I.

CONCEPT OF JURA REGALIA

1. Collado vs CA (G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002)

FACTS:

Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land (“Lot”), situated in Antipolo Rizal. Attached to the
application was a technical description, stating “this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.” The Solicitor General filed oppositions to the application.

Petitioners (Edna Collado and her co-applicants) allege that they have occupied the Lot
since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. They paid all real estate taxes and submitted evidence to prove that
there have been 9 transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners for having presented sufficient evidence to
establish registrable title over the property.

ISSUE:

(1) WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. NO.
(2) Did petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of
EO 33? NO.

HELD:
(1) Petitioners concede that the Lot is inside the literal description of Marikina
Watershed Reservation (MWR).

Their main claim over the Lot is that “all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the MWR are subject to private rights.” EO 33 (which established the
MWR) has a saving clause that the reservations are “subject to existing private rights, if
any there be.”

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first introduced
the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law"
partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was
the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or
registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.

Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests
and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through
the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was
described as follows:

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles,
and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the

Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the
legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.

Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.

Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource: The term "natural resource" includes

"not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a
community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of
property devoted to park and recreational purposes."
(2) An applicant must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part
of the public domain and that he has an interest to warrant registration in his name
arising from an imperfect title (may have been derived from old Spanish grants or titles).
In the case at bar, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession (at least 30
years).

Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33
in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on
April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years
prior to the filing of petitioners’ application.
2. Republic vs Dela Rosa (160 SCRA 228, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988)

FACTS:

The case is about a parcel of land whose ownership is disputed by four parties: the dela
Rosas, Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI), Atok Corp, and the Bureau of Forestry
Development (BFD).

In 1965, Jose de la Rosa on his and on his three children’s behalf, applied to register a
parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Benguet. According to the children, they acquired the
land by virtue of prescription. As evidence they produced tax declarations and realty tax
receipts.

Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI) opposed their application, claiming that half the lots
were covered by mineral claim sold to it in 1934. Since 1934, BCI had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. As evidence BCI
presented geological mappings, payment of taxes, and construction on the land. Atok
Corp’s claim is similar to BCI, that a mineral claim covering the lots had been sold to it
in 1931. Their evidence is similar to BCI: construction and tax payments.

The BFD also objected, saying that the land was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve (CCFR) under Proc. No. 217, dated 1929. As it was forest land, it was
not subject to alienation as stated in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

In the end, the CA affirmed the BFD’s rights on the surface of the land, while reaffirming
the rights to the underground to both BCI and Atok. In other words, the CA ruled that the
surface was to be agricultural on the surface, and mineral underneath.

ISSUE: Who has the best claim over the land? BCI and Atok Corp WON land can be
agricultural and mineral at the same time. NO

HELD:

BCI and Atok have vested rights over the land. The Court found that the mineral claims
sold to both BCI and Atok have been perfected prior to the approval of the 1935
Constitution. The court had earlier declared the legal effects of a valid mineral claim: it
segregates the area from the public domain and confers to the locator the beneficial
ownership pf the claim. As of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had
become private properties of BCI and Atok. Even if the land was included in the CCFR,
it did not impair the rights vested in both mining companies. The claim of the dela Rosas
were utterly disregarded for weak evidence, and even so, they could not have acquired
the land through prescription as the same had already been converted to mineral land.

Land cannot be half agri and half mineral. The SC said the classification of land must be
categorical. In this case, while the land was intiailly classified as forest land, it ceased to
be so and became completely mineral when the mining claims were perfected. Even if
the surface was being tilled, it is still to be considered mineral land.

Jura regalia. The SC discussed jura regalia in Sections 3-6 of Commonwealth Act No.
137. The Regalian doctrine is intended for the benefit of the State, and not of private
persons. Example, if a person is the owner of agricultural land and minerals are
discovered underneath, his ownership pf the land does not give him the right to extract
or utilize the minerals without the permission of the State, to which the minerals belong.
To further expound, once minerals are discovered in the land, the State can discontinue
the surface tilling so as to not impede the mining undertaken therein.

POLICY: The classification of land must be categorical, it cannot be half and half. The
perfection of mining claims convert land to mineral land even if they were previously
classified as forest land.
3. Carino vs Insular Government (212 U.S. 449 February 23, 1909)

FACTS:

Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the province of Benguet, applied for the registration of a
certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years,
which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the
land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in
question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the
Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription
against the crown.

ISSUE: WoN Carino owns the land. – YES.

HELD: (The US Supreme Court decided the case through Mr. Justice Holmes.)

Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks. It is true
that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations
toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same
zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that, in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.

The province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the SG, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish
officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which
formerly Carino was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have made his title
beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it does
not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect
seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have
permitted and had not the power to enforce.

It is true that the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish
conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16
hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August
13, 1898. BUT this section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the
occupation was of land admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a
length of time and under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that
the occupants were owners at that date.
In the case at bar, it might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim
of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Thus there is an existence
of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a
claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the
Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. The older decrees and
laws cited by the Carino’s counsel in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the
natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers or even into tenants at will.
4. Lee Hong Kok vs David (48 SCRA 372, G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972)

FACTS:

Respondent, Aniano David, acquired lawful title to the disputed lot located in Naga City
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application.

An order of award and issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on
June 18, 1958. This covered Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which
is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre (a register of property showing the extent,
value, and ownership of land for taxation)

The basis for the award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209
pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was the issuance by the Register of Deeds of Naga
City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959.

Since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings
in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his
favor, the petitioners (Lee Hong Kok) did not put up any opposition or adverse claim
thereto.

After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496.
Petitioners sought the declaration of the Torrens Title of Aniano David as null and void.
Their basis of ownership of the disputed lot was through accretion (process of growth or
increase).

RTC and Court of Appeals dismissed their complaint. Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUES: (1) WON petitioners (Lee Hong Kok) can question the validity of the Torrens
Title of respondent. - NO (2) WON David has original acquisition of title. - YES

HELD:

There is no legal justification for nullyfing the right of David to the disputed lot arising
from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials.

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of
title issued pursuant to a void patent.

The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private
parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land
involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been
declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as
their private property.

It is a well-settled rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the government

In Cabacug v. Lao, a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably
situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a
force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in

Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to
repurchase within a period of 5 years.

It was cited in Cariño v. Insular Government that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied
the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown." This was a
manifestation of the concept of jura regalia which was adopted by the present
Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head
thereof.

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the

unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation
is vested in Congress" They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom
by state grant.

On Imperium v. Dominium

1. Imperium - government authority possessed by the state appropriately embraced

in the concept of sovereignty
2. Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character.
In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution.
5. Sunbeam Convenience Food vs CA (181 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 50464, 1990)

FACTS:

The Director of Lands issued sales patents Beach Development Corporation.

Subsequently, such sales patent was transferred to Coral in favor of defendant

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles,
Bataan.

The Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed before the CFI an
action for reversion, which was dismissed.

The Solicitor General then filed an appeal contending that the CFI committed grave
abuse of discretion in not considering (in its decision to dismiss) the allegation that the
subject lans were forest lands. The CFI , therefore, erred in finding the subject lots
disposable and alienable lands of public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of
Lands. The CA set aside the decision of the CFI, hence the present petition.

ISSUE: Were the sales patents validly issued? Cannot be determined unless the land’s
classification is identified.

HELD:

The case is remanded There is a need to rule on the classification of the land. If the
land is indeed a forestland, then it is not subject to alienation or disposition and the case
is moot and academic. Because of the Regalian doctrine, there is a presumption that
unclassified lands are of public dominion. There must be a positive act from the
government classifying a land into an agricultural land which is alienable.
6. Republic vs Sayo (191 SCRA 71, G.R. No. L-60413, October 31, 1990)

FACTS:

In 1961, the spouses Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez filed an original application to
register a 33ha. tract of land known as Lot 7454. The land was part of Isabela but
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya by virtue of RA 236. Opposition (including the Bu of Lands
and the Bu of Forest Devt) dragged the cases for 20 yrs until 1981, when the parties
entered a compromise agreement, dividing the land amongst themselves. In 1981,
Judge Sayo approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and
ownership of the parties. The parties then applied to register the lot under the Torrens
system. The SocGen then stepped in, alleging that since he was counsel for the
Republic, he should have been given notice or allowed to participate.

