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 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

ISSN: 1466-2043 (Print) 1743-9094 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fccp20

Bangladesh-Pakistan relations: hostage to a

traumatic past

Zahid Shahab Ahmed & Musharaf Zahoor

To cite this article: Zahid Shahab Ahmed & Musharaf Zahoor (2019): Bangladesh-
Pakistan relations: hostage to a traumatic past, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, DOI:
10.1080/14662043.2019.1575032

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COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2019.1575032

Bangladesh-Pakistan relations: hostage to a traumatic

past
Zahid Shahab Ahmeda and Musharaf Zahoorb
a
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC,
Australia; bCentre for International Peace and Stability, National University of Sciences and
Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan

ABSTRACT
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations reached a low point in December 2013 when the
International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh convicted nine persons of war
crimes pertaining to Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, and imposed a death
sentence on senior Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami leader Abdul Quader Molla.
This paper examines the trials in connection to their impact on Bangladesh-
Pakistan relations. The analysis in this paper shows that the traumatic break of
East and West Pakistan continues to haunt bilateral relations and now has
spill-over effects on South Asian regionalism. It also argues that the Awami
League-India nexus is another historically persistent factor precluding better
Dhaka-Islamabad relations.

KEYWORDS Bangladesh; Pakistan; Jamaat-e-Islami; Awami League

Introduction
Modern war crimes tribunals can be dated from the conviction of Henry Wirz
for violations of the laws of war during the American Civil War (Farr, 1991). In
the approximately 150 years since, war crimes tribunals established according
to differing mandates and jurisdictions have prosecuted numerous individuals
under both domestic and international law. After the end of World War II, the
victors – namely France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America – established the International
Military Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to pro-
secute German and Japanese war criminals respectively (Sellars, 2010). Promi-
nent examples of war crimes tribunals in the post-Cold War era include the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), both established by the United
Nations. The former was set up in Tanzania in 1994 and dealt with the cases of
more than 50 accused after the Rwandan genocide (Møse, 2005, p. 920). The
proceedings of the latter included the recent conviction of Ratko Mladić for

CONTACT Zahid Shahab Ahmed zahid.ahmed@deakin.edu.au

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

war crimes related to events more than 20 years prior (UN, 2017). Bangladesh
re-constituted its International Crimes Tribunal (henceforth, ‘ICT’ or ‘the Tribu-
nal’) in 2012 to prosecute individuals for war crimes relating to the 1971 war;
however, like other war crimes tribunals, in particular the ICTR and ICTY (Barria
& Roper, 2005), the Bangladeshi Tribunal has not been free from controversy
and has had repercussions beyond the country’s borders. The aim of this
paper is to critically examine the impacts of the Tribunal in Bangladesh on
the country’s relations with Pakistan.
The causes and consequences of the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 have
been the subject of numerous studies. Most such studies have tended to focus
on structural aspects, such as the bad governance manifested in East Paki-
stan’s mishandling of the ‘Language Movement’ and in the central West Paki-
stan administration’s response to the 1970 Bhola Cyclone (Ali, 2010, p. 17; Tan
& Kudaisya, 2002, pp. 171–172). The socio-economic deprivation of the people
of East Pakistan is proof of the level of discrimination that was taking place at
government level in the years prior to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 (Ali,
2010, p. 15). This added to resentment against the government in East Paki-
stan – a feeling that spread rapidly across the population after the elections
of 1970 (Oldmixon, 2016). All these factors contributed to the rise of Mukti
Bahini1 and the Liberation War in East Pakistan (Pattanaik, 2005, p. 396).
After Pakistan recognised Bangladesh as an independent country in 1974,
there was hope of some improvement in bilateral relations. However, this
has been precluded by the two nations’ chequered history of interactions,
in particular Bangladesh’s continued allegation that Pakistan is culpable for
war crimes.
Aside from some minor progress, the Pakistan-Bangladesh relationship
remains dominated by conflict, in particular over the issue of the 1971 Liber-
ation War. Dhaka continues to demand an admission of guilt and official
apology for war crimes, which Islamabad has as yet declined to provide. It
is reported that the closest Pakistan ever reached to issuing an official
apology was during General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Dhaka in 2002
(Ahmed, 2012). Another troubling factor for Pakistan has been Bangladesh’s
close cooperation with the former’s archrival India, which had overtly sup-
ported Mukti Bahini for Pakistan’s disintegration (Cordera, 2015). Soon after
the end of the war in December 1971, India recognised Bangladesh as an
independent country and provided generous humanitarian and economic
aid to support the new country (Hewitt, 1992, p. 34). Dhaka’s closeness to
New Delhi does not come as a surprise to Pakistan, but it has become increas-
ingly concerned about what it sees as the ruling Awami League – India nexus.
The resumption of the Tribunal in Bangladesh caused a diplomatic crisis
between Bangladesh and Pakistan, as the ICT’s consideration of war crimes
during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 has opened old wounds for
both countries. In December 2013, Bangladesh-Pakistan relations reached a
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 3

