[G.R. No. 122092.

 May 19, 1999]

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO G.

SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA,
FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO,
CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V.
VILLAMIL, petitioners, vs. JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the
SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails
to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latters witnesses, or where the witnesses
testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck down.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant No.
799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 104, of Quezon City;[2] and (2) the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction
against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist from proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution,[3] this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the respondents to
comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic Management Command filed its
31-page Opposition[4] to the Petition, together with 90 pages of annexes. [5] On February 22, 1996, the Office of
the Solicitor General filed its Comment[6]agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After
petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5, 1997
Resolution,[7] required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the public
respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, [8] the Court in its September 24,
1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the required
memorandum. In view of Daceras manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive
the records of the case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the Special
Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty days from
notice; otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for decision. [9] Even after the expiration of the said
period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOUs refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a waiver of
its privilege to do so.

The Facts

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the
said RTC of Quezon City, stating:[10]

1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in
possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the
offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which xxx are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.

2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this
Honorable Court the following described properties:

'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI
submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38
revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten
(10) handgrenades.'
 Attached to the application[11] were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Morito,[12] as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe
Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested
search warrant,[13] the pertinent portion of which reads:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that
there is probable cause to believe that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President
Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:

Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56

Ten (10) M14 US rifles
Two (2) AK-47 rifle[s]
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]
Ten (10) cal 38 revolver[s]
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
Ten (10) handgrenades

in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives), and the
same should be seized and brought before this Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and]
4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to seize and bring the articles above-described and make an
immediate return there[of][14]

On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized the
following:[15]

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco

02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco
03 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco
04 M16 Rifle 5.56 Defaced Elisco
05 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco
06 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco
07 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco
08 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco
09 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco
10 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco
11 M16 Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco
12 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco
13 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco
(With pending
case-Casaway Case)
14 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 171754 Elisco
15 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco
16 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco
17 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco
18 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174637 (Tampered) Elisco
19 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco
20 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco

01 M14Rifle 7.62 1499694 Elisco
02 M14Rifle 7.62 889163 Elisco

01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal
01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin
02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin
01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield
02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade
(Paltik)
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.

02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.
03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.
04 BAR 19 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01 M16 2,023 rounds
03 Carbine M1 276 rounds
04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds
05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds
06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds
07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.

AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01. M16 Rifle 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.

02. Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01. M16 (short) 3 pcs.

02. M16 (long) 1 pc.
03. M14 8 pcs.
04. Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.
05. Mag Assy. Cal .22 1 pc.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01. M16 73 rounds
02. M14 160 rounds
03. M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds
04. Rifle Grenade 1 round

MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01. M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco

02. M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco
03. M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco
04. Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec
Pistol
05. Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)
Shotguns

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01. M16 (long) 3 pcs.

02. M16 (short) 4 pcs.
03. Intratec 1 pc.
04. US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01. M16 147 rds.
02. Cal. 30 5 rounds
03. 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds
04. Carbine 5 rounds
05. Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds
06. 9MM 30 rounds

NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND

01. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor
02. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor
03. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor
04. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor
05. Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor
06. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor
07. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor
08. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor
09. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor
10. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor
11. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor
12. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor
13. Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor
14. Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB
15. Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB
16. Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not Indicated

LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01. 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.

02. M16 2,349 rds.

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

01. Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.

02. Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs.
03. M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.
04. M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.
05. Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.
06. Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.
07. BAR (defective) 2 pcs.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash[16] before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash
and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.[17]
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. [18] On
August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order [19] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[20]
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause: [21]

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded
his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause [has] not xxx been sufficiently
established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general warrant.

II

Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded
his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or
implemented.

III

Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of discretion or
exceeding his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized
evidence.
 In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we shall also
discuss respondents argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual questions.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions

In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact,
which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition merely assails the
factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its implementation. [22]
This argument is not convincing. It is settled that there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or the falsity of alleged facts. [23] In the present case, petitioners do not question the truth of the facts as
found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at, a procedure which
they contend was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only
questions of law, which may be resolved in the present case.

Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant

The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic conditions for the
issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
[24]
 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.

More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce
are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.[25] In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who
appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners
were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity.

No Personal Examination of the Witnesses

In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid, stating that
before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the applicant and the
witnesses in order to determine whether there was probable cause x x x. [26] (Emphasis supplied.) This was
supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that
the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua
and the witnesses he produced.[27] The records, however, proclaim otherwise.
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascuas application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint
Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of information and (3)
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod, however, none of
the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the applicants
participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod:
[28]

COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth
before this Court?
WITNESS:
Yes Maam.
STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and other personal circumstances.
WITNESS:
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.
x x x x x x x x x
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even to affirm
his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing
questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown, is
also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in
this language:

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.

x x x x x x x x x

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the
claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. [29]

Bacolods Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him

Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony
showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed
to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he stated:
Q How do you know that said properties were subject of the offense?
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for several days, we gathered informations
from reliable sources that subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] the herein
described properties subject of the offense. (Summary of Information dtd Oct 94, SSs of Mario Enad
and Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov 94 are hereto attached). [30]
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security guards had
no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must
testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Corporation located at PICOP
Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. How come that you have knowledge that there are
illegal firearms in that place?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander to investigate the alleged
assassination plot of Congressman Amante.
Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?
A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot are employees of PICOP.
Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you do?
A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of PICOP in Tabon.
Q What did you find xxx?
A I found xxx several high-powered firearms.
Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.
Q By what means?
A By pretending to have some official business with the company.
Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you f[i]nd xxxt?
A I found xxx several high-powered firearms being kept in the compound of PICOP.
Q Where are those located?
A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
Q Inside the compound?
A Located inside the compound.
Q Then what?
A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.
Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own security guards?
A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.
Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As far as the verification at FEU,
Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license.  (Emphasis supplied.)
Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q What did you find out?
A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.
Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no firearms of their own?
A No high-powered firearms.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside the compound of PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols,
several handgrenades and ammos.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
 Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none  of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was
licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed. He also said that
some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trial court that PICOP, aside
from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses
inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the aforementioned no license certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could
have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was
also based. In People v. Judge Estrada,[32] the Court held:

The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained
under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the
existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by
law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could
easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the
applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.

Particularity of the Place to Be Searched

In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the
Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. [33] Thus, this
Court has held that this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no
less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social
need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards. [34] Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related
to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific
description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the
described items are to be found in a particular place. [35]
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply
authorizes a search of the aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies
only one place, and that is the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur. The PICOP compound, however, is made up of 200 offices/buildings,
15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and
some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.
[36]
 Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures
found inside the PICOP compound.[37]
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because they
submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant.They add that not one of
the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among those identified during the
hearing.[38]
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made
integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding police team
knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not
justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched. [39]Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the
subject of the warrant the place indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police.  Such conflict invites
uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforcers.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals,[40] this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search the
apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended  it to be the
subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the
police, viz.:

x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument,
arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for
the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge
had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have
been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant [was] exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What
is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants
had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of
Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal
knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a
change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power
of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door
to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be
searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)

Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence

As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95) issued by the
respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS No. 95-167 against
herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was
assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. They argued, as they do now,
that the illegally obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint. Their motion was denied. A
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
petitioners assert that State Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the
proceedings in IS No. 95-167.[41]
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the
firearms, explosives and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [42] As the
Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonablesearches and seizures.[43] Verily, they are the fruits of
the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence xxx. [44]
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and other
materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are
inadmissible, the Complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and order in the
country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only upon strict observance of
the constitutional and statutory rights of our people. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right
time for the right reason.[45]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant
No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL  and VOID. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman), Vitug, and  Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,  concur.
Purisima, J.,  did not participate in the deliberations.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-41.
[2]
 Presided by Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion (now deceased).
[3]
 Rollo, p. 160.
[4]
 Rollo, pp. 90-220.
[5]
 Rollo, pp. 221-310.
[6]
 Rollo, pp. 317-334.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 377.
[8]
 Rollo, p. 380.
[9]
 Rollo, p. 404.
[10]
 Rollo, p. 55.
[11]
 See separate folder.
[12]
 This Court notes that the supposed deposition was not signed by Judge Asuncion and that the stamp of
receipt was not signed by a responsible court employee.
[13]
 In their Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash, petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Quezon City to issue the search warrant to be served in Mindanao (Rollo, pp. 64-66). Although petitioners did
not repeat this argument before this Court, the trial courts refutation is instructive (Rollo, p. 52). Circular No. 13,
as amended by Circular No. 19, series of 1987, provides that a search warrant may be served only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court issuing it. As an exception, however, Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
51-94, dated August 18, 1994, authorized respondent judge and, in his absence, Judges Perlita J. Tria Tirona
and Marina Lozada Buzon, all of whom are Quezon City RTC judges, to act on all applications for search
warrant filed by the Philippine National Police with respect to the crimes of illegal gambling, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law, illegal possession of firearms and other major crimes.
[14]
 Rollo, p. 45.
[15]
 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
[16]
 Rollo, pp. 56-62.
[17]
 Rollo, pp. 63-68.
[18]
 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[19]
 Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[20]
 Rollo, pp. 100-106.
[21]
 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 21; Rollo, p. 344.
[22]
 Opposition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 200.
[23]
 Reyes  v. CA, 258 SCRA 658, July 11, 1996, per Romero, J.
[24]
 As amended in 1988.
[25]
 Republic v.  Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, 481-482, March 29, 1996.
[26]
 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[27]
 Rollo, p. 88.
[28]
 TSN, January 25, 1995, p. 2.
[29]
 Pendon v.  Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429, 438, November 16, 1990, per Medialdea, J.; citing
Mata v.  Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 391, March 26, 1984; and Roan  v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 694-695,
November 25, 1986.
[30]
 See page 2 of Deposition of Witnesses (of Bacolod and Morito).
[31]
 TSN, January 25, 1995, pp. 2-7.
[32]
 GR No. 124461, p. 13, September 25, 1998, per Martinez, J.
[33]
 See Uy Kheytin v.  Villareal, 42 Phil 886, September 21, 1920.
[34]
 Villanueva  v. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345, 350, December 27, 1972, per Fernando, CJ; cited in People v. Judge
Estrada, GR No. 124461, September 25, 1998.
[35]
 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 2nd ed., Vol. 2, 4.5, p. 207.
[36]
 Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 13. (Evidenced by a location plan attached as Annex C.)
[37]
 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
[38]
 Opposition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 205.
[39]
 Burgos  Sr. v.  Chief  of  Staff, 218 Phil. 754 (1984).
[40]
 GR No. 126379, June 26, 1998, pp. 7-8, per Narvasa, CJ.
[41]
 Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 8.
[42]
 2, Article III of the Constitution.
[43]
 Stonehill  v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, 394, June 19, 1967, per Concepcion, CJ.
[44]
 Ibid., p. 395, quoting Mapp  v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961).
[45]
 See  Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 106, 185, March 19, 1997 as well as in
PIRMA v.  Comelec, GR No. 129754, September 23, 1997; footnote no. 107, Panganiban, Battles in the
Supreme Court, 1998 ed., p. 50.
 [G.R. No. 134217. May 11, 2000]

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and

managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE,petitioners, vs.  JUDGE
APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City,
CEBU PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA,
MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON and
DANTE SOSMEÑA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.: Supremeä

Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING,

owned and managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, seek to nullify the
search warrant issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure of
certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners
located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to quash the search
warrant was denied by respondent Judge as well as their motion to
reconsider the denial. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private

respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco
Development Corporation (MENDCO),[1] Supervising Agent Jose Ermie
Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed an
application for search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
[2] The application sought the authorization to search the premises of K
Angelin Export International located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, and to
seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found therein which were
allegedly the object of unfair competition involving design patents,
punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. The
assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12  was issued by respondent
Judge on 16 October 1997 and executed in the afternoon of the following
day by NBI agents.[3]Inventory Sheetattached to the Return of Search
Warrant,  and all items seized have remained in NBI custody up to the
present.[4]  Seized from the factory were several pieces of furniture, indicated
in the

