Lawyer and Legal Profession
B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot
by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three
(3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa.
15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory
words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit
the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter
which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that
the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College
of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed
and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word "Attorney"
as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling
in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases,
not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting
arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain
his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly
by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes
dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty
of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5
As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable.
Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have
typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in
Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt
of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in
the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be
suspended until further orders from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations.
This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys,
moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the
Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that
he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not
reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character
of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he
is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the
test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite
good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In
Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the
Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of
a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law
before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering
justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee,
must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of
this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public
office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and
made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in
the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
Lawyer and Legal Profession
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby
SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to
prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar,
the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, 
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1154.  June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that
he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:  
Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No.  15687 for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.   Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary
to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an
indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. 
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he
being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a
single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.”  Moreover, Meling denies the charges and
adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
“Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous.  He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases,
not a retired judge nor a law professor.  In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.  Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character.  Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be
taken lightly by an applicant.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred
him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys
Held:  continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.  Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar
is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the
Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.  The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,  Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of
no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the
Lawyer and Legal Profession
welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon
was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The minute
resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to
issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be amiss. As set
forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case
No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP,
through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,.
Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the delinquency
further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action
taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On
January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On
March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment:
On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-
payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year
shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous
case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the
case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The
unanimous conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional
question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered, there were various
pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the
matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to
be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he
had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy.
Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his part was
discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his
health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of
the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October
23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise
of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid.
Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession
was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for
contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the bar is
concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the
bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered
for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
Case Digest
In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the
Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of
IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an
Lawyer and Legal Profession
invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus
deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.
Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.
Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must
be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable
annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions
assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to
perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney
for being a delinquent member of the bar.
A.C. No. 6634               August 23, 2007
TAN TIONG BIO a.k.a. HENRY TAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this complaint1 for disbarment filed by Tan Tiong Bio, a.k.a. Henry Tan, against Atty. Renato L.
Gonzales for allegedly notarizing a conveying deed outside the territory covered by his notarial commission and without
requiring the personal presence before him of the signatories to the deed before notarizing the same, in violation of the Notarial
Law and the lawyer’s oath.
As records reveal, complainant purchased several parcels of land at the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates (Southwoods, for
short), a mix residential-commercial complex situated in Carmona, Cavite owned/operated by Fil-Estate Golf and Development,
Inc. (FEGDI) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI has its office at Renaissance Towers, Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. In
one of the transactions adverted to, complainant, as vendee, was made to sign and execute Deed of Sale No. 1108 2 (Deed 1108,
hereinafter) covering a lot described in and covered by the vendor’s Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-427206. Following
payment of the contract price in full, including miscellaneous expenses, TCT No. 968702 in complainant’s name was delivered
to him with the corresponding completed deed of sale. Respondent Renato L. Gonzales, employed as corporate counsel for FEPI
and appointed/reappointed from 1996 to 2001 as notary public for Quezon City3 , was the notarizing officer of Deed 1108 on
which the name and signature of Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (Bondoc) appear as the vendor’s authorized representative.
As complainant would allege in his Complaint Affidavit dated November 17, 2003, and its annexes, sometime in 1995, he made
another Southwoods purchase covering Lot 10, Block 27, Phase 3 (or Lot 10). Several years following his payment of the
amount of ₱2,068,523, representing the full purchase price for Lot 10 and after he had signed a deed with the space for the title
number and technical description left in blank, complainant repeatedly asked for but was not able to secure a certificate of title
for the same or a refund of his payment. The rebuff, according to complainant, impelled him to file a case for estafa with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.

In connection with the estafa charge, so complainant claims, Ms. Bondoc, signatory (for FEGDI as vendor) to Deed 1108,
executed a counter-affidavit therein stating that she had not personally met nor transacted with the complainant either with
respect to the negotiations for the sale of the land covered by TCT No. T-427206 nor during the execution of Deed 1108.
Complainant would add, however, that Ms. Bondoc admitted that she and the complainant did sign the said deed of sale, but at
different times and in different places, and not in each other’s presence,4 like other "signed hundreds of deeds (of sale) over other
documents for our behalf of the President [of Fil-Estate] with buyers [she] had never (even) met." 5
It is on the basis of Ms. Bondoc’s foregoing statements that complainant initiated the present disbarment case before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), it being his posture that respondent Gonzales notarized Deed 1108 without requiring
him, or Ms. Bondoc, to appear and acknowledge before him the due and voluntary execution thereof, a practice not only
violative of the Notarial Law, but detrimental to his interests and those similarly situated as well.
Respondent, in his Verified Answer,6 was less than categorical on the matter of whether or not complainant and Ms. Bondoc, vis-
à-vis Deed 1108, indeed appeared before him and attested to the contents and the truth of what are stated in the deed. Instead, he
alleged as follows:
10. Because of the hundreds of documents I have notarized, I do not recall with absolute certainty the details of the
notarization ceremony of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. Nevertheless, what I do know is that I have
personally met both complainant and Atty. Bondoc and notarized documents which they had acknowledged. Based
on the admissions of both the complainant and Atty. Bondoc that they have not personally met, it appears that in
notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale in question, both complainant and Atty. Bondoc appeared before me and signed,
but at different times.
11. As a matter of practice, I require the personal appearance of all parties who seek to have deeds of sale notarized.
However, the parties need not necessarily sign and acknowledge their acts in one another’s presence. xxx
x x x           x x x          x x x
13. Thus, complainant cannot dispute that both signatories to the Deed of Absolute Sale personally appeared before
me …., albeit at different times. That is all that is required by law. The fact that the signatories to the Deed signed and
acknowledged the same on different occasions is of no moment, and certainly does not constitute misconduct on my
part.
x x x           x x x          x x x
15. The only basis for the charge of professional misconduct against me is that I allowed the signatories to
acknowledge their signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale at different times. However, complainant fails to cite any
law or rule which obliges a notary public to require the parties to the instrument to simultaneously appear before him,
as in fact, there is none. Thus, even if I did not require complainant and Atty. Bondoc to personally appear before me
at the same time, I cannot be faulted for such, as I am not required to do so.7
The respondent parlays in his answer the idea of laches, arguing that the transaction in question took place in 2001, while
complainant initiated the disbarment charge only in November 2003.
Lawyer and Legal Profession
At the preliminary conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission), complainant and respondent entered
into the following stipulation of facts, to wit:
[T]he Deed of Absolute Sale No. 1108 … was duly executed by Mr. Henry Tan and Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc as authorized
signatory of the seller; that the subject document was notarized by respondent as document no. 367, page no. 74, book no. 8,
series of 2001 of his notarial register; that respondent admits that his notarial appointment covers Quezon City and that the
subject document was notarized in Pasig City, specifically, at the Renaissance Tower; and that the parties admit that Atty. Alice
Odchigue-Bondoc and Henry Tan Tan were not present at the same time when the subject document was notarized xxx
(Underscoring added.)
After due hearings, Investigating Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila submitted his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION dated
August 27, 2004, which, as approved by the IBP Director for Bar Discipline, was forwarded to the Court.
In the report, the Commission recommended that respondent be adjudged liable and penalized for violating the rule proscribing
one from acting as a notary outside the area covered by his commission, but recommended the dismissal of the complaint insofar
as it charges the respondent for notarizing a document without the personal appearance before him of the party-signatories
thereto.
We agree.
As aptly found by the Investigating Commissioner, delving on the second part of the recommendation, complainant failed to
substantiate with competent proof his allegations that respondent performed the notarial procedure on Deed 1108 without his
(complainant) being present to acknowledge the due execution thereof. Being a notarized document, Deed 1108 and the
solemnities attending its execution are disputably presumed to be regular.8 Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the
certification in Deed 1108 that the vendor and the vendee personally appeared before the respondent to acknowledge the same
must be upheld. As we said in Vda. De Rosales v. Ramos,9 when a notary certifies to the due execution and delivery of the
document under his hand and seal, the document thus notarized is converted into a public document. To us and to the
Investigating Commissioner,10 the declaration of Ms. Bondoc in her counter-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office is not the
clear and convincing evidence required to overturn the presumption of regularity. Ms. Bondoc’s declaration that she had not met
or dealt directly with Southwoods buyers does not necessarily prove that such buyers and FEPI’s representatives in the purchase
did not in fact appear before the notary public to acknowledge the fact of contract execution before him. If at all, Ms. Bondoc’s
declaration simply means that she has not personally met the buyers, or, with like effect, that she, as representative of the seller,
has not appeared together with the buyers before the notarizing officer. As it were, the Notarial Law is silent as to whether or not
the parties to a conveying instrument must be present before the notary public at the same time when they acknowledge its due
execution.
There can be quibbling, however, that the respondent breached the injunction against notarizing a document in a place outside
one’s commission. As reported by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent acknowledged that from February 1, 1996 to
September 30, 2001, within which period Deed 1108 was notarized, his notarial commission then issued was for Quezon City. 11
Deed 1108 was, however, notarized in Pasig City. To compound matters, he admitted having notarized hundreds of documents in
Pasig City, where he used to hold office, 12 during the period that his notarial commission was only for and within Quezon City.
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond
the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While perhaps not on all fours
because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation involved, what the Court said in Nunga v. Viray 13 is very much apropos:

