Hobbesian Fear

Author(s): Jan H. Blits

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 417-431
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 HOBBESIAN FEAR

JANH. BLITS
Uniier-sity
of'Dehlaware

M ORE THAN ANY OTHER PHILOSOPHER, ThomasHobbesem-

phasizesthedetermining poweroffear.Fear,according toHobbes,suffuses
andshapeshumanlife.Itpervadesthestateofnature, ofwhosemanymiseries
the"worstof all [is] continualfear,and thedangerof violentdeath."'It is
boththesole originof civil society("theoriginalof all greatand lasting
societiesconsistednotinthemutualgoodwillmenhadtowardseachother,
butin themutualfeartheyhadofeach other")'andtheonlyreliablemeans
of itspreservation("duringthetimemenlive without a commonpowerto
keepthemall inawe,theyareinthatcondition whichis calledwar,as is of
everyman,againsteveryman.")3Atoncetheprincipal causeofwarandthe
principalmeansto peace,fearis thebasisbothof man'smosturgent plight
andofhisonlypossibleescape.
WhiletheroleoffearinHobbes'spoliticalphilosophy hasreceivedclose
scrutinyin recentyears,thecommonandunquestioned assumption among
virtuallyall contemporary scholarsis thatHobbes considersthe fearof
violentdeathman'sprimary fearandthemostpowerful forceinhumanlife.5
Scholarsassume,inotherwords,thatthepoliticallevelis thedeepeststratum
of Hobbesianfear.This prevailingassumption goes back to Rousseau's
criticismofHobbes.According toRousseau,eventhough Hobbesdeniesthat
manis naturally social,Hobbes'snaturalmanis characterized byqualities
producedbysocietyrather thanbynature.In additionto possessingreason
and foresight,theHobbesianmanis drivenbypride,and,aboveall,bythe
fearofothermen.He livesinconstant fearforhislifebecausehe is bloated
withunnatural passions,includingpride,whichcause mento invadeone
another.The protobourgeois, he lives entirely
outsidehimself, livingfor
himselfbutthrough others.Thus,in contrastto Rousseau'sself-sufficient,
inner-directed,naturalman(forwhomthiscriticism of Hobbesis meantto
preparetheway), theHobbesianman lacks inwardness or depth.He is

POLITICAL THEORY,Vol. 17 No. 3, August1989417-431

C) 1989Sage Publications,
Inc.

417

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418 POLITICALTHEORY/AUGUST 1989

thanpsychological
politicalrather in themodernsensethatRousseaugives
to thatterm.Because the fundamental factof his life is notsomething
radicallyinternalorprivate,butrather theoutwardstruggle withothermen
thatHobbes mistakenly calls "the stateof nature,"the fearof violent
death-thefearofothermen-is thedeepeststratum inhissoul."
Rousseauis perfectly correctindenying thetruesolitudeoftheHobbesian
man,butheis fundamentally mistaken ormisleading inclaiming thatthefear
of violentdeathis primary in Hobbes'sview.As we shallsee, Hobbes's
accountofmanandhissituation intheworlddoesnotbeginwith"thestate
ofnature," thatis,man'srelation toothermen,butrather withhisrelationto
thenatural world.Forthisreason,themostbasicfearinHobbes'saccountis
notthefearofothermen,northefearofGod orofspirits, buta deeper,more
radicalfearthatprecedesandunderlies thosetwofears.Prepoliticalinevery
senseof theterm,man'sdeepestinsecurity arisesnotfromwhatmencan
knowofone another, butfromwhattheycannotknowofthenatural world.
A condition for,rather thana consequenceof,man'suniversal enmity and
war,itstemsfromtheinherent ofman'snatural
limitations cognition.As we
shallsee by starting withHobbes'scritiqueofsensation, Hobbesianfearis
bestunderstood as a primal,indeterminate fearoftheunknown.

SENSATION

According to Hobbes,we haveno directaccessto,or immediate appre-

hensionof, theexternalworld.Thereis no correspondance betweenour
conception of thingsand thethingsthemselves. Everyconception thatwe
orappearanceofsomequalityorotheraccidentof
haveis "a represenitation
a bodywithout us whichis calledanobject."Thisrepresentationis whatwe
call ourconceptorknowledge anditsoriginlies insense,"for
ofthething,
thereis no conceptionin a man'smindwhichhathnotatfirst, orby
totally,
parts,been begottenupon the organs of sense."7 Hobbes does not mean,
however,thatthe "representation" of qualitiesthat
is a re-presentation
thereis no resemblance
actuallyresidein theobjectitself.On thecontrary,
betweenthesensationand its object.Whatis represented to themindis
presentonlyinthemind.Ithasnoexistenceintheexternal world."Thereis
nothingwithout orcolor."8Senseis mere
us (really)whichwe callan imnage
seeming,mereappearance."[T]he appearanceto us is fancy,the same
waking,thatdreaming."9 Whatactuallyexistsintheexternalobjectis notthe
sensiblequalitywe imagine(exceptmagnitudeand shape),but simply
motion."Wh7atsoeveraccidenztsor qualities our senses make us thinkthere

