Versailles.

He started by talking aboutthe November

Revolution and the November humiliation.And then, of
course, he brought out his theories against Versailles.
And then he emphasised further, with a number
of particularly aggressive statements, aboutall of that
only being possible as a result of the activities of the
Jews.And this is where he madethe anti-Semitic
problem the basis of his speech … He put
forward certain claims that were in no way valid.
When I left that meeting, we would get
together and talk in groups. And I said to my
friend, ‘After that speech, myimpression is that this man,
Hitler, will hopefully nevercome to political power.’ We
were agreed on that then.”24 Herbert Richter, a
veteran of the First World War, felt an even
greater antipathy to Hitler when he came across him in
a Munich café in 1921. He “immediately disliked
him,” because of his “scratchy voice” and his
tendency to “shout” out “really, really simple” political
ideas. Richter also foundHitler’s appearance
“rather comical, with his funny little moustache” and came
to the conclusion that he was “creepy” and “wasn’tquite
normal.”25 The testimony of people like Herbert
Richter and Josef Felder reminds us that Hitler’s
appearance on the Munich political scene did
not, at the time, mark a watershed moment. Even
though he gradually attracted a following, it
represented only a small proportion of potential
voters. Indeed, a recent study26 has revealed that
in 1919 the vast majority (more than 70 per cent) of
soldiers still in military accommodation in Munich voted
not for Right-wing groups but for the Social
Democratic party. But withinthe splinter parties on the
right—the so-called “völkisch” groups—Hitler undoubtedly
madean impression.He quickly dominated the tiny
German Workers’ Party and became not just its star
speaker but also the propaganda chief. He worked
 with Anton Drexler on a “party programme” and
then presented the resulting “twenty-fivepoints” to a
meeting on 24 February 1920.Shortly afterwards the name
of the party was changed to “National Socialist
German Workers Party” (NSDAP)— hence their
opponents using “Nazis” as a shorthand form. The
“twenty-fivepoints” of the party programmereflected the
familiar themes whichHitler repeatedly focused on in his
speeches: a demand that the peace treaties of
Versailles and Saint-Germain be set aside; that Jews
be stripped of German citizenship; that no more
foreigners be
allowed to immigrate into Germany; that only those of
“German blood” should be considered true citizens.
There were also a number of measures directed
against capitalism—a call for profit sharing and the
destruction of large departmentstores so that small traders
could flourish. How any futureNazi government might be
able in practical termsto implement these “twenty-five
points” was not mentioned. The whole “programme” was
deliberatelyvague on detail. This vagueness was to
proveadvantageous to Hitler in a number of ways.It
offered maximum flexibility for him to interpret Nazi
policyas he liked once he became leader, and it
allowed the Nazisto position themselvesas a
“movement” rather than a run-of-the-mill political party
tied down in formulating and agreeing detailed policy.
It also permitted a broadrangeof people to profess
support for the Nazis, since the proposal, for
example, to “remove the Jews” could be interpreted in
a large number of different ways—from legislation to
prevent Jews entering certain professionsto theforced
expulsion of Jews from Germany to something worse
altogether. This idea that the Nazisshould stand for a
“vision” of Germany rather than a collection of
detailed policies was not unique. The Freikorps
Oberland, for example, also wanted to see the
establishment of a “Third Reich” in Germany (in
succession to the “first” Reichof the Holy Roman Empire
and the “second” German Reichestablishedby Bismarck
in 1871 whichended in 1918). And its members
despised detailed definitions. “Nothing is more
characteristic of the associative spirit of the Oberlander
than their Idea of the Third Reich,” said one supporter, “…
the men dreamed deep dreams of this Mystery—a
mystery whichwould have been debased in a
concreted political programmeas soon as one attempted
to define it precisely.”27 And, just like the
Nazis, the Oberland called for “the subordination of
the individual … to the needs of the whole
nation.”28 By August 1921,Hitler had gained dictatorial
power over the fledgling Nazi party.The old days of
Anton Drexler’s committee meetings and discussion
papers were gone for good.But Hitler was still not
claiming that he himself was the saviour of
Germany—merely that Germany needed a saviour. “In
the very early years we didn’t say ‘Heil Hitler,’ that was
neversaid,