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from it. Notarization is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.14 Hence, the
requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual. 15
For all legal intents and purposes, respondent, by performing through the years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so
authorized, has indulged in deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, respondent likewise violated Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.
To be sure, respondent cannot plausibly seek refuge in the complainant’s alleged delay in filing the instant complaint for
disbarment. He cannot, as a means to defeat the present charge, invoke the complainant’s ill-motive in filing said complaint. We
have, time and again, held that the Court’s disciplinary authority cannot be defeated or frustrated by a mere delay in filing the
complaint, or by the complainant’s motivation to do so. The practice of law is so delicately affected by public interest that it is
both a right and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote public welfare.16 Indeed, we have
held that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe.17
Needless to stress, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as member of the bar and as a notary public.
His proven transgression does not, however, merit disbarment, as urged by the complainant. This most severe form of
disciplinary sanction ought to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a
respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty,
such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired.181avvphi1
The IBP Report recommended the revocation of respondent’s commission as a notary public (in any jurisdiction), if still existing,
and that he henceforth be disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. A one-month suspension
from the practice of law for violation of Canon 119 and Rule 1.0120 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is also
recommended for the respondent.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,21 the Court meted the penalty of two (2) years suspension from law practice on Atty. Simpliciano as
well as his permanent disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for notarizing several documents after his
commission as notary public had already expired.
Considering the circumstances and the extent of respondent’s willful malfeasance, and guided by Zoreta, a penalty higher than
that recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline ought to be imposed.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Renato L. Gonzales is PERMANENTLY BARRED from being commissioned as Notary
Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy
of this Decision.
Lawyer and Legal Profession
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and let the Office of the Bar Confidant be notified of this Decision which is hereby ordered
duly recorded in the personal files of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
03 - Tan Tiong Bo a.k.a. Henry Tan v. Gonzales (2007) (Southwoods)
Doctrine: • Notarization is invested with substantive public interest. Only those qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. • When a notary certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal, the document is
converted into a public document. It is presumed to be regular.
Facts: Tan purchased several parcels of land at the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, operated by Fil-Estate Golf and
Development, Inc. (FEGDI) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). The principal office of FEPI was in Pasig City. In one of the
transactions, Tan signed and executed a Deed of Sale. After paying the contract price in full, the corresponding TCT and Deed
of Sale was delivered to him. Attorney Gonzales who is the corporate counsel for FEPI and a notary public for Quezon City
notarized the Deed of Sale. Alice Bondoc signed as the vendors’ authorized representative. Tan purchased another lot from
Southwoods. However, he was not able to secure a certificate of titles nor was he able to refund his payment. As a result, he
filed a case for estafa in Pasig City. Bondoc, FEPI’s authorized representative, claimed that she had not personally met nor
transacted with Tan. She admitted that they signed the deed of sale, but at different times and in different places, and not in
each other’s presence. Tan initiated a disbarment case against Gonzales. During the preliminary conference with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Gonzales admitted that his notarial appointment covers Quezon City and that the deed of sale
was notarized in Pasig City.
Issues:
1. W/N Gonzales violated the notarial law and the lawyer’s oath for notarizing a conveying deed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of his notarial commission.
2. W/N Gonzales violated the notarial law and the lawyer’s oath for notarizing a conveying deed without requiring the personal
presence of the signatories of the deed.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest. Only those qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
The requirements for the issuance of a commission are treated with a “formality definitely more than casual”. Performing a
notarial act without a commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, particularly the Notarial Law. Here, the
notarial commission of Gonzales was issued for Quezon City. However, the deed of sale was notarized in Pasig City where he is
not authorized. Gonzales’ act constitutes malpractice of law and falsification.
2. NO. When a notary certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal, the document is
converted into a public document. As a result, the deed of sale is presumed to be regular. Without any competent proof or
evidence to the contrary, the certification stating that both vendor and vendee personally appeared before the notary public

must be upheld. The declaration of Bondoc is not clear and convincing evidence as to overturn the presumption of regularity.
Her declaration simply means that she had not appeared together with the buyers before the notary public. The law is silent as
to whether the parties must be present before the notary public at the same time.
Penalty: Permanently barred from being commissioned as a Notary Public; Suspended for 2 years.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his
pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by
the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A - "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B - "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
Parañaque, MM
Annex C - "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17,
1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar
"who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Lawyer and Legal Profession
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these
courts).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in
SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached
copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred
to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent’s signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his conviction,
in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent’s "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not
paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."cralaw virtua1aw library
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the
case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the
Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to
practice law.
The complainant’s basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28,
1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment
of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted
from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still
pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed,
and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited
practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard

and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep.
Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly
believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of
dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and
be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner
wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues
even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all good faith, to the
contrary.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the
IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for
final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent’s suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his
pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
years."cralaw virtua1aw library
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that
respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."cralaw virtua1aw library
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."cralaw virtua1aw library
x       x          x
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice
of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present
time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent’s Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same
IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did
not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise
admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
Lawyer and Legal Profession
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged
in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under
R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.
SECTION 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter
that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership
or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate.chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he
has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas’ personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
SANTOS V. LLAMAS

Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data
(date & place of issuance) in his pleadings
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted
member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Issues:
W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES
W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES
Held:
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues,
and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and
the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express willingness to
pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017
Lawyer and Legal Profession
ROSA YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint1 (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras (complainant)
against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the practice of law for a year. The issues
before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be held administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension
order and (b) whether his suspension should be lifted.
The Facts
In a Decision2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for falsifying
his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality and abandonment
of his family, with the penalties to be served simultaneously. 3 Respondent moved for reconsideration4 but the Court denied it
with finality in a Resolution5 dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion6 to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard R.
Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading prepared by
respondent, in violation of the suspension order.7 Moreover, complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a court in
Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension order.8 On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second
motion for contempt and disbarment,9 claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in
willful disobedience of the suspension order issued against respondent. 10 Complainant filed two (2) more motions for contempt
dated June 8, 200111 and August 21, 200112 raising the same arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective
comments,13 and complainant filed her replies14 to both comments. Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension15 dated
May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted
that he started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension. 16 Also, complainant manifested
that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift
suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and
recommendation.17
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order18 on the status of respondent' suspension,
essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his suspension. 19 Meanwhile,
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry through a Letter20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court
referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and recommendation.21
In a Report and Recommendation22 dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order declaring that
respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the Court. 23 Citing case law, the OBC
opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court's decision and an
order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the
OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were to be served simultaneously,
the period of suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002.24 To date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the
suspension.

Soon thereafter, in a Resolution25 dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and recommendation on
the pending incidents referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was constrained to issue a Resolution 26
dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report regarding the said incidents. In response, the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter27 to the Court, conveying that the Board of Governors had passed a Resolution dated
April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's suspension from the practice of law.28 However, in view of the pendency of respondent's
motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as soon as said motion is
resolved.29 Thereafter, in a letter30 dated September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration. The Court received the records and relevant documents only on February 15, 2016.31
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation32 dated January 16, 2012, instead of resolving only the pending incidents referred to the IBP,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against respondent which had been resolved with
finality by the Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying his wife's
signature in the bank loan documents and for immorality.33
In a Resolution34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year.35 Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for reconsideration,36 alleging that his administrative liability based on the
charges in the 1995 complaint had been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added
that to suspend him anew for another year based on the same grounds would constitute administrative double jeopardy. He
stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to
declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7,
2015.37
The Issues Before the Court
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while he was
suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation pertain to
respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the Court to lift the suspension order. However, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded to
determine respondent's liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant – which was already resolved with
finality by no less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating
Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more
than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in
resolving the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and
compelling reasons,38 as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised.39 Absent a valid fact-
finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings. 40 However, in light of
the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission that he resumed practicing law even without a Court order
Lawyer and Legal Profession
lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the IBP's factual
findings and recommendation thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience." 41 During the
suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law.42 It must be stressed, however,
that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. 43 The lawyer must submit the
required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. 44
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for
one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon after
this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to accepting new clients and cases, and
even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the Department of Agrarian Reform. 45 Indubitably, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be
held administratively liable therefor.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and willfully
appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of in this case – are grounds for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law,46 to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law47 shows that the Court consistently imposed an
additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an additional
suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however,
that suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred
from the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v. Paras.48 In Sanchez v. Torres,49 the
Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously
disbarred.50 Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's
personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although
the said penalty can no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon
respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can
no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes. That
being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and academic.
As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 200151 and indicating therein the firm name
Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.