The respondents claim that the SocGen had no authority as Lot 7454 is not public land.
Their primary evidence to support this was a photocopy of a certificate of the National
Library dated 1932 that the property was registered under the Spanish system of land
regsitration in the name on Don Liberato Bayaua.

ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement executed over ownership of Lot 7454 is valid.
NO

HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless the applicant succeeds
in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public
lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must
present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on
general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of
possession and title.

The certificate the respondents present to bolster their case cannot be considered title
to property, as it was not a grant made during the Spanish regime or any other primary
evidence of ownership.

Likewise, the parties cannot claim that the land is private, and then apply to register it
under the Torrens Act. The purpose of the Torrens Act is to establish the private
character of lands. The compromise agreement was likewise stuck down as it included
persons who have not substantially proven their ownership of the land.
7. Seville vs National Development Company (DAYHON) (G.R. No. 129401, February
2, 2001)

FACTS:

 -  Through PD No. 625, Leyte Sab-a Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was
created. LSBA integrated the private and government sector efforts for a planned
development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the province of Leyte.
LOI 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands restricted in the
Leyte Industrial Development Estate through negotiated sales with the
landowners.
 -  (1980) Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA parcels of land (464,920 sq.m), which
through tax declaration reflects Yap as the owner of said parcels.
 -  (1982) Appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application before the
Bureau of Lands covering the land obtained from Yap together with other lots
acquired by LSBDA (aggregate area: 442,7508 sq.m)

 -  Bureau of Lands issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent in LSBDA’s favor,

basing on the fact that the original certificate of title was in the name of LSBDA
as transcribed in the Registration Book.
 -  (1989) LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to National
Development Council (NDC), which led to the issuance of the new TCTs in
NDC’s favor. The subject property was then leased to Philippine Smelting &
Refining Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation
(PHILPHOS), and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Inc (LEPANTO).
 -  (1988) Herein respondent filed for a complaint for recovery of real property,
rentals and damages against herein respondents.
 -  The RTC declared:

o the deed of Sale executed by Yap as null and void

o herein petitioner as owner of the subject real property of the present action and
ordered NDC to

segregate from the OCT the area of the subject property and convey it to petitioners
o the respondents were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the rentals that were
due in petitioner’s favor
o with regard to the improvements introduced to the subject property, petitioners and
respondents were to discuss on the possibility of a compromise agreement on the
disposal of said improvements - The CA applying the regalian doctrine, however,
reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that:

o No competent evidence was presented to prove that subject property is indeed private
in character
o Granting arguendo that such evidences can be provided, failure to prove that such
property is alienable, cannot ripen into ownership
o Even prior to the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in LSBDA’s favor, the
property had been untitled
o Petitioners are guilty of laches for their failure to apply for judicial confirmation of their
title o Failure to present evidence of bad faith on the part of respondent LSBDA

ISSUE: WON respondent LSBDA’ title is null and void? NO

HELD:

Petitioners argue that LSBDA’s title was void as Yap had no right over said property.
They, petitioners, claim that they have acquired title over the property through
acquisitive possession of said land for more than 30 years. To refute said allegation,
respondents claim that failure of the petitioners to show that such land is alienable and
disposable. Because of which, possession of the land cannot ripen into ownership.

Granting arguendo that petitioners are correct in claiming that Yap’s ownership over the
property is questionable, however imputing the same to LBDA’s title is misplaced.
Petitioners failed to consider the fact that LSBDA’s title was based on the Miscellaneous
Sales Patent from the Bureau of Lands and not on the conveyance executed by Yap.

The Court held that because of petitioners’ failure to establish that the land had been
classified as alienable prior to the issuance of the title in favor of LSBDA, petitioners
cannot claim that they have gained ownership through acquisitive prescription.

Further, the Court held that all the lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
that all lands not appearing to be unequivocally owned privately are presumed to belong
to the State. To overcome this presumption, evidence must be shown that the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable. Consequently, occupation in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership.
8. Republic vs ROD Quezon (244 SCRA 537, G.R. No. 73974, Mar 31, 1995)

FACTS:

Manuel G. Atienza was awarded FP (free patent) No. 324198 over a parcel of land
located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon an investigation was conducted by the
Bureau of Lands in connection with alleged land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It
appeared that some of the free patents, including that of Atienza's, were fraudulently
acquired. A criminal complaint for falsification of public documents was filed in the CFI
against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying their applications for free
patent, the survey plans, and other documents pertinent to said applications. In its
decision, the court acquitted the accused of the crime charged but, finding that the land
covered by the application for free patent of private respondent was within the forest
zone, declared as null and void OCT (Original certificate of title) No. P-13840 in
Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon to cancel the same.

Before the promulgation of said decision, the Solicitor General filed for the petitioner a
complaint against Atienza, the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and the Rural Bank of
Sariaya, which was later dropped as defendant and, in an amended complaint,
substituted by the Development Bank of the Philippines as actual mortgagee of the
subject parcel of land. In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no
longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his
application for free patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land "was already alienable and
disposable public agricultural land." Since the subject land was a very small portion of
Lot, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court.
Atienza also averred that the Director of Lands had given due course to free and
homestead patent applications of claimants of the said lot. He further alleged that he
had been in possession of the land since the Japanese occupation, cultivating it and
introducing improvements thereon.

The DBP, after due and proper investigation and inspection of his title, even granted
him a loan with the subject property as collateral. Finally, he stated that his acquittal in
the criminal case proved that he committed no fraud in his application for free patent.
Lower court rendered a decision with the categorical finding based on "solid evidence"
that "the land in question was found definitely within the forest zone On appeal, Atienza
maintained that the land in question was not within the unclassified public forest land
and therefore alienable land of the public domain. The then Intermediate Appellate
Court relied only on the arguments he raised since petitioner had not filed any brief, and
arrived at the conclusion that "the litigated land is part of public land alienable and
disposable for homestead and [F]ree Patent."

CA- set aside the lower court's decision, declared as valid and subsisting Atienza's
OCT, and dismissed the cross-claim of the DBP.

ISSUE: WON the land in question is part of the alienable and disposable public land.
NO
HELD:

   Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be
privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral
or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership
unless they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
   In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands of the public
domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources).
   Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department through the Office of the President. Courts have no
authority to do so.
   Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the
burden of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public
domain lies upon the private claimant who, in this case, is Atienza.
   The records show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and
absolute evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim.
   The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system.

   In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that the indefeasibility of

a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means
of fraud.
   The "fraud" contemplated by the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is actual and
extrinsic, that is, "an intentional omission of fact required by law," which in the
case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to state that the land sought to
be registered still formed part of the unclassified forest lands.
9. Ituralde vs. Falcasantos (301SCRA 239, G.R. No. 128017, January 20, 1999)

FACTS:

In 1986, Ramon Ituralde obtained a 6k ha parcel of land in Basilan Province.

Falcasantos, meanwhile, applied with the Bureau of Lands to grant him the same
parcel of land under free patent.

In 1989 the Director of Lands allowed Ituralde to file a public land application for
the subject property. 1990 the trial court named Ituralde the owner and
possessor of the land. The CA reversed this decision and set aside the trial
court’s decision in Ituralde’s favor as the land was found to be forest land, and
therefore, inalienable. Ituralde, in his appeal to the SC, claims that since the
Director of Lands allowed him to file a public land application, the said land was
no longer part of public domain.

ISSUE: WON the filing of the public land application in 1989 made the land
alienable. NO.

HELD:

The CA is their decision found that since 1951, the subject parcel of land was
classified as a Forest Reserve Area, and hence, not capable of private
appropriation and occupation. Before any land may be declassified from the
forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government.

The filing of the public land application is not such positive act. The parcel of land
retained its public character and it is therefore not susceptible to private
ownership. As there was no award or grant to Ituralde of the land by free patent
or other ways of acquisition, under the concept of jura regalia, the State retains
ownership over the land.

POLICY:

Forest land, like mineral timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to
private ownership unless they under the Constitution, become private properties.
In the absence of such classification from the State, the land remains
unclassified public land.
10. Republic vs Candy Makers (492 SCRA 722)

FACTS:

Candy Maker Inc. purchased a parcel of land of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the
Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan Floodway, and on
the southeast by a legal easement. A Subdivision Plan and a technical description for
the property, which divided the property into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A and Lot No. 3138-
B, was then prepared and approved.

The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Antipolo City
filed on his Report declaring that "[t]he land falls within the Alienable and Disposable
Zone and that the property is the subject of a CENRO case. On the other hand, the
LRA, recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal
easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable.

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) approved Resolution No. 113, Series
of 1993, providing that untitled shoreland areas may be leased subject to conditions
enumerated therein.

The Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its Opposition alleging that the lot
subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is
considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its jurisdiction pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended.

The MTC rendered judgment confirming title of the applicants over the real property. On
appeal, the petitioner contended that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
application for registration since the actual copies of the Official Gazette (O.G.) where
the notice of hearing was published were not adduced in evidence; the applicant
likewise failed to establish exclusive ownership over the subject property in the manner
prescribed by law.

The applicant averred that Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. 1529 is inapplicable since it speaks of
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Instead, par. 4 of the same section should govern because the subject parcels of land
are lands of private ownership, having being acquired through purchase from its
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, inherited the same from their parents. CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

ISSUES:
(1) WON the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable
property of the State, and if so
(2) Whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its
ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.

HELD:

The SC ruled that the property subject of this application was alienable and disposable
public agricultural land until July 18, 1966. However, respondent failed to prove that it
possesses registerable title over the property.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce
of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. The statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural lands does not operate against the State unless the occupant proves
possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

Thereafter, respondent applied before the MTC for the registration of its alleged title
over the parcel of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the
government, whether express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a
title from the State. The rationale for the period "since time immemorial or since June
12, 1945" (in PD 1529) lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the
State, and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon only by virtue of
their imperfect title as continuous, open and notorious possession.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. In this case, the certification of the
CENRO in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources proved that the land
in question is found to be within the alienable and disposable site. However, the
applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim over the land. The respondent failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-in-
interest had acquired registerable title over the property before July 18, 1966.

The petition is Granted. The application for the registration of the property in question is
dismissed.
11. Miners vs Factoran (SY) (240 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995)

FACTS:

The instant case was filed by petitioner (Miners Association Of The Philippines, Inc.)
questioning the validity and constitutionality of the administrative orders issued by the
respondents (Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., Secretary Of Environment And Natural
Resources, And Joel D. Muyco, Director Of Mines And Geosciences Bureau) which
sprouted from the respective promulgation by the then president Aquino of Executive
Orders for the implementation of the new 1987 constitution regarding mining
applications and agreements and for guidelines during the transitory period.

The change was introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution governing
the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural
resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through
“license, concession or lease” under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions allowed under the
1987 Constitution.

Petitioner alleges that among others, the administrative orders and ultimately the
executive orders are unconstitutional because, among others, violates the non-
impairment of contract provision since the said orders pre-terminates existing mining
agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements.

ISSUE: WON the administrative orders are unconstitutional? NO.

HELD:

The adoption of the concept of jura regalia that all natural resources are owned by the
State embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the recognition of
the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for national economic
development, but also for its security and national defense, ushered in the adoption of
the constitutional policy of "full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the
State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or
production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.

Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, the State assumed a
more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization of the natural
resources of the country. Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains that
the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. Consonant therewith, the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken by means of direct act of the
State, or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements, or it may enter into agreements with foreign- owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country.

The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any
clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in
Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising
the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources are
matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. Accordingly,
the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and
amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Executive Orders. Police
Power, being co- extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public
interest; extends to all the vital public needs.