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    Reinstatement of Law on Local Government - Angeles

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    40 views362 pages

    Reinstatement of Law On Local Government - Angeles

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    Lorenzo Czar
    Reinstatement of Law on Local Government - Angeles

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    RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DR. JOSEPH EMMANUEL L. ANGELES 4 REX Book Store i —— REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BOOKI General Provisions TITLE! Basic Principles CHAPTER I ‘The Code: Policy and Application SECTION 1. Title. — This Act shall be known and cited as the “Local Government Code of 1991". §1.1 “Local Government” defined. A local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.” “Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v, Bel-Air Village Associa Ine., 328 SCRA 696 (2000). uae Local OF THE LAW ON’ RESTATE ET ERNMENT nment Unit” defined. ‘9f 1991 defines a local government eo eee endowed with powers as 12 “Local Gover ‘The Local Government ie and corporate” a poem “ody pole the National Government and as 8 corporate 1 pokitieal subd ‘entity representing the inhabit ry.? Local government inhabitants of its territo ; nity Tre composed of the provinces, cities, Hct cipalities and 2s. SThey are also the territorial and polities! subdivisions barangays. ofthe state 1.8 Development of local governments in the Philippines. i {J administration the Spanish occupation, the unit of local | adeninitratin was: eet whieh ordinarily se eS Sc eae mi contained numerous “barr we beginning aeeaaiarda continued the native barangays, confi i ra fs chiefs in authority under the title of cabeza di re ne ae h ‘he towne were organized with a native official called the pebernadorctlo (literally “tle governor”), with the popular ttle areupitan, or the head. He was the representative of the provincial caer the arbiter of local questions except those assuming a severe Tegal aspect, was responsible for the collection of the taxes, serio veund to assist the parish priest, and entertained all visiting Officials. Assisting the gobernadorcillo were tenientes (deputies), Slguetles (eubordinate employees), and chiefs of police, fields and cattle. Elections for municipal offices were held annually by the ‘outgoing gobernadorcillo and twelve cabezas de barangay, chosen by lot, and presided over by the provincial governor with the parish priest permitted to be present. For the office of gobernadorcillo, the names of the three candidates were nominated by plurality vote and ‘sent to the Governor-General, or in outlying provinces to the governor, ‘who selected one for the position. Other municipal offices were chosen directly by the convention. “Republic Act No. 7160, Section 15 (1992); Metropolitan Manila Developmen! ‘Authority. Bel-Air Village Association, Ine, 328 SCRA 836 (2000), ‘Const Article X, Setion 1 (1987); Metropolitan Manila Development Authst? ‘BeAr Village Association, Ine, 328 SCRA 896 (2000) ‘Cons. Article X, Section 1 (1887); Republic Act No, 7160, Section 15 (192 ‘Metroplitan Marila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Villa tion, Inc. 28 rua Maria Development Authority . Bel Air Village Associa See. BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS 3 ‘Title — Basie Principles ‘The municipality was divided into barangays (barrios or wards) of about fifty families. For their administration, there were cabezas de barangay shorn of much of their previous powers, whose principal duties were to act as agents for the collection of taxes for the payment of which they were held responsible. They paid no tribute of their own account and became members of the principalia (principal men), the voting and privileged class. Originally hereditary, breaks in the family line were filled by appointments by the Spanish officials; eventually the position became generally elective with service compulsory. In the year 1893, there was promulgated the Maura Law taking its name from its author, the then Minister of the Colonies. It applied to the towns of Luzon and the Visayan Islands in which more than one thousand cedulas were paid. A municipal council of five, the captain and four lieutenants, was constituted and performed certain specified duties. It was given charge of the active work or governing the municipality, such as administration of public works, etc., and the details of taxation. In addition, each of its members was required to have special qualifications. These positions were honorary. The term of office was four years. The officers, together with two substitutes were elected by twelve delegates of the principalia. The latter was composed of all persons who had held certain positions or who had paid a land tax of 50 pesos. The Governor-General and the provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the council and its individual members; the provincial council also had supervision of the municipal council. An exception to the general plan was the organization of the City of Manila, and up to the time of the Maura Law, of the other principal cities, such as Moilo and Cebu, whose government followed quite closely that which prevailed in Spanish- America, which in turn was derived from Spain, Founded in 1571 by Legazpi as a Spanish City, Manila was speedily given recognition and entitled like so many Spanish cities of the peninsula “very Loyal and Noble City.” These corporation had the usual Spanish officials, including two alcaldes (mayor) and regidores (councilors) who virtually became self-perpetuating bodies.