Legal Ethics Full TXT Letter E

March 18, 2015
A.C. No. 10672
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE, Complainant,

*
vs.
ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint dated May 9, 2006 filed by complainant Eduardo A.
1
Maglente (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent Atty.
Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), praying that the latter be directed to return the amount of
P48,000he.00 that received from the former.
The Facts
Complainant, as President of "Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated''
(Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in
order to determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the members of Samahan. In 2
connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended to cover
the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written acknowledgment executed by
respondent himself. Despite the payment, respondent failed to file an action in court. When
3
confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him was not enough to fully pay for the
filing fees in court. Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but respondent claimed to
4
have spent the same and even demanded more money. Complainant further alleged that when he
5
persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told him to shut up because it was
not his money in the first place. Hence, complainant filed this administrative complaint seeking the
6
return of the full amount he had paid to respondent.
In his defense, respondent denied spending complainant’s money, explaining that he had already
7
prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite costly. This
prompted him to immediately relay such information to complainant who undertook to raise the
amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant administrative case was filed against him. 8
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
9
found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
and accordingly, recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of Censure, with a warning
that a repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer penalty; and (b) directed to account for or return
the amount of 48,000.00 to complainant. 10
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent clearly received the amount of 48,000.00
from complainant, which was intended to answer for the filing fees of a case he was supposed to file
for the Samahan, but which he failed to do so. In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner
11
observed that had respondent prepared the complaint and performed research works, as he
claimed, then he could have kept a reasonable amount for his effort under the doctrine of quantum
meruit, but unfortunately, he could not present any proof in this respect. 12
In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
13
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended penalty from
Censure to suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. Aggrieved,
respondent moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated May 3,
14 15
2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for the acts complained of.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP, except as to
the penalty to be imposed upon respondent. 1âwphi1
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the
latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion,
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal
16
matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, which reads:
17
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection [therewith] shall render him liable. 1âwphi1
In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of 48,000.00 to
answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking
and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he received from complainant was not enough to fully
pay the filing fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed
to refund the amount of 48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x
x x.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the
client. A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation
18
of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.
19
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment, and hence, must be
20
disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty
to be imposed.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the
same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court meted out
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, the Court 21
suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his
retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Similarly, 22
in Meneses v. Macalino, the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any legal
23
service to his client as well as to return the money he received for such purpose. In view of the
24
foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Finally, the Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or return the amount of
48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative
and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities
which are purely civil in nature– for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer
from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement." Since the aforesaid amount was intended to answer for filing fees which
25
is intimately related to the lawyer- client relationship between complainant and respondent, the Court
finds the return thereof to be in order. 26
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of violating
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount of

48,000.00 he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure
to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent’s record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016
RE: DECISION DATED AUGUST 19, 2008, 3RD DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS IN
CA-G.R. SP NO. 79904 [HON. DIONISIO DONATO T. GARCIANO, ET AL. V. HON.
PATERNO G. TIAMSON, ETC., ET AL.], Petitioner, v. ATTY. JOSE DE G. FERRER,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This administrative complaint1 originated from the Court of Appeals Decision 2 dated
August 19, 2008, which summarily dismissed the Petition for Certiorari with prejudice
and found petitioners3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79904, as well as their counsel, Atty. Jose De
G. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer), guilty of direct contempt of court. 4 They were further imposed
a fine of P2,000.00.5 The Court of Appeals then ordered that a copy of its Decision be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and appropriate
disciplinary action against Atty. Ferrer, respondent in the present case. 6
On July 27, 2001, Dionisio Donato T. Garciano (Garciano), then Mayor of Baras, Rizal,
sought to appoint Rolando Pilapil Lacayan (Lacayan) as Sangguniang Bayan Secretary,
replacing Nolasco Vallestero (Vallestero).7 The appointment was opposed by Wilfredo
Robles (Robles), then Vice Mayor of Baras, Rizal. He said that the position is not vacant
and that it is the vice mayor, not the mayor, who has the authority 8 to appoint the
Sangguniang Bayan Secretary.
Garciano insisted and removed Vallestero's name from the payroll. 9 Vallestero sued
Garciano before the Sandiganbayan.10 Vallestero, Robles, and other Sangguniang Bayan
members also filed a "complaint for mandamus and damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction"11 against Garciano and other municipal officials 12 (Garciano, et
al.) before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They sought for the payment of
their respective salaries.13
On June 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court14 ordered Garciano, et al. to release the
funds and pay Vallestero's salaries and other benefits. 15 Garciano, et al. did not heed
the Regional Trial Court's order;16 hence, they were found liable for indirect contempt. 17
Appealing the trial court's ruling, Garciano, et al., through their counsel, Atty. Ferrer,
filed a Petition for Certiorari (First Petition) on October 9, 2003 before the Court of
Appeals.18 This was raffled to the Eleventh Division 19 and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 79752.20
On October 16, 2003, Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed another Petition for
Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order21 (Second Petition) before the Court of Appeals. This was
raffled to the Third Division22 and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79904. 23
On the same day, Garciano, et al. filed before the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Petition Under Rule 17 Section 1 24 of the Revised
Rules of Court.25 They allegedly moved to withdraw the First Petition to avail
themselves of other remedies, especially since a comment had not yet been filed. 26
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals Third Division 27 issued a temporary
restraining order, effective for 60 days and conditioned upon the posting of a bond
amounting to P100,000.00.28
Meanwhile, in its Resolution dated October 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals Eleventh
Division granted Garciano, et al.'s Motion to withdraw the First Petition. 29
In their Reply to the Comment on the Second Petition, Garciano, et al. admitted filing
the First Petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79752, which was similar to the Second
Petition.30 However, they maintained that the withdrawal of the First Petition was made
in good faith and in order to correct the technical defect of the First Petition, which was
solely verified by Garciano.31
Garciano, et al. insisted that they did not commit perjury when they stated in the
verification of their Second Petition that there was no pending petition filed involving
the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court. 32 Garciano, et al. also argued that
when they withdrew the First Petition, there was no adverse opinion yet issued by the
Eleventh Division.33 Finally, they claimed that the divisions of the Court of Appeals are
not different courts in relation to the other divisions, and both divisions where the
Petitions were filed are part and parcel of one court. 34 Hence, there was no forum
shopping.
In the Decision dated August 19, 2008, the Court of Appeals Third Division dismissed
the Second Petition with prejudice due to the deliberate violation of the rule against
forum shopping.35 The Court of Appeals found that Garciano, et al., through Atty.
Ferrer, filed two (2) Petitions for Certiorari successively. 36 It also held that the
withdrawal of the First Petition was "intended to camouflage the glaring and blatant
irregularity committed"37 by Garciano, et al. through their counsel. 38 If the withdrawal
was, indeed, impelled by the lack of verification of the other petitioners in the First
Petition, then Garciano, et al. should have called the attention of the Eleventh Division
instead of filing the Second Petition. 39 The Court of Appeals held that when the Second
Petition was filed (and the existence of the First Petition concealed), forum shopping
had already been committed.40 cralawred
The Court of Appeals further held that neither the adjudication of cases pending before
courts nor the contents of these cases are taken judicial notice by the courts,
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge.41 Rather, it is the party and the counsel's duty to inform the court trying
the case of any pendency of a similar case filed before any court. 42 Violation of this rule
makes the parties and their counsel guilty of forum shopping. 43 The Court of Appeals
reiterated that the rule against forum shopping seeks to avoid the issuance of
conflicting decisions by two (2) or more courts upon the same issue. 44
The
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Court of Appeals concluded:
WHEREFORE, the petition is summarily Dismissed with prejudice. Petitioners and
Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer are hereby found guilty of direct contempt of court for which a
maximum fine of P2,000.00 is imposed upon them, payable within 5 days from receipt
of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation and appropriate disciplinary action against Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer. 45
(Emphasis in the original)
In the Indorsement dated September 1, 2008, Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, Director for Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, forwarded the Notice of Judgment of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR S.P. No. 79904 to the Office of the Bar Confidant. 46
On November 19, 2008, this court resolved to note the Indorsement and treat the
Notice of Judgment as an administrative complaint against Atty. Ferrer. 47
Atty. Ferrer was ordered to comment on the administrative complaint. 48 In his

Comment, he states that he acted in good faith in the simultaneous filing of the Second
Petition and the urgent ex-parte Motion to withdraw Garciano, et al.'s First Petition 49 He
alleges that he withdrew the First Petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79752 on
October 16, 2003, the same day he filed the Second Petition docketed as CA-GR. S.P
No. 79904.50
Atty. Ferrer states that there was an urgent need to file the Second Petition as the First
Petition was verified by only one petitioner instead of four. 51 He also claims that the
technical defect may have hampered the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order.52 Thus, he deems that it was "more realistic and expedient" to file the Second
Petition and simultaneously withdraw the First Petition rather than amend the First
Petition.53 He states that amending the First Petition would have required a hearing
before it could be admitted as basis for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. 54
Atty. Ferrer adds that by filing the Motion to withdraw the First Petition on the same
day as the filing of the Second Petition, he substantially complied with the rule against
forum shopping.55 He asserts that he was acting in the best interest of his clients,
whose "liberty [were] then at stake and time was of the essence." 56 As the withdrawal
of the First Petition and the filing of the Second Petition were made simultaneously and
not one day after another, Atty. Ferrer claims that it was unlikely to have conflicting
decisions rendered by different courts on the same issue. 57
Finally, Atty. Ferrer states that there was no violation of the rule against forum
shopping because the First and Second Petitions were not filed before different
tribunals, although the Eleventh and Third Divisions of the Court of Appeals are
technically separate from each other.58 He states that forum shopping takes place
when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than appeal or certiorari) in another. 59 Atty. Ferrer further asserts that the filing
of the case took place before only one forum — the Court of Appeals — and that no
forum shopping could be considered to have taken place. 60
In his Report and Recommendation dated November 17, 2009, Commissioner Salvador
B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the findings of the Court of Appeals in toto. 61 He
stated that the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 19, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79904 is "loud and clear."62
Based on the Court of Appeals' findings, Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty.
Ferrer clearly violated the rule on forum shopping. 63 Thus, he recommended that Atty.
Ferrer be suspended for three (3) months from the practice of law with a stern warning
that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. 64
On February 13, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XX-2013-132,65 which resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. It recommended that the penalty of Atty.
Ferrer be reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with
more severely.66 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
then transmitted the Notice of Resolution to this court through a letter dated October 7,
2013.67
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer should be held
administratively liable for violating the rule against forum shopping.
We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. Respondent is guilty of violating the rule
against forum shopping.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the rule against forum shopping:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc.,68 this court enumerated the instances
where forum
shopping takes place:
There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court." The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were
explained in Chua
v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been
resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).69
(Citations omitted)
In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co, Inc.,70 the court elaborated on the purpose of the rule
against
forum shopping:
The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition
by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous
party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try
their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the
resultant confusion, this Court strictly adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and
any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. 71
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Respondent filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer. All the elements necessary for the commission of forum shopping are present.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent could have easily filed a
manifestation that the other petitioners had yet to verify the First Petition.
Respondent's reason that the failure of other petitioners to verify the First Petition may
imperil the issuance of a temporary restraining order cannot justify the willful violation
of the rule against forum shopping.
Respondent must be reminded that the withdrawal of any case, when it has been duly
filed and docketed with a court, rests upon the discretion of the court, and not at the
behest of litigants.72 Once a case is filed before a court and the court accepts the case,
the case is considered pending and is subject to that court's jurisdiction.
Thus, it was incumbent upon respondent to inform the court or division where he
subsequently filed his Second Petition that he had already filed the First Petition. The
Court of Appeals correctly held that courts cannot take judicial notice of actions that
have been filed either before their courts or before other courts.
This court's Circular

No. 28-91 is instructive on this point:
[I]n every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, the petitioner .
. . must certify under oath all of the following facts or undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agencies; (b) to the best
of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if
there is such other action or proceeding pending, he must state the status of the same;
and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the
aforesaid courts and such other tribunal or agency of that fact within five (5) days
therefrom. (Emphasis supplied).73 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to anticipate the possibility of being held liable for
forum shopping. He is expected to be aware of actions constituting forum shopping.
Respondent's defense of substantial compliance and good faith cannot exonerate him.
The elements of forum shopping are expected to be fundamentally understood by
members of the bar, and a defense of good faith cannot counter an abject violation of
the rule.
In Alonso v. Relamida, Jr.,74 the court elaborated on the liability of counsel who was
complicit in violating
the rule on forum shopping:
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of
obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to
claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another. Thus,
the following requisites should concur:
... (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in
both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state,
the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as
appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. 75 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
As we stated in Alonso, the incompetence of counsel in not knowing any better justifies
the imposition of administrative liability. Respondent himself admitted that he was
responsible for the withdrawal of the pending First Petition and the filing of the Second
Petition, in the belief that it was in the best interest of his clients. This court cannot
tolerate respondent's inability to realize that his actions would amount to forum
shopping. Respondent had full knowledge that when he filed the Second Petition, it
concerned the same parties and same cause of action.
As for his administrative liability, this court deems it necessary to modify the penalty
recommended in Resolution No. XX-2013-132 and impose on respondent the penalty of
six (6) months' suspension from legal practice. In Alonso, this court suspended the
lawyer for six (6) months and warned him not to repeat his infraction. 76
The Lawyers' Oath that respondent took exhorts him not to "wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the
same."77 Moreover, in Teodoro v. Atty. Gonzales:78
In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes. 79 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for six (6) months for engaging in forum shopping, effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same and
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of respondent as a member of the bar; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Resolution shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
A.C. No. 7437
AVIDA LAND CORPORATION(FORMERLY LAGUNA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS,

INC.), Complainant
vs.
ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO, Respondent
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that caused
delay in the execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.
In its questioned Resolution , the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of the
1
Philippines (IBP) adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating 2
Commissioner, who found respondent guilty of violating Canon 12, Rule 12.04 of the Code of
3 4
Professional Responsibility for delaying the enforcement of a writ of execution, and

recommended that the latter be reprimanded or censured with a stem warning that a repetition of
the same behavior in the future shall merit a harsher penalty. 5
Antecedent Facts
Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision
houses and lots. Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development Corporation
6
(Rodman). 7
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman, under which the latter was to acquire
8
from the former a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In
the event that such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay the full
contract price of ₱4,4 l 2,254.00, less the downpayment of ₱l,323,676.20, within 15 days from its
receipt of the loan disapproval. 9
After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property. 10
In three separate letters , complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance of
11
P3,088,577.80. Both parties agreed that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18
12
months. 13
Rodman made a partial payment of ₱404,782.56 on 22 March 1999. It also claimed to have made
other payments amounting to ₱1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July 1999, which complainant
disputed. 14
Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded that
Rodman vacate the subject property. 15
As Rodman remained in possession of the property, complainant filed an unlawful detainer case
16
against the former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City. 17
Soon after, Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) seeking the nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed for the
accounting of payments and the fixing of the period upon which the balance of the purchase
price should be paid. 18
The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the unlawful
detainer case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 19
HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter Atty. Ma.
Perpetua Y. Aquino, similarly dismissed Rodman's Complaint and ordered it to pay damages and
attorney's fees. Rodman appealed the ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB
20
Board). 21
In its subsequent Decision, the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling, directing Rodman
22
"to immediately pay its outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall have the right to
rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by complainant less deductions as
may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly compensation for the use of the premises at
the rate of 1 % of the contract price per month." 23
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the HLURB Board's Decision, questioning
24
the order to refund the sums paid by Rodman less deductions in case of a rescission of the
contract. Rodman filed a Comment/Opposition to complainant's motion and sought a
25
clarification of certain aspects of the Decision, but did not move for reconsideration.
26
The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution modifying its earlier Decision.1âwphi1 Thus:
27
x x x [T]he complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent (herein

complainant) its outstanding balance of ₱l,814,513.27, including interests and penalties which
may have accrued in the meantime, failing in which, the respondent shall have the right to
rescind the contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by the complainant less deductions as
may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly compensation for the use of the premises at
the rate of 1 % of the contract price per month.
As neither of the parties appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became final and
executory.
The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but their efforts were
in vain. With the judgment award still not satisfied after the lapse of six months, complainant
28
filed a motion for writs of execution and possession before the HLURB Board. Respondent filed
29
an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a Rejoinder to complainant's Reply.

30 31
In an Order dated 10 August 2006, the HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and
32
remanded the case records to the HLURB Regional Office for proceedings on the execution of
the judgment and/or other appropriate disposition.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order dated 10 August 2006, raising issues on the 33
computation of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition and Rejoinder, to which respondent

34 35
filed a Reply and Sur-rejoinder

36 37
On 17 January 2007, the HLURB Board issued an Order denying Rodman's Motion for
38
Reconsideration. It said that the computation of interests and penalties, as well as other matters
concerning the implementation of the final and executory Decision, shall be dealt with in the
execution proceedings before the Regional Office. It furthermore enjoined the parties from filing
any pleading in the guise of an appeal on collateral issues or questions already passed upon. 39
On 5 March 2007, respondent filed a Motion for Computation of Interest before the HLURB
40
Regional Office, citing the disagreement between the parties as to the reckoning date of the
accrual of interest. Complainant filed its Opposition with Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution and Possession. In its Order dated 31 July 2007, the HLURB Regional Office
41 42
accordingly computed the interest due, arriving at the total amount of ₱2,685,479.64 as payment
due to complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the
HLURB Board's earlier Resolution. 43
Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution, respondent, on behalf
44
of Rodman, filed a Motion (1) to Quash the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to
Set the Case for Conference. The said motion injected new issues and claims and demanded the
45
inclusion in the Order of a "provision that upon actual receipt of the amount of ₱2,685,479.64,
[complainant] should simultaneously turn-over the duplicate original title to Rodman."
(Emphasis omitted)
Respondent also filed a Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt for issuing a demand letter to
46
Rodman despite the pendency of the latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.
On 7 November 2007, the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to
thresh out the problems with the execution of the writ. The conference, however, failed to serve
its purpose.
Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and for the
setting of a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt. The motion alleged that
47
Arbiter Aquino had shown bias in favor of complainant, and that she had failed to set the Petition
for hearing.48
or earmg.
In an Order dated 23 April 2008, the HL URB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for
49
inhibition; (2) granted complainant's Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Writ of
Possession; and (3) directed complainant to comment on the Petition citing the latter for
contempt.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, reiterating that Arbiter
Aquino should inhibit herself from the case because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino eventually
yielded and ordered the re-raffle of the case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda.
When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion for the Issuance
of an Alias Writ of Execution, respondent submitted his vehement Opposition. He insisted that
his Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle should be acted upon first and argued that
"the merits of the instant case as well as the motions filed in relation thereto must be re-evaluated
by the new handling arbiter after the re-raffling x x x."
On 5 January 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of Conference issued by

Arbiter Foronda. The Manifestation stated that Rodman would be attending the conference, not
to submit itself to the jurisdiction of Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the re-raffling of the case.
On 16 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda, claiming
that his designation violated due process.1âwphi1 He said the re-raffle was questionable because
he was not notified of its conduct despite his earlier Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-
raffle.
Thereafter, the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter
Foronda could rule on the pending motions.
In a Resolution dated 22 September 2009, Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-raffle
was not an indispensable prerequisite for a substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction over a case at
the execution stage; (2) the claim of Rodman that its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 April
2008 Order had remained unresolved was rendered moot by Arbiter Aquino's eventual inhibition
from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the summary dismissal of complainant's motions to
resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution was denied.
The 22 September 2009 Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as respondent did
not file any more pleadings.
Administrative Complaint Against Respondent
On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant - through
its vice president for project development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-Affidavit against
50
respondent for alleged professional misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The
Complaint alleged that respondent's conduct in relation to the HLURB case manifested a
disregard of the following tenets: 51
1. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
2. Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
3. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
4. Canon 12 - A lawlyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
5. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
In his Comment, respondent claimed that what primarily caused the delays in the HLURB case
52
were the legal blunders of complainant's counsel, to wit:
1. It took complainant's counsel a period of six months to file a Motion for Writ of Execution of
the HLURB Board's Decision dated 22 June 2005. 53
2. The Motion for Writ of Execution was filed before the HLURB Board, which as an appellate
body had no jurisdiction to issue the writ.54
Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts of notarial rescission
and filing of an ejectment suit before the trial court. These acts allegedly contributed to the delay
in the resolution of the dispute.
55
Further, respondent argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the execution of the
Decision dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21 February 2007, as
complainant filed its Motion for Writ of Execution before the HLURB Regional Office only in
April 2007. 56
Lastly, respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause of his
client with utmost dedication, diligence, and good faith. 57
As respondent allegedly continued performing dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant filed
Supplemental Complaints against him. The Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation,
58
report, and recommendation. 59
On 22 June 2013, the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation on the Complaint. Neitherparty filed a motion for
60
reconsideration or a petition within the pereiod allowed. 61
The Ruling of the Court
Respondent is guilty of profession misconduct.
Despite the simplicity of the issue involved in the HLURB case, the path towards its resolution
became long, tedious, and frustrating because of the deliberate attempts of respondent to delay
the actual execution of the judgment therein. He continued to file pleadings over issues already
passed upon even after being enjoined not to do so, and made unfounded accusations of bias or
procedural defects. These acts manifest his propensity to disregard the authority of a tribunal and
abuse court processes, to the detriment of the administration of justice.
The defense that respondent is merely defending the cause of his client is untenable.
As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to serve
the latter with competence and diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ every
honorable means to defend the cause of his client and secure what is due the latter.62
Professional rules, however, impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are
63
required to exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. The Code also obliges lawyers to employ only fair and honest means
64
to attain the lawful objectives of their client. 65
In Millare v. Montero, the Court ruled that it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use
66
the judicial process - such as the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation, and frivolous
appeals - for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.
In Garcia v. Francisco, a lawyer willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse – all of
67
which were rebuffed – to get a favorable judgment. He was found to have violated his duty as a
member of the bar to pursue only those acts or proceedings that appear to be just, and only those
lines of defense he believed to be honestly debatable under the law.
Respondent cannot hide behind the pretense of advocating his client's cause to escape liability for
his actions that delayed and frustrated the administration of justice.
He even attempted to tum the tables on complainant by pointing out that the "legal blunders" of
the latter's counsel contributed to the delay in the execution of the judgment. Whether or not the
actions or omissions of complainant's counsel brought dire consequences to its client's cause is
not a factor in the instant case. Even assuming for argument's sake that complainant's counsel
committed procedural errors that prolonged some of the case incidents, these errors did not
prejudice the delivery of justice, as they were later cured. More important, the so-called
"blunders" were independent of respondent's actions, which were the direct cause of the delay.
Respondent argues that he could not have possibly delayed the execution of the judgment, as no
Motion for Execution of Judgment had been filed when the instant administrative case was
instituted. This argument can no longer be considered viable, as he continued to employ dilatory
tactics even after the Writ of Execution had already been issued, and complainant later filed
Supplemental Complaints against him.
What is patent from the acts of respondent - as herein narrated and evident from the records - is
that he has made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and ultimately
caused unjust delays in the administration of justice. These acts are in direct contravention of
Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse
court processes.
Further, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath68 by disobeying the legal orders of a duly
constituted authority, and disregarding his sworn duty to "delay no man for money or malice."
While the IBP similarly found respondent guilty of professional misconduct, we find that its
recommended penalty of reprimand is not commensurate with respondent’s transgression.
Under the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (IBP
Guidelines), reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a lawyer’s negligence causes
injury or potential injury to a client or a party. In this case, respondent’s injurious court orders.
69
He knowingly abused the legal process and violated orders of the HLURB Board of Regional
Office with the intent of delaying the execution of s judgment that had long been final and
executory. That he continued to do so even if a Complaint was already filed against him proved
that his acts were deliberate.
Further, ethical violations analogous to respondent’s infractions have not been treated as lightly
by the Court.
In Foronda v. Guerrrero, the respondent’s therein was suspended for two years from the practice
of law for filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter in
violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
70 71
In Saladaga v. Astorga, the repondent was found guilty of (1) breach of the Lawyer’s Oath; (2)
72
unlawful. Dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and (3) disrespect for the Court and causing the
undue delay of cases. For these offenses, a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
years, as recommended by the IBP, was imposed.
The respondents in Millare and Garcia, meanwhile, were suspended for one year from the
73 74
practice of law.
In Saa v. IBP, the petitioner was found to have violated Canon 12, Rule 12.04. and Rule 1.03
75 76 77 78
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the resolution of a case. He was also
suspended from practice of law for one year.
Thus, We have meted out the penalty of one to two years' suspension in cases involving multiple
violations of professional conduct that have caused unjust delays in the administration of justice.
The IBP Guidelines similarly provide that "suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that
he is violating a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or
interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding." 79
Respondent, therefore, should not receive a mere reprimand; he should be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating

Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, for
which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of
this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Public Information Office, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts. Likewise, a Notice of Suspension shall be appropriately posted on the
Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.
Upon his receipt of this Decision, respondent shall forthwith be suspended from the practice of
law and shall formally manifest to this Court that his suspension has started. He shall furnish all
courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013
GLORIA P. JINON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for disciplinary action filed by complainant Gloria P.
Jinon (Gloria) before the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) against respondent Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz (Atty. Jiz) for neglecting her case, misappropriating
funds, and assigning her case to another lawyer without her consent, in violation of the provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
The complaint alleged that Gloria, after the death of her brother Charlie in July 2001, entrusted two
(2) land titles covering properties owned by their deceased parents to her sister-in-law, Viola J. Jinon
(Viola): one located in Mangasina, Sta. Barbara, Iloilo (Sta. Barbara Property) and the other at No.
12 Valencia St., Poblacion, Leganes, Iloilo (Leganes Property) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-119598.2
Eventually, Gloria sold the Sta. Barbara Property, which resulted in disagreements between her and
Viola regarding their respective shares in the proceeds. Consequently, Viola refused to return to
Gloria TCT No. T-119598, prompting Gloria to engage the services of Atty. Jizon April 29, 2003 to
recover the said title, for which she immediately paid an acceptance fee of ₱17,000.00. 3
In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Jiz assured the transfer of the title in Gloria's name.
On August 13, 2003, Gloria, upon Atty. Jiz's instructions, remitted the amount of ₱45,000.00 4
to answer for the expenses of the transfer. However, when she later inquired about the status of her
case, she was surprised to learn from Atty. Jiz that a certain Atty. Caras was handling the same.
Moreover, when she visited the Leganes Property, which has been leased out to one Rose Morado
(Rose), she discovered that Atty. Jiz has been collecting the rentals for the period June 2003 up to
October 2004, which amounted to ₱12,000.00. When she demanded for the rentals, Atty. Jiz gave
her only ₱7,000.00, explaining that the balance of ₱5,000.00 would be added to the expenses
needed for the transfer of the title of the Leganes Property to her name.
The foregoing incidents prompted Gloria to terminate the legal services of Atty. Jiz and demand the
return of the amounts of ₱45,000.00 and ₱5,000.00 through a letter 5dated September 22, 2004,
which has remained unheeded.
To date, Atty. Jiz has not complied with his undertaking to recover TCT No. T-119598 from Viola and
effect its transfer in Gloria’s name, and has failed to return her money despite due demands. Hence,
the instant administrative complaint praying that Atty. Jiz: (1) be ordered to reimburse the total
amount of ₱67,000.00 (₱17,000.00 acceptance fee, ₱45,000.00 for the transfer of title, and
₱5,000.00 as unremitted rentals for the Leganes Property); and (2) be meted disciplinary action that
the Court may deem fit under the circumstances.
In his Answer6 andPosition Paper,7 Atty. Jiz admitted accepting Gloria’s case but claimed that it was
only for the purpose of protecting her rights against her sister-in-law, Viola. According to him, the
extent of his legal services covered the negotiation and consummation of the sale of the Sta.
Barbara Propertyfor a fee of ₱75,000.00;recovery of TCT No.T-119598from Viola; and the possible
filing of an ejectment case against the tenant of the Leganes Property. For his attorney’s fees, Gloria
had partially paid the sum of ₱62,000.00 inclusive of the acceptance fee of ₱17,000.00, leavingan
unpaid balance of ₱13,000.00.
Atty. Jiz also alleged that Gloria approached him to secure another owner’s copy of a title she
purportedly lost, but which would turn out to be in Viola’s possession. Despite her offer to pay legal
fees amounting to ₱100,000.00, heclaimed to have refused to file a "fraudulent cadastral case." He
likewise denied having committed to file one or to refer the case to another lawyer. 8
Thus, Atty. Jiz asseverated that he was not remiss in his legal duties to Gloria.Denying liability to
reimburse Gloria for any amount, much less for ₱45,000.00,he claimed that he had rendered the
corresponding legal services to her with fidelity and candor. In particular, he pointed to the demand
letters he sent to Viola for the return of the subject titleandto Rose,the tenant of the
Leganes Property, requiring the submission of the itemized expenses for the repair of the leased
property. He also claimed to have caused the execution of a lease contract covering the Leganes
Property.Hence, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
After the parties’ submission of their respective position papers, 9 the CBD, through Commissioner
Cecilio A.C. Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva), submitted its October 8, 2010 Report and
Recommendation.10 He found Atty. Jiz to have been remiss in his duty to update his client, Gloria,
regarding her case, and to respond to Gloria’s letter terminating his services and demanding the
refund of the sum of ₱45,000.00, in violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states:
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Commissioner Villanueva also observed that the scope of the legal services that Atty. Jiz undertook
to perform for Gloria could have been clarified had he been more candid with the exact fees that he
intended to collect.Recognizing, however, the legal services rendered by Atty. Jizin the form of legal
advice, sending of demand letters to Viola and Rose and collecting rentals from the latter,he found
the amount of ₱17,000.00 as sufficient and reasonable remuneration for his services.Moreover, Atty.
Jiz’sdisregard of the CBD’s orders – to submit his answer on time and attend hearings – showed
disrespect to the judiciary and his fellow lawyers.
With these findings, Commissioner Villanueva held Atty. Jiz to have committed improper conduct
and recommended that he be (1) ordered to refund to Gloria the amount of ₱45,000.00 with legal
interest, and (2) reprimanded, with a stern warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed
upon him for a repetition of the same acts.
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2011-303, 11
adopting with modification the Commission’s Report and Recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent
remiss in his duty and for disregarding the Orders of the Commission, Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and to Ordered to Restitute
complainant the amount of ₱45,000.00 and 12% interest from the time he received the amount until
fully paid within sixty (60) days from notice.
The Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether Atty. Jiz should be held administratively liable for having
been remiss in his duties as a lawyer with respect to the legal services he had undertaken to perform
for his client, Gloria.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of Commissioner
Villanueva and the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyer in
neglecting his client’s case, misappropriating her funds and disobeying the CBD’s lawful orders
requiring the submission of his pleadings and his attendance at hearings. He should thus be
suspended from the practice of law in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. 12 "Lawyers may, thus, be
disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity."13
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
x x x x x x x x x
RULE 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
x x x x x x x x x
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
x x x x x x x x x
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
x x x x x x x x x
Undeniably, "when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of
a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society." 14
Moreover, money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer
of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. 15 "A lawyer’s failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment." 16
In this case, Atty. Jiz committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. Aside
1âwphi1
from the demand letter 17 dated April 29, 2003 which he sent to Viola, he failed to perform any other
positive act in order to recover TCT No. T-119598 from Viola for more than a year. He also failed to
return, despite due demand, the funds allocated for the transfer of the title that he received from her.
The claim that the total amount of ₱62,000.00 that Gloria paid him was for the services he rendered
in facilitating the sale of the Sta. Barbara Property is belied by the receipt 18 dated April 29, 2003,
which states that the amount of ₱17,000.00 paid by Gloria was for "consultation and other legal
services" he would render "up to and including April 30, 2003." His handwritten notation at the
bottom portion made it clear that he received the said amount "as full payment." He likewise failed to
substantiate his averment that he actually facilitated the sale of the Sta. Barbara Property.
Furthermore, respondent’s infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBD’s directives
for him to file his pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his
irresponsibility but also his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. 19 As a member of the bar,
he ought to have known that the orders of the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers were not mere requests but directives which should have been
complied with promptly and completely.20
In Rollon v. Naraval,21 the Court suspended respondent Atty. Naraval from the practice of law for two
(2) years for failing to render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant and
for failing to return the money and documents he received.
Similarly, in Small v. Banares,22 the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years for failing to file a case for which the amount of ₱80,000.00 was given him by his client; to
update the latter of the status of the case;and to return the said amount upon demand.
Likewise, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, 23 the Court meted the same punishment to the respondent
lawyer for (1) having failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence and diligence; (2) refusing to
account for and to return his client’s money as well as the titles over certain properties owned by the
latter; and (3) failing to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for
information, all in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Considering the foregoing relevant jurisprudence, the Court finds it appropriate to adopt the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend Atty. Jiz from the practice of law for two
(2) years. With respect to the amount that he should refund to Gloria, only the sum of ₱45,000.00
plus legal interest should be returned to her, considering the finding that the initial payment of
₱17,000.00 was reasonable and sufficient remuneration for the actual legal services he rendered.
The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required.24 Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the
standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz, having clearly violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and disobeyed
lawful orders of the Commission on Bar Discipline, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. He is ORDERED to return to complainant Gloria P. Jinon the full amount of ₱45,000.00
with legal interest of 6% per annum from date of demand on September 22, 2004 up to the finality of
this Decision and 12% per annum from its finality until paid.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
respondent's records as attorney. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5440 December 10, 2014
SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is a complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
(complainants) against Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza (respondent). This case involves a determination
1
of whether respondent violated his duty to hold in trust all moneys and properties of the client; his
duty to account for all funds and property collected or received for or from the client; and his duty to
deliver the funds and property of the client when due or upon demand under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The facts are summarized as follows:

On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services of respondent to facilitate the
transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants. 2
Complainants then gave respondent a check for ₱68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes. They 3
also gave respondent a check for ₱13,800.00 for respondent’s professional fee. 4
Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups. 5
Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of title. However, 6
respondent still failed to produce the title.
Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay. Respondent refused to return the
7
amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes. Complainants were then issued a certificate to file
8
action. They also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money intended for the transfer taxes.
9 10
Respondent still did not return the money.
On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another letter to complainants. He promised to settle the transfer
of the land title. However, respondent reneged on this promise. Complainants were then forced to
11 12
obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company to secure the transfer
of the title to the property in their names.
13
Respondent contested the allegations of complainants. According to him, it was complainants who
caused the three-year delay in the transfer of title to complainants’ names. Complainants were not
able to furnish respondent several important documents: (a) original copy of the deed of extrajudicial
petition; (b) affidavit of publication with the clippings of the published item in a newspaper of general
circulation; and (c) a barangay certificate from the barangay where the property is located as
required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 14
In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of ₱13,800.00 despite all
the work he did for them, including facilitating the sale of the property. These involved "being-pulled
from the office four or five times to discuss . . . the details of the transaction [with the sellers]; going
twice to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna[,] Branch 24, to expedite the . . . issuance of a
[n]ew owner’s duplicate copy of the title; going twice to the office of the Register of Deeds for
Calamba, Laguna to make verification and submit the court [o]rder; [and facilitating the] preparation
and notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale." 15
Respondent also claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his receivables from
complainants for the services he rendered in various cases:
1) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas, for
Forcible Entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Santa
Rosa, Laguna. This case was dismissed by the Honorable Court for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, the issue of possession being intertwined with that of ownership;
2) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas for Accion
Publiciana docketed as Civil Case No. B-5386 raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna[,] Branch 25;
3) In Civil Case No. B-4503 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
et al., for nullity of title, [r]econveyance with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction directed specifically to herein complainant. This case was assigned to the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna[.] Respondent, for and in behalf of herein
complainant, submitted an [a]nswer and [o]pposition to the prayer for issuance of the
injunction, which was favorably acted upon. Consequently[,] the case was dismissed by the
Court[;]
4) In Civil Case No. B-688 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
et al., for [r]e-partition and [r]econveyance, which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24[;] [and]
5) Likewise, respondent represented herein complainant in [an] ESTAFA case they [filed]
against Greg Ramos and Benjamin Corsino, which case, as per reliable source, was
discontinued by complainant after the civil aspect of the same was amicably settled. 16
Respondent further alleged that complainants challenged him to prove his worth as a lawyer
by doing away with the requirements and expediting the cancellation of the Marcaidas’ title. 17
The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. The parties were then called to a mandatory conference
18
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. They were required to submit their position papers.
19 20
Respondent did not submit his position paper. 21
On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, submitted his findings
and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canon 16,
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
22 23
The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to respondent were encashed
despite respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of complainants. 24
Complainants had to obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer of title in their names.
25
Moreover, respondent admitted his liability in his letters to complainants. Complainant Nicasio San
26
Pedro’s affidavit of desistance is immaterial. 27
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disciplinary action of "censure and warning,"
hence:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the disciplinary

sanction of CENSURE and WARNING be given the respondent with the admonition that he be
extremely careful of his acts to forego severe penalty in the future.
28
In the Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It held:

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent’s
violation of Canon 16, [Rule] 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
he failed to effect the transfer of property despite encashment of the two checks, Atty. Isagani A.
Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to
Returnthe amount of Sixty Eight Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (₱68,250.00) Pesos to complainants
within thirty days from receipt of notice. (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring in the original)
29
On November 14, 2008, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration. The IBP Board of
30
Governors denied respondent’s motion in the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22,
2013:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which
had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399
dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED. (Emphasis and italics in the original)
31
On December 11, 2013, this court resolved to note the following: (a) Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 of the IBP Board of Governors; (b) Notice of Resolution No. XX-
2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors;and (c) IBP’s letter dated October 7,
2013 transmitting the documents pertaining to the case. 32
In the manifestation and motion dated October 25,2013, respondent requested for a formal hearing,
reasoning that he "wants to exercise his right to confront his accusers [to] cross[-]examine them and
that of their witness." The manifestation and motion was denied by this court in the resolution dated
33
September 22, 2014. 34
The main issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court resolves to adopt
and approve the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
It has been said that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high
standards oflegal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and
values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."
35
An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this
section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a
lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how
the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately
return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by the client. (Emphasis supplied)
36
Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to complainants’
name. He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty. However, after three
1âwphi1
(3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given to
him and even refused to return the money. Complainants’ alleged failure to provide the necessary
documents to effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the
following elements:
An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1)
lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3)
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the
balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds
of the client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course of his employment. 37
Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present evidence as
to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for complainants
remains unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot
validly retain their client’s funds or properties.
38
Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he
cannot appropriate for himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and notice to the
client. The rule is that when there is "a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount
claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees .... "
39
We also note that despite complainant Nicasio San Pedro's affidavit of desistance dated March 14,
2008, both complainants signed their comment to respondent's motion for reconsideration and
prayed that the motion be dismissed for lack of merit.40
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months. He is also ordered to RETURN to complainants the amount of ₱68,250.00 with 6%
legal interest from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment. Respondent is further
DIRECTED to submit to this court proof of payment of the amount within 10 days from payment. Let
a copy of this resolution be entered in respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza's personal record with
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10662

[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654]
JUN B. LUNA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Before us is a disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita for his failure to deliver
to his client, complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he received after
entering into a Compromise Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client’s consent.
On April 7, 2010, Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed an Affidavit-Complaint against his lawyer, Atty.
1
Dwight M. Galarrita (Atty. Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita’s legal services in filing a foreclosure Complaint on2
October 14, 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon. The Complaint against
3
one Jose Calvario (Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan
was secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land in Quezon Province. Due
4 5
to non-payment of the loan, Luna filed the Complaint praying for payment of the obligation with
interest, and issuance of a foreclosure decree upon Calvario’s failure to fully pay within the
period.6
The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by Luna’s presentation and
offer of evidence.7
Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his formal offer of
evidence. They submitted the Kasunduan (Compromise Agreement) before the trial court on
8 9
February 14, 2006. It provided that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his
10
mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna would cause the removal of the encumbrance annotation on
the land title. The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement in its February 20, 2006
11 12
Decision. Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed him of this Compromise Agreement,
13
and did not deliver to him the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty. Galarrita had received. 14
Luna’s Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel’s Report dated August 12, 2003 where Atty.
15
Galarrita proposed and provided justifications for settlement, and waived any compensation for
his services in the case: 16
Please take note that Mr. Jose Calvario is willing, able and ready to pay you IN CASH the full
amount of One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), no more no less. While we are
aware that it’s your desire to fight this case to its ultimate legal conclusion, allow us nonetheless,
to present the pros and cons of having this case be amicably settled.
Point One: He has in his possession the original copy of the checks you issued showing that
upon signing of the Contract Of Real Estate Mortgage, he received from you Eighty Eight
Thousand Pesos (Php88,000.00) only. Meaning, he has already paid in advance his interest of
12% or the equivalent of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Php12,000.00) when the contract was signed.
Consequently, it is useless for us to argue before the court that his principal indebtedness
amounted to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00). Hence, if you accept the
compromise settlement of One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), you stand to
gain Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (Php22,000.00).
....
Rest assured, your undersigned counsel leaves it to your better judgment as to whether he
deserves to be paid for his legal services regarding this case against Mr. Jose Calvario.
Repeat, I will no longer ask from you any compensation for my services regarding this case. 17
(Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Galarrita wrote Luna the following: Counsel’s Reports, Requests for Funding, and
Statements of Accounts in relation to case developments, retainer’s fees, and reimbursement for
expenses incurred. 18
After learning of the settlement, Luna wrote Atty. Galarrita: "I was so surprised when you went
into plea agreement for Compromise Agreement without my knowledge [a]nd beyond to [sic]
what we had discussed." Atty. Galarrita replied through the Letter dated January 27, 2006,
19 20
stating in part:
I entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Jose Calvario because I am certain that in this
kind of case, a compromise is better than WINNING it.
Everything is transparent. You even told me that you are not interested to acquire the land that’s
why you signaled your approval of a compromise.
I was hoping that you already understood my situation. As I have told you, I can’t waste my time
going to Gumaca every now and then. Traveling time is too precious for my cases here in Metro
Manila.
The point is: I did not receive any appearance fee for the numerous hearings conducted there
despite sending several statements of accounts (SOA) to your office.
If that’s the case, why prolong the agony?
Why bother after all to pursue this case when indeed, you are not interested to acquire the land
and you are not bent in spending the right remuneration for your undersigned counsel?
I have nothing to hide. The money will be deposited in my savings account because I just could
not handle that amount of cash in my pocket. 21
In his Letter dated February 27, 2006, Luna wrote:

22
Yes I’m not interested with that lot in Quezon, [and this is] the reason why I’m the one who
propose to them [that] [w]e settle this case on our own without any lawyer, they are the one[s]
who insist to go to Court. . . . This is what we come out to [p]ropose to them, with the right
amount to cover all those only been spent including Acceptance fee. You even waive[d] your fee
on this, for every hearing which I couldn’t understand, [y]et we end up that we still going [sic] to
pursue this case, it was discussed during my trip there. [This is] [t]he reason I’m too surprised
with your plea Agreement without my knowledge. 23
Luna mentioned that the delay in retainer’s fee payments was due to Atty. Galarrita’s negligence
in handling the case.24
In his Letter of the same date, Atty. Galarrita explained: "The reason this case was archived
25
[was] because I could not attend several hearings for lack of meal and transport allowance going
to Gumaca, Quezon. . . . that’s moot and academic because this case was not dismissed by the
court, at all." Atty. Galarrita then stated that "[f]or all my shortcomings as a lawyer, I now ask
26
forgiveness. . . . But let it not be said that I betrayed you and your cases."
27
In August 2009, Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma C. Tayag,
seeking delivery of the land title since they paid the P100,000.00 settlement amount. Another
28
heir, Lutchiare Calvario, wrote Luna in September 2009 again demanding delivery of title. 29
Luna alleged in his Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Galarrita has not remitted the P100,000.00 to
date. He prays for Atty. Galarrita’s disbarment.
30 31
In his Verified Answer, Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment Complaint. He
32 33
argues that he entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney that 34
includes this purpose. He regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments and possible
35
settlement before he entered the Compromise Agreement. He submits that Luna "‘slept’ on his
36
rights."
37
Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership
Agreement, Luna shall pay him _4,000.00 monthly. Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of
38 39
November 17, 2006, and after four years with no revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna’s
unpaid obligation amounted to P208,000.00. He listed other unpaid amounts for his legal
40
services. Atty. Galarrita, thus, argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien. Atty.
41 42
Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription under Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. More than
43
four years elapsed since their last communication in 2006 when the Compromise Agreement
became final. 44
In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
45
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of
46
Professional Responsibility and recommended "his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year[.]" 47
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No.
XX-2013-441, adopted and approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner’s
48
Report and Recommendation in that Atty. Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months and [o]rdered to [r]eturn the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant without prejudice to the filing of a collection case
for retainer’s fee against complainant." The Board of Governors denied reconsideration in its
49
May 3, 2014 Resolution No. XXI-2014-270. 50
The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that "no motion for reconsideration or petition for
review was filed as of November 17, 2014." In any case, it is this court that has the authority to
51
discipline members of the bar. 52
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held administratively
liable for entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client complainant Luna’s consent,
then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds received.
This court acknowledges the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, with modification increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two
(2) years.
Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all
their dealings. 53
Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of
Professional Responsibility]." 54
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of [their]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients[,]" and
55
to "delay no man for money or malice[.]" 56
These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly
fiduciary nature of their relationship. Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty, and property—to
57
their lawyers, certain that this confidence would not be abused.
Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a
mortgaged land in Quezon Province. However, without complainant Luna’s consent, respondent
Atty. Galarrita settled this case with the other party.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the
following cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right
to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a
prescription already acquired[.]"
The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when
entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation:
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in
any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise
their client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in
cash. (Emphasis supplied)
58
Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into compromise
agreements, but as found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that Complainant had not given any
authority for the Complainant [sic] to enter into Compromise Agreement at that precise stage
of the trial. Firstly, the Complainant was not made a party to the Compromise Agreement
despite the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement was executed. Secondly, there was no
indication that he had agreed to the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for his withdrawal of the
complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably informed of the execution of the Compromise
Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and came to know of the same only much later.
Respondent argued that Complainant had previously executed a Special Power of Attorney
wherein he authorized the former to "enter into possible amicable settlement or submit any
matter to arbitration and alternative modes of dispute resolution, simplification of the issues, the
necessity of amendment to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions
of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof, the limitation of the number of witnesses,
the advisability of preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner, the propriety of rendering
judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid
ground therefor be found to exist, the advisability of suspending the proceedings, offer matters
that may properly be considered under Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure." It would
seem, however, that despite the authority given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot justify
Respondent’s representation in the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. To dissect,
the SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month before the filing of the Complaint
for Foreclosure of Mortgage. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given
therein to Respondent to enter into a possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement
that could be secured or firmed up during the preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case.
In fact, the tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely executed in order to constitute
Respondent as Complainant’s representative during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.
Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be liberally
interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been executed, still the
Respondent may not have faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. During the
mandatory conference, it was established that at the time the compromise was executed the
Complainant was not abroad and, therefore, given the current information technology it would
have been easy or convenient for Respondent to have informed his client about it. Admittedly,
his failure in this regard had only given Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real
intention in agreeing to the compromise agreement for and in his behalf.
It would seem, however, that by Complainant’s act of demanding the amount from Respondent,
the former may have already ignored the issue on the lack of authority on his part thus curing the
defect on the latter’s authority to enter into the same. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
59
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Members of the bar must always conduct
60
themselves in a way that promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession." 61
Even though complainant Luna effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita’s
lack of authority to compromise the civil case when he demanded the payment of the settlement
proceeds, this does not erase his acts of abusing the trust and confidence reposed in him by
complainant Luna.
II
Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the
former’s receipt of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the amount
to complainant Luna. This court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust
property coming into the lawyer’s possession should promptly be reported by him [or her]." 62
Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
....
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit amounts received for
and on behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two
years, and even disbarment[,]" depending on the circumstances of each case.
63
In Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata, respondent received four checks totalling P225,000.00 from his
64
client’s employer after signing a Quitclaim and Release pursuant to their compromise
agreement.65 Despite full payment of settlement award, respondent only remitted P45,000.00 to
his client and refused to deliver the balance.66 Respondent explained that he delivered
P90,000.00 to his client’s wife, but his secretary misplaced the signed receipts, and he deducted
his 25% attorney’s fees of P56,250.00 from the award.67 The balance left was only P750.00.68
This court found Atty. Ishiwata guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to
restitute to complainant the amount of P154,500.00 representing the balance after P45,000.00
and the 10% attorney’s fees had been deducted from the settlement award. 69
In Aldovino v. Atty. Pujalte, Jr., respondent received P1,001,332.26 from the Branch Clerk of
70
Court corresponding to the six shares of his clients in the estate of their deceased mother, but
respondent only delivered P751,332.26 to his clients. Respondent explained that he deducted
71
P250,000.00 as his attorney’s fees, while complainants countered that respondent could only
retain P14,000.00 as they already paid him P86,000.00 for his services. This court found Atty.
72
Pujalte, Jr. guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended
him from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to return to complainants the
amount of P236,000.00. 73
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit, respondent received P255,000.00 from the Officer-in-Charge
74
Clerk of Court representing the monthly rentals deposited by the other party in the ejectment
case respondent handled for his client. Respondent did not inform his client of this transaction
75
and failed to reply to the final demand letter for accounting. Respondent did not file an Answer
76
to the administrative Complaint despite notice, and failed to appear at the mandatory
conference. This court found Atty. Langit guilty of violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the
77
Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for two (2) years,
and ordered him to restitute to complainant the amount of _255,000.00 with 12% interest per
annum. 78
In Bayonla v. Reyes, respondent should have delivered to her clients the amount of P123,582.67
79
—the net amount of Bayonla’s share in the expropriation compensation after deducting
respondent’s 40% share as attorney’s fees—but respondent only delivered P79,000.00 and
refused to remit the P44,582.67 shortage. This court found Atty. Reyes guilty of violating Rules
80
16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended her from the practice of
law for two (2) years, ordered her to pay complainants the amount of P44,582.67 with 12%
interest per annum, and render accounting and inventory. 81
In Jinon v. Jiz, respondent received P45,000.00 from his client for transfer of title expenses.
82 83
His client later learned that respondent had been collecting the rentals from the property
amounting to P12,000.00, yet respondent only turned over P7,000.00. Complainant terminated
84
respondent’s legal services and demanded the return of the amounts. Respondent countered that
85
his legal services covered negotiation and sale of the property for a fee of P75,000.00. This
86
court found Atty. Jiz guilty of violating Rules 16.01, 16.03, and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for two (2) years, and
ordered him to pay complainant the amount of P45,000.00 with 6% legal interest per annum
from date of demand until finality of Decision, then 12% until fully paid. 87
In this case, respondent Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving
complainant Luna’s property without informing him. Even though complainant Luna forewent
the lack of authority issue, respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by
refusing to turn over the P100,000.00 settlement amount received. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Investigating Commissioner found that:
On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had been advised of
Complainant’s supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario’s payment of P100,000.00. Despite
R[es]pondent’s allegations that he had informed Complainant about his so-called counsel’s
report, it remains undisputed that the Complainant did not give him any express approval of the
same.
There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had committed bad faith
in entering into the Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to November 2010, or a
period of four (4) years, Respondent failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from
Mr. Calvario to Complainant. Worse, he failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the
same. He kept the money and claimed he had the right to retain the same invoking the counsel’s
right to a retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that Complainant had incurred accrued attorney’s
fees which he is bound to pay under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state
that he entered into the said agreement with the odious motivation to hold on to it and pave the
way for the payment of his attorney’s fees. In so doing, he violated the trust reposed in him by
his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of [P]rofessional Responsibility.
As to Respondent’s invocation of the lawyer’s retaining lien and his retention of the money, the
undersigned deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of Professional Responsibility allows the
lawyer to apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client." But this provision assumes that
the client agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of attorney’s fees and as to the application of
the client’s fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements, in which case he may deduct what is
due him and remit the balance to his client, with full disclosure on every detail. Without the
client’s consent, the lawyer has no authority to apply the client’s money for his fees, but he
should instead return the money to his client, without prejudice to his filing a case to recover
his unsatisfied fees.
....
On Respondent’s argument that prescription has already set in against Complainant, suffice it to
state that the rules have already been supplanted by a new set of rules which do not anymore
carry the same. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
88
Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence. This court accepts and adopts the
89
findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, but with modification
increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years considering that
respondent Atty. Galarrita not only compromised litigation without complainant Luna’s consent,
but also refused to turn over the settlement proceeds to date.
III
This court sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount of P100,000.00
to complainant Luna.
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar, the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent
90
received P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot. However,91
respondent did not turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract
to Sell was given to complainant. This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for
92
three (3) years, but did not grant complainant’s prayer for the return of the P937,500.00. 93
Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an
action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." Thus,
94
disciplinary proceedings are limited to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar." 95
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from
disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in
a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement." 96
This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing
legal fees. This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative
proceedings when respondent’s civil liability was already established:
Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the
ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the
respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and
inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property
should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding
has already established as the respondent’s liability. That has been the reason why the Court
has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of
Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, supra. 97
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but justifies his refusal
to turn over the amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien. The Rules of Court
98
provides for attorney’s retaining lien as follows:
SEC. 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers
of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim
of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as
his client would have enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. 99
First, "lawyer[s] [are] not entitled to unilaterally appropriate [their] clients[’] money for
[themselves] by the mere fact that the client[s] [owe] [them] attorney’s fees." They must give
100
prompt notice to their clients of any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their clients.
101
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer’s duty to "account
for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."
Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these duties, warranting his suspension from
the practice of law.
Second, the elements required for full recognition of attorney’s lien are: "(1) lawyer-client
relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3)
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees."
102
Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not
the main issue in this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien defense
was not established. Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's Letter
dated August 12, 2003 waiving any compensation for his services in the foreclosure case. 103
Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty. Galarrita's negligence in handling the case, and
lack of supporting receipts for the incurred expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to
reimburse. 104
Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without prejudice to the filing of a
collection case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to return to complainant Jun B. Luna the amount of
Pl00,000.00, with legal interest of 6% per annum from February 2006 until fully paid, without
105
prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
respondent Atty. Galarrita's records as attorney. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014
NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P.
Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of
the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also
included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the rentals due for the
retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for
the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000.
Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the services of
respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of
title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds
from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but
deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for
the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s
services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an,
Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the
registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of
the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the
registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was
already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for
the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and
agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10%
per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay
Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed that
respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the
interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro,
through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod
City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third
MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in
Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an
account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the
third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter
parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total
of ₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In
September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated
because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants
called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October
2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero
terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial
foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the
10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest
rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son’s
accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and
value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he
owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her
for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it
was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that
Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the
money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and
covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was
less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because the sale was
actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable
and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was
unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias
Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also
denied that he was hiding from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September
to December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that complainants were
aware that he could no longer open a current account and they were the ones who proposed that his
wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already started with the titling of
Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated before it could be completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under
suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006
and learned of his suspension only in May 2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-
CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from
Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found
that based on the documents presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in
obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very
high interest rates of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with
jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and her husband
regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also mortgaged a property to
Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was only ₱300,000. Documents also
showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure
loans by promising her a 10% commission and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride"
on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he obtained from Navarro and Presbitero.
Respondent could not explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in three months except for his
claim that the price of sugar went down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of the
postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed them that
it would be his wife or son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent
had not been transparent in liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS
with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which
was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to
her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts
were already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from
complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were
not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that
there was insufficient evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended
penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of
Governors likewise ordered respondent to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to
complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead
imposed upon respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high
interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer
pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was
unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to
Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived
his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was
eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real
value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that
complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they even
suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the
IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro.
Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero
through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in
respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have
ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
1
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
2
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
3
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although
Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client
relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It
was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a
collateral for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of
Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional collateral but he
failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant
Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements.
Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his
knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that
were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to his without informing complainants.
Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the
loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. We agree with
4
the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that
respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received
₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could
not present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the
surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing
fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any
receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the
funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who
had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received
₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent
spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he received from
Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his
client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the
1âwphi1
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, the client.
5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time
he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate
mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and
that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent
eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest
rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to
Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client,
Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In his dealings with his client
6
Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and
confidence reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason
to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of
disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead, respondent employed his
7
knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself 8
that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of
Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid obligation to complainants,
except for advances for the expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that were not
accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
9
determination of respondent’s administrative liability.

10
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other. Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular
11
purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. If the lawyer does not use the money
12
for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his client. Respondent was
13
given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must return the full amount of the
advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16,
Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting
to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within
thirty days from finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct filed with this Court on
1
September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against respondent Atty. Eugenio
T. Sanicas (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case he filed
2
against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 2001, the Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester
Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to wit:
1. Backwages ........................... ₱146,726.67
2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety One Pesos & 64/100
(Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office, wjthin ten (10) days from receipt
hereof
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the
4
implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected
the total amount of ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the
following manner:
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

021051200 7802 ₱20,000.00 Attorney's fees
4
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
021261200 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
4
4
4
4
Total Amount: ₱95,000.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently,
complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of
₱95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of ₱20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus,
complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod
City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a conference before the barangay to
resolve the issues.
In his Comment, respondent admits that he received ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on
5
installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant agreed
to pay him additional attorney's fees equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of the
attorney's fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent
incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of ₱189,491.60, the sum of ₱17,226.57
representing respondent's professional fees has to be deducted, leaving a balance of ₱172,275.13. 6
Then from said amount, complainant proposed that he will get ₱100,000.00 and the balance of
₱72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the
amount of ₱95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of ₱20,000.00 attorney's fees,
7
₱17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and ₱2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left to
respondent was only ₱56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below the promised
25o/o attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of ₱72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater than what he
expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from spouses Lopez the sum
of ₱93,491.60. Adding the Pl 7,000.00 respondent previously remitted to complainant, the latter will
get a total amount of ₱110,491.60. This amount, according to respondent, exceeds the amount of
₱100,000.00 complainant agreed to and expected to receive.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
8
investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner
issued his Report and Recommendation with the following recommendation:
9
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of
two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all the amounts in his
possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees. On October 28, 2011, the
10
IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-139, which approved the Report and
11
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law
for two years, but with the modification that respondent should restitute the sum of ₱85,500.00 to 12
the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure
to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement
and return the same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship." Specifically,
13
Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to "account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004
received payments for attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of
complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to three months he
had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor rendered
an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and being
implemented when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the
total amount of ₱95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor
tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said amount,
which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Complainant brought the matter
before the barangay, but respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on
the part of the respondent to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises the
presumption that he converted it to his own use. His unjustified withholding of the funds also
14
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him. 15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive payment. He
implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received from spouses Lopez to his
additional 25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in the
total amount of ₱72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of ₱95,000.00 the amounts
of ₱20,000.00, ₱17,000.00, and ₱2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his dismay was only
₱56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other than his
self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support respondent's claim that
he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to pay
him additional 25% attorney's fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in
connection with the case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer's agreement, or
itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even
1âwphi1
assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from
his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional
employment. "The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. He
is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his
client." "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected
16
for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting." Moreover, a
17
lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone
that the client owes him attorney's fees."
18
In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon
demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness,
and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action."
19
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to
account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the
practice of law for two years." Thus, the IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending the
20
imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense and he is already a
nonagenarian, the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty
21
of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T.
Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
one (1) year upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severly.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this Resolution, the
net amount of ₱85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Resolution
until the full amount is returned. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Sanicas'
record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
AC. No. 10912, January 19, 2016
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution 1 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved the
findings and the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner for the disbarment
of Atty. Berlin Dela Cruz (respondent lawyer).
It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T. Yu
(complainant) in several cases after having received various amounts as acceptance
fees, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Case Title Acceptance

Fees
People v. Tortona for attempted homicide (Case No. 06-359) filed with the
P 20,000.00
Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite
Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Rodel Gamboa for qualified theft/estafa (I.S. No.
P 8,000.00
XV-07-INV-116-05339) filed with the City Prosecutor of Manila
Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et al. (Civil Case No. LP-00-0087) filed
P 15,000.00
before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas2
cralawlawlibrary
On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent
lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with the
Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory
Note with Deed of Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer appropriated the proceeds of the pledge
to his personal use. In order to facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent
lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated
August 31, 2011, in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however,
complainant was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the reason,
"Account Closed."4 Complainant immediately notified respondent lawyer of the dishonor
of the check.
In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the
acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of the cases
and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but to no avail.
In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another lawyer, Atty.
Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the redemption of the check in
cash within five days from notice; the refund of the paid acceptance fees, in exchange
for which no service was rendered; the payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in
the amount of PI00,000.00 in order to avoid the interests due and the possible
foreclosure of the pledge; and moral damages of P 300,000.00.
For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pinas City,
against him.7
On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD),8 where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent
lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and
commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD required respondent
lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint. 9 Despite having been duly served with a
copy of the complaint and the order to file his answer, as shown in a certification 10
issued by the Post Master of the Las Piñas Central Post Office, respondent still failed to
file an answer.
Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory

conference/hearing on November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and her counsel
appeared on the said day. The IBP-CBD then ordered the resetting of the mandatory
conference for the last time to January 11, 2013 and the personal service of the notice
thereof to respondent lawyer's given address. 11 Notwithstanding the receipt of the
notice by respondent lawyer's mother,12 he still failed to appear during the conference,
prompting complainant to move for the termination of the conference and the
submission of the case for report and recommendation.
On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of

respondent lawyer from the practice of law.13 Based on the evidence on record,
respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from a client, unless the
latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in violation of
law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct."
On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in Resolution
No. XXI-2014-698.14
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review before
this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of
the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory
and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.15
The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the accusations
against him despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him to explain his side. All
means were exhausted to give respondent lawyer a chance to oppose the charges
against him but to no avail and for reasons only for known to him. Whether respondent
lawyer had personally read the orders by the IBP-CBD or his mother failed to forward
the same for his personal consideration may only be an object of surmise in which the
Court cannot indulge. "Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the
law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility
and honor of the legal profession."16 Surely, respondent lawyer's failure or refusal to
participate in the IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder the Court from determining the
full extent of his liability and imposing an appropriate sanction, if any.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent lawyer's violation
of Canons 1,17 16,18 17,19 and Rules 1.01,20 16.04,21 of the CPR.
In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his
client's property. He had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry
which he presented as security in a contract of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and
willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to
borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant
disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry
becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed
from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Here, respondent
lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his
client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from
the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by
his client. That he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the
jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his exercising
influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the latter's
property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural
tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. 22 The rule against
borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from
taking advantage of his influence over his client. 23 The rule presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.24 Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside
the limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his representation that
the subject jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity. She accepted respondent
lawyer's check, which was eventually dishonored upon presentment. Despite notice of
the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not take steps to remedy the situation and, on the
whole, reneged on his obligation, constraining complainant to avail of legal remedies
against him.
Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent
lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and
his act of issuing a worthless check constitute grave violations of the CPR and the
lawyer's oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously breached the highly
fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing
worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action, 25 and thus seriously and
irreparably tarnishes the image of the profession. 26 Such conduct, while already off-
putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited
by a member of the Bar. 27 In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the
promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of the law and
the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach."28
As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court takes heed
of the guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be decreed
where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would
accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of
disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person." 29 Hence, caution is
called for amidst the Court's plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In line with
prevailing jurisprudence,30 the Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of three-year
suspension against respondent lawyer, with a stern warning that a repetition of any of
the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier
penalty.
Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the rule that
in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. 31 Thus, the Court is
not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for money received from his client in
a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order respondent lawyer to make the payment for
the subject jewelry he pawned, the value of which is yet to be determined in the
appropriate proceeding.
As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating

Commissioner erred in referring to them as "attorney's fees"—
As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after payment of
attorney's fees, this commission is not fully satisfied that the complainant was able to
prove it with substantial or clear evidence. It was not fully explained in the complaint
how or in what manner were the cases "abandoned" by the respondent; and what
prejudice was caused to the complainant. This Commission noted that not a single
document or order coming from the court of prosecutor's office was appended to the
Complaint-Affidavit that would at least apprise this body of what the respondent
actually did with the cases he represented. 32 cralawlawlibrary
There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that
attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. 33 In its
ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer
by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept,
attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing
party as indemnity for damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the
charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the
lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing
party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity
cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the
payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the
lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal
services rendered.35
In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00,

respectively, were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in which respondent
lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite this oversight of the Investigating
Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding that aside from her bare allegations,
complainant failed to present any evidence showing that respondent lawyer committed
abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of cases. Hence, the Court sees no legal
basis for the return of the subject acceptance fees.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of violating Canons
1, 16, 17, and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for THREE YEARS with a
STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in the personal
record of the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A.C. No. 11128
PEDRO RAMOS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIA NYMPHA C. MANDAGAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Pedro Ramos
1
(Ramos) against respondent Atty. Maria Nympha C. Mandagan (Atty. Mandagan) for gross
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Complaint, Ramos alleged that Atty. Mandagan demanded from him the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) in connection with the criminal case filed against him for
murder before the Sandiganbayan. According to Ramos, the P300,000.00 shall be used as bail bond
in the event that his petition for bail in the said criminal case is granted. Also, Atty. Mandagan
2
collected an additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) for operating expenses. In both
instances, an Acknowledgment Receipt was issued in his favor as proof of payment. 3
Contrary to the assurance, however, of Atty. Mandagan, Ramos’ petition for bail was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, Atty. Mandagan withdrew as his counsel without returning the amount of
₱300,000.00 despite the demand sent by Ramos’ counsel. 4
On December 19, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) issued an Order directing Atty. Mandagan to submit her Answer to Ramos’
5
complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.
In her Answer, Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount of ₱300,000.00 was not intended for
6
payment of bail, but as mobilization expenses for preparation of witnesses, defenses, and other
documentary exhibits for both Ramos and his co-accused Gary Silawon. Atty. Mandagan likewise
7
alleged that Ramos never paid her for acceptance, appearance fees, and legal services rendered in
the entire course of the proceedings until her withdrawal as counsel. 8
On April 26, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference directing the parties to
9
appear for a mandatory conference. During the mandatory conference, however, only Atty. Joselito
Frial appeared, as counsel for Ramos, while Atty. Mandagan was absent.
On August 29, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued an Order terminating the mandatory conference and
10
directed both parties to submit their respective position papers within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days upon receipt of the said order.
On December 18, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, finding Atty. 11
Mandagan liable for gross misconduct and for failure to render an accounting of funds, and
recommended that Atty. Mandagan be suspended for a period of one (1) year. Subsequently, the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in a Resolution dated October 11, 2014.
12
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Atty. Mandagan, but the same was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in a Resolution dated June 5, 2015.
13
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the Report and Recommendation of
the IBP-CBD, as adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to be proper under the
circumstances.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
1âwphi1
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts, and
their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. 14
In Cruz-Villanueva v. Atty. Rivera, this Court held that:
15
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer must render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently,
if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return
the money to the client. (Citations omitted)
16
In the present case, Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the amount of ₱300,000.00 from Ramos
for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the latter’s provisional liberty. When the petition for bail
of Ramos, however, was denied by the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Mandagan failed to return the amount
to Ramos. Worse, she unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to Ramos despite demand from
Ramos’ counsel.
Clearly, Atty. Mandagan failed to act in accordance with the rule stated in Canon 16 of the CPR, to
wit:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x
x.
In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa,17 this Court stated that:
[A] lawyer has the duty to deliver his client’s funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His
failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by
the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Indeed, it may border on the criminal
as it may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa. (Citations omitted)
18
This court cannot give credence to Atty. Mandagan’s defense that the amount she received from
Ramos was not for bail but merely for mobilization expenses. Records show that Atty. Mandagan
failed to substantiate her claim. At any rate, as correctly observed by the IBP-CBD, "[Atty.
Mandagan] should be forthright in stating what constitutes legal mobilization expenses if only to
dispel any doubt as to its intended
purpose." 19
Atty. Mandagan’s failure to make an accounting or to return the money to Ramos is a violation of the
trust reposed on her. As a lawyer, Atty. Mandagan should be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to her in her professional capacity because the CPR exacts a high degree of fidelity and
trust from members of the bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Maria Nympha C. Mandagan GUILTY of violating
Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS
her from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with
WARNING that a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of Atty. Maria Nympha C. Mandagan
as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10675
DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
complainant Datu Ismael Malangas (complainant) instituted this verified complaint for disbarment
1
against Atty. Paul C. Zaide (respondent lawyer).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of trust, and
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics in relation to the complaint for damages (Civil Case No.
2
6380 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Lanao del Norte at Iligan City) that he filed against Paul
Alfeche (Alfeche) and the NEMA Electrical and Industrial Sales, Inc./Melanio Siao (NEMA).
Complainant averred that on March 6, 2003, he figw·ed in an accident while crossing Quezon
Avenue, Iligan City, when two vehicles hit and pinned him in· between them, causing him to lose
consciousness; that he was then brought to a hospital where he was confined for four months; that
he was later transferred to other hospitals where he underwent different major operations for which
he spent more than Pl.5 million; and that despite the operations, he remained crippled and bed
ridden.
Because of these, he engaged respondent lawyer's professional services to prosecute his complaint
for damages against therein defendants Alfeche and NEMA; that he gave respondent lawyer
P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as filing fees; that respondent lawyer made him
believe that the amount of P50,000.00 was needed as filing fees in order to commence a P5 million-
damage suit covering the accrued and anticipated damages caused by the accident; that
subsequently, respondent lawyer filed on his behalf a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Iligan City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 6380; that respondent lawyer then furnished him
(complainant) with a copy of said Complaint seeking to recover damages in the amount of P5 million;
and that to assure him that the complaint had indeed been filed, this complaint was stamped
"received" by the RTC.
According to complainant, he later discovered, however, that his Complaint had been dismissed by
the RTC because of "failure to prosecute," for the reason that respondent lawyer did not attend two
hearings in the case, and also because respondent lawyer did not submit an Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss filed therein by NEMA; that on account of this, he asked respondent lawyer to file
a Motion for Reconsideration, only to find out later that respondent lawyer not only did not file a
motion for reconsideration from the Order of dismissal issued by the RTC, but worse, respondent
lawyer instead filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel effectively leaving him without counsel
to prosecute his case; and that after this, he sent a relative to the RTC, where he further discovered
through this relative that the amount of damages sought in the Complaint filed by respondent lawyer
was only P250,000.00, and not PS million, as stated in the copy of the Complaint given to him by
respondent lawyer.
Challenging complainant's allegations, respondent lawyer claimed that complainant was in fact a
client of the Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law Offices, a law firm that he joined way back in 2002, right
after he passed the Bar Examinations; and that as a junior associate in that law fim1, he only
received appearance fees in attending to complainant's civil case. Respondent lawyer specifically
denied that he received an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, and explained that complainant was
already an established client of the law office he was working for.
As regards the amount of damages, respondent lawyer claimed that in the Complaint he filed before
the RTC, he was even reluctant to ask for P250,000.00 in dan1ages, as complainant's hospital bills
did not reach this amount; but that he nevertheless prayed for this amount because he was
anticipating that complainant would incur additional expenses as a result of the accident. According
to respondent lawyer, the complaint which embodied a prayer for PS million in damages "was clearly
maneuvered to create an impression that (he, respondent lawyer) defrauded the complainant." 3
Lastly, respondent lawyer contended that although he deliberately skipped attending the hearings
set by the RTC in said Civil Case No. 6380, and that although he also intentionally filed no
opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss, these matters were initially agreed upon between him and
complainant after he (respondent lawyer) discovered that NEMA' s car did not in fact hit complainant,
because NEMA's car was not illegally parked where it was at the time of the accident; that although
complainant was aware of these facts, complainant suddenly changed his mind~ and insisted on
continuing with the case against NEMA, and pressing for the claim of P5 million in damages,
because complainant believed that NEMA had more leviable properties than the other defendant
Alfeche. According to respondent lawyer, he also found out that despite the fact that Alf eche had
already settled with complainant, the latter still persisted in pursuing the civil case against Alfeche;
4
that at this point, he realized that complainant was acting under the compulsion of greed in pressing
for the continuation of the case against his adversaries; and that because of these reasons, he
decided to withdraw from the case as complainant's counsel.
Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Following the investigation, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero oft11e IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted his Report and Recommendation dated January 29, 2013 finding respondent
5
lawyer guilty of dishonesty and breach of trust, for which he recommended a penalty of two years
suspension against respondent lawyer. Commissioner Cachapero found complainant's allegations
more credible than respondent lawyer's explanations, thus –
Respondent further mentioned that he has been handling cases for or against Complainant since he
embarked on law practice and has never received acceptance fee from Complainant. He pictured
himself as giving out pro bona services to Complainant for two (2) years. However, he may have
contradicted his declaration in this regard when in his Answer he mentioned that he received
P7,000.00 for docket fee and the rest was paid as advance fees for his services and the usual
visitation done by him at the hospital.
6
As regards the true amom1t of damages sought in said Civil Case No. 6380, Commissioner
Cachapero had this to say:
The undersigned deems the complainant's tale plausible enough. The aforesaid page containing a
statement of claim amounting to P5,000,000.00 shows impeccably that it was typed simultaneously
with the rest of the pages of the complaint. There is no showing that it was merely inserted as a
supplement or addition after taking out a genuine page of the same. It is a constituent part of the
complaint which could only have been printed and/or typed by the respondent or his agent.
Respondent claimed that the insertion of the page (page 8) was 'maneuvered' by Complainant. If
tliese were true, what would have motivated Complainant to do such a 'switching' act? None. In fact,
following his discovery of the same, he conducted himself out like a man wronged. He wrote
respondent twice in September 2004 (September 1 and 9, 2004) and castigated respondent for his
switching act. Surprisingly, respondent did not care to take the matter up with complainant through
letter or personal confrontation. To the undersigned, respondent's act of paying no heed to such
claim from Complainant reveals a subtle affumation of his fault in this regard. 7
Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent lawyer negligent in the handling of

complainant's case, citing the RTC's Order of July 1, 2004, to wit-
In this regard the record will show that as early as May 18, 2004, plaintiffs counsel was furriished a
copy of said motion, but for reasons only known to him no comment or opposition was registered by
plaintiff In fact, if only to afford plaintiff [a chance] to countervail movant's motion, last May 24, 2004,
as prayed for, plaintiffs counsel was given ten (10) days to file an Opposition, but sad to say, until
now, not\vithstanding the lapse of practically 37 days no opposition, neither a comment was filed by
plaintiff. With this development the Court will have to confine its scrutiny solely on the motion to
dismiss of movant. 8
Action of the IBP Board of Governors
Via Resolution No. XX:-2013-91,9 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Cachapero, viz.:

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A', and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent
committed Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and Negligence to Complainant, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is
hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years.,
On January 11, 2014 respondent lawyer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution. But
10
in its Resolution of May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent lawyer's Motion for
11
Reconsideration.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records, we find respondent lawyer guilty of professional misconduct
and of violating Canons 1, 16, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Not only
12 13 14
do we find complainant's version more credible but we also note the glaring inconsistencies in
respondent lawyer's allegations.
Respondent lawyer claims that as a mere associate in the Zaragoza Macabangkit Law offices, "he
has NO participation whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is giving to the office." But, as
15
pointed out by Commissioner Cachapero, respondent lawyer himself admitted that he received
"P7,000.00 for the docket fees and the rest [was paid] as advance fees for his services and the usual
visitation done [by] him at the hospital." Because of this admission, it can be concluded that
16
respondent lawyer received fees "for his services" from the complainant himself Further bolstering
the fact that respondent lawyer did in fact receive fees for his professional services are
complainant's demand letters - one received on September 1, 2004 and another delivered by
17
registered mail on September 9, 2004 -asking respondent lawyer to return the amount of P20,000.00
acceptance fee and to account for the docket fees paid to the RTC of Iligan City. To these,
respondent lawyer merely replied that he "was made to understand that the 'docket fee' in Alfeche
case is part of [respondent's] claims" without denying that he had received such an1ount. The
18
complainant was thus constrained to conduct his own investigation against his own lawyer, in the
course of which he discovered that of the P50,000.00 alleged filing fees that he gave respondent
lawyer, only P2,623.60 was paid by respondent lawyer to the RTC. As Commissioner Cachapero
aptly stated in his Report and Recommendation, "[r]espondent's act of paying no heed to such
19
claim from [c]omplainant reveals a subtle affirmation" that he, indeed, received the acceptance fee.
Finally, respondent lawyer's former law partners belied his clain1 that he did not receive, as in fact it
was the law firm which received, the an1ounts paid by the complainant. In their Joint Affidavit, 20
lawyers Leo M. Zaragoza and Alex E. Macabangkit averred that "the payment made by complainant
to Atty. Zaide belongs to him exclusively and we do not interfere in the arrangement x x x and we do
not [have] any share thereof. "21
Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the
amount paid in excess of what was required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16.01and16.03 of
the CPR, to wit:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good fai1h in
dealing wit the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship." Any lawyer who
22
does not live up to this duty must be prepared to take the consequences of his waywardness.
As regards the alleged switching of page 8 of the complaint, respondent lawyer claimed that it was
complainant who switched the pages "to create an impression that respondent lawyer defrauded the
complainant." He asserted in his Motion for Reconsideration that he came to learn of the PS million
23
claim only during the disbarment proceedings and that he ''thought it was a joke as respondent
lawyer was NOT able to attend the preliminary conference at the IBP Cagayan de Oro City, where
he could have seen the document. " That respondent lawyer seems to find it hard to get together
24
with himself is shown by the fact that on the very same page of his Motion for Reconsideration, he
himself admitted that "when respondent lawyer was told of the amount, he asked the clerk of the
office to change it to a more reasonable and realistic relief, which was eventually heeded, which
respondent lawyer was NOT aware that herein complainant was able to get a draft copy prepared by
the office." To borrow Commissioner Cachapero' s apt observation, this obvious contradiction
25
renders his defense doubtful, to say the least. Notably, respondent lawyer's former law partners also
belied his claim that Loma B. Martinez, the person who supposedly typed the Complaint, was a
personnel of their law firm. In their Joint Affidavit, they contended that "Loma B. Martinez was never
our Office Staff. She never prepared any pleading in the office for any of us including that of Atty.
Zaide."26
Respondent lawyer's transgressions did not end there. By his deliberate failure to file a Comment on
or Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss in said Civil Case No. 6380, and by his failure to appear
at the hearings in connection therewith, respondent lawyer unduly delayed the case as the trial court
had to postpone the hearings thereon, and this, in turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case
insofar as NEMA was concerned. As previously mentioned, the RTC had to put off for 37 days its
ruling on NEMA.'s Motion to Dismiss because respondent lawyer moved for time to oppose the
same. Yet, despite the 10-day extension given to him, respondent lawyer still failed to appear at the
hearings or file the appropriate pleading. These failings are clearly offensive to Rules 18.03 and
27
18.0428 of the CPR. If respondent lawyer's claim that he and complainant had indeed agreed to
drop the case against NEMA were true, then he as an officer of the court should have saved the
Court's precious time by at least promptly manifesting his lack of objection to NEMA's Motion to
Dismiss. This he did not do.
Given the gravity of the offenses imputed against him, and considering that this is his second
administrative case, respondent lawyer's defense that he was a young lawyer when he went astray,
29
hardly merits sympathy from this Court. Surely respondent lawyer could not have been unaware
1âwphi1
that when he took the solemn oath to become a member of the bar, he did so not only to enjoy the
rewards and privileges of an attorney and counsellor at law, but he also took upon his shoulders the
heavy burden of responsibility and duty that a full-fledged membership in the Philippine Bar
necessarily entailed. Respondent lawyer could not have been oblivious of the fact that the exercise
of a right or privilege is always encumbered with the burden of responsibility and duty.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
effective immediately. Atty. Paul C. Zaide is also ORDERED to promptly return to complainant the
sums given to him as acceptance fee and docket fees in the amount of P70,000.00, from which
should be deducted the amount of P2,623.60 paid as docketing fees.
SO ORDERED.

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March 18, 2015

A.C. No. 10672

EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE, Complainant,

return of the full amount he had paid to respondent.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount of

A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016

Atty. Ferrer was ordered to comment on the administrative complaint. 48 In his

This court's Circular

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer is hereby SUSPENDED from the

This Resolution shall be immediately executory.

A.C. No. 7437

AVIDA LAND CORPORATION(FORMERLY LAGUNA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS,

Professional Responsibility for delaying the enforcement of a writ of execution, and

After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property. 10

x x x [T]he complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent (herein

an Opposition/Comment on the motion and subsequently a Rejoinder to complainant's Reply.

computation of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition and Rejoinder, to which respondent

filed a Reply and Sur-rejoinder

On 5 January 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of Conference issued by

Administrative Complaint Against Respondent

execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

were the legal blunders of complainant's counsel, to wit:

report, and recommendation. 59

reconsideration or a petition within the pereiod allowed. 61

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of profession misconduct.

to attain the lawful objectives of their client. 65

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating

Republic of the Philippines

A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013

GLORIA P. JINON, Complainant,

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

The Court's Ruling

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A.C. No. 5440 December 10, 2014

SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO, Complainants,

The facts are summarized as follows:

Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups. 5

respondent still failed to produce the title.

Respondent still did not return the money.

Respondent did not submit his position paper. 21

Pedro’s affidavit of desistance is immaterial. 27

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the disciplinary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

September 22, 2014. 34

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:

A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:

A.C. No. 10662

JUN B. LUNA, Complainant,

(Emphasis in the original)

If that’s the case, why prolong the agony?

In his Letter dated February 27, 2006, Luna wrote:

Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership

May 3, 2014 Resolution No. XXI-2014-270. 50

discipline members of the bar. 52

to "delay no man for money or malice[.]" 56

their lawyers, certain that this confidence would not be abused.