Cases Atty Arellano-Midterms

Political law-midterm cases
Drilon vs ermita (senate vs ermita) assignment
Estrada v. Disierto, 253 SCRA 452 (2001)
F: Following the aborted impeachment trial & the resignation of majority of the members of the Cabinet & the defection of
the military & the police, at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, V-pres Arroyo was sworn into office as Pres. of the Phil., while
Pres. Estrada w/ his family left Malacanang. On the same day, however, Pres. Estrada wrote a letter to the Senate
stating that he was unable to exercise the powers of the office of the Presidency & the operation of the Consti, the V-pres
shall be Acting Pres. Is the Pres. only temporarily unable to act as Pres?
HELD: NO. On Jan. 20, 2001, despite receipt of the letter, the House issued a resolution supporting the assumption of
Arroyoi as Pres. Likewise, on Feb. 7, it confirmed the nomination by Pres. Arroyo of Sen. Guingona as V-Pres. On the
same day, the Senate also confirmed the nomination. The Senate on Feb. 8, issued a resolution confirming the existence
of a vacancy in the Senate brought about by the nomination of Sen. Guingona & urging the COMELEC to fill the vacancy.
Finally, both Houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by Pres. Arroyo. It is therefore clear that
Congress has recognized Arroyo as the Pres., & that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary. In the face of this
determination by a co-equal branch, the court is w/out authority to review. It is a pol’l question, w/c cannot be decided by
the Court w/out transgressing the princ. of separation of powers.
Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549
F: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, to
enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o
confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional.
HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the
heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest
the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. The first was to delete the
phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase "and all"
w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was intended to exempt the appointment of
bureau directors from the requirement of confirmation on the ground that this position is low and to require confirmation
would subject bureau directors to political influence. On the other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to
confirmation only those mentioned in the frist sentence, namely:
The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Consti, i.e.,
(1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]
(2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)];
(3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)];
(4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)];
(5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.)
The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other officers of
the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres. may be authorized by law
to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the Pres. alone.
CALDERON VS. CARALE (April 22, 1992)
Petition for prohibition to review the constitutionality & legality of the appointment of respondents
FACTS:
Sec.16, Art.VII: The President shall nominate &, w/ the consent of the Com on Appointments (CA), appoint the heads of
the exec depts., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain & other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Consti. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, & those whom he may be authorized by
sources: from the net and students’ digest 1

law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of depts., agencies, commissions, or boards.
 Sarmiento III v. Mison: (On power of CA to confirm appointments) The position of the BOC Commissioner (a
bureau head) is not one of those w/n the 1 st grp of appointments where the consent of the CA is required. While
the 1935 Consti includes ‘heads of bureaus’ among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
CA, the 1987 Consti deliberately excluded the position of ‘heads of bureaus’ from appointments that need the
consent of CA. The intent was to exclude pres’l appointments from confirmation by CA, except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII.
 Bautista v. Salonga: The position of Chairman of the Com on Human Rights is not among those mentioned in the
1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of 1987 Consti, appointments to w/c are to be made w/ the confirmation of the CA.
The Pres appoints the CHR Chairman & members pursuant to the 2 nd sentence in Sec. 16, Art VII, that is, w/o
confirmation of CA bec they are among the officers of govt whom the Pres ‘may be authorized by law to appoint.’
And Sec 2(c) of EO 163 authorizes the Pres to appoint the Chairman & members of CHR.
 Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Const’l Commissions: Since the seats reserved for sectoral reps in
par.2, Sec. 5, Art VI may be filled by appointment by the Pres by express provision of Sec. 7, Art XVIII of the
Consti, it is indubitable that sectoral reps are among the ‘other officers whose appointments are vested in the Pres
in this Consti’ referred to in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII whose appointments are subject to CA
confirmation.
 DOCTRINES FROM THE 3 CASES:
1) Confirmation by CA is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the 1 st sentence of Sec. 16, Art
VII, including those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Consti in the Pres.
2) Confirmation is not required when the Pres appoints other govt officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. Also, in Mison,
when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an
unconst’l manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments
are not other wise provided by law.
 March 1989, RA 6715, amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved.
 Sec. 13, RA 6715: “The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by CA….”
 Pursuant to RA 6715, Pres Aquino appointed the Chairman & Commissioners of the NLRC. Drilon then issued AO
No. 161, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
 The present petition questions the constitutionality & legality of the permanent appointments mentioned above w/o
submitting the same to CA for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715.
 PETITIONER: insists on a mandatory compliance w/ RA 6715. Mison & Bautista are not decisive in this case for
in the case at bar, the Pres issued permanent appointments w/o submitting them to CA for confirmation despite
passage of a law (RA 6715) w/c requires the confirmation by the CA of such appointments.
 SOLGEN (RESPONDENTS): RA 6715 transgresses Sec. 16, Art. VII by expanding the confirmation powers of CA
w/o const’l basis. Mison &Bautista laid the issue to rest.
 SOLGEN: “Three points as regards subsec. 3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII of the 1935 Consti & in the orig text of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of 1987 Consti as proposed in Resolution No. 517: 1) in both, the appointments of heads of bureaus were
required to be confirmed by CA; 2) in both, the appointments of other officers “whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law to appoint” are expressly made subject to confirmation by CA. However, in the final
version of Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of 1987 Consti, the appointment of heads of
bureaus & other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law & those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint – are excluded from the list of those officers whose appointments are to be confirmed by CA; 3)
Under 1935 Consti, the word “nominate” qualifies the entire Subsec.3 of Sec. 10 of Art VII thereof.
 SOLGEN: If confirmation is required, the 3 stage process of nomination, confirmation & appointment operates.
This is only true of the 1st grp enumerated in Sec. 16, Art. VII but the word nominate does not appear in the 2 nd &
3rd sentences. Therefore, the president’s appointment pursuant to the 2 nd & 3rd sentences need no confirmation.
ISSUE:
1) WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by CA of appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the 1 st sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose
appointments require confirmation by the CA.
RATIO:
 Mison: There are 4 groups of officers whom the Pres shall appoint

