Sino-Indian Relations: A security

perspective

By Barnika Bhuyan

Introduction

Both the ancient civilisations, India and China hold important consequential
positions not only wrt regional security but as major economic powers globally.
With the self image of identifying as the Middle Kingdom China has made
continuous efforts for its ‘peaceful rise’ . India too harbours the ambition of
being a USD 5 trillion economy and give rise to a ‘New’ version of itself. The
relation between two countries have been cordial and live cultural links during
the Chola empire in terms of trade are proven. However the study points out
that there is utter disregard for the past treaties and China has repeatedly
made expansionist claims over Indian territories. As China seems to be on the
path of securing it’s strategic interest in the conflicted territories, India too has
secured it’s aspirations. This is evident with the completion of the all weather
Darbuk -Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie road.It is indeed a logistical marvel and with
the world’s highest air strip at DBO, India finds itself at an advantageous
position. Also it’s important to notice that the ideological differences between
the two ancient civilisations is a bone of contention. With its anti democratic
propaganda China doesn’t bear the responsibility of accountability. It’s under
this cloud that attempts have been made in the research to analyse the role of
People's Liberation Army (PLA). China seems to be embroiled with domestic
turmoil and while contextualising the territorial disputes it is important to
understand these internal setbacks .The Wuhan coronavirus outbreak, reports of
differences within the Communist Party of China (CPC) and growing protests
in Hong Kong cannot be overlooked. An external crisis thus proves as a
consolidating factor for the CPC and PLA. Thus border disputes with India can
prove as distractions from internal distress
Research Question
1. What are the strategic interests of both the countries in terms of disputed
border areas?
2. How are the strategic assets and goals meant to be secured ?
3. What are the fundamental differences in the way forward for achieving
these goals i.e ideological and military capabilities?
Hypothesis
The study seeks to test the following hypothesis
1. There is a clear violation on the part of China of the erstwhile border
treaties and arrangements which is in tandem with their expansionist
policies.
2. The ideological differences and anti democratic propaganda of China
which makes it an unaccountable international player.
3. Tracing the military capabilities of both the countries and highlighting the
shortcomings of the PLA in terms of the excessive political control and
others

Review of Literature

Background

The border dispute can be understood wrt two sectors. In the western
sector Aksai Chin region is a disputed territory. With a sudden disregard
for the Johnson line after 1947 and the construction of road project from
Tibet to Xinjiang in the 50s China has asserted it's claims over the region.
It indeed was a failure on the part of India to not counter the road project
back then. The Shaksgam valley part of POK was also ceded to China by
Pakistan in 1963 as a part of the border settlement.
In the eastern sector China has gone to the extent of claiming Tawang as
a part of its territory. This it does because of the Links between Tawang
monastery and Lhasa monastery. Since Tibet was colonised by China
they seek to extend their claims over the region as well. Also it’s feared
that Arunachal Pradesh can prove to be a ground for activities which can
prove detrimental for China’s control over Tibet. There is a clear
disregard for the Mc Mahon line which was signed at the 1914 Simla
Convention as China disputes the sovereignty of Tibet to agree on this
arrangement. There have also been isolated incident as seen in 2017
during the Doklam standoff. It is a part of Bhutan but China has
attempted to construct roads in the region and extending their claim. India
acted on Bhutan's behalf because of its arrangement with the latter and
stalled the Chinese attempts.
It is the Line of Actual control that’s the board term for demarcation
between Indian and Chinese territories. It comprises of the western,
eastern and middle sector. The Line of Actual control is a result of the
1993 agreement of maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the line of
actual control in the India- China border areas. However there is no
congruence on ground by both parties as to what actually this line is.
Maps haven't been mutually exchanged to root out counter claims.
China's reference points for the Line of Actual Control is in strict
opposition to India's stance. The unqualified nature of the LAC makes it
possible for China to resort to 'salami slicing' of Indian territories.

China’s expansionist claims: Strategic assessment

The inhospitable terrain of Aksai Chin where it’s famously said

that ‘not even a blade of grass grows’ is of importance to China.
The region proves to be a direct link between Xinjiang province
and Tibet. China National Highway G219 runs from Xinjiang to
Lhatse in Tibet Autonomous region. This highway passes through the
disputed Aksai Chin region. It prove as an important logistical support for
China to station troops in Tibet. This was the earlier roadmap and the
goal was achieved by as early as 1957. It is this highway that is also a
feeder road for other passes along Shaksgam valley eta. One must note
that Xinjiang is inhabited by Uyghyr Muslims who have been repressed
by China for their religious beliefs. Its recognised by Senge H Sering, the
director of Indistitute of Gilgit Baltistan studies that Uyghurs do
recognise the Aksai Chin region to be a part of India. It is because of
these factors that China is cautious of India’s road and infrastructures
projects.India has developed it’s logistic capabilities which can cut off the
Chinese access to these regions when required. As difficult a terrain
Aksai Chin is, it actually helps China to maintain its stronghold over the
colonised population in Tibet and to repress Uyghur Muslims.
The second strategic interest of China is diverting water from
Brahmaputra . With its origin in Tibet, China plans to divert the water
through tunnels to the Xinjiang region. The United Nations Convention
on The Law of Non Navigation Uses of Water resources prohibits a
country from barring the natural flow of an international river. But China
is not a signatory to it. As a lower riparian state India has claims of
ensuring the 'first user right' and can secure its interests by constructing
dams on its side.
The third area of strategic interest is in Tawang. Their claim is based on
the fact that the 6th Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso was born in Tawang.
Bhaskar Roy mentions that on this ground the Vatican should claim all
the Roman Catholic countries. Claims have also been made that if India
meets with concessions on Tawang China is willing to forego claims over
entire Arunachal Pradesh. But it's important to understand that these
claims stem from a place of insecurity. If the reincarnation of 14th Dalai
Lama is from a region outside Chinese occupation, it can prove
detrimental to their interests. The visit by His Holiness to Tawang in
2017 amidst Chinese protest was a successful one. India has thus proven
that Chinese claims are uncalled for and the former will maintain its
sovereign rights.
The fourth area where China wished to assert it’s strategic claim was over
Doklam. This area which lies in the tri junction of India China and
Bhutan. It provides an overview to the chicken-neck corridor I.e Silliguri.
This is an important route which connects north east India to the
mainland.

Chinese Strategic interests: Contextual analysis

Having outlined the strategic interests it is imperative to contextualize

these interests. In Interpreting China's grand strategy Past Preseng and
Future RAND researchers Ashley J Tellis and Michael D Swaine talk
about how China's political system is driven by personality traits and not
legal or organizational rules. With the recent inaugural of Xi Jinping
Centre for Diplomatic Thought, the Xi doctrine its evident that he seeks
to establish his influence much like Mao and other leaders of the past.
The reports from China indicate that more than 60cr people are living
under Rs 10000 of monthly income. Thus the aggressive Xi doctrine is a
means to divert attention from China's economic downturn. China seems
to be at the offensive with other countries as well. When Australia rallied
for impartial investigation for Corona virus. It was slapped with 80%
tariff on its export of Barley to China . With the on going protests at
Hong Kong, China has excessively cracked down the protesters. The new
National Security Law for Hong Kong is repressive and has practically
squashed every form of dissent. It has generated a climate of fear and
shows how different China is from India. As stated earlier China is an
unaccountable entity and with its anti democratic propaganda seeks to
gain leverage.

Military strength: A comparison

It is often stated that China has the second highest defense budget. But it
must be noted that a major chunk of it is spent on salaries. It cannot be
denied that Chinese forces are deployed largely in Tibet to prevent any
uprising. It's important to thus note that India has raised Special Frontier
Force which specialises in mountain warfare and is composed mostly of
Tibetans in India. This can prove to be a force multiplier in times of need.
It has repeatedly been stated that China doesn't have the experience of
combat role. The last active engagement was during Vietnam War which
ended in massive defeat for the Chinese forces. Timothy R Heath talks
about how the Cultural revolution had decimated a large section of
officer class. The political influence on PLA is evident which renders it to
be of low skill. On the contrary it is noted that with the New Chief of
Defense Staff post India has been successful in surpassing red tapism and
delays in military decision making . Dennis J Blasko is of the opinion that
China has a large scale multi generational equipment which makes it
difficult to achieve inter operability and connectivity. The oft repeated
claim is that India was defeated during the 1962 war. But it’d be a grave
mistake to say that the defeat was because of poor capabilities. There
were a number of factors that played out which proved detrimental for
India. Since a fleet by fleet review was beyond the scope of this research
but open sources have stated India has calibrated military strategies after
the 1962 debacle and specifically in the last 5 years.
The Chinese adventurism in South China Sea is also met with stiff
opposition from other littoral countries. India has successfully entered
into logistical agreements with many of the countries like South Korea,
Australia etc. This proves as a strong counter to Chinese influence in the
region.
The modernisation attempts for Indian Army include holistic goals.
Ashley J Tellis is of the opinion that, “Indian military also needs to
change its mindset from a frontier defence force to an expeditionary one
capable of projecting power beyond the subcontinent.” The defence
budget for 2020-2021 is Rs.4.71 lakh cr. including pensions. For the
purpose of defence acquisition the government has permitted FDI up to
49% through automatic route. However there are challenges that a large
number of weapons are vintage I.e close to 70% . But as stated by
standing committee of Defence the mix should be 33%.

Conclusion
Sino-Indian relations are as old as time. With the trade links and
philosophers like Fa Hien visiting India the relations have been cordial.

However in the beginning of the study following hypotheses were

formulated:

1.There is a clear violation on the part of China of the erstwhile border

treaties and arrangements which is in tandem with their expansionist
policies.

2.The ideological differences and anti democratic propaganda of China

which makes it an unaccountable international player.

3.Tracing the military capabilities of both the countries and highlighting

the shortcomings of the PLA in terms of the excessive political control
and others

At the end of the study following inferences can be drawn-

1.China has violated all the erstwhile border arrangements and treaties
which is reflective of its expansionist ideology.

2. India being a democratic country has different ways of functioning

than China. The respect for Freedom of Speech and expression, minority
rights etc. lends India the image of a responsible power .
3. A fleet by fleet comparison was beyond the scope of this research but
it’s noted that India and China have their unique strength which when put
to use can give both of them necessary leverage.
The internal issues in China must not be overlooked. The recent support from
Taiwan during India- China standoff at Galwan is indicative of this .Also it’s
important to note that no one side is disproportionately better off in terms of
military capabilities or infrastructure. However an amicable solution to issues
can be an ideal way. Both the countries are engaged with internal disturbances
as well hence another front can prove to be force intensive. The Confidence
Building Measures and exchange of important data must not take a back seat
even during times of crisis. A mutually intensive growth must be the goal while
keeping in mind the real intentions of the other party .

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