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 BlitsI HOBBESIAN FEAR 419

be intheworld,theyaretiotthere, butareseeminigandappar-itionis only;the

thingsthatreallyare in theworldwithout us, are thosemotionsbywhich
theseseemings arecaused."I"Allourknowledge oftheexternal worldderives
originallyfromsense,yetsensedeceivesus fundamentally aboutthenature
of theworldbymakingus thinkthatqualitiesthathaveno existenceapart
from ourimagination Itpaintstheworldwithsensible
existintheworlditself.
qualitiesof itsown making.Furthermore, whilecoloringtheworld,sense
also concealswhatitappearstoreveal.Whileitmakesus think thatsensory
experience givesus directaccessto theworldaroundus,itactuallycutsus
offfromtheoutsideworld.Limitedto thedeceptivcsurfaceof things,it
closes us up withinourselves,hidingwhattrulyexistsbehinda screenof
representation.
Contrary towhatsensetellsus,theworldliterally lieshiddenindarkness.
Sensoryexperience is thetrueKingdomof Darkness. Lightitself,likecolors,
sounds,tastes,smells,andothersensiblequalities,is nothing buta "fancy,"
an "apparition." Indeed,farfrombeingan exception, lightis theparadigm
case of sensiblequalitiesas merephantasms."Settingforthits nature,
Hobbesexplains:

Upon every great agitationl or concussion of the braini(as happeneth froma stroke,
especiallyifthestrokebe upontheeye) wherebytheopticnervesuffereth anygreat
violence,thereappearethbeforetheeyes a certainlight,whichis itothinlg
wit/iota,but
an apparitiononly,all thatis realbeingtheconcussionor motionof thepartsof that
nerve;from whichexperience wemavconclude,thatapparitionoflightis rieally
nlothing
but motion within.'2

The sundoes notlighttheworld.Nothing does.Whatappearstobe light

is nodifferent
from whatwe see whenoureyeis rubbedorpressedhard.The
phenomenon oflightis merely anepiphenomenon accompanying physiolog-
ical motionswithinour senseorgans.The worldis utterly dark.It is not
invisibleonlyto us, itis notevenvisualin itself.Sightis a delusion.Man
onlythinks thathe can see.
Hobbes'scritiqueof sensationis directedchieflyagainstAristotle's ac-
count.ForAristotle, sightis notonlyman'shighest sense,butthemodelfor
all thesenses(even smellshave "forms").Sight,he argues,is themost
synopticsense,offering us a simultaneouswholealongwithan articulation
of thepartswithinthewhole.Whilebothtouchand sightdeal withthings
themselvesratherthanmerelywiththeirattributes, sightalone presents
thingsas theyareintheirverynature, independent ofhowtheyaffect orare
affectedbyus. Itis atoncethemostdetachedandthemostdiscriminating of
oursenses." ForHobbes,in contrast, all thesensesarereducibleto,or are

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420 POLITICALTHEORY/AUGUST 1989

kindsof, touch.'4Accordingto Hobbes.we cannotknowsomething by

disinterestedlyobserving itsform, butonlybyinvoluntarily experiencing its
resistance."Inall senseofexternal thingsthereis mutualactionandreaction,
thatis,twoendeavours opposingoneanother."'' Touch,themostcausaland
theleastdetachedof thesenses,involvesnotonlythecontiguity of two
bodies,oreventhetransmission ofpressure fromonetotheother, but,most
of all, themutualresistance of twobodies.In theact of touching thereis
mutualactionand reaction.The subjectand objectbothreceiveand apply
pressure.Each resiststhe other'sforcewitha forceof its own. Touch
therefore involvesboththeexperience and theexerciseof force.We know
something onlybyfeelingitsresistance toourforceor,whatamounts tothe
same,byfeeling ourresistance toitsforce.Thebalanceofforcesbothreveals
anddetermines thereality ofthings."'
Thisis true,furthermore, of therealityof theknowerhimself. Justas a
personcancometoknowan external objectonlybyresisting andhindering
theeffects ofitsforceonhim,so hecancometoknowhimself onlybyfeeling
theeffort he needsto maketo resistor overcometheforceof an external
body.The twoactsofdiscovery are,infact,notonlysimilar, butoneandthe
same.I cannotdiscoverthereality ofan external objectwithout atthesame
timefeelingmyown,andI cannotcometodiscovermyownreality without
at thesametimefeelingthatofan external body.Evenas sensecutsmeoff
frommyenvironment, it makesme completely dependent on myenviron-
mentforknowing whoor whatI am. It is on thisprimary levelandin this
basicsensethatRousseau'scriticism ofHobbesringstrue.'7
If manis blind,natureis dumb.Nature,consisting of matter in aimless
motion, doesnotexplainitself, doesnotanswerourquestions. Ruledbyforce
rather thanbyreason,itresistsourinquiries justas we resistitsmotion. The
fundamental relationbetweenman and theworldis thusone of mutual
resistance.Sense,however, concealsthisfactas itmakesusthink thatwe are
naturally receptive tosensory qualitiesexistingoutsideus. Itdeceivesus as
toourbasicrelation totheworldas itprojectsitsownfanciesontotheworld,
whichitthennaivelytakesbackas iftheyweresimplytheappearancesof
thingsthemselves. Placingus in a dreamworld ofappearances, itmakesus
theprisoners of our own creations.Sense does thispreciselybecause it
staunchly resiststheworld.Our"brainandheart"resisteverything foreign.
Sensiblequalitiesappearto residein theobjectsthatcause them,Hobbes
explains,becausethemotionoriginating in theobject,transmitted via the
nerves,membranes, andso on,"inwardtothebrainandheart,causesthere
a resistance,orcounter-pressure, orendeavour of thehearttodeliveritself,
whichendeavour, becauseouitward, seemsto be some matter without."'8