low point when the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) of Bangladesh con-
victed nine persons of war crimes and imposed a death sentence to a
senior leader of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI), Abdul Quader Molla.
Since then the bilateral relationship has continued on a downward trajectory.
The Tribunal and the Government of Bangladesh has accused Pakistan, in par-
ticular its army, of war crimes in East Pakistan. Islamabad, in response, has
actively denied these allegations and expressed concern about the executions
of senior politicians in Bangladesh. The result is a diplomatic crisis not only at
the bilateral level, but also at the level of regional relations – as evidenced by
the cancellation of the 2016 annual summit of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which was to take place in Islamabad.
Erstwhile studies on these events have examined the legality of the Tribunal
and its judgements (Chopra, 2015; Samad, 2016), but none has considered the
effects of Bangladesh carrying out the capital punishment sentences handed
down by the Tribunal on the bilateral relations of Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Further, the existing literature on Bangladesh-Pakistan relations covers a
range of issues, such as the 1971 war, the Bihari community, and the India
factor (Farzana, 2008; Mahmood, Farooq, & Awan, 2015), but does not contem-
plate the impact of the Tribunal on the bilateral relationship. This paper
addresses this gap through an analysis of contemporary relations between
Bangladesh and Pakistan following the first execution ordered by the Tribunal,
the hanging of the assistant secretary of BJI Abdul Quader Molla in December
2013, until BJI politician Mir Quasem Ali’s execution in September 2016. Primary
and secondary sources are drawn upon to inform the present analysis, includ-
ing official reports, press releases, and academic analyses.
The following inter-connected arguments are presented in this paper: (1)
The two countries’ chequered past, that is, the 1971 war and the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971, is a major cause of the conflictual relationship between
Bangladesh and Pakistan. This bilateral breakdown now has a spill-over
effect on South Asian regionalism; (2) The historic alliance between the
Awami League and India continues to disturb Islamabad and constrains
meaningful steps towards repairing the Bangladesh-Pakistan relationship. Fol-
lowing a brief account of the history of the 1971 war between India and Paki-
stan, this paper presents an analysis of the ICT in Bangladesh. Subsequently,
this paper examines the various impacts of the Tribunal on the bilateral
relationship between Bangladesh and Pakistan. It shows that the ICT’s judge-
ments have reignited historical animosity between the two sides with conse-
quences for both the bilateral relationship and the region more widely.

Background
Very few post-colonial states have disintegrated, and yet this is precisely what
happened in the case of Pakistan, which lost 32 per cent of its land and 56 per
4 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

cent of its population in 1971 (Hewitt, 1992, p. 31). This fact still shapes secur-
ity and foreign policy approaches in Pakistan. Given these deep fissures, Isla-
mabad finds it difficult to establish good relations with the Awami League, a
Bangladeshi political party that led the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971
with the support of Pakistan’s traditional rival, India.2 There are contradictory
accounts of the atrocities of the 1971 war. Numerous studies, especially those
drawing on Bangladeshi sources, claim that the war led to the deaths of
around three million people, and that the Pakistan Army and its collaborators
raped more than 200,000 Bengali women (Chopra, 2015, p. 22). For example,
the Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Wazed, published
an article in defence of the ICT in the Washington Times (7 March 2016),
blaming Pakistan for the three million deaths and other war crimes. In
addition, the war reportedly forced ten million people to seek refuge from
East Pakistan in India (Oldenburg, 2010, p. 2), while other estimates on the
number of such refugees vary from 300,000 to three million (‘The trial’,
2012). To understand the differing perspectives between Bangladesh and
Pakistan on this chapter of their shared history, it is important to consider
Pakistani accounts of the war in addition to those of Bangladeshi commenta-
tors. For example, the Pakistani Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into
the 1971 War3 estimated that the war led to 26,000 casualties overall (GOP,
1972, p. 513). In terms of objective analysis, in his comprehensive account
of the 1971 war, Bass (2013) labels the war as a genocide that led to systematic
killing of at least 300,000 Bengalis, a significant majority of which included
Hindus. Jones (2000) has supported the argument that the atrocities com-
mitted in East Pakistan should be called a genocide.
Bangladesh’s primary objective following independence was the return of
Bengali bureaucratic and military personnel from West Pakistan. The first Pre-
sident of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, brokered a deal with Pakistan
for the return of 20,000 soldiers and 500,000 civilians. Over 100,000 people
were arrested and charged with war crimes under the Bangladeshi Collabor-
ators (Special Tribunals) Order of 1972 and 752 were found guilty and sen-
tenced (Jalil, 2010, pp. 113–117). Rahman also wanted to try 1,500 West
Pakistani prisoners of war for war crimes (Ali, 2010, p. 100), but was pre-
vented from doing so by the 1974 Tripartite Agreement between Bangla-
desh, India, and Pakistan. In addition, in a bid to gain the support of
Pakistan and China for UN membership, Rahman released nearly 33,000
men, mostly BJI activists, in 1973 (Ali, 2010, p. 106). A general amnesty
was granted to all pro-Pakistani elements with the exception of those
facing specific criminal charges.
This amnesty paved the way for initiating good relations between Bangla-
desh and Pakistan, yet there could be no bilateral dialogue until Pakistan
recognised Bangladesh as an independent state. Nonetheless, when Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman was undergoing medical treatment in London in 1972,
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 5

Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called him to enquire after
his health, and importantly, invited Rahman to join him for a dialogue.
Rahman refused this invitation, citing the pre-condition that Pakistan recog-
nise Bangladesh’s independence before he would participate in bilateral
talks (Cheema, 2013, p. 64). On 22 February 1974, Pakistan formally recognised
Bangladesh as an independent state and invited Rahman to the second
summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).4 Rahman’s visit
to the OIC meeting in Lahore was an indication of the new nation’s Muslim
identity – something that it shared with Pakistan. In 1975, both nations
reached an agreement in which Bangladesh accepted half of Pakistan’s pre-
1971 external debt (Khanna & Sudarshan, 1998, p. 291). The relationship
improved considerably during the presidencies of Ziaur Rahman (1977–
1981) and Hossain Mohammad Ershad (1983–1990) in Bangladesh.
Since the 1980s, five Pakistani heads of government have visited Bangla-
desh to sign agreements on bilateral trade and cultural relations. However,
Bangladesh continues to demand an official apology from Pakistan for war
crimes committed during the Liberation War. In 2012, the differences
between the two countries resurfaced when Pakistan invited Bangladeshi
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed to attend the Developing-8 (D-8)
summit in Islamabad. Bangladesh replied that Hasina would only visit if Paki-
stan issued an apology in connection to the war crimes of 1971 (Daily Dawn,
19 November 2012). Islamabad refused this demand and consequently Sheikh
Hasina did not attend the summit. In the same year, Bangladeshi Foreign Min-
ister Dipu Moni raised the issue of an official apology in a meeting with his
Pakistani counterpart, Hina Rabbani Khar (Ahsan, 2014). According to a
renowned Bangladeshi historian, Muntassir Mamoon, the apology has
become more important in recent times because Bangladesh has become
stronger both politically and economically (‘Pak-Bangladesh ties’, 2012).
There are a range of factors, including domestic politics, that have led to
the evolution of the war crimes issue and to the Tribunal in its present
form. This matter deserves special consideration and will be addressed in
the following section.