As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings on their
behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared the pleading and only
requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when
respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters referred to it for
investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to ensure proper
administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, considering that
respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as a
member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest
ROUEL YAP PARAS v. ATTY. JUSTO P. PARAS, AC. No. 7348, 2016-09-27
Facts:
this administrative Complaint[1] directly filed before this Court, Rouel Yap Paras (Rouel) charges his father Atty. Justo J. Paras
(Atty. Paras) with violation of his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2... allegedly voluntarily offered
properties he did not own nor possess to the Department of Agrarian Reform for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.[3]... has been previously disciplined twice upon complaint of his wife.[4]
In September 2006, Rouel found out that a listing of possible beneficiaries for the Department of Agrarian Reform's
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was being made by a certain Edna Mijares and Tomas Visitacion.[5] On the same
month, h... received at their residence in Negros Oriental[6] a copy of a Notice of Coverage... from the Department of Land
Reform.
was addressed to Atty. Paras and was signed by Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Grace B. Fua.
Rouel... counsel... wrote Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer... requested a copy of all documents pertaining to the September 8,
2006 Notice of Coverage addressed to Atty. Paras
Lawyer and Legal Profession
Rouel's counsel also informed the Department of Agrarian Reform that: (1) the real properties were subject of a pending case;
[12] (2) Atty. Paras was suspended by this Court for unlawfully "having the said properties titled in his name[;]"
3. the properties were titled in the name of Atty. Paras only for free patent title coverage;[14] (4) Atty. Paras did not
possess the properties;[15] and (5) Rouel was the real owner and in possession of the properties.[16]
The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the request and furnished Rouel with all documents
Among... these documents were: (1) Atty. Paras' October 20, 2004 letter[18] to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M.
Leonidas; (2) an authorization letter[19] by Atty. Paras for Edna R. Mijares; and (3) an October 9, 2006 Certification[20] by
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
Rouel Yap Paras filed this Complaint before this Court and alleged:1. That respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS,. had violated
the LAWYER'S OATH and the Code of Professional Responsibility
1. That respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS,. had violated the LAWYER'S OATH and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,... That the respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he deliberate[ly]
represented himself as "LANDOWNER", and voluntarily offered real properties to the DAR for CARP coverage,
when he knew fully well that he is NOT THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred as respondent had already been suspended by this Court in two (2) previous
administrative cases.[23]... respondent filed his Comment.[24] He alleged that the present Complaint is "identical in subject-
matter, principal parties involved, issues and persecutory intent"[25] with A.C. No. 7349[26] filed against him by Rosa Yap-
Paras, complainant's mother.[27] However, respondent admitted that:... the properties subject-matter of the instant
[administrative] complaint ... [are] subject of a pending trial court proceedings [sic] before RTC
On the allegation of voluntary offer of properties, respondent claimed:
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of this case.[30]
On August 22, 2007, a mandatory conference was
Counsel of complainant appeared for complainant, while respondent appeared for himself.[33]  The conference ended with both
parties submitting their issues to Investigating Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner... of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.[34]
In his Report and Recommendation[46] dated January 5, 2008, Commissioner Hababag found respondent guilty of violating his
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:[47]
The penalty of a one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was recommended
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Hababag's Report and
Recommendation. However, the Board of Governors... modified the penalty and reduced respondent's suspension from one (1)
year to six (6) months.[51... complainant moved for reconsideration[52] of the January 17, 2008 Resolution, praying that the

penalty of suspension be reconsidered and a penalty of... disbarment be imposed instead. On January 3, 2013, the Motion for
Reconsideration was denied
Issues:
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he voluntarily offered... property that he neither owned nor possessed for coverage under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Ruling:
We confirm the guilt of respondent. However, we modify the penalty imposed.In deciding this case, this Court takes judicial
notice of two (2) administrative cases filed by Rosa Yap Panis against respondent
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of It's lawyer's oath and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year,... with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a
more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Justo J. ParasGUILTY of violating the lawyer's oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
[A.C. NO. 6422 : August 28, 2007]
WILFREDO T. GARCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. BENIAMINO A. LOPEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a complaint dated September 24, 2002, complainant Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia charged respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez
with violation of his oath as a member of the bar and officer of the court, and misrepresentation, amounting to perjury and
prayed that respondent be suspended or disbarred.
Complainant was the counsel of the late Angelina Sarmiento, applicant in LRC Case No. 05-M-96 which was pending in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15.1 Sarmiento sought the registration and confirmation of her title
over a 376,397 sq. m. tract of land. This was granted by the court.2 The case went all the way to the Supreme Court and
ultimately, the RTC decision was upheld. The decision became final and executory and the RTC, in an order dated February 21,
2002, directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the decree of registration and certificate of title. 3 The LRA failed
to comply, prompting the complainant to file an urgent motion to cite the LRA administrator or his representative in contempt of
court. Hearings were scheduled.
Lawyer and Legal Profession
On September 19, 2002, respondent, claiming to be the counsel of the heirs of Sarmiento, filed his entry of appearance and
motion for postponement.4
Complainant alleged that he was surprised by this, considering that he had not withdrawn from the case. He contended that
respondent should be sanctioned for misrepresenting to the court that he was the counsel of all the heirs of Sarmiento and
omitting to mention that complainant was the counsel of record. According to him, his attorney's fee was arranged on a
contingent basis and therefore, the attempt of respondent to enter his appearance at the final stage of the proceedings was
tantamount to "unfair harvesting" of the fruit of complainant's labors since 1996.5
It appears that Sarmiento was succeeded by the following compulsory heirs: Gina Jarviña (Angelina's daughter by her
common-law husband Victor Jarviña), Alfredo, Zenaida, Wilson, Jeanette and Geneva, all surnamed Ku (Angelina's children
by her husband prior to her relationship with Victor). Complainant presented an affidavit executed by Gina Jarviña and
Alfredo Ku wherein they stated that they did not engage the services of respondent and that they recognized complainant as their
only counsel of record.
In his defense, respondent claimed that he was merely representing Zenaida and Wilson Ku6 who sought his help on September
19, 2002 and told him that they wanted to retain his services. They allegedly did not have a lawyer to represent them in a hearing
scheduled the next day. Because of the scheduled hearing, he had to immediately file an entry of appearance with motion for
postponement. He asserted that it was an honest mistake not to have listed the names of his clients. He claimed it was not
deliberate and did not prejudice anyone. He insisted that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself to the court.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The
investigating commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes, in his report and recommendation dated January 8, 2004, found respondent
guilty of misrepresentation and violation of Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to
specify in his entry of appearance the individuals he was representing. He recommended that respondent be strongly
reprimanded for his act with a reminder that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution passed on February 27, 2004.
We affirm the factual findings of the IBP but modify the penalty recommended.
Lawyers are officers of the court who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the causes of their clients. The law
imposes on them peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities. Membership in the bar imposes on them certain obligations. 7
They are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each
other and otherwise conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times. 8
Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the original applicant. Upon her death, the attorney-client relationship was
terminated. However, complainant was retained as counsel by Gina Jarviña and Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of appearance
with motion of postponement in behalf of the "compulsory heirs of the late Angelita Sarmiento" when in truth he was merely
representing some of the heirs but not all of them, respondent was guilty of misrepresentation which could have deceived the
court. He had no authorization to represent all the heirs. He clearly violated his lawyer's oath that he will "do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court."
Likewise, the CPR states:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the CPR demands that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it
is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Respondent failed to observe the foregoing rules. He made it appear that he was entering his appearance as counsel for all the
heirs of Sarmiento which was highly unfair to complainant who had worked on the case from the very beginning (i.e. since
1996) and who had not been discharged as such. It is true that without the formal withdrawal of complainant as counsel of
record, respondent would merely be considered as collaborating counsel. Nevertheless, by being less than candid about whom he
was representing, respondent undeniably encroached upon the legal functions of complainant as the counsel of record.chanrobles
virtual law library
We cannot casually brush aside what respondent did. Even assuming that it was not a calculated deception, he was still remiss in
his duty to his fellow lawyer and the court. He should have been more careful about his actuation since the court was relying on
him in its task of ascertaining the truth.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month for
violating Canons 8 and 10, Rules 8.02 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is warned that the commission
of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Wilfredo T. Garcia, Complainant, v. Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez, Respondent | Adm. Case No. 6422 | 28 August 2007
November 12, 2017
Facts:
Complainant was the counsel of the late Angelina Sarmiento, applicant in LRC
Case No. 05-M-96 which was pending in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Lawyer and Legal Profession
Bulacan, Branch 15. Sarmiento sought the registration and confirmation of her title
over a 376,397 sq. m. tract of land. This was granted by the court.
The case went all the way to the Supreme Court and ultimately, the RTC decision was upheld. The decision became final and
executory and the RTC, in an order dated 21 February 2002, directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the decree
of registration and certificate of title. The LRA failed to comply, prompting the complainant to file an urgent motion to cite the
LRA administrator or his representative in contempt of court. Hearings were scheduled.On 19 September 2002, respondent,
claiming to be the counsel of the heirs of Sarmiento, filed his entry of appearance and motion for postponement. Complainant
alleged that he was surprised by this, considering that he had not withdrawn from the case. He contended that respondent
should be sanctioned for misrepresenting to the court that he was the counsel of all the heirs of Sarmiento and
omitting to mention that complainant was the counsel of record. According to him, his attorney's fee was arranged on a
contingent basis and therefore, the attempt of respondent to enter his appearance at the final stage of the proceedings was
tantamount to unfair harvesting of the fruit of complainant's labors since 1996. It appears that Sarmiento was succeeded by
the following compulsory heirs: Gina Jarvia (Angelina's daughter by her common-law husband Victor Jarvia), Alfredo, Zenaida,
Wilson, Jeanette and Geneva, all surnamed Ku (Angelina's children by her husband prior to her relationship with Victor).
Complainant presented an affidavit executed by Gina Jarvia and Alfredo Ku wherein they stated that they did not engage the
services of respondent and that they recognized complainant as their only counsel of record.
In his defense, respondent claimed that he was merely representing Zenaida and Wilson Ku who sought his help on September
19, 2002 and told him that they wanted to retain his services. They allegedly did not have a lawyer to represent them in a
hearing scheduled the next day. Because of the scheduled hearing, he had to immediately file an entry of appearance with
motion for postponement. He asserted that it was an honest mistake not to have listed the names of his clients. He claimed it
was not deliberate and did not prejudice anyone. He insisted that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself to the court.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The investigating
commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes, in his report and recommendation dated 8 January 2004, found respondent guilty of
misrepresentation and violation of Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to specify in his
entry of appearance the individuals he was representing. He recommended that respondent be strongly reprimanded for his
act with a reminder that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. This was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution passed on 27 February 2004.
Issue:
Was the respondent violated the Canons 8 and 10, and Rules 8.02 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Held:
Yes, the respondent is guilty of violating the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath.
Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the original applicant. Upon her death, the attorney-client relationship was
terminated. However, complainant was retained as counsel by Gina Jarvia and Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of appearance with
motion of postponement in behalf of the compulsory heirs of the late Angelita Sarmiento when in truth he was merely
representing some of the heirs but not all of them, respondent was guilty of misrepresentation which could have deceived the
court. He had no authorization to represent all the heirs. He clearly violated his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court.
Respondent failed to observe the foregoing rules. He made it appear that he was entering his appearance as counsel for all the