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 Blits/HOBBESIAN FEAR 421

Whatcausesus to thinkthatwe receivesensiblequalitiesis notthatin the

actofsensingwereceiveaninwardmotion fromanexternal object,butrather
thattheinwardmotionthatwe receivesetsup a resistance orcountermotion
whoseoutward directiongivesus theimpression ofoutwardness. Ourappar-
entreceptivitytotheworldis,paradoxically, theresult
ofouractualresistance
toit.We thinkwe areopentotheworldonlybecausewe areactuallyclosed
to it. Epitomizingtheparadoxicalqualityof our relationto theworld,the
sensoryworld'sapparentoutwardness reflectsnothingbut the outward
directionof our own self-assertiveness. If whatallows us to distinguish
betweenourfancies(including ourdreaming) andtheworldis thattheworld
resistsus,whatcausesus to confusethemis thatwe resisttheworld.
Hobbes'scritiqueofsensory experience robsmanofhisplaceintheworld.
It leaves himhomeless.Even as Hobbesincludesthestudyof manin the
studyof nature-evenas he makeshismechanistic psychology theleading
partofhismaterialisticphysics-thecrucialimplication ofthatincorporation
is thatmanbecomesexcludedfromtheworldofwhichhe was traditionally
considereda part.The worldto whichman traditionally belongednow
becomessomething alienandopposedtohim.Mancanknowtheworldonly
through experience;yetas an experiencing creaturehe is isolatedfromthe
world.Cutoffbyhisownpowersofperception, he literallyloses hisplace
in theworld.Place becomesa mere"apparition," "the fancyof hereor
there.""'Itsstatusbecomesthesameas thatofcolorsandsounds.Whatwe
normallythinkof as space becomes"imaginary space," whilea body's
magnitude orextension is nowseenas "realspace."-""[P1/aceis nothing out
ofthemind,norniagniitmtde anythingwithinit.""'Space thusceasesto be a
frameof reference forour lives,to give us orientation, to provideour
activitieswithstartingpoints,goals,ordirections. Itbecomesindifferent to
ourcomingandgoing,leavingthelocationof ourexistencenotonlyinde-
terminate, butundefinable as ourplaceintheworldbecomestransmogrified
intoour"situation."22Thisis themeaning ofHobbes'sreduction ofnatureto
matterin ceaseless,aimlessmotion.23Hobbes'smonisticclaimthatto be
meanstobe a bodyprovesintheendnottointegrate manintonature, butto
separatehimfromtheworld.

FEAR

In Hobbes'sview,nature, likeman,is essentially

reactive.All thatexists
arebodies."Everypartoftheuniverse, is body,andthatwhichis notbody
is no partof theuniverse:andbecausetheuniverseis all, thatwhichis no

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422 POLITICALTHEORY /AUGUST 1989

partofit,is nothing."'24Butnobodycan moveorgovernitself.All changeis

motion, andthecauseofall motionis motion.Everything is movedoraltered
fromwithout.Everything, therefore,is in constantmotion.The worldis
literally
restless. As nothinghasa natural endorresting place,thedistinction
betweenmotionand restis replacedbythedistinction betweencontinuous
andaccelerated motion.Whatwe call restis nottheopposite(letalone,the
culmination) of motion,but merelyone typeof unaccelerated motion,
qualitatively indistinguishablefromthecontinuous motionofan unopposed
body.Cause andeffect thusbecomevirtually one andthesame.As nothing
hasa natural tendency, no particulareffectis an endinitself.Everyeffect is
merelya linkin an endlesschainof events-one momentin a continuing
processofcauseandeffect. Everyeffect is as mucha causeofa subsequent
effectas theeffect ofa previouscause;andeverycauseis as muchtheeffect
of a previouscause as thecause of subsequent effect. Cause andeffectare
strictlynecessary.The cause of an effectis thesum or aggregateof all
accidents,intheagentandpatienttogether, whicharenecessary toproduce
theeffect.Thatis,ifall theaccidentsexist,theeffect mustbe produced;but
ifanyoneofthemis absent,theeffect cannotoccur.2Justas therecanbe no
effectwithout a cause,so therecan be no cause without an effect.
To be a
causemeanstobea bodyinmotion, thatis,tohavethepowertodosomething
to anotherbody.Thereis no such thingas potentiality. and
"Potentiality
power[are]all one."" To be a cause means,then,notonlytobe a poweror
to havesomepower,butactuallytobe exercising thatpower.Cause differs
frompoweronlyinthatitrefers toan effect alreadyproduced, whilepower
referstothesameeffect yettobe produced.27
Mentherefore naturallydesireknowledge ofcauses.Whatdistinguishes
themfromall otheranimals,in additionto and as a resultof theirhaving
reason,is "thecareofknowing causes."28 Whenotheranimalscomeacross
something new,theironlyinterest is whether theobjectis likelyto helpor
hurtthemat thatmoment. Whenmensee something new,theyattempt to
discoverits cause.29Otheranimalslive almostentirelyin the present,
because,"forwantofobservation, and memory of theorder,consequence,
anddependenceofthethingstheysee," theyhave"littleor no foresight of
thetimeto come."3"Men,on theotherhand,fearnotonlythepresent, but
thefuture as well."Forbeingassuredthattherebe causesofall thingsthat
havearrived hitherto,orshallarrivehereafter, itis impossible fora man,who
continually endeavoureth to securehimselfagainsttheevils he fears,and
procurethegood he desireth, notto be in a perpetual solicitudeofthetime
tocome."3'Becausemenareable torecognizethedependence ofone event
uponanother, theirfearnecessarilyextends as faras their thoughts andcauses

