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1. Albana VS. Castro [G.R. No.

158734 oct 2, 2009]

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts: During the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioners and private
respondents ran for the positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the
Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Panitan, Capiz. On May 18, 2001, the
petitioners were duly elected and proclaimed winners to the following positions:

(a)    Roberto Albaña – Mayor


(b)   Katherine Belo – Vice-Mayor
(c)    Generoso Derramas – Member of the Sang[g]uniang Bayan (SB)
(d)   Vicente Duran – Member of the SB
(e)    Ricardo Araque – Member of the SB
(f)    Lilia Aranas – Member of the SB
(g)   Merlinda Degala – Member of the SB
(h)   Gabriel Aranas – Member of the SB
(i)     Ernesto Bito-on – Member of the SB
(j)     Juvic Deslate – Member of the SB

On June 23, 2001, the private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners with
the COMELEC Law Department, alleging that the latter committed acts of terrorism
punishable by Section 261(e) of the Omnibus Election Code, and engaged in vote-
buying, punishable under Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. The private
respondents prayed that the petitioners be charged of the said crimes and disqualified
from holding office under Section 68 of the said Code, and Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646.

COMELEC En Banc issued, on February 28, 2003, a Resolution directing its Law
Department to file the appropriate Information against the petitioners
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereon (alleging no finding of fact)
COMELEC issued a Resolution denying the said motion for lack of merit

On October 21, 2003, the COMELEC First Division rendered the assailed resolution in
SPA No. 03-006 annulling the petitioners’ proclamation based on the grounds
aforementioned

The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and supplement to the motion for
reconsideration were denied by the COMELEC En Banc in the Resolution of May 5,
2004, declaring that the disqualification case was the result of the findings of the
Commission En Banc.

HENCE this petition for review under Rule 45

Issue: 1. WON the COMELEC ERRED in disqualifying the petitioners (YES) and 2.
WON COMELEC erred in directing its law department to file the appropriate
informations (NO)
Ruling: 1. YES: COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 says: If a complaint is filed with the
COMELEC against a candidate who has already been proclaimed winner, charging an
election offenseUnder Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Rep.
Act Nos. 6646 and 8436, and praying for the disqualification of the said candidate, the
COMELEC shall determine the existence of probable cause for the filing of an
Information against the candidate for the election offense charged. However, if the
COMELEC finds no probable cause, it is mandated to dismiss the complaint for the
disqualification of the candidate.

If the COMELEC finds that there is probable cause, it shall order its Law Department to
file the appropriate Information with the Regional trial court (RTC) which has territorial
jurisdiction over the offense, but shall, nonetheless, order the dismissal of the complaint
for disqualification, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case. If the trial
court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, it shall
order his disqualification pursuant to Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, as
amended by Section 46 of Rep. Act No. 8189

2. NO. The determination by the COMELEC of the existence of probable cause was
based on the affidavits of respondents and their witnesses. In their sworn statements,
they categorically declared that the May 14, 2001 elections in Panitan, Capiz were
tainted with widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism committed before,
during and after the voting. The alleged prohibited acts committed by petitioners and
their supporters such as the distribution of bags of goodies to residents of different
barangays and offering of money to some voters in exchange for their votes, preventing
respondent’s supporters from voting by blocking the road leading to the election
precincts and by harassing them, and the carrying of firearms by petitioner Belo himself
and the members of the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) were supported by
evidence on record that sufficiently established probable cause. And If the COMELEC
finds that there is probable cause, it shall order its Law Department to file the
appropriate Information with the Regional trial court (RTC) which has territorial
jurisdiction over the offense, but shall, nonetheless, order the dismissal of the
complaint for disqualification, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal
case. (COMELEC Resolution No. 2050)

2. Ligaya vs ORDA [G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010]

J: NANCHURA

Facts: On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda (Francis), the son of respondent Domingo Orda,
Jr., was shot to death in Parañaque City. He was then twenty years old and an
engineering student.
A certain Gina Azarcon (Gina) executed her sworn statement that she saw three male
persons perpetrate the crime; two of them, later identified as Rolly Tonion (Rolly) and
Jhunrey Soriano (Jhunrey), shot Francis inside his car. The City Prosecutor of
Parañaque City thus filed an Information for the crime of murder against Rolly and
Jhunrey
Two more witnesses, Ernesto Regala (Ernesto) and his son, Dennis, surfaced. Dennis
testified that before Francis was shot to death, the former went to the office of Ligaya,
who was then a Barangay Chairperson, to deliver collections from the public toilet.
When Dennis failed to return home, Ernesto proceeded to fetch him. They then saw
Ligaya hand a gun to accused Rolly, saying, “Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at walang
bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na naman si Orda.” They learned the following day that,
instead of respondent, it was Francis who was killed.

Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. On June 11, 2002, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Joint Resolution directing the City Prosecutor to
cause the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against the accused, holding that
the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were not credible because of their recantation.
On motion of the prosecution, the RTC, Branch 258, issued an Order dated July 5,
2005, allowing the withdrawal of the Informations against the accused and consequently
recalling the warrants for their arrest

CA nullified the aforesaid Order upon request by respondent said there was grave
abuse of discretion by rtc and was affirmed by the SC. Ligaya filed motion for
reconsideration

Pending the resolution of her motion, Ligaya filed an Urgent Petition for Bail. SC
resolved the Motion for reconsideration of Ligaya by directing RTC, Branch 258 to
make an independent evaluation of the records before allowing the withdrawal of the
Informations against petitioners. RTC 274 (reraffled to them after inhibition of the judge)
issued ordered dismissing the case stating that there was lack of probable cause. CA
reverse and ordered the reraffling of the case again.

Issue: whether the CA erred in finding that there was probable cause against
petitioners.

Ruling: No. A closer scrutiny of the Order of the RTC reveals that the Presiding Judge
allowed the withdrawal of the Informations, consequently dismissed the case against
petitioners, and lifted the warrants for their arrest on the following grounds:

1) the incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina, Ernesto and Dennis because of
their subsequent recantation;

2) the improbability that Dennis and Ernesto saw and heard the conversations of the
accused in view of the counter-evidence submitted by Ligaya, showing the physical set-
up of her residence or building, the kind of door she maintained thereat, and the inner
private room she had

3) the lack or insufficiency of evidence at the level of prosecution for purposes of


determining probable cause
4) the incredibility of the testimonies of Sabino and Jonas because of the absence of
corroborating evidence.

Base on the foregoing the RTC did not err in finding that no probable cause existed to
indict the petitioners for the crime of murder. Neither did it gravely abuse its discretion in
making said conclusion. There was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent
abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of
the Presiding Judge.

On the contrary, he came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for
petitioners to commit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts,
allegations and evidence on record.

Said conclusion was thoroughly explained in detail in the lengthy Order dated
September 30, 2005. THE purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine
probable cause is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from
the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

3. Metropolitan bank and trust company vs Rogelio andrandea [GR: 164538,


August 9, 2010]

J: Del Castillo

Facts: On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa.
It was alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its
Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc.

that respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s credit committee
authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to P200,000.00; that
through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up
capital of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was
able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 against uncleared regional
checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch; that,
consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even before the
seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that Universal’s
withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior
approval of petitioner’s head office; that the uncleared checks were later
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “Account Closed”; and, that
respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with


Universal and claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and
increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt
Settlement Agreement whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former
in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the
same in bi-monthly amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997,
covered by postdated checks, “plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance
and interest and other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001.”

Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution dated
July 10, 1997 found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for
estafa: SAYING: The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant
bank in estoppel to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made
even before the filing of this case, the relations between the parties have changed,
novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of
respondents..

DOJ affirmed. CA affirmed CA reason: (while novation does not extinguish criminal liability,
it may prevent the rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court)

Issue: 1. WON CA correct about its novation explanation? NO 2.WON there was really
probable cause YES

Ruling: 1. Novation not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability for estafa; Criminal
liability for estafa not affected by compromise or novation of contract.
Initially, it is best to emphasize that “novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability. Art 89 RPC

2. close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edad’s Resolution dated July 10, 1997
readily reveals that were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed
probable cause to indict respondents for the crime charged. From her own assessment
of the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioner’s auditor, her preliminary finding is that
“Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established.” Interestingly, she
suddenly changed tack and declared that the agreement altered the relation of the
parties and that novation had set in preventing the incipience of any criminal liability on
respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor
should not have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding
further the error, the DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s petition, ruled out estafa contrary to
the findings of the prosecutor.

In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists
against respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-
Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her belief that respondents are
guilty of the crime complained of.
4. JUANITO CHAN y LIM, a.k.a. ZHANG ZHENTING, vs.SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, PABLO C. FORMARAN III and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-ORGANIZED
CRIME TASK FORCE, represented by PO3 DANILO L. SUMPAY [G.R. No.
147065, March 14, 2008]

NACHURA, J.

Facts: On April 23, 1999, the Chief of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF), then Police Director Panfilo M. Lacson, referred to the State
Prosecutor for appropriate action the evidence collected by the task force during a buy-
bust operation against petitioner Juanito Chan, a Chinese citizen who was a resident of
Binondo, Manila.

The evidence consists of the following items:

EXH "A" – Shabu placed inside a box of HENNESSY V.S.O.P. COGNAC.

EXH "B" – Buy-bust money amounting to six thousand pesos placed inside a yellow
paper bag with markings "HAPPY BIRTHDAY."

EXH "C" – one (1) green Hyundai van with plate number ULK 815 used in transporting
the confiscated SHABU.

In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, PO3 Danilo L. Sumpay, PO3 Rolly S. Ibañez and SPO1
Ronald C. Parreño narrated that, on April 22, 1999, at about 10:30 p.m., their
Confidential Informant (CI) reported to them that a certain Juanito Chan was engaged in
the sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in different parts of Metro Manila,
and that Chan offered him a handsome commission if he would find a buyer of shabu.

According to them, the CI received a phone call from Chan later that evening, and the
two made a deal for the sale of one kilogram of shabu worth P600,000.00 at the parking
space in front of Fuji Mart Inc., along Timog Avenue, Quezon City between 5:30 and
7:30 a.m. the following day. They said that based on this information, a buy-bust
operation was organized by the PAOCTF. Hence, on April 23, 1999, at 6:00 a.m., they
apprehended Chan after he turned over to the poseur-buyer a small box containing one
self-sealing transparent plastic bag of white crystalline substance in exchange for the 12
bundles of boodle money (cut bond paper with a marked P500.00 peso bill on top)
which he received from the poseur-buyer.

Petitioner requested a preliminary investigation and waived his rights under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.

Chan submitted his Counter-Affidavit denying the charges against him. He claimed that
he was the victim of a frame-up and extortion by the police officers who allegedly
demanded P2 million in exchange for his release. He contended that his warrantless
arrest was illegal because he was not committing a crime at that time. He insisted that
the supposed sale of drugs never took place and that the alleged 1 kilo of shabu was
just planted by the arresting officers.

After preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III issued a


Resolution dated June 17, 1999 recommending the filing of an Information against the
petitioner.

In the laboratory findings, it appears that the confiscated item is an illegal drug (shabu).
The undersigned investigating prosecutor finds sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that the crime charged has been committed and that the herein
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should, therefore, be held for trial.

The petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of the Department of Justice.
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero denied the petition for review on the ground
that there was no reversible error in the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable
cause. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling, but this was likewise
denied.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Very Urgent Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the CA, assailing the Resolutions of
the Justice Secretary. The petition prayed, among others, that the appellate court nullify
said Resolutions and direct the withdrawal of the Information.

The CA dismissed the petition. Noting that the RTC had already assumed jurisdiction
over the case, it dismissed the case in accordance with the doctrine laid down in
Crespo v. Mogul that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case rests on the sound discretion of the court. The CA further held that certiorari
will not lie since petitioner may still avail of a motion to quash or dismiss the Information
with the trial court.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. He contends that State
Prosecutor Formaran could not have been objective and impartial in conducting the
preliminary investigation because the latter was a member of the PAOCTF, the agency
that initiated the case against him.

Issue: Whether the preliminary investigation was void for being violative of the
petitioner’s right to due process, which includes the right to be heard by an impartial
authority.

Held: No. The allegation that the State Prosecutor was not impartial in conducting the
preliminary investigation is merely speculative — a bare allegation unworthy of
credence. Such accusation is worthless in light of our finding that there is, indeed,
probable cause against petitioner. Moreover, bias and partiality can never be presumed.
The mere fact that State Prosecutor Formaran was also a member of the PAOCTF is
insignificant.
The now defunct PAOCTF was created to investigate and prosecute all crime
syndicates. It was a convergence and collaboration of the different agencies of the
government, including the Philippine National Police and the DOJ. Unsupported
statements of partiality will not suffice in the absence of contrary evidence that will
overcome the presumption that the State Prosecutor regularly performed his duty.

According to the Supreme Court, the documentary and object evidence submitted to the
State Prosecutor, particularly the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the 935.80 grams of shabu,
and the buy-bust money sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause against
petitioner for the crime charged. After all, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspect. Unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-
bust team were impelled by any improper motive, or were not properly performing their
duties, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.

5. BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR.,  vs SANDIGANBAYAN and


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, [G.R. Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010]

CARPIO, J.:

THE MAIN ISSUE PROVIDED IN THIS CASE TALKS ABOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
BUT THE INVESTIGATION TOPIC WILL DISCUSSED LATER ON IN THE RULING.

Facts: Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of
the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to
27 July 1998.

During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-


RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General
Santos City for development as housing projects.

AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of


the 12 individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject
property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith
caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per
square meter of the property.

Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same
property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per
square meter instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. On
24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration.
The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued
by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South
Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-
affidavit7 against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents.

After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found petitioner probably guilty of


violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.

Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration with a supplemental motion of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Sandiganbayan disposed of
petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.

In a memorandum, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that


petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs
(OMB-OLA), in a memorandum, recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner
participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale,
and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property.

The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The
Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have
should be ventilated in the trial of the case.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.

Held: The petition has no merit.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative


Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an information in the
proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –

a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or


resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice
thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as
the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the
information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing
of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable
cause in the resolution subject of the motion.(Emphasis supplied)

If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause
cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the
arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically
follows the filing of the information.

An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an
accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he
enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.23

Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, 24 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of
1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from
the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court
in which the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus:

Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty
(30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has
appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493,
provides:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493
mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused
appears before the court.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, thus:

Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the


arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.

Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed
no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of
RA 8493.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was already his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. The
Ombudsman has already denied petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration, impugning
for the first time the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Under
Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner
can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet again the same
finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.

We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner’s defenses are evidentiary in nature
and are best threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioner’s claim that the
Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause against
him is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of
the cases against petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the
panel of prosecutors

As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable
cause against petitioner prevails. This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause. The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to
pass upon criminal complaints.

RATIONALE: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant.

6. GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF


JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR.
JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL [G.R. No. 170723, March
3, 2008]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts: Laureano "Larry" Aguirre used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child
caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the Department of
Social Work and Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro Aguirre;
the latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and their four daughters, who
included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came to know Larry, who
was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have Larry spend a few days at their
home and then return him to the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two
years and nine months of age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre
and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal
Guardianship executed in their favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the
Heart of Mary Villa. Aguirre spouses' guardianship of Larry was legalized when the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as joint
co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.

As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that his
developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical growth
did not appear normal in that "at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on his tummy
like a frog, he did not utter his first word until he was three years of age; did not speak in
sentences until his sixth year; and only learned to stand up and walk after he turned five
years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry at the Colegio de San
Agustin, Dasmariñas Village, but the child experienced significant learning difficulties
there. In 1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and
psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation done on Larry revealed the
latter to be suffering from a mild mental deficiency. Consequent thereto, the Aguirre
spouses transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for special
children.

Respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning the intention


to have Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on
the intended patient, respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a
psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate whether or not the former could validly give
his consent to the medical procedure on account of his mental deficiency.
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre's written consent
was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence,
on 31 January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirre's eldest child, instituted a criminal
complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and 262,
both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz,
Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case
since she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person
of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context
of law and medicine. The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not
amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive
organ. Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State
Prosecutor dismissed the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio
dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the
questioned resolution.

Issue: Whether the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City committed grave abuse of discretion in their determining the existence or
absence of probable cause for filing criminal cases for falsification and mutilation under
Articles 172 (2) and 262 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held: Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present case.

No probable cause for falsification and mutilation exists - the Assistant City Prosecutor
deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of the case. He found that there was no
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the crimes complained of as
defined and punished under Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of
falsification of a private document, the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the
circumstances attendant to the case did not amount to the crime complained of, that is,
the lack of consent by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the
latter was not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant facts do not in any
way amount to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to appear in the
assailed report that said consent was obtained. That would have been an untruthful
statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre
has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the same token amount to falsification because said
report does not put forward that such finding arose after an examination of the
concerned patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned that though the
vasectomy rendered Larry unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage
contemplated under the pertinent provision of the penal code.

The court's duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is confined to a determination of


whether the assailed executive determination of probable cause was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law to
grant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of
whether or not there exists probable cause to file an information, the one seeking the
writ must be able to establish that the investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough.
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but has
transcended the same or acted without authority.

It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general policy of non-interference
in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court
cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find
sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or
convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception to this rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial
intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case herein.

7. BIENVENIDO DIÑO & RENATO COMPARATIVO v. PABLO OLIVAREZ [G.R.


No. 170447, December 4, 2009]

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo


Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by
Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city
prosecutor of Parañaque, two Informations were filed before the RTC charging
respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of
Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent filed before the Law Department
of COMELEC an appeal of the Joint Resolution. Respondent argued that the pendency
of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC should prevent the filing of
the Informations before the RTC as there could be no final finding of probable cause
until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. Law Department of the COMELEC
directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and to
suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution dated 20 September 2004 until
final resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC en banc.

Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor,


"Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations." The
Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged respondent with violation of only
paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus
Election Code. Respondent filed an "Opposition to the Admission of the Amended
Informations," arguing among others that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered
to amend the informations, since the COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the
entire records of the case and suspend the hearing of the cases. Judge Madrona issued
an order denying respondent’s Motion to Quash dated 11 October 2004, and admitted
the Amended Informations. Judge Madrona reset the arraignment however, respondent
failed to appear before the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and admitting the
Amended Informations, and ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the
cash bond.

Law Department of the COMELEC filed before the RTC a Manifestation and
Motion wherein it alleged that pursuant to the COMELEC’s powers to investigate and
prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to revoke the delegation of its
authority to the city prosecutor. Pursuant to these powers, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7457. The appellate court granted the appeal declared that the
COMELEC had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of election
offenses and to prosecute the same. As such, the COMELEC may delegate such
authority to the Chief State Prosecutor, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.
The COMELEC, however, has the corresponding power, too, to revoke such authority to
delegate. Thus, the categorical order of the COMELEC to suspend the prosecution of
the case before the RTC effectively deprived the city prosecutor of the authority to
amend the two informations

Issue: whether the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the COMELEC when it
filed the amended information?

Held: Yes. Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their
respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be
revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in
its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution
of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of
the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in
accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in
relation to election cases that such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and
prosecute. Being mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors, acting on behalf of the
COMELEC, must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.

It was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 that revoked the deputation of the City
Prosecutor of Parañaque. However, when the COMELEC Law Department directed the
City Prosecutor of Parañaque to transmit the entire records of the case to the Law
Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, by the fastest means
available and to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc,. The order issued by the
COMELEC Law Department was with the authority of the COMELEC En Banc. In
other words, it was as if the COMELEC En Banc was the one that ordered the
public prosecutor to transmit the entire records and to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until it finally resolves the appeal.

In the case at bench, public respondent city prosecutor clearly exceeded his
authority as a COMELEC-designated prosecutor when he amended the two
informations. Instead of filing a motion to suspend proceedings and hold abeyance the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner and to defer the latter’s arraignment
until after the appeal shall have been resolved, public respondent city prosecutor took it
upon himself to substitute his own judgment or discretion for that of the COMELEC, by
proceeding with the prosecution of the criminal cases. Such act was a clear defiance of
a direct and explicit order of the COMELEC, which was to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until the final resolution of said appeal by
the COMELEC En Banc. Indubitably, there was, on the part of the public respondent
city prosecutor, inordinate, if not indecent, haste in the filing of the amended
informations, thereby depriving petitioner of due process. In fact, it was only on
December 11, 2004 that he forwarded the records, – and these were not even the
original copies, but mere photocopies.

In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold the proceedings in
abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque clearly
exceeded the legal limit of its delegated authority. As a deputy of the COMELEC, the
public prosecutor acted on its own and wantonly defied the COMELEC’s
directives/orders. Thus, the filing of the amended informations and the amended
informations themselves, is declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.

8. LIGAYA SANTOS & ROBERT BUNDA v. DOMINGO I. ORDA, JR. [G.R. No.
189402 , May 6, 2010]

NACHURA, J.:

Facts:Pursuant to a sworn testimony of a witness regarding the shooting incident of


Orda’s son, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City thus filed an Information for the crime
of murder against Rolly and Jhunrey. Two more witnesses surfaced and testified that
they saw Ligaya hand the gun to accused Rolly, saying, "Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at
walang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na naman si Orda." Hence, an amended information
was filed impleading Ligaya and Robert. However, the DOJ issued a Joint Resolution
directing the City Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the Informations for murder
against the accused, because of recantation of the witnesses. On motion of the
prosecution, the RTC allowed the withdrawal of the Informations against the accused
and consequently recalling the warrants for their arrest.

Respondent elevated the matter to the CA, which nullified the aforesaid Order
and declared that RTC, Branch 258, committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
withdrawal of the Informations without making an independent evaluation on the merits
of the case. On final review, this Court affirmed the CA decision in G.R. No. 158236 on
September 1, 2004. Unsatisfied, Ligaya filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court
finally resolved petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, holding that the RTC, Branch
258, must make an independent evaluation of the records before allowing the
withdrawal of the Informations against petitioners. This impelled Ligaya to file before the
RTC, Branch 257, an Urgent Motion to Resolve Anew and on the Merits Previous
Motion to Withdraw Criminal Informations Pursuant to the DOJ Finding on Lack of
Probable Cause. On September 30, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 14 dismissing the
case for murder, ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them for their
crime. Consequently, it lifted the warrants for their arrests and ordered their immediate
release from detention. Upon appeal by the respondent, the CA granted the petition. In
disregarding the evidence presented by the prosecution, the CA declared that, indeed,
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: whether a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the correct remedy in assailing the RTC decision allowing the withdrawal of the
Informations and consequently dismissing the case for lack of probable cause?

Whether or not the the CA erred in finding that there is probable cause in the
case?

Held: No. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC, granting the motion of the
prosecution to withdraw the Informations and ordering the case dismissed, is final
because it disposed of the case and terminated the proceedings therein, leaving nothing
to be done by the court. Thus, the proper remedy is appeal.

Yes. The task of the Presiding Judge when an Information is filed with the court
is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged
in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which
he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction.

Moreover, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of


lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the bounden duty of
the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion.
Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution, but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and
should embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion.

Records show that the RTC, on motion of the prosecution, allowed the
withdrawal of the Informations for murder, holding that the prosecution witnesses’
testimonies were not credible. Pursuant to the Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 158236, the
RTC reviewed anew the records of the case and made an independent evaluation of the
evidence presented to ascertain the existence or non-existence of probable cause to
indict the petitioners. After such evaluation, the court, on September 30, 2005,
dismissed the case for murder against the accused, including petitioners herein,
ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them for their crime. Consequently,
it lifted the warrants for their arrest and ordered their immediate release from detention.
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 28, 2005.

A closer scrutiny of the Order of the RTC reveals that the Presiding Judge
allowed the withdrawal of the Informations, consequently dismissed the case against
petitioners, and lifted the warrants for their arrest on the following grounds: 1) the
incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina, Ernesto and Dennis because of their
subsequent recantation; 2) the improbability that Dennis and Ernesto saw and heard the
conversations of the accused in view of the counter-evidence submitted by Ligaya,
showing the physical set-up of her residence or building, the kind of door she
maintained thereat, and the inner private room she had; 3) the lack or insufficiency of
evidence at the level of prosecution for purposes of determining probable cause; and 4)
the incredibility of the testimonies of Sabino and Jonas because of the absence of
corroborating evidence.

Given the foregoing, we find that the RTC did not err in finding that no probable
cause existed to indict the petitioners for the crime of murder. Neither did it gravely
abuse its discretion in making said conclusion. There was no hint of whimsicality, nor of
gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law on the part of the Presiding Judge. On the contrary, he came to the conclusion that
there was no probable cause for petitioners to commit murder, by applying basic
precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations and evidence on record. Said
conclusion was thoroughly explained in detail in the lengthy Order dated September 30,
2005. We would like to stress that the purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged with
crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
9. HAROLD V. TAMARGO v. ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA &
LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR [G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010]

CORONA, J.:

Facts: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were
shot and killed along Escolta St., Binondo, Manila. a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced
and executed an affidavit where he stated that Lucio Columna told him that Atty.
Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that Columna was one
of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. After a preliminary investigation and based from the
Geron’s affidavit, the investigating prosecutor filed corresponding murder informations
against the accused. Columna was arrested in Cagayan, thereafter, he executed an
affidavit admitting his participation and that of the other accused. Thus, based from the
affidavit, the petitioner filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.

Due to the unsolicited letter stating Columna’s torture, and his affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his
contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. Columna admitted the authorship and
voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied
that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Thus,
the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was
approved by the city prosecutor.

Upon appeal by the petitioner, the DOJ reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of
the Informations for murder, and opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession
was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that there was
enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. Accordingly, the
Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of
Manila, Branch 29. However, Antipordas’ motion for reconsideration was granted, thus,
the order of withdrawal of the Informations. This time, he declared that the extrajudicial
confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that it was not
corroborated by other evidence. As a result, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to
withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied petitioner’s
MR.

The RTC granted the motion to withdraw the Informations. Petitioner filed an MR
but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases were
re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted
the MR of petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She ruled that, based on
Columna’s March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating
prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial and denied the MR of
the Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006. The CA ruled that the RTC judge
gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and
evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in
concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused.
Issue: whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against
respondents.

Held: No. Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against
the respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they
should be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown court case. When, at the
outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an
uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint
should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense
of such useless and expensive litigation. The rule is all the more significant here since
respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to
the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna.

Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to
satisfy herself whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold
respondents for trial as co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a
finding of probable cause against respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the
Informations for murder against them were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

10. HUBERT J. P. WEBB V. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON [G.R. No. 121234,


August 23, 1995]

PUNO, J.:

Facts: Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons,
through a letter-complaint were charged by the NBI with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Thereafter, DOJ formed a panel to conduct a preliminary investigation.
During preliminary investigation the NBI presented sworn statements of their witnesses.
Webb filed a Motion for production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the
NBI to produce. The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted
photocopies of the documents. It alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn
statement of Alfaro. This compelled Webb to file civil case for that purpose and was
latter produce through a subpoena duces tecum. Later, the DOJ Panel finds probable
cause and filed an information against them.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They
criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to
clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

Issues: (1) Whether DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable
cause.

(2) Whether respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them

(3) Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation

Ruling: (1) NO. We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary


investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112 provides that a preliminary investigation should
determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief
that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature . . ."   x x x It ought to be emphasized that in determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather,
he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an
abundance.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,  while probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

(2) NO. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In
arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that
the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that
“upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent
judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing
warrants of arrest against them.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two
(2) sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita
Birrer 35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking
recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied
both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing
so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They justpersonally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the
review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact
that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause
determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.

(3) NO. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their
behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings
during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of
the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this
jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under
preliminary investigation it deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on
Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the
preliminary investigation stage of a criminal proceeding.  41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule
117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and for production
or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution.  42 But these
provisions apply afterthe filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are
accorded to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and
to prepare for trial. 43

This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not,
however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect
his constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too
early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due
process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary
investigation is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold
that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and
property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of
petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with
homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of
preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary
investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial.

11. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), REPRESENTED BY


ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO V. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III [G.R. No. 177780,
January 25, 2012]

Facts: Antonio Tobias opened a savings account in METROBANK. 6 months after, he


applied for a P40M loan in consideration of these METROBANK asked for the
photocopy of the title and other document for its collateral. Thereafter, Antonio availed
of P20M, he paid interest thereon for about a year. Afterward, he defaulted on his
obligation, mortgage was then foreclosed and property was sold to MTEROBANK as it
was lone bidder. When certificate of sale was presented to Register of Deeds, it
appears that the title was in the name of another. Given such findings, METROBANK
requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate.
PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by
Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for
reinvestigation which was granted. In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-
investigation, he averred that he bought the land to certain Leonardo Fajardo, that
verified the veracity of the title, that he was advised by petitioner to have the title
transferred to his name and he executed a deed of absolute sale, and that petitioner
had inspected the title and that he had no intention to defraud petitioner. The City
Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his
being charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Tobias appealed to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) which reversed the prosecutor’s finding and order the
withdrawal of information. On appeal. CA affirmed the decision. It finds no probable
cause against private respondent Tobias. The record speaks well of Tobias’ good faith
and lack of criminal intention and liability. Hence this appeal.

METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient to


establish probable cause to hold Tobias for trial. They further, maintains that what the
Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused, which should
not be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such
lapse.
Issue: Whether contention of METROBANK is tenable.

Ruling: NO. We cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the
information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias showing how he came
to possess the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done
with abuse of discretion, least of all grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of the
CA on the matter, to wit:

It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the moment a person
has in his possession a falsified document and has made use of it, probable cause
orprima facie is already established and that no amount of satisfactory explanation will
prevent the filing of the case in court by the investigating officer, for any such good
explanation or defense can only be threshed out in the trial on the merit. We are not to
be persuaded. To give meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat the very
purpose for which preliminary investigation is required in this jurisdiction.

A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved against


hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is an
inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed, and (b) whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo
vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of discovering the person
or persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home Specialties,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410 [2005]). Prescindingly, under Section 3 of
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondent must be informed of the
accusation against him and shall have the right to examine the evidence against him
and submit his counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far, respondent in a
criminal preliminary investigation is legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.

Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on
Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As
such, it had no one to blame but itself.

12. GEORGE MILLER V. SECRETARY HERNANDO B. PEREZ [G.R. No. 165412,


May 30, 2011]

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Facts: Petitioner George Miller is a British national and an inmate at the Maximum
Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa City. He wrote two
confidential letters addressed to NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio Agalo-os which
contain a report on alleged irrehularities and drug activities of respondent Bernardino
and Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo). On January 6, 1999, at around 2:00 p.m, Miller was
stabbed at back of his head. An investigation was thereafter conducted. In the course of
the investigation, Quirante and Ceballos admitted their participation in the attack on
petitioner. PGIII Lopez recommended that Quirante and Ceballos be charged with
Frustrated Murder and the case be placed under further investigation “pending the
establishment of sufficient evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan
Bernardino and Ace Aprid. Prosecutor Antonio V. Padilla issued his resolution finding
the evidence sufficient to charge Quirante with attempted murder while dismissing the
case against Ceballos for insufficiency of evidence. Therafter, an information attempted
murder was filed against Quirante.

On December 2, 1999 Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo executed new affidavits


which contained a more detail of the incident and pointed to Bernardo and Aprid
allegedly planned the killing of petitioner together with Toledo. Prosecutor Leopoldo
Macinas issued his Memorandum addressed to the City Prosecutor finding probable
cause against Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo in conspiracy with Bernardino, Aprid and
Bernardo, for the crime of attempted murder. Consequently, an Amended Information
was filed with the RTC.

Bernardino filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ)


arguing that there was no sufficient evidence presented to support a claim of
conspiracy, which was based merely on conflicting testimonies or affidavits in a
language foreign to the affiants.  Petitioner filed his opposition, alleging that contrary to
the claim of Bernardino, the Bureau’s investigation was far from complete as the Report
of PGIII Lopez itself stated that the case is recommended for further investigation
“pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo,
Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid”. Public respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez, issued his Resolution finding merit in the petition.   According to
Secretary Perez, the new affidavits of Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo are not credible
considering “the length of time they were executed since the commission of the crime”
and also because said documents cannot be considered newly discovered
evidence.  Motion to Admit Second Amended Information, which dropped the name of
respondent Bernardino as one of the accused, was filed in court. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied under Resolution. On appeal, CA rendered
its Decision sustaining the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the questioned resolutions. Hence this case.

Issue: Whether CA erred in sustaining the ruling of secretary Peres for exclusion of
Bernardino in the information of attempted murder as accused.

Ruling: Yes. In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the


parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.  Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is
evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person.   Only prima
facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and
which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.  Therefore, matters of
evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are more appropriately presented and
heard during the trial. The term “probable cause” does not mean actual and positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty.  It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief.  Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of
the charge. While it is this Court’s general policy not to interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to
determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to substitute their
judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered
without or in excess of authority. Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the
complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal. The CA
thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez for the exclusion of
respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a prima facie case
against him having been established by the evidence on record

13. A. JIMENEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by CESAR CALIMLIM and LAILA


BALOIS - versus - THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, JESUS P. CAMMAYO,
ARTURO SANTOS, MANUEL FACTORA, TEODORO BARROZO, MANUEL ROY,
RONALD MANALILI and JOHN ULASSUS. [G.R. No. 155307, June 6, 2011]

 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Facts:           The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) entered into a
contract for the proposed construction of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center (BGHMC) Building (Phase I) with Royson and Co., Inc. (Royson). The contract
was approved by DPWH and construction ensued. An excavation of sixty meters deep
was made on the area under the control and supervision of the Project Director, Engr.
Arturo M. Santos.  Unfortunately, unusually heavy rains triggered the collapse of a
portion of the slope protection, resulting in a landslide which caused cracks in the
petitioner’s house and prejudiced the structural integrity of the house.  Petitioner
complained against the project before the Office of the Regional Director of the DPWH
Cordillera Administrative Region (DPWH-CAR) and the Office of the City Mayor, which
directed the Office of the City Engineer of Baguio City to conduct an investigation.
DPWH-CAR engineers submitted a Memorandum to the DPWH Regional Director
which stated, among others that “[t]he affected part of the lot (driveway) claimed by the
complainant is actually part of the BGH property as shown on the attached lot plan. ”
Royson subsequently proceeded to build reinforced concrete slope protection, a
grouted riprap, and a retaining wall for the compound.  Upon substantial completion of
the same, the retaining wall of the BGHMC Project collapsed. Petitioner filed an
Affidavit-Complaint against all respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman and
averred that the damage to its property was due to respondents’ gross negligence,
incompetence and/or malicious conduct because they failed to construct a perimeter
fence in the excavations made for the expansion of the BGHMC despite the fact that
petitioner had written Royson about the possibility of an erosion happening.   Jesus P.
Cammayo, then Assistant Secretary of the DPWH: He had no participation whatsoever in
the preparation, execution and approval of the contract and the project plans.   The
BGHMC Project was a locally funded special project classified under Special Buildings,
and as such, it was directly supervised by the Project Management Office for Special. He
added that despite the fact that original plans does not include provision for construction
of reinforced slope protection hence no obligation to construct such; he did all he could
do to prevent damage to petitioner’s property. His subordinates reported that the workers
discovered a previously undetected pre-war tunnel which collapsed due to the heavy
rains.  This totally unforeseen and unfortunate event caused the slope protection to
collapse and cause another landslide.            

Ombudsman dismissed the complaint after finding no probable cause to hold any of the
respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and noted that the damage
was not within petitioner’s property but on a portion of BGHMC’s property which petitioner
merely encroached. The Ombudsman denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed the instant petition and contended that the Ombudsman acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolution and
order.  

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint against all the respondents.

Ruling: No. It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause against those in
public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and
prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.  It has the discretion to determine
whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not.    As explained in Esquivel v. Ombudsman:

          The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists


reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts.  Settled is the rule
that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.  Said exercise of powers is
based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in
its exercise.  The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable
petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each
time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.

The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the latter exercises such powers
either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman, except when there is grave
abuse of discretion.  Indeed, the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause may
only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion defined as such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.  For there to be a
finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation
of law.

14. Saturnino C. Ocampo –versus- Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al. [G.R. No.
176830, 11 February 2014]

SERENO, CJ.:

Facts: Elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass
grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte. Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal
remains believed to be victims of Operation VD. 12 complaint-affidavits were filed from
relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD. On the basis of the 12 letters and their
attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners
to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses The Information was filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, presided by Judge Abando.
Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty. In this petition,
petitioners averred that were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits and right to
due process because (1) they did not receive a copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence; (2) Supplemental Affidavit was not furnished; (3) the prosecutor
deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution.
Issue: Whether Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation
and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest?

Ruling: No. A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect


the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.  While the
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional,
it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal
justice.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer
shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a
crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise,
the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit


evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity
to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side
of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known
address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed.
As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an
opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a
respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on
the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process.
It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.

15. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION -versus- OUDINE SANTOS


[G.R. No. 195542, March 19, 2014]

PEREZ, J.:

Facts: Lorenzo and Sy charged Santos, apart from being PIPC Corporation’s employee
Apart from being PIPC Corporation’s employee. Facilitating Lorenzo’s and Sy’s
investment with PIPC Corporation, Santos represented to the two that investing with
PIPC Corporation, an affiliate of PIPC–BVI, would be safe and full–proof.

Respondent Santos filed a petition for review before the Office of the Secretary of the
DOJ and assailed the Resolutions on the ground that she was a mere clerical
employee/information provider who never solicited nor recruited investors, in particular
complainants Sy and Lorenzo, for PIPC Corporation or PIPC–BVI.  Santos also claimed
dearth of evidence indicating she was a salesman/agent or an associated person of a
broker or dealer, as defined under the Securities Regulation Code. The court excluded
respondent Oudine Santos from the Information. Court of Appeals affirmed the same.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari raising the sole error of Santos’ exclusion from the
Information for violation of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code.

Issue: Whether its proper to exclude Santos from the information?

Ruling: No. Generally, at the preliminary investigation proper, the investigating


prosecutor, and ultimately, the Secretary of the DOJ, is afforded wide latitude of
discretion in the exercise of its power to determine probable cause to warrant criminal
prosecution.  The determination of probable cause is an executive function where the
prosecutor determines merely that a crime has been committed and that the accused
has committed the same. The rules do not require that a prosecutor has moral certainty
of the guilt of a person simply for preliminary investigation purposes.

However, the authority of the prosecutor and the DOJ is not absolute; it cannot be
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.  Where the findings of the investigating prosecutor
or the Secretary of the DOJ as to the existence of probable cause are equivalent to a
gross misapprehension of facts, certiorari will lie to correct these errors.

While it is our policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, we


have, on more than one occasion, adhered to some exceptions to the general rule.

When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the


accused;
1. when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
2. when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
3. when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
4. where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
5. when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
6. where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
7. where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
8. where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
9. when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.
Solicitation is the act of seeking or asking for business or information; it is not a
commitment to an agreement.

The transaction initiated by Santos with Sy and Lorenzo, respectively, is an investment


contract or participation in a profit sharing agreement that falls within the definition of the
law. When the investor is relatively uninformed and turns over his money to others,
essentially depending upon their representations and their honesty and skill in
managing it, the transaction generally is considered to be an investment contract. The
touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others.

At bottom, the exculpation of Santos cannot be preliminarily established simply by


asserting that she did not sign the investment contracts, as the facts alleged in this case
constitute fraud perpetrated on the public.  Specially so because the absence of Santos’
signature in the contract is, likewise, indicative of a scheme to circumvent and evade
liability should the pyramid fall apart.

Lastly, this court is dealing herein with the preliminary investigation aspect of
this case.  The court do not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack thereof.
Santos’ defense of being a mere employee or simply an information provider is
best raised and threshed out during trial of the case.

16. Ruth
17. Ruth
18. Ruth
19. PO VS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE [G.R. No. 195198, February 11, 2013]

Reyes, J:

Facts: A complaint against Chiu and Po for violation of Section 74(2),3 in relation
toSection 1444 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, the origin of the two
consolidated petitions now before the court.

On October 16, 2008, Assistant City Prosecutor Anna Lou B. Fernandez-Cavada


(Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavada) issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict
Chiu and Po based on the following grounds: The records of all business transactions of
the corporation and the minutes of any meetings shall be open to inspection by any
director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on
business days and he may demand, writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or
minutes, at his expense.

Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall refuse to allow any director, trustees,
stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from its
records or minutes, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, shall be liable to
such director, trustee, stockholder or member for damages, and in addition, shall be
guilty of an offense which shall be punishable under Section 144 of this Code.

A petition for review was filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). On March 2,
2010, then Undersecretary Ricardo R. Blancaflor issued a resolution reversing
Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavada’s findings. On April 30, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary
Alberto C. Agra issued a Resolution granting Tan’s motion for reconsideration.
Secretary Agra reversed the Resolution dated March 2, 2010 and instead affirmed
Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavada’s earlier disquisition. Chiu and Po’s motions for
reconsideration were denied by Secretary Agra.

Issue: Whether or Not DOJ erred in reversing the resolution of undersecretary and
upholding the prosecutor’s finding that there is a probable cause of violation of sec 144
of Corporation code committed by Po and Chiu?

Ruling: No. The purpose of determining probable cause is to ascertain that the person
accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not[,] a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect.

Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

Finally, it is once more appropriate to apply the Supreme Court’s general policy of non-
interference with the prosecutor’s discretion to file or not to file a criminal case. x x x
The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the
initial decision to prosecute him. The possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive which is
not the case herein.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive
Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that
the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.

The purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the the prosecutor is bound to
determine merely the existence of probable cause that a crime has been committed and
that the accused has committed the same. The rules do not require that a prosecutor
has moral certainty of the guilt of a person for the latter to be indicted for an offense
after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Further, we have repeatedly ruled that
the determination of probable cause, for purposes of preliminary investigation, is an
executive function. Such determination should be free from the court’s interference save
only in exceptional cases where the DOJ gravely abuses its discretion in the issuance of
its orders or resolutions.

20. Richie

21. CALLO CLARIDAD VS ESTEBAN [ G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013]

BERSAMIN, J.

Facts: At around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the
village, noticed that the side of the Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks,
which prompted him to move towards the parked cars. He inspected the then empty
vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He checked the cars and
discovered that the rear and side of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999 were smeared
with blood. He saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was
then that he found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel
cars. The body was naked from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the
chest, and with only the socks on. SG Sarmiento called for back-up. SG Rene Fabe
immediately barricaded the crime scene. Eyewitness saw Chase is with his friend Philip
before while on the Honda civic car hours before he was stabbed.
According to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Report No N-07-
163, the victim sustained two stab wounds, to wit: one on the left side of the lower chest
wall with a depth of 9 cm., which fractured the 4th rib and pierced the heart, and the
other on the middle third of the forearm.

Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint in its
resolution. OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial
evidence sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder; that the
circumstantial evidence could not link Philip to the crime; that several possibilities would
discount Philip’s presence at the time of the crime, including the possibility that there
were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of Chase; that Philip was not shown to
have any motive to kill Chase; that their common friends attested that the two had no ill-
feelings towards each other.

On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Due to lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient circumstantial evidence, and
the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the witnesses resulted in the lack of
probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged.
Petitioner assigned errors of the secretary via petition for review to the court of appeal
(Rule 43 of ROC). CA promulgated its assailed decision, dismissing the petition for
review, due toi lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or Not CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the
Secretary of Justice finding that there was no probable cause to charge Philip and
Teodora with murder for the killing of Chase?

Ruling: NO. Sc denies the petition for review and sustains CA’s findings. . The filing of
a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justice’s resolution on the
determination of probable cause was an improper remedy. Indeed, the CA had no
appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Secretary of Justice.

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the
decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies,
particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. , the Secretary of Justice was not an
officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of
Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an
essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the
respondents were guilty thereof.
The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause
only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of
Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such
intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference
to the doctrine of separation of powers.

22. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor,
National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE,

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of


Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then
the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest
proceedings were conducted against petitioner at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport
Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known
as the Maguindanao massacre. Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a
Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. DOJ resolved to
file the corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue
subpoenas to several persons. 25 informations for murder were also filed against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. Secretary
of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the
transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. The Court granted the request for the transfer of venue.
However, prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the Prosecution
filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional information for murder against
petitioner in Cotabato City RTC. Later on, additional information for murder were filed
against petitioner in the RTC in Quezon City the new venue of the trial pursuant to the
resolution of the Court. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for
murder when he was arraigned.

Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to


the Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution the Panel of
Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. Petitioner,
through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated
the request twice. Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request. Petitioner brought a
petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila, seeking to compel respondents to charge
Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC
RTC. Respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for
mandamus. Petitioner opposed. RTC of Manila issued the assailed order dismissing the
petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge


Dalandag, as an accused for multiple murder despite his admission to the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ.

Ruling: No. The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the
amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of
appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court.

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of
Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.

His exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in
excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint
or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions,
one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state
witness.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is
directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving
the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to
compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it
cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised,
or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
judgment or discretion.

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request


of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny
such letter-request.

23. De Los Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd.
(HS Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was
introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Subic
Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized representative of Active
Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI.
Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided to invest in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure Marine
Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at the Subic Bay Freeport
Zone which, when operational, would showcase live performances of false-killer whales
and sea lions. In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI
had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be
used in Ocean Adventure, and also guaranteed substantial returns on investment.
Desmond even presented a Business Plan. While no Certificate of Stock was issued
either to HS Equities or to Dio, HS Equities was expressly granted minority protection
rights in a subsequent Subscription and Shareholders Agreement stating that there shall
be “a nominee of the Subscriber to be elected as Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer, who
may not be removed by the Board of Directors without the affirmative vote of the
Subscriber.” Dio was appointed as its Treasurer. The parties later executed two (2)
Investor’s Convertible Promissory Notes. Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested
in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach, which involved the
development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed
that the said investment would be used to settle SBMEI’s loan obligation to First Metro
Investment Corporation and for the construction of 48 lodging units/cabanas. However,
when the corresponding subscription agreement was presented to Dio by SBMEI for
approval, it contained a clause stating that the “funds in the Subscription Bank Account”
were also to be used for the funding of Ocean Adventure’s Negative Cash Flow This
was in conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent of Westdale’s investment in Miracle
Beach and as such, Dio refused to sign the subscription agreement.

Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond’s
representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that
in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses which prompted her to call for an audit
investigation. Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent,
Desmond made certain disbursements from Westdale’s special account, meant only for
Miracle Beach expenditures (special account), and diverted therein for the operating
expenses of Ocean Adventure.21 When Desmond refused to execute an undertaking to
return the diverted funds, Dio, in her capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI, suspended the
release of the remaining funds in the aforesaid special account. Eventually, after Dio
was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed 2 criminal complaints, for
Estafa (a) through false pretenses and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
through misappropriation or conversion both against Desmond before the Olongapo
City Prosecutor’s Office. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against Desmond. The RTC ruled in favour of
Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against
him since the elements of estafa were not all present. The CA upheld the RTC’s
authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable cause for
issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish
probable cause.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC when it dismissed the subject information for lack of probable cause.

Ruling: Yes. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he
is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of
filing a criminal information in court. The second is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the
judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant.

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with
his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a
warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the
prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable
cause.

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was
not observed.

24. Mangila vs. Pangilinan [701 SCRA 355, GR No. 160739, July 17, 2013]

Bersamin, J.:

Facts: Seven criminal complaints were filed against petitioner Anita Mangila and four
others for syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the RPC, in relation to PD 1689
and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 for recruiting and promising
of employment by the petitioner to the private complainants as overseas contract
workers in Toronto, Canada and from collection of visa processing fees, membership
fees and on-line application fees from private complainant without lawful authority from
POEA.

Judge Heriberto Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC conducted a preliminary


investigation on the complaints. After examining one of the complainants, Judge
Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On
the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest were
transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and
appropriate actions in accordance with the prevailing rules.

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested and detained at the headquarters of the NBI.
Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release
from detention. She claimed that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet
completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of
arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause.

CA denied the petition for its lack of merit. Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the
denial of her petition but the CA denied the motion. Hence, this appeal via petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether Judge Mangila has the authority to issue warrant of arrest during the
preliminary investigation?

Ruling: Yes. Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary
investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in
writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against
Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for
habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant
issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the
legal authority to do so.

25. Hasegawa vs. Giron [703 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013] 

Perez, J.:

Facts: Respondent filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal


Detention against petitioner and several John Does alleging that she and her
officemate, Leonarda Marcos filed a complaint against their employer Pacific
Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates, Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo and
petitioner for illegal salary deductions, non-payment of 13 th month pay, and non-
remittance of SSS contributions. They averred that since the filing of said complaint,
they have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse by petitioner to pressure them to
withdraw the complaint. Respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave
threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust vexation against petitioner. Said cases are
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.

Petitioner, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied the accusation of kidnapping and serious


illegal detention against him. Petitioner categorically stated that he had nothing to do
with the kidnapping; that he was neither the “brains” nor a “participant” in the alleged
crimes; that he did not know the alleged kidnappers; and, that he was not present inside
one of the vehicles talking with one of the abductors at the place alleged by Marcos.

In a Resolution dated 5 January 2007, Senior State Prosecutor Emilie Fe M. De Los


Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
Respondent filed an appeal from the Resolution of the prosecutor dismissing her
complaint. In her Petition for Review before the DOJ, respondent claimed that the
Investigating Prosecutor gravely erred when she recommended the dismissal of the
case against petitioner despite overwhelming evidence showing the existence of
probable cause. She thus prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor.

Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor, then Secretary
of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the petition. Her motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the DOJ, she filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed and set aside the
Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing of an Information for Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner.

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in reversing the findings of the Secretary of Justice that no
probable cause exist in the case

Ruling: No. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the
accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere
with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the
corresponding information against an offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute
their own judgment for that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of
whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a
public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he
finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In
sum, the prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to
review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave
abuse of discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here present. We sustain
the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ.

The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her
findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged
crime was committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed
upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in
according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built
pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the
preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of
prosecution's evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a party’s
defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. By taking into
consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the Investigating Prosecutor already
went into the strict merits of the case.

26. ROSALINDA PUNZALAN AND RAINIER PUNZALAN VS. JUDGE RUBEN R.


PLATA [A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1301, DECEMBER 18, 2001]

PUNO, J.:

Facts: An information for attempted homicide allegedly committed against Rainier


Punzalan, was filed against Michael Plata. The accused therein, twenty-year old
Michael Plata, is the son of respondent Judge Plata. Michael Plata appealed to the
Chief State Prosecutor the resolution in I.S. No. 97-10732 upon which the information in
Criminal Case No. 66879 was based. The Chief State Prosecutor set aside the said
resolution upon finding that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
conflicting, and more importantly, that Dencio dela Peña voluntarily, spontaneously, and
knowingly admitted that it was he who accidentally shot Rainier Punzalan. The Chief
State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong to cause the withdrawal
of the information for attempted homicide against Michael Plata.

After the information against Michael Plata was filed and while it was not yet withdrawn,
numerous cases were filed by respondent's wife Rosario, his son Michael and his driver
Robert Cagara, the Platas' house boarder Dencio dela Peña and Rolando Curampes,
against herein complainant Rosalinda, her sons Rainier and Randall, and the latter's
friends who were eyewitnesses to the shooting incident.

Precioso R. Perlas and Ma. Teresa C. Manansala, on behalf of complainants Rosalinda


B. Punzalan and Rainier B. Punzalan, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) a Sworn Complaint against respondent judge for grave misconduct, lack of moral
character and oppressive conduct unbecoming a judge.

Respondent judge denies having exerted influence over the Mandaluyong City
prosecutors who filed the set of cases without preliminary investigations as he claims
that he does not even know them. He stressed that he had no participation in the filing
of all the cases cited by complainants, except for I.S. No. 97-11766, the robbery charge
filed by his son where he (Judge Plata) had to file a Supplemental Affidavit as he was
the registered owner of the vehicle subject of the robbery

They settled on a compromise agreement. But the Complainants moved for the revival
of the administrative action against the Judge because of his unbecoming of his position
and his grave abuse of discretion.

"Respondent bound himself to pay the sum of P180,000.00 payable in four (4) monthly
installments in consideration for the withdrawal of the criminal case for attempted
homicide and herein administrative case but he reneged on said promise. Adding insult
to injury, respondent merely rationalized that he was financially hard-up and claimed
that herein complainant was only after monetary compensation and not really (sic) to
exact judicial relief. Respondent judge's explanation of financial difficulties cannot be
countenanced. Compromise agreement entails reciprocal concessions, non-
compliance of (sic) which raises doubt as to respondent's sincerity and honest desire to
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced."

Issue: Whether or not the preliminary investigations can be terminated by reasons of


compromise agreements?

Ruling: Yes. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court pertaining to the disbarment
and discipline of lawyers provides, viz:

"No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,


settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same."

27. DISINI VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. 169823-24; 174764-


65, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013]

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under
Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No.
28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002). In this 2
actions it alleged his confederations with the late President Marcos and His family.
Gaining wealth in conspiracy with the Marcoses. ‘

Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished
by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The
Prosecution opposed the motion to quash. Disini voluntarily submitted himself for
arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for
permission to travel abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motions.

Hence, the petitioner filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court for the lack of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for this case.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction?


Ruling: Yes.

(PRELIMINARY INVERSTIGATION): Whether or not PCGG can conduct PI?

RULING: No.

Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) filed this cases.

Through its letter dated April 8, 1991, the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:

Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are
constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the
suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation.

x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil
complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or
criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed
with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against
petitioner’s properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-
gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds.
Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary
investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge,"
as it has prejudged the matter. x x x

xxxx

The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire
belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the
aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the
said preliminary investigation with an even hand.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the
PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of
the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent
constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such
preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.

It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of
the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG,
were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Desierto, with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file
the informations that became the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case
No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.

It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in
the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of
Disini the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its
finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of
Civil Case No. 0013.

28. Q
29. Q

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