Nicole Liranzo/2017-5717

Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois (1892)

Facts: In 1869, the Illinois legislature passed an act. The act gave the Illinois Central Railroad
Company (Company) title to submerged lands located in the Chicago harbor. The submerged lands
included in the act encompasses over 1,000 acres, which the public uses for navigation, commerce,
and fishing. The attorney general of the State of Illinois, Plaintiffs, brought suit against Company,
in representation of the people of Illinois. Plaintiffs requested the court to declare Plaintiffs’ title
to the submerged lands and the Plaintiffs’ exclusive right to develop the Chicago harbor by
building docks, wharves, piers, and other innovations. Company alleged it had the right to build
innovations in the harbor for its own purposes. The parties appealed the case to the Supreme Court
of the United States to determine whether the legislature had the authority to grant Company title
to the submerged lands and, as a result, the ability to regulate the harbor’s navigable waters.
Issue: 1Whether the public trust doctrine prevents the legislature from granting a private
corporation title to submerge land that is held in trust for the public

Held: Yes, the public trust doctrine prevents the legislature from granting a private corporation
title to submerge land that is held in trust for the public.

Dissent: Although a state cannot contractually remove itself with its sovereign powers, the public-
trust doctrine is not clearly applicable in the case at hand. The public trust doctrine would be proper
if the company attempted to disregard the public’s rights. If the State of Illinois wanted to reclaim
title to the submerged lands, the proper method of doing so would be by a constitutional
condemnation.
Discussion: Plaintiffs are entitled to the title of the submerged lands, which is in trust for the
people of the state, to ensure that the people may access the waters for navigation, commerce, and
fishing. Although the state has the authority to grant parcels of land to make improvements such
as docks, wharves, and piers, that authority is differs greatly from the state’s abdication of its
authority of lands under navigable waters. This kind of abdication is not consistent with the state’s
underlying responsibility of preserving the water for the public’s use. The state does not have the
authority to relinquish its public-trust obligations by transferring the property. The only way a state
may rid its control of trust lands is if the lands are used to enhance the public interest or can be
disposed of without greatly hindering the public’s interest in the remaining portions of the land
and water. The legislatures has never been deemed to have the authority to grant all lands beneath
navigable waters. In this case, neither of the two exceptions that would permit an abdication of the
state’s trust obligations is applicable. Every harbor and the company would be at the legislature’s
mercy if the Court allows such conduct by the Plaintiff. Further, the harbor is valuable to the people

1
https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/property/property-keyed-to-merrill/values-subject-to-ownership/illinois-
central-railroad-co-v-illinois/
of Illinois, and the grant is void on its face. Nonetheless, the state may be mandated to pay for
expenses that the Company endured to improve the harbor. Moreover, the state has the authority
to assume its trust obligations whenever it chooses so. However, the court is not able to cite
authority that invalidates a grant of this nature because the court has not established any precedent
for such a grant. Additionally, many other decisions have held that the state holds submerged
waters in trust for the public. Overall, the ownership of the harbor’s waters and the submerged
lands constitutes a public concern, the trust is governmental and cannot be disposed of, unless the
lands are used to enhance the public interest or can be disposed of without hindering the public’s
interest in the remaining portions of land and water.

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984)

The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards
to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution,
such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation
under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial
grouping as though they were a single “bubble”. Using this bubble provision, plants may install or
modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the
total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources
Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted
to improve air quality.

Does the Clean Air Act permit the EPA to define the term "stationary source" to mean whole
industrial plants only, which allows plants to build or modify units within plants without the
permit required under the Act? Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court,
reversed. The Supreme Court held that the bubble regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the
term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act. Congress did not have a specific intention for the
interpretation of that term, and the EPA’s regulation was a reasonable policy choice. The regulation
also provided reasonable accommodations for the many competing interests affected by the Act.
Justices Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate.