Delgado, Rod Bendolf F.

JD 4202
Atty. Nad Bronce June 1, 2020

ADMELEC FINAL EXAM

Item No. I

According to the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, supra, administrative agencies are vested with
two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislation enables them to
promulgate implementing rules and regulations, while quasi-adjudication enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations.

Item No. II

In the case of Republic vs. Lacap, it states that doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
entails that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court
without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation. Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Item No. III

In the case of Luison vs. Garcia, it states a protest to disqualify a protestee on the ground of
ineligibility is different from that of a protest based on frauds and irregularities where it may be
shown that protestant was the one really elected for having obtained a plurality of the legal
votes. In the first case, while the protestee may he ousted the protestant will not be seated; in
the second case, the protestant may assume office after protestee is unseated. The first case is
brought to court by a petition of quo warranto, while the second by instituting an election
protest. It also states that an action for quo warranto cannot be converted into an election
protest. The Court ruled that a candidate who files a protest against one who has been
proclaimed as having received the highest number of votes basing his protest merely on the
ground of his ineligibility to hold office, cannot disguise his action so as to make his protest a
justification to be seated in office. This is because these two cases are fundamentally different in
nature and in purpose. In quo warranto, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, and the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate,"
while in a protest, "the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots".

Item No. IV

According to the case of Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, the threefold liability rule simply means
that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful
act or omission, each of which is independent of the other. Thus, if such violation or wrongful
act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse
the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be
punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office,
or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the
penal and civil liabilities.

Item No. V

According to the case of Mandanas vs. Executive Secretary, the concept of local autonomy
under the 1987 Constitution refers to decentralization. In its broad or general sense,
decentralization has two forms in the Philippine setting, namely: the decentralization of power
and the decentralization of administration. The decentralization of power involves the
abdication of political power in favor of the autonomous LGUs as to grant them the freedom to
chart their own destinies and to shape their futures with minimum intervention from the central
government. This amounts to self-immolation because the autonomous LGUs thereby become
accountable not to the central authorities but to their constituencies. On the other hand, the
decentralization of administration occurs when the central government delegates
administrative powers to the LGUs as the means of broadening the base of governmental
powers and of making the LGUs more responsive and accountable in the process, and thereby
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and more effective partners in the
pursuit of the goals of national development and social progress. This form of decentralization
further relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs so that it can
concentrate on national concerns.

Item No. VI

VI-A

I would tell the beautiful Mayor that her beliefs are sound. Balladares is disqualified from
registering as a voter since he lacks the residency qualification required under R.A. No. 8189.

According to Section 9 of R.A. No. 8189, it states “All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at
least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may register as a voter.” [Emphasis
supplied]

In the given facts, Balladares registered as voter in Gutalac on May 4, 2018. According to R.A.
No. 7166, election for national, provincial, city and municipal elections are held on the second
Monday of May which was on May 14, 2018. Only ten (10) days have lapsed since the date of
his registration as a voter until the date of the election, which falls short in the requirement of at
least six (6) months immediately preceding the election as provided by the law cited above.
Even though Balladares was born and raised in Gutalac, he had acquired a new domicile later
on, and therefore changing his place of residency. In the case of Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
191970, the Court stated “for purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular
place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.” In the given facts, it stated that Balladares had bought a property in Makati and
“called it his home”, and he also “ put up his own religious denomination: Blessed Single
Christians for Others (BSCFO), Inc.” These acts entail his abandonment of his old
domicile as it is indicative of his intentions of staying in that particular place.

Therefore, Balladares is disqualified from registering as a voter since he lacks the residency
qualification required under R.A. No. 8189.

VI-B

If I were Balladares’s counsel, I will contend that he never abandoned his domicile (Gutalac)
and therefore fulfills the residency requirement laid down by R.A. No. 8189.

According to the second paragraph of Section 9 of R.A. No. 8189, “Any person who temporarily
resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation, profession,
employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the military or naval
reservations within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National
Police Forces, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law,
shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.” [Emphases supplied]

In the given facts, it states that he was born and raised in Gutalac, but moved to Quezon City
for college and, later on, moved to Makati City for work. It bears emphasizing that is was also
stated in the facts that he would occasionally visit his province. The fact that Balladares is born
in Gutalac makes it his domicile of origin. According to the case of Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 119976, the Court ruled that the “Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.” Here, Incumbent Mayor Aiza
Domingo-Crisostomo fails to establish these elements as it cannot be proven that (1) there was
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (2) that Balladares had abandoned his
domicile of origin, and (3) that the acts of Balladares of buying a condo unit and putting up a
religious denomination corresponds with the purpose of abandoning his original
domicile/residence. Once more, Balaldares returns to his province occasionally, and had chosen
to register as a voter in Gutalac. These acts are indicative of the fact that he had no intentions of
abandoning or not returning to his domicile of origin.

Therefore, Balladares is not disqualified from registering as a voter as he fulfills the residency
requirement laid down by R.A. No. 8189.

VI-C

Balladares did make a material misrepresentation in his COC for Mayor with regard to his
residency.

According to Section 3 of B.P. 52, on the qualifications for an elective local official (i.e. Mayor)
are “must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter; resident of the district,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, as the case may be, for at least
six (6) months at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy; must be at least twenty
one (21) years of age on election day; and must be able to read and write.” [Emphasis supplied]
In the given facts, Balladarez filed his Certificate of Candidancy on October 17, 2018, before that
he registered as voter in Gutalac on May 4, 2018. Since there was no mention of when he
returned to Gutalac, the time of reference would be the time when he registered as a voter up to
the filing of the COC. If you compute the starting date to the date of the filing, it would
approximately be around five (5) months. This falls short of the residency requirement of at
least six (6) months at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Therefore, Balladares did make a material misrepresentation in his COC for Mayor with regard
to his residency.

VI-D

Balladares would not qualify to run for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of
Zamboanga Del Norte.

According to Section 6, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, “No person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day
of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.”
[Emphasis supplied]

In the given facts, it was stated that Balladares was born in 1995, and the elections are dated
May 13, 2019. If we compute the age of Balladares from the day he was born up to the day of the
election, he would be twenty-four (24) years old. This falls short of the age requirement laid
down in our Constitution for Members of the House of Representaticves.

Therefore, Balladares would not qualify to run for the position of Representative of the 3rd
District of Zamboanga Del Norte.

VI-E

No. If Balladares did commit any false representation, and withdraws from the race, he may not
be substituted as a candidate.

According to the case of Tagolino vs. HRET and Lucy Torres-Gomez, G.R. No. 202202, the Court
elucidated on validity of the COC as a condition sine que non for the substitution of candidate.
It explained that while “Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified”, “Section 77
requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept
that a person without a valid COC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows
that if a person’s COC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be
validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid COC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.” [Emphasis
supplied]
In this case, since Balladares committed false representation in his COC, making him ineligible
to run for the position he seeks to assume, this then would render his COC invalid. Since the
existence of a valid COC is a condition for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted,
Balladares is then disqualified from doing so.

Therefore, Balladares may not be substituted as a candidate.

VI-F

No. If he did not make any material misrepresentation in his COC, there would not be any
ground to disqualify him.

According to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code on disqualification, it states “Any

candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.”

Here, it cannot be gleaned from the facts that Balladares committed any of the acts enumerated
in Section 68. Therefore, if he did not make any material misrepresentation in his COC, there
would not be any ground to disqualify him.

VI-G

No. BSCFO may not be registered for the party-list elections because religious denominations
are not allowed to under our Constitution.

According to Section 2 (5), Article 9 (B) of the 1987 Constitution, under the powers and
functions of the Commission on Elections, it states “Register, after sufficient publication,
political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. [….]”
[Emphasis supplied]

In the given facts, it states that the Blessed Single Christians for Others (BSCFO), Inc. is a
religious denomination that Balladares put up. Since it is categorically described as a religious
denomination, it could, therefore, not be registered as provided by the highest law of the land.
Hence, BSCFO may not be registered for the party-list elections because religious
denominations are not allowed to under our Constitution.
VII

VII-A

No, Dir. Mavis-Yu must not take the job as the position of Chief Program Evaluator is a public
office.

According to the case of NAC vs. Commission on Audit, “Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials”

Here, Dir. Mavis-Yu currently holds the permanent position of Service Director with monthly
salary of P120k at the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which is a public
office created by P.D. 107. The position offered to her by her friend is Chief Program Evaluator
in the Rapid Evaluation Project of the Pantawid Pamilya, the flagship program of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) which is a government agency and, therefore, is a
public office as well. According the cited provision earlier “Unless otherwise allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” [Emphases
supplied]

Therefore, Dir. Mavis-Yu must not take the job as the position of Chief Program Evaluator is a
public office

VII-B

If she accepted the job without resigning from the NEDA, she would be violating multiple laws.

According to Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, it states “Unless otherwise allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”

According to Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
No. 292, is states “Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, xxx.”

Here, it is not only clear that Dir. Mavis-Yu would be violating the laws on holding two offices
in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, but also the
prohibition on Double Compensation. Double Compensation is embedded in Sec. 2, Rule XVIII
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 cited earlier. In Resolution No.
001341, Double Compensation is defined as “two sets of compensation, from two different
offices held concurrently by one officer.” In the given facts, it stated that Dir. Mavis-Yu earns a
monthly salary of P120k at the NEDA, and if she accepts the job offered to her, she will be paid
P300k. This is a flagrant violation of the prohibition on double compensation.

Therefore, if she accepted the job without resigning from the NEDA, she would be violating
multiple laws.

VIII

VIII-A

Their contention is correct.