* Under the American occupation, the government of municipalities was first provided for in General Order No. 43 (1899), ‘This was superseded by General Order No. 40 (1900) promulgated "Martin, The Revised Administrative Code with Annotations, pp. 313-815 (1963) iting Malcolm, Government ofthe Philippine Islands, pp. 69-70. ili estATEMENT OF THELAW ON LOCAL. See “ GOVERNMENT by the Military Governor in accordance with the report oe a ‘ ief Justice Cayetano 7 ead Chie Jute Coan Pape Commision fy 7, 1900 urged and directed that body “to aor their attention int rst instance te sbeent of municipal corporations in whic Fete sland, both in the cites and rural COmmUnitis, Shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their ov local affairs sfushich they are capable, and subject to the tothe fullest extent of which he tre ea ot thee degree of supervision and cont capactse or observation of the workings of native controls show carer vonsistent with the maintenance of Iaw, order, and loyalty. In establishment of municipal governments, the Commission wi a yr ofthe work the govemments established bythe Military Governor, under the order of August 8, 1900, to formulate ‘and report a plan of municipal government, of which his Honor, Cayetano Arellano, President of the Audencia, was Chairman, ‘and they will give to the conclusions of that Board the weight and ‘consideration which the high character and distinguished abilities of its members justify.” Accordingly, the Philippine Commission passed ‘Act No. 82 on January 31, 1901, providing for the organization and government of municipalities, and Act No. 83 on February 5, 1901, for the organization of provinces. These Acts were subsequently ‘embodied with modifications in the Administrative Code of 1916° as, Chapters 56, 87, 64 and 67." ‘The Administrative Code was replaced by the Revised ‘Administrative Code of 1917" and the Assessment Law.” Afterwards, the 1985 Constitution came into force. The 1935 Constitution had no ‘specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control and supervision, the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to “general supervision +» a may be provided by law.” Pursuant to this principle under the 1886 Constitution eislation implementing local autonomy ‘was enacted. The legislature passed Local Autonomy Act of 1959," Barrio Charter of 1959," and Decentralization Act of 1967! “which FER Ran SE gg tt 8 meee. 0 (9 Republic Act No. 2264 (19659), a Rep Ne ne fh Hash (GENERAL PROVISIONS 5 See. BOOK 1 ‘Basic Principles Tile ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country. ‘The 1973 Constitution incorporated a state policy to guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units" and an entire article on local government." It called for the passage of local government code defining more responsive and accountable local government structures, The creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration could only be done in accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. Moreover, the power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically delegated to local governments. Pursuant thereto, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Local Tax Code," Real Property Tax Code,"” and Local Government Code of 1983."* Despite these legislative initiatives, the shackles of dependence on national government remained. Local government units were faced with the same problems that hampered their capabilities to participate effectively in the national development efforts, among which were: a) inadequate tax base, b) lack of fiscal control over ‘external sources of income, c) limited authority to prioritize and approve development projects, d) heavy dependence on external sources of income, and ¢) limited supervisory control over personnel of national line agencies.” ‘The 1987 Constitution adopted the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy and delegation of taxing authority in the 1973 Constitution’” and limited the President's power over local governments and autonomous regions to general supervision.” It ‘also added the following: 1) a directive to Congress enact a new local ‘government code” and organic acts for autonomous regions in Muslim ‘Mindanao and the Cordilleras;® 2) entitlement of local governments to just shares in national taxes which shall be automatically released Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, 181 SCRA 495 (2990); [National Power Corporation v. Cy of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259 (2003), "Const, Article Il, Section 10 (1973); Cons, Article XI, Setion 2 and 6 (1973). Const. Article XI (1873. Presidential Decree No, 21 (1973). "presidential Deeree No. 64 (1974) "™Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (1983); This law took effect on February 10, 1983. ‘National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 268 (2003). Const, Arle X, Section Zand 4 (1987). "Canst, Artile X, Section 4 and 16 (1987) "Const, Artile X, Section 3 (1987), "Const, Article X, ection 15 and 19 (1980). _ il LOCAL Bee, EMENT OF THE LAW ONL. 1 é SESTATEMENT OF THE A governments to an equitable to them nd 3) en anton and EVLOMEDE of saersaat wealth within ceit respective areas ns Inline with this Constitutional directive, Congress drafted the Local Gavernment Codeof 1991, Considered asthe mest roraiitiontry piece of legislation on local autonomy, the Code ly dealt with ent units. It widened the fiscal constraints faced by local Cie include taxes which wore local government unit lv th a aa fe ua the mpion of AX. or Products, forest concessonaires, mineral products, mining operations End the like, The Code likewise provided flesibilty to impose tax sites in accordance with their needs and capabilities. Tt did not preceribe graduated fixed rates but merely specified the minimum eee ayaniu tax rates and let the determination ofthe actual rates to the respeetive sanggunian™ (On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras granted political autonomy ‘and not mere administrative autonomy. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an exccutive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each ofthe autonomous regions.”” §1.4 Applicabili Since our law on municipal corporations is, in principle, patterned after that of the United States, the rules therein should ’be considered a part of our legal system. of US. jurisprudence. $1.5 Effectivity date of the Code. ‘The Local Government Code of 1991 took eff 1 1992alter pblation na newspaper of general eeulation Gin ArideX, Scion 6156 Gist Arie X Section 7 s8 7) ‘Netonal Power Corporation ¥ City of Caba "Candies Beet ent natuan, 401 SCRA 259 (2003). Comte alae 0 Audi, 181 SCRA 496 (1900 Mani, 24 SCRA S56 (L060) ngs Philippines v. Municipal Board of Cty of a. cna aan eng SY Muncpaly of Unset, Pocono ‘Ae No. 7160, Section 536 (1962), ae See 2 BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS ‘Title I — Basie Principles SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — (0) It Is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a ‘system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. {b) tis also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) _Itis likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. $2.1 Importance of policy sec The policy section like the preamble is available for the clarification of ambiguous provisions of the statute, but may not be used to create ambiguity.”’ The declaration of policy is not part of the substantive portion of the statute.”* §2.2 “Decentralization” defined. Decentralization is the process by which local government units are given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources bi the national government.” In this sense, itis substantially similes to “devolution.” Decentralization means devolution of national administration — but not power — to the local levels." Et tte mt tan “ace hy tte. cralrieane cena Se ES an RESTATEMENT OF THELAW ON LOCAL: Se GOVERNMENT §2.3 “Recall” defined. : Recall is a mode wal of a public officer by the peopie in a mode of rey office.” The people's prerogative y, peident oftheir sovereign Power an onal restraint, the power is impliej ia all absence of ) MeQuillin, The Lav of Municipal Corporations, §7.02 (8rd ed), Duluth v. (my 115 Minn 267, 132 NW 265, "8p MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 7.02 (8rd ed); Geod Deal of uy Hill Ine. v, Newark, 32 NJ 263, 160 A2l 620. 9 MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 7.02 (3ed ed) 49 MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 7.02 (rd ed), People v. Oakland, 92 Cal 611, 28 P 807; State v. Owens, $2 Fla 356, 109 So 428, TIA) MeQQillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 3.15.60 (Grd ed); In re Incorporation of Village to be Known as Village of Mitchell, 316 Il. App. 34 284, 743 N-E.24 871 (2000) WON LOCAL pesTATEMENTOF THE LAW RESTATEN GOVERNMENT $7.5 “Petition” requirement. sae vides then .e Implementing Rules prov Petition, vain ol ng es ei the ease maybe However, the Code doesnot require petition relations except where barangays are sought tobe created through The sungguniang panlalawigan.*" Senator Pimentel believes tha; tne petition requirement is directory but may facilitate the work g ion, division, merger, abolition Congress in the matter ofthe creati al io alteration of the boundaries of local government units. {§76 Voters of sub-province should not be excluded from voting for provincial officials. It is incorrect for the Commission on Elections to exclude the voters ofa sub-provinee from voting forthe positions of the Governor, Vice-Governor, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Under Section 462 ofthe Local Government Code, itis only when the voters ratify the conversion of the sub: province to a regular province thatthe President is empowered to appoint the officials of the newly created province." . §7.7 Law permitting creation of province or city by ARMM is unconstitutional, Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 She nire cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, locentea lepslave digit gy tently involves the power Been Rate 9412, (40, (eK) and AD) eting the Local Government Code of 1991. Dow ment 3 met 3 999) al mrt “moment Code of 1961: The Key to Nati “on on Elections 219 SCRA 672 1909, oO See. BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS 2 ‘Title — Basie Principles Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. x x x ‘To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office isto allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers “[wJithin its territorial jurisdiction x (Petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment. but. by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.” The contention has no merit. xx x (The Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because ()it validly created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the logislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1985 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present ease because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly. What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the ‘constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district. 181008 a _snareMT oF THE LAW . wee ‘GOVERNMENT Article VI of RA 90; we rule that Section 18, i _ Mional Assembly the power 1, An Hei grey Stn kof the Constitution, as wel In sammary. insofar as i grants to the treate provinees and cites. is as Section 3 ofthe Onintitge and cts because the ereation of Ginn a es 7 ce het MB provinces and cities nee ae centon of late power only Congres can exer te regan and Scion re rene he AE tom sembly cannot create a province Fanaa ee chal uve a lepslatvedistret. Moreover, the Can ee ver sembly cannot enact a AW creating @ national aaa ee ae fice ofa district representative of Congress because arias powers ofthe ARNDM Regional Assembly operate only sat ern justin as provided a Section 2, Aree ofthe Constitution, Thus, we rule that Mi enacted by J TERND Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shari Kebunsvan is void ™ SECTION 8. Division and Merger. — Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same , requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the ‘original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current lacks Faw Diewonary, p 525.6% ed) Hers of Allert Suuitan Cx of Mandaluyong, 828 SCRA 137 (2000); € , 2 ong, 32 37 20003; City ‘of Manila v, Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919) ¥ ue Law ON OCA, See te nestaTEMENT OTHE cise of eminent doma; irements before exercise in 19.3 Requirement me omer. local government unit can exerci. Tae reguicements We) enactent of ordinance 2 ov egaative council authorizing the local chief ‘exscttie {he led ef eminent domain; 2) power must be exercise a rurpose or welfare: 3) payment of just compensation for i Et definite offer made to the owner and offer wa ny and ai a opration cannot be made pursuant tO a resohition ae mance is different from a resolution. An ordinane ao nae pata resolution is merely a declaration of the sentimen, ie resign gen ela on Meneral and permanent character, but a resolution pneeeary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differentiy i ined reading is necessary for an ordinance, but net for a resolution tinless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sangguniay members. $193.1 “Public use” defined. Public use means public advantage, convenience or benefi, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperts of the whole community." ‘The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Commun of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to excrcix eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessit ‘must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that “necess within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated mus be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable ur Practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit tu the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit." ae stats Carporton 222 SCRA 6781898) aranague y. VM Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 674 (198), Hers ‘ibtie Supuitan v. City of Mandaluyong. $28 SCRA 197 (2000); Belusn of a Mesias of Pany (Cap) GR. No 153974 Angus 7, 2006 mel nto® of Camarines Surv, Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173 (1983) “Manip. The City of Pasig eta, GR No. 196349, Janoary 23,2005 sec 19 BOOK 1 — GENERAL PROVISIONS 8 ‘Tule 1— Base Principles §19.3.1.1 “Public use" applied. Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Couneil dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No, 42. . 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan, It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically publie. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, ‘which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan ‘The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road, The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation, is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not eapriciously choose what private property should be taken, ‘The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there ‘were other ways through which one can enter the vieinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through, the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient. to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction ofa road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road Particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere, x xx WMaskop v. The City of Pasig et al ,G R No, 136349, January 2: LAW ON LOCAL MENT OF " * FET ME OVERNMENT Bee 1g cayscorretly pointe out by the petitioner, therein show ng inthe eon! that an cular inspection was conducted during the ty J eourt conducted an ocular inspection of the subjeq trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof Thy prrtioner wes, therefore, deprived af its right to due proress. I bean Pressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence i ae veeived and the parties ate entitled to be present at an, tinge ofthe trial Consequently, where, asin this ense, the petition, vas not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factua) Fring of the court based on the said inspection has no probative findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the therefore. be rejected.” If at all the trial property during the ‘weight. The ‘ocular inspection must, 19.3.2 “Just compensation” defined. Just compensation” means the market value which shoulg be paid or “that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy. and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell Would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the properly, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequentis] benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequentil benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case. Furthermore, not only should the correet amount to be paid (o the owner of the land but the payment of the land must ‘be made within @ reasonable time from its taking.” If property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the proper is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court, In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was ia before the taking occurred." “Jesus Ts Lard Chnstian School Foun i wo 1g eter Contin Shon Foundation, Ie Manicpalts of ang G8 ‘SEsiaban, Jr. De Onori, 360 SCRA 230 (2 ie wri, 36 (2001) Te Petkonkatter& Co. v. Court of Appeals. 