CASE DIGESTS Assignment in Lieu of Midtrerm Exam)

CASE DIGESTS ASSIGNMENT
(In lieu of Midterm Exam)
In
AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL

LEGISLATION
Under
ATTY. DARWIN ANGELES
Submitted by:
MIGUEL A. ANAS JR.
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CASE DIGESTS
1. Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343)
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A.
No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes
a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No.
27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In
1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. After which is the enactment of
R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
rice lands and corn lands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to
their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land.
In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong
to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on
the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that
the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay
averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can
determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the
constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
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Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in
bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the
form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of
cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in
these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Associations have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it
appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform
program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner
and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR
can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that the just compensation
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determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree
with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise
of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain.
The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation has to be made in cash –
if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and
other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
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FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on
the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229
should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due
process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued
the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE: Are the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent
Domain?
RULING: Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional
distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned
under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking
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of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent
Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the
owner of the property expropriated.
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Facts: The case at bar is a consolidation of four cases harping on the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive Order Nos. 228 and 229, and Republic Act No. 6657. The
petitioners in this case question the unreasonable taking of their land without just compensation.
The lands were taken from the petitioners before the payment of just compensation. The
landowners also raised the issue that the mode of payment of compensation for the lands
subjected to the agrarian reform program was unfair and prejudicial to them. These petitions are
the root of the case:
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects
of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were
declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against
Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with
initial fund of P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares.
Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power
and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid
exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
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A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful
subject and the method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is
the method employed to achieve it.
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Facts:
The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted
by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are
cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory
limits but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice
and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective
rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the
court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not
eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
2. Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is
violative of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent
domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full
of just compensation
Held:
1. Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution
itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised
to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives.
However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination of just compensation
by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination.
2. No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no
other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent
domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of
pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully
available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the
entire program.
3. No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full
owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
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Facts: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform
Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State
of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress
on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was
promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition
of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the
mechanics for its implementation. After which is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on
the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by
due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of
solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is
imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the
beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored
judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the
agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged
violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to
a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of
Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private
agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
Held: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have
been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such
limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian
reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a
particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted
to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has
been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by
the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that
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all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and
the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights.
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2. Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.
G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011 (645 SCRA 401)
FACTS: Several parcels of unirrigated land which form part of a larger expanse originally
owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club was acquired by EMRASON for the purpose of
developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes". The
Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise
known as the "Local Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1 entitled "An
Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."
EMRASON applied for an authority to convert and develop its property into a residential
subdivision. The Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-
A approving EMRASON's application.
On June 15, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law or CARL took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition
and distribution. Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring
property of the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be managed
through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall
conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC
property, with three hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be
insufficient for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's
commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The DAR
earmarked for this purpose the subject property of EMRASON. DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong
sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest from
EMRASON.
EMRASON filed with the DARAB separate petitions to nullify the notices. The Legal Division
of DAR rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing
that the property covered thereby pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44,
series of 1990, is exempt from CARP. Supposedly, this was pursuant to a DOJ Opinion rendered
by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarifying that lands already converted to non-
agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.
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The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already
converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of
the CARL. The appellate court reasoned mainly that “…the municipality, conformably with its
statutory-conferred local autonomy, had passed a subdivision measure, i.e., Ordinance No. 1, and
had approved in line thereto, through the medium of Ordinance No. 29-A, [EMRASON's]
application for subdivision, or with like effect approved the conversion/classification of the lands
in dispute as residential. Significantly, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite, in his letter
of September 23, 1988 to [EMRASON], clarified that such conversion conforms to the
approved development plan of the municipality.”
ISSUE: WON the subject property could be placed under the CARP.
HELD: NO. The Local Autonomy Act of 1959, precursor of the Local Government Code of
1991, provided: SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city
councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils. - x x x Power to
adopt zoning and planning ordinances. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby
authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities
and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case
may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on
matters pertaining to planning and zoning.
The Court observes that the OP, the Court of Appeals, and even the parties themselves referred
to Resolution No. 29-Aas an ordinance. Although it may not be its official designation, calling
Resolution No. 29-A as Ordinance No. 29-A is not completely inaccurate.
Ortigas & Co. case, the Court found it immaterial that the then Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong declared certain lots as part of the commercial and industrial zone through a
resolution, rather than an ordinance, because Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of
the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance,
it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under
the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists “Any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding x x x."
While the subject property may be physically located within an agricultural zone under the 1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas, said property retained its residential
classification. According to Section 17, the Repealing Clause, of the 1981 Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas: "AH other ordinances, rules or regulations in conflict with the
provision of this Ordinance are hereby repealed: Provided, that rights that have vested before the
effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired."
As enunciated in the case of Ayog v. Cusi, Jr., that vested right has to be respected. It could not
be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows
private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and
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twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested
rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the
police power."
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or
transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or
contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those
already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to
the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people, x x x.
EMRASON mentions Resolution No. 105, Defining and Declaring the Boundaries of Industrial
and Residential Land Use Plan in the Municipalities of Imus and Parts of Dasmariflas, Carmona,
Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Gen. Trias, Silang, Tanza, Naic, Rosario, and Trece Martires City,
Province o[ Cavite, approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite on March 25, 1988.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan determined that "the lands extending from the said designated
industrial areas would have greater economic value for residential and institutional uses, and
would serve the interest and welfare for the greatest good of the greatest number of people."50
Resolution No. 105, approved by the HLURB in 1990, partly reads: Tracts of land in the
Municipality of Carmona from the People's Technology Complex to parts of the Municipality of
Silang, parts of the Municipalities of Dasmariñas, General Trias, Trece Martires City,
Municipalities of Tanza and Naic forming the strip of land traversed by the Puerto Azul Road
extending two kilometers more or less from each side of the road which are hereby declared as
industrial-residential-institutional mix.
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DOCTRINE: A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or
by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State,
except in a legitimate exercise of the police power.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals was right in ruling that the land owned by EMRASON, Inc.
was not covered by agrarian reform since it was classified as non-agricultural/residential lands
by Municipal Ordinance 29-A?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of EMRASON, Inc. It stated that the lands involved in
the present case are not subject to agrarian reform since it was classified as residential land by
Municipal Ordinance 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of CARL .
It also reiterated the ruling in Natalia vs. Department of Agrarian Reform that since a special law
classified the land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, that land or property cannot be
anymore subject to agrarian reform. The Court also used Sec. 3 of R.A. 2264 or Local Autonomy
Act to validate EMRASON's application via Ordinance 29-A made by the municipality of
Dasmariñas, Cavite.
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3. Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990 (192 SCRA 51)
Facts:
This is a Petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657. On June 10,
1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.
6657 (Commercial Farms). Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business and allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the following provisions in R.A. No.
6657. (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." (b) Section 11 which defines
"commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and
swine raising . . ." (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing
plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority
to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing
plan mentioned in Section 13". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the
production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as
compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation
they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of
five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower
ceiling. In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the
net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90)
days of the end of the fiscal year . . ." Luz Farms does not seek to nullify the whole act; it merely
contends that the Act's provisions with regard to livestock and poultry transcended its
constitutional mandate. Respondent cited Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition
(1954): "Agriculture" - the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting
crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry,
and farming.
Issues:
1. Whether or not livestock and poultry lands should be included in agrarian reform.
2. Whether or not the aforementioned provisions are constitutional, insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.
Held:
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1. No: The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. "Sa pangalawang
katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner
Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang
piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi
kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers" a statement from Commissioner Tadeo.
2. No: Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and
poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three
percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as
additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of
due process.
The Court granted the instant petition as well as declared Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as
well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith null and
void for being unconstitutional, and finally made the issued writ of preliminary injunction
permanent.
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Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines
and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the
same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner. On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines
approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections
13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated
its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657. Luz Farms, petitioner in
this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others
in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section
3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise
known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January
2,1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the
DAR on January 9,1989.
Issue: Are the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657 as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith constitutional?
12
Held: If legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1
of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as
part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and
which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208
[1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent. SO ORDERED.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Daez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000 (325 SCRA 856)
Facts: Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectares rice land in Brgy. Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C.
Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under
LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law.
The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all
affirmed the said Order and disregarded an Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that
they are not the tenants of the land. Their finding was that the Affidavit was merely issued under
duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the respondents.
Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same rice land under R.A. No.
6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject rice
land but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to
prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary
Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals
again reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings,
despite the fact that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become
final and executory
Held: It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are
one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude
the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the
application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare rice land, even
after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and
executory.
13
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by
the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is
land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the
government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards,
which would be a pointless process.
The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from
retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or
CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained
area.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts: Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa,
LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law.
The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all
they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings disclosed that the Affidavit was merely issued
under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (Eps) were issued to the respondents.
Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A. No.
6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject
riceland but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to
final and executory
application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even
executory. The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to
qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by
balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by implemeting the doctrine that social
justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its
name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner’s dominion, thus,
sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner
afterwards, which would be a pointless process. The issuance of Eps and CLOAs to beneficiaries
14
does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under
Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land
covered is later found to be part of the landowner’s retained area.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue: WON Daez may retain the disputed 4.1685 hectares land
Facts: Petitioner Daez owned a 4.1685 hectare land in Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being
cultivated by the respondent farmers Soriente et al. The problem arose when the land was
subjected to the OLT (Operation Land Transfer) pursuant to PD 27 as amended by LOI 474.
Thus, the land was transferred to the ownership of beneficiaries on December 9, 1980.On May
31, 1981, private respondents made an affidavit under duress stating they are not tenants but
hired workers. Hence, Daez applied for exemption of OLT claiming her land is untenanted and
the cancellation of the CLT’s. (not majorly related to the topic)
In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared
ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and
fourteen (14) hectares of rice land, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of
"batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their
41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare rice land in
Meycauayan.
DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina:

Denying Eudosia Daez’s application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered
under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven
(7) hectares.
DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong:

Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the
subject land. Disregarded the affidavit of the farmers under duress.
Court of Appeals:
Sustained the decision of both DAR secretaries. Supreme Court Denied their prayers and
sustained the decisions.
Main Issue Related to our topic

Exemption of the 4.1685 rice land from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her,
Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same rice land, this time under R.A.
No. 6657.
DAR Regional Director:

March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to
retain the subject rice land but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three
(3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof
as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
15
Facts: Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa,
LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by
law.The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all
they are not the tenants of the land. Their findings was that the Affidavit was merely issued
under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the respondents.
Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A. No.
6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject
riceland but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to
final and executory
application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even
executory.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by

the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is
land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the
government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards,
which would be a pointless process. The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not
absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found
to be part of the landowner's retained area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Del Castillo v. Orciga

G.R. No. 153850, August 31, 2006 (500 SCRA 498)
Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner del Castillo seeking the
nullification of the November 26, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
16
No. 66122, ordering him to vacate the subject landholding and directing the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to restore possession of the farm lot to
respondents. Petitioner Jovendo del Castillo is the son and administrator of Menardo del Castillo,
who previously owned a 1.3300-hectare riceland located at Omabo, Polpog, Bula, Camarines
Sur. Eugenio Orciga was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-070176 over the said
landholding on April 3, 1981. On August 1, 1988, Eugenio Orciga died. Prior to the final
selection and determination of the successor of the deceased tenant, on July 1, 1991, the heirs
agreed to rotate among themselves the cultivation of the riceland covered by said CLT. After
cultivating and harvesting the riceland from 1989 to 1991, Ronald Orciga abandoned the said
farm on May 3, 1991 and left the town.
On May 28, 1991, petitioner Del Castillo —a member of the CAFGU (Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit) —forcibly entered the riceland of the late Eugenio Orciga. He started to
cultivate the said land over the objection of the respondents, effectively ejecting them from their
possession and cultivation of the land. Respondents filed a Complaint on June 10, 1991, with the
Office of Provincial Adjudicator, DARAB, Naga City. for Reinstatement with Mandatory
Injunction and Damages. Petitiner (Del Castillo), in his Answer, averred that Orciga failed to
give lessor's share and was advised by DAR Para-legal Officer to take over the cultivation of the
land denying ejectment of respondents. He also claimed Orciga mortgaged portions of the farm.
PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
respondents, but the same was denied.Undaunted, Del Castillo, on July 18, 2001, interposed a
petition for review before the CA, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 66122.
On petition for review, the appellate court concluded that petitioner Del Castillo had no right
to take possession of the farmland being disputed even if the heirs had failed to deliver the
agricultural lessor's share. It held that when the beneficiary abandons the tillage or refuses to gain
rights accruing to the farmer-beneficiary under the law, it will be reverted to the government and
not to the farm lot owner. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: ho should be entitled to possess the disputed landholding under the DAR Land Transfer
Program —the petitioner, as representative of the former titled landowner, or the respondents, as
successors of the deceased beneficiary?
Held: The Court holds respondents to be the rightful possessors of the disputed farmland and at
the same time, rejects the instant petition.Undeniably, Eugenio Orciga, the original beneficiary
and predecessor-in-interest of respondents, was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No.
0070176 over the contested land pursuant to PD No. 27. Therefore, for all intents and purposes,
he is the acknowledged owner of the contested land. A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a
document issued to a tenant-farmer, which proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to
acquire the land. This certificate prescribes the terms and conditions of ownership over said land
and likewise describes the landholding —its area and its location. A CLT is the provisional title
of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of the land's
value or for as long as the beneficiary is an "amortizing owner."In the case at bar, the
petitioner has two options; first, to bring the dispute on the non-payment of the land to the DAR
and the Barangay Committee on Land Production that will subsequently resolve said dispute
pursuant to Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973
17
and other issuances; and, second, to negotiate with the DAR and LBP for payment of the
compensation claim pursuant to Section 2 of EO No. 228. Eventually, the scheme under EO No.
228 will result to the full payment of the compensation of the value of the land to Menardo del
Castillo, petitioner's father and former landowner. From the foregoing options, it is indubitably
clear that the reconveyance of the land to the former owner is not allowed. The policy is to hold
such lands under trust for the succeeding generations of farmers. The objective is to prevent
repetition of cases where the lands distributed to the tenant-farmers reverted to the former lot
owners or even conveyed to land speculators. Thus, possession of the land cannot be restored to
petitioner del Castillo although there was failure of the heirs to pay the landowner's share or
compensation. The transfer or conveyance of the riceland can only be made to an heir of the
beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who shall in turn cultivate the land. In the case in hand,
even if Ronald Orciga has abandoned the land, the right to possess and cultivate the land legally
belongs to the other heirs of Eugenio Orciga. Undoubtedly, petitioner Del Castillo is not a
beneficiary of Eugenio Orciga —the original beneficiary; hence, petitioner has no legal right to
the possession of the farmland.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner del Castillo seeks the nullification of the
November 26, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66122, ordering
him to vacate the subject landholding and directing the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) to restore possession of the farm lot to respondents.
The Facts
Petitioner Jovendo del Castillo is the son and administrator of Menardo del Castillo, who
previously owned a 1.3300-hectare riceland located at Omabo, Polpog, Bula, Camarines Sur.
The farmland was formerly cultivated by Eugenio Orciga. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27 (PD No. 27), Eugenio Orciga became the beneficiary of the Land Transfer Program of the
government during his lifetime. He was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-070176 over
the said landholding on April 3, 1981.
On August 1, 1988, Eugenio Orciga died. However, prior to the final selection and determination
of the successor of the deceased tenant, on July 1, 1991, the heirs agreed to rotate among
themselves the cultivation of the riceland covered by said CLT for a continuous period from May
1989 to May 1998. After cultivating and harvesting the riceland from 1989 to 1991, Ronald
Orciga abandoned the said farm on May 3, 1991, and eventually left the barrio without turning
over the landowner’s share of the agricultural harvest.
On May 28, 1991, fully armed with guns, petitioner del Castillo––a member of the CAFGU
(Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit)––forcibly entered the riceland of the late Eugenio
Orciga. He started to cultivate the said land over the objection of the respondents, effectively
ejecting them from their possession and cultivation of the land.
Respondents filed a Complaint on June 10, 1991, with the Office of Provincial Adjudicator,
DARAB, Naga City, docketed as DARAB Case No. 0000437 for Reinstatement with Mandatory
Injunction and Damages 9 entitled Abundo Orciga, et al. v. Jovendo Del Castillo.
18
In his Answer with Counterclaim 10 filed on July 5, 1991, petitioner averred that on May 6, 1991,
he had written a letter-complaint to Engr. Jaime Abonita, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), Bula, Camarines Sur, informing Abonita that beginning the second harvest in 1987,
Ronald Orciga had failed and refused to give the lessor’s share of the harvest despite repeated
demands. In said Answer, petitioner del Castillo stated that he had sought the assistance of DAR
Para-Legal Officer Gilbert Villar, who advised him that in the absence and until the return of
tenant-lessee Ronald Orciga, he could take over the cultivation of the land. He also denied
ejecting respondents from the land considering that certain mortgagees were cultivating the
riceland and in actual possession of it. He claimed that Ronald Orciga mortgaged portions of the
farm to Danilo Pornillos for PhP 3,500.00 11 and to Antonio Timado for PhP 3,500.00.
To respondents’ Complaint and petitioner’s Answer with Counterclaim, Provincial Adjudicator

Virgil G. Alberto then rendered his June 30, 1994 Decision in favor of petitioner, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for reinstatement is hereby dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Rolando Orciga is therefore given until the next cropping season of 1994 to personally cultivate
said farmholding, subject to payment of arrearages on rentals.
Believing that the Provincial Adjudicator had erred in his Decision, respondents filed a Motion
for Reconsideration on August 1, 1994, claiming that the Provincial Adjudicator’s Decision was
"contrary to law and not in accordance with the provisions and intent of MAR Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1978, in relation to A.O. 4, series of 1988"; but in his August 22, 1994
Resolution, the Provincial Adjudicator rejected the plea for reconsideration.
Consequently, on September 1, 1994, respondents filed an appeal before the DARAB which was
docketed as DARAB Case No. 3992 (Reg. Case No.05-437-CS-94). On March 9, 1998, the
DARAB rendered its judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby ANNULED AND A NEW
DECISION is hereby rendered:
1. Placing the disposition of subject landholding with the DAR, particularly the PARO of
Camarines Sur, for the implementation of Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
1978, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 14, Series of 1988;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee, and/or any person/s acting in his behalf, to vacate subject
landholding for the proper disposition of the DAR.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the sala of the Provincial Adjudicator a quo for the
issuance of a writ of execution. On April 16, 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the DARAB, in its February 7, 2001 Resolution, rejected petitioner’s motion.
Undaunted, del Castillo, on July 18, 2001, interposed a petition for review before the CA, which
was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 66122.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
19
The appellate court concluded that petitioner del Castillo had no right to take possession of the
farmland being disputed even if the heirs had failed to deliver the agricultural lessor’s share. It
held that when the beneficiary abandons the tillage or refuses to gain rights accruing to the
farmer-beneficiary under the law, it will be reverted to the government and not to the farm lot
owner.
The dispositive portion of the CA’s November 26, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The petitioner is hereby ordered to
vacate the premises in question. The DARAB is hereby directed to immediately reinstate
possession of the landholdings to respondents.
On December 13, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision, but the
CA discarded the said motion for lack of merit in its May 7, 2002 Resolution. Persistent,
petitioner now seeks a fourth and final review of his case through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court.
The Issue
The main issue is who should be entitled to possess the disputed landholding under the DAR
Land Transfer Program––the petitioner, as representative of the former titled landowner, or the
respondents, as successors of the deceased beneficiary.
The Court’s Ruling