heirs of Sarmiento which was highly unfair to complainant who had worked on the case from the very beginning (i.e. since
1996) and who had not been discharged as such. It is true that without the formal withdrawal of complainant as counsel of
record, respondent would merely be considered as collaborating counsel. Nevertheless, by being less than candid about whom
he was representing, respondent undeniably encroached upon the legal functions of complainant as the counsel of record.
The court ordered the respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month for violating Canons 8 and 10,
Rules 8.02 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is warned that the commission of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
[A.C. No. 2505. February 21, 1992.]
EVANGELINE LEDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; GROSS
MISREPRESENTATION AS A GROUND. — Respondent’s declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar
Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should
be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer
shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar
Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
2. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER; REQUISITES AND CONDITIONS PRESUMED TO
HAVE BEEN MET. — Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the
requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the
Judge’s official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.
3. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; ADOPTING CONFLICTING POSITIONS IN
PLEADINGS, DUPLICITOUS AND DEPLORABLE. — Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various
pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable. Respondent has resorted to
conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to
serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."cralaw
virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; COURTS ENTITLED TO EXPECT COMPLETE CANDOR AND HONESTY FROM LAWYERS APPEARING
AND PLEADING BEFORE THEM. — Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through
his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
5. ID.; ID.; GOOD MORAL CHARACTER, ESSENTIAL FOR ADMISSION TO AND FOR REMAINING IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW. — It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law
(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692).
Lawyer and Legal Profession
6. ID.; ID.; COURTS RETAIN THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE AN ATTORNEY. — As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A.
Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney’s character
is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
7. ID.; ID.; INDEFINITE SUSPENSION IMPOSED WHERE LAWYER IS FOUND EVIDENTLY LACKING IN GOOD
MORAL CHARACTER. — Wherefore, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly and unworthy to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang’s good moral character, in two
Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage,
solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code 1 as one of exceptional
character (Annex "A," Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in 1977), and
had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had
not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he was
"single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78,
claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer’s Oath
for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent’s law studies, he became aloof and
"abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent’s Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries
Complainant’s conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976
but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he
could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in
his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage
with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as
shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance, which
stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing
her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath
in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent’s disbarment
based on the following grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid,
and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam.
"c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
"d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to
his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only
befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is
he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Attached to Complainant’s Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant,
allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
Complainant’s help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their
marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the
minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing
officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty
years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him,
he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even
(sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent’s initials appear on the
upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging in
fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not
because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in
the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together
as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was
single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 5
March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the
charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded
for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General’s Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his
marriage is settled.
Lawyer and Legal Profession
Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent’s lack of good moral
character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross
misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7,
Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a
false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false
statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent’s protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact with
Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning,
are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The
presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code
have been met and that the Judge’s official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.cralawnad
Secondly, Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in
the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he
admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath
that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature
appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant’s own making (ibid.,
pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars.
3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he
denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage
contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to finish
his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in
order from the beginning."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor
coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to
comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and admitted
the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer’s Oath, which otherwise he would have
been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage
to Complainant.
Respondent’s lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to
suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also

as an officer of the Court.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to show that he is
unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further
Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
EVANGELINE LEDA v. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, Adm. Case No. 2505, 1992-02-21
Facts:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two
Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a
Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983... on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at
Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code[1] as one of... exceptional character
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in 1977), and
had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had
not lived... together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he was
"single." He then passed the examinations
First complaint:
Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that
Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of
good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her
Lawyer and Legal Profession
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Tabang's answer:... he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage
"was not as... yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar
examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to
take the Bar "for reason that to my... honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the
complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by
her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that... the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit or Desistance, which
stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing
her Complaint against
Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath
in a Resolution dated 20 August 1952.
Present complaint (disbarment):
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's disbarment
based on the following grounds:
"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid,
and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam.
"c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
"d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to
his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only
befriended... me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that
is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court."
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant,
allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
Complainant's help, he "could... not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend.
Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them
the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the... celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the
solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both
only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as... not to put her family name "in
shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take

away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's...
initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging in
fantasy and fabrications.
Tabang's defense:
Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his
studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the... requisites
of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years
before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to...
administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When
he applied for the 1981 Bar Examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
Issues:
"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid,
and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
Ruling:
Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral
character sufficiently established.
Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void.
The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil
Code have been met and that the Judge's official... duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to
suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated
Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the... court to be misled by any artifice."
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further
Orders, the suspension to... take effect immediately.
Principles:
Lawyer and Legal Profession
A.C. No. 244             March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar
examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General
who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll
of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before
taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the
following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts
the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of
successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although
he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational
authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect
(the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as
an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in
April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his
application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April,
1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in
Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for
the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed
the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
 Lawyer and Legal Profession

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false WITHIN 30 DAYS.
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
1. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
regular manner is equally essential..
a. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.
return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered. b. He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.                                               i.     Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).
                                             ii.     Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations
                                           iii.     Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.
CASE DIGEST
2. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses
In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

FACTS:

1. DIAO was admitted to the Bar.

a. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar [A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]
examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
b. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., Complainant, v. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, Respondents.

                                              i.     DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects: DECISION

1.   Did not complete his high school training
2.   Never attended Quisumbing College
3.   Never obtained a diploma. DE LEON, JR., J.: chanrobles virtual law library

2. DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service Before us is a verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo
of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyers oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent
high school diploma Villalon because it was discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February
a. Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3, 1996.2 chanrobles virtual law library
3rd and 4th year high school.
b. No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious: In the letter-complaint,3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of
complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given the title over a property owned by complainant
located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had
                                              i.     Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination to verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however, complainant and his
represented him as an A.A. graduate. family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of
                                             ii.     Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949
1.   He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
1
ISSUE:
WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-law requirements? NO. 2
HELD: 3

complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant
complained to the barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it
and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were watching over the construction.
Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
chanrobles virtual law library
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however, the latter answered that the
subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin.
Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor received any money therefor, and
he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that complainants father allegedly gave the subject property to him
(respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant. chanrobles virtual law library
In his Comment,4 respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn, he alleged that the property was
given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent
Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start
a piggery business without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to
evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent Villalon with the name of respondent Canares included
therein as protection because of the improvements to be introduced in the subject property. Upon presenting the title
covering the subject property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr. and not Jose
Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because the land was actually owned by him and
that he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject property be
transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he
would return the document already signed and notarized, which he did the following day. According to respondent Canares,
the trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside
the subject property by the caretaker of respondent Canares. chanrobles virtual law library
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote5 to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale covering the
subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that
respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for
forging his signature and selling the subject property without his consent. chanrobles virtual law library
In his Rejoinder6, respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained that he is a member of good
standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon
expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the
subject property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced
in writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the said document
for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent and knowledge. chanrobles virtual law library
4 him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which
5
6 7
Lawyer and Legal Profession
This Court referred7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. chanrobles
virtual law library
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for two (2) years and likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within
ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment. chanrobles virtual law library
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and
demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More
importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them
to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness
deserves the Commissions full faith and credence. chanrobles virtual law library
Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself the owner of the
subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and
incontrovertible facts. chanrobles virtual law library
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer)
knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly
authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose
Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe
considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property. chanrobles virtual law library
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a
consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject
property on the basis of the verbal or oral giving of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may
have said that. chanrobles virtual law library
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant) allegedly executed by
Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which
respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr.
is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the
respondent himself when he said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was
affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes
signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a
mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to
denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned. chanrobles virtual law library

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the complainant) allegedly
executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared
upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied
having executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know;
that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the
amount of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no payment of
P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he
should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his
defense.8 chanrobles virtual law library
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and observations of the
Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-
taken, the same being supported by the evidence adduced. chanrobles virtual law library
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus
rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.9 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a
lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed
by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by
any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the profession.10 chanrobles virtual law library
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo,
Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless
that the property was orally given to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the
fact that the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any
titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper
special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this
process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, 11
purportedly in favor of Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr., respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr.
who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat,
Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As regards the subsequent
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of
Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said
8 12
9 13
10
11
Lawyer and Legal Profession
amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. chanrobles virtual
law library
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject
property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public
Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalons acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
chanrobles virtual law library
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus,
every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature
and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.12 chanrobles virtual law library
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon respondent Atty. Villalon
too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,13 this Court
suspended therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:
chanrobles virtual law library
(i).... His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his clients property merits the penalty
of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and chanrobles virtual law library
(ii).... The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being duly authorized
by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabels subdivision lots;
(3) Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds date of execution; (4) respondent
knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila
soon after her confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale. 14 chanrobles virtual law
library
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that respondent Villalon had any
direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property dated December 5, 1991,15 which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly
denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated this ___day of October 1991, allegedly signed
by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr. was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that
14
15

they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon has been the
lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr. chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the
latters TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole
expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment. chanrobles virtual law library
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalons personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtual law library
CASE DIGEST
Ducat Jr. v Villalon
Adm. Case No. 3910. August 14, 2000
De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS
Villalon is the family lawyer of ducats. the original title of ducat sr was handed to villalon. The handing over has two
contradictory versions of reason, first because it is given as part of process to convey the land because of the good services of
villalon as villalon claimed, on the other hand, allegedly because the latter
reasoned that he shall check the measurements of the land subject of title as alleged by ducat jr. Ducat sr allegedly because of
his want to give the land to villalon executed a deed of sale of the land in favor of villalon. But because it was discovered that
the land is registered in the name of ducat jr,a deed of sale was forged to make it appear that there was one, ducusin was the
notary public there
Issue:
Ruling: villalon is guilty of gross misconduct for being involved in fraudulent notarization and forgery of signature. Public
confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. A lawyer may
be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor. 1 yr suspension
[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]
ROMANA R. MALIGSA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, Respondent.
DECISION
Lawyer and Legal Profession
PER CURIAM:
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct
unbecoming a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 19921 over a piece of property subject of a
pending civil case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-
5434.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He failed to comply despite service upon him of our
Resolution together with copy of the complaint.
On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his
right to do so and directed the case submitted for decision.
On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against
respondent for making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Quitclaim in question that the affiant therein signed
the document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact
the affiant did not and could not have done so.
The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor
of Juanito V. Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. 3 The subject document was notarized by
respondent on the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for
annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order plus damages.
The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the
affiant Irene Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.4 Moreover, Irene Maligsa could not have signed the
document because she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered."
5
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 6 provides
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under
the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned document specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally
appeared IRENE MALIGSA x x x x" 7 Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally appear before the Notary Public or any
other person authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments or documents.
In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the
alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before respondent

notary public on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require
the personal appearance of the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the affiant.
Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as
a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,8 the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his client's property which was still
the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and Art. II of
the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in the
practice of law is apropos.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from
doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession. 9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and protection of the
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public
and the courts and the administrative offices generally.10 Notarization of a private document converts the document into a
public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his
office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect
of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent
upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By
his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 11
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he
was penalized with a six (6) month suspension from the practice of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades
the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy
of his continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
Lawyer and Legal Profession
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar decorum must at all
times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya.
On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
Complaint-Affidavit1 with supporting documents2 against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct,
specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 3 The charge in the
complaint is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003,
respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino
Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del
Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil
Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision of
the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this
respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will certify the Court of Appeals’ Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I
would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy?" Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, "Sir, it’s in the
Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing." Respondent then replied, "Then you
should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then,
but you never bothered to notify me." Complainant replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement."
Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?" Complainant responded,
"No, Sir, I mean, it’s not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals’ decision." Respondent
angrily declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?" ("You mean to say you don’t care anymore?
Is that the way it is?") He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the
door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place. 4
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant and shouted,
"Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!" ("Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill
 Lawyer and Legal Profession

feelings against my client, don’t turn your ire on me!") Complainant was shocked at respondent’s words but still managed to Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
reply, "I don’t even know your client, Sir." Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainant’s window, he again
shouted, "Ukinnam nga babai!" ("Vulva of your mother, you woman!")5
Rule 8.02—A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it
is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and still is, the head neglectful counsel.
and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command
full respect from her staff.6
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached
upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit7 signed by employees of RTC-
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer
employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on 25 September 2003.8
of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it ill-
mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates.
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order9 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent
submitted his Compliance10 dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,16 respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down
847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30.
the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. 17 These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule
He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847
8.01, to wit:
before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records
of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in
public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no
explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the
records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to the court of origin. Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
resolution.11 Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was still
recuperating from physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness
with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the same Manifestation.12
and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.18
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of respondent’s public
apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.13
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the charges in the complaint.
Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for breach
of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.14 The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondent’s uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He
and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.15
has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a case
against respondent pending before this Court.19 We, however, cannot acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He
need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had apologized to the complainant
their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified true copy of its decision.
and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.
unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them,
respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
 Lawyer and Legal Profession

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,
perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It
emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance of professional duty. 20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (₱10,000.00) PESOS
with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar
Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST

ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO

Facts:
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and VP of
IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the records of Civil Case No.
784 had already been remanded to the MCTC.  Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case. 
  Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the CA
decision should first be presented.  To this respondent retorted, “You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to
get a copy?”  Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents.
Respondent then replied that complainant should’ve notified him. Complainant explained that it is not her duty to
notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door
so loud. He then returned to the office and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!”  (“Vulva of your mother, you woman!”) 
  Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearing of the case in view of the
respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.

Held:
Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.
Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will enter his
appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the
counsel of record respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02, because this
was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.
  His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was not only ill-mannered but
also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the complainant’s subordinates.   For these, he violated
Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized   to   the   complainant   and   the   latter accepted it. This
is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
1

7A.C. No. 6672               September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims. 4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent
them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his
lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached
"respondent’s" calling card:6

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that respondent had encroached on the
professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened
the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the
CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus,
Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the
public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. 15 Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to
gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.18

Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of
Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.1avvphi1

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the
latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his
office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
(such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling
for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. 24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-
solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the
legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the
IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in
reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the
legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt
of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED

CASE DIGEST

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them,
Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01

Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card.

Issue:
W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services

Held:
Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants
advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the
public’s estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to
Rule 1.03, which proscribes “ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from
barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserves no place in the legal profession.

[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000.]

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Complainant, v. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P.
BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary:red

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado
C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from
the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and
effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the
aforementioned civil case which in effect required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any
member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or
execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole
purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation
of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B.
De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who
apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was
immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.

The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-
30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of
Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March
1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of
apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of
apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology,
dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC
President.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court
where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the
manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon
dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex ‘A’ and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for
being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case."cralaw
virtua1aw library

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already the
retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were
represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating
the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent whether by design or
because of oversight is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell
short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the
Manifestation 1 which, among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement
with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and
agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous
dismissal.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"x       x       x

"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will be filed by them."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings, nevertheless, the recommended
six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of Respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective
immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest
CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN

FACTS
AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling some students due to having published objectionable features or
articles in the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel
for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the
subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from
the expelled students and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have against AMACC and to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the
consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty.
Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics

HELD
YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics.
In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained
counsel for the students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty.
Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least communicating the matter with their lawyer even being
aware that the students were being represented by counsel.
Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter
disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is
the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel."

G.R. No. L-14277             April 30, 1960

MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.

Manuel L. Fernandez in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.

LABRADOR, J.:

Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to annul two orders dated June 16 and July 29, 1958, of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Eloy B. Bello, presiding. The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as counsel in Special Proceedings No.
3931, entitled "Guardianship of the Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed Perreyras, Timotea Perreyras, petitioner-guardian," orders him to return
to the guardian within 15 days the sum of P200.00 collected by him, and causes a copy of the order to be sent to the Supreme Court for corresponding
disciplinary action on the petitioner (Annex J). The second order denies petitioner's motion for reconsideration and warns him not to use improper terms
in his pleadings. (Annex L.)

The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be briefly stated as follows: Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as
her counsel, instituted Special Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her brothers, the minors
Federico and Pedro Perreyras. Upon her appointment and upon her qualifying as such, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in
common with the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umañgay. The request was granted by Judge Villamor, and on
August 24, 1951, a deed of sale, prepared and notarized by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, was executed by the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umañgay for
the sum of P1,000. This sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952 (Annex C).

The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay by Florentino
Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay were, in turn,
sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, redemption price of the
nipa land and as assignee of the credit in favor of Maximiano Umañgay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00 was given to said attorney, in payment
of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father of the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not show that these
payments were authorized by the court.

On January 21, 1958, Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court from Judge Pasicolan, issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show cause why
she should not be punished for contempt for failing to account for the property and money of the wards. After hearing the guardian Timotea Perreyras,
the court issued another order date January 20, 1958, exonerating her of the contempt charges, disapproving all payments made by her, including that
made to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, and requiring Attys. Manuel L. Fernandez and Braulio Fernandez to show cause why they should not be suspended
from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the same order, the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with
the guardian and having taken money from her without previous approval of the court (Annex D). Atty. Braulio Fernandez submitted a written
explanation, and the court, considering it satisfactory, exonerated him of the preferred charges. On January 30, 1958, the court again issued another
order directing Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to submit in ten days a written answer to the charges stated in the order of January 27, 1958 (Annex G). On
February 1, 1958, he submitted an explanation (Annex H.), admitting receipt of the sum of P400.00 from the guardian, but alleging that when he received
the amount he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation had terminated when the guardian secured the services of Atty. Braulio
Fernandez; that he acted in good faith and the guardianship proceedings were instituted by him only to help the minors the action being less expensive
than an intestate proceeding, and that he was paid only P50.00 for his services to the guardian. So he asked that the charges be dismissed and that the
guardian be warned not to make unjustifiable complaints against him.

