GUINANOY, Jesse D.

1. Basis of criminal law:

G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
FACTS:
Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben
lived happily but soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become
violent. Ben, a habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he would provoke her, slap her, pin her
down on the bed or beat her. These incidents happened several times and Marivic would often
run home to her parents. She had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile.
On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then eight months pregnant, and the victim
quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she was able to run to another room. Allegedly there
was no provocation on her part when she got home that night, and it was her husband who
began the provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely, appellant admitted having killed the victim, who was then
sleeping at the time, with the use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts
opined that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman syndrome and at the time she killed her
husband, her mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the
imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as constituting
self-defense;
2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
DECISION:
No, the Court ruled in the negative on both issues.
1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising
from the battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner; (b) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life; and (c) at
the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and
actual – grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense.
Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly established. Here, there
was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon
him. In fact, she had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children’s bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the reality or even imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. Ben was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.
2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been
consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. Here, there is no
showing that appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. It appears that
the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided
to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously
and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her favor.
2. Application of the provisions of the RPC, Article 2
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of
grave oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After
fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody
of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol"
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB In the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After
the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nê
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner is immune to suit
DECISION:
Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered
by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the
DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges. The
immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done
in "official capacity."
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.3
The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of
his authority or jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 163267 May 5, 2010
TEOFILO EVANGELISTA, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 when he was found in possession
of 1. One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine; 2. One (1)
Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2) magazines; 3. Nineteen
(19) 9mm bullets without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City on January 30, 1996.
After posting his bail, petitioner filed on February 14, 1996 an Urgent Motion for (a) Suspension
of Proceedings and (b) the Holding of A Preliminary Investigation.7 The RTC granted the motion
and, accordingly, the State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation.
During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos) that
he bought the subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by the Dubai authorities,
which turned over the same to a PAL personnel in Dubai. Upon inquiry, the Firearms and
Explosive Office (FEO) in Camp Crame certified that petitioner is neither registered with said
office nor licensed holder of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions. Bustos likewise verified from
the Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no record to show that the firearms were legally
purchased.
The RTC rendered a decision stating the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions. The petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial which was
granted. The petitioner denied ownership of the said firearms stating that he was forced to claim
ownership of the firearms but the RTC rendered the same decision with modified penalty of
imprisonment. CA affirmed the findings of the trial court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner was in possession of firearms and ammunition when he arrived in the
Philippines
DECISION:
Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the
Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival
at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in
the Philippines.
n the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the Court has
reiterated the essential elements in People v. Eling to wit: (1) the existence of subject firearm;
and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the
corresponding license for it.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime.
The existence of the subject firearms and the ammunition were established through the
testimony of Acierto. Their existence was likewise admitted by petitioner when he entered into
stipulation and through his subsequent judicial admission. Concerning petitioner’s lack of
authority to possess the firearms, SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. testified that upon verification, it was
ascertained that the name of petitioner does not appear in the list of registered firearm holders
or a registered owner thereof. As proof, he submitted a certification to that effect and identified
the same in court. The testimony of SPO4 Bondoc, Jr. or the certification from the FEO would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element.
3. Equipoise rule
G.R. No. 181494 March 17, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MONALYN CERVANTES y SOLAR,
Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant and three others were charged with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425
(selling or distributing a regulated drug). April 5, 2000, in the City of Manila, accused ISIDRO
ARGUSON y ARENDELA, @ Tisoy, MONALYN [CERVANTES] y SOLAR @ Mona, WILSON
DEL MONTE @ Wilson and RICHARD REQUIZ @ Richard, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, for the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, sell,
deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer, FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE POINT
SEVENTY SIX (473.76) GRAMS OF METHAMPHETAMINE [HYDROCHLORIDE], commonly
known as shabu.
A team led by SPO2 Geronimo Pastrana, PO3 Ramos, and PO2 Emerson Balosbalos arranged
a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Arguson’s rest house in Barangay Lambingan, Tanza,
Cavite.2 Upon arriving at the rest house, PO3 Ramos and PO2 Balosbalos, acting as poseur-
buyers, were introduced by the DPA to Arguson as the buyers of PhP 500,000 worth of shabu.
At about three o’clock in the afternoon of that day, in front of the McDonald’s branch in P.
Ocampo St., Pasay City,3 Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for someone who will
come out from the nearby Estrella St. Very much later, accused-appellant emerged from
Estrella St. and approached PO3 Ramos to check if he still had the money. After being shown
the money bundle, accused-appellant left, only to return a few minutes later this time with
Arguson, Wilson Del Monte, who was holding a black plastic bag, and Richard Requiz. Arguson
then took from Del Monte the bag, later found to contain 473.76 grams of shabu packed in six
small self-sealing transparent bags, and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos, who in turn gave him the
bundle of boodle money. Finally, PO3 Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal to indicate the
consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. Accused-appellant and
her scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente
Lim.
Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house, her youngest child
asked her to go to [McDonald’s], Vito Cruz branch, to buy ice cream. At about 4:30 in the
afternoon, there was a commotion going on in front of the restaurant. She then saw a woman
who alighted from a nearby van and pointed her out to her companions, one of whom [was] an
old man boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child. Thereafter, two (2)
younger male persons, whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ, were also
boarded into the same van. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came and
took them to Camp Vicente Lim, where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time.
On the other hand, accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around Vito Cruz
and that on the day in question, while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonald’s], Vito Cruz
branch, a commotion happened near his post. As he moved backward from where he stood, he
was suddenly approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle
together with CERVANTES and REQUIZ, whom he did not know prior to that incident.
For his part, accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question, he was riding a
borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center, passing by F.B. Harrison St., when he
bumped a parked van, wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him, saying "pulis ako wag kang
aalis dyan[!] " The man left and when he returned, accused CERVANTES was with him.
Thereafter, he was boarded into the van together with the other accused.
On April 23, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding
accused-appellant guilty as charged and meting upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua. July
19, 2007 the CA, finding the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs12 to
have sufficiently been satisfied and the identification of accused-appellant having been
established, affirmed her conviction.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Cervantes is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating guilty of violating Sec.
15, Art. III of RA 6425
DECISION:
To paraphrase an unyielding rule, if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more
explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other
consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.
But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a reversal of the appealed
decision is indicated on another but more compelling ground. We refer to the postulate that the
prosecution, having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized
regulated substance, is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-
appellant’s guilt.
Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP
personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. To a point, the reliance on the presumptive regularity is
tenable. This presumption is, however, disputable and may be overturned by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; any taint of irregularity vitiates the
performance and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the buy bust team
committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its
operation, the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. The Court need not
belabor this matter anew.
G.R. No. 172500 September 21, 2007
LILIBETH ARICHETA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Said accused being then the owner of a parcel of land located at Bo. Bagumbong, Novaliches,
Kalookan City which she acquired from NHA, defraud MARGARITA VASQUEZ, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused well knowing that she had already sold the said lot to a third
party, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sold the same lot to MARGARITA VASQUEZ.
Petitioner denied personally knowing the private complainant. She insisted that she did not sell
the house and lot to private complainant but merely mortgaged it to her. She narrated that she
first mortgaged the property to Margarita Galang who occupied the property with the condition
that she would vacate the same when the money she loaned is returned.
The RTC convicted accused-petitioner of Estafa. Accused-petitioner appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated 26 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modifications the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa
DECISION:
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. The
elements of Estafa by means of deceit as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows: (1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
(2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party must have
relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part
with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
As above explained, the alleged false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to
private complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private
complainant. To prove such allegation, the prosecution should first establish that the property
was previously sold to a third party before it was sold to private complainant. The prosecution
utterly failed to do this. The fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of
proof.
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while the other may be compatible
with the finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty required for conviction.
In the present case, the prosecution, which has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt
all the essential elements of the felony, failed to discharge this burden. It failed to establish, as
alleged in the information, the false representation or false pretense that petitioner supposedly
committed; that is, the property in question was previously sold to another person before it was
sold to private complainant. With this failure, the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioner
prevails and we are thus constrained to render an acquittal.
4. Ex post facto
G.R. No. 128508 February 1, 1999
DANIEL G. FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO P.
PEDRONIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo
City; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and STATION COMMANDER OF ILOILO CITY,
respondent.
FACTS:
On May 26, 1988, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City, convicted petitioner of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. By decision
promulgated on February 27, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On August 20,
1990, the Supreme Court denied a petition for review on certiorari of the conviction.
Upon the remand of the record to the lower court, on June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for
probation contending that he was eligible for probation because at the time he committed the
offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for
probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had
interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not applicable to him.
On January 5, 1996, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for probation. On July 29, 1996,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul the lower court's denial
of his application for probation. On November 12, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied due course
to the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner could qualify to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968
since he had appealed from his conviction in 1988, after Presidential Decree No. 1990
amending Presidential Decree No. 968, became effective in 1986
DECISION:
The contention is without merit. At that time, President Marcos was vested with legislative
powers concurrently with the Batasan Pambansa.
PD No. 1990 is not ex post facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted
after its effectivity. An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was
innocent at the time of its commission. Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law
that it amends, is not penal in character. It may not be considered as an ex post facto law.
At the time of the commission of the offense charged—violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22—
in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation.
However, petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner
no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal.
G.R. No. 177961 April 7, 2009
LOURDES A. SABLE, Petitioner, Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.
ENRIQUETA LOQUILLANO-BELARMINO, Presiding Judge, Branch 57, RTC, Cebu City,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with Concepcion Abangan (Concepcion), Ildefonsa Anoba (Ildefonsa) and
Valentine Abellanosa (Valentine), is accused of Falsification of Public Documents under Article
172(1) in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner and co-accused Ildefonsa are the grand-daughters of Eleuteria Abangan, who is one
of the registered owners of Lot No. 3608, which is registered under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. RO-2740 in the names of Andrea Abangan, Fabian Abangan, Sergio Abangan,
Antonino Abangan, Perfecta Abangan and Eleuteria Abangan. Private complainant Gaspar
Abangan (Gaspar) is the grandson of Lamberto Abangan, who is a brother of the registered
owners of the lot. Petitioner, together with her co-accused Ildefonsa, allegedly falsified an
Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Partition Agreement, as the
signatures contained therein were not the signatures of the true owners of the land. Petitioner
and Ildefonsa also allegedly caused it to appear that a certain Remedios Abangan, who was
already dead, signed the document.
On 28 November 2000, the RTC convicted petitioner of the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, but
acquitted Ildefonsa. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 of said RTC
Decision on 20 January 2001. The same was denied by respondent Judge Enriqueta
Loquillano-Belarmino in an Order dated 20 November 2003. On 25 August 2003, petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the 22 July 2003 Order and intimated her desire to apply for
probation instead of appealing the judgment of conviction. RTC denied the motion.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not accused is allowed for probation
DECISION:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability
and save the state the time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal.
In the present petition before Us, petitioner filed the application for probation on 25 August
2003, almost eight months from the time the assailed judgment of the RTC became final.
Clearly, the application for probation was filed out of time pursuant to Rule 122, Sec. 6 of the
Rules of Court, which states that an “appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from.
Furthermore, the application for probation must necessarily fail, because before the application
was instituted, petitioner already filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC on 17 June 2003. The
Probation Law is patently clear that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.”
5. Prospectivity/Retroactivity
G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation
Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch order from the desk officer. The
order directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest issued by Judge
Ignacio Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with
ransom. The team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in
Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about
to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put him under
arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his
waist was a Charter Arms. A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives
Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866
On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner moved to
reconsider but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998. He appealed to the CA. On May 4,
2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating PD no. 1866
DECISION:
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that
the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.
The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony
of SPO2 Disuanco. Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm. Its existence was
likewise admitted by no less than petitioner himself. As for petitioner’s lack of authority to
possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38
bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed
that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. As proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by
Roque, the chief records officer of the same office.
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense
on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the
pendency of the case with the trial court. As a general rule, penal laws should not have
retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to
this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief
Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on the very principles on
which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and
regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on
principles of strict justice.”Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No.
8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is
lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-
Appellant.
FACTS:
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court appellant was
accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening more or less,
at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being
only five years old.
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, the defense admitted
the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born
on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate,
upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a
5-year old girl, the trial court sentenced him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000
as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The defense moved to reopen trial for
reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently born on 1 March
1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed on 28
January 2003. The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344 regarding criminal liability
of an accused who was a minor during the commission of the crime and the suspension of
sentence of one who is no longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.
DECISION:
The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the straightforward testimony of
the victim and the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense witnesses. The Court did
not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was only 17 during the commission of
the crime since, in view of the circumstances to which accused committed the felony, it was
proved that he acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing that the accused
understood the consequences of his action. Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused
was meted with reclusion perpetua instead of the death penalty. As to the civil liability of
accused, his minority also had no bearing to the decision of the Court, ordering accused to pay
the victim for damages. However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension
of his sentence provided in Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an accused
found guilty of a capital offense. The Court stated that what was important was the intent of the
Act to uphold the welfare of a child in conflict with the law. What was to be considered was the
fact that accused committed the crime at a tender age.
6. Mala in se/Malum prohibitum
G.R. No. 170308 March 7, 2008
GALO MONGE, petitioner, Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in
possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo
Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the
requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any. Petitioner fled the scene in
that instant whereas Potencio was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter,
to the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). The
DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that the items,
totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from Potencio. Later
on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencio’s whereabouts had been unknown since the time of
the seizure until he surfaced on 3 January 1998. An information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 688 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of
1997. The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was imposed nine (9) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in its
medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay the costs. Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the
ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute
necessity for his testimony. The appellate court dismissed this challenge and affirmed the
findings of the trial court. However, it modified the penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence
of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of
prision mayor as maximum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating PD 705 as amended by EO 277
DECISION:
Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession of,
processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner has never
denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it was
Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log down from
the mountain and in transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is
unavailing.
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany
lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together,
has already given rise to criminal liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the
second act punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as
a state witness on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioner’s
liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found
in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the
latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that
punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, in prosecutions under its provisions,
claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and
criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed. In other words, mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent
malice or criminal intent, is illegal. It would therefore make no difference at all whether it was
petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.
G.R. No. 190889 January 10, 2011
ELENITA C. FAJARDO, Petitioner, Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan.
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations
Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza
(P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on Ilang-Ilang and
Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed
men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns. Upon arrival
thereat, they noticed that several persons scampered and ran in different directions. The
responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired shots at the policemen
before entering the house of petitioner. Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun
between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after which, she entered the house and
locked the main door. At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police
Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw
Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw something. Witnesses recovered the
discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol. The warrant was
served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and
members of the media, as witnesses, the police team proceeded to search petitioner’s house.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess
the confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating PD 1866
DECISION:
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an
act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the
crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that
the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any
other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the
firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the
use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended
to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject
receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the
house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the
receivers, before or during their disposal. Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute
for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the
same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in
se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law. The quantum of proof
required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned. The
gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioner’s waistband was not identified with sufficient particularity;
as such, it is impossible to match the same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover, SPO1
Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of the
PISOG arrived in petitioner’s house. It is not unlikely then that the receivers later on discarded
were components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio. Hence, this Court is constrained to
acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of
innocence in her favor was not adequately overcome by the evidence adduced by the
prosecution.