Theory and Practice by Jiirgen Habermas ‘Translated by John Viertel Beacon Press Boston fiTheory and Pati an sient 7 ‘eee be one ae ines a dsoge pai Se ng alan: © 78 by Beton Pros ‘cerman te Chapt 3, a7 © 194 Herman ‘echuraotveag Gob; Chpers © gy Soham Vere ‘Ghpecrs@ wit shramp Yrs Inaction © at ty tiienp Vote Fie ped eo apron Altigtsreroed Prine nthe Unie Sats of Ameri Library of Congres Cataloging in Publication Dat om Je ‘Tramtadon of Tesi Pras nde binge eee 1 Sole —hatons a ee 1 fottat Noreen ou ee a TN oss ISDN o-toponge-X (pik) Contents ‘Teansator’s Note Introdiction: Some Dificulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis ‘The Clasical Doctrine of Politic in Relation 1 Social Philosophy Natural Law and Revolution : i Hegel’ Critique of the French Revolution 4 Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel’ Jena Philosophy of Mind Ietween Philosophy and Science: Marxism at Critique 2 Doginatism; Reason, and Decision: On Theory and Praxis in our Scientific Civilization Nous Index Be 70 195 258‘Translator’s Note on German Terms “The dificulties which spring fom the fac that crucial terms in German have a quite different range of meaning and connotation ‘fom any of the available English equivalent will not be unfa aniliar to anyone who has occupied hinself with German phils. ‘ophy, social theory, or psychology. The glossary below i intended to recall some of the main problems that arise as a consequence and to explain the usage adopted in this translation (2) Inthe essys on “Technology and Science at Ideology," * ‘on “Technical Progress and the Social Life World"? on "Prac: tical Consequences of Technical Scientibe Progres,"* and on "The Conditions for Revolutionizing Advanced Capitalistc So- al Systems,"* all of which are closely related in theme, 1 have investigated ewo tendencies of development which are characteris. tic of advanced capital (disregarding the forms in which cen ‘Talfation manifests itself), with a view tothe depoltiization of the public. I refer in the fist place yo the cumulative grow on Some Dificulties i the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 5 {hep of de tate of ervenonit act which isdeiged to ‘dye growing interdependence of research technology and Een adinnaton, whi ha conv he sen of Eacenasintoa pinay fer of proucton Stat intervention sind planed siendhe ANT technological progr can srve 10 eyo the inbulanee and confit wih ea rom 4 pros OF production governed by ihe imperatives of capital invetment Of cour, tees vo be the ete tat the esp for conta by the state administration andthe productive potential of acence {technology can ony be deployed systematically at the cow of brodacing a conf, which forthe cine being, canbe Kept = the appearance of technodacy Onuhe other hand, the exclusion of consequential: practical quer ‘Samia. dscusian bye depoliued public cere ir sacsingly dificult. asa seule a lougiern_cosion of she ‘luca teadition which formerly had-aegulated conduct and hich ill now, could be presuppoagd az tact boundary cond “ion of he pliie-stem erase af this a chooie oa! for (a) Finally, in the esays on the polities of scence and on the relorm of higher education (ce "On Social Change in Academic Education” and "Democratization of Higher Educa tion—Politicization of Science" further, the collection Protest Movement and Unisenity Reform, the esay "The Scientia tion of Politics and Public Opinion,” and the introduction to the Philosophical poiial Profiles 1 have examined what con Sequences result forthe system of the sciences ive from the ee cumstance that science increasingly plays the role of primary force of production, Their new political significance, which, for ‘example, has led Laman tothe consideration of whether in focure che primary functional role in the total societal develop- ment will accrue tthe system of science, represents both 2 chal Tenge and a problem for the aences. To begin wit, science an sey elf ean investigate empirically and from various points6 ‘Theory and Practice of view the organization of scientific and technological progres: this is the tsk of those complex eflrts which then lay claim to the tile ofa "Science of Science." Furthermore, science can ana Iyee reflectively the social context in which itis embedded not ‘only institutionally, but methodologically, and which atthe same time determines the utilization of information scientifically pro- ‘duced; thi the task ofa substantive critique of science, Finally, the practical utilization of knowledge, its translation into tech nologies and strategies, on the one hand, and into communicative praxis on the other, can alio be prepared scientifically: thi isthe task of a praxeology which still remains in is very beginnings, and to which the investigation of possible interactions between Science and polities would also belong (for example, in the form (of politcal contultation) ‘The restructuring ofthe system of higher education is now under way can be understood a8 both a part of techno: logical planning and at the same time a reaction against 8 an spt to constitute the system of the sciences a8 political en tity. An inseution of higher learning which is enlightened with respect to the citigue of science, and also politically capable of action, could constitute itself as an advocate to urge that among, the alternatives of priority for sientife and technological prog: re, the decision {8 not made automatically according to the “natural laws" imposed by the miltaryindusrial viewpoint, but is decided, on the bass of a general discursive formation of will, only after weighing politically the practical consequences * ‘All these investigations of the empirical relationship be tween science, polities, and public opinion in advanced capital tie social systems must remain unsatisfactory as long a8 even the beginnings of theory of advanced capitals have not really been worked out. I feel that today the formulation of such & theory myaake its departure from three central complexes of probiemé{() Why does the securing of legitimation become one fof the most Important problems for the system under advanced ‘pital? Are confits which could be tolerably controlled by state planning displaced into the politcal systema? Must theory of politcal crises replace the theary of economic crses{ @) Can the new potentials for confct and apathy, characterized By with Some Dificulies in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 7 drawal of moan ad aclnaton toward roe, wich ae sippored by the abate led to real to pero a Sigel lunes a sch imenons ao endange ce ere Syn Are groups which render quttorable te fllimest of important fonction within he tem, pony merely pany idenal with groupe cpuble of consou poieat acon in & ‘ls sation Tah proc of eon, wih amend ose “rombling of the unctonally neseay iegiimaton of gover: tng nth and ofthe motaion fo crying ou kn the ‘seu ggrocen of plticraton wich facet potentials {ncn Der wage aor eatin which snow exes ‘meinedptaly sil rest in compalon for the ora onthe working nade oman af cas consounest {Gan rata within the inl working ca fon, ich, for wrutral rent aces to plc enlightenment ta whch oul be won ont fr one gae awe the Ino which form poll coscoumen casted roa the ‘Piero prodctine aor ine sper othe ction — ‘Up to now we have developed no hypotheses which are sul- Scent rece andar capable ol ing teed to pov cm Pinal sewer oes quetion = Knowledge and interest In the social philosophical estays on Theory and Praxis 1 | hhave not treated epistemologica questions systematically, Nor is thatthe context within which the history ofthese problems is treated in my book Knowledge and Human Inteeits or in my inaugural lecture of the same tile, it one were to apply rigid standards, Sul, I have caried my historical investigations and exploratory considerations sufiiently fr, that the program for 2 theory of science becomes clearly discernible, a theory whic isimended tobe capable of grasping systematialy the constitutive ‘conditions of science and thoxe of its application Ihave let my: self be guided by the problem pose! by the stem of primitive terms (or the “transcendental framework’) within which we org nize our experience a prior! and prior call scence, and do so in8 ‘Theory and Practice ner thf eure the oat of escent bet ‘ions pcucel y hs Inthe ncaa fume aon ne encour sje ofthe type of ming tw xpi things ena comon valk train prnpes ple of bog manipulated a ineiaion (cea the le ot poutbleiebjectve emanation we ‘Scouts objecsot ie pol pening end acing ees oa sr experis pony ternce ad Sonion icin plete stwctred and tobe undead smbolly. The Je dana othe emiamalye and ofthe hermenetc Scere tse on tae sete of eli, whieh ne rake diy ivy fom te wept eer tect ‘Saved eines communenion. Th eval y tmeholge covparion a he andra these cm {ip the il eomrucon ofthe tren, the reo of hoary tte cet domain the ea of vento We {cng werent ofr Seog above a the dt iSen inte prague laclon ets he Inkoraatis pk fed by the Silent aden an have Epa sna tnowlege tan aue te form o xl exes {tonal Peiciom, hh abo fer the bere pore herenetc knowlege areas the or of nerpeon enon comple of mening, Theresa upon ) ltdontphemecn te og urate afasene sad he pag Sac araur ofthe pele nplctone of the intrasion {genet win ane “Fi ierennted lve to acon ofthe wo etre ot scence jut menoneds The teed bck tote oon Sha inthe cotton a lnc she dois eee tated in erny pater sbjeciing any tae viewpoints eer of nea ee or of ucrboaie eae ‘Bunlation,‘Thoe two vewpunu expen annoy epi intens which deco Lote fave ‘uanramcendnal sata The interes Eno ae of gine scr lr the poy or ori obo ot ‘Soe or ria tg eS insay arora Sas tory arena Nort inher ands oy be aed Some Dificulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 9 back tothe biological heritage of a congrete meoivationa poten til; for they are abstract. Rather, they set fromthe ipera tives ofa soroeuusal lear depe - ‘Bige ‘Thetlone the tecnica! and pracialInterts of now fe ae ot regulators of for theake of the objectivity of knowledge: instead they hem. selves determine the aspect under which realty i objecifed. and indicate the wnity ofthe life context in which cognition is em- bedded: expressions e-eleente o-a reality which is abjetified (simultaneously dacloned and consituted) as such in two diferent capexts af action and experience. The “underlving "intexea xablshesshe-anity- between thi const Le context in which hntelede rome the wracare oF the Psble applction-vhich thi knowledge. ave “The wines donot incorporate into their methodological understanding of thensver this bass of interest which serves a4, ‘the g priori link between the origins and the applications of their J theories, However, the eiigue which Mart developed as a theory of society and Freud at metaprychology are ditnguished | _recisly by incorporating in their consciousness an interest which * Airects Knowledge, an terest in emancipation going beyond-che technical and the practical interest of bnawedge, By testing psychoanalyisas an analysis of Tanguage ming at reflection bout oneself, T have sought to show how the relations of power embodied in sytematiealy distorted communication can be a tacked directly by the proces of crtgue, xo tht in the sll reflection, which the atalytic method has made posible and provoked, in the end fnsight can coincide with emancipation from unrecognized dependences-that is, knowledge coincides with the falfllment of the intrest in iberation through know! gel” Therefore te relation of theory to therapy is jus as con- Sttutve for Freudian dheory asthe relation of theory to praxis is for Marxist theory. This can be shown in detail the logical Gs10 Theory ond Practice form of general interpretations and in the pragmatic achieve ments of explanatory understanding Gn ‘causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding. Methodological problems ‘From the circumstance-thar theories. of the critical ype isle thet (aru) consti context and ‘of the relation of theory to practice. In the investigations which ‘were collected in the anthology On the Logic of the Socal Sci. fences (Franklurt 1g70) and also in the say "Universalitite Smproch der Henmencutk” ("The Claim to Universality of Hemencoic”] a well a in my dicuions with Luann, ® 1 have sought to uace the mow important mcthodoogial quee ‘ions tobe sre, rather problenati and nox sanyo Pllc frm: the quetons which vs frm the program andthe Eonceptualstaigy ofa theory of oiry which has practical ali Die we begin with the distinctive postion of the cognitive subject. {with respec to an object domain which conrricted-of the formane of subjects capable of speth an aon Siete ie as gneve peer over thee ‘abject, we an delimit our pepe inte of fo camper cp RPO > AAD Contried withthe objetviom of src behavioral iene etal soilogy garde lt guinea redction intentional action io behavior When the soject domain consis ol ymboially truer formations which are gence oceord ing to underlying rle nem, then the categoria framework cannot remain indierent toward that which specie to ord tary language commonication, Aeon othe data ia understand Jngot meanings mst be permitted From this ress he problem of measurement which i ical for te soil sciences. In place of controled obuervation, which guarantees the anonymity (= angen) ofthe oberving subject and ths ofthe repro Aluctity of the obsereaon, tere rus a paticipstoey elation of the understanding uhjec tothe subject contoning hin Some Dificulties inthe Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 11 {Gegenucber (lier eg) The paradigm sno longer the obser- Un but ihe aloguenihas -camminicaan inh the un- deraanding subject must invest a part of his subjectivity, no ‘mater in what manner this may-be contol sien mentee aes lo level which makes und “Tobe se (the ample ofthe ground tiem fashionable demand for «type of "action revearch” that i to combine polite! enlightenment with research, overlooks tat the uncontoled moxication of the flix incompatible with the simultaneous gathering of data in that field, » condition ‘which isa valid forthe soil sciences All operations which Ca be traced back tothe language game of physial measurement {even thowe with instruments which can only be comeructed with the aid of complicated theories) cane coordinated with sense pereptons observations) and hingevent language in which the observations can be expresed dexipively On he other hand, hee sno corssponding se of asi essing oper sam i heat inseam ela laninge openie of peua,aiy nie ie ‘understood utterances could he expressed descriptively. There we "orig tan al rae pln ‘we-employ hermeneutics instead of 2 measurement procedure, ‘whieh hermeneutics isnot, It can be assumed that a theory of ‘ordinary language communication would fist be required which oes not perfect communicative competence but rather explains it, order to permit 2 controled wanslation of communicative ‘experience ino data (just a loge provides a normative bass for the construction of measurement procedures in certain investiga tions into the psjchology of cognitive development, or transfor ‘mational grammar in the investigation of the psycholinguistis of children's language acquisition) (2) Gonfronted with the idealism of the hrmencuties deve ‘oped forthe sciences ofthe mind, critical sociology guards tell against reducing che meaning complexes abjecified within socal ‘stem tothe coutentso caltural-twadition, Critical of ideology, ihea ‘Theory and Practice hind the consensus. presented a 3 fact, that | nates of uaa pach uitng power fdlh ste the dessa jt don soya sitnatn, oe back oBockages in communication, independently of the changing semantic con. ‘eo Ths Beck ite ter oem Shin Me cas om | Bk pee a Se ee Re Soe ee cpeec al erge ed = mee a Clad eh options entalye-ey har FequTeexptantion within “| the tamework ofa theory of sytematially distorted communica |) matic. could be develo be Tike convincingly with ‘sumptions of historical materialism. chen sematic compre Henian-of-cultsal-trdiion woul not be excluded. Perhaps verifiable astumption:sbout the loge of the development of ‘moral systems, of structures ofthe world images and correspond: Jing eu practices, could resilt from 3 theory of socal evolution this would revel whether, ait seems the contingent manifold of trtltional meanings which are organize within the framework of world images, vary systematically acording to features under Standable in terran of univer pragmaces2* (9 (@ Contromea withthe universalism of x comprehensively designed systems theory, cite sociology goats el agaist the "eduction of ll ial conic o-umsolvet problem the re ion of self governing systems I i certainly meaningul to ‘oneeive socal spent entities which solve objectively posed problems by meas of suprasubjecive learning proce how ‘ve, the reference sstem of machine cybernetics prover useful ‘only insofar a8 solution of problems of contol is involved. ‘Among other thing, soda systems ate distinguished om ma ‘hin (with leaaing capacity) snd Irom_orgatie by theft ‘Wat mbjecve learing proves ke place andre ognized ‘within the Bamevork of ordinary language communication, A Some Dificulies in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxit 15 systems concept which is more appropriate to the socal scienees spd organizations that is fr the extension of contzol capabilities) ‘an therefore not be taken identity. Ultrastabiligy—or in Luhmann’s formul action of the world's complexity by means of increasing rystem complexity [igentomplesiaet}—represents a designation of gouls which results unavoidably from a functionals coneeptval Strategy, although especially on the socioculeural level of evolu- tion the problem of continued existence [Bestandiproblem) be- comes difuse, andthe alk of “survival” metaphorical @) Finally, confronted with the dogmatic heritage of the philosophy of history, eric Dburdening the concepts of of refection {German dealisn) From the conceptual strategy of transcendental philos- ‘ophy there results (already in the followers of Kant, and today also among those who wish to develop a Marist theory of seiety n conjunction with Hussels analyses ofthe “lifeworld”) a peew | ‘compulsion to conceive the socal world as 2 continuum in the same way asthe world of the objects of posible experience ‘Thus to the objective structures within which socialized individ uals entounter each other and-act-communicaively,largewcale subjects are asigned. The projective generation of higher-order subjects has along tradition, Marx too di not always make clear that the atuibutes ascribed to social classes (such a6 clas con- sciousness, class interest, clas action) did not represent a simple transference from the level of individual consciousnes to that of a collective. These ate rather designations for something that can ‘only be arrived at intersubjectvely, in the consultation or the ‘cooperation of individuals living together Objections In this extremely selective and oversimplified retrospective summary I have emphasized three lines of argumentation along.4 ‘Theory and Practice Which 1 have pursued the relation of theory and praxis beyond {howe historical investigations which are collected fn this volume "These arguments are certainly unsatisfactory as fa s ther degree of explication and completeness concerned Ihave always been ware ofthe fragmentary and provisional character of these con fiderations But only a cleaty sated position makes discursive at tack and defense posible-tha is, substantive argument. Yet cer minty inaccuracies have rept i, and to a greater degree than T Would have liked. Though 1 have exposed myself to eiicism on {his level, {will not deal with this here. However, the objections with repect to my construction itself ae on another level. At the ‘moment I can see three objections which must be taken seriously (other apponens of my views have not been able to convince me that their arguments carry weight; naturally Tearnot exclude the posibilty that psychological reasons are responsible for this; T fan only hope that this not the case). ere too I must conéne ‘myself co an outline: (0) The fist objection refers to the inadequately clarified ‘tats ofthe interest that diect knowledge, The formula "quas- transcendental” isa product of an embarrasnent which points to more problems than it solves. On the one hand, Ihave elie Guise taking the position of wanscendental loge i the suet Sense in my atempl to daify the systematic relations between the logic of scientific investigation and the logic of the contexts in which the corresponding sciences are constituted and applied. 1 not assume the synthetic achievements of an intelligible ego nor in general productive subjectivity. But Lalo-prsupposéras docs Peirce the real imerrelationship of communicating (and empera Where each of thts subsystems is part ofthe srrounding social sytem, which im tara are the result af the sococltoral evolution ofthe ha the Topical methodological complexe to empirical hick would li PRGA! interest of kno ‘annot simply_be reduced spaying che price ofa nat to explain the technical aswell asthe Knowledge o fortsitous historical constellations an * Some Dificulis in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 15 relatvisticlly deprive sllxelection of she possibility of a justi ‘atry bass farts cain to validity In neither of these two cases ‘could i be made plausible how theories could have any truth at allsineluding ones own theories. (2) The second objection is diected against the asertion that inthe jndghts produced by-seltrallection,bnovledge-and ‘he emancipatory interest of-beowiedgeare—one.” Even one sdmite that inherent ge m-mabe, isnot te be reconclewith the paciculaity which must adhere to every interest, even that which aims at sell liberation. is not a specife content already claimed for reson, ‘when Tinked to emancipatory interest, namely tht of a substan. tive rationalty—while reason itself as a consequence of its own ‘dea, must exclude any specification in terms of particular goals Is the element of decision and commitment, on which every praxis fof subjecs instructed by ertque depends, especially 4 revo tionary praxis not suppresed in a dogmatically asterted interest ‘of reson, and thereby a the same time immunized? In the end the normative bass fora critical sociology is smuggled in su reptitiously, when one considers that in the interes of the libera: tion trom the objeciied self-deception of dogmatic power, two ‘things are inevitably mingled: on the one hand, the interes in| enlightenment, in the sense of a relents discursive validation of| aims to validity (and the discursive disolution of opinions and. norms the validity of which is based on unjustified claims, no rmatier to what exten itis actually accepted) on the other hand, the interest in enlightenment, inthe seme of practical change of| established conditions (and the realization of goals which demand the risks of king sides, and thus, precisely, the rlinguishment of the neutral role of participant in discourse =" (3) The third objection is directed agains the ieresponsibit- lay of discussions about the relationship of theory and praxis ‘which fail to deal with questions of the organization of enlighten: ment and of enlightened praxis. Oskar Nege has formulated his objection most clay an the political level. ASI do not pose the ‘question of organization, and thus do not draw the consequences ‘of knowiedge direc toward liberation, I remain confined to a6 Theory and Practice prepolitical concept of objective partisanship. Instead, an org nisational praxis adequate for the requirement of enlightenment fom a mass sale would have to be diseased; Negt hirsel had in ‘mind the decentralized activities which were widespread in the Student movement of his time; hence the examples of spontaneous selforganization “for which enlightenment and revolutionary ‘overthrow were no longer posed a alternatives" ‘An analogous objection is directed, on the theoretical level against the posibilty of carrying the model of psychoanalysis ‘over into socal theory. For I actually di inventigate the eritealy| ‘motivated process of seltreflection in terms of the example ofthe psychoanalytic dialogue, in order to clavfy in terms of this the logic underlying the translation of critique into seliberaion. [Now however, therapy is bound by the Tule of the art and by Inhibiting instiationa conditions, to which the political stage, and especially the revolutionary struggle, is not subject. There fore from the conservative side the misgivings readily arise that a transferring of the doctor-patient model to political praxis of large groups would encourage the uncontrolled exercise of force fon the part of selfappointed elites, who clos themselves off against potemtial opponents with dogmatic claims of privileged acces to true insight. On the other side the misgiving arises that the same model leads to a rationalisic denial of the militant clement in the confrontation with political opponents, because the pacifist illaion aise thatthe critical insight will by itself destroy the dominating dogmatism of existing institutions Action and discourse We no longer find, in dialectical logic, asin a certain way ‘Marx stl di, the normative basis fora socal theory onstrated ‘with practical intent. Of coun, the logic of 2 sellxelction, which traces back the formative course of an ofo's identity through all invalutions of systematically distorted communice tions and brings thin analytically to this eg's awareness, can be called “dialectical” if itis the task of dialectics, inthe sense ofthe “Hrgelian “Phenomenology” fan of a psychoanalysis which isnot conceived in a scientisie manner, fo reconstruct that which hat Some Dificutis in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxit x7 ‘been repressed from the historical traces of repressed dialogues °° ‘But what is dialectical is then only the structure of compulsion that dialectical thought explodes by assimiating itself to it, This is Adorno’s central insght®” ‘Then, however, our problem is merely deferred, For the structare of distorted communication is rot ultimate; it has its basis in the logic of undistorted language In a certain way, mature autonomy (Méndighet] * is the sole idea which we have at our disposal inthe sense ofthe philer sophical tragtion~as I asserted in my Frankfurt inaugural le: tute?*for in every speech act the telor of reaching an under standing (Verstaendigung) is already inherent. “With the very first sentence the intention of a general and voluntary consensus js unmistakably enunciated." Witigenstein has remarked that the concept of reaching an wnderstanding les in the concept of language. We can only say in a selfexplicative sense that language ‘communication “serves” this reaching of an understanding. Every understanding reched is confirmed in a reasonable consensus 38 we say: otherwise it does not represent a “teal” understanding, (Competent orators know that every consent attained can infact be deceptive; but they must alway have been in postsson ofthe prior concept of the rational consensus underlying the concept of ‘a deceptive (or merely compulsory) consensus, Reaching an under standing is a normative concept: everyone who speaks natural Janguage has intuitive knowledge of it and therelore is confident ‘of being abl, in principle, to distinguish a trve consensus from 3 fale one, In the educated language of philosophical culture {Bildungssprache] we call this knowledge a priori or innate. This is based on traditional interpretations. But even independently of these interpretations we can attempt to clarify the normative implications that lie in the concept of possible understanding. with which every speaker (and heater) i naively familias. Thi auempt I undertake with the outline of a universal pragmatics ofthis work ul now only the Vorberetende Bemerhungen einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetens has been pub- lished #® ‘We can proceed from the fact that functioning language ‘games, in which speech acts ate exchanged, are based on an under8 ‘Theory and Practice lying consensus. This underlying consensus is formed in the recip: seal econiton oft east four dais wali which speaks if and to-the extent to-which-reaching an ‘ders communication. ‘The elaim tnenticity can only be realized in interaction: in time, whether the othe ide is “in ruth or honestly participating o is only pretending to engage in com- ‘municative action and is in fat behaving strategically. The case ‘on the other Band. the approp on sich we ate to follow, These are claims of validity-whieh-can factual recognition of these lain bases itself in every case, evel tat of ear nthe posi lay ofthe discursive valldation of the aims made. Discourses are sn which we sek to show the gr the underlying consensus, are assumed naively. Discourse, on the ‘other hand, serves the justification of problematic claims to vali ity of opinions and norms. Thus the system of action and experi: ‘encereles us ina compelling manner to form of commiaication| in which the participants do not exchange information, do not director carry out action, nor do they have or communicate ex: ‘perience; instead they search for arguments or offer justifications action. This js intended to sender inoperative a-motiver except ‘solely that ofa cooperative readines to arrive at an understanding, and further requires shat questions of validity be separate fom thos gees, Dssmuse thanby.rendrs pombe italien on of claims to a is onssts in our announcing with respect tothe objets of communicative action (hinge and events, persons and uterance) a reservation concerning their existence and conceiving of facts as well as of norms from the viewpoint of Some Dificulies in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxit 19 fesit2xiuee. To weak +4 Howe! doc, in dice we [shite genera tne Tha ae are nomad to nae ota wieh ay or may not be the can norms ae tem no commons al arin eh ay or tr appopae but nee or napropete Boy the stro ths peal tes form of cm imicton garnet ihe puly of alin» concn {Tete hh cn gan cognitions rational Bee a {ite mo broudy cece tone! seme a ea Tainted ftom ee ccainy by Ws dim to be tle dinoure ibe odo of he ueodtoned With i af ons thes uh ih ns eso ale a coupling titre of ru why acon weiner Serafaebane orbs SES pons Te ‘So ofan soc haarir tle heap eal situation of dicourse[Sprechstuation] And correspond ingly, dhe deaiztion of pare communicative action would have tebe recone athe con hich the authenticity ‘speaking and acting subject can be imputed aswell verified, Teannot go into this here. But I have indicated the derivation from the foundation of ordinary language communication to the ‘extent that in the following sections T can present the strategy ‘With which I wish to respond tothe abovementioned objections Objectivity of Rnowledge and interest would like to eat the first rwo objections jointly. In the light of the newly introduced system of relations between action and discourse, the fllowing points, which, of course, I ean only disuss in terms ofa few strategic indications, present chemseives tome in diferent light than previously. (0) In the investigations up to this point Ihave brought out the interrelation between knowledge and interest, without mak: ing clear the crtial threshold between, communication (which ich ace he cmpulons of scp), Tote sure tne co re ae cet domain can be const ar cnn0 ‘Theory and Practice tation ofthe objectivations which we undertake in the world of tocil fe prior all scence But the genuine claim wo objectivity Which is raised with the insauration of science Is based on Virtualzacon of the presue of experience and decision, and itis ly this which permits a dacurive esting of hypothetical claims to validity and thus the generation of rationally grounded know teige. Agtnut che science’ objcvistc understanding of then felves which mafvely relates uel wo the facts, an indirect Telationship to action can be shown for theoretical knowledge, ‘but not anying like a direct derivation from the imperatives pov bythe pris of life (nor have I ever aterted that there ft {uch a derivation). The opinions which form the input of di ‘ourse_and thas the rave material which a subject to argu ‘mentation with the aim of substanation-do indeed have thei ‘origin in the divereimerelatons of experienc and action. The logic of these experiential relations is manifested even in dix course iuelf by the fact that opinions can only be specified, and their derivation made clea, in languages of 3 specie form and can only be tested by methods of» speci kind (on high level of generalization: by “obiervation” and “interiewing” [ere ping]. Therefore the dicurivelysubrtantiated theoretical state ‘ent (which survive argumentation) can in turn be relevant only to specie contexts of application: satementssbout the phenom hal domain of things snd the deep strictures which ‘manifest themselves in terms of things and evens) cam-anly be translated back into orientations for goal directed rational action (Gtecinologes and vate): statementsabous the phenomenal omajn of pans and-vtereeerforabowehe deep structures of “ocil sytem) can ony be tranlted ack int. oteattions for communicative action (in_practical knowledge). The interests which direct knowledge preserve te ani cm ‘ST seion and experience vis vs dicoure they retain the latent relevent af ereia nowlge to action by wey ofthe tan formation of opinions into thecrecal-xatemente andi re transformation ino Knaledge oriented toward action. Buty 20- means do they remove or-resole-(ebletcy-the-diflerence be ‘ween opitiont about objects bated on-expesience relatedto jon, on the one hand, and watements about lat Saunded on Some Dificultis in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 21 spares hate re of xperens and unencumbered by con, on-ahe othe; jus ay lite do hey afee te dMerence between those daims vo validity which are simply recognized as factual and those which have a reaoned jusieation. “Te satus che “lower intres the eica at the practical intern of knowledge, can, to begin with, cally by the Tak hat 2 ca cbe be cmpncined (3) enpiril inclinadont or aude nor be propa. js fed ike arable values in relation to noms faction, nsead ne ‘iss vaiind th me none) Tar (B) aot Hooeledge can be Sneed -gencraled mote for Stems of action which are guide by means ofthe commu * tion of statements which can be true. Actions are channeled by dhe Fecoglion of claims io valde hat cn be rele die {rely Tati why onthe higher levels of scocatural develop. iment the fundamental regulators no longer ake the form a Particular sl (or inne) bu precy tat of gneral coe itive rategis of he actionseltedorganation of eperence ‘Alongs de inert of tows ac Met ad anal ‘by way of relestion on the logic of imquiry chat structures the {aitaL-and the nae sineny then clan “anscen dental” sams: however, as soon a they are understood in terms of an anthropology of knowledge as ess of natual history, ‘tay have an “omponca unt pace emprea™ within gue ison marks ects Teory of evolon which expected to Spin emergent properties chacerie ofthe sear Aikloemcin ober wordy to explain De conacents of sal systema an part of satura! hivory-cannot, fo i par, be do ‘lope ‘iin the tramcendenal Esmewerk of objecting ‘Sen, Whe thony of selston is ame the ake Cannot wholly dive alo the form of tefeton on the pe:2 Theory and Practice history of culture that is dependent on a prior understanding of the sociocultural lifeform. For the ime being thee are spec tions, which can only be confirmed by a scientific clarification of the status enjoyed by the contemporary theory of evolution and research in ethology. Till then, at most, they designate a perspec: Live for the formulation of the problems (@) As far as the third, the emancipatory, interest of know! ‘edge is concerned, a more dstine delimitation appear, in my view, to offer iselé This interest cn nly develop tothe degree fence stem of action-dixoure, i dflerence from sient arg ‘menation becomes let the pycoanayie dialogue Is not 4 discoure, and refection on oneself dacs not provide renwoned jmifston, What is ressone jutcation within the context of 2c of reetion on one! bases elf on ticoretial Knowledge ‘whic hasbeen gained independently of the relection on one hamely, the rational rconsruction of rule systems which We have to master if we wish to procen experince cognitively OF paridpate in systems of action or cay on dicourse, Til now 1 have noe adequately distinguished posterior reconstruction [Nach somsruttion) from relecion on once ‘Sell zeeion bring conncountr- those determinants of a selformative_procet_of culation and-spirieual_formation (Bildeng) whi mine a comtemporary paxit faction and the conception afthe madd. Analytic memory thus fembraces the particulars, the specie course of sel formation of 2m individual subject (ot ofa collective held together by grup ‘entity. Rational secant in conta daa ity a) ‘mous rule systems, which any subjects whatsoever_can Comply ‘th, nota af they Rave aqua he cospandiegcapetence ‘IL expect. thal Recontructons thus € not encom pass subjectivity within the horizon of which alone the exper: ence of reflection is possible. I the philosophical tradition these Some Dificulies in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 5 ‘00 legitimate forms of self knowledge have generally remained “uniferentiated and have both been included under th term of reflection. However, a reliable criterion of distinction ie available Selfreflecton leads to insight due to the fact that what has pre- viously been unconscious is made conscious in 4 manner ich in| practical consequences: analy insights intervene in ie, if may borrow this dramatic phrase from Wittgenstein. A sucess recom struction ako raises an “unconsciously” functioning tule system to consciousness ina certain manner: it renders explicit the intaiive Knowledge thats given with competence with respect to the rues the form of “know how.” But this theoretical knowledge hat no practical consequences. By learning logic or linguistics I ac quite theoretical knowledge, but im general T do not thereby ‘ange my previous practice of reasoning oF speaking “This circumstance finds its explanation inthe fact that se reflection, 2s can be shown in the model of the psychoanalytic dialogue between doctor and patient, is not a discourse, but effects, at the same time, both more and less than a discourse ‘The therapeutic “discourse” effects les, a8 the patient by no means takes up a symmetrical postire visdvis the dactor from the very beginning: the conditions for a participant in discourse are precisely what is not falélled by the patient. It is only the successful therapeutic discourse which brings, a its result that which in ordinary discourse must be required from the very 0 set; the elective equality of opportunities in perceiving the roles within the dialogue, and in general, in the choice and exercise of speech acts, must st be established between partners in a dia logue who are so unequally equipped On the other hand, the therapeutic discourse effects mote than the ordinary one. Because ‘emains contained in a peculie way within the sytem of action and experience, an thus is nota discourse cut fre from action or experience, which has ait theme exclusively questions of valid fey and must import all contents and information from the out. side, succesful seltrelection results in insight which satisfies not ‘only the conditions of the discursive realization ofa caim to truth (or correctnes) but in addition satisfies the condition ofthe real: ization of a claim to authentciy [Wehrhafighet], which nor.4 Theory and Pracice ally isnot to be attained disursively at all. In the patients fceptance ofthe “worked out” interpretation which the doctor Sgess to him and his conSrming tha these are applicable, he the same time sees trough a self decepion. The tue interpre tation atthe sume time makes posible the authentic intention (ofthe subject with respect to those atteranc, with which Re has ll then deceived hnsel (and posibly other) Claims to authen ticity as a rule can only be teed within the context of action “That distinctive communication in which the ditortons ofthe ammonicntve structure themelves ean be overcome i the only ‘one in which cai to eruth can be tested “dicurivel” oper tnd imultancounly with» claim to authenticity, or be veeted 38 tnjustiied Reconstruction ar, on the other hand, the objec of ord nary dicoure.‘To be mare, compared to other dscurtive objects they are ditnguished by being fst generated within a rlexive atte, Cogative component ofthe praxis of He, the aims 10 ‘alidity of which have been rendered problematic, are not what [Seal with in reconsructed rule yscms; nor sit those scene theorems, which cumulate inthe raconal grounds of such lam to validity rather the reconstruction of rule sytems requires an Impulte which originates in the dicouresthemcver Ie igre ily that reletion about preuppositons on which me avays ‘rend vey ately vr ratonar speech, Acoringly, this pe of Tnowiedge her avaysamed the vans of pei, ofa “pure” Iunowledge: in logic, mathematic, epistemology, and linguistic. today it forms the core ofthe philowphic dis plines This type ‘of knowledge is not consitudve forthe objecuvating science ‘ccondingy it retains untouched bythe technical ax wells the practical tert. For sciences of the crite type which, ike Pychoanalysi, make sellzelecion into method of procedure, construction, of coure, appear 1 have a conti signif ‘ince onthe horizontal av ella the yertcal level Tes only reliance upon reconstruction which permis dhe theoretical de ‘elopmentof selfreflection, In this way reconstructions therefore {tain an indirect relation tothe emancpatory interest of now! (SE i ser ah ea ty ties Some Dificultis in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 2 (On the institutionaization of discourses Sulla third objection remains: is the psychoanalytic dia logue not necesarily misleading a8 a model for discusion between politically organized groups? How can the translation of theory Into praxis be appropriately organized? Betore Igo into this quet- ton, 1 would like to place the relation of theory and praxis in an evolutionary historical perspective. ‘Within the reference system of action and discourse the nor: mative question concerning the relation of theory and praxis can be given 2 surprisingly descriptive aspect. On the one hand, the ‘assumption is plausible cha dhe consensus which supports action is based on claims to validity, that are accepted 26 factual, in various ways These caims can only be relied disursvey. Furthermore, t can be shown that we must presuppose an ideal situation of verbal communication, on both sides, whenever we ‘wish to cary on discourse. Thus for communicative action, di ‘courses ate ofa fundamental significance. On the other hand, it is only late in history that discourses have lst their sporadic character. Only when certain domains of discourse are institu: tionalized to such an extent that under specifable conditions a ieneral expectation exists, that discursive conversations will be {nated can they become a systematically relevant mechanism of Tearaing fora given society In the course of socal evolution such institutionaliztions of partial discourses, specie to certain domains, signify innovative Achievements rich in consequence, which a theory of social evolu tion would have to explain in relation to the unfolding of the forces of production and the expansion ofthe capacities for con trol, Dramatic examples are, first, the insitutionalzation of dis ‘course in which the claims to validity of mythical and religions interpretations of the world could be systematically questioned tnd tested: as sach we understand the beginnings of philosophy Jn Athens during the Classical period. Second, the institutional itation of discourse in which the claims to validity of echnical exploitable profane knowledge transmitted in the domains of profesional ethics could be systematically questioned and tested;6 Theory and Practice as such we understand the beginnings of the modern experi: mental sciences, which certainly had their precursors in antiquity tnd at the end ofthe Middle Ages And finally, the institutional. ination of discourse in which the claims to validity involving practical quewions and political decisions were intended 10 be continually questioned and tested; first in England during the Seventeenth century, and later on the Continent and in the ‘United States, with precursors in the Italian cities of the Rena sanct, a politcal public sphere came into being and in conne- tion with this representative forms of government—bougeois ‘democracy. These ae very cade examples and certainly examples ‘only. Today the tradicional patterns of socialization, which till ‘ow were eniconced ax natural in the cultural tradition, are set free by the psycholoizing of children’s edacation and the plan: ning of school curieula according to cultural policy, and ren ered accessible to general practical discourse by means of a proces of “scientzaton.” Much the same is tue in literary and Artistic production; “afirmatve” bourgeois culture, divorced from the praxis of life and claiming the transcendence of beautiful illusion [des tchoenen Scheins), is undergoing a proces of dit solution. Flow equivocal such phenomena may be, and how litle the phenomenal form of discourse assures the institutionally secured extension of the discursive learning mechanism to new domains fof knowledge and the formation of will which are remote fom tradition, an be shown in tems of the example of bourgeois democracy. Alter the bold ftion ofthe dependence ofall politi: cally consequential decisionmaking procenes on the legally se ‘cared discursive formation of wil on the part ofthe citizen publi was shattered in the course of the nineteenth century by the restrictive conditions of the mode of production, a polarization of forces resulted, if this ovesimplification may be permitted. On the one hand, a tendency has st in to reject as ilusion the claim that politcal and practical questions may be clatifeddiscursively, and to deny, positvistclly, the truth value of such questions. In the mass democracies of the advanced capitalise soial estes, the bourgeois ideas of freedom and elf determination are being, Some Dificuties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 27 ‘constricted and have yielded tothe “realistic” imerpretation that politieal ditcourse in public, in political partcs and organiza: ions, isn any cae mere appearance and will remain such under all conceivable circumstances. The compromise of intrets obeys the logic of force, and the balance of forces produced by counter. forces and isnot accesible to rationalization, In the face of this, a tendency had developed which i 1 be extensively investigated in this volume: the attempt to explain why the ideas of the Dourgeois revolution neceurily had to remain false conscious nes, why they had to remain ideology, and could only be realized by those who, due to their position i the proces of production and the experience produced by their cass conditions, would have the disposition to see through bourgeois ideology. Marx is csqually rtical of the nave demand to create bourgeois demoe- racy at he is ofthe undsguised recantation of bourgeois ideals, He shows that democracy cannot be realize as bourgeois democ cy. This insight is baed on the critique of politial economy, Which wat seen asa critique of ideology. To make this critique practical was the task of the Communists, From this the Com ‘munis Party developed. In this type of organization something very peculiar js insttutionalied: externally in the face of the class enemy, strategic action and political struggle: internally, with respect tothe mas of the wage laborers, the organization of enlightenment, the discursive inducement of process of self reflection. The vanguard ofthe proletariat must master both: the ‘ritique of weapons and the weapons of exitique ‘At this point, the history ofthe ace, which, in ever new ad vances, has insittionalized the discursive form of problem solving unrefeced in a “natural” manner, becomes peculiarly rellexive. In order to asert discursive formation ofthe will a an ‘organizational principe forthe socal system as whole with con- ‘sciousness and will the political struggle is now to be made de pendent on a theory that makes posible the enlightenment of focial clases as to ther own nature. However, can selfreflection ‘become fully practical in the form of political struggle—and thus ‘be legitimately made the tsk ofan organization engaged in this struggle?8 Theory and Practice Organization of enlightenment Just as we can wnderstand “thinking” asthe proces of di coursedependent argumentation internalized by a single subject “to eltzelction too can be conceived ae the internalization of 2 “therapeutic discourse.” In both cases the withdrawing of com ‘munication into the inwardnese of» solitary subject by no means revokes the virally retained intersubjective suucture of the “ialogue; the thinking subject just aswell as the releting subject ‘must play t least to role ofthe dialogue, if argumentation is not to become merely analytic (and thus in principle reproducible ‘by machines). Im the ease of (internalized) discourse this is un- problematic The positions of the partners in discourse ae egal {arian and in principle interchangeable; therefore the internal assignment of voles in the dialogue creater no dificultes in ‘thought. But this not «onthe ease of Gnternalied) therapy. "The postions ofthe partners in the psychoanalytic dialogue are asymmetrical: they change in many ways during the course ofthe commenication and only terminate ina symmetrical relation hich holds beeween participants in discourse from the very out. set-at the conclusion of succesful treatment, The selfretection ‘of a Tone subject therefore requires quite paradoxical achieve- ‘ment one part of the self must be spit off from the other part in such a manner that the subject cam be in a postion to render Aid to ill. The prychoanalytc dialogue only renders visible this {Internal labor, divided between parts ofthe subject; thereby, what retained 2 virtual presence within the solitary subject due tothe internalization of an external relation is reconstituted again a8 such an external relation. Sail the model of solitary veltxeflection alto has its jusifca tion. For in itis manifested the visk that const in the posibiity of sophistic delusion that only asumes the appearance of self reflection: in the act of solitary seltreflection the subject can Aeceive ite. To be sure ie aso has to pay the price for it decep- ion ive. If, however, on the horizontal level on which two partners confront each other (the one in the role of conferring enlightenment, the other seeking enlightenment about himeel), Some Dificuties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 19 the misleading of the one isnot to be exploited by the other, the unity ofthe lifecontext must be secured on both sides insti tionally, vo that both suller equally from resulting errors and the consequences of such ervors. This isthe model which Flegl de- ‘eloped in his concept of morality which ie subject to the ea of destin. Tn the ease of psychoanalysis two Fundamental and two prag- ‘matic sanctions against misuse in the sense of exploiting deception ‘an be enumerate. For one, che fundamental theorems ly claim to truth and this claim muse be defensible in accordance withthe usual rules of scentfe discoune, otherwise the theory must be relinquished or reise. Secondly, the appropriatencs ofthe in texpretaton, which is theoretically derived and applied td the particular case, requires confirmation in succesful serefletion; truth must converge with authentiity~in other words, the patient himself isthe final authority. Furthermore, pyehoanalyts must comply with the requirements of professional ethics and practices of a legally santioned association of physicians; within limits violation of profesional norms and regulations can be controlled, Finally, in general the patient can maintain « certain distance fom his doctor; inspite of transference (and countertansferenc) the role of the patient is nota total role, but only one among ‘many within adilrentiated sytem of roles, Within certain limits, the patient retains the option to change analysts orto break ofthe ‘Bt what is the situation with respect to sanctions on the level of interaction between large groups, which is defined by analogous model of systematically distorted communication, and hich, under the guidance of proceses of enlightenment, is to be changed politically? G-H. Gadamer and H. J. Giegel quite rightly criticize un ‘iferentiated attempts to transfer a model borrowed from prycho- analysis to large groups: "A etique which confronts the othe, or ‘dominant social prejudices generally, with is compuluoy charac- ter, and, on the other hand, vases the clam to disolving eich complexes of deception commanicatively, will find isel(-here 1 am in agreement with Giegel—in a false position. Ie most ignore fundamental diflerences. Inthe case of piychonnalyi, the sulle» Theory and Practice ing and the deste for cure of the patient serve asthe tenable basis forthe therapeutic activity ofthe doctor, whose assertion of authority and urging fr the clarification of represed motives are rot without compulsion, “in this the voluntary submision of the one tothe other is the supportive bass. In eacal life, on the other hand, the re sistance ofthe opponent and the resistance against the opponent are the common presupposition for al.” © Gadamer is referring here to Giegels aterion “The revolutionary struggle is by no means a psychoanalytic treatment on large scale. The diference betecen these {60 forms of emancipatory praxis results from the fact that the patient is aided in feeing himself from the compulsions to which he is subjected, while for the ruling class, the ateempt to gain freedom from the socal complex of eom- pulsion, in itself, must appear 26a threat to the rule which ‘it exercises over the other classes. The confrontation here presents itil in a much sharper form than in the case of psychoanalysis ‘The oppressed clase not only doubis the ability ofthe ruling ds 19 conduct the dialogue, but also has good reasons for asuming that each attempt on its part to enter into a dialogue with the ruling clas wil only serve 44s an opportunity for the later to strengthen the security ‘ofits domination fw confine ourselves to the Marxist example of the orgs nized class struggle which Glegel invokes, then itis evident that the strategic confrontation between classes and the interaction ‘between doctor and patient are not the sume thing. This model ‘an only be sed for normatively structuring the relationship be: toreen the Communist Party and the masses who let themselves be enlightened by the Party concerning their own situation, Ul for Marx the theory isthe same in both cases. I ean apply theories such as psychoanalysis (and the Marxist criuque of ideology) in ‘order to guide processes of reflection and to dinolve barriers to ‘communication; the authenticity ofthe recipient in hi relations ‘with himself and with others iv an indicator of the truth of the Some Dificultis in the Attempt to Link Theory and Proxis 9 inerpretation which the analyst (or the Party intellectual) has siggested, But I can also ne this same theory to derive an ex: planatory hypothesis, without having (or taking) the opportunity ‘of initiating communication with those actually concerned, and thus confirm my interpretation by their processes of reflection In this case I must remain satisfies with the ussal procedutes of scientific discourse: for example, whether the pater of behavior Ana the patterns of communication identied as pathological are repeated under spec conditions or change under other condi- tions, which permit one to assume that 2 process of reflection has taken place, ‘Then, to be sure, that gentine confirmation of the critique remains unattinable, a confirmation which can only bbe gained in communication of the type of therapeutic “dis courte,” that is, prectely in suecessal process of education [Biaing] voluntarily agreed ¢o by the recipients themselves. We ‘must distinguish between the level of theoretical discourse and the organization of procestes of enlightenment in thich the theory is applied. This organization can (initially) be confined to the groups distinguished by their situation of intrest, toward ‘which the enlightenment is directed. (OF couse, critique does not bear this mode of employment stamped on its forehead~not even the critique of poliial econ ‘omy. Thus Marx by no means excludes situations in whieh con- fidence in the opponents capability to carry ona dialogue is not i principle unjustified and in which the weapon ofeitque will fave greater effect than the critique of the weapons. These are situations in which the iniiaives of radical veformism, which seeks to pernuadle not only within the group, but also externally, fe moe promising than the revolutionary struggle. Aguin, in ‘other situations, i Becomes dificult in general wo distinguish the troupe at which active work of enlightenment can be directed from the opponents held captive by ideology; then all that re mains isthe dif disemination of insights individvally gained in the style of the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Iti thus, for example, that Adorno evaluated his own critique. fn the face of various sectarian enterprises, one might point ovt today that in advanced eapitalian changing the structure ofthe general sy tem of education [Bildungsnstem] might posibly be more ima Theory and Practice portant forthe organization of enlightenment than the inefectual training of cadres oF the building of impotent parties. With this only wish to state that these are empirical questions which must not be prejudged, There can be no meaningtal theory which per fe, and regards of the circumstances, obligates one to militancy. In any event, we can distinguish theories according to whether ‘or not in their structure they point toward posible emancipation. Historieal remarks on the question of organization “The mediation of theory and praxis can only be clarified if to begin with we distinguish thre functions, which are measured in terms of diferent criteria: the formation and extension of tical theorems, which can stand up to scientific discourse; the organization of processes of enlightenment, in which such the- forems are applied and can be tested in a unique manner by the Inidation of proceses of reflection carried on within certain froups toward which these processes have been directed; and the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical ques- tions, and the conduct of the political struggle. On the first level, ‘the aim is true statements, on the sew, authentic insights, and fon the third, prudent decisions. Because in the tradition of the European workingelass movement all three tasks at once were assigned to the party organization, the specie differences have become obscured. The theory serves primarily to enlighten those to whom it is addressed about the postion they occupy in an antagonistic socal system and about the interest of which they ‘must become conscious in this situation as being objectively theirs. Only to the degree that organized enlightenment and con sultation lead to those groups toward which this is directed 2c tally recognising themselves in the interpretations offered, do ‘the analytically proposed interpretations actually become con. sciousness, and does the objectively auributed situation of inter: sts actually become the real interest of a group capable of action. Marx, who viewed the industrial proletariat s the sole {group toward which he directed his analysis, called this constitu the mass of prolearins as "a clas for ive" OF course, Marx specified the objective conditions under which the com: Some Dificuties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxit 55 rmunists, already theoretically enlightened, were to organize the process of enlightenment for the mass of the workers The eco: homie compulsion for forming “worker? coalitions” and the socialization of labor within the factory system prodiced a com- ‘mon situation in which the workers would naturally be forced to lear to defend their common interests; the "eal subsumption of wage labor under capita” produced the equally ral basso which the participants could be made conscious of the political Significance of their economic struges, ‘The organizatfon of ation must be distinguished from this, proces of enlightenment. While the theory legitimize the work of enlightenment, at well ax providing its own refutation when ‘communication fails, and can, in any case, be corrected, it ean by no means legitimize « fortiori the risky decisions of strategic action. Decisions forthe political struggle cannot at the outset, be justified theoretically and thea be carried out organirationally. TThe sole possible justifcation at this level ix consensus aimed at in practical discourse, among the participants, who, in the com: sciousness oftheir common interests and their knowledge of the circumstances, of the predictable comequencer and secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know what ris they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations. There can be no theory which at the outset can attire a world-istorical amision in return for the potential sacrifices, The wle advantage ‘which Marx could have been permitted to anure to proletariat, acting in solidarity would have been that a lass, which with the aid ofa true ertique constitutes itself as a dass only then at all in position 19 make clea to itself in practical discourse how iis to ac politically ina rational manner—while the members of bourgeois partes and of the ruling class as such are ensmared in ideology and incapable of rationally clavfying practieal quer tions: thus they can only act and react under compulsion. Those three functions which I have distinguished cannot be futilled according to one and the same princple: 4 theory «an only be formulated under the precondition that there engaged in scientific work have the Freedom to conduct theoretical di- course; proceses of enlightenment (if they are to avoid exploita: tion and deception) can only be organized under the precondition“ Theory and Practice that those who carry out he active work of enlightenment com ‘mit chemlves wholly tothe proper precautions and asiure scope for communications on the model of therapeutic “discourses: finally, a political struggle can only be legitimately conducted under the precondition that all decisions of consequence vill ‘depend on the practical discourse of the purticipants—here t00, and especially here, there is no privileged access to wrath. An organization which tres to master all three of these task acord ing to the same principle will not be able to full any of them correclly. And even if this organization is succesful according to the anial criteria of merciless history, a8 Lenin's Party wat, it exacts the same price for its succes which ambivalent victories have always exacted il now in the unbroken continuity of a history subject to “natural” uncontrolled causality. In hie famous article "Methodieches rut Onganizationstage ("Toward a Methodology for the Problem of Onganiraion,” September 192s), Georg Lukics developed the most consistent formulation of 2 theory of the Party, one which solves the prob- Jem of the mediation of theory and praxis solely with a view to the imperatives of the conduct ofthe political stroggle, This ie the meaning of the thesis: “The organization is the form of the mediation between theory and praxis” © To begin with, Lakics subjects theory tothe requirements of strategic action: ‘Only posing the question with an organizational orientation rakes it possible to actualy eritcize the theory from the viewpoint of praxis. the theory is juxtaposed to an action without mediation, without it becoming clear how its eect fon the later is intended, thus, without making clear the ‘organizational links beeween them, then the theory iself «an only be eiicized with respect to its immanent theort- cal contradictions, and 40 forth. ‘That the truth ofa theory cam be teste independently of whether it is useful for certain discourses which are preparatory to ac tion is immaterial for Lukics. Theoretieal statements are to be selected from the point of view of organirational questions ‘Therefore any scope for scientific discourse within the Party is Some Dificulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxit 55 also prohibited. To permit i¢ would only further opportunism: ‘While for pure theory the most diverse views and directions can live side by side peaceably. while their oppositions asaume the form merely of discusions which can take place placdly within the framework of one and the sime organization without threat ‘ening to disupe it, the same questions, when they are given an organizational orientation, present themselves in the sharpest manner as directions which are mutually exclusive. Every ‘the ‘oretca” direction or divergence of views must immediately be transformed into an organizational issue if it is not to remain rere theory. an abstract opinion, if i rally has the intention of showing she path to its Yalization.” Lukics does not want to tolerate any indecision concerning, the validity of hypotheses. ‘Theoretical deviations are therefore tobe immediately subjected to sanctions on the organizational level Secondly, just like theory, the enlightenment of the proletariat salsa subordinated lunhesiatingly to the purposes of the Party leadership. To be ste lke Marx, Lukes sees the ask of the Party to consist in inducing the mass of the wage workers to atain “selE knowledge asthe knowledge of their objective situation ata ertain stage ‘of the historical development.” with the aid of 2 correct theory. But he by no means conceives ofthe efforts of the Communist Panty to develop proletarian class consciousness as a process of enlightenment, “in which all that is involved is rendering the lunconscious conscious, the latent actual, and 0 forth; in a beter formulation: in which this process of becoming conscious does not represent 2 terible ideological crisis for the proletariat it Sell" ® Like Lenin, Lukics is convinced thatthe proletariat is ‘sill powerfully enenazed in the forms of thinking and feeling of capitalism, that the subjective development lags behind the cconomic crises However, if “fom the absence of a clear and persistent will to revolution within the proletariat” one ie not to conclude “the absence of an objective revolutionary situs tion," if the “confit between individual consciousness and class consciousness in every single proletarian is by mo means sccidental;"* then the Party as the embodiment of class com: sciousness must act representatively forthe masses, and not allow itself to be made dependent on their spontancty. The PartyPa ‘Theory and Practice takes the fist conscious step it steers still backward protetars {nto a struggle, and only during the course ofthat struggle wil it constitateitelf a8 a class. Inthe Party the still backward class ray see a consciournes, anticipated but as yet inacesible to it, at leat a6 a fetish: "The organizational independence of the Party is necessity, so that the proletariat can directly perceive ite own class consciousness a8 ahistorical igure [Gestle." ‘ut with that, ultimately, the cheory is also withdrawn from ‘confirmation by the agreement of those whom itis to aid in the attainment of welfrellection. Ifthe Party, rendered organization lly independent, must exercise "the uninterrupted tactical con- sideration of the state of consciousness of the broadest and most backward mases,” then “here the function of the correct theory for the organisational problem of the Communist Party can be seen. The Party isto represent the highest objective form of proletarian action. However, for shat, correct theoretical insight is the abolute precondition.” The further theoretical develop- ment, of which Lukdes speaks at another place, is to be directed by the compulsive choice exercised by the organizational ques- tions: but ax far as the mases, which are mediatzed, are con- cerned, the theory is an unassailable objective authority ‘Organizational questions are not primary things. Between them and an objective philosophy of history Lukics has etab- lished a direct relationship. Stalnise praxis has furnished the fatal proof that a Party organization which proceeds instru: sentally and a Marxism which has degenerated into a science ‘of apologetics complement each other only coo well°* ‘During the last few years Oskar Nege has undertaken some unorthodox considerations on the question of organization. But i€ T understand him correctly, he himeelt still remaine captive ‘within the uadition in which the formation of theory and the ‘organization of enlightenment have not been separated from the ‘compulsions of strategic action with suficient igor. The ats tonomy of theory and enlightenment, however, is required for the sake ofthe independence of political action, No theory and. no enlightenment can relieve us of the risks of taking a partisan position and of the unintended consequences involved in this ‘Autempis at emancipation, which a the same time are attempt Some Dificulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Prexis 37 to realize the Utopian contents of the cultural tradition, can, under certain circumstances be rendered plausible 8 practical necessities, taking into consideration the conflicts generated by the sytem (which have to be explained theoretically) and the avoidable represions and suflering, But such attempts ate also tess, they est the limits within which human mature can be changed and above all, the limits of the historially variable structure of motivation, limits about which we poses no the: 1 knowledge, and in my view, cannot in prindple poses testing “practical hypotheses” of this kind, we, the subjects involved, are ourselves included in the design of the ‘experiment, then no barrier between experimenter and subjects can be erected. Instead, lsh participants most have the oppor: tunity to know what they are doing-thus, they mast form a common will discusively ‘There ae situations in the face of which sch considerations are either scurrilous or simply ridiculous; in sich situations we mus act as best we can-but then without appealing toa theory, whose capacity for jstifiation doesnot extend that fr. A remark on the objectivating application of reflexive theories ‘The status of 2 theory designed for enlightenment entails the distinctive characteristic that its clan to fon various level. The fst step of corroboration is sientif di- ‘course; there the claim to truth of theoretically derived hypoth- esis supported or refuted in the usual form of sclemtfic argue mentation. Natwlly a theory which does not survive di cursive examination must be rejected, and, of course, the claim to validity of retlexive theories can only be confirmed tentatively. But ican only be realized inthe succesful processes ofenlighten- rent, which lead to the aceptance by those concerned, free of any compulsion, ofthe theoretically derivable interpretations, To be sure, proceses of enlightenment, too, merely support the theory's claim to wth, without validating it, a8 long a all thowe __ potentially involved, to whom the theoretical interpretation has * relerence, have not had the chance of accepting oF rejecting thes Theory and Practice interpretation ofered under suitable circumstancer, From this results a reservation with respect to the application of reflexive ‘theories under the conditions of political struggle. Ieturn once again tothe doubts raised by Gadamer and Giese “The groupe which look upon themicives a theoretically enlightened (and which Marx in his time identified asthe avant fgrde ofthe Communists or also of the Party) must choose, with 4 view to their opponents, in each instance between enlighten: ‘ent and struggle, thus between maintaining and breaking off ‘communication. Even strugele, strategic action in the narcower| sense, must, of course, remain coupled to discourse within the avantgarde and the groups to which they direct their appeal. In these practical discourses, which divectly serve the organiza tion of the struggle, and not enlightenment, the opponent who has een excluded by the breaking off of communication (and aso the potential alles) can only be involved virtually. In rela tion to this, the interenting task is posed of explaining the op pponent’s temporary incapacity for” communication: in other ‘words, chus explaining the ideological compulsion which is sup- posed to result necessarily from his being bound to particular interest. This requires an objecivating application ofthe theory. For in explanations ofthis kin, critical of ideology, we presuppose ‘counterfactually uninterrupted natural (and nthe sense in cated above, dialectical) relation between the opponents. We abstract from the condition that our own group must claim, with the help of the same theory, t9 have understood the natural interzelationship, and thereby already have transcended it, Here we se that a reflexive theory can only be applied without com: twadiction under the condition of enlightenment and not thore of tzategic action. This diferenc is explicable ata consequence ofthe retrospective posture of reflection. ‘When and insofar a¢ itis succesful, the organization of enlightenment initiates procter of reflection. The theoretical interpretations in terms of which the subjects come to know them: selves and their situation are retrogpective: they bring to con Sciousness a process of formation [Bildungsprozess]. Thus the theory that creates consciousness can bring about the conditions “under which the sjtematie distortions of communi Some Dificulie in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis 59 solved and a practical discourse can then be conducted; but it does not contain any information which prejudges the future ac. tion of those concerned. ‘The paychoanalyst does not have the Fight either, to make proposals for prospective action; the patient rut drav his own conclusion as far as his actions ae concerned, The retrospective posture of reflection has the real that the en: lightenment i offers does enable us to extricate ourselves from a (ialectica)incerrelationship of distorted communication. But 10 the extent to which the theory brings us enlightenment about our captivity within this ntereationaip, it alto disrupts the Inter, ‘herefore the demand to uct dialectcally with insight is senseless, cis based on a category mistake, We only act within an imterrela tionship of systematically distorted communication as long as this interrelation perpetuates itself because it has not been under stood i its asenes by us or anyone else. Therefore theory cannot have the same function for the organization of action, of the ‘The pracical consequences of sellefection are changes in at tue whieh result fom insight ino the causaities in the past, and indeed result of themselves. In conuas, strategic action oriented foward the future, which i prepared for in the internal discus: sions of groups, who (a the avantgarde) presuppore for then selves already succesfully completed proceses of enlightenment, ‘annot be justified in the same manner by reflective knowledge, “The declaration, critical of ideology, of the temporary i capacity for dialogue on the part ofthe strategic oppo Subject to the hypothetical proviso that dicourse, wh posible under the given circumstances, will alone be able to Aecide the wath of the theory, once this discourse is held among all the participants, Of course, the objective application of a re- fexive theary under the conditions of strategic action isnot ile sitimate in every respect. It ean serve to interpret hypothetically the constellations ofthe strugele, from the viewpoint that every viewry sought would not merely (a is usual) lead tothe assertion ‘of one particular interest against another, bt instead would be a step toward the intended goal, which would make universal en Tightenment, and by virwe of it, the uninhibited discursive for mation of wil, posible for all participants (and thus no longer© Theory and Practice merely those affected). Seen from that anticipated goal, such in- terpretaions are retrospective. Therefore, for strategic action and for the maxims by which the decisions in the dicourse that pre- pares for this action are justified, these interpretations open up 2 perspective, But the objctivating interpretations themselves ca- not claim 2 justfcatory function: for they must comprehend counterfacually one's own action, which now is only being planned (and the reactions of the opponent, 35 a moment of a collective process of education or consciousness formation which isnot yet concluded. In contrast, dhe certainty ofselfreBection is ‘based on the remembered proces of selt-formation, which in pre sly that act of remembering, is relegated tothe past ‘That the strategic action of these who have decided to en ‘gage in struggle, and that means to take risks, can be interpreted [hypothetically aba retrospection which is posible only in anti ppition, but at the same time not compellingly justified on this level withthe aid of a reflexive theory, has its good reason: the ‘indicating superiority of those who do the enlightening over those who are tobe enlightened is theoretically unavoidable, but at the same time itis fictive and requires sltcorrection; in a process of enlightenment there can only be participants, The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy In Aristotle's opus the Potties is part ofthe practical philos- ‘phy. Is tradition reaches even into the nineteenth century ll itis finally broken of conclusively by the eiique of Historia And its course dries up even more completely, the more its ext resis are diverted ino the channels of the speifc aciences, Thus, since the end ofthe eighteenth century, the newly emerging voial Sciences and the discipline of jurisprudence have drawn of the waters of dasical polities. This process of separation from the body of practical philosophy has ended, forthe time, with the ‘establishment of political science on the model of the modern ‘experimental scienes, having little more than the name in com ‘mon with the old politics Wherever we sill encounter the later, i sems hopelessly old-fashioned to us ts jusifcation was com tested as Jong ago a8 the beginning of the modern period within the framework of philosophy itself; when, in the middle of the seventeenth century, Hobbes oecupied himself with “the matter, forme and power of a commonwealth," he was no longer doing politic in the manner of Aristotle, but rather socal philosophy. ‘Two hundred years beloce is final defeat, he resolutely rejected the classical tradition. He completed the revolution in approach, in the whole manner of thinking, which had been initiated in political philosophy by Machiavelli on one side, by Thomas More fon the other. The old politics has become alien to all of ws, espe * cally in thee respects: ”* Theory and Practice (2) Politics was understood toe the doctrine of the good and just life; it was the continuation of ethics Aristotle saw no ‘opposition between the consittion formulated in the nomoi and the ethos of cv lie: conversely, the ethical character of action eas not separable from custom and law. Only the poitia makes the citizen capable of the good life: and he is altogether a z00n politton, inthe sense that he is dependent on the city, the pots, for the realization of his human nature? In Kant, in contrast, the ethical conduct of the individual who is free only inwardly is clearly distinguished from the legality of his external ations. And just as morality is separated from legality, so the ewo in turn are Separated from pole, which is accorded a most dubious rle as the technical expertie in a utilitarian doctrine of prudence (@) The old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to praxis, inthe narrow sense of the Gree. This had nothing to do ‘with techne, the skllfal production of artifacts and the expert mastery of objected tasks In the final insanee, polities was always directed toward the formation and cultivation of char acter, it proceeded pedagogically and not technically. For Hobbes, fn the other hand che maxim promulgated by Bacon, ofsientia bropter potentian, is seltevident: mankind owes ite greatest ad ‘ances to technology, and above al othe politcal technique, or the corect establishment ofthe state (@) Aristocle emphasizes thar politics, and practical philos ‘ophy in general, cannot be compared in is claitn to knowledge ‘wih a rigorous science, withthe apodictc episteme. For it ube ject matter, the Just and the Excellent, in its context of a variable And contingent praxis, lacks ontological constancy a8 well 38 log: feal nocesity. The capacity of practical philosophy is Phronens, a prudent understanding of the situation, and on this the ta. tion ofclasial polities has continued to base isl, by way ofthe rudentia of Cicero, down to Burke's “prudence.” Hobbes, on the other hand, wishes to make politics serve to secure knowledge of the essential nature of justice itself, namely of the les and com pacts. This assertion aleady complies with the ideal of knowledge ‘originating in Hobbes's time, the ideal ofthe new scence, which plies that we only know an object to the extent that we our selves can produce it The Classical Doctrine of Politics “ Vico's reckoning of gains and losses in his comparison of the modern and the casial method of study Hobbes commences the wentyninth chapter of Leviathan with the confident atsertion: “Though nothing can be immortal ‘which mortals make: yet, fmen had the use of reason they pres ‘o, their Commonwealth might be secured, ales, om peishing by internal diseases... Therelore when they come to be dis solved, not by external violence, bu intestine disorder, the fault is notin men, as they are the Matter, but as they are the Makers, and orderer of them.” In this the three aforementioned aspects ofthe distinction between the modern and the clasical approach are implicit. Fist, the claim of sienifeally grounded social pi losopity aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct order of the state and society as such. Is asertions are to be valid independently of place, time, and circumstances, and are to permit an enduring foundation for communal lif, regaré less ofthe historical situation, Second, the translation of know! ‘ee into practice, the application, isa teneal problem, With a Enowledge af the general conditions for a cotrect order of the state and of society, practical prudent action of human beings toward each other is no longer required, but what is required intead is the correctly calculated generation of rales, relation ‘hips and institutions. Third, human behavior is therefore to be row considered only as the material for scence. The engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social in tercourse and confine themselves othe construction of conditions ‘under whic Inman beings, jos like objects within nature, wil necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replace instruction in leading 4 good and jus life with making possible a life of well-being within a cor rectly instituted ot “To be suse, “order” thereby changes its meaning, just ax Aes the “domain” which is being ordered—the subject matter of political scence iselt i changed. The order of virtuous conduct [s changed into the regulation of vocal intercourse. The displace: nt ofthe scientific object corresponds tothe change in method:“4 Theory and Practice ‘logical approach which has just been indicated. Poltes becomes the philosophy ofthe sca 30 that today scientific politi can, with justfeation, be counted among the socal science. Since the claigcation, which Max Weber brought about, in the socalled value judgment controversy, and the precise defn. tion ofa postiviste “logic of inveigation,”# the socal sciences nave been separated completely from the normative elements that were the heritage of clasial politics, a heritage now quite for otten-that, in any ase, was how the matter presented itll to these sciences understanding of themwclves in the philosophy of science. But social philosophy already had been forced to conc its normative implications from ite: it was no longer permitted to admit to those elements of moral doctrine sil adhering to it; the normative determinations were submerged in equivocation about “nature"-human nature and that of human insivtions In cal philosophy both are still current issues its descent fom Classical polities and its determined rejection ofthe lae’s prin- ple. But i would be much mote dificult to work thit ont systematically in terms ofthe antinomies contained in the critical epistemology which formulates the modern social sciences un derstanding of themselves. Therefore, itis more appropriate to attempt ahistorical explication ofthe problem: how is knowledge of the social interrelationships of life wih a view to politieal 36: tion posible? How, within a political situation, can we obtain clarification of what is practically necessary and at che same time ‘objectively posible? This question can be translated back into ‘ur historical context: how can the promise of practical politice— namely, of providing practical orientation about what is right and jus in a given situation—be redeemed without relinquishing, fon the one hand, the rigor of scientific knowledge. which modern social philosophy demands in contrast to the practical philosophy of clasicsm? And on the other, how can the promise of social Philosophy, to furnish an analysis of the interrlationships of social life, be redeemed without relinguishing the practical or entation of clasial polities? On the road voward science, socal philosophy has lost what polities formerly was capable of providing as prodence, This loss ‘The Classical Doctrine of Politics 6 ot hermeneutic power in the theoretical penetration of situations which were o be mastered practically war recognized as early a ‘Vico, who, fom the viewpoint ofthe humanistic thetorical trad tion, presented the new philosophy inaugurated by Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes with a reckoning of profits and loses: But now to speak of prudence in civic life, as human afans are governed by chance and choice, both of which are highly “uncertain... therefore thote who solely have truth in view only with difcuty understand the paths which these affairs take and, with stil greater dificult, their goals... . Thue Deas one has to judge what i to be done life according to the weight ofthese things and their encumbrances, which are called circumstances, and many of them may possibly be Steange and incoherent, and some of them frequently wrong and at times even opposed the goal the actions of men cannot be measured with the straight ruler of the under standing, whit is rigid... The imprudent scholars, who ago directly from the universally true co the singular, rupture the interconnections of life. The wise men, however, who attain the ecernal truth by the uneven and insecure paths of practice, make 2 detour, a iti not posible to attain tie by direct road; and the thoughts which there conceive promise useful for along time, at least insofar as nature Vico retains the Aristotelian dstinetion berween scence and prudence, pisteme and phroness: while science sims at "eternal “ruil,” making statements about what is always and necessarily so, practical prudence is only concerned with the “probable.” Vico shows how this lauer procedure, precisely becuse it makes leser theoretical claims, brings greater certainty in practice. He points to thetoric, which employs primarily the capacity of Dhronesis and the art of “topics”: “Of the orators we demand above all that they be capable, under the presses of negotiations ‘which permit no delays or postponement... of rendering fan: _ mediate aid. However, wen one places any doubstul propositionat In a a a a ot eszes 6 Theory and Practice before our cra itt, they will reply: Tet me mediate a while on this”# “This point to a dates! relation that has only become fully clear with the development ofthe vocal sciences of our day: 10 the degree to which poi is sientcally rationalized, and praxis is inaructed theeretcally by tecnica recommendation, theresa growth af hat residual complec of problems, in the face ‘of which the analysis of the experimental sciences must onfes incompetence. On the basso division of labor between the ene pirical sienees and the seting of norms no subject to scene tevitcation, there a growing scope or pure detson: oa rowing “degre the genuine area of praxis withdrawn altogeter from thedsipline of metho inesigation* In his polemics gaint the socal philosophy of his Une, Vico anipated a tendency hich has fly sterted self oly today. Uncertainty with respet tb acon grows greater, the more rigorous the citer for sien {ie verigeaton selected for this domain. Vico therfore rejeca the presumption of modern philosophy to “carey the method of scientific judgment over ito the practice of prudence" The founding of paccal philosophy a a sence, which Bacon" had demanded and Hobbes fist promised o ata, appears mit Buide to Veo. But here he fails to see that the new methodical Sppracl alo cicloses a new objec, the compte o interrelation Ships of social life To be sure, “scientise”objecivation (only much later will i become permissible tos: the rigorous objec tivation of experimental scence) detaches the soa to wich an extent frm the praxis of life tat the application ofthe insights The soverign ust see to it hat he enables as many size a posible o ve comfortably a human nature per nits by mean ofthe ewe pone lv le maintain pence veraly and defends the pnt gunn exter ences hat very ize can be “enriched and “enjoy Rarmlo ibery." Toes constructs weregny in atrdance with Natal Law, beeus the legiimating enon ofthe ate to ake pt bie ber vcey Bus thats nly one seo the mater For Ivorder to bring about such a olety he most construc over tigny in te frm of abslute power thi ie explained by it Machlavelian pesopprion:& ate of mature which ix com pletely polities, in which everyone fears death and herefore feck to amerthimel by all pone means in fea death ‘rps, Tht condition can only be seminal by state of pct when the ear oa men, hat they must contol ve {en inducs them to ave single shorty with 1 monopay of pial forces that can compel alt herp the peace To Be tre chy pay this price in the expectation et the able ‘The Clasical Doctrine of Poliies 6 power will be exerived in the service of a Uberal society. The uthority of the state must be absolute, abolved even from this lawter expectation, if che natural force of the political is 10 be tamed at allman argument which even Kant found unanswer- abl, co the extent that he disavowed any right of revstance to the power of the state. However, Hobbes catrics this argument still further. The dialeaical way in which politi natural force is tamed by means of a second nature, embodied in sovercignty founded in contract, requites, ofcourse, thatthe laws of civil ir tercourse are 1o be provided, a it were, wholesale by the general ‘dause of the social contract, and tha these lave can only be given inthe exelusve form of sovereign commands (euctoritas non ver: fas jcitlegem). But the dialectic is only fulfilled through the ‘stipulation thatthe judgment isl of whether these commands correspond to the expectations of the socal contrat, must be te served exclusively forthe sovereign. For without this proviso hi sovereignty would ot be absolute, and that, of course, was the ‘reupposition™ The sovereign not only legates all Jaws, but itis alo he alone who determines whether they cor respond with the Natural Law of the scil contract. Not only cat hhe never do an injustice, but he eannot even aet in a recognis- bly immoral manner.® Asa consequence, the distinction between monarchy and tyranny, between legitimate and despotic rule, i inadmnisible in practice." .. He is said to he a king who governs well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise, The case therefore is Drought to this past, chat a king legitimately constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of aking, and if not, count him tyrant.” In Hobbes too, Machiavelli in the end carves the day over More In the end he cannot rid himelf ofthe spite he has conjured up at che beginning of his system. The iberal jut fication ofthe state is devoured by the sates absoluiem,* and sn thi itis indeed 4 Leviathan ‘This dialetic, in which the liberal contents of Natoral Law are sacrificed tothe absolutist form of its sanctions, can be related to the methodological dificultes that formed our point of de parture. The norms of Natural Reasoa ultimately fall prey to the Tmechanies of natural dsites from which they were initially de-. ‘Theory and Practice rived. For obedience to theie norms must be secured by means of sanctions which are calculated in terms of the physics of huaan " paure: thus laws become commands inthe sense of a psycolog- ally calculated compuisive motivation, Inthe end the sanction ing force, compelling by natural laws in the causal sense, gains ‘control over the natural laws in the normative sense, even i it does so in their name. In the preface to De Cive Hobbes warns his readers to respect this relationship in their practical conduct 1 persuaded myself... that you will estem it beter to enjoy yourselves in the present stat, though perhaps not the best. than by waging war endeavor to procure a reformation for other men in another age, yourselves in the meanwhile cither killed or consumed with age ‘The second antinomy: the practical impotence ofthe rience of power as rcial technique ‘Only at this poin, where Hobbes reflects on the relationship of his theory to the politcal praxis of his fellow citizens, isthe truly problemati character revealed ofthat derivation of norma tive laws from exusal ones, the founding of relationships of justice fon the inviolable laws of nature, o which the attempt to found ‘cial philowophy a8 3 science bas led. Hobe, 10, pursues this icience with the approach of a technician he appropriates ‘Bacon's maxim that sience only serves power; theory only serves ‘onstruction; and in the end all knowledge only ix directed toward an action or an achievement ™ Hobbes investigates the ‘mechanics of social relations in the same way as Galileo invest ‘gates that of motion in mature" For as ina watch, or some such small machine [an analogy by which nature a a whole was interpreved at that time LHL], the matte, gure, and motion of the wheels cannot ‘well be known, except it be taken insunder and viewed i Darts: So to make a more curious search into the rights of ‘ates and duties of subjects, its necessary say, not to take ‘The Classical Doctrine of Plies n ‘em insunder, but yet that they be considered a if were dissolved that i, chat we rightly understand what the quality of human natace is, in what matters it, in what ‘ot, Bt to make up cis] government, and how men must be agreed among themselves that intend to grow up into a wel: grounded state The relationship of theory and praxis is defined in accordance with the model of clasical mechanics. The xientife analyis of the relationships of lf, objctifed ss an objet of nature, informs us about the causal lawfulness according to which existing states reproduce themselves itis less interested in the factual history of the origin of specific institutions than in the general conditions| for the functioning of human socal life. The construction of Natural Law can be understood as a general physics of sociation With its knowledge concerning the basic character and consti tion of human nature, ie specifies those institutional arrange ments, the physically effective compulsive force of which can be ‘expecied to produce the natural modes of reaction that wil lead to an orderly cohabitation of human beings. This i the mechan ics ofthe societal state, while the state of nature is the epitome of all those disturbances which can be predicted with certainty ‘when the institutions are inefecual or totally lacking, Aeacience ko proceeds by means of causal analysis inthe domain of social philosophy, the construction of Nataral Law serves o expin the Tunetioning of sate apparatines. This knowledge can be applied prognostically and can serve to reorganize a governmental order that i threatened. Hobbes leaves no doubt sbout the technologicat selfunder- standing of a socal philosophy established as 2 science: “Now the greatest commodities of mankind are the arts; namely, of ‘measuring matter and motion; of moving ponderous bodies: of architecture; of navigation: of making instruments forall uses of ‘aleulating the celestial motions, the aspects ofthe stars, and the parts of time... Philosophy, therefore, isthe cause of all theve bbenefs"*" And in the same way, a scientific soci philosophy can be of use, to an even greater degree than the philosophy of” ‘Theory and Practice But the utlity of moral and civil philosophy is to be et mated, not so much bythe commodities we have by knowing these sciences, as by the calamities we receive from not know- ing them. Now, all such calamities as may be avoided by human indunry, aise from war, but cielly from cl wat for from this proceed slaughter, solitude, andthe want of ll things But the cause of war isnot that men ae willing to nave it; forthe will has nothing for object but good, atleast that which seemeth good. Nort from this, that men know rot that the effects of war ate evil; for who is there that thinks not poverty and loss of life to be great evil? The ‘ause, therefore, of civil war ie, that men know not the ‘causes neither of war nor of peace... But why have they fot learned them, uns fr tis reason, that none hitherto Thave taught them in clear and exact method? ™ ‘Thus because, before Hobbes, the Cartesian demand fora method had no been put forth regarding the foundations of vocal pilor ophy, the classical doctrine of polities could never attain re knowledge In posession ofthe new method, Hobbes for the rt time develops & physics of sociation. As soon as insight into the mechanic of the societal tate has been gained, the technically required arrangements can be fashioned ¢o produce the correct social and politieal order. “To be sure, from this the ificlty arises thatthe technicians who instal the “correct” order must be drawn from the circle of Sirens who, athe same time, as members ofan existing “faulty” ‘order, aso constitute the abjects ofthis adentfic knowledge. The same human beings whose behavior was initially conceived a5 an object of nature, in the necessary causal interconnections of inst tonal compulsions and modes of reaction given with hman nature, must atthe same time assume the role of subjects who, with the knowledge of these inerrelatonships, are to fashion the Deiter arrangements, They ae just as much objects ofthe cond tions to be investigated, as subjects of the conditions to be changed. “Thus the same dificulty which arose in the genetic approach to considering the social contract, where the normative constraint ‘The Clastcal Doctrine of Politics a was to arise out of natural causality, is now repeated inthe teh nological imterpretation of the relation of theory to praxis a the first case, Hobbes can point t0 the heuristic character of the artificially constructed sate with the argument that all sates which in fat aroe by virtue of despotic force can still be con Ceived ar though the power oftheir sovereigns arose from recip focal contractual obligation. However, in the acteal application of his socal philosophy Hobbes must again have recourse to the [ctional roe of» constitutive asembly of citizens. For this own, doctrine isto have any practical consequences, it must be gener- ally published and accepted by the mass of the citizens. The tdtizens must come to understand through public argumentation nd to recognize that under the name of “natural laws" his doc: twine enunciates objetive needs and recommends what is prac: tically necessary in the general interes ‘But now on the contrary, that neither the sword noe the pen should be allowed any cesation; that the knowledge of the law of nature should lowe ite growth, not advancing 8 whit beyond its ancient stature; that there should sil be uch asin with the several factions of philosophers, that the very stme action should be decied by some, and as ‘much elevated by other. these 4) are so many sgas, ‘so many manifest argoments, that what hath hitherto been vwritten by moral philosophers, hath not made any progress inthe knowledge ofthe tath; but yet hath took with the ‘world not 4 meh by giving any light tothe understanding ‘i entertinment to the affections whilst by the succesful ‘hetorcations of thir spesch they have confirmed them in thee rathly conceived opinions In this passage Hobbes polemicizes aginst the topical treat rent of the subject matter in the old politics and against the humanistic thetoric of his contemporaries in whom the clasical tradition sill Lved on. Half a century later he was answered by Vico's metacritique of the attempt to replace practical prudence by 4 methodologically rigorous science of socal philosophy, "as ‘they [the representatives of the new method) have not developed" ‘Theory and Practice the general sense and have never sought to establish the probabil ities, being quite content withthe ruth alone, 3 they do not on- sider what men ara whole think ofthese things and whether they aso have the impresion of truth... "The ancient Roman there {ore rightly aked what the case ‘appears to be and judges and senators formulated their opinions 10 a to include the words ‘it teens!” Vico hits on the dificlty with which Hobbes has wres tle in vain, The scientifically established theory of socal action fails to include the dimension of praxis to which the classical doc- ‘tine offered direct access. Social philosophy constructed after the rmadlel of modern physics, namely, with the atitude ofthe tech nian, can only reflect the practical consequences of is own teachings within the limits of technological selevidence. Hobbes can only repeat in a stereotype manner: For were the nature of human actions at distinctly ‘known asthe nature of quantity in geometrical gures (that js, not only in geometry bat also in the philsophy of nature rendered a scence by the geometrical method). HJ, the strength of aoarice and ambition, which is sustained by the ‘erroneous opinions of the vulgor touching the nature of foirr and wnowe, would presently fsint and languish; and ‘mankind would enjoy such an immoral peace, that ‘there would hardly be lee any pretence for wa." ‘But both the mechanistic presuppositions of his method as wel asthe absoluie consequences of his doctrine exclude the posi: ity that, out of their insight alone, men will be ready to sbmit to the authority ofthe sate. Hobbes presumes thatthe knowledge provided by socal philosophy, whore certainty obviates pubic Aiscussion, has practical results But the posibillty of these results cannot be accounted for within the framework of his tal phi lesophy iselfthe relationship of theory to praxis can no longer be explained theoretically ‘From the perspective ofthis dilemma, Hobbes would have to subject his doctrine to revision, together with its clan to complete certainty in questions of social action. For unlike the ‘mere technical application of scientific results, the translation of ‘The Closical Doctrine of Politics hry nt pans i fc wth the tak fencing ito the ca ‘rlounen sid the comvigios of ines repute tat thee Fel sltane mat be interpret in cone situations 2 the Pracally neuary sou forthe saan of jee teiicinded, thy mnt be concived fom the very ste tithin this perspective of acting human bingy Tein ise that Vico recommen the art af rere which “brows deal with the sence o whic it addres” Tis are ens that tte which are to have consumes rei seems prey atine: thi he sober of wh in the sm ‘ommants of csens paripating in pu dscanion A teary wheal Sst wi te span fhe thea, to secre contol ener proce are will enum apie tnoier when i i wamonel tote dovain af 2 pedagopal tuned moa! phitnophy, Conta ver he process of sare seal diferent fom contol oer wil ores cve i in ‘he end the Iter were toe vied out in the ame ane the former (hich swt socil teil planning with anced indowral odes reqs today)" pei melon Shrough the concious ofthe cen who isc and act (werhande nd handy il ede” The ae ofthe tee Neal domination a atten principe solitary and sees tree trom any negotiated agreement mang ace sbjece wh vith to contol their vocal tations praca, Neverthe, {en in this pet sient wocal phish, im 4s ruta, emalasdognl for echnical spite ois etal Tobe Stein Hobbes he uncool lene in he communication Seen ctiensdiacsing and acing togerher-by whieh the conta oer sit is dalectialy dtp (except i the xe of complete manipulation) =i preserved inthe moment of com ling the contact, but thi feted again immediatly by fechas ecg the norman compulion generated by the conract to the cll conpution a lnainceal amas uur This unig lent, which Hobbes was ble tos. pret within hie theory. will not Howener, be hid to et ft Snancereappens anew inthe tempt interpret theory feel “chnolgially at praxis Hobbes surance tat sol plo topical ight oy roqire methologial certainty inorder6 Theory and Practice to become, without any detours, the practical certainty of citizens encowed with politcal insight, only reveals the impotence of any thinking which abstacs away the dstintion between control Hing and acting The relation between theory and praxis inthe social philos ‘phy of the eightenth century. The problem of «dialectical ‘eversion of socal theory to the experiential horizon of prac fical consciousness. ‘The farther development of racial philosophy during the eighteenth century can be comprehended as a reply tothe ques tionable aspects, indicated here, of this frst atlempe 10 make ‘lasical politics into science. For this continuation of the de- ‘velopment, two trends are characteristic The fst is the attempt {o ground the natural laws ofthe social condition directly in the Jaws of nature, in such @ way that the precarious transition from the fact of nature, represented by a war of all against all to the [Natural Law norma of the civil state can be avoided, and in the same way, the antinomies which are linked to this transition ‘Asis well known, Locke made the order of property of hourgeis Society as such the natural basis of state power founded on con- tract; but he formulated the laws of bourgeois society and its state in terms of Natural Lave, From there it was but a step to the ‘conceptions of Politis! Economy, inthe second haf of the eigh- teenth century, which decared these laws to be che natural laws ‘of society tell When, finally, Kant again took up the problem of the origins as posed by modern socal philosophy, which Hobbes had developedin Kans view, the problem is to organize a group of rational beings who together re- ‘quire universal laws for their survival, but of whom each feparate individual is vecretly inclined to exempt himself from them, the constitution must be s0 designed that, al though the citiens are opposed to one another in their p ‘ate attitudes, these opposing views may inhibit one another {nsuch a way thatthe public conduct of the cians wil be the same af they did noc have such evil atitudes™™ The Classical Doctrine of Politics n when Kant returned to this problem, he was already familiar ‘with the economie answer to his question, which for rhetorical purposes he had once more formulated in terms of Natural Lav. In the advanced Western countries the sphere of trade in com: rmodities and of social labor had’ meanwhile become separated from the regulation by the supreme sate authority, 40 that the “natural order” could now be understood terme of the cate fgories of the laws of motion governing this “civil society.” the Société civil itslf® ‘But still more significant for out problem is the other ten dency, which, ill only adambrated in Locke, becomes prominent in the various economic schools of the eighteenth century: the theory of civil society is complemented by 4 doctrine of 2 pubs lie sphere of politic. Theory, which in its scientific structure is designed for technical application, fails to relate properly, a8 we have sen, to the praxis of citizens who deliberate and act: i therefore requires correction by a body of doctrine, appended in ‘a peculiar manner; this appendage i, 10 be sure, not considered [a¥t of the theory iil, but merely a its practical complement ‘The Physioerat” wish to install the monarch as in praxis the guardian of the “Natural Order” of socety which they have analyzed theoretically: the monarch, however, does not gui i fight into the las ofthe ordre naturel dieectly be must allow this insight 10 be mediated for him by the public éelairé. Hobbes papered over the dimension of the transfer of theory into praxis. [Now itis opened up aguin under the tue of “public opinion,’ the concept of which was preciely defined forthe first time within the cirle of the Physiocrats. L’opinion publique is the enlight. ened result ofthe common and public rellection, uided by the philosophers asthe representatives of modern acience—a rele. tion on the fundamental bases of the social order: it comprehend the natural laws of this order in the form of the practical cer- ity of active tzene: it doesnot roe, but the enlightened ruler will Rave to comply with ite insight. A liberalize version ofthis doctrine ofthe public phere of, polities cam be found at the same time in the economists and Saciologsts who belong to the tradition of Scotish moral pilos- ‘phy. They go further than the Physiocratsand make the mediat-B Theory and Practice {ng function of pubic opinion a consi part ofthe theory of Gul voety wel, which they exend in the dzeton of phils phy af history. The “natural tory ov sey” eomeived whe aw governed progres of mankind’ clviaon “rom dene ocean’ it enbraces the development to Wand ier eit inthe economic andi the plea sense In acordance with This» politcal public phere anos to the tune dager a the natura avs ofthe market art three With dhe ascendancy of he private, autonomous exchange of com Ios this wll lend tothe equlaton of vocal rank and to {cents ofc sgh of equality. The evationary concep of soiry ths assures the theory of prior and unconstrained forreyndence wth public opinion. Brune the physics af oxi timin tis weson extended ino the pilsopy of history. as onze the progres of pactalconoumes tbe anecenary ‘ne tds not ned to imerpe tration to praxis technolo {ely The seiloy ofthe Seta thinkers could confine vet te an interplay wih poi public sphere hat was ready to “ntti huteay” in oer to give inva action an vient tion in fathering practalyin the narrow ense—the histor fel process A the theory knew that twain Barony withthe teria proces i i ot have to srt the cians on Bow they could organi scl progres Tne cn atin te phiosphical certainty concerning the course of history as 2 whole tothe sme degree that piss can forthe course of nature then the probe ofthe reation betwen theory and procs n0timluble In principle, the pilosphy of history cn then extend prediction othe comequenes of Crafersing sown tenchings imo the procs o acting eens Cn the other hand i easy ro sce that precy ths extravagant gh of knowledge not oe stained by flowing the pri Ciples of rigorous sence "The doctrine ofthe politcal pubic Sphere could ot be integrated into the theory of civil ocey— {Ee claonsp of which theory to pra wat lye fut changing the structure ofthis thcory tel. In ther ratber facie evoluttonise, the Scots were aware of thi just a le a tere their French contemporaries inte liner philawphis ot Niwory* The Classical Doctrine of Politics 7” ‘The problem was now posed thus: if, im addition, Social Philosophy wishes wo clatfy its own relationship to praxis theo retical, and if this sim lends it into the dimension of antiipat- ing, in the manner of philosophy of history, the. practical consciousness of politically active citizens-then obviously the ‘methodological ignorance ofthe difference between control and action, on which the technically oriented sience is baved, cannot be allowed to continue. Instead, 2 seientifially founded social phi losophy which reflects on itielf in the manner of philosophy of history must be concerned with a methodological approach which, fon the one hand, wll correspond to 2 clarifieation of practical consciousness, but onthe other, will not relinguish that method: ical rigor which isthe ireersible achievement of modern science, The problem which arose with Hobbes, which the Physiocrate Sought to take into account and the Scots sought to solve; the problem which goes back ultimately to the deficiency of the ‘movin method of investigation compared to that ofthe Ancients a5 noted by Vico-is that the moderns achieve the rigor oftheir theory at the cost of access to praxis. This problem of thearet- ically satistactory mediation between theory and praxis obviously required a revision of scentifi socal philesophy trom the specific viewpoint of the classical doctrine of polities, imofar a i wae able to se itself as the prudent guide to praxis. And froma he viewpoint of modern science, to be sure, methodological rigor in pursuit of sis perspective isnot to be sirifce. ‘Vico stil asignet to the old polities the topical procedure of rhetoric; this procedure never claimed to represent ascitic method. The only method that, at leas as far as the mame was concerned, was practiced both in theoretical as well as in practical philosophy, was the at of disputation-dislecics*" To be sin ‘ccording tothe studies of Kapp there can hardly be any doubt {ht for Aristotle science does not in principle, or for systematic rea sons, depend on the employment af dilecis, but uses t only for pedagogic purposes it serves to introduce the student to know fee, and of course the scientist, 09, inslar ashe will remains 2 student. Seen from thie point of view, dialectics i the discourse of instruction and merely a prolegomenon to rigorous analysis, ‘Buc in the context of practical philosophy, dialectics did not sem5 Theory and Practice {exhaust its function within such propaedeatics. Thus, rhetorie indeed served the end of effective recommendation and warning: it aimed a decision, atthe action of the citizen. In those cases, however, where rhetoric was involved with the actual mater under discussion, the orator was engaged in the philosophical transe- tion of practical pradence within the specif sphere of Politics. For this Aristotle recommends the topical procedure asa dialee- tical one; taking ats point of departure something familiar to ‘us, such ay traditionally or authoritatively legitimized and 2c ‘cepted points of view, commonplaces, and rules, i lads diaee- tially to heir confirmation in the practical tasks of a given Situation. The logical force of such topos is validated ia the sab- ‘ordination of particular cases under Poles, rues which in turn ‘can only be explained in terms oftheir schematic application to ‘concrete particulars. In so doing, dialectics does not aim at estab ishing premises, as do the propaedeutic preparations to an apo- diese science. As exercise of reflective judgm partiet mutually instruct exch other, it instead accomplishes the Eubwumption of specific cases under schemata gained by prior understanding, and is more suitable to the hermeneutics of situ: ations experienced in life and for the purposes of attaining a Consensus among politically active citizens. ‘Obviously thsi the form of the dinlectic from which Hegel ‘departs But Hegel stands abreast of modern science. He invokes dialectics forthe methodically certain refection of scence on ‘elf; the primacy of topics over analytics, which the thetorician Vico only auserted peagoically against the theoeetcans of bis ‘ime (for the sequential order of thei studies), Hegel, much more boldly, turns into the methodological primacy ofthe dialectical procedure over the analytic in the investigation of the things themselves In this way he can also attack, ina wholly novel ma ner, tat dificulty which prevented social philosophy from carry ing out sucessfully its sien approach. For 28 we sa, socal Philosophy was deprived ultimately of ite really meaningful Achievement, the certainty of universally valid statement, even by its own criteria, because it was only able to make reassuring dlaims about the practical consequences of its own teachings, with ‘out being able to attain theoretical certainty in the most impor- The Classical Doctrine of Politics a tan point: how “the furthering of hmmm ie” could actually be brought aboot by puting theory int pas By comprehening with that we are sying, within te oF pevenal horn of racial consioumesHegel i abe ‘ole [sblte]scenically based sci philosophy i ai Teal theory of sot, and therchy tele. ant develop the ssteores in sacha wy tat tis theory tener sep guided fn permested by the selfconsoumnes of fo ow telatonship opm2 Natural Law and Revolution hold ot hereon coral the sion that the Reston veel i nt pu om Pilbophy This aur abscreton yt lle Hep! kd fre he ech ‘couton ondewatingof tall among terme of hat ine [Sad tenme sconmonpne that ie Revolt had was iene pst from ns nto elt Plnophy here meant the pip of rane Natura wt toe wee the pie ofthe new ction A gestion Iter he soi sent of psp te sil ingen te words of Hegel 3 Be tok bac ath unesot ecient that ta es had Ste plone though thr bb sd had contrac poll eat sending 1 bore tess pipe deandng of Tei ietetatonof Newel Ean the baton ot itnopy rom the ey Degg an init etic swe op ne eon how Pian pnt ne then mye ett pn tounge mane tt lop The “oeton of Sata Se pvp opt wh relay ‘Mes ba oreddboot elt ors nh pe Stone Now Ama sti om he mother ny Ini lt he nina ono of al eeton There hora nd weit reno 5p ‘s Naturel Law end Revolution 85 plying the concept of the bourgeois revolution objectively to ‘much earlier evens; thus, for example, those which ted to the secession of the Netherlands from the Spanish Crown, But st jectively the appeal at that time was to the preservation of the Dirivileges of the estates (for example, the declaration of indepen fence of July 26, 1581); for on the bass of classical Natural Lave, ‘iolen resistance against the established government could only be legitimized in terms of the continuity of an ancient and at the same time eternal law, for example, the restoration, regeneration, ‘or reformation of a tradition of law which had been interrupted AA century later it was tl the landing of Willismaof Orange and not the declaration of Parliament on the succession to the Em lish throne which had given the Glorious Revolution its name The Declaration of Right itself wae considered to be an afirmar tion of ancient rights and freedoms ‘The appearance of William and the fight of James may have seemed 1 contemporaries events of the magnitude and the inevitability of destiny astronomically controled, x0 that just for this reason it was compared to the revolutions of the stars Tt was thus not credited to an actual political act of those engaged in the events; the objectively or ‘ented concept of revolution didnot rengnize any revolutionaries, {In Edmund Burke's memorable polemics agains the French Rev. lution$ the distinction, which was seevident in 1689, stil nds its echo: the Glorious Revolution gains is sgnifiance a a sort of ‘natural upheaval without the intervention of human arbitrariness and violence, in definitive contrast withthe Great Rebellion, with its regicde and civil war. in the preceding decades "The appeal to classical Natural Law was not revolutionary, 48 the appeal to modern Natural Law has come to be. Indeed i {is noc merely a concept of revolution which brings the revolution ofthe stars down to earth and which thus merely employs its an mage forthe upheaval of the tate, likening it anyother event in nature, but rather a concept of revolution which enter as such into the consciousnes of active revolutionaries and which can be ‘carried to its conclusion by these revolutionaries alone, Such a ‘concept could only be ignited by rational Natoral Law, could develop only inthe act of translating this into postive consti {ional law. What sii this psitivization that endows it with is& Theory and Practice ical violent character? In the fr place certainly, is violent p force, without which the existing authority cannot be overthrown sind 2 change inthe basis for legitimation of any future authority Cannot be brought about. But we shall leave aside the sociological concept of revolution, Rather we shal seek the immanent connec: tion between modern Natural Law and the bourgeois revolution. ‘While in clasical Natoral Lav, the norms of moral and just action are equally oriented in their content toward the good— fd that means the vrtwous—life ofthe citizens, the formal law fof the modern age is divested ofthe catalogues of duties in the material order of life, whether ofa city of ofa socal clas, Instead, Itallows a neutral sphere of personal choice, in which every duzen, asa private person can egoistically follow goals of max Imizing his own needs. Formal rights are in principle rights of freedom, because they mist set fee all acts which are not ex: plicdy_ prohibited according to. externally specified citera, Hobbes had already enunciated clearly that under formal laws freedom consists in thie indirect exemption® And as is well Known, Locke defines the purpose of such laws tobe the right to Aispose of private property, in which life and the tresdom of one's person are included. Nor do the maxims ofthe Physiocrats? which Inspired all the later atempss to supplement the French declara tion of the rights of men and citizens by a decaration of the ‘corresponding duties, retura tothe commandments of virtue pre- sented by lasscal Natural Law. For the supreme duty from which all rights derive, interpreted concretely in economic terms, s sen, in a most naturalistic manner, tobe the obligation to sl prese. vation: its meaning is again the right o private autonomy. This Physiocrat doctrine of duties, especially, shows that formal la, once accepted, excludes any reference back to material morality. Legal duties are instead to be derived, for their part, only from the primary sense of being endowed with rights. If formal accords spheres of activity to each individual choice, then the ‘hice of each must be limited forthe sake ofall if these spheres fate to be reconciled, But formal law frees the conduct of citizens ‘within a morally neutral domain, releasing them from the mo- tivation of internalized duties and liberating them to look after their own interests; therefore the Hmitations which result from Natural Law and Revolution 85 his formal wc now nly be imposed external. Bec ei in principles aw of felon, oa aw dred en thee {Seal oder fie sa awa euon The nee of pt «estonia ees the ng ep il mation a erin, of aban When sete a fs na won sly yp eae fre, td egy fendered emery From han th tof te pn of Nat Law auc in pcr ie as el asses On thee an th poe aeron fcr aw dean ‘toon power hich print comple. On the eke tnd he pian of acl Lato be ently preeled y mvihg Dt the toon af fated Sad qe Ions a the anal eden a Nara Lawson donates of Neue Lhe Cxiginl connote nea. ben conc ‘though the we which gummi ters mere reed by the wl of a ee india pull by common aad ‘adoring. The coat of pate ay the re Siucoary eheeth coy pent no prbien ee an te te power sued the ak of nance thing and sucig sen of oma awe hh Bene ‘esoiy spl oe mw howe th por a wt 10 be reid om ry furan tn scans wih sew prin then at ioe deo preach td Been pot tach tthe tel of te weal tt Bad to svete iuspetive see fer eolaonay ston. Be (Sic te pa waste cae jem of compelling jets the sancti mpl ba tobe cone erasing {npr sutdhonen ingght and agement Th Soy ch et petviaton of Raul Rights wat init Aten swe as In races edt fundamen sights Ava oncqence f the reolecnary eit etn seismic beh sgh and wi the tight ito the elma eee of te Sadana nom ane we esa desire ‘tnconing poner at wal boon by tse orm Te SC accra o make the cat ta es pencreig po86 ‘Theory and Practice teal power solely from piltphicl insight, The ide ofthe polit! rlimton of phlowphy-namey the autonomous ce ion, by contac of lal compulsion springing soll from the compulsion of philosophical reson the concept of revoltion Stich followed immanent from the principles of mera Nat Aral Law; under other name ofthe soda contact is concept In been derived long before the bourgeois revoltion, grown fonscion of ie unerood isl ners ofthe onteation ‘tra gh and then lnk his concep with ts own name In this sense the slogan ofthe realiation of plop had ben vipat tthe me ofthe Revlon, before ts formulation the Young Hegelian rt cones prec ses this lds only or Pai and oto Pisin The pe poy in rae oe Fesponds tothe appeal to common seein Americ. Tn general, the colonia didnot carry out tet emandpadon Irom the mother country wit the sc awareness of making eel. ‘The talk of a1 American Revolution only became caren ott fest; bby the outbreak of the French Revoltion Te had beady entered into common wage While Thomas Pine en: flue that which the wo ren the American Revoton amd {he French Revolution, had speccally in common, by potng to the univeral foundation ofthe stein Natural Law, Robenpierre Slvaysrocred this fndamental clan ofthe Dourgesin revo tion forthe French Revolution alone® The Anglo-Saxon tad tion of Natral Law derive rom Lace, on which he father of the. American Constation based themlvy, std 10 which ‘Thomas Paine then appeal expicly to jatily a revolution, trav never taken seriou as an etenalyrevoutonary doin hot only by a French competitor like Robesperte, Du alo by neither Burke nor Hegel. Hege isso far from accepting the ont pt an American Revolution tat he ast, pointing tthe talery valve of internal coloniation: "Had the foes of scent Germany sll exited, then of course the French, Revoltion would never have come tops” While the French Reveiton becomes the very key othe piloapic concep of World History {orhim, Hegel would ike to encode North Anne entirely rom pilowphicl consideration, ara mere and of the faut Natural Law and Revolution % ‘The meaning of “declaration” in the American and in the French Declarations of the Rights of Man “There are, in fact, unmistakable diferences, even though the "Americans, just like the French, appeal tothe principles of mod: fer Natural Law: and the common features, which the basis of legitimation displays, extend to. correspondence in wording, specially in the two declarations of fundamental rights” But "hese two declarations have a diferent specie meaning, in spite Of their substantive correspondence. With ther recoure to the Rights of Man, the American colonists want to legitimize their independence from the British Empire: the French to legitimize the overthrow of the ancien régime. Certainly, in both cases a ‘constitution is set up which remains within the framework ofthe Aeclared fundamental rights. But already the value assigned ex ternally by the position inthe two documents ofthis declaration is not accidental: preceding the French Constitution as a pre amble, merely attached to the American Constitution as amend: ments. The American Bill of Rights makes an inventory, ia fesence, of the exising rights posse by British citizens. “The form ofits justification in terms of universal Natural Law only became necessary with respect to emancipation from the mother ‘country. The Bll of Rights, which in substance i anticipated in the opening sentences of the Declaration of Independence. has as suc the sense primaily of providing another basis of leita ‘ion for the traditional substance of rights; the French decla tion, in contrast, is intended to assert positively forthe frst time 8 fundamentally new sytem of rights In France the revolutionary imcaning of the declaration is w lay the foundation for a new constitution. In America, however, i isto justify independence, 83 consequence of which, tobe sure, anew constitution becomes neces." When in 1828 John Adams raised against ‘Thomas Jefferson, ‘to whom, asthe author of the Declaration of Independence, full Ihonors of a spiritus rector were accorded, the objection that this declaration did not contain 2 single new ides, he received the ‘iaractristic reply trom the abject of his attack: ye, ie may veryoe ‘Theory and Practice well epresnt a compilation of commonplaces. And thee years ier Jeteron wrote to Rind H. Lee, who had clled this delintion simply pagan of Lack, that it had not been veh a that tine wo nd new principles and argument "bat {0 place before mankind the common seme ofthe mje A phe by Thomas Pane which appeared at the beginning of {hye and which invoke the ration nope by Lace for the aren question ofthe impending emancipation td this id to have influence Jefeon, bore the pithy tile “Common Sent" For the Ametican colonns Lock concions bad be- tome commonplace in ie place of ened argument her own ‘xpertencesofgovernnent were sufientl convincing; gover nent which reine percep dependen on the patamentary {oolutom ota ditant mother county ky wih expe to ade DalicesUner these circumstances 2 declan cou only ave TResigicance of reaver wat win any cane tng com thon fonction: “It wa intended to be am expresion of the Tmeriim mind.» -All is authority rots hen on he harmon ing sentiment of he day- 2" ‘When onthe ether hand, the ABDE Ses compose his pamphlet onthe Thi Etat as the representatve of he maton {nny the Convention of Notable of 1788, he had to take his int of departre from an entely diferent situation: “One Exnmor joige its demands according tothe lated remarks of {Sw nuthors who toa leer or restr dere have informed them fehesabout he righteof ma The Tied xa al behind inthis reget I sy, not ony behind the night of thre who hve staid the sos ode, but sho behing the mat of come thon ideas which for pubic opinion: Tn the prsnc of this gop between individual night and iajority opinion, the praca ak flo the phibophe 0 Sse poli recognition for reson il by means of i floence onthe powe of publi opinion. The philosophers mute propose the cath, mut diseninate thei wabriged ight Pull, fr onl wen reson “hit the mark everywhere doe i Kicic property, or ony then wl orm that power of publi pinion, to which one cn perinps were mow of thowe change which te erly adantagents fo he peoples throne mus Natural Laws end Revolution % first atend tothe division of labor between the philosopher and the politician, which Sis poine to in the motto of his polemie. ‘The philosopher must not lc himself be inkibited by the prudent condact of the statesman, who must gauge his steps by the most immediate dificulis if his work i to clea a path forthe sates ‘man toward the goal I is not the philosophers task to put the ‘ruth into effect, but only 1o presenti, to explain it—la declare. “This is the path by which theory becomes practical force: HC all men thought the rth, then the greatest cha would present no ise, son asthe represen ‘ject of the plc nee, What beer cen Ido than fo cone wih al my power tthe emiation of the hic clears the pu? I the beginning they mee with hol reception ut gradually they frm pi pinion, and nally athe exciton ofthe princper one Scones ase of what at ist mee Wd ane “This dary to dvar the truth incumbent on the phils oper ll te more when "public opinion finally even dictates the laws forthe lawgivers” Sites borrows this forma directly from the Phsioerat according wo their dotine, the monarch ‘must allow hime we inatrcid about the law of nature by 2 philosophically and economically enlightened public, and the lon mat thn hei eon frm thee lo, ‘The evidence of the natral oder which tans power by publi ie he sole bass on which «correc constitution ean be founded, Public opinion enlightened to the pont of evidence. together vith a despotcaly averted absolute rue ofthe laws of eta, wil gurantee the rightful of cal conditions" The pubic inaruction ofthe nation [Vel] was the cre of Physicatic theory. Le Mercer, Miran and Dupont cach dew up Pat forthe organintion of popular edvation® “The Physocsts had done their preparatory work wel there does not seem to be any doubt about the guifeance of Doubling» Declaration of Human Rig when fh Bnally~ Theory and Practice come tothe point where public opinion could dictate laws to the legislators. The philosophers themselves had become legislator. Ke was already sa ofthe frst report ofthe committee constituted to prepare the Declaration of Rights (presented by Mounts) that the report was more appropriate fora philosophical society than fora National Awembly, And, acording to contemporary reports, thie assembly was transformed “en cole de Sorbonne” during the discussion of the Rights of Man.*! But once the philosophic in- fight was attained, thie trath required propagation * The Physio- rats had prepared the philosophic seltunderstanding of such a ‘declaration in a will broader sense: to a legislator inspired by public opinion the Natural Laws must be wo evident thatthe act, fof rendering them positive need only consis in declaring them. ‘To the Physiocrat school décerer had the technical sense of translating the ordre naturel into the ordre positf in such 2 manner that Natural Law would merely be implemented and applied in the laws derived from it 7 Becween July gand August 4,178 the subject of discussion in the National Assembly was whether and in what form a declaration of fundamental rights would be necessary. In these sessions the French sense of “declaration” as distinct from he American “declarations” which had preceded it was notably Clarified. At frst Lafayete hal interpreted the function of such 2 ‘declaration wholly inthe sense of Jeffenon, with whom he was jn comact in Paris at that ime But the Anglophile faction ofthe ‘Assembly immediately objected: “I beg you to consider, what an immense difference there is between » colonial. people which breaks the bond ofa distant government, and one of the oldest nations on earth which for 1400 years has given itself its own Form. fof government."® Later Champoin de Cict, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, explicated this dilference: the example of North “America was not compelling, becuse there were only proprietors land equal citizens over there. And finally, the delegate Malovet declared: the Americans had heen able to declare their Natural Rights without any hesitation, because their society consisted in a ‘majority of proprietors who were already accustomed to equality ‘and who hardly knew the yoke of taxes and prejudice. Such peo- ple were without quetion ready for freedom, unlike the people Natural Law ond Revolution o jn France at that time With that, Lafayette's interpretation was refuted, but his eiies were not able to prevail with thelr warnings agnnst any kind of declaration; they were only able to show what meaning such a declaration could not have in France ‘The majority of the Astembly considered 4 declaration to be necessary, because the public required effectively publiied ew. Vightenment, This meaning is unmistakably set forth in the pre amble: a declaration is desired, because "te ignorance, forgeting and neglect ofthe rights of man are the universal causes of publi ‘misfortune and the corruption of the regime.” In Americe the Declaration was itself the expression of “common sense France it had fst to form the opinion publique ‘In America the positivization of Natural Law didnot demand «revolutionary role of philosophy. A tension between theory and praxis, between Natural Law principles and their techni! real laation, considerations how philosophical insight could atsin political power by way of public opinionall this did not exit "here, Indeed, the colonists who desired their independence and founded theit own state behaved with respect to the Lockean tradition just as those who aet politically have always behaved hen they take their orientation fom caseal Natural Law: ere concerned with the prudent application of alteady giyey forms 10 a concrete situation. The philosophical raids of the National Assembly, on the other hand, fad realized the bresk of modern Natural Law with the classical in a more rigorous fash jon: at least as far as the decisive majority was concerned, their attitude toward the norms, no matter how they might be legitimized by mature, was no longer practical, but technical; they discused the organizational means forthe construction ofa total ‘order of society. Only thus did the postivization of Natural Law ‘ecome a revolutionary tsk: philosophy was no longer to supply the orientation for plitially prudent action under laws, but ag to insall a technically corect system of insiutions withthe ad ‘of ams. Of cours, not only i the meaning of the Declarations of Human Rights ofthe two countries diferent, but it ean be shoe ‘hat altogether, even where the wording corresponds, two af _forent constructions of the Natural Lave of bourgeois society are implieda Theory and Practice ‘The liberal construction of the Natural Law of bourgeois society: John Lacke and Thomas Paine “Till that momentous controversy with the English Patia. ment in 1764, Americans had always been proud of being subjects ‘of the British Empire" And even during the next decade, the Gquarel over the legislative competence of the English Parliament fad as premise the question: what rights do we Americans have as British subjects? Te was mot till 1774 that a pamphlet appeared in which James Wilkon attempted to subordinate the English lib Cries of Common Law and the rights assured to the individual Colonies in their charters to higher viewpoint of Natural Lav: the happiness ofthe society is che first law of every government. ™ ‘The Declaration of the Fist Continental Congress which at semble in the same year begins a similar sense with the ase. tion that on the bass of the unchanging laws of nature, of the fandamnental principles of the English Constitution and various contracts (charters and compacts), 4 series of rights ae due tothe inhabitants of the English colonies in North America; to be sure, this is followed immediatly by Locke's formulation ofthe right to life, liberty, and property. Sherman's famous statement, "The Colonies adopt the common law, not asthe common law, but 28 the highest reason,” sil is wholly within the classical eraditon "This tradition had been preserved in America to. greter extent, because the absence of an absoluist practice in government had not made there the radical reinterpretation of StoieChristian| [Natural Law as necesary, that had been caried through in the ‘mother country since Hobbes. Thus Locke was stil understood Within the continuity of claical Natural Law, even after eman ipation had become unavoidable and nothing but modern Nat- tural Law had remained as a basis for its justification; the Christian presuppositions of his doctrine may have abetted this "The posture with which Locke was invoked remained the same as that which Americans had assumed wp to that time in appeal ing to their vested freedoms, and with which Englishmen them felves had appealed to their ancient rights since the time of the Magna Carta, Like practical philosophy before him, Locke 10 Natural Law ond Revolution 8 sppeared to present the ls ofthe god life and prudent action fr not the rules aecording to which the cnvec soa der Was tow toe ina erring o plan “This exentilly wnrevoutonsy view was sappored from the other side by preiely tho elements ofthe Lackean doctrine that ae simply iveconllable with caw Natural Law. Be ‘aue in contrat to Hobbes, Lack proceeds fom the premise that men preserve thei ie primarily by aber rather than by sgresion and defen, he interpre the fundamenal right of seltpeervation a the right of property Locke's derivation of human right simple, Inthe at of nature personal labor for india ie lone prove th siglo pare pop eny. This nator righ which gether th property alo scars Wie and tcdon, ech man con teche decd man against all other, for in any cai Is meanred by hs physeal powers and lil Tnsecrity and therewith the ned fr sate thority, thus the motive fr sociation, only arte witha mode of production deerme bythe market; for this requis these curity of private property beyond thve goods produced pero. Sly and for one's own consumpion-the sate of mature becomes Unteable. Aen wdate under government whi capable of protecting private property to an extent bey the immediate pita power and disposition ofthe individual This gover nent mus guarantee algal order, which in ie substance had ‘ays Been Based on private prop, even prior tothe sate, but ‘hich now. in view othe incressing clon azsing fem prop fy expandel tothe ponesion of capt, fas to be expicly Sanctioned. Ths every pole goverment is “entrusted with {he condition and for this end, that men might have an secure Se pop natural rights to resem, ie ant property ae not suspended in he ail nat; they ae ony at were ekchanged for satestnctioned vl righ, the powers ofthe inde 10 longer sfc forthe erin ** The government may have the power to regulate the commerce between the awner of pt sate property, but never 20 mach power tht it can intervene Hetns the Je penton without his Breement or thi would be no propery ataTheory and Practice ‘When the American colonists invoked the authority of this doctrine against the encroachments of the English Parliament, they were brought toa revolutionary seléundertanding neither by the modern justifications of their demands Howing from nat tral rights nor by the transposition of Locke back into classical [Natural Law For the liberal construction of Natural Law, that of| Doungeois society, which was implicit in the rights received from Locke and declared against England, had merely the estrctive meaning of protecting the private autonomous sphere of social intercoutue against state intervention. How litde this wadition fof Natural Law compels philosophic insight to prepate fr rev: ‘olutionary action has been shown, though against his wil, bythe ‘ery author who unsringly sought to place the American and French Revolutions on the same level—Thomas Paine. In the second patt of his book on the rights of man, pub- lished in 1992, Paine repeats the thesis that the emancipation ‘of America would have had little significance had it not been 2c- ‘companied by a revolution in the principles and practice of gow- ‘ernment However, hemaintains that this revolution has nothing to do with th politcal act of realizing Natural Law, in the sense ‘of constructing 4 comstution which organizes the teal society: ‘onthe contrary, it ole aim isto limit politcal power to a mni- mom. Natural Law is not rendered positive by means of a revo. Tution; ie does not gain its validation subjectively Uwrough the consciousness of politically active citizens, but objectively through the eflect of the uninhibited workings of socety’s immanent nat- tural laws. For Paine identifies the natura rights of man with ‘the natural laws of commodity exchange and socal labor. He ex- pli state the specific interconnection between Locke and ‘Adam Smith; he sees thatthe clasical economics ofthe eighteenth ‘century projet into the natural basis of society the same natural laws whieh im the veventeent century were still conceived a the ‘norms of formal law: "By the simple operation of constructing Government on the principles of Society end the rights of m every dificulty retires” *" ‘The distinction between the state of nature and the state of society has been replaced by that between society and the sate. ‘The inits on the powers ofall government imposed by Natural Natural Lew end Revolution 9% Law, which, according to Locke, wee carved over from the sate ‘of mature into the wocal tate, have become the laws of 4 netral Soce one which tno longer based upon a contrat The gor fnment constituted according 10 mare, and shove al limited, ow came out of sy," previ came “ot of the social compact Paine wes both expensons as synonyms ‘Wieh clas economy, sich as Adatt Smithy he shares the conn tha a sem of nse on the dion of la society wil naturally follow a harmonious development as long 2s i cam be protected against the depo intervention a spvernment The contontaton ofthe spomtancus foe of Gia cohesion and selleeglation with the formal means of ercion ofa represive sate power anticipates a conception of Society a ving oat, whch only aecrds ay tothe sate 2% one element split of from the whol,» pariulaity that has tae self independent. Hi polemic pape of 1795 begiat wih an emplati indication of the heerogencous orgs of 0 Siety and potemment® ciety i brought forth by our needy the fevernment by oor weaknees Every sc sate fll fhe {ngs but even under fs Best consituton government remains a neesary Ei forthe en of oppresion ithe omauence of the Poll inequality of masters sal srvant and nt the socal Aiferenes between rich and poor Ind, Panes iberalism dos not shy avay from anarchnte consequence) he mys it ‘one place, begins to act spontaneouy a that moment when the formal power of government i aolished-then a universal sociation artes, and the common nee cteates universal se ey wn ie pen of Nar Law is ot mater of 0 lcons, a 00m a8 the right of man ctncde withthe principles of soir unter the common name of Lays of Nate, Neteral Tigh wll Gnd wei reliable counterpart inthe laws of wale and commerce bu thee laws are obey by private persons Beete this is immediacy tm tener anno because the sae i ‘poss formal ws under the treat of punishment The practice Ca universal free trade wil therelor give stronger guarantees {0 therights of man than any theory whieh has tain pest ower by ite of public opinion, wih dca laws ed has6 Theory and Practice positivizes Natural Law. Philoophy does not have to make any {fort for the realization of this Natural Law. “The French, however, had political economy of their own, in terms of which they ould interpret the Natural Law doctrine of their own Locke, even if inthe National Assembly this could fot be formed into the unbroken coherence which the Anglo- Saxon tradition attained inthe hands of a Thomas Paine. There is no doubt that both inform an content the American delara tions were the model forthe Dérlaration des droits de Chomme et dd citoyen; and certainly Lafayeste, who as the frst to hand in a draft, was not the only deputy influenced by the Americans “However, this influence was not so strong thatthe American spnit could have gained acceptance in the French formulation, bu it served asa catalyst which made posible the peculiar combination fof the doctrines of Rousea and the Physiocats, initially 50 con- twadictory. From this arose a diferent NaturalLaw construction of bourgeois society: and this construction did indeed inspire 2 revolutionary selfunderstanding in the politically active citizens, The dissemination of competing Natural-Law constructions of bourgeois society: Rowsseau and the Physocrats Alter Mirabeau had presented a report before the Plenum of the National Assembly on August 17, reporting for the Com smiuce of Five, which had been assigned the examination of the project submitted to i, for a declaration of the rights of man, the discussion was opened by che delegate Crenier, one of the most articulate adherents of Rovsseau, as were Binsrat and the Count Antraigues? He expresied the opinion, with relerence © the American model, that this declaration could not have the form ‘ofa deduction from principles for aright was the result of 2 con tract and not a principle fom which true statements could be deduced. tn earlier sessions Grenier had already wished to identify the decaration of human rights with the act of concluding 430 ial contract. In the state of nature man is nether master nor slave, he has neither rights nor duties; the natural independence and selépreservation ofeach could only be elevated tothe natural right to freedom and equality by a social contract. The delars Natural Law end Revolution * sion of the rights of man is therefore equivalent tothe constitu: tion of the general wil, o the formation of which all contribute and before the laws of which all are equal. During the further course ofthe debate Démeunier opposed this conception with an fangument which deserves attention: “That is the sytem of Hobbes, which has been rejected by all of Europe" * Indeed, Rousseau was in agreement with Hobbes in be lieving tht the compulsion for sociation had to be derived fom state of universal mistrust and from the precarious insecr ‘of universal and violent competitive struggle, This characteriza: tion, put forward in a number of pasage, doesnot only, to be sure fit that state of nature which immediately precedes the so- dial state, but also-in principle—the cvlied society of com temporary France, and this is by no means acidental. For aguinst Hobbes Rousseau insists that the state dominated by natural political evils which make sociation necesary x not by any means sbolished in 2 social sate which is the result of despotic com- pulsion, but these evil live om in the competition of private interest within a restless and stifetorn system based on the di vision of labor and expanded needs. In Rouse the socal com tract sto perform the same task a in Hobbes: the natal political cil ofa universal selfasertion of all agains alli ao substantial thatthe positive validity of general norms can only be enforced by am absolute power. But che total cesion of proprietary rights [bereignung) and submission isthe same only in its forts, The Alienation of self [Selbstentéuererang] in Hobbes means submis sion to compulsion whieh, though set up by men themselves, ill remains an irevocably external compulsion, but in Rowseau itmeans the wansformation of corrupted human nature into the ‘moral person ofthe citizen. For thus sovereign power itself can become internalized, be brought back from the externally com pulsive sovereignty of the prince to an internally present sov ‘reignty ofthe people. Inthe fae of the presupposition they held in common, it was consistent that these two solutions appeared to Ronsseat as completely alternative. In hie famous leter of July 26, 1767, to Mizabeau, the Physicrat, he therefore confess: ‘an sce no viable middle path between the rawest democracy and the most complete Hobbesian system,8 Theory and Practice 1k was to this that the delegate Démeunir was obviously al Iuding, in otder to remind his audience that human rights could not be based on Hobbes at all. But it is not only in the deter- mination of the fundamental natural evil that Hobbes is dis: tinguished from Locke; as the one considers weapons to be the primary means of selfpreservaton, while the other ses these in food, clothing, and shelter, 50 for Hobbes socially organized sll preservation requires an order of coercion against internal and external eneaier, wheress for Locke it requires an order of prop erty which protects agaist hunger and want. And the Natur Law bass of sate power is different too: because, according t0 Locke, men overcome the economic natural evil in the same ‘manner, in principle, Before their socation as after—by indi- ‘vidual labor-and therélore property rights in :heie substance ze prior to the state. The government is only to remove certain Fis, 40 that the natural form of selfprservation can be beter ‘maineained, Hobbes, however, requires a sovereign power for the complete liquidation of the sate of nature, For obedience, the fear which liberates from fear, isa product of sociation, and does not have its origin in nature, as does labor, the pain whch re- ‘moves pain? Thus legal limite against the will of the Hobbesian sovereign cannot be set by 4 nature against which he is const- tuted, no more than they can against the democratically inverted and morally internalized sovereignty of the general will in Row ‘seauunless of course, the natural rights follow from the nature ‘ofthis will self. This indeed is what che delegate Crenier wanted to asert. Freedom and equality, and in consequence also life, security, and happiness, theve the citizens do not ome to the auton atism, secured by private law, of ether natural rights or social “intercourse based in nature. Rather, that these principles of free ‘dom and equality cannot be violated is based solely onthe struc ture of the volonté générale, although this will as the powwoir sowwerain is free to enact whatever laws it likes-as long a8 hey ae laws ‘As act of the general wil, these legal conventions must have the character of universal laws; there can be no aw concerning 3 Singular case. At the same time, the ubjecs, who participate in Natural Lew end Revolution 9 the formation of the general will, only obey themselves and each other mutually: From this one sees that the sovereign powers absolute, as sacred, a inviolate a doesnot transgres the Kits fof universally obligatory conventions, nor can it da so; fur thermore that each man can have complete disposition over that of his property and his freedom which i eft to him by these convention. In this way the sovereign never has the ght to impose more burdens on one subjet than on an- ‘other, for then the mater becomes a particular one and therefore his power is no longer competent. Compared to the liberal constuction of human right, the ma- terial automatism of a Natural Law fulfled by the natural laws of society is replaced by the formal automatic operation of the ‘general will, which, because ofits own nature, can violate the in terests of society just a litle as the feeom of even one individ ual In itself the sole author of a total contitution orgeniing the state and society itis inthe general wil thatthe Natural Law is founded, and not in the functioning, according to its own lawlul nes, of an order that is prior 10 the state, whether this be the state of nature or society that has its origin in nature. These are the consequences drawn by Crenier. His proposal for declara tion ofthe rights of man only contains nine propositions. To the ‘question of what are these natural rights, whose promulgation Alone can form the aetof constitution ofa nation, he replies: the ‘exclusive subjection to genera laws andthe collaboration in the feneral will fom whiet hese laws proceed exclusively. Against thi, Mirabeau defended dhe specially enumerated rights of man drawn up by the Committee of Five witha reference tothe Nat uralLav principles of his father. The natural order ofthe Physio cats appeared to give a more solid foundation tothe decaration than the general wil of Rousseau. The proposal of Rousseau's partisans in any case only a handful ofthe delegates, was a hope Tessly weaker position; above all, the form ofthe declaration was _0t Influenced by them. But in substance their arguments were100 ‘Theory and Practice salvaged precisely by their opponents, inspired by the Physiocrat ‘conception of Natural Lae “The Physocrat did not know, any more than the English ‘conomists who were their contemporaries ofa rigorous distinc tion between the sate of mature and the state of society: society itself isa piece of nature and by no means arose out of a contract Le Mercier speaks of a société naturelle, wniverslle et tacit, in which certain rights and dates ate tacitly in force, To be sure, it then is differentiated into varios socetés patiuliées et com rentionnelles as soon as landed property becomes the basis of Social reproduction. From then on, internal order and external security must be secured by the power of the state. In order that the economie circulation of a socety based on agrarian produe- ton can take place in 4 natural way, the protection of landed property, ar well a the fre exercise ofthe Fights of property in general, must be organized and thus the transition of society toa political society” must be cartied out. The material imerrelar Lonships of life are subject tothe laws of physical nature and on. the whole obey an ordre naturel. In contrast to the liberal con ‘ception of a natural harmony, however, the Physiocrats are con- vince that at che stage of development at which agriculeure and political orgenization have become necessary forthe reproduction ‘ofa more extensive and richer life, the natural laws of society no longer assert themselves with the necesity of an ordre physique. Rather, in the ordre posit the ordre naturel must be made to dominate on the basi of philosophical insight and by means of political power and ite assertion, which must ten be maintained Aespoticaly. The political society is x creation ofthe sate, dic: ‘aed by insight into the natural laws of motion of material life Just like Locke, Quesnay recognizes the right of property 38 the core of Natural Law; and as is well known, he anticipated ‘Adam Smith's insight of "Iaiserfaire,” which Le Mercer cle- brated a the “glory of our century.” Inthe fee competition be- tween the individual interests of private proprietors, the total interest of society was to find its satisfaction. But here, 8 also in ‘general, the Physiocrats are to be distinguished from the liberals ina decisive point: the desired harmony would not result nat- rally trom the egoistic interplay of immediate interes, but Natural La and Revolution aor ‘only from the enlightened seltinterest within the framework of a natural order organized by the site, As long as the eltizens re. main captive to controversial opinions and have not advanced to "recognizing the evidence ofthe natural order, they cana emerge ‘rom the depraved state of society. Only by an enlightened despot, ‘who in accordance with natural maxims asserts his sovereign power to render postive the order of Natural Law, can the nat- lal order of society be created and stabilied. The Physiocrats are in agreement with Rousseau that human rights can exist only as ctizens rights, freedom only within a poliial sate. The nat tural order of society is actualized solely by means of politica power, but, ofcourse. in distinction to Rouseau, this power pro- ‘ceeds on the basis of laws which have been established from philo- Ssophical insight into the mature ofthe things themselves. Meanwhile, now that a declaration of the rights of man had to be derived from the undisputed basis of politcal freedom and ‘equality, a peculiar combination of the two theories suggested itself 'do not maintain that in the intellectual antechambers of the National Assembly such a relationship was explicitly ext ished. Stil, not only ae the basic tats of these wo theories to bbe recognized in spedtc statements of the declaration in its nal form, but the concept of positiviration ofthese aie rights was articulated in terms of a tacit interplay ofthe two traditions. ‘The relationship of state and society in the two construc tions of Natural Law In order to bring about and secure the natural order of so ciety politically, the sovereign who was instrcted by a Phyio- ‘tially enlightened publi and thus by publfe opinion, had to positivize the natural rights of man—this was the substance of legal despotism, s0 quickly discredited, In 1789, however it was Aesred to put ino eflect democratically what had previously been attempted despotically. The inverted despotism of the general will could bridge the gap which discredited the system all the more readily, the more the ultimately economic justification of Physiogat Natural Law had paled, For what remained of it in the philowophieconsciousnes of the time was merely the idea ofoe ‘Theory and Practice a natural order which could auain existence solely within the framework of apolitical sciety-and which now was to be real ined from below, by revolution, instead of from above, despot filly The Abbé Sigyes had already transformed the public opinion ‘which enlightens the sovereign about natural laws into an au thority which was to dicate laws to the legislator of the day ‘uring the course of the Revolution, public opinion became the sovereign itself. With respect to what is to be understood by a democratic sovereign, the Contvet Socal at that time enjoyed ‘canonical authority. The drat of the decaration prepared by the CGocumiice of Five, which Démeunier defended against Crenier and whieh Mirabeau also supported, contained in the second idle the contract of submision alot in Rousseau’s own words “Every individual in common places his person and his capabil- ities under the supreme direction of the general wil, and atthe same time the wcity incorporates him a8 pare” * And Article 6 of the tated version lays the bass for this formula with the sentence: “The law is the expression of the general wil.” On the other hand, the National Assembly di not wish to base the cual rights as sich on the nature of the general wil. However, if the rights of man are a prior given in any manner, and yet are to be compatible with the sovereignty ofthe general will, then their nacural foundation can only lie in the society well. Wher- fever these correspond, even literally, with the prepoliical and prey negative right of the American declaration, with its ib- tral Bais, they still are only considered as fundamental politcal Fights, That isin fact the way Nataral Law was conceived of by the Physiorats, and that i the way it was understood by the great ‘majority ofthe National Asiembly. In this way the often noted “intermixture” in the French declaration of the rights of man, the rights of citizens and the principles of constitutional law oles no real dificulty—from the ‘Outset Natural Law is conceived as the law of vcety. In Article the state can be defined asthe institution ensuring all the rights ‘of man, because thee are tacitly regarded asthe rights of a po- liically constituted society. In any ease, the theee fundamental rights mentioned by name are but a repetition of formula, __ security once again imposes upon the total subject of Natural Lew and Revolution 105, whieh tad the validity of political serament for the Physio: schoo: le bet, ke proprde le sree. = Later, inthe Delran of Right of June 2g, 179.8 right of security is explicate in a manner which clas te ie plicit meaning of the underlying Natal Law comucion of Bourgeois scey. Security, i ays in Article 8, consis of the protection accorded by the seiey to everyone of is members forthe preersmton of his penon, his rgh ant his property. “Society is dhs named a the subject which organi the far relationships of human ie a a whole. It can ether be ender Sod as government which tncions lal order wih the mandate and the limited authority ofthe united individuals, nor 2 at union of individuals theme which eontrons the gor ‘rnment ab contracting par. Other the converse of the Drindple in Article gq would have no meaning: thatthe oppres on of any single individual dsroe the legal onder a whol forin that arte its: the oppresion of each individual takes pce when the body of society oppresed Corps soviet, Rous Zeus concep signifies, jum ike the sce foltque af the Phys joer otal constitution ognize by the inattionalzation ot natura sighs, which embrace the stat and society polly. No State of natre i found inthis comtiationeas Hin Laces conception; this consti is not based on Hntereltionshps of socal Ineroure originating in nature, such a woul have Corresponded to the conceptions of dat Stith of Thomas Paine No substantial basis prior to this consution exits fort fortis order which the National Avy ivell ow wits to produce polly forthe fist tine—though to be sure, acord dng tothe principles of mated not ent inthe sae of ma tute prior to all polite "Therefore it was no contradiction when the catalogue of the rights of Hbeeyof 199. which lad the foundation for 5 cies witha idea suuctre incorporated the rights of vac participation Fortis comruction paces the toa sca ne terelatonship of ite under the cont of pital wilt be sure, one enlightened interme of Natural Lav. Ite right to ewoetyfaa Theory and Practice the obligation to guarantee the fundamental rights then (as Srl #8 reciprocally complements Arle 8) dhe voelety for Hs port can only be genrantea by the ative “elaboration ofall Th order to ase to each the enjoyment and preservation of hi righ; this gurantee is Based on the sovereignty ofthe people Te the bea eonsraction of Natural Law the fundamental igh cotespon to the laws of inecoure developed prior to Ute state the substance of this intercourse originates ina sate of nature or ina socket roted in matre andi preserved intact Shin the ramevork of he poiial onder Inde the pital der has the exclave purpore of preserving these laws Under thos Greumstancs its sullen o charge the government, ina ‘tanner tat ean be revoked, with the commision of sanctioning the natural right, The members othe sity rere the ght of inating the government and of supervising whether i is Afrkng ina tusworthy manner This the wl ac of pital ecion mating, which ibe American Decaation of Indepen- dence defines inthe fos of he “coment of the governed.” Un- Snterrpted recourse to the contival implementation of the politcal decion-naking Ir not needed. This “active callabora Tn ofall" (Fction de tou), baned by Roses inthe sover tignyof the people ivonly regret when the nmtionaation St fundamental Fights docs not merely preserve 3 substance prior tothe sate, but must fst ces, ae. and mainain an Org tae toa constitution, however ie may accord wih the pet {Sples of nature, agama a depraved socal inerure. For this, Sipten pole porer requ and hereto aoe democratic iteration ofthis power in an ever present plical wa. tis not as though oe conception recognize the democratic rincple and the other denied i The to ate not distinguish ie primarily with reece the organization of sate powet in By ther imterpreation of the elaonship. between the sate aid society. Jeleron can only conceive of a radical: thon of democracy In sacha way that the domination of public ‘opinion (Locke's Law of Opinion) makes a goverment based on formal ls entre pert “publi opinion isn the place Of awe ad rena tral 8 power als ever any Natural Lew end Revolution 105, where." Jeferson not only prefer a condition where there are newspapers but no government to 2 government without newe papers: he is even convinced that ti ch a condition which will frst fully realize democracy. The represtive power of the sate as such may die away, together with formal aw, a8 soon as society organizes itself. In contrast to this, Sityes cannot conceive of & democratically enthroned public opinion in any ether way thaa 8 the sovereign of legislative machine: and the Jacobins, t00, as apt disciples of Rousseau, conceive of demacray, even in ite, radical form, in such 2 way that the general will exercises its sovereignty by means of formal and general laws. For the French ‘do not take a natural bass of society distinct fom the state nto their calculations; the liberation of a sphere of commodity ex ange and social labor from state intervention must itself be realized and asserted, they believe, within the framework of a total consttation which always embraces society well From ths spetifedstintion between the Natura-Law con struetion of bourgeois society which was dominant in America, and that dominant in France, ce diferent interpretations ofthe revolutionary task necesarily follow: how to postvize Natural Law and acualize democracy. The revolutionary act tell cannot have the sme significance, when in the one place it a matter of setting free the spontaneous fores of seltreguation in harmony with Natural Law, while in the other, i seeks t0 assert for the frst time a total constitution in accordance with Natural Law against a depraved society and a human nature which has Been ‘corrupted. Inthe one place, revolutionary frceismobilized forthe restriction of despodcally unrestrained power: in the othe, for the conseruction of a natural order which cannot count on a natural basis whieh wil meet it halfway. In the one place, the Revolution can lt the uncarbed egoism of natura interests work for its in the other, it has to mobilize moral incentives, Revolutionary selfawareness in Jacobin France and in Je Jerson's America: Robespiere and Paine Here is how Rousseau saw the isue: the transformation of ‘man suited to an isolated and autarchic life into a iinae ‘Theory and Practice capable of peaeul cooperation was conevable only 262 com {ehson Therefore the sacl contract requires denataring rig atualextnceto make ito 4 moral oe: the coe {tae a morl act as sch, Bera of that, Rowseau considers Tonsatoninscod withthe principles of the scl contract dob ponte for small nation st primitive sage of dvelog- tmentfor example Core, where ae and nasty had hardly volved pet, were propery as broadly and equitably dixt- Sela where pe and spl mores prevailed For the great {Ste imam advanced sage of cation he id nt consider & publican ansformation applicable. His doctrine was not fee ‘Seonay: hod ye tobe erred in a resolutionary many se Tne pup dd not reece nis ofthis made applic Ton, whic the teacher himself ha drawn; they wanted 0 bring Sou’ repubiconeowstton alo in avanced sey within ng uate by evolutions or more preci 0 carr the rev Tuon which had ateady broken out toward i goo i 200 ance with thi plan Noone wal more aware ofthe immanent eicaly which this ened theory than Rebepiere He eld ast 0 the principe that the esablishent of Nataral Law by meas ofthe Power ofan intra coercive sovereign guarantcing fedom Fm equa, was posible, ony on the bas of ete ad not on that ct interes Consort the problem of succes com pleon of the Revolution ws pose for him in the folowing Km an te etme fii Be generate among he thus ofthe populon? "The sey wosld Sing forth its rer Sng work ith respec tool concer it creat 2 wv i She in men, wich would induce them to 60 good. and avoid wth the adional a of thought At heen ofthe ‘Sonu whose intelectual energies Bad een devoted othe un thsking of prey deception more than to any other mater, Robespete sea hinself driven to the quesionble restoration Oa rtina bait in God forthe sake of tae which 0 Tonge wuld sprout forth of Tet from the sil of am une. ype people For tenons of sate he wens to decree a qua Elsa al ofthe “Supreme Beings in ao ding, Robesperre ishorin doubt whats inolved in tempting to repreduce rural Low and Revolution 107 song ix pon 1 be brig “The ide of te Supreme Bing nde tory of ol cost peso ote th ram nd en’ St poe tery antl by heel and io sua CRalcaty pcan th ged remain af rete ed produce rltnty al eins on win the vey Seow ofthe ule Thoms ane; on teehee ‘ham bt effec pan fad en hie ithe Ben ta might rent to Cage Wang {id ot have ong vie ines enluony ee, Party no te ore hy maniplaon an itty taro Every fein iroenen athe eno of He he do em by he eal Ths mater is coined in the Right of Man, wes sti hom hte of Jefe oP at bere the exon othe Replica te Flr helo Burts wing In she Unie Ste the se had Chung hereon views wre itdl ye Fees a ston Only nod he soy ofc Wa and fs conics ban tempore ot Euapeo sacha aale tet ate Anrcn emanation tn he nance el ‘cnirntatan ol war inthe si se. een, ha ‘eure tom Fone a he high an of ie Rees at inert he ee of 97 a tr feared ce fori of 18g on onned the Repblian onan ago Se guvrmen The ner noel te gest ereneade at Amara Initpentece, who sible uted ord he Fons Revlon bajo nyo ces ho te hyo ‘sn form undo ape to Natl ete Shiver outing ote stato sa op seeatoney Set ihc Natura Law and th a igh of English tradition.®? c Cn ether an, he retttnsy npn a ie nonce we man sy poison keke tn sine mutate Aen de ht ben tee fo «French selfunderstanding, so now the Americans could discern the revolutionary aspect of the foundation of their own govern.oo ‘Theory and Practice iment more clestly in the mirror ofthe French Revolution. Act ally the consciousness ofan American Revolution, the traditional age that has come to prevail toda, was formed only with the lection of Jefferson as President (which was therefore called the “Revolution of 10"). In this image are preserved the uaits of revolution whieh had its genuine descent from the Anglo-Saxon teatition of Natural Law and could not be confused with the evolutionary selfunderstanding of the European continent. 1a ‘rou. Rebespierre proclaimed before the National Convention that one half of the revolution was already realized, while the ‘cher sil had to be carried out, This revolution, whose comple tion he conecived asthe realization of philosophy." is not the tame as the revolotion whose concept Thomas Paine interpreted So ffectvely for republican America “To the traditional sates Paine oppose the new systems of rule based on Natural Lae while the former arose by pure fre, formally by conquest, the latter are based on the laws ofa society ‘Separate from the state and a the same time on the rights of men, tho, as members of a society in which they share in common, Commission the government with the cae of their common affairs, Dat are not themselves incorporated into the state. A revolution fm the striet sense dius as the ask of overthrowing those “Rover ments out of power” and in their place setting up “governments fou of society"—or more precisely, of letting such governments fame to be exablished. For itis ruliient to remove represive force in order forthe principles ofvoiety to enter into effect and ‘produce a government which serves the spontaneous development ff society viliation, and commerce." "Through the interests of liberated private persons these principles will assert themselves with the stme natral force asthe laws of nature and the instincts (of animals. One consideration which Paine brings to bear proves, that he does not expect the positivization of Natural Law, insofar ts itis to realize the abstractly formulated construction of the Natural Law of bourgeois society, 0 arise from revolutionary action as such: 1c possible that an individual can work out a system of principles according to which a state can be erected on any Natural Law and Revolution 109 posible teitry. That sno more han an operation of ‘ind aang on the bs cf ch ps a 2pplicaion to de numero and vail dreemsoneohg tlon, 10 ageitre and amulet: omer ood trade ere lesen srt of knowlege Thee oo 2 fom the various pars a sxiety cle hina cole of praca experience which no ladda parce sw Eiltapoats labor achieves autonomy, An emancipation of ocety ca rate by revolution: “It commerce were perited to att the asl Bouts plc revotaon inthe aes NR The Marxist evitique of liberal Natural Law anda dialecticat ‘concept ofthe bourgeois revolution Fro his imate point which she ier! sland ing ofthe Bourne revlon atts in Thon Fast Mex inurpetaon cold take fu det pase tthe two generate in Forinlly Marx snes he goo Comical tate no ether ay tun ih aden eat inthe eral aidan “Due tothe tmancpadon of rons property from the commonwealth the state gained separate ox istence beside and external to bourgeois society it is nothing esene Theory and Practice than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily accord themselves, externally aswell as internally forthe mutual {guarantee of their property and their interest... The most perfect example of 4 modern state is North America" ®" There- fore the sate can be conceived a the guarantor of 3 contract by all the members ofa society concerning those conditions "within ‘which individuals had the enjoyment of chance. This right (0 enjoy chance undisturbed within certain conditions has wp tll ‘now been called personal freon.” ® Now thie liberal construc tion of Natural Law isl! had considered political economy to be the crucial test of its truth: the natural laws of society sere 10 Fulfil the promise of the natural rights of man, If Marx could therefore prove for politieal economy thatthe free commerce of private proprietors among each other necessarily excluded the enjoyment of equal opportunity for pervonal autonomy on the part of all individuals, when he had at the same time furnished the proof that the formal and general laws of the bourgeois pri- vate legal order must be economically deprived oftheir professed justice. The interests of the bourgeois [Bargerlichen] can no longer be identised with that of al citizens [Barger]: precisely those general laws in which the formal rights ate expressed serve only to assert the particular interest of one elas “The individuals who role under these conditions... must sive a general expresion to ther wil, determined by these specific conditions, a the wil of the state, a8 the Ia ‘Their personal rule must atthe same time constuteisclt ‘Their personal power is based on cond: tions which develop a5 conditions common to many, the ‘maintenance of which they have aserted as rulers against ‘others and atthe same time as valid forall The expression of, this will determined by their common interes i the lav Precisely the asertion of individuals independent of each ‘other, the asertion of their own wills, which on thi bats are their behavior towards each other, renders sel denial necesary in las and rights. Selfdenial in the exceptional cus, selkasertion of their interest in the average cae* Natural Lew and Revolution aa Because in serving the interests of the private proprietors the sate doesnot serve the interests of society as whole, it re- ‘mains an instrument of domination; the reprewive power cannot wither away, cannot return to a society which regulates ite spontaneously. Marx only has o confront the expectations ofthe liberal, Natural-Law construction of bourgeois society with the developmental tendencies ofthis society itself in order to contront the bourgeois revolution polemically with its own concept. Be. ‘cause this revolution bad’ pilisophially formed a concept of Itsel, it could be taken at its word by ts rts. The astonishing, ‘combination of philosophy and economics is not the peculiar dlistinciveness of the Paris Manuscript was already antic pated in the philosophic selfunderstnding of the boorgeois revolution In consonance with the linguistic usage of the Hegelian philosophy of right, Marx comprelends the bourgeois revolution 88 the emancipation of cizens [burgher] but not of fiuman be ings: recognized before the law as tree and equal legal persons, sul ache same time the citizens are atthe mercy of the natural ‘conditions ofa society of exchange, which hasbeen set fee. ‘Man, such as he is as a member of bourgeois society, the nonpolitical man, appears necesarly however a8 the natu: ral man, The droits de Fhomme appear as drvits naturel, for seconscious activity i eoneentrated on the politial ac The egoistic man isthe passive result ofa dissolved society in which he i merely presented aya given phenomenon, ‘The political revolution disolves bourgeois lite imo its component parts, without revolutionizing these parts themselves and subjecting them toa critique. Iti related to bourgeois society, co the world of needs, of labor, of private inerests and puivate law, as to the basis ofits existence, as to a precondition which requires no further justification therefore as to its natural basis” ‘The polemical concept of 1 merely political emancipation, which athe sun time is recognised “as + great step forward," thus turns critically aguinet the central presupposition underlying the7 Theory and Practice ‘AngloSaxon tradition of Natural Law. To be sure, Mare never made an explicit distinction between the liberal construction and the competing one going back to Rousseau and the Physio- fats, which recognized no separation in principle of human rights from citizens’ rights, of fundamental rights prior to the state from thove conferred bythe state Therefore it had to remain inexplicable to him at & nation which has just bogun to liberate itself solemnly proclaims the justification of egoistie man separate frou his fellowmen and the community inthe Declaration de 1791), and even repeats thie proclamation at the very moment... when the sacrifice of all interests of bourgeois, society have been made the order of the day and epoism ‘must be punished as aexime (Déclaration de 1793). As has been shown, the liberal doctrine of Natural Law ‘oul not, indeed, have served as the basis for the self understand: ing of the French Revolution. For the latter had as it basis the ides ofa political society, an organization embracing both sate And society. Without knowing it, Marx himself stands within this tradition, and takes hie departure from is concept of revolution, though tobe sure, giving this concept a new content. While the political revolution had emancipated the citizen legally, the fu ture proletarian revolution was to emancipate man socially. As well Known, Marx constructed an interpretation of the Pa revolt of June a5, 188, asthe indication of such 2 proletarian revolution; he compared it with the outbreak of the February ‘Revolution of that same year in terms ofthe formula: “After June revolution means: the overthrow of bourgeois society, while prior to February it had meant: the overthrow ofthe political form of the state."©? The proletariat should use the political power it had tained in order to organize a revolusion from above ("by means ‘of despotic intervention in the bourgeois relations of produc tion”) and should thus now organize als the socially derived natural basis ofthe tate which the bourgeoisie had revolutionized politically. In this, of course, it was no longer 2 question of Posiivizing Natural Law: instead, the revolution relies on carry: Natural Law and Revolution ng ing out a justice extracted dialecically from natural history. In the framework of 2 world history deciphered as a structure of guilt, Hegel had sacrificed abstract Natural Law to what seemed to him a more living judgment of destiny. Therefore tothe sate ‘ment, adopted approvingly, tha che revolution had received its frst stimulus from philosophy, he had atthe same tne added the limitation: "But this philorophy is only abstract thought, and not the concrete comprehension of absolute truth, which cond tutes an immeasurable dierence." Marx, with his aitique of ideology applied to the bourgeois constitutional state and with his sociological resolution on the basis of natural rights, went beyond Hegel to discredit so enduringly for Marxism both the idea of legality itself and the intention of Natural Law at such that ever since the link between Natural Law and revolution has been dissolved. The parties of the internationalied civil war have Aivided this heritage betwen themselves with ftefl unambigu ity: the one side has taken up the heritage of revolution, the other the ideology of Natural Lave Fundamental sights as principles for «total constitutional ‘order in the welfare state In the welfare states of the mast democracies of a highly industrialized and bureaueraticlly highly onganized society, the recognized human and citizens’ rights occupy a peculiarly am- bivalent postion. Three aspecs ate characteristic ofthis () On the one side, the guarantee of fundamental rights is the recognized foundation of constitutionality, ofan order in terms of which the exercie of authority, the use of free, and the

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