216 SCRA 884 (1992), I-v. De Onoris, 369 SCRA 20 (2001) “Republic of the Hue of the Phppines x. Court of Appeals, ef a, 343 SCRA 611 (20 Sec 19 BOOK GENERAL PROVISIONS ° Title T — Basic Principles While Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over Republic ‘Ret No, 7160, which is a substantive law. Therefore, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper Pourt, based on the fur market value at the time of the taking of the property." $19.3.2.1 “Taking” defined. ‘There is a “taking” when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for ‘a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as tooust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, “is nothing without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment, Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional sense. §19.3.3 “Valid and definite offer” defined. ‘The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. [An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. [t creates a power of acceptance permitting the offerce, by accepting the offer, to transform the offeror’s promise into a contractual obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things, TeCity of Cebu v. Spouses Apolomo, et a, 981 SCRA 754 (2002) "RA 300 (1990) [ENT OF THE LAW ON LOCAL, ery rest RESTATE GOVERNMENT srainty on both theobject and the cause or consideration of yroertainty 0° ancleat the envisioned contract, ‘The purpose of the requiremet wnt of a valid and definite offer ty a eto encourage settlements and voluntary befirst made 0 ey nee for public purposes in order to avo acquisition of PrP ofa court action. The law is desigmed to give the expense te apportunity to sell his land without the expenge to the owney ence of a protracted and expensive litigation. Ti. ar oectantal right which should be protected in every instance Tranvourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only ae coeromer but also the eondemnor, the expenses and delays of Treetticn Ie permits the landowner to receive fall compensation, and eeenty acquiring the property. immediate use ancl enjoyment of ths propery, reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory pepho forma offer. to acquire the property fora reasonable price must evmade to the owner or his privy. A single bone fide offer that i rejected by the oxner will suffice ‘The exproprating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property. However, it hhasa right to rely on what appears inthe certificate of title covering the and tobe expropriated. Hence, itis required to make its offer onl to the registored owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of tithe are not required to go beyond what appears on its face In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. xx x Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties. There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioner's TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the Fequisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world fees ROOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS. Tale! Basic Principles of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos. Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that “the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road,” a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property. In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr, Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160." §19.4 Purpose of deposit. ‘The City insists that it made a deposit of P1.5 million with the RTC by way of advance payment on the lots it sought to expropriate. By withdrawing this deposit, respondents may be assumed to have given their consent to the expropriation. But the advance deposit required under Section 19 of the Local Government Code constitutes an advance payment only in the event the expropriation prospers. Such deposit also has a dual purpose: as pre-payment if the expropriation succeeds and as indemnity for damages if it is dismissed. ‘This advance payment, a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of possession, should not be confused with Payment of just compensation for the taking of property even if it could be a factor in eventually determining just compensation. If the proceedings fail. the money could be used to indemnify the owner for damages. Here, therefore, the owners’ withdrawal of the deposit that the City made does not amount to a waiver of the defenses they raised against the expropriation. With the dismissal of the complaint, the amount or a portion of it could be awarded to the owners as indemnity to cover the expenses they incurred in defending their right." Jeaus TsTond Chritian School Foundatwon, Ine v, Muniapality of Pasig GR, No 152280, August 09, 200 ‘City of Manila v. Alegar Corporation, etal, GR. No. 187604, June 25, 2012 jr OF THE LAW ONLOCAL se - nestarot GOVERNMENT cy vas. Property subject power of eminent domain, , Forme, the tendency