The Tribunal and its judgements

The issue of war crimes was central to the agenda of the first Bangladeshi gov-
ernment in 1971. In 1973, the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act was passed
by the Bangladesh legislature and some of its citizens were put on trial, but
the Tripartite Agreement of 1974 led to the return of prisoners of war to Paki-
stan. Later, the process was completely ‘derailed’ by the 1975 coup and assas-
sination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Chopra, 2015, p. 212). The subsequent
president, General Ziaur Rahman, facilitated the entry of the BJI into main-
stream politics and so began an era of increasing BJI power.
6 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

The issue of war crimes has evolved and changed throughout Bangladesh’s
history. Some administrations, especially those including the BJI, have made no
effort to prosecute war criminals. However, the issue of re-forming the Tribunal
became central to the Awami League’s mandate following its 2008 election
campaign (‘The trial’, 2012). The Tribunal was thus re-established in 2010,
almost forty years after the war of independence (Samad, 2016). This step
received strong public support, since the majority of Bangladeshis view the
ICT as crucial for healing the wounds of war (Chopra, 2015, p. 211). The then
ICT Chief Prosecutor Golam Arieff Tipoo (2013) published an article claiming
that ‘Bangladesh is fairly trying to prosecute those responsible for genocide’.
In accordance with its election promises, the Awami League reconstituted
the ICT Act for establishing the ICT-1 in 2010 and the ICT-2 in 2012. These
special courts have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for war crimes, geno-
cide, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and genocide committed
in Bangladesh before or after the ICT Act was passed. The Tribunal has been
working on judicial proceedings for 658 such allegations. As at July 2016, it
had issued 25 judgements. The ICT-2 issued its first judgment in the case of
Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad in January 2013. A month later, the ICT-1
passed a judgement on the case of Delowar Hossain Sayeedi. Both Azad
and Sayeedi were senior BJI members.
The Tribunal’s judgements have led to six executions (see Table 1). Only
one defendant, Md Obaidul Haque, has been acquitted. Two others,
Ghulam Azam and Abdul Alim, were sentenced to life imprisonment in
view of their advanced ages (each over 80 years old). Both Azam, who
served as chief of BJI in 1971, and Alim, of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP), died in custody. Of the 11 death sentences handed down, ten have

Table 1. Death penalty verdicts handed down by ICT, January 2013–September 2016.
Name Affiliation ICT verdict and status
Abdul Quader Molla BJI Death sentence
Executed in December 2013
Muhammad Kamaruzzaman BJI Death sentence
Executed in April 2015
Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid BJI Death sentence
Executed in November 2015
Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury BNP Death sentence
Executed in November 2015
Motiur Rehman Nizami BJI Death sentence
Executed in May 2016
Mir Quasem Ali BJI Death sentence
Executed in September 2016
Zahid Hossain Khokon BJI Death sentence
Md. Mobarak Hossain BJI Death sentence
A.T.M. Azharul Islam BJI Death sentence
Sheikh Sirajul Haque BJI Death sentence
Mohibur Rahman BJI Death sentence
Source: Created by authors.
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 7

been given to BJI members and one to a BNP leader. All of the death sen-
tences have been imposed on defendants who were very senior politicians.
For example, Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, the BNP leader executed in
November 2015, was a former minister and seven-time member of parlia-
ment. Chowdhury was convicted of working as an undercover agent for Paki-
stan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Oldmixon, 2016). The BNP did not exist
at the time of the 1971 war, but Chowdhury and a number of others who later
became its leaders were accused of supporting the Pakistani army. Given that
most individuals apprehended and tried are senior leaders of opposition
parties – the BJI and the BNP – there has been a widespread political violence
in Bangladesh.5 In 2013, clashes between BJI workers and police led to more
than 500 casualties (‘Clashes’, 2014).
The historical context of the war features in all ICT case proceedings, as do
allegation of the BJI’s direct involvement in war crimes through militias such
as Al-Badr and Al-Shams. For greater justification, several ICT judgements cite
the publications of prominent Pakistani intellectual Hossain Haqqani. The func-
tion of these references is to eliminate any political criticism of the Tribunal, in
particular suggestions that the Awami League exploits the ICT as a tool to crush
any political opposition (Samad, 2016). It is worth noting that Haqqani was Paki-
stan’s Ambassador to the US during 2008–2011; on this basis, the Tribunal’s fre-
quent references to his work add credibility to its judgments. One particular
book by Haqqani, which specifically references the direct involvement of the
BJI in war crimes, is repeatedly cited in ICT judgements:
The Jamaat-e-Islami and specially its student wing, Islami Jamaat-e-Talaba (IJT)
joined the military’s efforts in May 1971 to launch two paramilitary counter insur-
gency units. The IJT provided a large number of recruits. The two special bri-
gades of Islamist cadres were named Al-shams (the sun in Arabic) and Al-Badr
(the moon). A separate Razakars Directorate was established. Two separate
wings called Al-Badr and Al-shams were recognised. Well-educated and properly
motivated students from the schools and Madrasas were put in Al-Badr wing,
where they were trained to undertake specialised operations, where the remain-
der were grouped together under Al-shams, which was responsible for the pro-
tection of bridges, vital points and other areas. (Haqqani, 2005, p. 79)

