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a quân đội Trung Qu
How useful will China's weapons be in a real
war?
When Hou Minjun, commander of an armored
unit in the Chinese military's 27th Army, was
ordered to drive his troops on a nine-day trip
during a training exercise in Inner Mongolia, he
lost over half his force in the event.
In the first 48 hours of the 2013 North Sword
1405 exercise, Hou looked on as all 40 tanks in
his battalion broke down one after another.
Only 15 could be repaired and continue the
145-mile march, as reported by a People's
Liberation Army (PLA) news service.
Despite simulating a noncombat situation, the
battalion lost virtually all of its equipment in an
experience that Hou, who has served for 32
years, described as "painful."
The North Sword 1405 debacle is indicative of
the challenges facing China's officers.
Despite the Chinese regime's recent efforts to
carry out broad changes and upgrades, many
cracks in the PLA persist in the quality of its
personnel training and equipment, according
to experts and reports.
Obsolete and mismatched tanks
Hou's experience in the North Sword exercise
is not surprising. Of thousands of tanks
currently in service with the PLA, the
overwhelming majority are variants of the T-
55, a Soviet design first produced shortly after
World War II.
Upgrades and retrofits have extended the
lifespan of this successful weapon, but after
over 60 years of service, the design simply
does not fit in a modern arsenal.
Particularly following the 1991 Gulf War, in
which American aircraft and armor laid waste
to thousands of Soviet and Chinese-built
vehicles.
The PLA has been making new procurements
and designing updated tanks, such as the ZTZ-
99, which incorporates Western as well as
Soviet design philosophies, to keep pace.
It might not be enough, however. According to
a February report by War on the Rocks, a
military analysis blog, what modernizations
the PLA's armored forces have carried out may
well be a hindrance, as they are far from
comprehensive.
New equipment is trickled into service
gradually, PI_A armored units generally work
with "multiple generations under one roof," to
paraphrase from a Chinese proverb.
The slow, uncertain pace of upgrades force
officers to frequently readjust their battle
plans—a reality that, combined with the
overall quality of PLA training, does not bode
well for the force's prospects in a modern
conflict.
Engine trouble
Air power is one field in which the Chinese
regime has placed much attention, with mixed
results. While of the PLA's aircraft, like its
tanks, are old models such as the locally
produced J-7 andJ-8.
China has added hundreds of fourth-
generation—that is, designs from the late Cold
War era—jets to its arsenal.
One example is the J-11 interceptor, a Chinese
copy of the Soviet SU-27SK air superiority
fighter.
The PLA's air force ordered this plane in 1992,
and afterward began producing thej-11 locally
with Russian-provided components, namely
engines.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Chinese regime has been eager to purchase
advanced weapons from the Russian
government. This partnership has only
partially borne fruit.
The Kremlin, wary of the Chinese propensity to
steal and reverse-engineer foreign technology,
has tended to guard its secrets carefully,
leading to various abortive deals at the PLA's
expense.
Hoping to wean themselves off the Russian-
supplied engines that are essential for the
PLA's modern air fleet, the Chinese have tried
to produce their own engines for decades,
fitting them into the J-11 and the locally
designed J-10, which was also optimized to use
a Russian engine.
The Chinese WS-10 jet engine, long in
development as a local alternative to the PLA's
|-11s, has consistently performed dubiously.
According to a report published on
Globalsecurity.org, the Chinese military was
unsatisfied with the engine in 2007, and in
2009 a Chinese official said there were still
problems with the design.
Chinese fighter jets are reliant on Russian
imports for their engines.
In 2010, the Washington Post reported that
according to Russian and Chinese experts, the
WS-10A engine needed servicing following just
30 hours of operation, as opposed to 400
hours for the Russian-produced engines, and
far below international standards.
In 2013, the PLA's naval forces began
deploying small numbers of thej-15, a carrier-
based aircraft that, like the J-11, also comes
from the Su-27 family.
Early models ofthisjetwere fitted with Russian
engines, but in 2010 it was announced that a
Chinese-built engine, the WS-10H, would be
used instead. As of 2012, however, they were
still a weak point for the aircraft.
Whether or not this newest development of a
home-grown Chinese engine has met
expectations is unclear.
Regardless, an acceptable engine for the 4th
generation Su-27 family does not translate into
an engine suitable for the J-20, China's
supposed 5th generation jet that is meant to
match the American F-22 Raptor.
According to an article published on the "War
is Boring" blog titled "The Chinese Military is a
Paper Dragon," the J-20 won't be in service
until 2021 at the earliest.
The herculean task of training China's recruits
Even as China outfits its military with new
weapons, its soldiers may not have sufficient
know-how to use them properly. It takes time
and effort to train personnel, and competence
is needed to develop effective tactics and
strategies.
A recent report titled "China's Incomplete
Military Transformation," published by the
RAND Corporation, analyzed personnel
deficiencies in many sectors of the PLA,
including the 2nd Artillery Corps, which
controls China's nuclear weapons.
According to a report by the Project 2049
Institute think tank, in the summer of 2012,
2nd Artillery personnel conducting a 15-day
military exercise in an underground bunker
complex could not hold out to the end.
About halfway through the drill the personnel
were so distraught that female troops from a
PLA "cultural performance troupe" had to be
brought in to cheer them up.
Theorizing that young men were not suited for
long subterranean shifts, the 2nd Artillery tried
a shortened, three-day-long version of the
exercise—this time with women.
The results were even more disappointing. A
sizable portion of the personnel had to receive
psychological counselling by the second day,
and some even refused to eat.
Halfway through the drill the personnel were
so distraught that female troops had to be
brought in to cheer them up.
China maintains a large fleet of submarines,
including nuclear-powered subs carrying
ballistic missiles, but among the five nations on
the United Nation Security Council, only the
Chinese have yet to send their nuclear missile
subs on an operational patrol.
In a high-profile case from 2003, a Chinese
diesel-powered submarine sank with all
hands, revealing the poor state of training and
maintenance in the PLA's naval forces.
Raised under the restrictive one-child policy,
80 percent of the PLA's combat troops are only
children who grew up receiving the exclusive
attention of their parents and grandparents, a
Chinese general told The New York Times.
Molding them into soldiers capable of
following orders and cooperating in a highly
collectivist military environment may be a
challenge. Scott w. Harold, one of the authors
of the RAND report told the New York Times
that "kids come into the army who are used to
being coddled and the apple of their parents'
eyes."
The quality and utility of PLA training exercises
is a subject of frequent criticism from and
directed at Chinese officers.
Exercises are often rigged by commanders
attempting to impress their superiors, and
military publications point at excessive
"formalism" in training.
Overall, the PLA has often found itself hard-
pressed to simulate the realistic environments
that would reveal weaknesses in its military
doctrine and provide planners opportunities
to improve.
In addition to requiring more funds for fuel,
ammunition, and other supplies needed for
improved training, the PLA faces a systemic
roadblock that lies in its founding nature, that
is, its role as the armed wing of the Chinese
Communist Party.
Under the party's leadership
To keep the "gun" underthe control of the CCP,
the PLA had to be subordinated to the Party
and kept away from Chinese civil oversight.
Communist ideology pervades all levels of the
PLA.
According to a report by the Sinodefense news
website, officers spend over a third of their
time engaging in "political work," a term for
ideological meetings, study sessions, and
indoctrination.
All Chinese career officers are Communist
Party members, and all units larger than a
platoon are supervised by a political officer to
ensure that Party discipline is maintained. At
the top levels of the PLA, key decisions are
made by political committees.
The heavily politicized nature of the PLA, as
well as the fact that the Communist Party
keeps it in relative seclusion from civil
agencies, contributes to severe corruption in
its organization.
Like the Party, the PLA operates largely above
the law—embezzlement and illicit business are
common among Chinese officers.
Recent anti-corruption efforts by current
Chinese regime leaders have disciplined
thousands of military personnel for their vices.
The most prominent senior officerto fall under
investigation is Xu Caihou, former vice
chairman of the Central Military Commission
and director of the General Political
Department.
Despite his prominent rank, which he held
since the early 2000s, Xu never commanded a
specific military unit and spent his entire
career in the General Political Department.
Among the charges levied against him was the
acceptance of bribes in exchange for
promotions. During the investigation, the
general was found to have been in possession
of vast hoards of hard cash and precious gems
ương' nhất Châu Ãu
The 13 most 'miserable' countries in Europe
LIFE on the continent has often been
considered a laid-back, sun-drenched
alternative to Britain.
But in recent years, economic woes have cast
a dark cloud over Europe.
And a look at the formidable factors of both
unemployment and inflation can be used to
look at the misery of economic hardship in
Western Europe, according to an investment
management company.
Hermes Investment used data from the
eurozone and its own projections to calculate
exactly which countries face the most misery -
and the findings certainly don't make for
happy reading.
Overall the most miserable countries are those
who have put austerity measures in place to
cut fiscal deficits and debt, said the company.
Greece was found to be the most miserable of
all, perhaps of little surprise given that the
debt-laden country is on the brink of
bankruptcy. And it's outlook for isn't great
either, said Neil Williams, chief economist at
Hermes.
He predicts that Greece will stay in the euro to
avoid the far harsher fallout of leaving but that
by doing will ensures a veil of gloom for the
country for the immediate future.
The happiest countries were found to be
Ireland and Germany.
But thanks to lost growth and jobs, overall
eurozone 'misery' is typically higher than when
the euro became the single currency.
Furthermore, the biggest economies,
Germany, France and Italy, were found to be
more miserable than the before the economic
crisis, as intra-regional trade remains
subdued, said Hermes.
Britain didn't factor into the index, which
reflects the euro currency area.
Most miserable countries:
1. Greece
2. Cyprus
3. Italy
4. Portugal
5. Spain
6. France
7. Belgium
8. Luxembourg
9. Finland
10. Netherlands
11 .Austria
12.Ireland
13.Germany