On February 10, 1953, Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay were summoned to appear for further examination on the proceeds of the sale of
the nipa land. After hearing their testimonies, the court on June 16, 1958, found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt of court because he had
taken the amount of P400.00 from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the court. The court also found the conduct of counsel to be
anomalous for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid attorney's fees due him from the father of
the wards (Annex J). This is the first order sought to be annulled in this appeal. The second order is that denying the motion for reconsideration of
respondent attorney.

It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings conducted in the court below are irregular because no formal charge was filed against him.
There is no merit in this contention. The court motu proprio preferred the charges in its order dated January 20, 1958, and in another order dated
January 27, 1958, the petitioner was duly advised thereof and was given an opportunity to file a written answer thereto. It has been held in the following
case that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of law:

The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold person guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and
punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person
charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. The above
requirements were complied with by the filing of the order on September 30, and the giving of full opportunity to the respondent to appear
and defendant himself. The contention that a formal information filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin proceedings must be
overruled. (People vs. B. M. Venturanza, et al., defendants, Jose Y. Torres, appellant, 98 Phil., 211; 52 Off. Gaz. [2] 769.).

The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt court on two grounds, the first is that he instituted the guardianship proceedings for the sole
purpose of facilitating payment to him of the debts of the wards. The facts do not, however, bear out this finding. Before the guardianship proceedings
were instituted, the wards were indebted in the sum of P200.00 to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umañgay, and as the wards had no money with
which to pay the debt, the only way to settle it is by selling the nipa land. But the land could not have been sold by the minors without intervention of a
guardian. So the petitioner must have believed that guardianship proceedings was the proper remedy. The judges of the court below, from whom Judge
Bello took over, must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the petitioner was more beneficial to the wards when they appointed a guardian
and approved the sale of the land. As there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner, the finding on this point of the court below should be
reversed.

However, the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1,000 was in custodia legis and could not be taken and used in payment of debts
without its previous authority is correct. As a lawyer the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of the wards are under
the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the money
taken was to pay the debt of the father of the wards. The reprimand is, therefore, fully justified. But the order for the refund of the P200.00 and the
closing of the guardianship proceedings after such return, would deprive petitioner of the fees that he was entitled to receive from the father of the
guardian and the wards, for services rendered in a civil case, which services are admitted to have been due from their father. While the reprimand is in
order for petitioner's mistake, the mistake is no sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his client could not pay
before his death. The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid
their just and lawful fees. Certainly the court can not deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.

In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order for the return of the P200.00 on the ground that petitioner is "below average
standard of a lawyer." The opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fee. It is the contract between the
lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won a civil case for his client, the deceased father of the guardian and
the wards. That P200.00 is the amount of the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing petitioner to return
the P200.00, and in effect denying him the right to collect the same, is not justified, to say the least. This portion of the final order is hereby modified in
the sense that the return of the P200.00 is without prejudice to petitioner's right to demand payment for the services rendered the deceased out of the
proceeds of the property left by him (deceased).

In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be stricken out for employing strong language. We believe
the said strong language must have been impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner as
"anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If any
one is to blame for the language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked
petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself;
he who sows the wind will reap a storm.

Wherefore, the orders are modified as above indicated. Without costs.

CASE DIGEST

MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ vs. HON. ELOY B. BELLO G.R. No. L-14277, 30 April 1960

FACTS:

In the course of the proceeding, Judge Bello stated that Fernandez does not deserve the P200.00 attorney’s fees because Fernandez is a “below average 
standard of a lawyer.” Fernandez then responded with strong language

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strong language used by Atty. Fernandez against Judge Bello is forgivable.

RULING:

Yes. In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration be stricken out for employing strong language. We beli
eve the said strong language must have been impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner as “anom
alous and unbecoming” and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee “through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner.” If anyone is to bl
ame for the language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked petitioner, a
nd the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows 
the wind will reap a storm.

[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000

 ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO Petitioner, v. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated March 17, 19941 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which
reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the
Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City.

The relevant facts are summarized as follows:

On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yaredfiled an amended complaint[2 before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI,
against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment of affidavit of
adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and damages.

In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the
sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of
the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both were among
several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May
10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and that
respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.

To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547,
T-4666 and T-52546,3 which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or transferred from TCT
Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the name of Tiongco.

After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which, on three separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the
notices of lis pendens.4 All these motions were denied.[5

On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision[6 dismissing petitioner's complaint and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court
found that petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[7on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens[8
dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated January 10, 1994.[9 He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"[10 which was also
denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.[11 Displaying remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for Reconsideration."[12 This
time, however, his arguments proved persuasive. In an Order[13dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge ruled to wit:

In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs.
Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment
in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof so that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff's
action had already prescribed, which finding is based on the admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was registered way back of May 10,
1974 so that the possibility of this finding being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and, considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this
case, among which are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the same deed of
adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were alleged as
formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to
plaintiff without the latter intervening, much less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared with
finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of
subject lots consisting only a total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has torrens title covering the parcels of
lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and
upon further review of the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the continued annotation of
subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights, if
any, are now foreclosed by prescription.

This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.[14 On March 4, 1994, the public respondent issued an Order[15 reversing himself on the
ground that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal has
been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration[16 against the Order dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent
judge issued the order, subject of this petition, which is quoted hereunder:

Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the
records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted
to the appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens annotated on
TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation of
lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square meters
claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens
on TCT No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 andon TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.

On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis pendens.[17

Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL
CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that
properties in litigation are still within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.[18 The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.19

Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[20 and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[21 otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis pendens. From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only in:

a) An action to recover possession of real estate;

b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;

d) An action for partition; and

e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.[22

Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property to put the property under the coverage of the rule.[23 It
is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pendens.

Whether as a matter, of procedure[24 or substance,[25 the rule is that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party
who caused it to be recorded.[26

The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past
jurisprudence.

Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27 that:

[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts
that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that
courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28 thus:

xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals
(formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the
restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed
upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ
of certiorari sought against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is no discernible special and important reason for not
presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce
the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,[29

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a
number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court
despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be
sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstance justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,[30 Aleria v. Velez, [31 and Tano v. Socrates.[32 Only the presence of exceptional and
compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule.[33
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There
is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the appeal of the main case
was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34 we ruled, to wit:

The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in
the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally
determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by
the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary
attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's appeal.
It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule
that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents
thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. [emphasis supplied]

Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby
bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case will be incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical
language employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both before us and the
court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress
which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar,"[35 is impelled by
less than less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self
the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[36 a retired police major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio bonito,"[37 an unmarried
mestizo with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for being houseless[38 who rents a place on the subject property sought to be recovered by petitioner.
Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is
now ready to skin defendant alive for not being a bastard,"[39 and a "horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon who would
stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired
object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at her behind her back."[40 He claims that Atty. Deguma, a
lawyer with the Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to be ambitious enough to
secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no lest than an IMDC
major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass and audacity.[41 In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own benefit.[42
Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no
happiness."[43

Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast with little
regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a shocking absence
of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to
comport themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:

CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL
AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before the courts.

In Romero v. Valle,44 we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he
upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed
by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court.[45 We are aghast at the facility
with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public record that in
Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,[46 we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner, Major
Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though
entertaining, do not find a ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina,
si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.[47

WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST
CASE 16
: Yared v. Ilarde
FACTS
: Estrella Yared, substituted by Carmen Tiongco because the former is now dead, and Jose Tiongco were opposing parties to a property in litigation.
Carmen directly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Supreme Court because Judge Ilarde of the RTC ordered the cancellati on of annotation of
notices of lis pendens. The Supreme Court noticed and commented that Carmen has failed to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy and that she
should have filed the petition in the CA first.However, the Supreme Court also noticed the improper and unethical language employed by Jose Tiangco,
who was also a counsel for the private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both in SC and lower court. He described the counsel of the
petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, ―a rambunctious wreastler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and who stampedes into
the court room like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar.‖ Jose Tiongco alleged that Atty. Deguma does that ―to
please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available Carmelo Tiongco, an unmarried mestizo who lives with Carmen.‖ He further
described Atty. Deguma as ―an unmarried maiden of certain age‖ and a ―love-crazed female Apache who is ready to skin the defendant alive for not
being a bastard‖ and a ―horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon.‖ He also stated that Atty. Deguma is using PAO as a
―marriage bureau for her own benefit.‖

ISSUE
: W/N Jose Tiongco, being also one of the counsels of the defendants, violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
: Yes. With the language that he employed, he obviously violated

Canon 8-A Rule 8.01 which states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.
He also violated Rule 11.03 which says that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language before the courts. The SC also cited
Romero vs Valle, ―although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral,
should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another.‖ Jose Tiongco was merely warned.