The ICT has been subject to intense scrutiny since its creation. There was huge
controversy surrounding Justice Mohammed Nizamul Huq’s communication
with a Bangladeshi lawyer living abroad (Chopra, 2015, p. 213). Justice Huq
eventually resigned for involving outside influence in the Tribunal. There con-
tinues to be heavy criticism of the ICT from international human rights organ-
isations, including Amnesty International, which has constantly demanded
that the Bangladesh government overturn all death sentences (AI, 2013).
The ICT has consistently faced allegations of conducting ‘unfair trials’ since
its first case investigating BJI leader Delwar Hossain Sayeedi. For example,
in 2013, the government was criticised for amending the ICT Act in order to
8 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

challenge Abdul Quader Molla’s appeal before the Supreme Court, which
resulted in the rejection of his review petition. Samad is of the view that ‘with-
drawing dependent’s fundamental constitutional rights also indicates that
Bangladesh is willing to prosecute the accused at the expense of basic
human rights’ (Samad, 2016). However, Dhaka denies these allegations and
the government wholeheartedly affirms the value of the ICT.
The Tribunal and its judgements have been criticised by western and
Muslim nations alike. For example, the Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan
has openly criticised the trial and execution of BJI members, and following
the execution of Motiur Rahman Nizami in May 2016, Turkey recalled its
envoy to Bangladesh. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, which is led
by President Erdogan, has ties to the BJI. Ankara’s position was that it did
not think ‘Nizami deserved such a punishment’ (GOT, 2016). Further, the pre-
sident made a statement on the eve of the execution, fuelling public demon-
strations against the execution in Ankara and Istanbul.6 The US has also been
carefully observing the ICT. In one of its statements, the US State Department
expressed concern over the Tribunal’s compliance with human rights obli-
gations which Bangladesh has agreed to uphold, stating that ‘further improve-
ments to the ICT process could ensure these proceedings meet domestic and
international obligations’ (Harf, 2015). The Government of Bangladesh has
received offers of support from the US and the EU to make the ICT trials
more free and transparent (Samad, 2016).
Despite this unfavourable international reception, the Tribunal has faced
no real hurdle to its operations because it enjoys the full backing of the gov-
ernment, the people, and India. As Wazed confirms, war crimes trials are
popular in Bangladesh and people have reacted positively to the death sen-
tences of ‘war criminals’ (Washington Times, 7 March 2016). Following
Nizami’s execution, an Indian official remarked that ‘the issue of war crimes
trial is internal to Bangladesh. It has wide popular support. India has also
been supportive of a judicial process to address pending issues of retributive
justice for war crimes committed during the movement for independence of
Bangladesh in 1971’ (Times of India, 13 May 2016). India has used the trials in
Bangladesh to pursue its own strategic goal of isolating Pakistan in South Asia
(Yousaf, Ahmad, & Shah, 2017, p. 137). India’s desire to capitalise on Pakistan’s
isolation in the region has led it to support the Awami League’s position on
war crimes and the Tribunal. The Awami League’s overt criticism of Pakistan
and its closeness to New Delhi adds to the already aggravated relationship
between Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Two-way diplomatic fury

The legacy of an antagonistic shared past has been a deciding factor in Ban-
gladesh-Pakistan relations. In addition to the pending issue of Biharis in
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 9

Bangladesh,7 Dhaka continues to accuse Pakistan of war crimes and demands

an official apology for the events of 1971. Islamabad’s continued denial of
involvement in war crimes and its refusal to issue the official apology
requested continue to inhibit Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh.
Domestic politics in Bangladesh is a deciding factor in the country’s
relations with Pakistan. An analysis of the bilateral relationship over time
suggests that tensions tend to increase when the Awami League holds
office (Mahmood et al., 2015). In addition, the actions and policies of India
have influenced Pakistan-Bangladesh relations since the creation of Bangla-
desh in 1971. Following the 1971 war, it was clear that the Bangladesh govern-
ment led by the Awami League would cooperate with its sympathisers and
supporters in New Delhi. Immediately after the 1971 ceasefire, India provided
Bangladesh with over $5 million for immediate relief programmes, and an
additional £5 million ($6.5 million) in foreign exchange to boost the new
economy (Hewitt, 1992, p. 34). In 1972, Bangladesh and India deepened
their friendship by signing the twenty-five year India-Bangladesh Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Peace, which committed to cooperation in secur-
ity matters. From the early days of India’s initial support to the Awami League-
led freedom struggle in 1971, New Delhi has viewed the party as its key ally,
and the Awami League has considered India a friendly country (Kumar, 2014;
Mohsin, 2003, p. 89). In contrast, since the establishment of bilateral ties in
1974, Islamabad has been more comfortable dealing with the BNP than the
Awami League. This is because the Awami League is traditionally pro-India,
which automatically leads it to an anti-Pakistan position given the South
Asian nations’ long-standing rivalry. This dynamic has naturally led to Paki-
stan’s closeness to the BNP, a party that maintains regular communication
with the Government of Pakistan.8 Therefore, from Pakistan’s perspective,
an Awami League-India nexus constrains bilateral relation between Bangla-
desh and Pakistan.
Domestic party politics also plays a role in Pakistan’s foreign policy formu-
lations, and a change of government in 2013 altered Islamabad’s position on
the ICT. Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister for the third time in June
2013, replacing the erstwhile Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government.
During the PPP era, Pakistan’s Foreign Office was silent on the matter of the
ICT and had not issued any statement regarding the verdicts. With the
change of government in Islamabad, however, the Foreign Office has been
more willing to make public its strong reactions to and express deep concerns
about the trials in Bangladesh. Since July 2013, the Foreign Office has issued
statements and press briefings on each of the death sentences conferred to
BJI members.
The two nations’ bilateral relations have been particularly tense following
Abdul Quader Molla’s execution in December 2013.9 Anger over the sentence
resonated at all levels of politics in Pakistan. The National Assembly and the
10 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

Provincial Assembly of Punjab passed resolutions voicing concerns over the

hanging. The National Assembly offered its condolences to Molla’s family
and demanded that the Government of Bangladesh drop its cases against
other BJI leaders. Pakistan’s then Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan,
stated that ‘We respect independence and sovereignty of Bangladesh but
there should be a policy of forgive and forget’ (The News, 16 December
2013). On another occasion, Nisar was heard admiring Molla’s ‘loyalty’ to Paki-
stan (Oldmixon, 2016). However, despite expressing its dissent through state-
ments and diplomatic channels, Pakistan’s Foreign Office ultimately conceded
that Molla’s hanging came under the purview of Bangladesh’s domestic affairs.
The situation deteriorated when the Government of Bangladesh sum-
moned Pakistan’s High Commissioner in Dhaka to lodge a protest against
the National Assembly of Pakistan’s resolution condemning Molla’s execution.
Further, the outraged Awami League activists and so-called progressive youth
elements responded to Pakistan’s displeasure over Molla’s hanging by attack-
ing its High Commission in Dhaka (‘Thousands storm’, 2013). The protestors
set fire to Pakistani flags and burnt effigies of Imran Khan, the leader of Paki-
stan Tehreek-e-Insaf, who had strongly criticised Molla’s hanging. The situ-
ation deteriorated further when a banned terrorist organisation, the
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan threatened to attack the Bangladeshi High Com-
mission in Islamabad in retaliation (Zaman, 2013). The events that followed
strained the relationship between Islamabad and Dhaka so much that each
country requested the other increase security around its diplomatic mission.
It is crucial to analyse Pakistan’s official statements in order to understand
the impact of the two nations’ shared history on contemporary relations. Isla-
mabad’s first direct reaction to the Tribunal came in July 2013 when the
Foreign Office made a statement reiterating the concerns of international
human rights organisations about the conduct of the ICT. This followed a
Foreign Office press briefing in October 2014 stating that Pakistan is
‘mindful of the development in Bangladesh’ (GOP, 2016c), but at this stage,
no direct concern was expressed in relation to the ICT verdicts. However, in
2015 the mood shifted in Islamabad, and the Acting High Commissioner of
Bangladesh was summoned by Pakistan’s Foreign Office and told that Paki-
stan viewed the war crimes trials as a violation of the 1974 Tripartite Agree-
ment (GOP, 2016c). This policy shift came following the expelling/
withdrawal of Pakistani diplomats from Bangladesh.
There has been a strong reaction to ICT verdicts from various political fac-
tions in Pakistan. These reactions facilitated the passing of the National
Assembly’s resolution on the issue and the Foreign Office’s later decision to
issue a statement.10 The Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) in Pakistan has been most
critical of the ICT. Expressing its solidarity with the BJI, the Jamaat has been
putting pressure on the government to take tougher action against Bangla-
desh. For example, following the execution of Nizami, the Jamaat organised
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 11

protests across Pakistan against Bangladesh. While the Jamaat in Pakistan is

not a strong political player, holding only four seats in the National Assembly,
it enjoys a widespread network of members which helps it to mobilise people
to attend demonstrations.11 In the context of mounting domestic pressure,
the Foreign Office issued a press release on the date of Nizami’s execution,
which asserted that Nizami’s ‘only sin was upholding the constitution and
laws of Pakistan’. The release also reminded Bangladesh of its obligation to
‘not proceed with the trials as an act of clemency’ as part of the 1974 Tripartite
Agreement (GOP, 2016b). Simultaneously, there has been criticism from Ban-
gladesh on Pakistan for not just misinterpreting the agreement but violating it
by refusing to take back Pakistani nationals i.e. Biharis (Habib, 2016). Further,
on the validity of the 1974 deal, Bangladesh’s Law Ministry Anisul Huq stated,
‘the law says that a deal becomes invalid if anyone violates any of its con-
ditions. So, this agreement is no longer acceptable’ (The Daily Star, 15 May
2016).
Molla’s hanging restored the bitter memories of separation and triggered a
debate in both countries, especially in the media, regarding the nature of Paki-
stan-Bangladesh ties. In Pakistan, articles in various Urdu and English newspa-
pers condemned Molla’s hanging. The outrage in Bangladesh over Pakistan’s
response to Molla’s killing also affected business and trade activities between
the two countries. Textile investors who had shifted their businesses from
Pakistan to Bangladesh started to express concern about the discriminatory
behaviour of the Bangladeshi government. In response, the Bangladeshi gov-
ernment began to criticise Pakistani investors, blaming them for adverse
events including the Rana Plaza collapse (Business Recorder, 10 April 2014).12
In this way, Bangladesh and Pakistan’s troubled and interrelated histories
have prevented their bilateral relationship from expanding, especially in the
area of economic cooperation.
In 2015, diplomatic fury intensified and direct attacks were made on the
diplomatic missions of each nation. In February 2015, Bangladesh’s National
Security Intelligence agency deported Pakistani diplomat Mazhar Khan, alle-
ging he had been supporting religious extremism in Bangladesh as an
agent of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Similarly, the Pakistani mis-
sion’s Second Secretary (Political) Farina Arshad was accused of links with the
ISI and withdrawn by Islamabad in December 2015 (Oldmixon, 2016). In
response, Islamabad expelled Bangladeshi diplomat Moushumi Rahman on
allegations of ‘anti-Pakistan activities’, although Rahman was later reinstated
(Haider, 2016). Soon after, the Bangladeshi diplomatic mission in Islamabad
accused local authorities of mistreating its staff (Oldmixon, 2016). In the dip-
lomatic crossfire that emerged in the wake of Nizami’s May 2016 execution,
Pakistan said that it would take the matter of war crimes to the UN. In
response, an Awami League member said that his government would prose-
cute 195 Pakistani soldiers for war crimes under the 1972 Simla Agreement
12 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

