn statement executed by the accused Feliciano in the absence of
a competent counsel of his choice, is admissible in evidence

HELD: No. Accused-appellant had been denied of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel when he was questioned by the police officer without having been
apprised by his right to counsel.

CASE # 343: PEOPLE VS SAMUS

FACTS: The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty. The accused contend that he was forced by the
CIS to admit the killing of the victims and the sale of jewelry by means of torture and
threat. He also testified that he was forced to execute a document admitting the killing.
He was forced to sign said document. He did not know Atty. Juliano and did not talk to
him. Accused claims that his alleged confession to the media while in police custody
cannot be admitted in evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings, the
turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of Pontaos and Bitos, relative thereto should
be excluded for being fruits of the poisonous tree.

ISSUE: WON uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible

HELD: While it is true that the confessions of appellant were made without benefit of
counsel, they are still admissible in evidence because of appellants failure to make
timely objections before the trial court. If only the defense had proffered them on time,
the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to
support its case. To disregard a major portion of the prosecutions case at a late stage
during an appeal goes against the norms of fundamental fairness. Indeed, justice is
dispensed not only for the accused, but also for the prosecution. Be that as it may, and
even if we now affirm appellants conviction for murder, we do not, however agree with
the trial courts imposition of the death sentence, because the proven aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the Information.

CASE # 344: PEOPLE VS TOMAQUIN

FACTS: Elizar Tomaquin was found by the lower court guilty of the crime of murder
beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner avers that the trial court erred when it convict him
on the basis of his uncounselled confession. The court is confronted with the issue of
the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession. This appeal particularly involves the
question whether a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be considered an
independent counsel within the purview of Art 3 Sec 12 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be considered an independent

and competent counsel

HELD: No. considering atty. Parawan’s roles as a barangay captain was a

peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of
providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of commiting a
crime in his jurisdiction, Atty Parawan could not be considered as an independent
counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the
constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one
who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any intervening conflict
interest. The court cannot imagine how atty Parawan could have effectively
safeguarded appellant’s rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself
entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he
would want appellant to admit having committed it.

CASE # 345: PEOPLE VS BAGNATE

FACTS: Amado Bagnate was found guilty of murder for killing his grandmother, Aurea
Brona and rape with homicide for killing and raping his niece, Rosalie Rayala. Accused
was convicted on the strength of his extra- judicial confession. Appellant claims that
Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and independent counsel as he failed to advise
him of the penalty to be imposed on the crimes he was accused of committing; hence,
he was not aware of the consequences of his admissions.

ISSUE: W/N extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is admissible as evidence.

RULING: Yes. To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be

express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and
competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be continuously
assisted by counsel from the very start thereof. The presence of counsel is intended to
secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession, and the assistance given must
be independent and competent, that is, providing full protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused. The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the
imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down
appellant’s extrajudicial confession. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a
counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed.
Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent
just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime
he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to
the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime.

CASE # 346: PEOPLE VS GALLARDO

FACTS: On August 18, 1991, elements of the Tuguegarao Police Station went to
Camalaniugan to fetch accused Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna who were
detained at the Camalaniugan Municipal Jail in connection with other criminal cases.
These two accused were brought to the Tuguegarao Police Station to be questioned on
the killing of Edmundo Orizal. Arriving in Tuguegarao the same day, Investigator Isidro
Marcos investigated said accused and took their statements at the Tuguegarao Police
Station. The investigator, however, did not inform them of their constitutional rights.

ISSUE: WON extrajudicial confessions may be used as evidence against the accused

HELD: Yes. Under the rules laid by the constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a a
confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: 1)
the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express: and 4) the
confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with.

IIIIIDNSNMDS

CASE # 347: PEOPLE VS BARASINA

FACTS: Appellant was charged with murder. Having stated his desire to have a lawyer
before giving his statement, Atty. Torres was fetched to act as counsel of the accused
during the investigation. Said counsel was present when appellant made and signed his
written statement.

ISSUE: WON appellant’s statement may not be admitted in evidence for having been
made without the presence of a counsel of his own choice

HELD: No. Art. 3, Sec 12 of the Consti does not convey the message that the choice of
a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were
otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
Petition is dismissed.

CASE # 348: PEOPLE VS MORIAL

FACTS:

Facts:

On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of

the investigation and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial
were asked several questions by the policemen and were invited to the police station for
continuing investigation. They were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later
interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in the morning.
That investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by
Leandro that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With
the latter’s consent, his statements were reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then
advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a counsel, whatever will be his
answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a
lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the
former and he first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After
Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against him
as evidence in court, the investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the
presence of the counsel. After “all the material points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked
the investigator if he can leave due to very important engagement. The latter agreed to
the lawyer’s request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing
to answer questions in his absence, the latter agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s
absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the investigation and propounded several
more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.

Issue:
Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.

Ruling:

Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the

custodial investigation; therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence against him and his other co-accused. The Court stressed out that an accused
under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the
very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left after
Leonardo had admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can
Atty. Aguilar rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material
points”, referring to the participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid
since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last
paragraph of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted.”

Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during

the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent
was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent.
Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless
the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no
such written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.

CASE # 349: PEOPLE VS ANDAN

FACTS: Accused-appellant and two other suspects were rounded up in connection

with a rape with homicide case. In the presence of the mayor, the police,
representatives of the media and appellant’s own wife and son, appellant confessed his
guilt, disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where
he hid her bags. The confession was captured on videotape.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant’s extrajudicial oral confession unassisted by a counsel

is admissible in evidence

HELD: Yes. The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a

spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in
an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.
What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. Appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. His confessions to the media were made in response to
questions by news reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Decision
of lower court is affirmed. Accused-appellant is convicted of the special complex crime
of rape with homicide.

CASE # 350: PEOPLE VS ENDINO

FACTS: The crime of murder was charged against accused Endino and accused-
appellant Galgarin. Galgarin was arrested and convicted for the crime of murder
qualified by treachery, while on the other hand Endino remained at large.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in admitting accused-appelant‘s videotaped

confession as evidence against him

HELD: Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on

video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial
investigation, as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.

CASE # 351: PEOPLE VS ORDONO

The 2 accused were convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide
attended with conspiracy on the bases of their extra judicial confession.  An interview
with a radio announcer was also done where the 2 accused accepted responsibility for
the crime.  They now assail their conviction as their confession was attended by
infirmities’ i.e. mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation.

ISSUE: WON the confessions is inadmissible in evidence due to the lack

of counsel assistance during custodial investigation

HELD:

The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession inadmissible.  The
presence of the mayor, municipal judge and the family of the accused during the
confession did not cure the defect.  However, statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to a news reporter on televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence.  By analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio
announcer should likewise be held admissible.  The interview was not in the nature of
an investigation, and thus, the uncounselled confession did not violate accused’s
constitutional rights.