Note: In the first part of the case, even the title of the case, it was not mentioned whether Jose Tiongco is a lawyer or not. Then, there‘s one sentence
which addressed him ―Atty. Jose Tiongco.‖

A.C. No. 7269               November 23, 2011

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale
over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where
Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany
Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s
collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela
Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with
him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente’s
former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer 1 presented as proof by
Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented
Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for
him since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings
of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente’s only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his
former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s staff, alleging Macasieb’s failure to endorse pleadings and notices
of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit and that there was no mention
that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working at
Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb
resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmente’s allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally
practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s allegation that
his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right
to submit the report.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-
271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmente’s
suspension to six months.

Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with
standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No.
XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmente’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension
from the practice of law.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the IBP.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a
source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of
that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for
the general practice of law.6

The Court explained:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 7

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law
through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned
from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente’s office until
2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.

We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban
(Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban
set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in
the case, considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente’s office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the
Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report
shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were other
documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003.
Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants
of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.

Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to
inquire about its status. Busmente’s allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:

a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite
718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.

b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of
her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro
Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our
lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not be
taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us
(sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of
those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that
the following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:

1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to
practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has
legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings
in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to
Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente
should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.1âwphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be also
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST.

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA v. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, AC. No. 7269, 2011-11-23

Facts:

Noe-Lacsamana alleged... that

Ulaso's deed of sale over the property... was annulled, which resulted... in the filing of an ejectment case

Busmente appeared as counsel.

Another case... for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel.

Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon... verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer... and
that his signature in the Answer... presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

Issues:

whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

Ruling:

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law
through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente's staff

It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente's claim that Macasieb already resigned, if
Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente's office.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the instant case.

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to
Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility

A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory
Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and
Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file
a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by
Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint 1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office
of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the
Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty.
Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other
documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s
signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of
Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo.
Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty.
Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed
against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-
0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper
complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty.
Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged.
Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints
signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-
complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that
not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane
Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by
Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to
Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary
pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by
the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that
Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a
mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but
respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP.
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit
their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position
paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty.
Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to
exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E.
Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the
various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent
was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer.
The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover,
respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar
Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain
responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself
out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find
out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have
known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit. 8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter,
Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29
January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold
respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his
law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the
Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of
law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although
he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to
support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to
these matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated
events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify
the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had
an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however,
admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he
was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint
Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia
were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-
lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of
Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not
administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case
against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 CASE DIGEST

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA vs.

ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER
A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013
Facts:

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a
complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a
co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.

The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office
of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the
Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty.
Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact.

The Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint’s validity.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that
the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.

The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for insufficiency of evidence. The administrative case for
dishonesty was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence.

Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they
were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated
further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report   by the PNP Crime
Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report
concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and
the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.

Issue:
        Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is administratively liable

Ruling:

Yes. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of
his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A LAWYER SHALL NOT,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of
Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, the court finds Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

Penalty: suspension from the practice of law for one year

Adm. Case No. 3066 October 26, 1999

J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and SPOUSES JESUS and ROSARIO K. MERCADO, complainants,
vs.
EDUARDO DE VERA and JOSE RONGKALES BANDALAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION

VITUG, J.:

The petition for disbarment filed by J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. ("Mercado and Sons"), and the spouses Jesus K. Mercado and
Rosario P. Mercado against Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera and Atty. Jose Rongkales Bandalan, the former Regional Trial Court Judge of Davao City, Branch 14,
is an offshoot of Civil Case No. 17215, an action for "dissolution/liquidation of conjugal partnership, accounting, support with support pendente lite,
annulment of contract, reconveyance or recovery of possession of conjugal share, partition, damages, and attorneys fees" filed by Rosario P. Mercado
("R. Mercado") against Jesus K. Mercado ("J. Mercado"), Mercado and Sons, and Standard Fruits Corporation ("Stanfilco"). The case was assigned to the
sala of then Judge Bandalan. Representing R. Mercado was Atty. De Vera.

On 15 December 1986, Judge Bandalan decided the case in favor of R. Mercado. She was awarded the sum of a little over P9 million. On 19 December
1986, J. Mercado and Mercado and Sons filed a timely notice of appeal. Stanfilco, for its part, filed a motion for reconsideration. On 05 January 1987,
Judge Bandalan granted the motion for execution pending appeal filed by Atty. De Vera. On even date, the judge likewise granted Atty. De Vera's "motion
to note plaintiffs counsel's statement of claim of Attorney's lien (charging and retaining) and motion to direct Provincial Registry of Deeds of Davao to
annotate such liens on the certificates of titles of (the) Mercado spouses." On 12 January 1998, a writ of execution was issued. Two days later or on 14
January 1987, notices of garnishment under execution pending appeal were served by Sheriff Aquillo Angon on the respective managers of RCBC,
Claveria, Davao City; RCBC, Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Traders Royal Bank, City Hall Drive, Davao City; and Traders Royal Bank, R. Magsaysay Ave., Davao
City. It would appear that a total amount of P1,270,734.56 was garnished.1âwphi1.nêt
On 26 February 1987, R. Mercado terminated the services of Atty. De Vera, offering the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She, at the
same time, demanded an accounting and the turn-over of the money still in the possession of Atty. De Vera. The latter refused to heed the demand,
claiming that pursuant to the decision, he should, in fact, be entitled to P2,254,217.00 by way of attorney's fees. Failing to recover what she had felt was
lawfully due to her, R. Mercado filed disbarment proceedings against Atty. de Vera. The matter was initially referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation; however, upon the approval and implementation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the case was
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") and assigned to Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda.

Assailing the conduct of the proceedings, Atty. De Vera filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, docketed G.R. No. 96333,
to enjoin Commissioner Pineda from continuing with the investigation. The petition was dismissed by the Court, in its resolution 1 of 02 September 1992,
and Commissioner Pineda was directed to proceed and to submit his report to the Court within ten (10) days from notice. Prior to his receipt of the
resolution, however, Commissioner Pineda had ceased to be the IBP hearing officer; consequently, the case was re-assigned to Commissioner Plaridel C.
Jose.

Noting that the proper forum of complaints against Justices and judges of lower courts is the Supreme Court, Commissioner Jose dismissed the case
against Judge Bandalan for lack of jurisdiction. In his report, dated 04 November 1992, Commissioner Jose recommended the dismissal of the disbarment
case "without prejudice to the rights of the parties to ventilate the question of attorney's fees that should be due to Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera before the
proper forum." It would appear that a clarificatory addendum report, dated 06 December 1993, was later submitted by Commissioner Jose.

Meanwhile, on 23 March 1993, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. X-93-41 recommending to the Supreme Court the suspension of Atty.
De Vera from the practice of law for one (1) year and dismissing the case against Judge Bandalan for lack of jurisdiction. This action of the IBP Board of
Governors prompted Atty. De Vera to file Administrative Case No. 4438 seeking the disbarment of Attorneys Mervyn G. Encanto, Numeriano G. Tanopo.,
Jr., Jose Aguila Grapilon, Beda G. Fajardo, Rene C. Villa, and Carmen Leonor P. Mercado-Alcantara for grave misconduct, violation of the lawyer's oath,
and malpractice. Atty. De Vera averred that the resolution of 23 March 1993 was not formally discussed, deliberated upon, actually adopted nor passed
upon during, and before the expiration of, the term of office of the members of the IBP Board of Governors. He also accused Atty. Alcantara of conspiring
with the IBP officers in the preparation, rendition and release of the resolution, citing the latter's motions for early resolutions filed on 12 October 1993
and 26 July 1994. He, finally, alleged that a copy of the resolution was sent to him only on 09 June 1995.

Atty. Numeriano G. Tanopo, Jr., explained that Resolution No. X-93-41 was adopted at a special meeting convened on 23 March 1993 by Executive Vice
President Mervyn Encanto during which Governors Jose Aguila Grapilon, Ma. Zita C. Valera, Beda G. Fajardo, Rene C. Villa and Teodoro D. Nano, Jr., were
in attendance. The resolution was placed in the charge of the Directorate for Bar Discipline for the procurement of the signatures of the members of the
IBP Board of Governors. Since the members from the nine different IBP regions would normally visit the National Office only once a month, it was not
unusual for the signing of resolutions to take place a month or so following board meetings. The adoption of the assailed resolution, according to Atty.
Tanopo, had no taint of irregularity at all, asserting that the term of office of the aforenamed members of the Board of Governors expired only on 30
June 1993. Atty. Tanopo himself expressed surprise why the "Addendum Report," dated 06 December 1993, had surfaced nine months after the
adoption of the resolution of the Board of Governors in A.C. No. 3066. He explained that the newly-elected members of the IBP Board of Governors, in a
special meeting held on 18 December 1993, noted that "the previous Board under President Tanopo already rendered a decision in the above-entitled
case as embodied under Resolution No. X-93-41 dated March 23, 1993, except that the same has not been forwarded to the Supreme Court inasmuch as
some members of the previous Board had not affixed their signatures on the copy of the decision." Hence, he said, Resolution No. XI-93-170 was passed
directing Governor Agustinus Gonzaga, Chairman of the Committee on Bar Discipline, "to require the members of the immediately preceding Board of
Governors to affix their signatures on their decision in the above-entitled case," and that, therefore, it was not possible for Atty. De Vera to be informed
sooner of the resolution of his case.