(News Age, 14 May 2016). Dhaka has responded aggressively to any criticism of
the trials, maintaining the cases are ‘internal’ matters for Bangladesh. After the
fifth execution was carried out, namely the hanging of the BJI’s Nizami, Islama-
bad summoned the Bangladeshi ambassador to its Foreign Office and
expressed its opposition to the carrying out of the sentence. The Office
later issued a statement criticising Bangladesh’s government for dismissing
Nizami’s review petition.13 In reaction, Dhaka issued a note verbale stating
that the unfavourable reaction from Islamabad indicates that country’s
likely involvement in war crimes.
Pakistan’s official stance has not changed considerably since the war
period itself. In official documentation produced during the war in August
1971, for instance, the government justified its use of force in East Pakistan
by blaming the Awami League and India for producing ‘lawlessness’ (GOP,
1971, p. 21). The reactions from Pakistani decision-makers on the ICT verdicts
would suggest that several still view Bangladesh through a historical prism as
a province of Pakistan; a mindset found also in the civil bureaucracy.
The tensions between Dhaka and Islamabad have been playing out in
official bilateral interactions, but have also becoming increasingly evident in
media discourse. The latter is largely due to the differences between the
two side’s accounts of the atrocities of 1971. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, who is con-
sidered an authority on international law in Pakistan, published a newspaper
article entitled ‘Bangladesh on trial’ in the week following Nizami’s execution.
In his article, Soofi (2016) stated that all sides committed atrocities during the
1971 war and that Pakistan had expressed ‘regret’ for its part to Bangladeshis
in 2002.14 Not surprisingly, this garnered a strong reaction from Bangladeshi
commentators. On 30 May 2016, Bangladesh’s Daily Observer republished an
article by Indian journalist Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury suggesting that Soofi’s
article was ‘full of distortion, half-truths and outright lies’.15 Chaudhury’s
article was also shared via the Facebook page ‘Hate war criminals & their col-
laborators’, and received over 2000 likes. This clearly indicates the clash of nar-
ratives taking place at the societal level between the two nations.

Impacts on bilateral relations and beyond

Their chequered past, inter alia geographic distance and relations with India,
has affected economic cooperation between Bangladesh and Pakistan. While
the Awami League-India nexus plays its role in constraining Pakistan’s
relations with Bangladesh, it is important to highlight that the core issue
remains an official apology from Pakistan for the war crimes committed in
East Pakistan.
Trade relations are not the mere exchange of goods, but can foster inter-
dependence and enhance people-to-people contacts (Barbieri, 1996). Trade
can also support and supplement diplomatic mechanisms in enhancing
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 13

understanding between rivals. Bangladesh and Pakistan have not demon-

strated the political will necessary for bilateral economic cooperation. The
potential for two-way trade is significant but as yet unrealised. The President
of the Federal Chamber of Commerce and Industries in Pakistan, Suhail Bin
Rashid, said Pakistan and Bangladesh have a combined trade potential of
$345 billion and a potential consumer market worth around US$346 million
(Rana, 2013). The current level of two-way trade is far below these figures.
Nonetheless, Bangladesh was Pakistan’s eighth largest export partner in
2015, generating an estimated US$700 million (MSU, 2015), although Pakistan
exports more to China, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.16 In contrast, Bangladeshi
goods and services are not significant among Pakistani imports, and Bangla-
desh fails to rank in the top ten of Pakistan’s import partners. As shown in
Table 2, bilateral trade between Bangladesh and Pakistan has been erratic.
Pakistan’s exports to Bangladesh dropped during both 2011 and 2013.
Prior to the current diplomatic crisis, there had been a discernible improve-
ment in economic cooperation between Bangladesh and Pakistan. According
to the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Pakistani
investors have contributed $2 billion to Bangladesh’s textile, leather, and gar-
ments sectors (Ansari & Shaheen, 2013). Due to electricity shortages in Paki-
stan and the investor friendly policies of the Bangladeshi government,
many local textile factories have shifted their businesses to Bangladesh. Paki-
stan’s textile industry accounts for 38 per cent of workers in the manufactur-
ing sector and over half of its exports, which stood at nearly $25 billion in the
2010–2011 fiscal year (Anthony & Paul, 2011). More than 40 per cent of the
Pakistani textile industry and around 200,000 looms had shifted to Bangla-
desh by 2011 (Azad, 2011). At least six Pakistani companies manage their
operations from Bangladesh’s Export Promotion Zones. Pakistani companies
have duty free access to raw jute, and up to 15,000 metric ton of tea per
annum from Bangladesh (GOP, 2012, p. 41). This demonstrates the potential
for greater economic cooperation between the two nations.
In the present context, however, political dialogue is non-existent at the
official and non-official levels between Bangladeshi and Pakistani leaders;

Table 2. Bangladesh’s exports and imports with Pakistan

(2009–2016).
Year Export (million US$) Import (million US$)
2009–10 77.67 323.7
2010–11 86.79 669.3
2011–12 73.21 517.1
2012–13 68.70 488.4
2013–14 56.04 530.53
2014–15 57.57 481.82
2015–16 47.07 507.46
Source: (DCCI, 2017).
14 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

