Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival of Hobbes in

Weimar and National Socialist Germany

Author(s): John P. McCormick
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 619-652
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 FEAR, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATE
Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, and the Revival of
Hobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany

JOHN P. McCORMICK
Universityof Chicago

It is strikingthatone of the most consequentialrepresentativesof [the]abstractscientific

orientationof the seventeenthcentury[ThomasHobbes] became so [Link]
is because as ajurstic thinkerhe wantedto graspthe realityof societal life just as much
as he, as a philosopher and a naturalscientist, wanted to grasp the reality of na-
ture. [J]unstic thoughtIn those days had not yet become so overpoweredby the
naturalsciences thathe, in the intensityof his scientific approach,should unsuspectingly
have overlooked the specific realityof legal life.
Carl Schmitt,PoliticalTheology (1922)

In the light of Hobbes's naturalscience, man and his works become a mere phantasma-
goria. ThroughHobbes's naturalscience, "the native hue" of his political science "is
sicklied o'er with the pale cast"of somethingwhich is remlmscentof death but utterly
lacks the majestyof death--of somethingwhich foreshadowsthe positivism of our day.
It seems then thatif we want to dojustice to the life which vibratesin Hobbes's political
teaching, we must understandthat teachingby itself, and not in the light of his natural
science. Can this be done?2
Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of
Hobbes'sPolitical Philosophy"(1959)

In the passages cited above, a masterand a studentassertthe existence of

a dissociation, if not a divorce, between thatwhich is natural-scientificand
thatwhich is "personalistic,""human,""specificallyreal,""alive"withinthe

AUTHOR'SNOTE: For their commentsand criticisms, I thank Richard Bernstein, Stephen

Holmes, BernardManin,RobertPippin,Moishe Postone, TracyStrong,and GeorgeSchwab,as
well as membersof thefollowing organizationsat the Universityof Chicago: the Interdisciplin-
ary Social Theory Forum, the Modern EuropeanHistory Workshop,and the Political Theory
SundayNight Group.

POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 22 No. 4, November 1994 619-652

? 1994 Sage Publications,Inc.
619
620 POLITICALTHEORY/ November1994

philosophyof [Link] whichthe secondquote

concludes might lead the readerto assume that even after the lapse of the
almost fortyyearsthatseparatesthe statements,the master'spropositionhad
yet to be fully demonstrated,and moreover,that the studentrecognizesthe
problematicnatureof suchan assertion,despitehis obvioussympathieswith it.
Carl Schmitt,in his Weimarwritingsas they pertainto Hobbes, particu-
larlyin TheConceptof the Political, felt the needto emphasizethis supposed
distinction or opposition in work of the great seventeenth-centuryEnglish
political [Link] projectwas subsequentlytaken up by Leo Straussin
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes as a resultof his intellectualexchange
with Schmittover "theconcept of the political."As Hobbes remarked,"The
Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear" (I, 14, 99),3 and both interpreters
recognize something vital, substantive, and fundamentally human in
Hobbes's groundingof the statein the fearof death-or as Straussrepeatedly
emphasizes,the fear of violent [Link] the eve of Weimar'scollapse, they
sought to retrieve this primalsource of political orderand free it from the
elements thatHobbes himself had found necessaryto employ to constructa
state on this foundation-natural science and technology. Schmitt and
Strauss saw in these latterelements the very cause of the breakdown-the
"neutralization"-of thatwhich they were intendedto help build,the modern
state. The particularsociopoliticalsituationof Weimar-violence exercised
by privategroups, a widespreadperceptionof technology as a "runaway"
phenomenon,and so on-rendered it a critical moment to reintroducethe
issue of fearandthe issue of science, andconsequentlyto reformulateHobbes
and the intellectualfoundationof the state.
But, I will suggest, the issues of fear,violence, technology,and the state
could not be so easily distinguishedwithinHobbes'sthought,and in light of
the emergence of National Socialism, both Schmitt and Strauss felt com-
pelled, in subsequentworks such as The Leviathanin The State Theoryof
ThomasHobbesandNaturalRightand History,eitherto qualifysignificantly
or abandoncompletelythis approachto Hobbes-in retrospect,an approach
with ominous implications.4

SCHMITT'STHE CONCEPTOF THE POLITICAL(1932)

In Der Begriff des Politischen,5Carl Schmittsets forth his most famous

thesis on the essence of politics: "Thespecific political distinctionto which
political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and
enemy" (CP, 26). Yet despite the apparentnovelty of this proposition,one
 McCormuck/ FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 621

finds the shadowof ThomasHobbescast quiteprominentlyover this famous

[Link] Hobbeshimself had maintained,in humanity'snaturalcondition,
in the state of nature,"everymanto every man,for wantof a common power
to keep them all in awe is an Enemy" (I, 15, 102).6 Indeed, Schmltt's
friend/enemy distinction is intended to serve a theoretical-politicalrole
analogous to Hobbes's state of nature.
If Hobbes predicatedthe modern state on the state of nature, Schmitt
declares that "theconcept of the state presupposesthe concept of the politi-
cal." And any inquiriesmade into the "essence"of the state thatdo not first
take this foundationinto considerationwould be premature(CP, 19). Ques-
tions as to whetherthe state is "a machine or an organism,a person or an
institution,a society or a community,an enterpriseor a beehive"-questions
in which Schmitt will eventually become quite interested,as we will see-
must be provisionallyset aside (CP, 19).
Schmitt thus conceives of his formulation of "the political" as an
"Archimedeanpoint"not unlike that which Hobbes sought to locate in the
state of nature:

Insofar as it is not derved from other critera, the antithesis of frend and enemy
correspondsto the relativelyindependentcritera of otherantitheses:good andevil in the
moral sphere, beautifuland ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. In any event it is
independent,not in the sense of a distinctnew domain,but in thatit can neitherbe based
on any one antithesisor any combinationof otherantitheses,norcan it be tracedto these.
(CP, 26)

"The political"is irreducibleto any otherelement. Indeed,Schmittenvi-

sions the friend/enemydistinctionas so fundamentaland elementarythat in
the course of his argumenthe feels compelled at particularpoints to remark
on the self-evidence of his thesis:"nothingcan escape this logical conclusion
of the political" (CP, 36). Schmitt even resortsto the most questionableof
Hobbes's argumentsto demonstratethe actualexistence of the stateof affairs
he describes:like the stateof nature,the politicalcan be shown to exist based
on the behaviorof states In the arenaof internationalaffairs(CP, 28).
The heartof Schmitt's neo-Hobbeslanprojectderives from their similar
sociopolitical situations.7Schmitt observes that Hobbes formulatedhis po-
litical theory "in the terribletimes of civil war"where

all legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive themselves
regardingpolitical realities in perods of untroubledsecurity vansh. If within the state
thereare orgamzedpartiescapableof accordingtheirmembersmoreprotectionthanthe
state, then the latterbecomes at best an annex of such parties,and the individualcitizen
knows whom he has to obey. (CP, 52)
622 POLITICALTHEORY/ November1994

This also happens to be an excellent descriptionof WeimarGermany

during its crisis years.8Schmitt sees in the context of Hobbes's thought a
parallelwith his own, andrelatedly,a parallelin [Link] Leviathan,
Hobbes sought "to instill in man again 'the mutualrelationbetween Protec-
tion andObedience'" (CP, 52) andso forestallthe strifeandchaos thatarises
when armedautonomousgroupsconfronteach [Link] is not farremoved
fromSchmitt'sown [Link] exceptionalsituationof civil warreveals
normallyconcealed political realities such as humanbehaviorin a state of
nature:"In it, states exist among themselves in a condition of continual
danger,and their acting subjects are evil for precisely the same reasons as
animals who are stirredby theirdrives (hunger,greediness,fear,jealousy)"
(CP, 59). Therefore,arguesSchmitt,all "genuine"political theones-those
thathave observedthe normallyconcealed"politicalrealities"-presuppose
"manto be evil," meaning"dangerousand dynamic"(CP, 61).
Schmittthus shareswith Hobbesnot only a similarhistoricalcontext, but
a similar outlook on humanityas well. What are the ramificationsof this9
This particularoutlook on humanityoffers the way out of the problemsof
the stateof nature,civil war,or impendingcivil [Link] "genuine"
political philosopherswho take the view thatthe humanbeing is essentially
dangerous,Schmittwrites, "theirrealismcan frightenmen in need of secu-
rity"(CP, 65). This is preciselythe [Link],as did Hobbes,
thatby frightening"men"one can best "instill"in them thatprinclple-"the
cogito ergo sum of the state"-protego ergo obligo (CP, 52). In otherwords,
fear is the source of [Link] once confrontedwith the
prospect of their own dangerousness will be terrified into the arms of
authority.
Thus, as Schmittexplains, "ForHobbes, trulya powerfuland systematic
politicalthinker,the pessimisticconceptionof manis the elementarypresup-
position of a specific system of political thought"(CP, 65). But, systematic
does not mean, for Schmitt, scientific or technical. Technologyhas helped
foster the liberal conception of man, which assumes that, with wealth and
abundance,humanity'sdangerousnesscan be ameliorated,and hence blinds
humanity to the eternal reality of "the political" (CP, 61). Technology,
accordingto Schmitt,has aided in the "neutralization"of the state and the
Europeanorder of states, again concealing the natureof the "political."9
Schmlttchides EduardSprangerfor taking"too technical"a perspectiveon
humannature,for viewing It in light of "thetacticalmanipulationof instinc-
tive drives" (CP, 59). Hobbes's insight, on the contrary,is neither "the
productof a frightfuland disquietingfantasy nor of a philosophybased on
free competition by a bourgeois society in its first stage but is the
fundamentalpresuppositionof a specific political philosophy" (CP, 65).
 McCormick/ FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 623

Schmltt'stask then is to elaborateon Hobbes's view of humanityand revive

the fear that is characteristicof man's naturalconditionin threeways: (1) by
demonstratingthe substantiveaffinity between his concept of the political
and Hobbes's stateof nature,(2) by makingclearthe ever-presentpossibility
of a returnto that situationin the form of civil war, and (3) by convincing
individuals-partisans and nonpartisansalike-that only a state with a
monopoly on decisions regardingwhatis "political"can guaranteepeace and
[Link] mustdo all of this while avoidingthe elementsof naturalscience
and technologyoften associatedwith Hobbes,which underminedthis project
to begin with.
The radicalsubjectivitycharacteristicof the politicalheightensthe danger
regardingSchmitt'sconcept of the political,andconsequentlyintensifies the
fear inspired by it. "Only the actual participantscan correctly recognize,
understand,and judge the concrete situationand settle the extreme case of
conflict. Each participantis in a position to judge whether the adversary
intends to negate his opponent'sway of life and thereforemust be repulsed
or fought to preserveone's own form of existence"(CP, 27). The fact thatin
the absence of a centralizedpower there is no standardby which one can
judge anotheras an enemy,or be so judged by them, clearly implies thatone
must always be readyto be attackedor, more reasonably,compels one to be
the first to strike. This is obviously a revival of the Hobbesianscenario of
"theconditionof meerNature"where all "arejudges of thejustnesse of their
own fears" (I, 14, 96). In this light Pasquale Pasqulno observes that it is
exactly "the absence or eplstemological impossibilityof defining an obJec-
tive criterionof whatconstitutesa threatto the individual'sself preservation
which transformsthe naturalright into the origin of the potentialwar of all
againstall."'?Schmittdropsthe naturalrightand reemphasizesthe potential
war. Hence this radicalsubjectivityis the source of the dangerin Schmitt's
"political,"and accordingto Pasquino,"theessentialreasonwhy the Hobbe-
slan state of natureis one of total uncertaintyand lack of freedom.""lThis
potentialityfor war and the uncertaintywhich arises from this radicalsub-
jectivlty intensify fear because they insure the constancy of the [Link]
fact, the threatof danger is always present,even when the actual danger is
not. As Hobbes remarks,the essence of the war which is the state of nature
"consistethnot in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto"(I,
13, 88-9). Accordingly,Schmittmaintainsthat"totheenemy conceptbelongs
the ever presentpossibility of combat"(CP, 32, emphasis added).
The continuedexistence of this kindof subjectivitywithinsociety implies
the preservationof the state of war and the fearthatit [Link] Hobbes
makes explicit, it is a "diseased"commonwealththat toleratesthe doctrine,
"Thateveryprivate man is Judge of Good and Evil actions"(I, 29, 223); and
624 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

worse, one which allows persons to resort to violence to defend such

judgments,"Forthose menthatareso remisselygoverned,thatthey daretake
up Armes, to defend, or introducean Opinion, are still in Warre"(I, 18).
Schmittsaw in the pluralisttheoriesof the early twentiethcenturya justifi-
cation for just such behavior (CP, 52), and like Hobbes, evaluated the
outcome as state vulnerabilityboth domesticallyand with regardto foreign
powers as well:

The intensificationof internalantagonismshas the effect of weakemng the common

Identityvis-a-vis [Link] domesticconflictsamongpoliticalpartieshave become
the sole political difference, the most extreme degree of internalpolitical tension is
thereby reached; i.e., the domestic, not the foreign fnend-and-enemygroupings are
decisive for armedconflict. The ever presentpossibilityof conflict mustalways be kept
in mind. If one wants to speak of politics in the context of the primacy of internal
politics, then this conflict no longerrefersto war betweenorganizednationsbut to civil
war.(CP, 32)

Hobbes adamantlymaintainsthatthe existence of violent factions, whether

constituted by familial ties, religious affiliation, or economic status, is
"contraryto the peace and safety of the people, a takingof the Sword out of
the hand of the Sovereign"(II, 22, 164). And it is precisely these kinds of
armedantagonismsthathad reemergedin late Weimar:tradeunions versus
companygoons, communistmobs versusfascistgangs, politicalpartyversus
political party, and so on.12Each had declared the rght to evaluate self-
protectionin one's own way, and to act [Link] had claimed the
rightto judge the political (CP, 37).
Schmitt wants desperatelyto demonstratethat this situationimplies the
likelihoodof combustionintocivil warandHobbes'sstateof [Link] must
revive the fear thatled to the terminationof the stateof natureto preventthe
reversionback to it. If groups other than the state have power, particularly
such as thatover declaringwar,or worse if they do not possess such a power
themselves but can preventthe state from exercising that power, the state
disappears:

It would be an indicationthatthese counterforceshad not reachedthe decisive point in

the political if they turnedout to be not sufficientlypowerfulto preventa war contrary
to theirinterestsor [Link] counterforcesbe strongenoughto hindera war
desired by the state thatwas contraryto theirinterestsor pnnciples but not sufficiently
capablethemselvesof decidingaboutwar,thena unifiedpoliticalentity would no longer
exist. (CP, 39)

Schmltt'simplicitreadingof Hobbes,therefore,is thata returnto the stateof

natureis an ever presentpossibility for a society. This reading is generally
 McCormick/ FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 625

countered by those who see Hobbes's state of nature as either a mere

rhetoricaldevice or an anthropologicalsuppositionabouta very distantpast.
But as Pasqulnopersuasivelyargues,the stateof natureis not nearlyso distant
from present reality as all that. Hobbes viewed the state of naturenot as a
factuallyhistoricalpast,butratheras a politicallypossible present;he viewed
the state of natureas "a hypotheticalcrumblingof the state"and society "as
if It were dissolved."'3Hobbes conceived of this condition as one of "terror,
that is to say a condition in which no individualis certainof his/herborders
or even his physical identity,that is his life"; and he was "anxiousto show
that the state of natureactually exists."'4The state of natureas it exists in
relationship to the present is Hobbes's utmost concern, according to
Pasquino:"It can happenat any time and must always be avoided. It is the
face of the threatthatpolitical ordermust wardoff."s5
This buttressingof Schmitt's reading of Hobbes more clearly demon-
strateshis own [Link] to make real the terrorof what is and
what might be so as to strengthenthe existing [Link] citizens of Weimar
must reaffirmthe pact that delivers humanbeings out of the state of nature
and into civil society by transferringtheirillegitimatelyexercised subjectiv-
ity regardingfriend and enemy back to the sovereign state. "Tothe state as
an essentially political entity belongs thejus belli, i.e., the real possibility of
deciding in a concrete situationupon the enemy and the ability to fight him
with the power emanatingfrom the entity"(CP, 45). The state, and the state
alone, decides on internalenemies (CP, 46), and externalones as well (CP,
28-9). Regardinginternalenemies, Schmittseeks to reversethepluralistview
of the state as merely one interestgroup among many others in society or
even as a servantthereof (CP, 44). The state must stand above society as a
quasi-objectiveentity,ratherthanhelpprecipitatecivil warby existing as one
subjectivityamong others. Regardingexternalenemies, just as Hobbes had
Catholics in mind when he warned against allegiance to extra-national
powers, Schmitt surely thinks of the communists when he writes that one
should not "love and supportthe enemies of one's own people" (CP, 29).
Moscow should come before Berlin no more than Rome before London or
Pans. Only one's own statecan ask one to surrenderone's life for it (CP, 46),
and Schmittmocks liberalindividualismfor not being able to commandthis
from citizens (CP, 71). But here he partscompany with Hobbes, who is the
most famous exponent of this kind of right-the right not to lay down one's
life in response to a political command. It is here that we should turn to
Strauss'scritiqueand radicalizationof Schmltt'sproject,because it is on this
point andthe issues surroundingit thatStrauss'sessay pivots. However,some
preliminaryissues need to be addressedfirst.
626 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

In his recent work, RichardWolin identifies Schmitt as the archetypal

Weimarexponentof "politicalexistentialism"'the obsession with the "brute
facticlty,""bruteprimacy"of humanexistence and an accompanyingaes-
thetizationof conflict, violence, and death as ends in themselves.'6What
should be clear from my presentationthus far is thatSchmittseeks to make
the threatof conflict-of war-felt andfearednotas anend in itself, as Wolin
and othercriticssuggest, butratherso as to makewar'soutbreakall the more
unlikelydomestically,andits prosecutionmoreeasily [Link]
Schmittaestheticlzedviolentconflictto generatethe fearnecessaryto prevent
disorderis not contestable-that he did so for its own sake is.17This serves
as a more adequateexplanationof Schmltt's intentionsratherthan a mere
justificationof them,becauseas we will see, Schmittmust be held account-
able for aestheticizingviolent conflict in the Weimarcontext, whateverhis
intentions. In Political Romanticism,Schmitt declared that for romantics,
"the state is a work of art."'8A question that must be asked is how much
Schmitthimself aestheticlzedmattersof state.
The issue of theaestheticizationof violence is, however,inherentlyrelated
to a subjectonly implicitin TheConceptof the Political, but which becomes
explicit in Schmitt'slaterworkon Hobbes:the questionof [Link] the wake
of the emergence of National Socialism, several notable Germanscholars
attemptedto understandthe returnor persistenceof myth in whatis suppos-
edly the age of [Link] theirrespectiveanalysesof myth,Max Horkheimer
and T. W. Adorno,ErnstCasslrerandHansBlumenbergfocus, in one way or
another,on the elementof fear.'9Mythis a humanresponseto the fearinspired
by "theabsolutismof nature,"to use Blumenberg'[Link]
confront the amorphous,unpredictable,and incomprehensiblyvariableap-
pearanceof natureas a whole, humanityprefersto fixate on specific entities
with more clearlydiscernibletraitsas surrogates,and subsequentlyntualize
theminto [Link] thisextent,bothHobbes'sandSchmitt'stheoriesfunction
as myths. Accordingto the Germantheoristsof myth, humanityexchanges
the fear of the unorderedand chaotic for the fear of somethingmore certain
and [Link] is the very exchangethatHobbesoffers:subjectsgive
up theirepistemologlcaluncertaintyregardingthe totalityof humannature-
theirfearof everythingandeveryoneat every moment-for the moretolerable
knowledgethatit is onlythestatethatis to be feared,andthenonlyundercertain
[Link],Hobbesnameshis stateafterthe mythicbiblicalmonster,
the [Link] extentto which Schmitt'srevivalandreformulationof the
Hobbeslanexchangein TheConceptof thePolitical succumbsto the element
of myth and the questionconcerningthe potentialramificationsof this are
subjectsthatwill be takenup in latersections of this essay.
 McCorrmck/ FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 627

STRAUSS'S COMMENTARYON THE

CONCEPTOF THE POLITICAL(1932)

The young Leo Straussrecognizes Schmitt'sprojectas I have described

it and its relationshipto that of Hobbes;he confirmsthe necessity of such a
projectbased on "thepresentsituation"of Weimar;he criticizes the project
on the basis of Schmitt's own assumptionsand alms; and finally, he refash-
ions, redirects,and radicalizesthe projectitself.20
Straussrealizes that Schmitt's inquiryinto "theorderof humanthings,"
into "the political," is necessarily an examinationof the foundationof the
state(CCP, 81), for the statewas foundedwith "thefundamentalandextreme
status of man"in mind (CCP, 88). Indeed,as Straussrecognizes explicitly,
"the political, which Schmitt brings out as fundamental,is 'the state of
nature.' ... SchmittrestoresHobbes's conceptionof the state of natureto a
place of honor"(CCP, 87-8). Just as "inspiringfear"is a primarycharac-
teristicof Hobbes'sstateof nature,the samecan be said of Schmltt'spolitical,
accordingto Strauss'sinterpretation(CCP, 95). As Straussobservedregard-
ing Hobbes in a work publishedonly a few years earlierin 1930:

Fear is not only alarmand flight, but also distrust,suspicion, caution,care lest one fear.
Now it is not deathin itself thatcan be avoided,but only deathby violence, which is the
greatest of possible evils. For life itself can be of such misery that death comes to be
rankedwith the good. In the final instance what is of prmary concern is ensunng the
continuanceof life in the sense of ensunng defense against other men. Concern with
self-protectionis the fundamentalconsideration,the one most fully in accord with the
humansituation. The fear of death,the fearof deathby violence, is [for Hobbes] the
source of all right,the prmary basis of naturalright.21

Straussthus acknowledges as justified Schmitt'srevival of the image of

the stateof natureandthe notionof fearthatmustaccompanyit. The "present
situation"in "the age of neutralizationsand depoliticlzlng"calls for such a
revival, accordingto Strauss,echoing anotherof Schmltt'sworks (CCP, 82).
The prevailingpluralistand liberaltheories of society and "culture,"which
view these entities as "autonomous"-that is, as legitimatelyseparatefrom
the state-have neutralizedthe political (CCP, 86). Because such theories
view cultureas something naturalin the sense thathumanbeings develop it
more or less spontaneously,they overlook thatthereis somethingthatexists
prior to culture. "This conception makes us forget that 'culture' always
presupposessomething which is cultivated:cultureis always cultivationof
nature"(CCP, 86). Straussmakesexplicit thatnaturein this sense also entails
humannatureand hence the state of nature:
628 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

Since we understandby "culture"above all the cultureof humannature,the presuppo-

sitionof cultureis, aboveall, humannature,andsince manis by naturean animalsociale,
the humannatureunderlyingcultureis the naturalliving togetherof men, i.e., the mode
in which man-pror to culture-behaves towardsother men. The term for the natural
living together thus understoodis the status naturalis. One may therefore say, the
foundationof cultureis the status naturalis.(CCP, 87)

The cultivation of the state of nature is, as we know according to Hobbes and
Schmitt, the state, not society initially. The state, by establishing order, makes
possible the existence of society. Therefore, Strauss more firmly grounds the
Schmlttian thesis against the proponents of the theory of "autonomous"
culture and society, namely, liberals and pluralists. The latter overlook the
fact that the state of nature and the state itself exist prior to culture commonly
understood as It exists within society. Consequently, behavior that weakens
the state increases the risk of reviving the state of nature. The status naturalis,
and human nature as it exists within it-the political-do not go away simply
because, according to Schmitt, liberalism has ignored it or even "negated" it.
As Strauss reiterates Schmitt, liberalism merely "conceals" the political:

Liberalismhas not killed the political, but merely killed understandingof the political,
and sincerityregardingthe [Link] clear the obfuscationof realitywhich liberalism
has caused, the political must be broughtout and shown to be completely undemable.
Liberalismis responsiblefor having covered over the political, and the political must
once again be broughtto light, if the questionof the stateis to be put in full serousness.
(CCP, 82-3)22

Strauss and Schmitt agree that liberalism has put the state into crisis by
"obfuscating" the political, and that the specter of the state of nature must be
made apparent-with all the fear that accompanies it-and that "a different
system" must be made the basis of the state "thatdoes not negate the political,
but brings the political into full recognition" (CCP, 83). However it is on the
question of how to found this "different system" that the student challenges
the master. The figure of Hobbes again proves central to the disagreement.
On the issue of how one cultivates nature-how the state is founded or
how culture is developed-Strauss identifies two ways of proceeding. The
first "means culture develops the natural disposition; it is careful cultivation
of nature-whether of the soil or of the human mind; in this it obeys the
indications that nature itself gives" (CCP, 86). Strauss identifies the second
kind of cultivation with Bacon: "culture is not so much faithful cultivation
of nature as a harsh and cunning fight against nature"(CCP, 87). This second,
"specifically modern conception of nature," can also be located in Hobbes
according to Strauss, a conception that associates culture with "a disciplining
of human will, as the opposite of the status naturalis" (CCP, 87). The
 McCormuck/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 629

implication for politics is that the authoritariansuppression of nature-

especially human nature-is easier, more "natural,"and ultimately more
stable than the disciplining and educatingentailed by popularself-rule. The
latter is actually the "harsh and cunning fight against nature,"and the
former-straightforward authoritarianrule-while ostensibly "harsh,"is
actually more in accordwith nature.
Accordingto Strauss,Hobbesnot only held the "natural"pessimisticview
of humanityas "dangerous"and "dynamic,"that Schmittearlier identifies,
but simultaneously he held the more problematicand unnaturalview of
humanityas educable, prudent,and capable of self-control for the sake of
[Link] latterview fuels the "autonomy"theoryof society,
and gives it the justification for demandingsome degree of the subjectivity
addressed in the previous section. Moreover, it provides society with the
justification for holding leverageagainstthe state. Citizens must be allowed
to rule themselves in some sense, andsociety must be allowed to remainfree
of the state to some degree. The first view of cultivatinghuman natureput
forthby Strausswould, in line with the empiricalrealityof the stateof nature,
deem humanity as "morally depraved"and simply and unequivocally in
"needof being ruled"(CCP, 97). It would hence rule out any "autonomy"or
"subjectivity"for individuals,society, or culture,which insteadmust be kept
underthe tight controlof the [Link] Schmitt,following Hobbes,
for not being truly and exclusively pessimistic, for not identifyingthis more
extreme dangerousnessof humanity,and for not advocatingsingularlyand
explicitly a more direct mode to govern it. And as Strausssubtly asserts in
much of his early writings,this severe mode of rule,contraryto conventional
wisdom, is actually less, ratherthanmore, dependenton technology.
In his book on Spinoza,Straussexplainedhow the "disclpliningof human
will," the less pessimistic cultivationof humannatureprescribedby Hobbes,
necessarily requiresthe dominationof naturein general: "Physics,"which
Straussidentifies explicitly with technology,

is concerned with man's happiness, anthropology[which he identifies likewise with

"politicalphilosophy"]with man'[Link] greatestmisfortuneis deathby violence;
happinessconsists in the limitless increaseof power over men and over things. Fearof
violent death, and the pursuit of domination over things-it is basically these two
determnants of willing which Hobbes accepts as justified.2

Insteadof adoptingthe firstkindof cultivationpreviouslydescribedwhich

"obeysthe indicationsthatnatureitself gives" (which observeshumanbeings
in the state of nature,recognizes them as incapableof rulingthemselves, and
governs them accordingly), Hobbes opts for the other kind of cultivation,
630 POLITICALTHEORY/ November1994

which eventually distracts human beings from their own nature by the
conquest of outer nature-by providing for their potential happiness with the
promise of a commodious life. The direct domination of humanity, suggested
by "anthropology," is more natural than the direct domination of external
nature, for the latter, relying more explicitly on physics, is actually "the harsh
and cunning fight against nature" described above. According to Strauss,
Hobbes chooses physics over anthropology, and hence ultimately technology
over political philosophy. Technology is employed by Hobbes to neutralize
precisely those characteristics that make man dangerous, that create the
likelihood of violent death, and emphasizes that charactenstic that makes
man capable of improvement, namely, reason:

Reason, the provident outlook on the future, thus justifies the strving after power,
possessions, gain, wealth,since these providethe meansto gratifythe underlyingdesire
for pleasuresof the senses. Reasondoes notjustify, but indeed refutes,all strivingafter
reputation,honor,fame: in a word and thatword used in the sense appliedby Hobbes,
vanity. The legitimatestriving after pleasureis sublatedinto strving after power.
What is condemned is the striving after [Link] (or more accurately
physics as distinct from anthropology)is to be understoodas arsing from the strving
after power scientia [Link] aim is cultivation,the cultivationof nature.
Whatnatureoffers to manwithoutsupplementaryactivityon the partof manis sufficient
for no more than a life of [Link] that life may become more comfortable,human
exertion is required,and the regulationof unregulatednature. The purposepursued
by science is conquestover nature.2

Reason, science, and technology tame man by reducing vanity, physical

needs, and religion. Yet it is precisely the continued existence of this subJec-
tive reason pursued toward private ends within civil society that will under-
mine Hobbes's state. Strauss focuses on the contradiction within Schmitt that
we observed at the close of the last section. Schmitt maintains that the nature
of "the political" allows that the state, of which Hobbes is the founder, "may
'demand . from those belonging to a nation readiness to die,' and the
legitimacy of this demand is at least qualified by Hobbes: the man in the
battle-ranks who deserts by reason of fear for his life acts 'only' dishonorably,
but not unjustly" (CCP, 88). And it is precisely the reservation of such a
rlght-subjectively determined by an individual's reason-regarding how
and when and in what capacity one's life can be employed, which becomes
a powerful weapon against the state.
The normative consequences of Hobbes's grant of subjectivity (however
narrow) to individuals for the question of what is right retains no real force,
according to Strauss. SubJective freedom is maintained "at the price of the
meaning of human life, for when man abandons the task of raising the
question regarding what is right, and when man abandons this question, he
 McCormck / FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 631

abandons his humanity"(CP, 101). Schmitt, to the extent that he models

himself on Hobbes, betrays the fact that he is "under the spell" of the
liberalismhe criticizes. He defines his political as beyond objective norma-
tive standards-by defining it as if it were neutral(CP, 103). Schmltt's
depiction of the political is hence reduced to a subjective Interpretation
characteristicof "the individualistic-liberalsociety" he wishes to replace
(CP, 102). According to Strauss, Schmitt's project, as it stands, is hence
"provisional"for it is "forced to make use of liberal elements" (CP, 83).
Schmltt's critique"is detainedon the plane createdby liberalism. [H]is
critique of liberalism takes place within the horizon of liberalism"(CP,
104-5).25
Strauss is familiar with Schmitt's attempt to separate the substantive
Hobbesfromthe mechanisticHobbes(CCP,97, 103). Straussis in full accord
with this projectto the extent that the substantiveHobbes recognized what
characterizesman's fundamentalcondition and the element with which to
manage it-fear. But one must furtherdistance this from the other Hobbes
who undermineshis own insight by setting in motion the forces that will
neutralizehis system. Schmitt,in his failureto emphasizethe radicaldanger-
ousness of man ratherthan what amountsto mere "liberal"dangerousness,
is susceptible to the subjectivity and the tendency toward neutralityand
technology thatcharacterizethe latterHobbes. "A radicalcritiqueof liberal-
ism," according to Strauss, "is thereforepossible only on the basis of an
adequate understandingof Hobbes" (CCP, 105). This understandingis
crucial if "the decisive battle between 'the spint of technology,' the 'mass
faith of an antireligious,this-worldly activism' and the opposite spirit and
faith, which, it seems, does not yet have a name,"is to be won (CCP, 104).
Hobbes negated the political; Schmitt affirms it (CCP, 90). According to
Strauss, he opens the possibility of starting the project over again. This
"urgenttask"(CCP, 105), initiatedby Schmitt,is takenup by Straussin his
own projecton [Link] the Germanyof 1933, Straussexalts thepossibility
that" 'the orderof humanthings' may arise afresh"(CCP, 101).

STRAUSS'SUNDERTAKING
OF THE
POLITICALPHILOSOPHYOF HOBBES (1933)

Based on the quality of Strauss's commentaryon The Concept of the

Political, as well as a draftof the beginningof his work on Hobbes, Schmitt
obtained for Strauss a Rockefeller FoundationFellowship to continue this
endeavorin FranceandEnglandin 1933. Apparently,whatwas writtenat this
632 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

point were the first five chaptersof what was eventually publishedas The
Political Philosophyof Hobbes in Englandin 1936.26In these sections, we
find the most explicit and detailedattemptof the Weimarprojectof Schmitt
and StraussregardingHobbes.27
Strauss declares that "the particularobject of the present study" is to
demonstratethat "the real basis of [Hobbes's] political philosophy is not
modern science" (PPH, ix). Strausscites with approvalG. C. Robertson's
observationthatHobbes'spoliticalinsightsweremadelong beforehe became
"a mechanicalphilosopher"(PPH, ix) and wishes to apprehendHobbes's
thoughtson "menandmanners"beforetheywere"distorted"by the influence
of modernscience (PPH, ix). ThroughStrauss'sproject,"we areenabledto
perceivethat[Hobbes's]originalconceptionof humanlife was presentin his
mind before he was acquaintedwith modernscience, and thus to establish
the fact that that conception is independentof modem science" (PPH, xi).
Certainly,Hobbes developed his "method"in the fashion of Descartes and
Galileo,butthe significanceof his thoughtdoes not lie in this similarity."The
universal importanceof Hobbes's political philosophy cannot but remain
unrecognizedso long as, in accordancewith Hobbes's own statements,the
method is considered to be the decisive featureof his politics. Now it is
obvious that the methodis not its only and even its most importantcharac-
teristic" (PPH, 2). Reminiscent of his commentaryon Schmitt, Strauss
maintainsthat the most importantcharacteristicof Hobbes's thought is its
substance,its insight into humanity,the insightrelatedto the fact that "man
is by natureevil,""rapacious"(PPH, 3). Accordingto Strauss,Hobbesfounds
his theoryof the state at the root, not on science and technology,but on the
fear generatedby this insight. "His contentionthatthe State originatesonly
in mutualfearandcan only so originatehas thus moral,not merelytechnical
significance"(PPH, 23). It is Spinozawho completelytechnifiespolitics, not
Hobbes (PPH, 28). For Strauss(as for Schmitt),there is something vital to
be graspedbeyond Hobbes's method.
In his commentaryon Schmltt'swork,Strausschastisedhis seniorfor not
distinguishing between that kind of pessimism that views humanity as
prudentanimals, dangerousyet educable, on one hand, and that kind that
views it as dangerous,period, on the other, in need of nothing other than
"beingruled."HereStraussemphasizesthatman'sreason,ratherthanmaking
him educable and improvable,as even the former more moderatekind of
pessimismargues,rather,makeshim even moredangerousand in even more
dire need of being ruled:

The specific differencebetween man and all otheranimalsis [Link] man is much
less atthe mercyof momentarysense-impressions,he canenvisagethe futuremuchbetter
 McCormick/ FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 633

thancan animals;for this very reasonhe is not like ammalshungryonly with the hunger
of the moment, but also with futurehunger,and thus he is the most predatory,the most
cunning, the strongest,and the most dangerousammal.(PPH, 9)