The Court holds respondents to be the rightful possessors of the disputed farmland and at the
same time, rejects the instant petition.
The Main Issue: Who is Entitled to the Possession of the Riceland

Petitioner del Castillo asserts that restoring the possession of the riceland to the respondents
would be prejudicial to the interest of Menardo del Castillo, the former landowner, due to the
unjustified abandonment of said landholding by Ronald Orciga, the designated successor of the
beneficiary, Eugenio Orciga. He also argues that his father, Menardo del Castillo, is still entitled
to just and full compensation of the riceland which, at the time the case was originally filed
before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Camarines Sur, had not been
paid by Eugenio Orciga. Furthermore, he claims that because of the respondents’ pending
payment of the amortizations, he should still be considered the owner of the riceland. Based on
such reasons, he concludes that he is entitled to possess and cultivate the land as administrator on
behalf of his father.
We DISAGREE.
Undeniably, Eugenio Orciga, the original beneficiary and predecessor-in-interest of respondents,
was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0070176 over the contested land pursuant to PD
No. 27. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, he is the acknowledged owner of the contested
land.
20
A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a document issued to a tenant-farmer, which proves
inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is
issued in order for the tenant- farmer to acquire the land. This certificate prescribes the terms and
conditions of ownership over said land and likewise describes the landholding––its area and its
location. A CLT is the provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is
awaiting full payment of the land’s value or for as long as the beneficiary is an "amortizing
owner."
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 266 states that:

[u]pon receipt of the copy of the CLT, the Register of Deeds concerned shall record it in the
primary entry book and annotate a memorandum thereof in the corresponding certificate of title
covering the land, without need of prior surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. It
shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to notify the registered owner concerned of such fact
within a reasonable time (par. 2).
More so, under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 315, the CLT shall be accepted as collateral
for loans. Land transfer under PD No. 27 is effected in two (2) stages: (1) issuance of a CLT to a
farmer-beneficiary as soon as DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in
recognition that said person is a "deemed owner"; and (2) issuance of an Emancipation Patent as
proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease
rentals by the farmer or beneficiary.
As of May 28, 1991, when petitioner grabbed possession of the said land, respondents, as
successors-in-interest of Eugenio Orciga, had not yet been issued an Emancipation Patent
because they were still paying lease-rentals or the agreed share to the lot owner. Since the
respondents were not able to continue cultivating the land and pay the share of petitioner’s
father, Jovendo del Castillo insists that he should be allowed to take over and possess the land.
Petitioner’s asseveration that he is still entitled to possess and cultivate said farmland does not
hold water under PD No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO No. 228). PD No. 27 took effect
on October 21, 1972 while EO No. 228 became effective on July 17, 1987. The said decree
provides that the tenant-farmer should be a full- fledged member of a duly recognized farmer’s
cooperative. If the private agricultural land is primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system
of share-a-crop or lease tenants, the tenant-farmer shall be a "deemed owner" of a portion
constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares, if not irrigated and three (3) hectares, if
irrigated.
To determine the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer under PD No. 27, the
value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one half (2 ½) times the average harvest of three
normal crop years. The cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per
annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations.
Then, the landholding is transferred by the Department of Agrarian Reform to the tenant-farmer,
and a CLT is issued to him; thereafter, the tenant-farmer starts to pay the amortizations to the
land-owner.
21
The CLT of Eugenio Orciga was issued on April 3, 1981; thus, he has been the rightful owner of
said farmland by virtue of PD No. 27.
Let us now move on to the other issue of non-payment of the amortizations on said farmland––
which is del Castillo’s basis to insist ownership over the land on his father’s behalf. PD No. 27 is
clear that in case of non-payment, the amortizations due shall be paid by the farmer’s cooperative
in which the defaulting tenant-farmer is a member, with the cooperative having a right of
recourse against the farmer. The government shall guarantee such amortizations with shares of
stocks in government-owned and government-controlled corporations.
Clearly, therefore, the landowner is assured of payment even if the tenant-farmer defaults in
paying amortizations since the farmers’ cooperative will assume paying the amortizations.
With regard to the reversion of the landholding to the owner, this is proscribed under PD No. 27
since it is explicitly provided that:
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government
shall not be transferable except by the hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance
with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and
regulations (par. 13).
The landowner has no reason to complain since full payment of the value is even guaranteed by
the shares of stocks of government corporations.
In the light of this decree, petitioner del Castillo’s position––that his possession of the
landholding be maintained––has no strong legal mooring under PD No. 27.
On July 17, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 228 which
provides that as of October 21, 1972, all qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now "deemed full
owners" of the land they acquired by virtue of PD No. 27. E.O. No. 228 modified PD No. 27 on
the manner of payment of the value of the land to the landowner. EO No. 228 even provided for
different modes of payment of the value of the land, thus:
SECTION 3. Compensation shall be paid to the landowners in any of the following modes, at the
option of the landowners:
(a) Bond payment over ten (10) years, with ten percent (10%) of the value of the land payable
immediately in cash, and the balance in the form of LBP bonds bearing market rates of
interest that are aligned with 90-day treasury bills rates, net of applicable final withholding
tax. One-tenth of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuances until the tenth year. The LBP bonds issued hereunder shall be eligible for the
purchase of government assets to be privatized;
(b) Direct payment in cash or kind by the farmer-beneficiaries with the terms to be mutually
agreed upon by the beneficiaries and landowners and subject to the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform; and
(c) Other modes of payment as may be prescribed or approved by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council.
22
If the landowner decides that the financing should be extended by Land Bank for the payment of
the value of the land to him under Section 3(a) of EO No. 228, a mortgage is constituted over the
landholding.
Section 7 of the Executive Order provides:

As of the date of this Executive Order, a lien by way of mortgage shall exist in favor of the Land
Bank on all lands it has financed and acquired by the farmer-beneficiary by virtue of P.D. No. 27
for all amortizations, both principal and interest, due from the farmer-beneficiary or a valid
transferee until the amortizations are paid in full.
In this manner of payment, the farmer-beneficiary pays the amortizations directly to the Land
Bank and no longer to the land owner. However, the failure of the farmer-beneficiary to pay
three (3) annual amortizations to Land Bank will result in the foreclosure of the mortgage.
Section 11, EO No. 228 further directs the Land Bank, within three (3) months from the transfer
of the land, to sell the foreclosed land to any interested landless farmer duly certified as a bona
fide landless farmer by the Department of Agrarian Reform of the barangay or the two closest
barangays where the land is located.
Specifically, Section 2 of EO No. 228 explains the procedure on the payment of lease rentals by
the farmer-beneficiary who was granted a CLT under PD No. 27. If a dispute arises, the
mechanism for its resolution is as follows:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer beneficiary after October 21, 1972, shall be
considered as advance payment for the land. In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding
the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform
and the Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within
thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances. In the event a party questions in
court the resolution of the dispute, the landowner’s compensation claim shall still be processed
for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before
the court.
Unmistakably, that in case the farmer-beneficiary under PD No. 27 is unable to pay the agreed
lease rentals, the LBP will process the compensation claim for payment; and the proceeds shall
be held in trust by its Trust Department until the landowner finally accepts the payment or the
court orders him to accept it. Under Section 7 of EO No. 228, a lien by way of mortgage shall
exist in favor of LBP on the land it has financed in favor of a farmer-beneficiary under PD No.
27. In short, the payment of the full value of the land to the landowner is assured under EO No.
228, which explains the rule that even if the lease-rentals or amortizations have not been paid to
the landowner, the possession is retained by the farmer-beneficiary.
In the case at bar, the petitioner has two options; first, to bring the dispute on the non-payment of
the land to the DAR and the Barangay Committee on Land Production that will subsequently
23
resolve said dispute pursuant to Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Memorandum Circular No.
26, series of 1973 and other issuances; and, second, to negotiate with the DAR and LBP for
payment of the compensation claim pursuant to Section 2 of EO No. 228. Eventually, the scheme
under EO No. 228 will result to the full payment of the compensation of the value of the land to
Menardo del Castillo, petitioner’s father and former landowner.
From the foregoing options, it is indubitably clear that the reconveyance of the land to the former
owner is not allowed. The policy is to hold such lands under trust for the succeeding generations
of farmers. 28 The objective is to prevent repetition of cases where the lands distributed to the
tenant-farmers reverted to the former lot owners or even conveyed to land speculators. 29 Thus,
possession of the land cannot be restored to petitioner del Castillo although there was failure of
the heirs to pay the landowner’s share or compensation. The transfer or conveyance of the
riceland can only be made to an heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who shall in
turn cultivate the land. In the case in hand, even if Ronald Orciga has abandoned the land, the
right to possess and cultivate the land legally belongs to the other heirs of Eugenio Orciga.
Undoubtedly, petitioner del Castillo is not a beneficiary of Eugenio Orciga––the original
beneficiary; hence, petitioner has no legal right to the possession of the farmland.
On the other issue of deceased Eugenio Orciga’s successor, the Court rules that the July 1, 1991
Agreement among the heirs of Eugenio Orciga (that stipulated a provision for a rotation system
in the cultivation of the riceland among themselves) directly contravenes Ministry Memorandum
Circular No. 19, Series of 1978. The said ministry memorandum circular states that:
Where there are several heirs, and in the absence of extra judicial settlement or waiver of
rights in favor of one heirwho shall be the sole owner and cultivator, the heirs shall[,] within one
month from the death of the tenant-beneficiary[,] be free to choose from among themselves one
who shall have sole ownership and cultivation of the land, x x x Provided, however, That [sic]
the surviving spouse shall be given first preference; otherwise, in the absence or due to the
permanent incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be determined among the heirs
according to age (emphases supplied).
Moreover, the ministry memorandum circular also provides that:
1. Succession to the farmholding covered by Operation Land Transfer shall be governed by the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines subject to the following
limitations:
a. The farmholding shall not be partitioned or fragmented.

b. The ownership and cultivation of the farmholding shall ultimately be consolidated in one
heir who possesses the following qualifications:
(1) being a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers’ cooperative;

(2) capable of personally cultivating the farmholding; and
(3) willing to assume the obligations and responsibilities of a tenant-beneficiary.
24
c. Such owner-cultivator shall compensate the other heirs to the extent of their respective
legal interest in the land, subject to the payment of whatever outstanding obligations of
the deceased tenant-beneficiary.
The records show that Emelina Orciga Volante is desirous to avail herself of the right to cultivate
the land according to the rotation system of the heirs. This is contrary to MAR Memorandum
Circular No. 19, which requires that the ownership and cultivation shall be consolidated in one
heir. The said agreement is therefore illegal and ineffective. The heirs must agree on one of them
to be the owner-cultivator of the land in accordance with the law, but priority is granted to the
surviving spouse, and in the latter’s absence or permanent incapacity, the age of the heirs will be
used to decide who should succeed as farmer-beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the November 26, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
1. The respondents or heirs of the late Eugenio Orciga are ordered, within one month from
finality of this Decision, to choose the sole owner and cultivator of the landholding from
among themselves, giving first preference to his surviving spouse, or in her absence or
incapacity, from among the heirs, and to give priority according to age of the heirs in
accordance with MAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978.
2. In case of respondents’ failure to comply with MAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
1978, the DAR is ordered to determine the heir or successor-in-interest of the late Eugenio
Orciga as farmer-beneficiary within one month reckoned from the lapse of the 30-day period
given to respondents to determine the sole owner-cultivator.
3. Petitioner Jovendo del Castillo is ordered to immediately surrender possession of the
disputed landholding to respondents, and the DARAB is directed to ensure the immediate
restoration of possession of said landholding to the respondents.
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6. Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corp. v. Dela Cruz

G. R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014
Facts: The Dakila property used to be tenanted by Susana Surio and the others but the tenants
freely and voluntarily relinquished their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago through their
respective sworn statement in exchange for some financial assistance and individual homelots
titled and distributed in their names. Holy Trinity purchased the remaining 208,050 sq.m. of the
Dakila property from Santiago who caused the transfer of the title to Holy Trinity and subdivided
the Dakila property into 6 lots. Holy Trinity then develop the property by dumping filing
materials on the topsoil, erected a perimeter fence and steel gate and later on established its field
office on the property. The Sanggunian Bayan of Malolos passed Municipal Resolution No. 16-
98 reclassifying four of the six subdivided lots belonging to the Holy Trinity into residential lots.
In 2006, Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio wrote to Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer of Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale of the Dakila property. DAR
25
Provincial Office of Bulacan filed a petition to annul the sale of the Dakila property with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan.
Issue: Was the Dakila property agricultural land within the coverage of RA 6657 or PD 27?
Held: No. Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of RA 6657, two
requisites must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be devoted to agricultural activity, and (2)
that the land must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.
For land to be covered under PD 27, it must be devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a
system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. Unfortunately! the Dakila property did
not meet these requirements.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts: A parcel of land in Bulacan is registered to Freddie Santiago. The Dakila property used to
be tenanted by Susana Surio and the others but the tenants freely and voluntarily relinquished
their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago through their respective sworn statement in exchange for
some financial assistance and individual homelots titled and distributed in their names. Holy
Trinity purchased the remaining 208, 050 sq. m. of the Dakila property from Santiago, who
subsequently caused the transfer of the title thereof to the former and subdivided the same into 6
lots. Holy Trinity then developed the property by dumping filing materials on the topsoil, erected
a perimeter fence and steel gate and later on established its field office on the property.
In 1988, the Sanggunian Bayan of Malolos passed Municipal Resolution No.16-86 reclassifying
four of the six subdivided lots belonging to the Holy Trinity into residential lots. The Municipal
Planning and Development Office (MPDO) of Bulacan issued the Certificate of Eligibility for
Conversion, Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance in favor of Hoy Trinity for its
residential subdivision project on the Dakila property.
In 1999, Holy Trinity purchased another from Santiago another parcel of land in Bulacan. In
2006, Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio wrote to Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer of Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale of the Dakila property. It was followed
by the letter request of the Chairman of Sumapang Matanda Barangay Agrarian Reform Council
to place the Dakila property within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
PD 27. DAR Provincial Office of Bulacan filed a petition to annul the sale of the Dakila property
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan.
Ruling:
The Dakila property was not an agricultural land within the coverage of R.A. No. 6657 or P.D.
No. 27. The CA declared that the Dakila property as an agricultural land; and that there was no
valid reclassification under Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 because the law required an
ordinance, not a resolution.
We agree in part with the CA. Under Republic Act No. 7160, local government units, such as the
Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, are vested with the power to reclassify lands. However,
Section 20, Chapter II, Title I of Republic Act No. 7160 ordains:
26
Section 20. Reclassification of Lands. – (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance
passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the
reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition
in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or(2) where the land shall
have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned: x x x.
Clearly, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be
passed after the conduct of public hearings. The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis
of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. Given the foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution
was ineffectual for that purpose. A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was temporary in nature, and differed from an
ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed a general and permanent
character.49 We also note that the petitioner did not show if the requisite public hearings were
conducted at all. In the absence of any valid and complete reclassification, therefore, the Dakila
property remained under the category of an agricultural land.
Nonetheless, the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject to the coverage of Republic
Act No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.
7. Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative Development, Inc. v.

Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 159089, May 3, 2006
Facts: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the
June 30, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65498.
On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for
petitioner (Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.)with
respondent (Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation). On April 2, 1996, petitioner,
represented by its alleged chairman, Manuel K. Asta, filed a complaint with the RTC for
Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against
respondent, the alleged . . . officers of petitioner who entered into the agreement, and the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao (hereinafter PARO), represented by Saturnino D.
Sibbaluca. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended complaint with leave of court alleging that
the persons, who executed the contract, were not authorized by it. Respondent's filed a Motion to
Dismiss alleging that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has
primary, exclusive, and original jurisdiction; that petitioner failed to comply with the compulsory
mediation and conciliation proceedings at the barangay level; and for the unauthorized institution
of the complaint in behalf of petitioner. Respondent also averred that petitioner was engaged in
forum shopping because it also filed a petition before the DAR praying for the disapproval of the
Joint Production Agreement. The PARO also filed a motion to dismiss on May 16, 1996. On
August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's Fees. On February 25,
27
1997, the DARAB decided the case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint Production
Agreement as valid and binding and ordering petitioner to account for the proceeds of the
produce and to comply with the terms of the contract. The RTC then issued its decision on
October 18, 1999.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of the case at
bench by RTC of Tagum City on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and nature of the suit.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the ‘Joint Production
Agreement' is valid instead of declaring it as null and void ab initio, its provisions, terms and
condition, cause and purposes being violative of the express mandatory provision of R.A. 6657.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the 'Joint Production
Agreement' is a leasehold contract and therefore valid.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in interpreting and applying the prevailing
doctrines and jurisprudence delineating the jurisdiction between the regular court and DARAB
on the matter of agricultural land and tenancy relationship.
Held: Section 50 of Republic Act 6657 and Section 17 of Executive Order 229 vest in the DAR
the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through Executive Order 129-A,
the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and
functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The subject matter
of the present controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In question are
the rights and obligations of two juridical persons engaged in the management, cultivation and
use of agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
of the government.
To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement, it is normally necessary to establish the

following elements: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the
subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5)there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)
the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner is thus
correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural
leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within the sphere of
agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements —whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise —over lands devoted to
agriculture. Such disputes include those concerning farm workers' associations or representations
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. Also included is any controversy relating to the terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian
28
reform beneficiaries—whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator
and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. The assailed Joint Production
Agreement is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or
arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land
beneficiaries and investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas.
Jurisdiction over the present controversy lies with the DARAB. As the RTC had correctly
dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it was superfluous for the trial court and
the Court of Appeals for that matter to have ruled further on the issue of the validity of the
agreement.
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8. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative

G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012
Facts: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the commercial farming of bananas. A portion of

the land it owns was placed under CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) coverage.
Thus, its certificates of title over portions of the land under CARP were cancelled, and new
TCTs were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Subsequently, beneficiaries
were identified, most of whom were members of respondent cooperative. Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) were issued for them.
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful occupation against respondents, alleging that it was the
lawful owner of two parcels of land within the portions covered by the CLOA and that the said
CLOAs had yet to attain finality owing to appeals filed by petitioner. Thus, while the
beneficiaries had yet to be designated with finality, respondents refused to do work for petitioner,
and forcibly entered the land subject to the dispute and occupied the same. On the other hand,
respondents argued that indeed, petitioner had the TCTs of the parcel of land subject to the
dispute, but these were put under the name of the Republic upon subjecting it to CARP. Thus,
despite the award of CLOAs to respondents, petitioner continued to manage the land while
paying them wages. Respondents thus demanded that their rights under the CLOAs be
established, and that the petitioner pay them their production share. The CA affirmed the DAR
Adjudication Board's decision ordering the petitioner to turn over the possession of the land to
the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation.
Held: NO. Respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation. The action taken by respondents
to guard the land was reasonable and necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent
what petitioner attempted to do. Respondents were simply protecting their right, after the
petitioner's attempt to thwart the CARP's implementation. What the petitioner did was install
workers which it conspired with on land already identified as falling under CARP and having
CARP-designated beneficiaries. This served as an attempted roadblock to installing the
legitimate beneficiaries on the land.
29
Petitioners already lost ownership over the land when it acknowledged that there was a deposit
of the initial valuation of the land. It even manifested that the Republic's TCTs were neither
attacked nor assailed in this case. Thus, upon petitioner's own reasoning, it already lost
possession and ownership over the land when the condition (payment of just compensation) was
fulfilled, which was not disputed in this case.
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian
reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to
own directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over
the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Hence, petitioner must now turn
over possession of the disputed land to respondents.
In the case of Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, the Court ruled that the
Constitution and the CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control
over agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught.
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9. Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 159674, June 30, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents
(EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur. The parcels
of land, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have
been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).
Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same
were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful
cultivation thereof. HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines
through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661.
The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares. HMI, through a
certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed
petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered
under said law. The RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs The
Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team.
Petitioners' TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision. After the DARAB
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with
their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the assailed Resolution:
The petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed
by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power
of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioners filed a
"Motion for Reconsideration with Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners."
The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Petitioners now file this present Petition contending
30
that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible
one year after their registration.
Issues: Whether there was compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure; the certification against forum shopping?
Whether Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as

TCTs issued in registration proceedings?
Held: Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular
No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum
shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the
rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to
resolve the same issues. Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who
is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v.
Cabantog and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio that the certification of non-forum shopping
must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel.
In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Appeals
merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation of
the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar, without
discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in
consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be
determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the suspension or
relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as
those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.
Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued in administrative
proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings: The same
confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the
landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest,
just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of
Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as
that in the Public Land Act.
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with
Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the
same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the
issuance of the patent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
31
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person." The EPs themselves, like the
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and
CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
registration proceedings.
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10. Sta. Monica Industrial Corporation v. Department of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 164846, June 18, 2006
Facts: Asuncion Trinidad is the owner of five parcels of land with a total area of 4.69 hectares in
Calumpit, Bulacan. Private respondent Basilio De Guzman is the agricultural leasehold tenant of
Trinidad, who was issued certificates of Land Transfer on July 22, 1981 as an agricultural
leasehold tenant. De Guzman filed a petition for the issuance of patent under his name with the
DAR Regional Office. The latter then sent notices to Trinidad requiring her to comment, but
instead of complying, she filed a motion for bill of particulars. After due proceedings, the
Regional Director of DAR issued the order granting Emancipation Patent in favor of De Guzman
as qualified farmer-beneficiary of Agrarian Reform Program. Thus, Trinidad filed a motion for
reconsideration, but her motion was denied.
A year later, petitioner Sta. Monica filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA
assailing the order of DAR. Sta. Monica claimed that while it is true that Trinidad was the former
owner of the disputed parcel of land, the said landholding was sold on Jan. 27, 1986 in favor of
Sta. Monica. In fact, the latter was able to secure from the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Bulacan a corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title thereto, with No. 301408 (now TCT No.
RT-70512). It also asserted that there was a denial of due process because it was not furnished a
notice of coverage under the CARP law. In his comment, De Guzman argued that the alleged
sale of the landholding is illegal due to the lack of requisite clearance from the DAR. The said
clearance is required under P.D. No. 27, the Tenant Emancipation Decree, which prohibits
transfer of covered lands except to tenant-beneficiaries. According to De Guzman, since no
clearance was sought from, and granted by, the DAR, the sale in favor of petitioner by Trinidad
is inexistent and void. Hence, Trinidad remained the owner of the disputed property.

Thus, the CA dismissed the petition of Sta. Monica for lack of merit. The CA ruled that Sta.
Monica is not a real party-in-interest because it cannot be considered as an owner of the land it
bought from Trinidad.
Issue: Has Sta. Monica, a corporation with separate juridical personality been denied of the
opportunity of notice and hearing when the DAR awarded land ownership to an agrarian reform
farmer-beneficiary, in the person of De Guzman?
Held: No. The corporation Sta. Monica was not denied of the opportunity of notice and hearing.
Trinidad is still deemed the owner of the agricultural land sold to Sta. Monica; no need for
separate notice of coverage under CARP law. Buyer Sta. Monica is owned and controlled by
Trinidad and her family of which they own 98% of the outstanding capital stock. As owners of
32
98% of outstanding capital stock, they are beneficial owners of all the assets of the corporation
including the agricultural land sold by Trinidad to Sta. Monica. At the very last, the notice to her
is already a notice to Sta. Monica because the corporation acted as a mere conduit of Trinidad.
The sale of the land from Trinidad to Sta. Monica was a mere ploy to evade the applicable
provisions of the agrarian law. But it is a fiat that the corporate vehicle cannot be used as a shield
to protect fraud or justify wrong. Thus, the veil of corporate fiction will be pierced when it is
used to defeat public convenience and subvert public policy. Hence, the Court held that Trinidad
is still deemed the owner of the agricultural land sold to Sta. Monica, hence, a separate notice of
coverage under the CARP law is no longer necessary.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts: Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation is a juridical person whose 98% of
its shares is owned by Trinidad and her family. Trinidad is the owner of a parcel of land located
in Bulacan and also the treasurer of Sta. Monica. Basilio de Guzman is a leasehold tenant of
Trinidad.
A leasehold contract was executed between Trinidad and De Guzman in April 1976. He was
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer on July 1981. Desiring to own the land he till, Basilio filed
a petition for issuance of emancipation patent in his name with the Regional Director – DAR.
DAR placed under OLT pursuant to PD 27 the landholdings of Trinidad. Sta. Monica filed a
petition for prohibition stating that out of the 83, 689 sqm owned by Trinidad, they acquired 39,
547 sqm through sale with title in its favor and that it was not furnished notice of the coverage
under CARP Law.
Basilio contends that the alleged sale of the landholding is illegal due to lack of requisite
clearance from DAR pursuant to PD 27 which prohibits transfer of covered lands except to
tenant-beneficiaries.
Issue: Is the sale of the land by Trinidad to Sta. Monica valid?
Held: NO. The sale between Trinidad and Sta. Monica was a mere front to frustrate the
implementation of the agrarian law which is prohibited by PD 27. Transfer of ownership over
tenanted rice and corn land after October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-
tillers thereon. It is recalled that in 1981, a certificate of land transfer was issued to Basilio. In
1986, sale to Sta. Monica occurred. As lessee, Basilio has the right to be informed about matters
affecting the land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it.
Trinidad and family owned 98% of Sta. Monica and yet failed to notify DAR of the prior sale
during agrarian reform proceedings. She feigned ignorance of Basilio’s claim that he was her
tenant. That she and Sta. Monica has the same cousel; that instead of replying to the petition of
Basilio, she filed for a motion for a bill of particular knowing fully that she is a party to the
transaction; and Basilio still pays Trinidad lease long after she sold the land to Sta. Monica.
Since, Trinidad is still deemed the owner of the lands sold to Sta. Monica, there is no need for a
separate notice under CARP Law.
33
Corporate vehicle cannot be used as a shield to protect fraud or justify wrong. The veil of
corporate fiction will be pierced when it is used to defeat public convenience and subvert public
policy.
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11. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal

G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004
Facts: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988. Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to
determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the
Landbank’s valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for
determination of just compensation. In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based
the same on the facts established in another case pending before it.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production figures in
another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without conducting a
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties
Held: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the
knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier stated,
the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a
hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
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12. Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 164195, February 6, 2007 (632 SCRA 727)
34
Facts: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners
of five parcels of agricultural lands located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province. On 12
October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the
government. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately from PARO of Davao
province a notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the
properties has been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare while HPI's properties
were valued at P164,478,178.14. AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366 and
No. 113359, and applied for the shifting of the mode of acquisition for TCT No. 113359 from
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. HPI also
rejected the valuation of its three parcels of land covered by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362
and No. T-10363. Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP's valuation, the DAR
requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations in the names and for the
accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC thereafter withdrew the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI
withdrew the amount of P45,481,706.76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed
the Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to
issue a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. After the issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of the RP the ROD of Davao, upon the request of the DAR, issued
TCTs and Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three
years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render a decision on
the valuation of the land. Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just
compensation were filed by AFC and HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum City (acting as a Special Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated. The
SAC rendered a decision dated 25 September 2001 fixing the just compensation for the
1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs. LBP filed a Motion
for Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 on the ground that the trial court based its valuation on
the value of residential and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands involved are
agricultural. On December 5, 2001, the trial court modified its decision ordering the DAR to pay
interest. LBP filed a Notice of Appeal and was given due course in the Order of the RTC dated
15 May 2002. In the same Order, the RTC set aside its Order dated 5 December 2001 granting
execution pending appeal. On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12 February 2003 orders of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals granted said petition for being meritorious. AFC and HPI filed a joint
Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June
2004. Earlier, on 23 January 2003, DAR filed its own separate petition before the Court of
Appeals by way of a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of the
DAR for failure to state the material dates under Rule 42, Section 2, of the Rules of Court. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879
became final and executory and entry of judgment was issued by the appellate court on 7 May
2003. On the other hand, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, AFC and HPI filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not there is payment of Just Compensation?
35
Held: The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just”
inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It is not the taker’s gain but
the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, and ample. When the trial court arrived at the valuation of a landowner’s
property taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market
value, assessor’s value and the volume and value of its produce, such valuation is considered in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6657. Conspicuously, the trial court did not merely rely solely
on the appraisal report submitted by the Commissioners. The trial court conducted hearings for
the purpose of receiving the parties’ evidence. The SAC, correctly determined the amount of just
compensation due to AFC and HPI.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts: The LBP filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration on the Decision of the SC dated 6
February 2007 partially granting the LBP's petition and affirming the decision of the CA giving
due course to LBP's appeal. The grounds for the LBPs motion for reconsideration are that special
agrarian courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula devised to implement Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657; the LBP complied with the constitutional requirement on prompt and
full payment of just compensation; the LBP ensured that the interests already earned on the bond
portion of the revalued amounts were aligned with 91-day treasury bill (T-Bill) rates and on the
cash portion the normal banking interest rates; that petitioners are not entitled to an award of
Attorney's fees and commissioners' fees; and that LBP's counsel did not unnecessarily delay the
proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not SACs are bound by the formula devised to implement Section 17 of R. A.
No. 6657 on Determination of Just Compensation?
Held: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the SC declared that as the government agency
principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules
and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in
the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors
mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the
formula which was devised to implement the said provision. The ruling in the Celada case is in
conflict with the Apo Fruits which the SC ruled that the more acceptable practice has always
been to interpret and reconcile apparently conflicting jurisprudence to give effect to both by
harmonizing the two (Celada Ruling vis-à-vis Apo Fruits Ruling). The trial court, actually took
into consideration all the factors in the determination of just compensation as articulated in
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. The trial court had substantially applied the formula by
looking into all the factors included therein,i.e.net income, comparable sales and market value
per tax declaration, to arrive at the proper land value. The basic formula set forth in DAR AO
No. 5, Series of 1998 does not and cannot strictly bind the courts. As established in earlier
36
jurisprudence, the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function
which is vested in the regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative agencies.
The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the
evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be arbitrarily restricted by a
formula dictated by the DAR, an administrative agency. The modification of the Decision dated
6 February 2007 pertaining to the award of interest on just compensation, commissioner's fees
and attorney's fees, is in order. In all other respects, the Decision dated 6 February 2007 is
MAINTAINED.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FACTS: Petitioners are registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in Davao
Province, which they voluntarily offered to sell to the government. Upon initial valuation of the
LBP, petitioners considered such as unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for
the properties and thus rejected the valuation.DAR then requested LBP to deposit the amounts
equivalent to the LBP valuations in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, new TCTs over the
lands were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and CLOAs were subsequently
issued to farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioners, then, filed a complaint for the determination of just
compensation with the DARAB but despite the lapse of 10 years, the latter failed and refused to
render decision on the valuation of the disputed lands, which prompted petitioners to proceed
with the RTC as Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. The trial
court set the just compensation to be paid and fixed the interest due on the balance of the
compensation due at 12% per annum. CA reversed the decision on appeal.
ISSUE: Under whose jurisdiction is the determination of the final just compensation proper?
How is the value of just compensation determined?
HELD: It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be
lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government. On the issue determination of just compensation, Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guide posts for the
determination of just compensation, reads, as follows: Sec. 7. Determination of Just
Compensation. –In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors hall be
considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers
and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation. The RTC provided the following elucidation in its assailed
decision: The recommendation of the Commissioners’ Report for a value of P85.00 per sq.m. or
P850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is founded on evidence. The schedule of market values of the City
of Tagum as per its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibit
"J-6" and "CC-6") give the lowest value for residential land at P100/sq.m. for 4th class
residential land in 1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of P80.00/sq.m. for barangay
residential lot. It appears that certain portions of the land in question have been classified
37
as Medium Industrial District (Exhibit"J-4" and "CC-4"). The lowest value as for industrial
land, 3rd class in a barangay is P130.00 sq.m. The average of these figures, using the lowest
values in Exhibit "6" and "CC-6" yields the figure of P103.33 which is even higher by 22.2%
than that recommended by the Commissioners. It is even of judicial notice that assessments
made by local governments are much lower than real market value. Likewise, the value of the
improvements thereon, not even considered in the average of P103.33. If considered, this will
necessarily result in a higher average value. Thus, the value of just compensation as determined
by the trial court is deemed proper and equitable.
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13. Chamber of Real Estate Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued administrative orders and a memorandum regarding
the procedures governing land conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural. Petitioner
assailed its constitutionality, stating that the Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
including lands already reclassified by LGUs and the President under the coverage of the said
orders whereby such lands must now undergo the conversion process over which the DAR has
jurisdiction. According to petitioner, this violates the autonomy granted to the LGUs. The SC did
not agree with petitioner as the power of LGUs to reclassify lands is not absolute and that the
LGC recognized this by providing that the rules on reclassification will not modify
RA 6657 (CARP). Moreover, since the Secretary has been vested with the power to implement
the CARP, he has the power to promulgate rules pursuant thereto, such as in the case at bar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3
entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use
conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-
99,4 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its
coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential,
commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted
to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of
which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized;
and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on
or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657. Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another
Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land
Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and
repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural
use. To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development,
38
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which
temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. By
reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in
turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.
Issue: WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT
HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR
OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
Held: YES. Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included
in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely
acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No.
129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that
includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further,
the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the
category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and
is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided
for under Republic Act No. 6657. More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990, which Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the
authority to approve land conversion.38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority
to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion. It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the
purpose to which they are intended. Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s
conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15
June 1988.45 The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning
of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority.46
Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion
authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes.
Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands. It bears
stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies
how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically
convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts: Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced
all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all
untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses
after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion
of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses, it covers the following: (1) those to be converted
39
to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those
to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─
the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously
authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be
converted to such uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 -
2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. The AO was amended again in
2007 to include provisions particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and
calamities. To address the conversion to lands to non agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended the
processing and approval of land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is
a slowdown of housing projects because of such stoppage.
Issue: Is DAR’s AO unconstitutional?
Held: RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or
fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether
natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect,
lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of
conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because there is nothing in
Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR
the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted
to its conversion authority. It also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was
not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or
requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.
The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional
mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law
because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are
unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of
administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased
in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FACTS: This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement
40
of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as
amended by DAR AO No. 05-07,and DAR Memorandum No. 88,for having been issued
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal
and unconstitutional. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 07-97,entitled
―Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
Agricultural Uses,‖ which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use
conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural
lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15
June 1988.Subsequently, DAR AO No. 01-99,entitled ―Revised Rules and Regulations on the
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses,‖ was also issued amending and
updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following
agricultural lands, among others, (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial,
industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes. The Secretary issued another
Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled ―2002 Comprehensive Rules on
Land Use Conversion,‖ which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99,
and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers
all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use. Thereafter the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions of
DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing land
conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the unabated conversion of
prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary further issued Memorandum
No. 88 on15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all
land use conversion applications. By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual
slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage,
unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the
petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands that have been
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial, or for other non-agricultural uses.
HELD: Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (―inferior‖) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This
is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court‘s
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court‘s docket. In the case at bench, petitioner failed to
41
specifically and sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to
this Court and why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance. The
present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance
of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal
of this petition. Executive Order No. 129-Avested upon the DAR the responsibility of
implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful
implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorized the
DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities
for agrarian reform implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or
disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-
agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given the DAR
the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law.
Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that ―the authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its
powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x. Under DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, ―lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural usesbefore15 June 1988‖ have been included in the definition of
agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the
scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to
promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the
authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition
of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of
agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is
not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as
provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.Any reclassification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by
way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after15 June 1988must undergo the
process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands
may be used for other purposes. It is different, however, when through Presidential
Proclamations public agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or
purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary.
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988in the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, subjecting to DAR‘s jurisdiction for conversion lands which had already been
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or
after 15 June 1988.Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the
reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land
use conversion procedure or that DAR‘s approval or clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs. It bears emphasis that said
Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the President in order to address the
unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the
worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure
42
that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be
carried into. The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general
welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.
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14. Cuenca v. Department of Agrarian Reform

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Roberto J. Cuenca
G.R. No. 154112, September 23, 2004
Facts: Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117
hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of
sugar cane.
On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La

Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing
the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for
'Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405,
Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.'Private respondent Cuenca
prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio and Executive Order No.
405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared unconstitutional.MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.The respondent Judge issued a Temporary
Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the Notice
of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on January 17 and 18, 2000.
In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunado's
motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all
persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and
the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land.The Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into cognizance
that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private respondent, which seeks to exclude his
land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrarian reform matter and within the jurisdiction of
the DAR, not with the trial court.The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely
abused its discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial court, which is a
violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.
43
Held: The Petition has merit. The issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter
over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)All controversies on the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has
granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the
RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is
particularly true in the light of theexpress prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's
Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to
strictly observe Section 68 of RA6657, which reads:
"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. —No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program."
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15. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Hilippines

G.R. No. 169913, June 8, 2011 (651 SCRA 352)
Facts: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the
owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City. Said spouses were
childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. When
Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the
subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on
February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. On May 15,
1954, Hilaria died. Gregorio’s brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed asspecial administrator of
the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the
regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased spouses, filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject
property. The decision stated that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late
spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of
Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2)
interest in it.
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice
and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to
farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said program. However,
only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the
44
landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject
property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of
law was violated Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject
property.
Issue: Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the
property bought by the ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heir’s
due process.
Held: YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or
corn production, implying that there was no need for an actual notice. The importance of an
actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facts: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the
owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo,Â IliganÂ City. Said spouses were
childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. When
Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the
subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on
February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.Â On May
15, 1954, Hilaria died.Â Gregorio's brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was
appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the administrator of the
intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of title
over the subject property. The decision stated thatÂ the subject property was the conjugal
property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half
(1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the
intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a
one-half (1/2) interest in it.Â Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law
mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the
said program. Â However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them
that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program;
hence, their right to due process of law was violated Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR
issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants
and actual cultivators of the subject property.
Issue: Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the
property bought by the ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heir's due
process.
45
HELD: YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice
and/or corn production, implying that there was no need for an actual notice. The importance of
an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be
underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of
administrative due process of law. Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27
and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating
private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions,
especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should
therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the
DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act
committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the
proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should
be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In
addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should
be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject
property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the
reason to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property. Moreover, DAR
should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the
name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless, good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.Petitioners' right to due
process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the
subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside
the October 28, 2004 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 13, 2005
Resolution2 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a
parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject
property). Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman
(Virgilio) by another woman. Virgilio had been raised by the couple since he was two years old.
Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad, by still another woman. When
Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property. On February 16,
1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP
16,000.5 The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954.
Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was
issued in the name of Deleste. The arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated
by Deleste and from then on, he paid the taxes on the property. On May 15, 1954, Hilaria
died.7 Gregorio’s brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of the estate of
46
the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular
administrator of the joint estate.
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed
before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action against Deleste for the
reversion of title over the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 698. Said case went up to
this Court in Noel v. CA, where We rendered a Decision on January 11, 1995, affirming the
ruling of the CA that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio
and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to
Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to
be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on October 21,
1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn
lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-
beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said program.12 However, only the
heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the
landowners. Concomitantly, the notices and processes relative to the coverage were sent to these
heirs.13
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the "Zoning Regulation of
Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential.14
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of
private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.15 The CLTs
were registered on July 15, 1986.16
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed.17 The survey of a portion of the land consisting of
20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on January 8, 1999.18 The claim
folder for Lot No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP which issued a Memorandum of Valuation
and a Certificate of Cash Deposit on May 21, 2001 and September 12, 2001, respectively.
Thereafter, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on
August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents over their
respective portions of Lot No. 1407.19
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan City for the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No.
1407, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a
Decision granting the expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion
could not be determined, as the subject property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to
any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the expropriated portion of
the subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was deposited with the Development Bank
of the Philippines in Iligan City, in trust for the RTC in Iligan City.20
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private
respondents’ EPs.21 This was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.
47
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision22 declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership,
the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the
violation of petitioners’ constitutional right to due process of law.
Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on July 22, 2003.
Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution pursuant
to Section 2, Rule XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was granted in an Order dated
August 4, 2003 despite strong opposition from private respondents.23 On January 28, 2004, the
DARAB nullified the Order dated August 4, 2003 granting the writ of execution.24
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its
Decision25 dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs were valid as it was the
heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at
the time the subject property was placed under the coverage of the OLT Program considering
that DAR was not a party to the said case. Further, it stated that the record is bereft of any
evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held
that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative
determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary or the latter’s
authorized representative. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
DARAB in its Resolution26 dated July 8, 2004.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
85471, challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners’ failure to attach the writ of
execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record
referred to in the petition and other supporting papers, as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also denied by the appellate court in
a Resolution dated September 13, 2005 for being pro forma.
On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court. In Our
Resolution27 dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said petition for failure to show
sufficiently any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of
its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.
On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.28 On April 11, 2008, they
also filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.29
In Our Resolution30 dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
The Issues
48
I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.
II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IS
JUSTIFIED; AND [WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
IS JUST CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN.
XXXX
III. [WHETHER PETITIONERS’ LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM

GIVEN THAT THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313
RECLASSIFYING THE AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN 1975.
IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY
EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO
AGRARIAN REFORM.
V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS

CORRECT GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN REPEALED.
VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL

GIVEN THAT THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING.
VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT

THEY WERE DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN GROSS
VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(E) OF R.A. 6657 X X X.31
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Effect of non-compliance with the requirements

under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of
any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, it is required under Sec.
6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original
or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from, with
certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other
supporting papers. As stated:
49
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. – The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents;
(b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for
the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy
of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified
true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it
was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning the contents of the
petition, as well as the documents that should accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground
for its dismissal as stated in Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the Rules:
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 for petitioners’
failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such
material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers.32
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the foregoing documents
required by the appellate court are not necessary for the proper disposition of the case.
Specifically:
Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program]?
Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the landowner?
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land Bank?
[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering that EPs were
already issued on the basis of CLTs]?
Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?33
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when
they appended to the petition filed before the CA certified true copies of the following
documents: (1) the challenged resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated April 6, 2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March 15, 2004 issued by
the DARAB reversing on appeal the decision of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the
order of execution pending appeal; (4) the Order dated December 8, 2003 issued by the PARAD
50
reinstating the writ of execution earlier issued; and (5) the Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued
by the PARAD in the original proceedings for the cancellation of the EPs.34 The CA, therefore,
erred when it dismissed the petition based on such technical ground.
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the appellate court,
instead of dismissing outright the petition, could have just required petitioners to submit the
necessary documents. In Spouses Espejo v. Ito,35 the Court held that "under Section 3 (d), Rule 3
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals,36 the Court of Appeals is with authority to
require the parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary to promote the interests
of substantial justice."
Moreover, petitioners’ subsequent submission of the documents required by the CA with the
motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.37 In Jaro v. CA, this Court held that subsequent and substantial compliance may
call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. Particularly:
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition had but the
Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that "non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that
no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced" to the court for it to depart from
the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The hard stance taken by the
Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under the circumstances.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an
appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz
and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent
submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two cases to
comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in
each case was the fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the formal
requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals,
stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions "the appellate court clearly put a
premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case."38 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be
avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.39 As held in Sta. Ana v.
Spouses Carpo:40
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their
operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with
the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an
opportunity to be heard.
51
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical
infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities,
we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare
cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need
to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always
tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the
guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of
his cause. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is unwarranted in the instant
case.
On the coverage of the subject property by the agrarian reform program
Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage
of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City
of Iligan reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land.41
Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any evidence that
the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the
validity of the reclassification over the subject property.42 It further noted that whether the
subject property is exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative determination, the
jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary, not with the DARAB.
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program.43 However, this will not prevent the Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition
considering that the issues raised in it may already be resolved on the basis of the records before
Us. Besides, to allow the matter to remain with the Office of the DAR Secretary would only
cause unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the parties. Applicable, by analogy, is Our ruling
in the recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International v. Department of
Labor and Employment Secretary,44 where We held:
But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of injustice, would
result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in the position to resolve the
case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
Court of Appeals:
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further reception
of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the
52
trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by
the remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the CA could not
validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its dismissal ruling,
where appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with petitioners that the
subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform
program in view of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City
Ordinance No. 1313.
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA,45 this Court held that
pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code,
municipal and/or city councils are empowered to "adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission." It was also emphasized
therein that "[t]he power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural
to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the
[DAR]."46
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City of
Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. DARAB,
however, believes that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be
valid.
We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of Iligan
in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task
Force on Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was already in
existence at that time, having been created on September 19, 1973 pursuant to Executive Order
No. 419. It should be noted, however, that the Task Force was not empowered to review and
approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9, 1978,
with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to
submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to
the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and ratification. The Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements.47
Significantly, accompanying the Certification48 dated October 8, 1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo,

Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and Development Office, Iligan City, and the
letter49 dated October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional Officer of the HLURB, is
the Certificate of Approval issued by Imelda Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human
Settlements and Chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed,
approved on September 21, 1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that City Ordinance No.
1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was approved by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The
validity of said local zoning ordinance is, therefore, beyond question.
53
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the
enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an "agricultural
land" within the ambit of RA 6657. As this Court held in Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing
Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.,50 "To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one
valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized
government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect."
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent reclassification by the local
zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the legal effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be
already taken as of October 21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that
the rights which accrued from said date must be respected. They also maintain that the
reclassification of the subject property did not alter its agricultural nature, much less its actual
use.51
Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away by the expedience of
issuing a local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural land into a residential/commercial
area. As this Court extensively discussed in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA:52
In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground that the subject lands
had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Dasmariñas, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC, specifying them as residential.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved the issue of whether
lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e., National Housing
Authority and Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June 1988, are covered
by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. We answered in the negative, thus:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657
provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it
is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands
which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential land."
x x x x x x x x x
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself
defined "agricultural land" thus —
54
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and
not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by
such conversion. . . . .
However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative Order 04, Series of
2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands from CARP Coverage under Section
(3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990.
It reads:
I. Prefatory Statement
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), Section 3,
Paragraph (c) defines "agricultural land" as referring to "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land."
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or "DOJ Opinion 44-1990" for brevity)
and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12 August 2993, 225
SCRA 278) opines that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by RA 6657
to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve
such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all
lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no
longer need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest
tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27,
which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to defeat

vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, where the
Court was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein is agricultural in
nature on the ground that the same had been classified as "park" since 1979 under the Zoning
Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through
local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB. Municipal Ordinance
No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the
municipality into residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and
districts and parks for open spaces. It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into
55
residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a
municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the
retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that an
ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should be given
prospective application only, and should not change the nature of existing agricultural
lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not disclose any
provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into residential or light
industrial. While it declared that after the passage of the measure, the subject area shall be used
only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not provided therein that it shall have
retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within the
zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we
apply the general rule, as we must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation
only. The further implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural
lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the instant case.
In this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were "deemed
owners" of the land they till as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the
tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following provision of the law:
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed owner of a
portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if
irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are "deemed owners" as of
October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers
absolute ownership over the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied
with, such as payment of just compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-
farmers. This was elucidated by the Court in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform:53
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers’
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also
had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land
they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
56
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after
proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers’ cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2
that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as
advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an inchoate
right over the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to
serve as a "provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting
full payment of [just compensation] or for as long as the [tenant-farmer] is an ‘amortizing
owner’."54 This certificate "proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted
to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land"55 he
was tilling.
Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers cannot be
considered as full owners of the land they are tilling unless they have fully paid the amortizations
due them. This is because it is only upon such full payment of the amortizations that EPs may be
issued in their favor.
In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2)
stages. The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR
transfers the landholding to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its "deemed
owner." And the second stage is the issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the
landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-
beneficiary.56
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it
was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have
an inchoate right over the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed
requirements. Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and
subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested rights
to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private respondents were issued
the CLTs and were "deemed owners."
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had
taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights
accrued prior to reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
57
On the violation of petitioners’ right to due process of law
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under
the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was
violated.57 Citing De Chavez v. Zobel,58 both the DAR and the private respondents claim that the
enactment of PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or
corn production,59 implying that there was no need for an actual notice.
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the
agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with
the essential requirements of administrative due process of law.60 Our ruling in Heirs of Jugalbot
v. CA61 is particularly instructive:
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The
Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process
because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper
party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro
N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of
the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have
been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
xxxx
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification
signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was
tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there
was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of
the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such
ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A.
Roa of her right to property through the denial of due process.
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar since there was
likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be
conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was
there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention
area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and
Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed
by law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be
strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the
procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case,
no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an
ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies
58
that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a
violation of constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical
and tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and private respondents does not
show that this Court ever made mention that actual notice may be dispensed with under PD 27,
its enactment being a purported "statutory notice" to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to
rice and/or corn production that their lands are subjected to the OLT program.
Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Dev’t. Corp. v. DAR,62 this Court underscored the
significance of notice in implementing the agrarian reform program when it stated that "notice is
part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the State’s
intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the
opportunity to present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from
the agrarian law."
The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB that petitioners were not denied
the right to due process despite the fact that only the Nanamans were identified as the owners.
Particularly:
Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners were denied the right to be given the notice
since only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The fault lies with petitioners who did
not present the tax declaration in the name of Dr. Deleste as of October 21, 1972. It was only in
1995 that Civil Case No. 698 was finally decided by the Supreme Court dividing the 34.7
hectares between the Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr. Deleste died in 1992 after PD 27
was promulgated, hence, the subject land or his ½ share was considered in his name only (see
Art. 777, New Civil Code). Even then, it must be borne in mind that on September 26, 1972, PD
No. 2 was issued by President Marcos proclaiming the whole country as a land reform area, this
was followed by PD 27. This should have alarmed them more so when private respondents are in
actual possession and cultivation of the subject property.
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject
property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was
registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole
world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale.
In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument involving
unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who
may subsequently deal with the same property.63 x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify other persons not parties
to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into."64 There was,
therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject
property.
59
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is
bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a
new one issued in the name of Deleste.65Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless "good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession."66
Petitioners’ right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them
that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA,67 where, despite a
finding that there was a violation of due process in the implementation of the comprehensive
agrarian reform program when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and
investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquiring the property, thereby effectively
depriving petitioner the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those
portions to be acquired,68 this Court nonetheless ruled that such violation does not give the Court
the power to nullify the certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) already issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries, since the DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in
the acquisition proceedings.
Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOAs and should
first ask the DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-Santiago, in her Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion,69 stated that "[i]f the acts of DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas
& Co. violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside. It follows that the
fruits of the wrongful acts, in this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and
void." She also noted that "[i]f CLOAs can under the DAR’s own order be cancelled
administratively, with more reason can the courts, especially the Supreme Court, do so when the
matter is clearly in issue."
In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must
immediately take action and declare the issuance as null and void. There being no question that
the CLTs in the instant case were "improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is
warranted."70 The same holds true with respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue
of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs on which they were
grounded are void.71 Cancellation of the EPs and OCTs are clearly warranted in the instant case
since, aside from the violation of petitioners’ right to due process of law, the subject property is
outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata
The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs’ validity has already been settled by this Court in
Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,72 where We held that the EPs
and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time the
petitioners therein instituted the case in 2005; hence, their issuance may no longer be reviewed.73
60
In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a "relitigation" of the
issue concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents.
Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) "bar by prior
judgment,"74 wherein the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand, or cause of action;75 and (2) "conclusiveness of judgment,"76 which
precludes relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.77
Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos,78 this Court, in Spouses Antonio v. Sayman,79 expounded on the

difference between the two aspects of res judicata:
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) "bar by prior judgment" and (2)
"conclusiveness of judgment." This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these
two aspects of res judicata as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their
privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the
same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes
of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right,
fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application "when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction."80 Elucidating further on this second aspect of res judicata, the Court, in
Spouses Antonio, stated:
x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and
persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the
judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or
petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other
action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus,
61
only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.81 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We find that LBP’s contention that
this Court’s ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had
already become indefeasible and incontrovertible precludes a "relitigation" of the issue
concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents does not hold water.
In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy and the instant
case. Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are similar. However, the petitioners are
totally different. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petitioners are the more than 120
individuals who claim to be descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorio’s brother, and who
collectively assert their right to a share in Gregorio’s estate, arguing that they were deprived of
their inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to private respondents without
notice to them. On the other hand, in the instant case, petitioners are the heirs of Deleste who
seek nullification of the EPs issued to private respondents on grounds of violation of due process
of law, disregard of landowner’s right of retention, improvident issuance of EPs and OCTs, and
non-coverage of the agrarian reform program, among others. Evidently, there is even no privity
among the petitioners in these two cases.
And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the
issue was whether the filing of a petition for prohibition was the proper remedy for the
petitioners therein, considering that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001, four (4)
years prior to the filing of said petition in 2005. In the instant case, however, the issue is whether
the EPs and OCTs issued in favor of private respondents are void, thus warranting their
cancellation.
In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such that the necessity of
applying the rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in the other. In Heirs of Sofia
Nanaman Lonoy, the petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners therein in 2005,
notwithstanding the fact that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001. For that reason,
apart from making a ruling that "[p]rohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is
already a fait accompli," it becomes incumbent upon this Court to hold that:
x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had become indefeasible
and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in 2005, and
may no longer be judicially reviewed.82 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of private respondents’ EPs and
OCTs was filed on February 28, 2002. Taking into account that the EPs and OCTs were issued
on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, the filing of the petition was well within
the prescribed one year period, thus, barring the defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility.
Even if the petition was filed before the DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as mandated
by Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree,83 this should necessarily have the same effect,
considering that DARAB’s jurisdiction extends to cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs,
62
EPs, and even of certificates of title issued by virtue of a void EP. As this Court held in Gabriel
v. Jamias:84
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional
and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all
matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian
reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the
DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to
cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority.
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not
put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation
patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. Section 12 (g) of
P.D. No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with
jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. No.
266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of
Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a certificate
of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence
of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA, on which it was
grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of a certificate of title issued by virtue of a
void emancipation patent.
From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the regular courts
which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in the names of
the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the petitioners’ Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation
patents previously issued to them by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the
DAR under the OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that the said emancipation patents were
erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid retention rights of respondents had already
attained finality. Considering that the action filed by respondents with the DARAB was precisely
to annul the emancipation patents issued to the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls
within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001
does not bar Us from making a finding in the instant case that the EPs and OCTs issued to
private respondents are, indeed, void.
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised by the
parties.
63
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CA’s
October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The
Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original
Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents.
64

CASE DIGESTS Assignment in Lieu of Midtrerm Exam)

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CASE DIGESTS Assignment in Lieu of Midtrerm Exam)

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CASE DIGESTS ASSIGNMENT

(In lieu of Midterm Exam)

AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL

ATTY. DARWIN ANGELES

MIGUEL A. ANAS JR.

1. Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

3. Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

4. Daez v. Court of Appeals

DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina:

DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong:

Main Issue Related to our topic

DAR Regional Director:

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by

5. Del Castillo v. Orciga

To respondents’ Complaint and petitioner’s Answer with Counterclaim, Provincial Adjudicator

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court’s Ruling

The Main Issue: Who is Entitled to the Possession of the Riceland

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 266 states that:

Section 7 of the Executive Order provides:

Moreover, the ministry memorandum circular also provides that:

a. The farmholding shall not be partitioned or fragmented.

(1) being a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers’ cooperative;

6. Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corp. v. Dela Cruz

7. Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative Development, Inc. v.

To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement, it is normally necessary to establish the

8. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative

Facts: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the commercial farming of bananas. A portion of

Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation.

9. Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform

Whether Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as

10. Sta. Monica Industrial Corporation v. Department of Agrarian Reform

Issue: Is the sale of the land by Trinidad to Sta. Monica valid?

11. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal

12. Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines

Issue: Whether or not there is payment of Just Compensation?

Issue: Is DAR’s AO unconstitutional?

14. Cuenca v. Department of Agrarian Reform

On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La

15. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Hilippines

II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR

III. [WHETHER PETITIONERS’ LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM

V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO

VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS

VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL

VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT

The petition is meritorious.

Effect of non-compliance with the requirements

Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?33

On the coverage of the subject property by the agrarian reform program

Significantly, accompanying the Certification48 dated October 8, 1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo,

As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to defeat

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata