AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL LEGISLATION

CASE DIGESTS

1. Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343)

Facts: The case at bar is one of the four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 27, Executive Order Nos. 228 and 229, and Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL).

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
rice lands and corn lands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to
their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land.
In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong
to a different class.

The association also invokes the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn
lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the same.
Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants who are
actually cultivating such lands. Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm
holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall
have been determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR
Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention.

Issue: Are the assailed statutes constitutional?

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power
and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid
exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.

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 A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful
subject and the method.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is
the method employed to achieve it.
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2. Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.
G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011 (645 SCRA 401)

FACTS: Several parcels of unirrigated land which form part of a larger expanse originally
owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club was acquired by EMRASON for the purpose of
developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveler’s Life Homes". The
Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise
known as the "Local Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1 entitled "An
Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."
EMRASON applied for an authority to convert and develop its property into a residential
subdivision. The Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-
A approving EMRASON's application.

On June 15, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law or CARL took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition
and distribution. Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring
property of the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be managed
through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall
conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC
property, with three hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be
insufficient for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's
commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The DAR
earmarked for this purpose the subject property of EMRASON. DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong
sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest from
EMRASON.

EMRASON filed with the DARAB separate petitions to nullify the notices. The Legal Division
of DAR rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing
that the property covered thereby pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44,
series of 1990, is exempt from CARP. Supposedly, this was pursuant to a DOJ Opinion rendered
by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarifying that lands already converted to non-
agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already
converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of
the CARL. The appellate court reasoned mainly that “…the municipality, conformably with its
statutory-conferred local autonomy, had passed a subdivision measure, i.e., Ordinance No. 1, and
had approved in line thereto, through the medium of Ordinance No. 29-A, [EMRASON's]

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 application for subdivision, or with like effect approved the conversion/classification of the lands
in dispute as residential. Significantly, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite, in his letter
of September 23, 1988 to [EMRASON], clarified that such conversion conforms to the approved
development plan of the municipality.”

Issue: Can subject property be placed under the coverage of CARP?

Held: No. The Court declared that the lands involved in the present case are not subject to
agrarian reform since it was classified as residential land by Municipal Ordinance 29-A of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of CARL . It also reiterated the ruling in
Natalia vs. Department of Agrarian Reform that since a special law classified the land for
residential, commercial, or industrial use, that land or property cannot be anymore subject to
agrarian reform. The Court also used Sec. 3 of R.A. 2264 or Local Autonomy Act to validate
EMRASON's application via Ordinance 29-A made by the municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Finally, it bears stressing that a state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by
the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the Constitution of the state,
except in a legitimate exercise of the police power.
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3. Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990 (192 SCRA 51)

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines
and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the
same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner. On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines
approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections
13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated
its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657. Luz Farms, petitioner in
this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others
in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section
3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise
known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January
2,1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the
DAR on January 9,1989.

Issue: Are the assailed provisions of RA 6657, insofar as the said law includes the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith constitutional?

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 Held: No: The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government

Moreover, Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock
and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three
percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as
additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due
process.

Hence, the Court declared Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion
of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules
and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith null and void for being unconstitutional,
and finally made the issued writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
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4. Daez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000 (325 SCRA 856)

Facts: Petitioner Eudosia Daez owned a 4.1685 hectares rice land in Meycauayan, Bulacan
which was being cultivated by the herein respondent farmers. The problem arose when the land
was subjected to the OLT (Operation Land Transfer) pursuant to PD 27 as amended by LOI 474.
Consequently, the land was transferred to the ownership of beneficiaries on December 9, 1980.
On May 31, 1981, private respondents executed an affidavit under duress stating that they are not
tenants but hired workers. To that effect, Daez applied for exemption of her property in question
from the coverage of the OLT claiming that her land is untenanted, and finally for the
cancellation of the corresponding EPs and CLOAs already issued to the beneficiaries.

In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared
ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and
fourteen (14) hectares of rice land, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of
"batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Pe ñaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their
41.8064-hectare landholdings in Bulacan, was the subject 4.1685-hectare rice land in
Meycauayan.

DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding that the
subject land is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-
hectare limit provided by law. The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and disregarded the aforementioned affidavit
made by the respondent farmers upon finding that it was merely issued under duress.

Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same rice land under R.A. No.
6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject rice

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 land but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to
prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary
Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals
again reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue: Can petitioner still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings, despite the fact
that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become final and
executory?

Held: It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are
one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude
the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the
application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare rice land, even
after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and
executory.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by

the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not
meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is
land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the
government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards,
which would be a pointless process. The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not
absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found
to be part of the landowner's retained area.
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5. Del Castillo v. Orciga

G.R. No. 153850, August 31, 2006 (500 SCRA 498)

Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner del Castillo seeking the
nullification of the November 26, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66122, ordering him to vacate the subject landholding and directing the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to restore possession of the farm lot to
respondents. Petitioner Jovendo del Castillo is the son and administrator of Menardo del Castillo,
who previously owned a 1.3300-hectare rice land located at Omabo, Polpog, Bula, Camarines
Sur. Eugenio Orciga was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-070176 over the said
landholding on April 3, 1981. On August 1, 1988, Eugenio Orciga died. Prior to the final
selection and determination of the successor of the deceased tenant, on July 1, 1991, the heirs
agreed to rotate among themselves the cultivation of the rice land covered by said CLT. After
cultivating and harvesting the rice land from 1989 to 1991, Ronald Orciga abandoned the said
farm on May 3, 1991 and left the town.

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On May 28, 1991, petitioner Del Castillo, a CAFGU member forcibly entered the rice land of the
late Eugenio Orciga. He started to cultivate the said land over the objection of the respondents,
effectively ejecting them from their possession and cultivation of the land. Respondents filed a
Complaint on June 10, 1991, with the Office of Provincial Adjudicator, DARAB, Naga City. for
Reinstatement with Mandatory Injunction and Damages. Petitioner (Del Castillo), in his Answer,
averred that Orciga failed to give lessor's share and was advised by DAR Para-legal Officer to
take over the cultivation of the land denying ejectment of respondents. He also claimed Orciga
mortgaged portions of the farm. PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by respondents, but the same was denied. Undaunted, Del Castillo,
on July 18, 2001, interposed a petition for review before the CA, which was docketed as CA
G.R. SP No. 66122.
On petition for review, the appellate court concluded that petitioner Del Castillo had no right
to take possession of the farmland being disputed even if the heirs had failed to deliver the
agricultural lessor's share. It held that when the beneficiary abandons the tillage or refuses to gain
rights accruing to the farmer-beneficiary under the law, it will be reverted to the government and
not to the farm lot owner. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Who should be entitled to possess the disputed landholding under the DAR Land Transfer
Program —the petitioner, as representative of the former titled landowner, or the respondents, as
successors of the deceased beneficiary?

Held: The Court holds respondents to be the rightful possessors of the disputed farmland and at
the same time, rejects the instant petition. Undeniably, Eugenio Orciga, the original beneficiary
and predecessor-in-interest of respondents, was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No.
0070176 over the contested land pursuant to PD No. 27. Therefore, for all intents and purposes,
he is the acknowledged owner of the contested land. A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a
document issued to a tenant-farmer, which proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to
acquire the land. This certificate prescribes the terms and conditions of ownership over said land
and likewise describes the landholding —its area and its location. A CLT is the provisional title
of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of the land's
value or for as long as the beneficiary is an "amortizing owner."In the case at bar, the
petitioner has two options; first, to bring the dispute on the non-payment of the land to the DAR
and the Barangay Committee on Land Production that will subsequently resolve said dispute
pursuant to Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973
and other issuances; and, second, to negotiate with the DAR and LBP for payment of the
compensation claim pursuant to Section 2 of EO No. 228. Eventually, the scheme under EO No.
228 will result to the full payment of the compensation of the value of the land to Menardo del
Castillo, petitioner's father and former landowner. From the foregoing options, it is indubitably
clear that the reconveyance of the land to the former owner is not allowed. The policy is to hold
such lands under trust for the succeeding generations of farmers. The objective is to prevent
repetition of cases where the lands distributed to the tenant-farmers reverted to the former lot
owners or even conveyed to land speculators. Thus, possession of the land cannot be restored to
petitioner del Castillo although there was failure of the heirs to pay the landowner's share or
compensation. The transfer or conveyance of the riceland can only be made to an heir of the
beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who shall in turn cultivate the land. In the case in hand,

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 even if Ronald Orciga has abandoned the land, the right to possess and cultivate the land legally
belongs to the other heirs of Eugenio Orciga. Undoubtedly, petitioner Del Castillo is not a
beneficiary of Eugenio Orciga —the original beneficiary; hence, petitioner has no legal right to
the possession of the farmland.
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6. Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corp. v. Dela Cruz

G. R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014

Facts: A parcel of land in Bulacan is registered to Freddie Santiago. The Dakila property used to
be tenanted by Susana Surio and the others but the tenants freely and voluntarily relinquished
their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago through their respective sworn statement in exchange for
some financial assistance and individual home lots titled and distributed in their names. Holy
Trinity purchased the remaining 208,050 sq. m. of the Dakila property from Santiago, who
subsequently caused the transfer of the title thereof to the former and subdivided the same into 6
lots. Holy Trinity then developed the property by dumping filing materials on the topsoil, erected
a perimeter fence and steel gate and later on established its field office on the property.

In 1988, the Sanggunian Bayan of Malolos passed Municipal Resolution No.16-86 reclassifying
four of the six subdivided lots belonging to the Holy Trinity into residential lots. The Municipal
Planning and Development Office (MPDO) of Bulacan issued the Certificate of Eligibility for
Conversion, Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance in favor of Hoy Trinity for its
residential subdivision project on the Dakila property.

In 1999, Holy Trinity purchased another from Santiago another parcel of land in Bulacan. In
2006, Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio wrote to Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer of Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale of the Dakila property. It was followed
by the letter request of the Chairman of Sumapang Matanda Barangay Agrarian Reform Council
to place the Dakila property within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
PD 27. DAR Provincial Office of Bulacan filed a petition to annul the sale of the Dakila property
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan.

Issue: Was the Dakila property agricultural land within the coverage of RA 6657 or PD 27?

Held: No. Before the land may be placed under the coverage of RA 6657, two requisites must be
met, namely: (1) that the land must be devoted to agricultural activity, and (2) that the land must
not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. For land to be
covered under PD 27, it must be devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. Unfortunately! the Dakila property did not meet
these requirements.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared that the Dakila property was not an agricultural
land, and that there was no valid reclassification under Municipal Resolution No. 6-98 because
the law required an ordinance, not a resolution. The Court agreed in part with the CA. Under
Republic Act No. 7160, local government units, such as the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan,
are vested with the power to reclassify lands. However, Section 20, Chapter II, Title I thereof

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 provides that: “(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian
after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural
lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1)
when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or(2) where the land shall have substantially
greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: x x x.”

Clearly, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be
passed after the conduct of public hearings. The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis
of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98. Given the foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution
was ineffectual for that purpose. A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was temporary in nature, and differed from an
ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed a general and permanent character.
It was also noted that the petitioner did not show if the requisite public hearings were conducted
at all. In the absence of any valid and complete reclassification, therefore, the Dakila property
remained under the category of an agricultural land.

Nonetheless, the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject to the coverage of Republic
Act No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.
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7. Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative Development, Inc. v.

Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 159089, May 3, 2006

Facts: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the
June 30, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65498.

On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for
petitioner (Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.)with
respondent (Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation). On April 2, 1996, petitioner,
represented by its alleged chairman, Manuel K. Asta, filed a complaint with the RTC for
Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against
respondent, the alleged . . . officers of petitioner who entered into the agreement, and the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao (hereinafter PARO), represented by Saturnino D.
Sibbaluca. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended complaint with leave of court alleging that
the persons, who executed the contract, were not authorized by it. Respondent's filed a Motion to
Dismiss alleging that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has
primary, exclusive, and original jurisdiction; that petitioner failed to comply with the compulsory
mediation and conciliation proceedings at the barangay level; and for the unauthorized institution
of the complaint in behalf of petitioner. Respondent also averred that petitioner was engaged in
forum shopping because it also filed a petition before the DAR praying for the disapproval of the
Joint Production Agreement. The PARO also filed a motion to dismiss on May 16, 1996. On
August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's Fees. On February 25,

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1997, the DARAB decided the case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint Production
Agreement as valid and binding and ordering petitioner to account for the proceeds of the
produce and to comply with the terms of the contract.

Issue: Does the Court of Appeals have committed grave error on the following:
1) In affirming the dismissal of the case at bench by RTC of Tagum City on the ground that it
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the suit?
2) In finding that the ‘Joint Production Agreement' is valid instead of declaring it as null and
void ab initio, its provisions, terms and condition, cause and purposes being violative of the
express mandatory provision of R.A. 6657?
3) In holding that the 'Joint Production Agreement' is a leasehold contract and therefore valid?
4) In interpreting and applying the prevailing doctrines and jurisprudence delineating the
jurisdiction between the regular court and DARAB on the matter of agricultural land and
tenancy relationship?

Held: Section 50 of Republic Act 6657 and Section 17 of Executive Order 229 vest in the DAR
the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through Executive Order 129-A,
the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and
functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The subject matter
of the present controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In question are
the rights and obligations of two juridical persons engaged in the management, cultivation and
use of agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
of the government.

To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement, it is normally necessary to establish the

following elements: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the
subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5)there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)
the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner is thus
correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural
leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within the sphere of
agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements - whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise - over lands devoted to
agriculture. Such disputes include those concerning farm workers' associations or representations
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements. Also included is any controversy relating to the terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries - whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. The assailed Joint Production Agreement
is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or
arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land
beneficiaries and investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas.

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 Jurisdiction over the present controversy lies with the DARAB. As the RTC had correctly
dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it was superfluous for the trial court and
the Court of Appeals for that matter to have ruled further on the issue of the validity of the
agreement.
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8. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative

G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012

Facts: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the commercial farming of bananas. A portion of

the land it owns was placed under CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) coverage.
Thus, its certificates of title over portions of the land under CARP were cancelled, and new
TCTs were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Subsequently, beneficiaries
were identified, most of whom were members of respondent cooperative. Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) were issued for them.

Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful occupation against respondents, alleging that it was the
lawful owner of two parcels of land within the portions covered by the CLOA and that the said
CLOAs had yet to attain finality owing to appeals filed by petitioner. Thus, while the
beneficiaries had yet to be designated with finality, respondents refused to do work for petitioner,
and forcibly entered the land subject to the dispute and occupied the same. On the other hand,
respondents argued that indeed, petitioner had the TCTs of the parcel of land subject to the
dispute, but these were put under the name of the Republic upon subjecting it to CARP. Thus,
despite the award of CLOAs to respondents, petitioner continued to manage the land while
paying them wages. Respondents thus demanded that their rights under the CLOAs be
established, and that the petitioner pay them their production share. The CA affirmed the DAR
Adjudication Board's decision ordering the petitioner to turn over the possession of the land to
the respondents.

Issue: Are respondents guilty of unlawful occupation?

Held: NO. Respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation. The action taken by respondents
to guard the land was reasonable and necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent
what petitioner attempted to do. Respondents were simply protecting their right, after the
petitioner's attempt to thwart the CARP's implementation. What the petitioner did was install
workers which it conspired with on land already identified as falling under CARP and having
CARP-designated beneficiaries. This served as an attempted roadblock to installing the
legitimate beneficiaries on the land.

Petitioners already lost ownership over the land when it acknowledged that there was a deposit
of the initial valuation of the land. It even manifested that the Republic's TCTs were neither
attacked nor assailed in this case. Thus, upon petitioner's own reasoning, it already lost
possession and ownership over the land when the condition (payment of just compensation) was
fulfilled, which was not disputed in this case.

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 Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian
reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to
own directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over
the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Hence, petitioner must now turn
over possession of the disputed land to respondents.

In the case of Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, the Court ruled that the
Constitution and the CARL intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control
over agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught.
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9. Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 159674, June 30, 2006

Facts: The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents
(EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur. The parcels
of land, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which has been
denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).
Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same
were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful
cultivation thereof. HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines
through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661.
The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares. HMI, through a
certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed
petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered
under said law. The RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs The
Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team.
Petitioners' TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision. After the DARAB
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with
their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the assailed Resolution:

The petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed
by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power
of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioners filed a
"Motion for Reconsideration with Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners."
The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Petitioners now file this present Petition contending
that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible
one year after their registration.

Issue: Are Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents indefeasible as TCTs
issued in registration proceedings?
11
 Held: Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular
No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum
shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the
rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to
resolve the same issues. Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who
is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v.
Cabantog and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio that the certification of non-forum shopping
must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel.
In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Appeals
merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation of
the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar, without
discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in
consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be
determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the suspension or
relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as
those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued in administrative
proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings: The same
confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the
landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest,
just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of
Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as
that in the Public Land Act.

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with
Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the
same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the
issuance of the patent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person." The EPs themselves, like the
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and
CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
registration proceedings.
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10. Sta. Monica Industrial Corporation v. Department of Agrarian Reform

12
G.R. No. 164846, June 18, 2006

Facts: Asuncion Trinidad is the owner of five parcels of land with a total area of 4.69 hectares in
Calumpit, Bulacan. Private respondent Basilio De Guzman is the agricultural leasehold tenant of
Trinidad, who was issued certificates of Land Transfer on July 22, 1981 as an agricultural
leasehold tenant. De Guzman filed a petition for the issuance of patent under his name with the
DAR Regional Office. The latter then sent notices to Trinidad requiring her to comment, but
instead of complying, she filed a motion for bill of particulars. After due proceedings, the
Regional Director of DAR issued the order granting Emancipation Patent in favor of De Guzman
as qualified farmer-beneficiary of Agrarian Reform Program. Thus, Trinidad filed a motion for
reconsideration, but her motion was denied.

A year later, petitioner Sta. Monica filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA
assailing the order of DAR. Sta. Monica claimed that while it is true that Trinidad was the former
owner of the disputed parcel of land, the said landholding was sold on Jan. 27, 1986 in favor of
Sta. Monica. In fact, the latter was able to secure from the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Bulacan a corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title thereto, with No. 301408 (now TCT No.
RT-70512). It also asserted that there was a denial of due process because it was not furnished a
notice of coverage under the CARP law. In his comment, De Guzman argued that the alleged
sale of the landholding is illegal due to the lack of requisite clearance from the DAR. The said
clearance is required under P.D. No. 27, the Tenant Emancipation Decree, which prohibits
transfer of covered lands except to tenant-beneficiaries. According to De Guzman, since no
clearance was sought from, and granted by, the DAR, the sale in favor of petitioner by Trinidad
is inexistent and void. Hence, Trinidad remained the owner of the disputed property.
 
Thus, the CA dismissed the petition of Sta. Monica for lack of merit. The CA ruled that Sta.
Monica is not a real party-in-interest because it cannot be considered as an owner of the land it
bought from Trinidad.

Issue: Has Sta. Monica, a corporation with separate juridical personality been denied of the
opportunity of notice and hearing when the DAR awarded land ownership to De Guzman as
farmer-beneficiary?

Held: No. The corporation Sta. Monica was not denied of the opportunity of notice and hearing.
Trinidad is still deemed the owner of the agricultural land sold to Sta. Monica; no need for
separate notice of coverage under CARP law. Buyer Sta. Monica is owned and controlled by
Trinidad and her family of which they own 98% of the outstanding capital stock. As owners of
98% of outstanding capital stock, they are beneficial owners of all the assets of the corporation
including the agricultural land sold by Trinidad to Sta. Monica. At the very last, the notice to her
is already a notice to Sta. Monica because the corporation acted as a mere conduit of Trinidad.

The sale of the land from Trinidad to Sta. Monica was a mere ploy to evade the applicable
provisions of the agrarian law, hence, null and void. Nonetheless, it is a fiat that the corporate
vehicle cannot be used as a shield to protect fraud or justify wrong. Thus, the veil of corporate
fiction will be pierced when it is used to defeat public convenience and subvert public policy.
Hence, the Court held that Trinidad is still deemed the owner of the agricultural land sold to Sta.
Monica thereby making a separate notice of coverage under the CARP law no longer necessary.
13
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

11. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal

G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004

Facts: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte.   A portion of the land was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative proceeding was
conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the
valuation of the land.  Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Land Bank’s
valuation.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for
determination of just compensation. In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based
the same on the facts established in another case pending before it.

Issue: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production figures in
another case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without conducting a
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties

Held: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the
knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not obtaining here. Furthermore, as earlier stated,
the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts.  In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a
hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

“SEC. 3.  Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.” 
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
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12. Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 164195, February 6, 2007 (632 SCRA 727)

Facts: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners
of five parcels of agricultural lands located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province. On 12
October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the
government. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately from PARO of Davao
14
province a notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the
properties has been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare while HPI's properties
were valued at P164,478,178.14. AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366 and
No. 113359, and applied for the shifting of the mode of acquisition for TCT No. 113359 from
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. HPI also
rejected the valuation of its three parcels of land covered by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362
and No. T-10363. Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP's valuation, the DAR
requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations in the names and for the
accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC thereafter withdrew the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI
withdrew the amount of P45,481,706.76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed
the Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to
issue a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. After the issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of the RP the ROD of Davao, upon the request of the DAR, issued
TCTs and Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three
years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and refused to render a decision on
the valuation of the land. Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just
compensation were filed by AFC and HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum City (acting as a Special Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated. The
SAC rendered a decision dated 25 September 2001 fixing the just compensation for the
1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs. LBP filed a Motion
for Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 on the ground that the trial court based its valuation on
the value of residential and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands involved are
agricultural. On December 5, 2001, the trial court modified its decision ordering the DAR to pay
interest. LBP filed a Notice of Appeal and was given due course in the Order of the RTC dated
15 May 2002. In the same Order, the RTC set aside its Order dated 5 December 2001 granting
execution pending appeal. On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12 February 2003 orders of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals granted said petition for being meritorious. AFC and HPI filed a joint
Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June
2004. Earlier, on 23 January 2003, DAR filed its own separate petition before the Court of
Appeals by way of a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of the
DAR for failure to state the material dates under Rule 42, Section 2, of the Rules of Court. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879
became final and executory and entry of judgment was issued by the appellate court on 7 May
2003. On the other hand, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, AFC and HPI filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue: Is the court acting as SAC bound by the formula devised to implement Section 17 of R. A.
No. 6657 on the determination of just compensation?