was toconfne the meat ofthe yy Former ung itsll At presen. private property forbidden, tothe a aged by the constitution for the public use withoy, be taken oF Cirion isnot limited to the tangible subject matter g, Just compa property, but includes the right of user and enjoymey, corpus nat when such Fights are destroyed or taken for public ys, the owner is entitled to compensation. ci ration cannot condemn lands outside its san i Sits une the power has been delegated Tegolatre Likewise, private property already devoted to publicus ee eangrens eannt be expropriated by a municipal corporation acting der a general grant of authority," unless expressly authorized in do so by statute.” {196 No approval required from Department of Agrarian Reform prior to expropriation. Inis true that local government units have no inherent power ‘eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power t cexpropriate, the legislature may retain certain control o impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments ‘While such delegated power may be a limited authority, itis complete within its limits. The limitations on the exercise of the delegated ower must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations as statutes conferring the power sf ‘eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication, Restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto. The Republics the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, eannot be bound by provisions of law ‘couched in general terms. Therefore. loeal government units do 1st need to secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform ft The Law of Municipal Coporations,§ $2 13 (Grd ed). suas uot sae PAI Mun The Law o Manip! Craton. 32 «Superior Cour of Amada Ca 80. rat Oe ‘City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Mama. 40 Phil 349 (2919) deat Mtn. The La of Sicpal Corporations. 93274 edd) Cait? v Deseret Water, Onl & Trrgation Co, 249 US. 416,611 Ed 821,27 8c 19 6 fee 19 OOK [ — GENERAL PROVISE Title 1 — Basie Paocaplew the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings." $19.7 Effect of alleging “negotiations” instead of “offer” in expropriation complaint. ‘An allegation of “negotiations” instead of “offer” in a complaint for expropriation filed by a municipal corporation is not a ground for a motion to dismiss but merely a ground for a motion for bill of particulars." $19.8 Priority in expropriation for socialized housing. Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that: ‘See. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidianes; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (©) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (@ Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have nut yet been acquired: (©) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (. Privately-owned lands. Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The Jocal government units shall five bugetars prion to on-site development of government lands. Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition, — The modes of ‘acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among TPrownce af Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173 (1998), City of Cebu v- Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 175 (1996) ———— sue LAWON LOCAL sstnTEMETOPTHELAW © . “ Rese ‘GOVERNMENT is and swapping. land assemby community mortgage ; cst oeelidntion and banking, donation to the Government, jin, = Mont, negotiated purchase, and XPropriatg, Provider pnodesof quisition have been exhausted Provide erat where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of ing — aoa property owners shall be exempted for purposs, Of this Act: Provided, finally, that abandoned property, a, Tecin defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State ‘a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 9, of the Rules of Court. ‘These provisions are limitations to the exercise of the powiy ofeminent domain, specially with respect to the order of priority ig requiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceeing, tea means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein fexpropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of ‘ftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of ‘due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for publi: use. Failure to comply wath these requirements results in dismissal of the complaint for expropriation.” Section 10 of R.A. 7279 also prefers the acquisition of private property by “negotiated sale” over the filing of an expropriation suit It provides that such suit may be resorted to only when the other ‘modes of acquisitions have been exhausted. Thus: Sec. 10, Modes of Land Acquisition —The modes of acquiring land for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation Proulded, however, That expropriation shall be resorted tool ‘when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of lant ‘owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purpose of this Act. xx x be eatin em itate or Heise ie hte ded BL eyes C19 Ma CRA 551 (2004) _ om se 19 BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS 65 Title — Basie Principles ‘There isa sensible reason for the above. Litigation is costly and protracted. The government should also lead in avoiding litigations nd overburdening its courts Indeed, the Court has held that when the property owner rejects the offer but hints for a better price, the government ‘Should renegotiate by calling the property owner to a conference. ‘The government must exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain by agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply will warrant the dismissal of the complaint, Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides for this procedure, Thus Article 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale — (a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered. x x x x (©) Ifthe owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price, The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference, When an agreement 1s reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed. Here, the City of Manila initially offered P1,500.00 per sq m to the owners for their lots. But after the latter rejected the offer, claiming that the offered price was even lower than their current zonal value, the City did not bother to renegotiate or improve its offer. The intent of the law is for the State or the local government to make a reasonable offer in good faith, not merely a pro forma offer to acquire the propert ‘The Court cannot treat the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA. 7279 bightly. It held im state or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. City of Mantla, that these requirements are strict limitations on the local government's exercise of the power of eminent. domain, They are the only safeguards of property owners against the exercise of that power. The burden is on the local government to prove that it satisfied the requirements mentioned or that they do not apply in the particular case.** FGiy Manav, Alegar Corporation, etal. GR. No. 187604, June 25, 2012, op tH LAWON LOCA. Se PSA VERNMENT rt with proper jurisdiction. cithin the jurisdiction of the Regi vation action within Ce sina ain esan The value of the property to be expropriated is estimateg just compensation for it, This, however, 18 merely incident t th, expropriation suit.” g19.9 Cour §19.10 Effect of previously decided case. e le of res judicata, which finds application in general), anee a pee ings, cannot bar the right of the State or i, agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminen: demain, av an inherent power of the State, dictates that the righ, to exervise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata, The scope of eminent domain is plenary ‘and, like police power, can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use All separate interests of individual, in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of proper remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the peopie in their soveresgn capacity, and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it ‘Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred fru ‘exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, 1t does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgmest dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot. however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequentls exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, 334 SCRA 127 (200) eeaah OOK L— GENERAL, PROVISIONS # “Tile I — Basie Prnerplos true of the principle of “law of the case.” In Republic v. De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent ma still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.” §19.11 When special civil action of prohibi appropriate. Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. This har against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended for public use. and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners, Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property ‘was issued, As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount, any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised hy the City only through the filing of a verified complaint, 1m the proper court Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist, Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.» "Paranaque v VM Reslty Corporation, 282 SCRA G78 (190); Filstream International, Ine + Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 716 (1898). sSpouues Yusay ¥. Court of Appeals, GR No. 156884, April 06, 2012, ON LOCH, Frollan v. Pan Onental Shipping. 9 Phil 905 (1950), US. ¥ Ruiz, 156 SCRA 487 (1985) "Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme, 195 SCRA 692 (1991); Guillergan, ct al v. Ganzon, etal. 121 Phil. 1102 (1966), Department of Public Services Labor Union v- Court of Industral Relations, etal, 110 Phil 927 (196). Bernas, The 1987 Constitution ofthe Republic ofthe Philippines. A Commentary, pp. 1 However, see 17 MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 4 City of Lang Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F 24 48% whch state that “the st from suit usually does not extend to municipal curporations "S'Repubhe Act No. 7160, Section 22,24 (1992), Sew Guillergan, etal. v. Ganzon, ‘et al, 125 Phil. 1102 (1986) 5517 MeQuilln, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §49:2 (3rd ed ), Ashton v. ‘Town of Lantana, 146 Fla 671, 1 So. 2d 639 (1941) ‘1907 Rules of Covi Procedure, Rule 14, Section 15 J imaunity oF THE LAW ON LOCAL Se a mse ; are artificial creatures of state, nd hayg 3 the state This lack of capacity to sue the ‘no inherent fei a necessary OM e separation of powers doctrj ith of the separation of ine es state i 5 226 Enforcement of judgment: ‘ually. the proper procedure for enforcement of judgmen ually, the era municipal corporation is by mandamus to require against 9 mul ny ofa tax, oF by contempt Proceedings payment orto compel eI Faved vatuin a laneaee, against muni property used for municipal purposes*” nor may be enforced upof Pr collect by execution against the property of g a Juco

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