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 Blits/liOBBESIAN FEAR 423

them to "desire to know why, and how." "Anxiety for the future time
disposeth men to inquire into the causes of things."32
Men, however, can never satisfy the desire to know natural causes or allay
the fear the ignorance of such causes breeds. Hobbes sharply distinguishes
between science and prescientific experience. The former is not the perfec-
tion, but rather the opposite, of the latter. Whereas prescientific knowledge
can tell us nothing about causal relations because it is "given immediately
by nature, and not gotten by ratiocination,"33scientific knowledge deals with
cause and effect. As the cultivation of our innate reason, science is capable
of dealing with the consequence and not just with the sequence of events,
with the why and not merely with the that. Science, Hobbes says, is "the
science of causes." It can provide a connected and orderly account of cause
and effect.34Science, however, can provide "absolute" or certain knowledge
of natural effects, but not of natural causes. While science consists of two
parts-the analytic or resolutive method, which works from known effects
to unknown causes, and the synthetic or compositive method, which works
conversely from known causes to unknown effects-the analytic method can
yield only hypothetical knowledge, for whereas synthesis begins fromgiven
causes, analysis must begin from"the appearances or effectsof nature,which
we know by sense."35 It cannot tell us what did in fact cause a given effect,
but only what may have caused it ("some ways and means by which [the
effects] may be, I do not say they are generated").3" The analytic method is
ultimately as limited as sensory experience, because it is crucially dependent
upon sensation.

Of arts,somearedemonstrable, othersindemonstrable;anddemonstrablearethosethe
construction
of thesubjectwhereofis in thepowerof theartisthimself, who,in his
demonstration,does no morebutdeducetheconsequencesof hisownoperation. The
reasonwhereof is this,thatthescienceot everysubjectis derivedfroma precognition
of thecauses,generation, and constructionof thesame; and consequently
wherethe
causesareknown, thereis placelordemonstration, butnotwherethecausesaretoseek
for.Geometry therefore is demonstrable,forthelinesandfiguresfromwhichwe reason
aredrawnanddescribed byourselves;andcivilphilosophy is demonstrable,
becausewe
makethecommonwealth ourselves.Butbecauseof naturalbodieswe knownotthe
butseekitfromtheeffects,
construction, thereliesnodemonstrationofwhatcauseswe
seekfor,butonlyofwhattheymaybe.37

Man is a maker. He can understand only what he makes, only those things
of which he is the cause or whose construction or generation lies wholly
within his power.38 He can know that every natural phenomenon is caused
by some sort of motion ' For it is by motion only that any mutation is made

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424 POLITICAL THEORY/ AUGUST 1989

inanything,"39 buthe can neverknowwithcertainty theparticular causeof

anyparticular phenomenon. Scientificknowledge is conditionalknowledge.
This is thereasonthatHobbes's naturalscience is concernedonlywith
knowingphenomenafromthemannerof theirgeneration andwithdevis-
ingwaysof generating thephenomena, and notwithknowledgeof nature
itself.4'Natureis in principleunknowable exceptinsofaras it resistsand
threatens us.4'
Although mancanunderstand onlywhathemakes,heis bornintoa world
thathe did not make and whose basic powershe can therefore never
adequatelyknow or control.Livingin darknessand confronted by an
opposingworld,heis fundamentally exposedtounknown powersorcauses.
Imbuedwitha radicaluncertainty leadingtoanendlessdemandforsecurity,
hismostbasicfearis an indeterminate orobjectlessfear,a primalfearofthe
unknown.
Hobbesindicatesboththeoriginandcharacter ofthisfearin hisaccount
ofappetite andaversioninChapter6 ofLeviatlhani. Thatchapter beginswith
thereduction of thepassionsto motionseithertowardor away fromthe
objectsthatarouseourappetite oraversion, anditculminates inthereduction
ofappetiteandaversion to desireand fear:"lifeitselfis butmotion, andcan
neverbe without desire,norwithout fear,no more than without sense."42All
movementtowardan object is desire;all movementaway is fear.The
reduction ofman'spsychiclifeto matter inmotionimpliesthatall aversion
It also implies,evenmorebasically,thatman'sprimary
is fear.43 fearis an
indeterminate fearoftheunknown. Inthepassagelinking thetworeductions
thatconstitute theframework of thechapter, Hobbesdiscussesournatural
appetites andaversions. We areborn,hesays,withonlya fewappetites and
aversionsand noneforanything particular.We havea naturalappetitefor
food,butnotforicecreamorroastbeef.Allparticular appetitesareacquired.
Theyproceedfromexperience, forofthings we do notknow,we can desire
onlyto "tasteand try,"thatis, to testtheireffects uponourselvesor other
men."Butaversionwe haveforthings, notonlywhichwe knowhavehurt
us,butalso thatwe do notknowwhether theywillhurtus,ornot."44 Desires
presuppose experience, fearsdo not.Wecandesireonlywhatwebelievewill
nothurt us,butwefeareverything thatwedo notknowwillnothurt us.While
we can desiresomething onlyifwe knowit,we naturally fearsomething
precisely becausewe do notknowit.Knowledgeis a necessary condition for
desire;ignorance is a sufficient
condition forfear.Sincewearebornignorant,
we are bornwithout a desireforanything in particular,butwitha fearof
everything ingeneral.We arebornwitha fearat onceofeverything andof
nothing, a fearthathas no particular objectprecisely becauseitis a fearof