According to the case of Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v. Casas, G.R. No. 200898, An employee's
right not to be dismissed without just or authorized cause as provided by law, is covered by his
right to substantial due process.”
According to the case of Adiong vs. CA, G.R. No. 136480, “The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. This requirement is met where one is
given a chance to explain his said of the controversy, even if no hearing is conducted.”

In the given facts, it stated that after CSC informed CHED about the cancellation of the
eligibilities of the three employees, “In no time, the CHED’s Human Resource Division sent
notices to Gracia, Sarsa and Florencio to vacate their offices on the ground that they have no
eligibilities as a result of the cancellation of the results of their civil service exam.” The three
employees were not given the opportunity to be heard nor were they given a chance to explain,
which is a violation of their right to substantial due process.

Therefore, their contention is correct.

VIII-B

I agree that mere notices are not enough to remove said employees from their permanent posts.

According to Perez vs. PTTC, G.R. No. 152048 , the Court stated that “To meet the requirements
of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two
written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said
employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating
that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the
employer's decision to dismiss the employee.”

In the given facts, CHED’s Human Resource Division merely “sent notices to Gracia, Sarsa and
Florencio to vacate their offices on the ground that they have no eligibilities as a result of the
cancellation of the results of their civil service exam.” Without giving the employees a
reasonable opportunity to explain their side and another written notice indicating that, upon
due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's
decision to dismiss the said employees, this falls short of the requirements of due process in the
dismissal of an employee which is against the law.
Therefore, I agree that mere notices are not enough to remove said employees from their
permanent posts.

VIII-C

They would be considered de facto officers.

According to the case of Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, a de facto officer is defined as “one
whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice,
will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the
duties of the office were exercised x x x x under color of a known election or appointment, void
because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility,
want of power or defect being unknown to the public x x x x [or] under color of an election, or
appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
such.” [Emphasis supplied]

In the given facts, the officers were only dismissed on the ground that they have no eligibilities
as a result of the cancellation of the results of their civil service exam.

Therefore, they would be considered de facto officers.

IX

I would rule that the Memorandum is invalid because there is a clear threat to the right of
freedom of speech and freedom of expression of the employees.

According to the case of Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.205728, “The principles laid
down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future,
especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for
one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the
hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote
necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression.”

Here, the Memorandum states “all employees are hereby prohibited from commenting,
speaking, posting, or otherwise giving reactions on all social media platforms about election
candidates, local or national, and election issues, local or national” which is flagrant violation of
their right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression.

Therefore, I would rule that the Memorandum is invalid because there is a clear threat to the
right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression of the employees.

I would rule that Section 105 of the Local Government Code is invalid.
According to Section 2, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution, “The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy”. In the case of Congressman Mandas vs. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 199802, the Court stated that “The constitutional mandate to ensure local
autonomy refers to decentralization. […] The decentralization of power involves the abdication
of political power in favor of the autonomous LGUs as to grant them the freedom to chart their
own destinies and to shape their futures with minimum intervention from the central
government. This amounts to self-immolation because the autonomous LGUs thereby become
accountable not to the central authorities but to their constituencies.” In another case, National
Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, G.R. No. 152774, the Court ruled that “the Constitution permits
the President to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or
its officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Supervisory power, when
contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such body.”

Here, Section 105 states “the Secretary of Health may, upon the direction of the President and
in consultation with the local government unit concerned, temporarily assume direct
supervision and control over health operations in any local government unit”. The usage of
the word “control” makes it invalid as the President cannot permit such delegation of power. In
the case cited earlier, the Court also stated “The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly
differentiate the President’s power of supervision over local governments and his power of
control of the executive departments bureaus and offices. Similar to the counterpart provisions
in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control.”

Therefore, I would rule that Section 105 of the Local Government Code is invalid.

Bonus

The one nasty habit that I developed this period of quarantine is oversleeping and excessive
smoking.

When I was in law school, I was sleep deprived. The maximum hours of sleep I get would
probably be five or six (If I’m lucky). But, this quarantine, I get ten or eleven hours of sleep.
People would say that it is “the life”, but I do not agree. I feel unproductive waking up late and
not being able to do anything because I already feel lazy. It affects my day so badly. I miss
waking up at three or four in the morning just to read. At least, even if I was sleep deprived, I
felt productive.

Before, when I used to attend school, I would be able to finish a pack of cigarettes in a week. It
was a very stressful environment, but it was fulfilling. At times when I feel extra stressed or
anxious, I smoke – probably two or three sticks a day. But, this quarantine, I’ll be surprised if a
pack of cigarette lasts me three days. I am now, what people would call, a chain-smoker. I am
not proud of it. I’ve been wanting to change, but this quarantine has got me feeling so anxious
all the time. I wish I could just stop, but I feel like I am now addicted to nicotine. I was never
addicted to nicotine back when I was in school. If I wanted to stop, I could effortlessly do so.
But now I can’t. People are dying because of the coronavirus, wishing they had lived more
years, and here I am, slowly killing myself with a little stick between my lips.