Straussnotes the tension in Hobbes between this "vitalistic"conception of

humanappetitesand the "mechanistic"one (PPH, 9), which Strausscharac-
terized in his commentaryon Schmittas the specifically liberalconception.
The latterposits humanappetite"asa resultof the infinitenumberof external
impressions"made from withoutthe body, and hence manageable,control-
lable. Controlthe stimuliandyou controlthe [Link] andtechnology
are of course indispensablefor this kind of control. The former theory of
appetites,on the otherhand,posits "thathumanappetiteis infinite in itself,"
and hence unquenchableand volatile (PPH, 9). "The mechanistic [techno-
liberal]conceptionis basedon the mechanisticexplanationof perceptionand
therewithon the generaltheoryof motion;on the otherhand,the apparently
vitalistic [trulypessimistic] conceptionis based not on any generalscientific
theory,but on insight into humannature"(PPH, 9). The lattertheory,which
Straussearlieridentifiedas anthropology,recognizes the differencebetween
animal and man: "the animal desires only finite objects as such, while man
spontaneouslydesires infinitely"(PPH, 9). Straussasserts,despite the con-
tradiction,"therecan be no doubtthatonly this latterview of humanappetite
corresponds to the intention of Hobbes's political philosophy" (PPH, 9).
Hence, "thewarof everyone againsteveryonearises of necessity fromman's
very nature"(PPH, 12). Infiniteappetitesgenerateinfinite conflicts.28
It is precisely "the fear each man has of every otherman as his potential
murderer"that serves as "theoriginof law and the State"(PPH, 17). Strauss
focuses more dramaticallyon this fear of death than any other author.29 He
explains the precise reason Hobbes chose to base his theoryon the negative
expression"avoidingdeath"over thepositive one "preservinglife" "because
we feel death and not life; because we fear death immediatelyand directly,
while we desire life only because rationalreflection tells us that it is the
condition of our happiness;because we fear death infinitely more than we
desire life" (PPH, 16).
To make the fear with which he is concernedmore intense, Straussmakes
the source of that fear more extreme than it appearsin Hobbes himself, or
even in [Link] is not merelyfearof deaththatis at the base of Hobbesian
politics and hence the politics of the modernstate, but fear of violent death.
Because man, unlike the animals, is not content with limited satisfactions,
but desires limitless ones as well, such as recognition,he inflicts the worst
damage, the worst pain. It is well worth quoting Strauss at length here:
Because man craves recognition,he can be offended, slighted,
634 POLITICALTHEORY/ November1994

and to be slighted is the greatestanimi molestia, and from the feeling of being slighted
anses the greatestwill to [Link] one slightedlongs for revenge. In orderto avenge
himselfhe attackstheother,indifferentwhetherhe loses his life in so [Link]
as to the preservationof his own life, he desires,however,above all thatthe othershould
remainalive; for "revengeaimethnot at the death,but at the captivityand subjectionof
an enemy . revengeaimethat triumph,which over the deadis not" The strugglewhich
thus breaksout, in which, accordingto the opimon of both opponents,the object is not
killing but the subjectionof the other, of necessity becomes serous, because it is a
struggle between bodies, a real struggle. From the beginmng of the conflict the two
opponentshave, withoutrealizingandforeseeingit, completelyleft the imaginaryworld.
At some point in the conflict, actualinjury,or more accuratelyphysical pain, arousesa
fear for life. Fear moderates anger, puts the sense of being slighted into the back-
ground, and transformsthe desire for revenge into [Link] aim of the hateris no
longer triumphover the enemy, but his death. The struggle for pre-eminence,about
"trifles",has become a [Link] this way naturalman happensunfore-
seen uponthe dangerof death. .. Only fora momentcan he free himself fromthedanger
of deathby killing his enemy, for since every man is his enemy, after the killing of his
first enemy he is "againin the like dangerof another",indeed of all [Link] killing
of the enemy is thus the least far-sightedconsequence of the withdrawalfrom death.
(PPH, 20-1)3

With his thoroughly existential reading of Hobbes's state of nature, Strauss

demonstrates how the subjective desires of men lead to their struggle with
other men with the deliberate aim of inflicting pain on them. However, in the
heat of battle the opponents become focused no longer on the trigger, the
external cause of the original altercation, but rather on life and death. Schmitt
described how realms such as economics and religion become so intense as
to no longer concern themselves with economic or religious issues as they
become political but rather with the destruction of a decided enemy "the
negation of the other." The prospect of this negation, the fear it inspires, is
sufficient to compel man to abandon the subjective trifles that serve as
sources of conflict and potential harbingers of violence, pain, and death. The
religious impulses, which Hobbes regarded in his day as nothing more than
expressions of pride, the class identity that was seen in much the same way
by Schmitt, must no longer inspire feelings of "slight." According to Strauss,
the fear of violent death serves as an antidote to the realm of pride as most
broadly interpreted by Hobbes:

Prde, far from being the ongin of thejust attitude,is ratherthe only orgin of the unjust
attitude. Not prde, and still less obedience,but fear of violent death,is accordingto
[Hobbes] the orgin of the just [Link] man does from fear of death, in the
consciousness of the weaknessof othermen, when he honestlyconfesses to himself and
to othershis weakness and his fearof death,unconcernedabouthis honour,this alone is
fundamentallyjust. (PPH, 25)
 McCormick/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 635

Fearof violent deathdefeats the frivolous butdangeroussubjectiveattitudes

that characterizethe state of nature and the epoch of religious wars for
Hobbes, and potentially, the era of malignant pluralism for Schmitt and
[Link] a passagereminiscentof Schmltt'sthatdescribedhow in civil war
"men"recognizethat"alllegitimateandnormativeillusions"with whichthey
like to "deceive themselves" in periods of peace "vanish,"Strauss asserts
how thatwhich is the productof civil war,death,dissolves such illusions that
in the end can only be viewed as the productof vanity: "Because man by
naturelives in the dreamof the happinessof triumph,of glittering,imposing,
apparentgood, he requiresa no less imposingpower to awakenhim fromhis
dream:this imposing power is the imperiousmajestyof death... The ideal
condition for self knowledge is, therefore,unforeseenmortaldanger"(PPH,
19).31
Thus, argues Strauss,Hobbes's politics is based not on science, but on
substance,[Link] relationshipbetweenthe two
must recognize the substanceas the antecedentof the science, not vice versa.
Only the fearof violentdeathconquersthe subjectivevanitythatignitesstrife,
and only it subdues the prejudicethatinterfereswith science:

Hobbes identifies conscience with the fear of death;only throughknowledge of mortal

danger,knowledge which is at the same time a retreatfrom death can man be radically
liberatedfromnaturalvanity,fromthe naturalabsorptionin the worldof hls imagination.
If this is the case, the fear of death, the fear of violent death, is the necessarycondition
not only of society but also of science. Just as life in common is hinderedby passion,
science is hinderedby prejudice.(PPH, 26)

Fear,the stateof nature,andthe stateitself all exist priorto science, which

must lie within the realmof cultureand society. Thereforea trulyHobbesian
theory of the state cannotbe based on science; science is possible only after
the state has already been established. Science can even be more or less
discardedwhen one understandsthese [Link] Hobbes'spolitical
philosophy is based on the fear of violent death,

because it is basedon experence of humanlife, it can never,in spite of all the temptations
of naturalscience, fall completely into the danger of abstractionfrom moral life and
forget moral difference. Hobbes's political philosophy has thus for that very reason a
moral basis, because it is not derved from naturalscience but is foundedon first-hand
experence of humanlife. (PPH, 29)

It can never completely fall into such dangerwhen it can be retrievedby the
likes of Schmitt and [Link] they, particularlyStrauss,have articulated
what is priorto science in Hobbes'[Link] successfully cared
636 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

out Schmitt's projectand his own correctionof it by getting "beyond the

horizon of liberalism"by supposedly adequatelyunderstandingHobbes.
Straussisolates Hobbes's thoughtfrom the forces of neutralizationthat will
undermineit. Once one adequatelyunderstandsthe basis of politics as fear
of violent death,a fear based not on a somewhatdangerous,yet improvable
and educable humannature,but simply on an infinitely dangeroushuman
nature,one no longerhas anyneedfor [Link] correctsthe mistakes
of Hobbes'sliberalsuccessors,who takeup the taskof tryingto have citizens
rulethemselvesby providingthemwiththe productsof theconquestof nature
and allay theirfears by showing them the orderlinessof nature,one can set
up a state more In accord with the naturalcondition of humanity,more in
accord with "the political." The logical outcome of Strauss's turning of
Schmitt's view of man to one which views him simply in need of "being
ruled,"is a theoryof state thatconsistentlyinstills in citizens the fear of the
"humansituation"by constantlyremindingthemof its [Link] this is to
be achieved withouttechnology,withoutthe apparatusof physical domina-
tion, somethingelse must hold sway. The myth of the state-the Leviathan,
the sea monsterafterwhich Hobbes namedhis greatestwork on the state-
must invoke uniformlyand in a controlledmannerthe terrorthateach citizen
felt individually and overwhelmingly in the state of [Link] is the
element which can maintainthe state's separationfrom society while simul-
taneouslykeepingit in check. Thus, for the stateto keep fromintegratingtoo
extensively within society and hence weakening itself, myth must hold
sway.32
Despite the mythic title of Leviathan,Hobbes was to emphasize myth
moreheavily in his [Link] his commentaryon Hobbes'sBehemoth,
Stephen Holmes describes how Hobbes came to realize that "the ultimate
sourceof politicalauthorityis not coercionof the body,butcaptivationof the
mind."33It is to this issue in HobbesthatStrauss'sworkpoints and to which
Schmitthimself turnsin his laterwork on Hobbes, although,as we will see,
his attitude toward the project as a whole has become significantly less
sanguine.34

SCHMITT'STHE LEVIATHANIN THE STATE

THEORYOF THOMASHOBBES. MEANING
AND FAILUREOF A POLITICALSYMBOL(1938)

Much happened in both Schmltt's personal life and German politics

between 1933 and 1938, the publicationdate of Schmltt'sbook on Hobbes's
 McCormuck/ FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 637

Leviathan.35Schmitt,enticed by the promiseof prestigiouspositions,joined

the NationalSocialist Partynot long afterItcame to [Link] several
years in which Schmittheldjudicial posts and wrote treatisesfor the regime,
his unorthodoxNational Socialism, his past connection with political Ca-
tholicism, and his previous public denunciationsof the partyeventuallyran
him afoul of the SS, and he retiredinto privatelife after 1936.36
Schmitt had not taken up the Welmar-Hobbesianprojecthe sharedwith
Strausssince 1933. Perhapshe thoughthe hadfounda solutionin thepolitical
choice he made in May of [Link] afterthe events of the ensuing years,
he returnedto Hobbes and his Leviathan,which Schmitt declared was the
"earthly"and "mortal"god that must time and time again bring man out of
the "chaos"of the "naturalcondition"(L, 22). This statementhighlightsthe
themesof Schmitt'streatisethatarenew to theproject:mythandits mortality.
In the Leviathanbook, we still find SchmittdefendingHobbes againstthose
who would interprethim "superficially"as strictlya "rationalist,mechanist,
sensualist, individualist"(L, 22). Schmitt is more forthrightin admitting,
however,thatthese elements,particularlythemechanistic,arepresent(L, 30),
but that they do not constituteHobbes's theoryas a whole. Schmittempha-
sizes that for Hobbes there are three Leviathans:the mythical monster,the
representativeperson, and the machine (L, 30). Schmitt's thesis is that
Leviathanas mythical monster,or even as representativeperson-images
that can sufficiently keep men in awe-hlstoncally become supersededby
Leviathanthe machine-which is viewed as a meretool to be used by various
groups of citizens (L, 54). In other words, Schmitt admits that the Weimar
attemptto divorce the "mechanistic"from the "vital"in Hobbes has been
historicallyimpossible. What accountsfor this change of mind?37
The neutralization of Hobbes's state-its transformation into mere
machine-beglns, with good reason, as a response to the wars of religion,
but led inevitably to "the neutralizationof every truth"(L, 64). Not only
religious, but metaphysical,juristic, and political considerationseventually
come to mean nothing to the "clean"and "exact" workings of the state
mechanisms(L, 62-3). Liberalsand communistsboth agree that the state is
a machine, an apparatuswhich the most "vared political constellationscan
utilize as a technically neutralinstrument"(L, 62-3). In hindsight, writes
Schmitt,reversinghis argumentin TheConceptof the Political, the statecan
be viewed as "thefirst productof the age of technology"(L, 53).
The fault does not lie fully with Hobbes, according to Schmitt, for he
expected his state to continue to inspire awe as a myth that stood above
society, maintainingpeace throughthe fear it engendered,and expected It to
function as smoothly as a finely tuned machine. Schmitt elaborateson an
insightby Straussnotedearlier,thatSpinozaperpetratesthe radicaltechniclz-
638 POLITICALTHEORY/ November1994

ing of Hobbeslanpolitics. Resortingto an anti-Semitismnot presentin his

Weimarwrtings, Schmitthereblames"theJew"Spinozafor acceleratingthe
neutralizingprocess of turningthe Leviathanfrom a myth into a machine.38
Hobbes, the religious insider(nominallyChristianEnglishman),formulated
the state/civil society relationshipin the following stable manner:

publicpeace and sovereignpower

Insures
individualfreedom.

Spinoza, the religious outsider(a Jew), changes the prioritiesso as to make

the relationshipfundamentallyunstable:

individualfreedom
insuredby
publicpeace and sovereignpower.

Thus the dangerous subjectivity that was the concern of Schmitt in his
reformulation of Hobbes in The Concept of the Political is historically given
a place of prmacy over the state, which was foundedprecisely to keep it in
check. As ReinhartKoselleck, himself a studentof Schmitt,explains it, the
slightest traceof subjectivitythatHobbesgrantedto his citizens as compen-
sation for giving up the "NaturalRight"of the state of nature,latertakes its
revenge on the state itself:

The Statecreateda new order,but then-in genuinelyhistoricfashion-fell prey to that

[Link] evident in Hobbes, the moralinnerspace thathad been excised from the State
and reserved for man as a human being meant (even rudimentarily)a source of
unrest. The authorityof conscience remainedan unconqueredremnantof the state
of nature,protrudinginto the formallyperfectedState.39

As the subjectivltiesproliferatedand gained in power,they demandedof

the stateobjectivity-obJectivity towardits own existence-the logical result
of which is the complete neutralityof the state. Accordingto Schmitt,Kant
is guilty of finally sappingthe stateof any substantivecontentof its own, of
disentangling the "organism" from the "mechanism"; simultaneously,
Schelling and the Romantics disentangle "art"from "mechanics,"but in
Hobbes these elements were all together,and hence the Leviathanstate, in
this awesome totality, was potentially mythical (L, 61). After Kant, the
reigning image for jurisprudence is no longer a personal judge pronouncing
decisions, but a mechanism dispensing rules: "The legislator humanus
becomes a machina legislatoria"(L, 100).
 McCorrmck/ FEAR, TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 639

Because the government has no moral content, neither do the laws it

thereby produces:"For the technically representedneutralityit is decisive
thatthe laws of the statebecome independentfromevery substantivecontent,
fromreligious or legal truthandpropriety,andshouldbe valid only as a result
of the positive determinationsof the state's decision in the form of com-
mands"(L, 67).40A state thatis purelymechanicaland has no value content
whatsoever other than efficiency has no boundary,not even the Hobbeslan
one of the protection of individual life. "Such a state can be tolerant or
intolerantbut [Link] has its truth,andjustice in its technical
perfection... The state machineeither functions or does not function"(L,
68-9). Ironically,it is the state'sgrantingbotha subjectiverealmandthe right
to resist the state in the protectionof one's life that comes to endangerthe
lives of citizens, accordingto [Link] the state recognized,as Schmitt
and Strausswished, thatman simply neededto be ruledand thatto granthim
any subjective determinationof self-preservationwas dangerousto order,
peace, and life, it could have held for itself the moral content of protecting
the lives of its citizens. As the subjectiveentities of civil society demanded
more objectivity from the state,they drainedit of even this [Link] any of
these subjective entities, "autonomous"(L, 68) as they are from the state,
should in their guaranteedsubjective freedom of conscience choose not to
recognize the boundaryof the statein the safety of the people, and also seize
the neutralized,efficient, but weakenedstate, the results would be horrific.
It would be the state of naturewhere all are not equal in their ability to kill
and be killed. It would be an entitywith the subjectivityof the stateof nature,
and the objective efficiency of the [Link] Schmittso masterfully
describedthe predicamentof lateWeimarin Hobbesiantermsin TheConcept
of the Political, he has hereperhapsset forthjust such a Hobbesiandepiction
of National Socialism.
The aspect of myth in Hobbes's Leviathancould have kept the elements
of society frombecomingautonomousandfrommakingdemandsagainstthe
state; accordingto Schmitt, it could have ruled not throughthe apparatuses
of technicalefficiency, but ratherby "captivatingminds."Now it is reduced
to the failure that Schmitt's title suggests. As Pasquinoobserves, Hobbes's
statealways was in a ratherprecariouspositionvls-A-vlsits subjects:"Behind
the absolutecharacterof the Hobbeslansovereign one begins to discover its
fragility ... its dependenceon those who dependupon it."41The frontispiece
that presently adorns Schmitt's Der Leviathanbears this out: it features a
beachedwhale, harpoonedand subduedby the fishermenwho surroundit. It
is a far cry from the frontlspieceof Hobbes's English edition of his work,
which featuredthe giant sovereign,madeup of an infinite numberof people,
640 POLITICALTHEORY/ November1994

arisingover the horizon-presumably fromthe sea-with swordand staff in

hand. The formeris the fate of this great Leviathan,accordingto Schmitt.
How could Schmittenvision the stateto be dead at the very momenthe lived
under the most powerful state-the totalitarianstate par excellence-in
history?In his Weimarwritings(which the Nazis apparentlydid not consult
beforesoliciting his services),Schmittnotesthata statethatis integratedinto
every facet of society is hardlya state at all. For a state to be a state, for
Schmitt,it muststandover andabove society, governingit-no doubtfirmly
and vigilantly-as a separateentity.42And even in Hobbeslan terms, the
NationalSocialist stateis no sovereignstatebuta pervertedlypowerfulform
of the state of nature,where no one is sure if he is friend or enemy to his
fellow citizen or to the regime.
However, Schmitt is not simply the historically legitimatedprophetof
doom he implicitlypresentshimselfto be in Der [Link],he is also
a contributorto the state of affairshe crticizes underNationalSocialism. In
his Weimarwritings,Schmitthad warnedagainstthe takeoverof the stateby
nonneutralforces who would "seize"the apparatusof "statewill-formation"
for themselves, "without themselves ceasing to be social and non-state
entities."43He even describedsuch an appropriationof the state in termsof
the dethroningof the Leviathan:"Whenthe 'mortalgod' falls fromhis throne
and the realmof objectivereasonandcivil society becomes 'a greatgang of
thieves,' then the partiesslaughterthe powerful Leviathanand slice pieces
from the flesh of his body."44Schmitthad promotedthe Reichsprasidentas
the "neutral"force to keep the social elements at bay-a neutralforce only
with regardto the competingparties,but not neutraltowardits own power.
Yet as Schmitt's WeimartheoreticaladversaryHans Kelsen so presciently
asked at the time: whatis to preventthe supposedlyneutralentityfrombeing
a participantin the social conflictSchmittdescribes?45Schmitthadno answer
in Weimar and he still has no answer under National Socialism in Der
Leviathan.
Thus the stanceof HobbesianneutralitythatSchmittmaintainedthrough-
out the 1920s and 1930s turnsout to be [Link] important
differencebetweenthe stateof natureandthe friend/enemydistinctionis that
in the former,despite some occasionalreferencesby Hobbes to families or
professions, there are no friends,and hence no [Link]
abstractindividualismof Hobbes's "war of all against all" points up his
ultimateagnosticismregardingtherespectivecombatantsin theEnglishCivil
War:Leviathanwas written,for the most part,in supportof the king, but was
easily convertedby Hobbes into ajustification for Cromwell.46Schmitthad
much strongerpreferencesregardingthe participantsin Weimar'snearcivil
war. It did matterto him, for instance, that the Social Democratsnot gain
 McCormick/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 641

victory,let alone the [Link] wouldbe theenemies of these

groups would necessarily be, accordingto Schmltt's"conceptof the politi-
cal," betterfriendsof the state. Shouldthese friendsgain controlof the state,
it would be appropriatefor them to suppressthe enemies of that state. This
is in fact what the National Socialists did, albeit in a mannermore ruthless
than Schmitt could have [Link] this effect, Schmitt's theory encour-
aged as much as it forewarnedagainstthe seizure of the Leviathanstate by
radicallysubjective social forces.
Moreover,the potentiallylethalresultsof such a seizure arecompounded
by Schmitt's theoreticaltamperingwith the Hobbeslanformulaof protego
ergo obligo. Had Hobbes originallyformulatedthe state in the way in which
Schmitt and Strausswished in 1933-by not grantingto the individualthe
subjective rght of self-protection,even for the sake of betterinsuringthat
individual'slife-the logic of the Leviathanwould have brokendown. It is
only the retentionof some of thatsubjectivityregardingself-preservationthat
rules completely in the state of naturethatencourages"Hobbesianman"to
make a compact and submit to the state. Schmittwas correctto recognize in
Der Leviathanthat the state was, in a way, ultimatelythe productof the age
of technology;it was an instrument,a tool. It servedas a meansto something
else, namely security and stability,preservationand peace.47The state itself
could not, withoutmost unfortunateresults,be what he and Strausswanted,
namely the embodimentof these things, and not the means [Link] a
formulationis as dangerousas it is [Link] statecould notbe expected
to absorball of the rightto self-preservationfromthe stateof nature,and still
at the same time guaranteeit. The radicalsubjectivity,the dangerousrightto
judge, accruingto the state as it does in Schmltt'sandStrauss'sinterpretation
of Hobbes, only increases that subjectivity's volatility exponentially. If
Schmitt,and particularlyStrauss,had only deigned to consult that "liberal,"
John Locke, as they engaged in their intellectualplaying-with-matchesin
1933, they might have paused to question,as did Locke:

I desire to know what kind of Governmentthat is, and how much better it is than the
State of Nature,where one Man commandinga multitude,has Libertyto be Judgein hls
own Case, and may do to all his Subjectswhateverhe pleases, withoutthe least liberty
to anyoneto questionor controlethose who Executehis Pleasure?And in whatsoeverhe
doth, whetherled by Reason, Mistakeor Passion, must be submittedto? Much betterit
is in the State of Nature wherein Men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of
another.4

In Locke's reformulationof Hobbes, it is absolute rule, not the state of

nature,which is the actual state of "Warre."The state of naturewhere each
individualhas an equal chance of remainingalive must surely be betterthan
642 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

a situationwhere one has completelygiven over one's rightto and capacity

for self-protectionto an inordinatelystrongerforce thatoffers no guarantee,
no insuranceof protecting one's life. Schmitt surely must have come to
understandthatWeimar,for all of his crticisms of it, was certainlybetterthan
National Socialism; there, whateverthe social disturbancesand economic
fluctuations,Schmitt'sacademiccontroversiesdid not cause him to fear for
his life.49
If, in Der Leviathan,Schmitt perhapsimplicitly recognizes his earlier
mistake in attemptingto reformulatethe Hobbesian protection/obedience
relationshipin so dangerousa fashion,he apparentlydoes not recognize the
mistakein his earliercalling for the ruleof mythinsteadof the rule of technik
in the art of [Link] MartinHeldegger, but for different reasons,
Schmittmust have originally seen in NationalSocialism a myth that could
serve as an alternativeand antidoteto the age of [Link] must
have viewed myth as an elementof the Hobbesianprojectthathad faded but
could be revived to supplantthe presentlypredominantelement,technology,
which threatenedto bring down the whole [Link] like Heldegger,
Schmitt must have realized somewhat late that in modernity,myth can be
revivedonly very carefully,particularlyin relationshipto [Link] we
now know,and as WalterBenJaminhadalreadyobservedin his masterpiece
of 1936, 'The Artworkin the Age of Its TechnologicalReproducibility,"in
NationalSocialism, myth and technology were fatefullybound:

The logical result of Fascism is the introductionof aesthetics into political life. The
violationof the masses, whom Fascism,with its Fiihrercult, forces to its knees, has its
counterpartin the violence of an apparatuswuhchis pressedinto the productionof ritual
values. All efforts to renderpolitics aestheticculminatein one thing:war. "Fiat
ars-pereat mundus,"says Fascism,and expects war to supplythe artisticgratifica-
tion of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. Mankind['s]
self-alienationhas reachedsuch a degreethatit can experence its own destructionas an
aestheticpleasureof the first order.

In 1933, how did Straussand Schmittexpect to revive thatprimalsubstance,

that link to myth, the fear of violent death? Did they not realize, as did
Benjamin,that"anapparatus"wouldbe neededto change"senseperception"
by "technology,"and "pressinto production"such "ntualvalues"95'
In one of the two quotes that opened this study, Straussdisparagesthe
concept of "phantasmagoria" to which the world is reducedundera certain
interpretationof Hobbes. But if phantasmagoria can be described,according
to Susan Buck-Morss, as "an appearanceof reality that tricks the senses
throughtechnical manipulation,"as a "technoaesthetics"that serves as "a
means of social control,"this is precisely what Hobbes had in mind for his
 McCormick/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 643

Leviathan.52The Leviathanis intendedas a phantasmagoria;the technology

and the myth are for Hobbes intrinsicallylinked from the [Link]
Strauss might have paid better attentionto the opening lines of Hobbes's
Introductionto Leviathan,wherehe describeshow humanscan manufacture
a political machine,the state, in the way thatGod createda naturalmachine,
the human being.53And it is this technical construction that necessarily
underliesthe Leviathanpreferredby SchmittandStrauss:the "MortallGod,"
which "haththe use of so much Power and Strengthconferredon him, that
by terrorthereof,he is enabledto conformethe wills of them all, to Peace at
home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad" (II, 17, 120-1).54
In Hobbes, and consequentlyin modernity,the resultof this entwinement
of mythandtechnology is the tragicfact thatthe formercan serve to intensify
ratherthandiminishthe threatposed by the [Link] attemptto exalt
mythover science andtechnologybeyondHobbes'soriginalbalancebetween
the two spheres paradoxicallyleads only to a greaterpredominanceof the
latterwithinthe formeras a resultof theirintnnsiclink. The way to disengage
the mutual relationship of myth and technology, or in the more familiar
phrasingof Horkheimerand Adorno, myth and enlightenment,would per-
haps be throughthe thresholdof reasonand not that of myth.55This would,
of course, necessitate the abandonmentof fear as a contributingelement to
politics. As Benjaminpoints out so well, the potentialresult of the opposite
strategy,of subordinatingrationalityto myth,is [Link] whatbettersite could
fear, pain, violence, aesthetics,and technology gather?56
We observed that in The Concept of the Political, Schmitt found it
necessary to aestheticize-to elevate to mythic proportions-conflict to
generate the salutary fear that could restore order to society. But such
aestheticization, such myth making, on the contrary,contributed to the
generationof far-from-salutary fearandthe intensificationof [Link]
than, in Hobbes's words, insunng "Peace at home," and simply fostenng
"mutuallayd"againstexternalenemies, the aestheticlzationandelevation of
conflict to the statusof myth inspireda war,ghastly in mannerand scale, on
Germany'sown citizens, and in unprecedentedglobal termson othernations.
Schmitt's student, FranzNeumann,in fact describes the National Socialist
state, not as the Leviathan, but ratheras its opposite, the Behemoth: "a
non-state,a situationof lawlessness, disorderand anarchy."57
Thus SchmittandStrauss'sWeimarattemptto supplantliberalismthrough
a reinterpretationof Hobbes is a catastrophicfailurein two ways. First,they
tamperwith one Hobbesianformula-the protection-obedience relationship-
that had already been improved by the liberalism that succeeded Hobbes.
Second, they experiment with another Hobbesian formula-the myth-
technology relationship-to which post-Hobbesianliberalismcontinues to
644 POLITICALTHEORY/ November1994

be oblivious. In both cases they renderthe reformulationmore dangerous

thanthe original,supposedlyunstableproposition,and the historicalreality
with which it correspondswas undeniablydisastrous.
In his commentaryon Schmitt's The Concept of the Political, Strauss
expressedthe need to "disregardthe questionwhetherit is possible to speak
of any conceptionof culture[andnature]except the modernone"(CCP, 87).
He obviously felt thatthe modernconceptionof these entities, which led to
the crsis of the staterequireda [Link]
his writings in the dwindlingdays of Weimarwere "basedon the premise,
sanctionedby powerfulprejudice,thata returnto pre-moder philosophyis
impossible."58 Thatchanged,however,with the publicationof the full text of
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes in 1936, and especially Natural Right
and History in 1953. Modernphilosophical-politicalexpressions, particu-
larly as reflected in Hobbes, are in these later works cast in a particularly
unfavorablecomparison with the classical [Link] light of ensuing
events, perhapsStrausswas-to use a word thathas figuredprominentlyin
this study-frightened into this stance by the implications of the earlier
project he shared with Carl [Link] his "second sailing," he would no
longer so explicitly voice modernsolutionsto [Link]
the United States, Strauss kept his political inclinations hidden behind a
religion in which he did not believe, an ostensible venerationof things
ancient,and a doctrineof esotericwriting.59
Walter BenJamin,unlike Strauss, did not have sufficient influence to
guaranteehis exit fromGermanyandthe continent,andthusone of Fascism's
most brilliantcritics becameone of its millions of victims in 1940.60
After the war, Carl Schmitt attemptedto justify his collaborationwith
NationalSocialism by appealingto the Hobbesianstandardof"obediencefor
protection"He merelyofferedallegianceto a new regime,whichhe assumed
would in turnprotecthim.61It is almostfitting then thatthis Hobbeslanwho
soughtto theorizeinto oblivionthe protectioncomponentof the "protection-
obedience"formula,came ratherclose several times duringthe ThirdReich
to payingwith his life for makingthatunforgivablepoliticalchoice.62Instead
Schmittlived well into his nineties,claiminguntilthe end thathe was simply
misconstrued.63

CONCLUSION

In their Weimarworks on Hobbes, Schmitt and Straussattemptto pre-

serve, strengthen,and even redefine the state by reviving the source of its
 McCormick/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 645

development, the fear of violent death. To not recreatethe conditions that

broughtaboutthe crisis of the stateto begin with, SchmittandStraussattempt
to refoundthe state solely on this "vital,"and inevitably"mythic,"element
of fear,divorcingit from the "neutralizing"elements of science and technol-
ogy. By viewing man as an incomgibly dangerous being, Schmitt, and
especially Strauss,hopedto eradicatethejustificationfor a subjectiveautono-
mous realmcultivatedby science and technologyand governed by the right
of self-protection, which might grow to rival the power of the state and
threatento bringaboutthe chaos of the stateof [Link] therewas a flaw,
a fateful flaw, in this project.A revival of the myths necessaryto instill this
fearfor the sake of creatingor strengtheningauthoritygives no realguarantee
of actually allaying that fear: it does not abolish the state of nature, but
perpetuatesit. It may not diminishthe role of technology in modem politics,
but rather serves to expand that role many times. This project was, as such
astute and learnedmen should have known, not the elimination,but rather,
potentially,the very institutionalizationand manufactureof chaos.

NOTES

1. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapterson The Concept of Sovereignty,trans.

George Schwab (Cambrdge: MIT Press, 1986), 34.
2. Leo Strauss, "On the Basis of Hobbes's Political Philosophy,"in What Is Political
Philosophy?and OtherStudies (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 178-9.
3. All referencesto Hobbes are from Leviathan,ed. RichardTuck (Cambridge:Cambrdge
UmversityPress, 1991). Book, chapter,and page citationsappearin parentheseswithinthe text.
4. This study differs from that of both Straussdisciple Heinnch Meier, Carl Schmitt,Leo
Strauss und "Der Begriffdes Politischen"(Stuttgart:J. B. MetzlerscheBuchhandlung,1988)
and Strauss critic John Gunnell, "Straussbefore Straussiamsm:The WeimarConversation,"
Reviewof Politics (Winter1990), in thatmy interestis primarilywith Schmittas participantand
with Hobbes as subjectof this "conversation."
5. The Conceptof the Political, [Link] (New Brunswick:RutgersUmversity
Press, 1976). References are to this edition, cited as CP within the text. Schmitt's thesis was
originallyput forthm an article of the same title in 1927.
6. The language of frend and enemy is quite prevalentin Leviathan,for instance: "when
either [a groupof people] have no common enemy, or he thatby one partis held for an enemy,
is by anotherpartheld for afrend, they must needs by the differenceof theirinterestsdissolve,
and fall again into a war among themselves"(II, 17, 119, emphasis added).
7. StephenHolmes objects to attemptsat softemnng Schmitt'spolitical theorythatpresentit
as Hobbesianratherthan as [Link] "CarlSchmitt:The Debility of Liberalism,"The
AnatomyofAntiliberalism(Cambridge,MA. HarvardUmversityPress, 1993), 41. Examplesof
such scholarshipare, in German,Helmut Rumpf's Carl Schmittund ThomasHobbes: Ideelle
Beziehungen und aktuelle Bedeutung mit einer Abhandlungiber: Die FriihschriftenCarl
Schmitts(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1972), and in English, David J. Levy, "The Relevance
646 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

of CarlSchmitt,"The Worldand I (March1987). Althoughthis strategyis indeedquestionable,

there is little doubtthat Hobbes had a profoundeffect on Schmitt'[Link]
influence does not make Schmitt'sthoughtany less extremebut, as this essay will show, does
highlightSchmitt'smajortheoretical-politicalobjectives.A reliableaccountof the relationship
can be foundin HerfnedMiinkler,"CarlSchmittundThomasHobbes,"Neue PolitischeLiteratur
29 (1984).
8. See Detlev Peukert,The WeimarRepublic:The Crisis of Classical Modernity,trans.
RichardDeveson (New York:Hill and Wang,1992).
9. This theme is developed more fully by Schmitt in "The Age of Neutralizationsand
Depoliticizations"(1929), [Link] John P. McCormick,Telos96 (Summer
1993). I do not concernmyself specifically with this essay here,becauseit does not deal directly
with the figureof ThomasHobbes. However,it is importantto pointout thatthis essay has been
mismterpretedas an endorsementof modern technology in many studies of Schmitt. Both
RichardWolinandJerryZ. Mullermisreadthe essay in this way, apparentlyunderthe influence
of Jeffrey Herf's faulty ReactionaryModernism:Technology,Culture,and Politics in Weimar
and the ThirdRetch (Cambrdge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984). None of these authors
make note of Schmitt'scriticismsof technologyin his early works such as TheodorDdublers
"Nordlicht" Drei Studieniiber die Elemente,den Geist unddie Akualitdtdes Werkes(Mumch:
Muller,1916), orRomischerKatholizismusundpolitischeForm(Hellerau:JakobHegner,1923).
For a criticism of Herf, see my "Introductionto Schmitt's 'The Age of Neutralizationsand
Depoliticizations,'" Telos96 (Summer1993).As thepresentstudydemonstrates,a criticalstance
towardtechnologyis maintaned by Schmittthroughouthis Weimarwritingsand even beyond.
See Wolin,"CarlSchmitt,PoliticalExistentialismandthe TotalState,"in The Termsof Cultural
Criticism(New York:ColumbiaUmversityPress, 1992), and "CarlSchmitt,The Conservative
Revolutionary:HabitusandThe Aestheticsof Horror,"Political Theory20, no. 3 (August 1992);
as well as Muller,"CarlSchmitt,Hans Freyerand the RadicalConservativeCritiqueof Liberal
Democracyin the WeimarRepublic,"Historyof Political Thought12, no. 4 (Winter1991). A
more accurateaccount of Schmitt'sattitudetowardtechnology can be found in G. L. Ulmen,
Politische Mehrwert:Eine Studieiiber Max Weberund Carl Schmitt(Weinheim:VCH Acta
Humamora,1991).
10. Pasquale Pasquino, "Hobbes: Natural Right, Absolutism, and Political Obligation"
(ApprochesCognitivesDu Social of the Centre-Nationalde la RechercheScientifique,Pans, no.
90158, September1990), 9.
11. Ibid.
12. See Eve Rosenhaft, "Working-ClassLife and Working-ClassPolitics: Commumsts,
Nazis, and the StateBattle for the Streetsof Berlin 1928-1932,"in Social Changeand Political
Developmentin WeimarGermany,eds. RichardBessel and E. J. Feuchtwanger(New York:
Barnesand Noble, 1981), 207-40, for a compellingaccountof this state of affairs.
13. PasqualePasquino,"Hobbeson the NaturalConditionof Mankind"(part1 of the English
manuscriptof "ThomasHobbes: la rationalit6de L'obeissancea la loi, La pensde politique,"
Spnng 1994), 3. Setting aside the view thatthe state of natureis a mere intellectualenterprise,
Pasquinoprefersto employ the termsubtractionto describeit ratherthanabstraction,because
the stateof natureis for Hobbesa strippingaway fromtheempmcalworldratherthanthe product
of imagination.
14. [Link] of coursethe famouspassagewhereHobbesassertshow close the "natural
condition"really is to contemporaryrealityby remindinghis readersthatthey arm themselves
when traveling,bolt theirdoors at night, and lock theirchests even when at home (I, 13, 89).
15. Ibid.,6.
 McCormick/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 647

16. RichardWolin, The Termsof CulturalCriticism,87; "CarlSchmitt, The Conservative

Revolutionary,"443.
17. George Schwab declares, "Nowherein [Schmitt's]writings can one detect a desire on
his part to perpetuatecrises as a means of escaping the tediousness of everyday bourgeois
existence" (The Challenge of The Exception[New York:GreenwoodRepnnt, 1989], 55).
18. Political Romanticism,[Link] Oakes (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1985), 125.
19. See Horkhelmerand Adorno,Dialectic of Enlightenment(1944), [Link]
(New York:Continuum,1989);Casslrer,TheMythof theState(New Haven,CT:YaleUmversity
Press, 1946); Symbol, Myth and Culture:Essays and Lectures, 1935-1945, ed. Donald Philip
Verene(New Haven, CT:Yale UniversityPress, 1979); and Blumenberg,WorkOn Myth,trans.
RobertWallace(Cambridge,MA. MIT Press, 1989). See also, "Mythin ContemporaryLife," a
special issue of Social Research 52, no. 2 (Summer 1985), particularlythe contributionsof
Sheldon Wolin, David Apter,GianmVattimo,and UmbertoEco.
20. Leo Strauss's"Anmerkungenzu Carl Schmitt,Der Begriff des Politischen"was ongi-
nally publishedin ArchivfiirSozialwissenschaftundSozialpolitik67, no. 6, 732-49. An English
translation,"Commentson CarlSchmitt'sBegriffdes Politischen,"by E. M. Sinclairappearsin
the Englisheditionof The Conceptof the Political cited above. I will cite Strauss'sessay as CCP
in the body of the text.
21. Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York:Schocken,
1965), 92.
22. Several years later, in 1939, Walter Benjamin observed that one of the effects of
technology-which Schmittand Straussin these works associateexplicitly with liberalism-is
to rendera person "no longer capable of telling his provenfnend from his mortalenemy" ("On
Some Motifs in Baudelaire,"in Illuminations,ed. HannahArendt[New York:Schocken, 1968],
168). WhetherBenjamin,who was quite familiarwith Schmitt'swork,is hereexplicitly alluding
to the political is not clear.
23. Strauss,Spinoza'sCritiqueof Religion, 88.
24. Ibid., 89-92.
25. Strauss'sassessment thatSchmitt'sprojectremains"withinthe horizonof liberalism"is
sometimes exaggeratedin an attemptto defend Schmitt'sWeimarwork from chargesof latent
Nazism. Yet just because Schmitt's work is not latently Nazi, does not mean that it is not
authoritarian or [Link]'scommentscan be seen to emphasizethe pointthatSchmitt's
theoreticalshortcomingsin his attackon liberalismare not for lack of trying;the intentand the
[Link] ChantalMouffemorereasonablyexplains,"itis incorrectto assert,
as some do, that Schmitt'sthinkingwas imbuedwith Nazism before his turnaboutof 1933 and
his espousal of Hitler's [Link] is, however,no doubtthatit was his deep hostility to
liberalismwhich made possible, or which did not prevent,his joimng the Nazis" (Mouffe, The
Returnof the Political [London:Verso, 1993], 121). Straussis, of course, correctin observing
thatSchmittis caughtin the thrallof the liberalismhe is [Link] RichardWolinpoints out,
Schmitt'semphasis on self-preservationin The Conceptof the Political leaves him susceptible
to some of the same charges leveled against liberalismitself: "In Schmitt'spolitical theorywe
tradethe 'good life' for 'mere life' " (The Termsof CulturalCriticism,99).
26. See Meier, Carl Schmitt,Leo Strauss und "Der Begriffdes Politischen," 134-5, 137-9.
Despite the fact thatSchmittjoined the NationalSocialist Partyin May of 1933, as late as July
of thatyear,Strausswas still seeking a correspondencewith Schmittaboutthe prospectof aiding
in the compilationof a criticaledition of Hobbes's work (Meier,Carl Schmitt,Leo Strauss und
"DerBegriffdes Politischen,"17, n. 11). See also PaulEdwardGottfned, CarlSchmitt:Politics
and Theory(New York:Greenwood, 1990).
648 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

27. Citations are from the 1952, University of Chicago Press edition, titled in full, The
Political Philosophyof Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis, abbreviatedas PPH in the text.
28. Strauss's interpretationis characteristicallyin opposition to that of the "Cambridge
School"of the historyof [Link]
"Men,on Hobbes'saccount,do not want to harmothermen for the sake of harrmngthem;they
wish forpowerover themit is true,butpoweronly to securetheirown [Link] common
idea that Hobbes was in some sense 'pessimistic'abouthumannatureis wide of the mark,for
his naturalmen were in prnciple stand-offishtowardsone anotherratherthan inherently
belligerent"(Hobbes [Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1989], 55). Tuck ignores the fact that
Hobbes explicitly states that some persons "takepleasure" in exercising power over others
"fartherthantheirsecurityrequires"(1, 13, 88). Witnessthe precedentto this conflict between
the "Straussian" and"Cambridge" interpretationsof apoliticaltheorist:compareStrauss'soverly
slmsterinterpretationof Machiavelli'spoliticsin Thoughtson Machiavelli(Chicago:Umversity
of Chicago Press, 1958) with QuentinSkinner'sunnecessarilytepid one in The Foundationsof
ModernPolitical Thought(Cambridge:CambridgeUmversityPress, 1978, 2 vols.). Surely the
temperamentsof the greatestfiguresof Westernpoliticalthoughtcan be said to fall somewhere
between the sadistic nihilism and the genteel detachmentthat these two schools consistently
attemptto impose on them in theirrespectiveinterpretations.
29. In 1958, when ReinhartKoselleckdiscussestherole of fearin Hobbes'spoliticalthought,
it is Strauss'swork thathe cites. See Critiqueand Crisis: Enlightenmentand the Pathogenesis
of ModernSociety(Cambridge,MA. MIT Press, 1988), 24.
30. JurgenHabermasobserves with a certaindegree of accuracy that "above all it is the
aestheticsof violence thatfascinates[Schmitt]"(TheNew Conservatism[Cambridge,MA. MIT
Press, 1988], 137). As we can see, any fascinationon Schmitt'spartwith violence is rathermild
in comparisonwith thatof the young Strausson Hobbes.
31. Strausshereexemplifies morefully thanSchmittthe "politicalexistentialism"thatWolin
identifies as characteristicof Weimarintellectuals:"the devaluationof all traditionalvalues
meantthathumanexistence,in its brutefacticity,becamea value in andof itself-the only value
thatremained,as it were. By emphasizingthe bruteprimacyof humanexistence, denuded
of all supportingvalue structures,thereseems to be only one certaintyleft in life: theinevitability
of death. [the]existentialculminationof life itself' (The Termsof CulturalCriticism,86-7).
Obviouslyembarrassedby these ratherextremesentimentsexpressedin his youthfulwritings-
particularlyin lightof histoncalevents-Strauss latercriticizedthis fascinationwith the "abyss"
thatdominatedWeimarintellectualdebates:"Thecontroversycan easily degenerateinto a race
in which he wins who offers the smallestsecurityandthe [Link] would not be difficult
to guess who would be the [Link] as an assertiondoes not become true because it is
shown to be comforting, so it does not become true because it is shown to be terrifying"
(quoted in the so-called AutobiographicalPreface, which was added to the English edition
of Spinoza's Critiqueof Religion, 11). Straussis not so forthright,however,in admittingthathe
himself tookpartin a theoreticalprojectthatsoughtto offer "thesmallestsecurityandthe greatest
terror."
32. It is interestingthatthe two historiansof modem mythwho do deal with Hobbes at all,
Cassirerand Blumenberg(cited above), focus solely on the myth of the state of natureand not
thatof the Leviathan.
33. StephenHolmes, "Introduction," in ThomasHobbes,Behemoth(Chicago:Umversityof
Chlcago Press, 1991), xi.
34. Of course, Schmittwas alreadyno strangerto the issue of myth. In the last chapterof his
1923 book on representativegovernment,afterhavingundressedtheparagonof Westernrational
politics, the Europeanparliament,Schmittspeaksambiguouslyaboutthe politics of "myth" see
 McCormick/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 649

"IrrationalistTheoriesof the Direct Use of Force"in The Crisis of ParliamentaryDemocracy,

[Link] Kennedy(Cambrdge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
35. Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn and Fehlschlag elnes
politischen Symbols(Hamburg:HanseatischeVerlagsaostalt,1938). I will cite the most recent
edition (Koln: Klett-Cotta,1982) as L. The English renderngs are from the translationof the
work by George Schwab forthcomingfrom GreenwoodPress.
36. For more detailed accounts of Schmitt's involvement with National Socialism, see
Schwab, TheChallengeof The Exception,andJosephBendersky,Carl Schmitt:Theorstfor the
Reich (Pnnceton:Pnnceton Unversity Press, 1983).
37. Strausstoo gave up the attemptto divorce the "human"from the "scientific"Hobbes in
his later treatmentof the philosopherin Natural Right and History (Chicago: Umversity of
ChicagoPress, 1953);in fact, Strausscomes to portrayHobbesas the bearerof thelatterformally
profaneelement, "Theman who was the first to draw the consequences for naturalrightfrom
this momentouschange [the emergence of modem science, of nonteleologicalnaturalscience]
was Thomas Hobbes. To Hobbes we must turn if we desire to understandthe specific
characterof modemnaturalright"(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1971), 166, also 170-4.
38. In his treatmentof Schmitt'sLeviathan,Holmes focuses moreextensively on the vtrulent
anti-Semitismexpressedin the book, particularlySchmitt'sprofesseddisgustat Hobbes'schoice
of mythic symbol: a monsterfrom the Jewish tradition(The Anatomyof Antiliberalism,50-3).
WhetherSchmittwas an anti-Semitebeforejoining the party-a claim madeby JohnHerz, and
more forcefully,RichardWolin-is morecontroversial:see Herz,"Lookingat CarlSchmittfrom
the VantagePoint of the 1990s," Interpretation19, no. 3 (Spnng 1992); Wolin, The Termsof
CulturalCriticism.A recentGermanarticlethatmakessuch an argumentis RaphaelGross,"Carl
Schmitts 'Nomos' und die 'Juden,' " Merkur47, no. 5 (May 1993). In the introductionto his
forthcoming translationof Schmitt's Leviathan book, George Schwab argues that the anti-
Semitism that Schmittexpressed underNationalSocialism was purelyopportumstic.
39. Koselleck, Critiqueand Crisis, 38-9.
40. Again Koselleck sheds light on this relationshipbetween mechanisticcommand and
empty law:

Reason thuscreatesa neutralzone of State "technology"in which thereis no law but the
prnnce'swill. In such a State only the formal legality of the laws is rational,not their
content; therefore the formal commandmentof political morality to obey the laws
regardlessof theircontentis [Link] State is not only a mortalGod; it becomes
an automaton,the great machine, and the laws are the levers moved by the sovereign's
absolute will, in orderto keep the state machineryrunning.(Ibid., 33)

41. PasqualePasquino,"Hobbeson the Legal Conditionin the Commonwealth"(part2 of

the English manuscriptof "ThomasHobbes:la rationalit6de L'obeissancea la loi"), 13.
42. Note Schmitt's distinctionbetween a "totalquantitativestate"and a "total qualitative
state"in "Weiterentwicklungdes totalen Staats in Deutschland"(January1933), in Positionen
und Begriffe im Kampfmit Weimar-Genf-Versailles: 1923-1939 (Hamburg:Hanseatische
Verlagsanstalt,1940). This distinctionis overlooked in many new left accounts of Schmitt. In
addition to Wolin, The Termsof Cultural Criticism, see John Keane, "Dictatorshipand the
Decline of Parliament:CarlSchmitt'sTheoryof PoliticalSovereignty"in Democracyand Civil
Society (London: Verso, 1988). A post-Marxist treatmentof Schmitt, which does in fact
demonstratemoresensitivityto the distinctionbetweenthequantitativeandqualitativetotalstate
is Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory(Cambridge,MA: MIT
Press, 1992), 204, 237, 239.
650 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

43. Der Hiiterder Verfassung(Tiibmgen:Verlagvon J. C. B. Mohr[PaulSiebeck], 1931),73.

44. "Staatsethikund pluralistisherStaat"(1930), in Positionenund Begriffe,28-9.
45. Hans Kelsen, "Wer soil der Huter der Verfassung seln?" Die Justiz 6 (1930/31),
1917-8.
46. See Hobbes, "A Review, and Conclusion,"in Leviathan,as well as QuentinSkinner,
"Conquestand Consent:Thomas Hobbes and the EngagementControversy,"in The Interreg-
num,ed. G. E. Aylmer(London:Macmillan,1972), on the datingof the book.
47. As PerryAndersonnghtly observes regardingboth Schmitt'sand Michael Oakeshott's
views of Hobbes: "It would be difficult to thunkof a more incongruousauthorityfor any
'non-instrumental' understandingof the [Link] civil associationbetweenindividu-
als in Leviathanis supremelyan 'instrument'to securecommonends-the aims of securityand
prosperity,'mutualpeace' and 'commodiousliving' " ("TheIntransigentRightat the Endof the
Century,"LondonReviewof Books, 9/24/92, 7, emphasisadded).
48. TheSecond Treatiseon Government,2, ? 13, 19-27.
49. On the subjectof Schmitt'sprecariouspositionin the Reich afterhis fall fromfavorwith
the regime,see Bendersky,Carl Schmitt:Theoristforthe Reich, 263-4; Schwab, TheChallenge
of the Exception,142.
50. "DasKunstwerkim ZeitalterseinertechmschenReproduzierbarkeit," orginally publish-
ed in ZeitschriftfiirSozialforschung5, no. 1, 1936. Translatedby HarryZohn as "TheWorkof
Art in the Age of MechamcalReproduction,"in Illuminations,241.
51. In her recentarticleon Benjamnn's"Artwork"essay, Susan Buck-Morssrecountshow
in 1932 Hitlerrehearsedhis facial expressions in frontof a mirrorunderthe supervisionof an
opera singer. Buck-Morss compares photographsof Hitler's subsequentspeeches with psy-
chopictonalstudiesof faces expressingdifferentemotionalstates. Whatshe finds, surprisingly,
is thatHitler'sexpressionscorrespond,not to representationsof aggression,anger,or rage, but
ratherto depictionsof fear andpain ("Aestheticsand Anaesthetics:WalterBenjamin'sArtwork
Essay Reconsidered,"October62 [Fall 1992], 39-40). Thusthe fearof violentdeaththatSchmitt
and Strausswished to revive, divorced from the influence of technology,was already being
communicatedtechmcallyand mechamcallythroughloudspeakers,newsreels,motionpictures,
photographs,and [Link] a divorce was alreadyunlikely.
52. Ibid.,22-3.
53. Hobbes writes:

Nature(the Art wherebyGod hathmade and govemes the World)is by the Art of man,
as in many other things, so in this also imitated,that it can make an ArtificialAnimal.
For seeing life is but a motionof Limbs,the begimngwhereof is in some pnncipallpart
withln;why may we not say, thatall Automata(Enginesthatmove themselvesby springs
and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiallife? . Art goes yet further,imitating
thatRationalland most excellent worke of Nature,[Link] Art is createdthatgreat
LEVIATHANcalled a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE,(in LatineCIVITAS),which is
but an ArtificiallMan. ("TheIntroduction,"9)

54. According to Buck-Morss, phantasmagoriahave "the effect of anaesthetizing the

organism,not throughnumbing,but throughfloodingthe senses. These simulatedsensona alter
consciousness,muchlike a drug,but they do so throughsensorydistractionratherthanchemical
alteration,and-most significantly-their effects are experiencedcollectively ratherthanindi-
vidually"(ibid.). We must not forget that Hobbes intendedhis automaton,his man-monster-
machine to be a "visible Power to keep them in awe" (2, 17, 117, emphasis added)-in other
words, a sense-induceddistractionof the masses.
 McCormick/ FEAR,TECHNOLOGY,AND THE STATE 651

55. See particularlythe first two essays of Dialectic of Enlightenment,'The Concept of

Enlightenment,"and"Odysseusor MythandEnlightenment."AlthoughBlumenbergrecogmnzes
the intrnslc relationshipbetween mythandenlightenmentrationalityin Workon Myth,Cassirer,
a renowned Kantian, insists on their distinction. However, Cassirer comes very close to
acknowledgingthe "dialecticof enlightenment"when he remarkson the "strategic,""techncal,"
and "artificial"qualityof myth in relationshipto modemtechnologyand politics-what he calls
"thetechmqueof political myth"(Symbol,Mythand Culture,235-7).
56. As we have seen, Benjaminclaimedthat,"Alleffortsto renderpoliticsaestheticculminate
In one thing:war."And as MichaelGeyer rermndsus, in termsthatrecall Benjamunand Schmitt,
war was indeed the essence of NationalSocialism:

The direction of the Third Reich was toward war. War was essential to regain the
"autonomyof the political" and to recenter the stage by giving politics at least the
appearanceof purposefulandunifiedactionwhichit otherwiselacks. In the counterrevo-
lutionaryThirdReich, war,victorous war,was meantto achieve [Link]
only happenedto be Hitler's main and ultimategoal in the creationof a new German
society, it also made the ThirdReich an "exceptionalstate."Warpermitsthe "autonomy
of the political"to reach its extreme in the age of [Link] an "exceptionalstate"
war is neithersimply the predatoryinstinctof special interests,nor the manifestationof
atavistic [Link],war is foughtto createand recreateand society and a state
which "habituallylives on war.""Warrecentersstateandsociety in combat,dormnation,
and directexploitation"('The Statein NationalSocialistGermany,"in Statemakingand
Social Movements:Essays in Historyand Theory,eds. CharlesBrightandSusanHarding
[Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress, 1984], 198).

I have questionedwhetheror not Schmittintentionallyadvocatedwarin the mannerthatboth

Benjaminand Geyer describe it. I have arguedagainstWolin that, in 1933, Schmitt sought to
overcome the state of nature,the friend/enemydistinction,in domestic politics so thatthe state
could take partin these in the realmwhere,accordingto Schmitt,they could neverbe overcome,
the realm of internationalrelations. Thus, for Schmitt, war had to be suppressedat home to
preparefor it [Link] Socialism defies Schmitt'sown "conceptof the political"by as
vigorously making war at home as on foreign soil-by maintaimng,in Geyer's words, "an
escalating system of domestic terrorand violence abroad"("TheStigma of Violence: National-
ism and War in TwentiethCentury Germany,"German Studies Review [Winter 1992], 97).
Nevertheless, the fear that Schmitt sought to inspire throughthe aestheticizationof conflict
regardingthe political,contributedto the aesthetizationof warthatwould not only manifestitself
externally, but internally as well. Wolin is right to invoke Benjamin against Schmitt at the
conclusionof "CarlSchmitt,theConservativeRevolutionary," but notbecause Schmittendorsed
"violence for violence's sake"(443), butratherbecauseSchmittdid not understand,as Benjamin
did, what Buck-Morss calls "the modem constellationof aesthetics, politics, and war"("Aes-
thetics and Anaesthetics,"9). What purpose does it serve-except perhaps some aesthetic
one-to demomze Schmitt without correctly understandinghim? That Schmittdeserves to be
takento taskin an informedmannerforbothhis misconceivedunderminingof Weimarliberalism
and his subsequentpolitical affiliationshould be clear from the exposition of this article.
57. Behemoth:The Structureand Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944 (New York:
Harper& Row, 1944), xii.
58. "AutoblographicalPreface,"Spinoza'sCritiqueof Religion, 30.
59. In a review of Heinnch Meier's book on Schmittand Strauss,Paul Gottfrieddescribes
how Strauss'sfollowers attemptto artificiallyseparateStrauss'sWeimarviews from those of
652 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1994

Schmitt(Telos96 [Summer1993]). Yet certainadmirersof Straussreveal more thanothers on

this point and even leave open the questionof how much-if at all-Strauss changedhis mind
[Link] VolkerRelnecke and JonathanUhlanerremark:"LeavingEuropebehind,
Straussbegan to rearrangehis [Link] abandonednone of the positions
with which he hadworkedfor over a decade,buttransformedtheircoordination"("TheProblem
of Leo Strauss:Religion, Philosophyand Politics,"GraduateFaculty PhilosophyJournal 16,
no. 1 [1992], 196). Thereis of course the assessmentof young Strauss'spoliticalpredilections
thatHannahArendtconveyed to her biographer:see ElisabethYoung-Bruehl,HannahArendt:
For Love of the World(New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1982). The most thoroughaccount
of Strauss'sthoughtas a whole is ShadiaDrury'sThePolitical Ideas of Leo Strauss(New York:
St. Martin,1988).
60. On Benjamin'sabortedattemptto escape the Nazis andhis subsequentsuicide, see Susan
Buck-Morss,The Originof NegativeDialectics: [Link], WalterBenjamin,and the
FrankfurtInstitute(New York:Free Press, 1977), 162-3.
61. Bendersky,Carl Schmitt:Theoristfor the Reich, 204.
62. Ibid., 230-42.
63. In his later years, Schmitt would seemingly deny, yet actually affirm, his self-under-
standingas a moder Hobbes:a controversialtheorst, denouncedin his own time,butinfluential
for centures to come. As G. L. Ulmen recounts:

Some yearsbeforehis death,Schmittwroteto me that"Iam no Hobbes,but,like Hobbes,

I am a 'sole retrieverof an ancientprudence.'" He was refernngto his charactenzation
of Hobbesin his 1938 book where he laudedhis prototypeas "thereal teacherof a great
political expenence; alone, like every pioneer;misunderstood,like one whose political
ideas are unrealizedamong his own people; unrewarded,like one who opens a door
which anothercan go through;and yet, in the undyingcommunityof great men who
know theirtimes, 'a sole retrieverof an ancientprudence.'Over the centurieswe call to
him:Nonjamfrustradoces, ThomasHobbes!"("AnthropologicalTheology/Theological
Anthropology,"Telos93 (Fall 1992), 73, (n. 14)

John P McCormickrecentlycompleteda doctoraldissertationtitled "AgainstPolitics

as Technology:Carl Schmitt'sCritiqueof Liberalism"in the Departmentof Political
Science at the Universityof Chicago. He has taughtpolitical theoryin the college and
in continuingstudies at the universityand has publishedpieces on Machiavelli in the
AmericanPolitical Science Review and on Schmittin Telos. He is spending 1994-95
conductingpostdoctoralresearchin Germanyas a FulbrightFellow at the Universitdt
Bremen.