1) Heads of exec depts., ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Consti.
2) All other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3) Those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint
4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the Pres alone.
 In the course of the debates on the text of Sec 16, Art VII, there were 2 major changes proposed & approved by
Const’l Commission: 1) exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation
by CA; 2) exclusion of appointments made under the 2nd sentence of the section from the same requirement.
 The 2nd sentence refers to all other officers of the govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
& those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint.
 The NLRC Chairman & Commissioners fall w/n the 2 nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII, more specifically, under the
“third grp” in Mison (I.e. those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint). Thus, they are not among
those mentioned in 1st sentence whose appointments require confirmation by CA.
 To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman &
Members of NLRC, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because:
1) It amends by legislation, the 1 st sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by CA
2) It amends by legislation the 2nd sentence of Sec 16, Art VII by imposing the confirmation of the CA on
appointments w/c are otherwise entrusted only w/ the Pres.
 Legislation cannot expand a const’l provision after the SC has interpreted it.
 Sec 16, Art VII was deliberately intended by the framers to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935
Consti where the CA exercised the power of confirmation over almost all pres’l appointments, leading to many
cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.
 Subsec. 3, Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1935 Consti: “The Pres shall nominate & w/ the consent of the CA, shall appoint the
heads of the exec depts. & bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy & Air Forces from
the rank of captain or commander, & all other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, & those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
 The solution to Congress’ displeasure/disapproval to the deliberate limitation on the CA’s power of confirmation is
a future const’l change w/c may consider either a return to the 1935 const’l provisions or the adoption of a hybrid
system bet’n 1935 & 1987 Consti.
HELD; Petition DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation
of CA of appointments of the Chairman & Members of the NLRC is UNCONSTITUTIONAL & of no legal force & effect.
CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)
F: the petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst.
secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject
of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was violative of
Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by
law or by the pressing functions of his positions.
HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOOCs, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If maximum benefits are to be derived from
a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction
of other govt. offices or employment.
xxx
The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared to the prohibition
applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987 Consti. to
treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Consti. itself. xxx
However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said official's office. The reason is that

these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.
(b) They shall not practice any other profession.

(c) They shall not participate in any business.
(d) They shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted.
In Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546, the SC upheld the power of the President to create military
tribunals authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and
functioning, thus rejecting the "open court" theory. The SC there held: "Martial law creates an exception to the general
rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil
character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process.
The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. xxx
In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2
decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are
entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military govt. and even
on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have
been regularly functioning. The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as
Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning,
military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.
"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure
and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of
evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence
on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and
who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous
efforts to eliminate the danger.
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)
F: Following an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, Pres. Estrada ordered the deployment of the Phil.
Marines to join in visibility patrols around the metropolis. The Pres. invoked his Comm.-in-Chief powers under Sec 18, Art
VII of the Consti. The IBP seeks to nullify the order on consitutional grounds. Does it have standing?
HELD: Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the consti. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law & nothing more,
while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothed it w/ standing. That is too gen’l, an interests that is shared by other
groups & the whole citizenry. IBP’s fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law profession & improve
the admin. of justice cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.
SANLAKAS vs. EXEC SEC (02/03/2004)
Tinga, J.
Facts:
July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny
-Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP &
PNP to supress the rebellion.
-by evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks.
GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003
thru Proc NO. 435.
Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights,
interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society.
Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of

speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their
grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of the
Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there exists no factual basis
for the declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not
require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads because
"overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional
right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law;
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and
functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state of rebellion is a
"superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of
the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution
4. PImentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive
exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion
Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions standing of
petitioners
Issues:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation
3. whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper
Held: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas & PM
have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez "… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which
would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot
claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it

alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime
of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that
Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the Consti, they are still not endowed
with standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in
cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement
lies at the very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A
taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental importance"
regarding constitutional questions in this particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the
Consti on giving the Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of
the state of rebellion.
2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of "actual
controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading
review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also declared a
state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated.
3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to
the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However,
as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the
calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not
expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only
with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the evolution
of executive power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re:
Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so
when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the
powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to
address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State." This, plus
Marcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to
declare a certain status, argue towards the validity of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration
is devoid of any legal significance for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish
or violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, 61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of
a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may
resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded.In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n
quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'" 64 In other words, a person may
be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.The argument that the declaration of a state
of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap
of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally,
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution.The petitions do not cite a
specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or
as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested
on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article
VI.
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210
F: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments
confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of
10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: W/N MONSOD HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR 1O YEARS?
HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.)
The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was
liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they
use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work.
The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have
their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization,
lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved
in management policy formulation.
Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then
worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the
Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-
manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.
ISSUE: W/N THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

CONFIRMING MONSOD'S APPOINTMENT?
HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is
mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no
occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
Adapted.
2. Appointment and term of office of Commissioners; Rule against reappointment
Art. IX, C, Sec. 1. xxx

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Ulep v. Legal Clinic 223 SCRA 378 (1993) (legal ethics digest)
FACTS:
The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the following advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of
law and whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility
RULING:
The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in the case
of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal services in the
Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been permitted
with a limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services
are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefore.
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation
of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04). The Canons of Professional Ethics,
before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements
for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of
concerning the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation.
There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the advertisement of a
lawyer’s services. However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for
which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions.
The respondent’s defense with the case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in
our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides,
even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state.”
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing
the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Umil vs. Ramos
FACTS:
This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by
the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential information” that the authorities received. Except for
one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New
People’s Army.
HELD/RATIO:
The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a
continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information
was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would
be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set
aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made were
bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the
authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state.
People vs. Marti --
Marti and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4)
gift-wrapped packages.
Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in
Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages.
However, before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package
and found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right
against illegal searches and seizure.
Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396).
This case involves Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency (issued on 24 February 2006,
as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I). PP 1017 reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: â€œThe President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,â€ and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [ power
to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
(Phrases in brackets added)
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, as noted in the brackets above.
1. Calling-out power
The validity of this power is already settled in Sanlakas. However, there is a distinction between the Presidentâ€™s
authority to declare a â€œstate of rebellionâ€ (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency.
In declaring a state of national emergency under PP 1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the Stateâ€™s extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as
in Sanlakas.

2. â€œTake Careâ€ Power
PP 1017 states in part: â€œto enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.â€ The first part is valid. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of
the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
However, the President cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos under PP
1081 (declaring martial law). Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes.
PP 1017 is, therefore, unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate â€œdecrees.â€
3. Power to Take Over
PP 1017 authorizes the President to call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, but
also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? According to
the Supreme Court, the answer is simple - during the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to
grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
However, Section 17 must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. When Section 17 speaks of the
â€œStateâ€, it refers to Congress, not the President. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress in accordance
with Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution, the requirements of which are:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the Presidentâ€™s authority to declare â€œa state of national
emergencyâ€ and to exercise emergency powers. The President is authorized to declare a state of national emergency.
However, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances
have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with
public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the
State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]
Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019
against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC
until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around

two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS,
Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio
L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3,
paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a
check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for
the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the
prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him.
It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to
life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-
affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for
the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at
the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an
assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity
was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the
ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence
shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen.
Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot.
Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-
named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases
before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted
petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day
period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the
TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the
prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such
action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them
innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of
acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed
serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be
conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around)
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and
Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted
dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a
scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of
each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A
conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro
were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and
after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way
out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace
"a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It
was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent
with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected
guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are
charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby
avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two
weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said
Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment
was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of
the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and
developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision:
That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its
decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian
powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of
one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or

suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the
cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice
Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would
have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the
integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights
are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been
taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments.
Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with
an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but
serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their
own conscience and honor.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the
supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all
the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the
Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one.
The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But
the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions
are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this
case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant,
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to
enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right
of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do
so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to
do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been
ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave
the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any
country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public
health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It

would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the
law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the
Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has
determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the
past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED
FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Free Exercise Clause

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al (July 9,
2003)
Facts: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that extends
voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is
to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and
manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation
of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and
validly perform for the Muslims.
Issue: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion
Ruling: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim
community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it
violate the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product
as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA
the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue
halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing
laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for
human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of
Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food
products, the perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal
certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval of a food
product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL
AND VOID.

Ebralinag, et al vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (March 1, 1993)
Facts: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach
their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are
"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God”. They
feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing
the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against
official control.
Issue: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled
from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony
which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge
Ruling: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. The
sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and
present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety,
the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's
Witnesses, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of
the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from
the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life
and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a
vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes,
the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand
of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be condusive to love of country or
respect for duly constituted authorities. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they
are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the
duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education
accessible to all. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be
taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by
actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during
the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the
petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a
year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of
their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union.

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise
of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo
that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her
right to freedom of religion.

Ang Mga Kaanib vs. Iglesia (December 12, 2001)
Facts: Respondent Iglesia ng Dios Kay Cristo Jesus, Haligi at Suhay ng Katotohanan (Church of God in Christ Jesus,
the Pillar and Ground of Truth), is a non-stock religious society or corporation registered in 1936. Sometime in 1976, one
Eliseo Soriano and several other members of respondent corporation disassociated themselves from the latter and
succeeded in registering on March 30, 1977 a new non-stock religious society or corporation, named Iglesia ng Dios Kay
Kristo Hesus, Haligi at Saligan ng Katotohanan. Respondent corporation filed with the SEC a petition to compel the
Iglesia ng Dios Kay Kristo Hesus, Haligi at Saligan ng Katotohanan to change its corporate name to another name that is
not similar or identical to any name already used by a corporation, partnership or association registered with the
Commission. Petitioner is compelled to change its corporate name and be barred from using the same or similar name on
the ground that the same causes confusion among their members as well as the public. SEC rendered a decision
ordering petitioner to change its corporate name. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the
decision of the SEC En Banc.
Issue: Whether the court of appeals failed to properly appreciate the scope of the constitutional guarantee on religious
freedom
Ruling: The additional words "Ang Mga Kaanib " and "Sa Bansang Pilipinas, Inc." in petitioner's name are, as correctly
observed by the SEC, merely descriptive of and also referring to the members, or kaanib, of respondent who are likewise
residing in the Philippines. These words can hardly serve as an effective differentiating medium necessary to avoid
confusion or difficulty in distinguishing petitioner from respondent. This is especially so, since both petitioner and
respondent corporations are using the same acronym — H.S.K.; not to mention the fact that both are espousing religious
beliefs and operating in the same place. The fact that there are other non-stock religious societies or corporations using
the names Church of the Living God, Inc., Church of God Jesus Christ the Son of God the Head, Church of God in Christ
& By the Holy Spirit, and other similar names, is of no consequence. It does not authorize the use by petitioner of the
essential and distinguishing feature of respondent's registered and protected corporate name. Ordering petitioner to
change its corporate name is not a violation of its constitutionally guaranteed right to religious freedom. In so doing, the
SEC merely compelled petitioner to abide by one of the SEC guidelines in the approval of partnership and corporate
names, namely its undertaking to manifest its willingness to change its corporate name in the event another person, firm,
or entity has acquired a prior right to the use of the said firm name or one deceptively or confusingly similar to it. The
instant petition for review is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

Cases Atty Arellano-Midterms

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Cases Atty Arellano-Midterms

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Political law-midterm cases

Drilon vs ermita (senate vs ermita) assignment

Estrada v. Disierto, 253 SCRA 452 (2001)

Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549

CALDERON VS. CARALE (April 22, 1992)

sources: from the net and students’ digest 1

sources: from the net and students’ digest 2

CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

sources: from the net and students’ digest 3

(b) They shall not practice any other profession.

IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)

SANLAKAS vs. EXEC SEC (02/03/2004)

sources: from the net and students’ digest 4

claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it

Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

ISSUE: W/N THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

2. Appointment and term of office of Commissioners; Rule against reappointment

Art. IX, C, Sec. 1. xxx

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

Umil vs. Ramos

sources: from the net and students’ digest 8

People vs. Marti --

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396).

sources: from the net and students’ digest 9

3. Power to Take Over

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

sources: from the net and students’ digest 10

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

sources: from the net and students’ digest 12

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

sources: from the net and students’ digest 14

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Free Exercise Clause

sources: from the net and students’ digest 15

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]

sources: from the net and students’ digest 16

FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Art. III, Sec 5) – Free Exercise Clause

sources: from the net and students’ digest 17

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