their only interaction is the continuous exchange of statements between both

sides against the actions of the other. When bilateralism fails, multilateralism
can improve relations, and informal meetings on the sidelines of annual
SAARC summits have provided important breakthroughs on several
occasions.17 An informal meeting between Bangladeshi and Pakistani
leaders took place in 2006 when Prime Minister Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh
visited Pakistan to attend the annual SAARC summit. The last official visit by
a Pakistan leader to Dhaka was General Pervez Musharaf’s 2002 trip (Jabbar,
2015). Both Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif did not visit Bangladesh
during their governments (2008–2017).
A similar meeting might have taken place in 2016 when Pakistan was to
host another SAARC summit, but bilateral tensions again constrained the
SAARC process. The scheduled SAARC summit has been indefinitely post-
poned due to tensions between India and Pakistan, with New Delhi accusing
Pakistan of disturbances in Indian-administered Kashmir. Bangladesh used the
occasion to declare its solidarity with India and anger at Pakistan. Dhaka
refused to attend the scheduled SAARC summit in Islamabad and sent the fol-
lowing statement to the SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu: ‘The growing inter-
ference in the internal affairs of Bangladesh by one country has created an
environment, which is not conducive to the successful hosting of the 19th
SAARC summit in Islamabad in November 2016’ (Bhattacherjee, 2016). The
SAARC has faced a serious impasse since, as four of its member states,
namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and India, refused to attend the
2016 summit, and thus it is now more than three years since the most
recent summit took place in November 2014.
The SAARC as a vehicle for regional cooperation is threatened by tense
relations between its members and by India’s long-term policy of isolating
Pakistan in South Asia (Yousaf et al., 2017). This is evident through tensions
in Pakistan’s relations with India, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Also, India’s
strategy of SAARC minus Pakistan is manifested through, New Delhi’s
support for sub-regional mechanisms of cooperation excluding Pakistan,
including the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Econ-
omic Cooperation (BIMSETC) and India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Sub-Regional
Cooperation (IBM-SRC) (Toppo, 2016).18 Following the cancellation of the
scheduled SAARC summit which was to take place in November 2016 in Isla-
mabad, Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar sent an indirect warning to Isla-
mabad that India would find other ways, such as BIMSTEC, to achieve regional
cooperation excluding Pakistan (‘If SAARC’, 2016). The policy of regional
cooperation without Pakistan is also clear from the fact that it was the only
member of SAARC not to be invited to BIMSTEC’s summit held in Goa in
2016 (Hou, 2016). At a time when Pakistan’s relations are tense not only
with India but also other SAARC members including Afghanistan and Bangla-
desh, it is easier for New Delhi to capitalise on the situation to make
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 15

geostrategic gains in opposition to Pakistan. This is a dangerous development

and will not only deteriorate Pakistan’s bilateral relations with the stake-
holders but will also have significant impacts on SAARC processes.
While it is in India’s best interests to isolate Pakistan in South Asia, Islamabad has
not made any serious effort to improve relations with Bangladesh. The bilateral
relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan continue on a downward trajectory
since 2013. A recent drama over a video which was reported posted on the Face-
book page of the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka. In this 14-minute video, it
was claimed that the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was not the one who declared the
independence of Bangladesh in 1971. On this Dhaka has asked for an apology
from Pakistan for spreading ‘misleading’ information (GOB, 2017), but Islamabad
calls it a case of cybercrime. On this issue, Pakistan’s Foreign Office summoned
the Bangladeshi high commissioner in Islamabad to convey that a video by a
third party cannot be attributed to Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka … Paki-
stan desired to move forward in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement of
1974 wherein the Prime Minister of Bangladesh desired that the people of Ban-
gladesh should ‘forget the past and make a fresh start’. As fresh start is however
not easy with a core issue of an unconditional apology put on the backburner.

Human history records many war crimes being committed by states within and
outside of their territories. There are some instances of apology by a state, for
example, Australia to the aboriginal people and Japan has made several apolo-
gies in relation to war crimes committed by the imperial army during the World
War II. While official Pakistan has refrained from issuing an official apology,
there has been a demand from Pakistani-origin intellectuals and human
rights activists urging Islamabad to apologise from the government of Bangla-
desh (Ahmed, 2012; Ehsan, 2012; Younus, 2017). This is however not that simple
for any civilian government in Pakistan which has to balance a delicate civil–
military relations in the country. The Pakistan army has a long history of directly
ruling the country but also having a significant influence during civilian govern-
ments. It is however important to reiterate that the closest Pakistan reached to
issuing an apology was during General Musharraf’s visit to Dhaka in 2002. Then
he visited the national War Memorial in Savar and wrote in the visitor’s book,
‘Your brothers and sisters in Pakistan share the pains of the events of 1971.
The excesses committed during the unfortunate period are regrettable’
(Ehsan, 2012). The army’s influence is prominent also in Pakistan’s foreign
policy (Ahmed, 2010), and this make it different from the countries, such as Aus-
tralia and Japan, which have managed to issue apologies. Considering that and
the allegations of war crimes on the Pakistan army, it is going to be very difficult
for Islamabad to issue an unconditional apology.

Conclusion
The trauma of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War is a determining factor in
Bangladesh–Pakistan relations. Further, as argued in the paper, the India
16 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

factor also influences the bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and Paki-
stan. New Delhi has cleverly used its support for the Awami League and the ICT
for its own strategic gains. For example, its long-term plan of isolating Pakistan
in South Asia. It wants to capitalise on Pakistan’s isolation in the region and
therefore has been supportive of the Awami League’s position on the war
crimes. Bangladesh views the war trials as central to healing and national recon-
ciliation. Pakistan has also not done enough to ease relations with Bangladesh.
The loss of East Pakistan continues to shape Pakistan’s foreign policy
approach towards Bangladesh. Thus, Islamabad has considered it to be its
moral responsibility to condemn war crime trials and executions in Bangladesh.
For Pakistan, the ICT has opened up old wounds. Nonetheless, Islamabad has
framed its criticism of the Tribunal in the context of international allegations
of a lack of fairness and Bangladesh’s commitments under the 1974 Tripartite
Agreement. Although the first ICT judgement was made in January 2013, Isla-
mabad only reacted following a change of government. The government of
Nawaz Sharif (2013–2017) reversed Pakistan’s earlier position of treating the
ICT as a domestic affair for Bangladesh. Given Dhaka’s view of the ICT as an
internal matter has not changed, it has reacted strongly to statements by
various political factions in Pakistan, including the Pakistan Muslim League,
in power until 2018. While there is a realisation of the importance of issuing
an official apology on war crimes to Bangladesh in some Pakistani circles, it is
not going to be easy given the Pakistan army’s influence in foreign policy.
This is because an apology from Pakistan would also mean acceptance of the
war crimes allegations about the Pakistan army by Islamabad.
This has caused a diplomatic crisis at the bilateral level, and no direct dia-
logue has since taken place either at the bilateral or the multilateral level. His-
torical baggage is a major reason why neither country has taken concrete
steps to realise the potential for profitable two-way trade. The bilateral
tension between Bangladesh and Pakistan has also affected regional
cooperation through the SAARC – a forum that has often provided informal
opportunities to South Asian leaders for discussing bilateral issues. Under
the present circumstances, a true reconciliation can only emerge if both
countries demonstrate the willingness to face down the demons of the past
and initiate meaningful bilateral cooperation. This would require Pakistan to
re-think its historic position on the apology issue. Domestically, the govern-
ment has to bring on board all stakeholders including the army to reach a con-
sensus on the relations with Bangladesh.

Notes
1. Mukti Bahini is a Bengali term for the military resistance formed by armed mili-
tary and guerrilla forces in East Pakistan for the creation of an independent
country from Pakistan.
 COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 17

2. After assisting East Pakistan in its freedom struggle, India’s support for the
Awami League began to be seen as interference in the internal affairs of Bangla-
desh, causing disenchantment among local military personnel, and leading to
the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975.
3. The Hamoodur Rehman Commission was set up by the Government of Pakistan
in 1972 to assess Pakistan’s political and military involvement in East Pakistan
1947–1971. Chief Justice Hamoodur Rehman headed the Commission.
4. OIC – Organistaion of Islamic Conference.
5. The BNP was created in 1978, during the era of President Ziaur Rahman. Rahman
as its founding chairperson started moving closer to the Muslim world, including
Pakistan (Mahmood et al., 2015, p. 69). Since the early 1990s, the BNP has been
close to BJI and this relationship became stronger following the 18 Party Alliance
in 2012. During the 1999 and 2001 elections, a small-scale political alliance of
four parties, including BNP and BJI, was formed. The BNP has aligned with BJI,
and this political support has provided the Jamaat with much-needed opportu-
nities to expand its network in Bangladesh.
6. In his statement, President Erdogan said, ‘I condemn the mentality that sen-
tences to death a mujahid [Arabic word meaning “to strive in the cause of
God”], who is over the age of 70 and who we believe has no earthly sin’. Prior
to this, Erdogan had also called Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to stop the
execution of Molla (‘Turkey recalls’, 2016).
7. The return of Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan continues to affect the bilat-
eral ties. There are 300,000 Muslim Biharis (Urdu-speakers) scattered across 116
squalid camps in Bangladesh. In 1947, Biharis had migrated from the present-
day Indian state of Bihar to East Pakistan. After the 1971 war, over 100,000
moved from Bangladesh to Pakistan; however, the remaining Biharis of Bangla-
desh still demand repatriation to Pakistan (UNHCR, 2014). In 1985 there was
some progress made on this issue when President Zia-ul-Haq agreed to
accept the remaining Biharis in Pakistan. However, no concrete steps were
taken to produce or implement an agreement on this issue. Similarly, in 2002,
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf tried to move towards more positive
relations with Bangladesh, but could not do much on the issue of the emigration
of Biharis (Farzana, 2008, p. 15).
8. On 8 June 2016, BNP’s Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia sent her good wishes to
Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan in the context of the latter’s heart surgery in London.
The Foreign Office of Pakistan published Zia’s message on its website (GOP,
2016a).
9. In 2009, the Tribunal sentenced BJI’s Abdul Quader Molla to death for an alleged
massacre and for collaboration with the Pakistan Army during the war in 1971.
The sentence was challenged in Bangladesh’s highest court but the challenge
was rejected. Molla’s hanging triggered violent protests in Bangladesh by
Islamists.
10. In May 2016, Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously passed a bill condemn-
ing Nizami’s execution. At the beginning of the session, Jamaat-e-Islami’s Sahib-
zada Tariqullah led the fatiha (prayers for the deceased) for Nizami and also
demanded the government take action on the matter (The Express Tribune, 12
May 2016).
11. According to Hoffman, ‘the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami has been critical in
penetrating the mosques and madrasas and mobilizing people for street dem-
onstrations’ (Hoffman, 1995, p. 205).
18 Z. S. AHMED AND M. ZAHOOR

12. In 2013, Rana Plaza collapsed, killing more than 1,000 workers at a garment
factory in the heart of Dhaka (The New York Times, 22 May 2013).
13. Nafees Zakaria, a Foreign Office representative in Islamabad, offered condo-
lences to Nizami’s family and said that ‘the act of supressing the opposition
by killing their leaders through flawed trials is completely against the spirit of
democracy’ (Dawn, 12 May 2016).
14. Soofi’s think tank, Research Society on International Law, has also published a
paper entitled ‘Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal’. This paper presents a critique
of the ICT, suggesting it violates the 1974 Accord [http:// rsilpak.org/wp
… /Position-Paper-on-the-Bangladesh-International-Crimes-Tribunal.pdf].
15. ‘Pakistan’s role in Bangladesh war crimes will always haunt them’, by Chaudhury
was originally published in The Economic Times of India on 27 May 2016.
16. Pakistan’s largest export partners are the USA, China, Afghanistan, the UK,
Germany, the UAE, and Spain.
17. ‘For example, India’s then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistan’s then-Pre-
sident General Zia-ul-Haq had a meeting during the first Saarc summit, and
Zia made a historic visit to New Delhi soon after. Just before the 2002
summit, tensions escalated between India and Pakistan due to the December
2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, but the leaders of both countries
still agreed to meet on the sidelines of Saarc’ (Ahmed, 2014).
18. BIMSTEC has the following members: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar,
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

Acknowledgement
The authors are thankful to Dr Stuti Bhatnagar for her insightful comments on the
paper. The authors are indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for their productive
feedback.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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