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 Blits/HOBBESIAN FEAR 425

whatwe do notknow.It is byitsverynatureas indetcrminate as ignorance

itself.4'Whereasthefearofothermen,likeanyother fear,requires
particular
experience,if only the experienceof introspection, man's mostradical
insecurity precedesall experience andunderlies fears.
all particular
"Thisperpetual fear,alwaysaccompanying mankind intheignorance of
causes,as itwerein thedark,mustneedshaveforobjectsomething." Fear
is a pain,andmennaturally avoidpain.Mentherefore seektoavoidnotonly
theobjectof fear,butfearitself.But an objectlessfearis an unresolvable
fear.No one can fightor flee whathe cannotidentify or know.To be
resolvable, fearmustattachtosomething; itmusthavean object.Thuswhen
an objectis lacking,menwill findan imaginary one. Theywill inventan
identifiable objectthattheycan fear."Andtherefore whenthereis nothing
tobe seen,thereis nothing toaccuse,eitheroftheirgood,orevilfortune, but
somepower,oragentinvisible:inwhichsenseperhapsitwas,thatsomeof
theold poetssaid,thatthegodswereatfirst createdbyhumanfear."4" Men
will imagineinvisiblecauses in the absenceof visibleones. They will
rationalize theirprerational,formlessfearbyfinding pseudo-objects forit.
Whatallowsthemto deceivethemselves in thisway is thesame as what
makesit necessaryforthemto do so, namely,the"representational" or
subjective characterofsensory experience. Sensoryexperience is ultimately
as indeterminate as man'sprimary fear.It,too,lacksa genuineobject.Men,
livingindarkness, havevisions,butdo notreallysee. Whattheysee aretheir
owndreamlike creations,whichtheyimaginetobe real."Theappearanceto
us is fancy, thesamewaking,thatdreaming." Whilefearis thusable togive
formtotheformless, italso causesmentopersonify theobjectstheycreate,
to makethem"powers"or"agents."Theyimaginea personalcause,thatis,
one thathas a will or an intention liketheirown,forthesamereasonthat
theyimagineanycause.Fearof theunknown forcesthemtoassimilatethe
unknown totheknown,tounderstand theunfamiliar intermsofthefamiliar;
andwhatmenknowbestis theirownwillfulness. Thus,

theythatmakelittle, orno inquiryintothenatural yetfrom

causesofthings. thefearthat
proceedsfromtheignorance itsell;ol' whatit is thathaththepowertodo themmuch
goodorharm, areinclinedtosuppose,andfeignuntothemselves, severalkindsofpowers
andtostandinaweoftheir
invisible; ownimaginations; andintimeofdistress toinvoke
them;as also in thetimeof expectedgood success,to give themthanks;makingthe
creaturesoftheir ownfancy, gods.... Andthisfearofthings
their is thenatural
invisible,
seedof. . . religion.47

The indeterminacy
offearthusshowstheconnection,otherwiseobscure
desireforliberty
inHobbes,betweenman'snatural tendency
andhisnatural

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426 POLITICAL THEORY/ AUGUST 1989

to submitto authority.Libertyis "theabsenceof external impediments,"48

"theabsenceofopposition."49 As is indicatedbythenegativity ofHobbes's
definition,
itis essentially toanyparticular
indifferent goal.Whatmatters is
notwhatI do,butthatnothing externaltomehinders mefromdoingwhatI
wantto do. Libertyis, literally,
open-ended. If,then,liberty,like fear,is
indeterminate, theindeterminacy of fearforcesmento relyon authority.
Ignoranceof naturalcausesbothimpelsand impedesmenfrominquiring
intothecausesofthings. Itimpelsthemtoinquirebecausetheybelievethat
theirsecurityrequiressuch knowledge, but it also impedestheirsearch
becausewhattheydo notknowfrightens them.Fearbothincitesandinhibits.
"Ignoranceof causes[therefore] or rather
disposeth, constrainetha manto
relyontheadviceandauthority ofothers."'itmakeshavingananswermore
important thanknowing thetruth,thusmakingauthority nolessunobtrusive
thannecessary.It ultimately collapsesthedistinction betweenfirst-and
second-hand knowledge, betweenremoteand immediate causes,between
the possibleand theimpossible,and betweenknowledgeand ignorance
itself.5'

ENLIGHTENMENT

In accordancewithwhatwe havejustseen,Hobbesdistinguishes "two

verygeneralobjects[offear]:one,thepowerofspiritsinvisible;theother,
thepowerof . . men." Hobbes's politicaldoctrinerestson the proper
management of thesetwo fears.In orderto establishand maintaincivil
society,men'scommonfearofa sovereign mustbe madetooverpower their
mutualfearofoneanother. The commongoodrequiresa commonfear.Yet
evenifmenfearthesovereign morethantheyfearoneanother, theywillnot
enjoylastingpeace unlessin thefirst
placetheyfear"powersvisible,"that
is,deathat thehandsofothermen,morethantheyfear"powersinvisible,"
thatis, hellfire
or damnation.
The maintenance ofcivilsocietydependson
justice,andjusticedependson thepowerof lifeand death.Butsincemen
will alwayschoosewhatseemsto themthelesserevil,"it is impossiblea
commonwealth shouldstand,whereanyotherthanthesovereignhatha
powerof givinggreater rewardsthanlife,andof inflicting greater punish-
mentsthandeath."53 Menmusttherefore feardeathas thegreatest evil.The
fearof invisiblepowers,however, leads themto believethatpowersexist
thatare capableof inflicting
a greaterevil thandeathand of bestowinga
greater rewardthanthepreservation of life.It leads themto believein the
existenceof incorporealsubstancesand hencein thepossibility of eternal

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 Blits/HOBBESIAN FEAR 427

damnation, thereby rendering themunfit forcivillife."Fornomancanserve

twomasters;noris he less,butrather morea master, whomwe believewe
aretoobeyforfearofdamnation, thanhewhomwe obeyforfearoftemporal
death."54Hobbesthusseekstheremovalofsuchfears:"Ifthissuperstitious
fearofspirits weretakenaway,. . . menwouldbe muchmorefitted thanthey
are forcivilobedience.""'Far fromagreeingwiththetraditional viewthat
thegoodsocietydependson religious belief,Hobbes'spoliticaltheory rests
on theprinciplethatthepopularfearof anypowerhigherthanthecivil
authority is destructiveofsocietyitself.Pietysubverts society.
Hobbes'sattempt to base politicson therightto self-preservation thus
requires popularenlightenment to liberatemenfromthespiritual fearsthat,
lesseningtheirdependence on temporal powers,render themunfitforcivil
obedienceandpeace.Enlightenment, in a
consisting thoroughgoing materi-
alism,mustdispelthepowerofthe"Kingdom ofDarkness," whosetwomain
pillarsaretraditional philosophy, particularlyAristotelian metaphysics and
physics,whichteachesthatincorporeal substancesexist,and traditional
Christianity, whichteachesthatmenhaveimmortal soulscapableofreceiv-
ingpunishment supernaturally.
WhereastheScholastics, inaccordancewith
natural cognition, "absurdly" animatetheworld,5' Hobbes'snatural science,
reducing thewholeuniverse tothelawsofGalileanphysics,57 disabusesmen
ofthebeliefinincorporeal beings.Itdemystifies theworld,notinthesense
ofrendering itintelligible,
butrather inthesenseofstripping itofeverything
immaterial. In Hobbes'saccount,"power"is relatedto"powers"sometimes
as singularto plural,butat othertimesas impersonal to personal.In this
respect, hisscienceis Epicurean ratherthanCartesian initspurpose.Itaims
nottomaketheworldknowable, buttoridmenofthefearofspiritual powers.
Hobbes'scorporeal psychology is,aboveall,a psychology ofenlightenment.
His reduction ofman'spsychiclifeto motionis ofa piecewithhisdenying
the existenceof the vacuum:theexistenceof emptyspace impliesthe
existenceof incorporeal substance.Hobbes'spsychology is thusa chainof
reductionist analysesculminating intheformula: "Nothing but.",51"Sense,in
all cases, is nothingelse butoriginalfancy";5` "Imagination therefore is
nothingbut decayingsense"';6'"Imaginationand memoryare but one
thing"';6'"Experience is nothingbutmemory."62 Civilpeacedependson the
reduction ofmantohisbodyor,tosaythesamething, ofsensory experience
tomerefancy.
Hobbes'sliberalpoliticaltheory restsonremoving thefearof"thepower
of spiritsinvisible"whileat thesame timestrengthening thefearof "the
powerof [other]men."Thistransformation is notpossiblewithout enlight-
enment, whichmustteachmentoforget abouttheirsoulsandcareonlyabout

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428 POLITICALTHEORY/AUGUST 1989

theirgoodsinthisworld,inparticular theirbodilygoods.Menmustcometo
believethatthisworldis theonlyworldand thattheonlytruegoods are
tangiblegoods.Itwouldbe a mistake toconcludefromthis,however, as Leo
Straussdoes,thatHobbescreditsenlightenment withtheabilityto ridmen
oftheirdeepestirrational fearsorthathe believesthatoncemenhavebeen
disabusedof theirdelusionsaboutthetruecharacter of realitythefearof
violentdeathwillcomeintoitsownas thestrongest forcein humanlife."3
Sucha conclusion assumesthatthepoliticalis primary forHobbes,thatwhat
is politicallyprimaryis simplyprimaryforhim."4It presupposesthat
Hobbes's"basicassumption" is thatthefearofviolentdeathis naturally "the
strongest forcein humanlife""`becauseitstartsfromRousseau'scriticism
thatthecoreoftheHobbesianmanis social,thatforHobbesthefundamental
factin humanlifeis theoutwardstruggleof all againstall. It therefore
overlooksthevitaldistinction inHobbesbetweentwoaspectsof"thefearof
invisiblepowers,"namely,itsnaturalorigin(fearof theunknown) and its
forms
artificial (fearofreligion). Bybeginning from men'srelation withone
another, thisviewignorestheexistenceoftheobjectlessfearthatprecedes
and underlies all of man'sparticular fears,including boththefearof other
menandthefearof God,ghosts,goblins,and thelike.It assumes,in other
words,thattheoriginofthefearofinvisible powersis theignorance resulting
fromerroneousdoctrines, not the ignorance resulting from the inherent
limitations of man's naturalcognition. Treating all fear on the level of
particular fears,it reachestheconclusionthatHobbesbelievesthefearof
violentdeathcanbemadetosupersede man'sdeepestirrational fearsthrough
the"extraordinary" powerofenlightenment.""
While Hobbes believesthatenlightenment can dispel the traditional
Kingdomof Darkness,he neversuggeststhatit can removethe natural
kingdom of darkness. Man is bornintoa worldofdarkness thatreasoncan
never illuminate.Moreover,as Hobbesian enlightenment reveals the
unilluminable nature oftheworld,itnecessarily heightens man'sfearofthe
unknown. Whatdiminishes themostpernicious socialeffect also increases
theprimary psychological sourceofthatfear.Farfromdiminishing thefear,
enlightenment onlyincreasesit,butitdoes so insucha wayas tofocusthe
fearonvisibleortangible objects,thusallowingmentoresolvetheirprimary
fearwithout sacrificingthetrueneedsofsocietyandtheenjoyment oftheir
naturalrights.No less in regardto fearthanto anything else,"thestateof
mancan neverbe without someincommodity orother.""7 Man paysforhis
greatersecurityinone respectwitha greater senseof insecurity in another.
Whathegainspolitically (theprotection ofhislife),helosespsychologically
(hissenseofhavinga placein theworld).

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 Blits/HOBBESIAN FEAR 429

Existentialism,whosedeepestrootslieinRousseau'scriticism ofHobbes,
is generallyunderstood as a radicalrepudiation of theEnlightenment. It
criticizesthe Enlightenment for being superficial."8Notwithstanding
Hobbes'sgrimviewof "thestateof nature," ittaxestheEnlightenment for
beingnaivelyoptimistic-for that
suggesting man,though unable to tran-
scendtheempirical worldthrough theexerciseofreason,can makehimself
athomeintheworldthrough thepowerofreasontomaster andpossessnature
through science.Yet, howevermuchHobbes expectsmodernscienceto
contributetoman'shappiness byincreasingthecommodities hemayenjoy,'9
Hobbesianfearprovesto be notunlikewhatKierkegaard, Heidegger, and
otherscall anxiety(angst).As we haveseen,forHobbesman'smostfunda-
mentalrelation is notthatbetweenmanandman,as Rousseausuggests, but
therelation withineachmanbetweenignorance andfear.Thecoreofman's
beingis hisrelation totheunalterablyunknown. Thus,whatatfirstseemsto
be existentialism'sradicalrepudiation
oftheEnlightenment maybe rather a
distillation
orculmination ofitsfounding thought, forEnlightenmentneces-
sarilyentailsestrangement. In theenditprovesto be bothself-limited and
self-limiting.
Although theremovalofreligioushopesandfearsis meantto
allowmentocarefornothing beyondthisworld,inrevealing theimpenetra-
ble darknessof theworldEnlightenment alienatesmanfromtheworld.It
renders himhomelessinthisworld,whileleavinghimnothing beyond.

NOTES

1. Hobbes,Leviathani,ch. 13; TheEniglishWor-ks of TlhomatasHobbes ofMalmeesbuiry,

vol. 3, ed. bySirWilliamMolesworth (London:JohnBohn,1839-1845).113.Thespellingand
punctuation ofsomequotationshavebeenmodernized. All italicsareoriginal.
2. Hobbes.De Cive,ch.2; FtiglishWorks,
vol. 2, 6.
3. Hobbes,Leliathani,
ch. 13;FEnglish
Works, vol.3, 112-113.
4. Forexample,EldonJ. Eisenach.Two Worl(lsoJliberalismn: atd Politicsint
Religionlt
Hobbes, Locke, antdMill (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. 1981), 26-54; and David
Johnston,TheRlhetor-ic
of leviathan:
TlhomasHobbesanidthePolitic.s ofCtdltralTraniisforina-
tioni
(Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress,1986),esp. 34-36,45-46.68, 92-113,120-121.
5. Forexample,Leo Strauss, RightantdHistors(Chicago:University
Naitural ofChicago
Press.1953), 180-181,196-198;andJohnston, Rhetoric. 34.
6. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau,"DiscourseontheOriginoflnequalityv, inTlueFirstanidSeconid
Discourse,ed. by RogerD. Masters(New York:St. Martin'sPress,1964),95-96,107-108,
117-131,138-139,142. 155-156,221-222:Emile,trans.by Allan Bloom(New York:Basic
Books,1979),48, 64-69.78,80-88,92-93,207-208,213-214.It is important to recognizethat
Hobbes'sfamiliar phrase"thefearof violentdeath' is an abbreviation
of "thefearof violent