Attorneys Mervyn G. Encanto, Jose Aguila Grapilon, Beda G. Fajardo, Rene C. Villa and Ma. Zita C. Valera added that the adoption of Resolution No. X-93-
41 was duly taken up and considered in the Special Meeting held on 23 March 1993. Attorneys Grapilon, Tanopo, Encanto and Fajardo were able to sign
the resolution before the expiration of their term on 30 June 1993. Atty. Valera affixed his signature in the early part of 1994 while Atty. Villa also did so
sometime in October 1994 or thereabouts. Attorneys Estenzo and Nano were unable to sign the resolution at all. Atty. Encanto said that he could not
have given a copy of the resolution to Atty. De Vera when the latter went to his office in May 1994 since the resolution was not yet ready for release at
the time nor could he then discuss the matter with Atty. De Vera because of the rule on confidentiality of pending proceedings.

Atty. Alcantara, in her case, denied the charge that she had conspired with the IBP officers in the issuance of the IBP Board resolution and pointed out
that the motions for early resolution she filed would show nothing more than an adherence to the regular procedure adopted in resolving A.C. No. 3066.

Atty. De Vera, in his reply, contended that the Minutes could not be taken to be a true and faithful recording of the proceedings. He cited, for instance,
the absurdity that while on page four thereof, the minutes indicated that Commissioner Plaridel Jose was asking for thirty days from 21 October 1992
within which to submit his report in A.C. No. 3066, Resolution No. X-93-37 approved the request granting Commissioner Jose a period of thirty days from
21 October 1993 within which to submit the report. For another, the request for extension of time to submit the report was granted on the same day the
report was taken up. He likewise questioned why the IBP Board of Governors evidently failed to consider that Commissioner Jose had actually submitted
two reports.

In A.C. No. 3066 —

While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services
rendered. So, also, he must be protected against clients who wrongly refuse to give him his just due. In Albano vs. Coloma, 2 this Court has said:

Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting
solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he
is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is
indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his
due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by
counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation. 3

Correlatively, a lawyer is entitled to a "lien over funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession. 4
Under Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 5 he may "apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client." 6 In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client
agrees with the lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the
lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees; instead, it
should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with the proper court to fix the
amount of his attorney's fees. 7 If a lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of his claimed compensation
even when there is a disagreement between him and his client would not only be violative of the trust relationship between them but can
also open the door to possible abuse by those who are less than mindful of their fiduciary duty.

The Court cannot ignore the findings made by the IBP Board of Governors, in its resolution of 23 March 1993, hereunder reproduced; viz:
 The records show that complainant Mrs. Mercado, assisted by her erstwhile counsel, respondent de Vera was able to withdraw
garnished funds from the banks in the total amount of P1,270,734.56 on January 14, 1987 and January 16, 1987 (Exhs. "CC" and
"DD", "30" and "31"). Said withdrawals were in consequence of an Order dated January 12, 1987 issued by Judge Bandalan (Exh.
"K" or "15"). As prayed for by complainant Mrs. Mercado per motion for execution pending appeal (Exh. "G" or "14") filed in her
behalf by respondent de Vera, she was almost 73 years old, in poor health and needed the amount for her daily subsistence and
medical needs.

There was an open admission by respondent de Vera as borne by his entire testimony, that he was with Mrs. Mercado in the banks
to assist her to withdraw the garnished funds.

Complainant Mrs. Mercado's testimony on June 13, 1989 that she was staying in a boarding house (TSN, June 13, 1989, page 14)
and that the money, then about P911,374.95 out of the garnished amount of P1,223,874.95 after depositing P300,000.00 with
Metro Bank and TRB (TSN, September 5, 1989, pages 31 to 36, Exhs. "MM" & "NN") are more than enough reasons not to
withdraw or encash the garnished amounts in the form of Manager Checks. If not only for respondent de Vera's prodding and
insistence, complainant Mrs. Mercado would not have withdrawn and encashed such a huge amount of money, only to bring it to
an unsafe boarding house which understandably could not provide a guarded and safer depository of such huge amount of money,
as in banks. Why would complainant Mrs. Mercado withdraw from the banks the whole amount of P1,223,873.95, and on the
same day, deposit P300,000.00 in other banks and carry with her P911,374.95?

The scheming plot of respondent de Vera is too obvious to escape notice.

With so much money contained in six bags, respondent de Vera invited the aging complainant Mrs. Mercado to his house,
convinced the old lady to leave the money with him as accordingly, she did not have a room in her boarding house and that it
would be safe if she left the money with him.

xxx xxx xxx

That respondent de Vera was, upon his unilateral estimation, entitled to about P2.250 Million in attorney's fees, would not
exculpate him from the condemnable act of infidelity in the custody of his client's funds. He was duty bound to turn over and
render a full accounting of what he received in satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of complainant Mrs. Mercado in Civil
Case No. 17215. The relation between client and attorney is one of trust and confidence.

Regrettably, Atty. De Vera would appear to have indeed gone over the bounds of propriety when he refused to turn-over to his client the amount in
excess of the P350,000.00 he was, in effect, allowed to retain. His disagreement with the client, of course, entitled him to take proper legal steps in order
to recover what he might feel to be his just due but, certainly, it was not a matter that he could take into his own hands.

The Court is not prepared to conclude, however, that the circumstances detailed by the IBP would create an impression, as so suggested in the resolution
of 23 March 1993, that respondent lawyer somehow had much to be responsible for in the turn of events that led to his possession of the funds of his
client. In any event, the proven actuations of Atty. De Vera, in the view of the Court, would sufficiently warrant a commensurate disciplinary action.

In A.C. No. 4438 —

A close review of the IBP proceedings, substantially reflected in the Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Governors, would indicate to the Court that no
serious irregularity attended the adoption of Resolution No. X-93-41 insofar, particularly, as it recommended the suspension of Atty. De Vera from the
practice of law. Respondents were able to adequately show why the assailed resolution of the Board of Governors' recommendation could not have
been accomplished on the same day of the meeting. Evidently; it was not an uncommon practice for board resolutions to be signed on different dates by
the members of the Board of Governors. While Resolution No. X-93-41 had been signed by some of the previous members of the Board of Governors
after the expiration of their term of office, the action attested to by the resolution, nevertheless, would unquestionably disclose that it was adopted
during their tenure. In fact, the succeeding members of the Board of Governors affirmed, in their meeting of 18 December 1993, that the "previous
Board . . . already rendered a decision . . . as embodied under Resolution No. X-93-41 dated March 23, 1993 . . . " but that only some members of the
previous Board had yet to affix their signatures thereat. There might have been some inconsistencies in the assailed minutes of the meeting of the Board
of Governors, but these incongruences hardly would establish convincingly, a concerted effort on the part of respondents to manipulate the outcome of
the case against Atty. De Vera.

The charge against Atty. Alcantara likewise has nothing much to stand on. The allegation that she has been bragging about the fact that she could have
Atty. De Vera disbarred because of her influence in the IBP is not substantiated. Her motions for the early resolution of the case, after the IBP Board of
Governors adopted Resolution No. X-93-41, only confirm the long delay in the release of the resolution and, indeed, her apparent lack of knowledge of
the final resolution theretofore reached by the Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, in Administrative Case No. 3066, Resolution No.

X-93-41, dated 23 March 1993, of the IBP Board of Governors, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months and he is further DIRECTED to return to Rosario K. Mercado the amount in his possession in excess of P350,000.00,
without prejudice to whatever judicial action he may take to recover his unsatisfied attorney's fees, if any. His suspension stands until he has
satisfactorily shown to the Court his compliance therewith. Copies of this resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and spread on the
personal record of Atty. De Vera.1âwphi1.nêt

Administrative Case No. 4438 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.

Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.

R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash
payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount
as and for attorney's fees.

We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this
Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have
heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national
impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly
on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were
also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual
working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later,
petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September
6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went
to his home province to recuperate.

In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his
working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work
during his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel
refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was
driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a
single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was
allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund
of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to
pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging
petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two
years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence
the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.

Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was
employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990;
and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that
private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and,
therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4

Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general
prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has
recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be
made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the
employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is
necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the
employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his
"boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized
deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.

However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:

YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00

1988 720.00 760.00 200.00

1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00

 1990 605.00 570.00

1991 165.00 2,300.00

———— ———— ————

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is
even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the
present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the
same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as
a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition
when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to
shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this
practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to
prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted,
car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves,
or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of
private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to
attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7
necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for
reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by
petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to
the date of actual payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST

Five J Taxi and Armamiento vs. NLRC Case Digest

Five J Taxi and/or Juan Armamiento vs. NLRC 

235 SCRA 556 

Facts: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days
weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they
were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their boundary, for every actual
working day. 

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Petitioners
learned that he was working for Mine of Gold Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 1983, he was
held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to this home
province to recuperate. 

In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his
working schedule was made on an alternative basis where he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work
during his schedule. On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his boundary of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in
Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was
revealed that he was driving a taxi for Bulaklak Company. 

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a
single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was
allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund
of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to
pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. 

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging
petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. 

Issue: Whether or not the deductions made were illegal and if illegal, considered a prohibition regarding wages. 

Ruling: The Court declares that the deposits made amounts to the prohibition provided by law. The deposits made were illegal and the respondents must
be refunded. 

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows: 

Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of
loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or
business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
rules and regulations. 
It can be deduced that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer.
Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his boundary. 

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as
a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has given to the same clean condition
when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to
shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this
practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to
prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted,
car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

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