On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant

alleging that: (a) the crime they were accused of did not exist; (b) the
issuance of the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge
failed to ask the witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the warrant did
not particularly describe the things to be seized.[5]

On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to

Quash  where they additionally alleged that the assailed warrant was
applied for without a certification against forum shopping.[6] On 30
January 1998 respondent Judge denied theMotion to Quash  and
the Supplemental Motion to Quash.[7] On 2 March 1998 petitioners
moved to reconsider the denial of their motion to quash and alleged
substantially the same grounds found in their original Motion to
Quash  but adding thereto two (2) new grounds, namely: (a) respondent
court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter; and, (b) respondent
court failed to “substantiate” the order sought to be reconsidered.[8] The
denial of their last motion[9] prompted petitioners to come to this Court.
Courtä

The principal issues that must be addressed in this petition are: (a)
questions involving jurisdiction over the offense; (b) the need for a
certification of non-forum shopping; and, (c) the existence of the crime.

Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over the
offense since it was not designated as a special court for Intellectual
Property Rights  (IPR), citing in support thereof Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities as Special Courts for IPR. The courts enumerated therein are
mandated to try and decide violations of IPR including Art. 189 of
the Revised Penal Code  committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. The sala of Judge Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9,
Cebu City, was designated Special Court for IPR for the 7th Judicial
Region.[10] Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No.104-
96 was issued providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was
thereafter confined to the Regional Trial Courts.[11]

The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned
in the administrative orders. But the Court has consistently ruled that a
search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain
pursuant to its original jurisdiction.[12] The authority to issue search
warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their
territorial jurisdiction.[13] In the instant case, the premises searched
located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial
jurisdiction of the respondent court.[14]

Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of

Special Courts for IPR. Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified
which court could “try and decide” cases involving violations of IPR. It
did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all
matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial
processes) in any one court. Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by
substantive law; in this case, BP Blg.129, and not by a procedural rule,
much less by an administrative order.[15] The power to issue search
warrants for violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the
courts enumerated in Supreme Court Administrative Order No.113-95. Jä
lexj

Petitioners next allege that the application for a search warrant should
have been dismissed outright since it was not accompanied by a
certification of non-forum shopping, citing as authority therefor
Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[16]  In that case, we
sustained the quashal of the search warrant because the applicant had
been guilty of forum shopping as private respondent sought a search
warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only after he was denied by
the courts of Pampanga. The instant case differs significantly, for here
there is no allegation of forum-shopping, only failure to acquire a
certification against forum-shopping. The Rules of Court as amended
requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting any
mention of “applications.”[17] In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-
94, the old rule on the matter, required such certification even from
“applications.” Our ruling in Washington Distillers  required no such
certification from applications for search warrants. Hence, the absence of
such certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for
search warrant.

The last question to be resolved is whether unfair competition involving

design patents punishable under Art. 189 of theRevised Penal
Code  exists in this case. Prosecutor Ivan Herrero seems to agree as he
filed the corresponding Information against petitioners on 17 March
1998.[18] However, since the IPR Code  took effect on 1 January 1998
any discussion contrary to the view herein expressed would be pointless.
The repealing clause of the Code provides –

All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly,

Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended;
and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code;   Presidential Decree
No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby
repealed (italics ours).[19]

The issue involving the existence of “unfair competition” as a felony

involving design patents, referred to in Art. 189 of theRevised Penal
Code,  has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal of the article.

The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible

violation of the IPR Code. The assailed acts specifically alleged were the
manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture similar to that
patented by MENDCO, without securing any license or patent for the
same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding Mendco and the buying
public.[20] The Code defines “unfair competition” thus – LexjÓ uris

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means
contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured
by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the
one having established such goodwill, or shall commit any acts calculated
to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be
subject to an action therefor.