Held: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the SC declared that as the government agency
principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules
and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in

15
 the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors
mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the
formula which was devised to implement the said provision. The ruling in the Celada case is in
conflict with the Apo Fruits which the SC ruled that the more acceptable practice has always
been to interpret and reconcile apparently conflicting jurisprudence to give effect to both by
harmonizing the two (Celada Ruling vis-à-vis Apo Fruits Ruling). The trial court, actually took
into consideration all the factors in the determination of just compensation as articulated in
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. The trial court had substantially applied the formula by
looking into all the factors included therein, i.e., net income, comparable sales and market value
per tax declaration, to arrive at the proper land value. The basic formula set forth in DAR AO
No. 5, Series of 1998 does not and cannot strictly bind the courts. As established in earlier
jurisprudence, the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function
which is vested in the regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative agencies.

The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the
evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be arbitrarily restricted by a
formula dictated by the DAR, an administrative agency. The modification of the Decision dated
6 February 2007 pertaining to the award of interest on just compensation, commissioner's fees
and attorney's fees, is in order.
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13. Chamber of Real Estate Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010

Facts: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3
entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use
conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-
99,4 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its
coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential,
commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted
to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of
which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized;
and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on
or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657. Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another
Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land
Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and
repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural
use. To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which

16
 temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. By
reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in
turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

Issue: Is DAR’s AO unconstitutional?

Held: RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or
fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether
natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect,
lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of
conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because there is nothing in
Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR
the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted
to its conversion authority. It also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was
not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or
requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.
The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional
mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law
because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are
unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of
administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased
in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.
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14. Cuenca v. Department of Agrarian Reform

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Roberto J. Cuenca
G.R. No. 154112, September 23, 2004

Facts: Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117
hectares, situated in Barangay Haguimit, La Carlota City, and devoted principally to the planting
of sugar cane. On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent
Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for

17
'Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405,
Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. 'Private respondent Cuenca
prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio and Executive Order No.
405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared unconstitutional. MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.The respondent Judge issued a Temporary
Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the Notice
of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on January 17 and 18, 2000.

In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunado's
motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all
persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and
the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

Issue: The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into cognizance
that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private respondent, which seeks to exclude his
land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrarian reform matter and within the jurisdiction of
the DAR, not with the trial court. The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely
abused its discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial court, which is a
violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.

Held: The Petition has merit. The issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter
over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). All controversies on the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has
granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.

Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the
RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is
particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's
Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to
strictly observe Section 68 of RA6657, which reads:

"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. - No injunction,

restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program."

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 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 169913, June 8, 2011 (651 SCRA 352)

Facts: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin were the owners of a parcel of
agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a
son named Virgilio Nanaman by another woman. When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and
Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste for P
16,000.00 The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954.
Also, the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was
issued in the name of Deleste. On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. Gregorio’s brother, Juan
Nanaman, was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint
estate. Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action
against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property. The decision stated that the
subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the
latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result,
Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of
the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.

Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice
and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to
farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said program. However,
only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the
landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject
property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of
law was violated. Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject
property.

Issue: Is the failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the property bought by
the ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heir’s due process?

Held: YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or
corn production, implying that there was no need for an actual notice. The importance of an
actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as
non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due
process of law. Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private
property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal provisions,
especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should
therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the
DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act
committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the
proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should

19
be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, and tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In
addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should
be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject
property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the
reason to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property. Moreover, DAR
should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the
name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless, good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession. Petitioners' right to due
process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the
subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

Submitted by:

MIGUEL A. ANAS JR.

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