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of

protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed
guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person who is selling his goods and gives them the general
appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the
goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are
contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of
their appearance which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe
that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than
the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods
with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of
his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any
agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other
means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering
the services of another who has identified such services in the mind of
the public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade
or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature
calculated to discredit goods, businesses or services of another.[21]

There is evidently no mention of any crime of “unfair competition”

involving design patents in the controlling provisions on Unfair
Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at all, for
the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189
of the Revised Penal Code.  In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly
construe the statute against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused,[22] for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by
intendment, implication or any equitable consideration.[23]
[24]IPR Code,  to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts
constitute patent infringement as defined by the same Code-JuriÓ
smis  Respondents invoke jurisprudence to support their contention that “unfair
competition” exists in this case. However, we are prevented from applying
these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair Competition found in
the

Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. –   76.1.  The making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing a patented product or a product
obtained directly or indirectly from a patented process, or the use of a
patented process without authorization of the patentee constitutes patent
infringement.[25]

Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the
enactment of the IPR Code,  we are constrained to invoke the provisions
of the Code. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code  provides that penal
laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such application would be
beneficial to the accused.[26] Since the IPRCode  effectively obliterates
the possibility of any criminal liability attaching to the acts alleged, then
that Code must be applied here.

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding

of probable cause in connection with one specific offense  to be
determined personally by the judge after examination of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.[27] Hence, since there is no
crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these
stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The nullity
of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in
petitioners’ Motion to Quash  and Motion for Reconsideration.Since the
assailed search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue
thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established
jurisprudence.[28]

In petitioners’ Reply with Additional Information   they allege that the trial

court denied their motion to transfer their case to a Special Court for
IPR. We have gone through the records and we fail to find any trace of
such motion or even a copy of the order denying it. All that appears in
the records is a copy of an order granting a similar motion filed by a
certain Minnie Dayon with regard to Search Warrant No. 639-10-1697-
12.[29] This attachment being immaterial we shall give it no further
attention. Jjjä uris

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City,
dated 30 January 1998, denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No.
637-10-1697-12  dated 30 October 1997 and the Supplemental Motion to
Quash  dated 10 November 1997 filed by petitioners, as well as the Order
dated 8 April 1998 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration  dated
2 March 1998, is SET ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 issued
on 16 October 1997 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and respondents are
ordered to return to petitioners the property seized by virtue of the
illegal search warrant.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing,  and Buena, JJ.,  concur.

De Leon, Jr., J.,  on leave.

[1] Original Record, pp. 222-223.

[2] Id., p. 1.

[3] Id., pp. 5 and 9.

[4] Id., p. 11; Rollo, p. 31.

[5] Original Record, pp. 13-14.

[6] Id., p. 30.

[7] Id., p. 84.

[8] Id., p. 86.

[9] Id., p. 124.

[10] Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95, 2 October 1995.

[11] Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96, 21 October 1996.

[12] Ilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109560, 26 May 1995 244 SCRA
346, citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994,
232 SCRA 249.

[13] Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994, 232
SCRA 249.

[14] Par. 3, (h), Sec. 14, Chapter II, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

[15] See Note 13.

[16] G.R. No. 118151, 22 August 1996, 260 SCRA 821.

[17] Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court.

[18] Original Record, pp. 239-240.

[19] Subsection 239.1, Section 239, Part V, RA 8293.

[20] See Note 16.

[21] Sec.168., Part III, RA 8293.

[22] People v. Subido, G.R. No. 21734, 5 September 1975, 66 SCRA 545.

[23] People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950)

[24] Cigarette Manufacturing Co. v. Mojica, 27 Phil. 266 (1914);

Ogura v. Chua, 59 Phil. 471 (1934)

[25] Chapter VIII, Part II, RA 8293.

[26] Act No. 3815.

[27] Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

[28] Nolasco v. Pano, G.R. No. 69803, 30 January 1987, 147 SCRA 509.

[29] Rollo, p. 156.