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430 POLITICALTHEORY/AUGUST 1989

deathat thehandsofothermen. Itrefers toonlyone possiblecauseof violentdeath,namely

othermen,and notto otherpossiblecausessuchas naturalcatastrophiesor violentaccidents.
thanthedesireforself-preservation,
Less extensive itis limitedtothefearofothermenas one's
potentialmurderer.
Works,vol. 3, 1.
7. Hobbes, Leviathian,ch. l; Entglisht
8. Hobbes, Human Nature, II, 4; Etiglish Works,vol. 4, 4.
9. Hobbes, Leviathacn,ch. 1; EnzglishWorks,vol. 3, 2.
10. Hobbes, Human Natre, I1, 10; EntglishWorks,vol. 4, 8.
11. Hobbes, De Corpore, VI, 10; EinglishWorks,vol. 1, 77-79.
Nature, It, 7; EniglishWorks,vol. 4, 5-6.
12. Hobbes, Hutncwai
13. Aristotle,Metaphysics,98t)a22 ff.;On ihe Soul, 424a 17 ff.
14. Hobbes, De Corpore, IX, 7; XXV, 2; EniglishWorks.vol. 1, 390-391.
15. Hobbes, De Corpore, XXV, 10; English Works,vol. 1, 405.
16. HansJonas,TlhePhIeJIOltIeniome of Life(Chicago:University of ChicagoPress,1966),
147-148.
Nature. VIII, 4; En1glishWorks.vol. 4, 38.
17. See, e.g., Hobbes, Hum1ani
18. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1: English Works,vol. 3, 2.
19. Hobbes, Decameron PhYsiologicumn, Il; English Works,vol. 7. 84.
20. Hobbes.De Corpore.VII. 2; Eniglish vol. 1.93-94.
Works.
21. Hobbes, De Corpore, VIII 5; EniglishWorks.vol. 1, 105.
22. Hobbes, De CorPore, XIV, 2(); English Works,vol. 1, 2()O.
23. WhileHobbessaysthatmotionis thecauseofall things
thathavea cause(De Corpore,
VI, 5; English Works,vol. 1, 69-7(0), he nonethelessdefines it in termsof place: "Motion is a
continual relinquishingol one place, and acquiring of another"(De Corpore, VIl, 10; FE11glish
Works, vol. 1, 109). He defineswhatis real-perhaps,mostreal-in termsof whatis merely
imaginary.Motionthusseems to have two meaningsor levels of meaningfor Hobbes,
corresponding to his twomeaningsforspace. Whatwe ordinarily call motionis "imaginary
motion," thatis,theappearanceof"realmotion."Itexistsonlyinthemind,oronlyintermsof
whatexistsonlyinthemind,namelyplace."ThenI say,motionis nothing butchangeofplace,
forall theeffect ofa bodyupontheorgansofoursensesis nothing butfancy. Thereforewe can
fancynothingfromseeingit moved,butchangeof place" (Decameronr Physiologicumn, II;
EnglishWorks, vol. 7, 83-84). WhatI havecalled"realmotion."on theotherhand,is nota
property oraccidentofourminds, butrather
ofbodiesthemselves.
Thecauseot themotion that
we perceive, it is identicalto power (De Corpore, X, 6,; English11
Works,vol. 1. 131).
24. Hobbes, l.eviathaln,ch. 46; Eliglish1Works,vol. 3. 672.
25. Hobbes, De Corpore, IX. 3; EnlglishWorks,vol. 1. 121-122.
26. Hobbes, An1Answer to Bishop Briaihall; EinglishiWorks,vol. 4, 299.
27. Hobbes.De Corpore.X, l; Eigligsh
Works,
vol. 1. 127-128.
28. Hobbes, Leviathant,ch. 6: EmiglishWorks,vol. 3. 45.
29. Hobbes, HumnliNaiture,IX, 18; EniglishWorks.vol. 4. 50-51.
30. Hobbes,Leviathain,ch. 12;Entglish Works,vol.3, 94.
31. Hobbes, Leviathatn.ch. 12; English Works.vol. 3, 95.
32. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 11; EmiglishWorks,vol. 3, 92.
33. Hobbes, De Corpore, 1, 2; English Works,vol. 1, 3.
34. Hobbes, De Corpore, VI, 1: English Works,vol. 1, 65-66.
35. Hobbes, De Corpore, XXV, 1; Eiglish Works,vol. 1, 388.
36. Hobbes, De Corpore. XXV, 1; English Works.vol. 1, 388; see also De Corpore, XXX,
15; English Works,vol. 1, 531.

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 Blits/HOBBESIAN FEAR 431

37. Hobbes,Six Lesson.sto thleProfessorsof Maldweniatics, Epist.Ded.; EniglishWorks,

vol. 7, 183-184.
38. Hobbes,De Corpore,1,5; XXV,1; EnglishWorks, vol. 1,6,388.
39. Hobbes,DecanerolnPhysiologicum, VII, FnglishWotks, vol. 7, 129.
40. Hobbes,De Corpore,VI, 1,8; VIl, 1; XXV, 1; Eniglish WVor-ks,vol. 1,65-66,75-76,92,
388-389.
41. In contrast to physics,thetwomethodsconstituting theartof geometry are perfectly
inverse.The analyticis as preciseas thesynthetic andleadstoequallycertainresults. Compare
De Corpore,XXV, I; FnglishWorks, vol. 1,387-388withDe Corpore,XX, 6; FnglishWorks,
vol. 1,309-310.See WilliamSacksteder, "Hobbes:The ArtoftheGeometricians,"Jornal of
theHisitor ofPlhilosoplhy (April1980),131-146.
42. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch.6; EnglishWo-ks, vol. 3, 51.
43. See also Hobbes,Hunmant Nature,VII, 2-3; XII, l; FnglishWorks, vol. 4, 31-32,67-68.
44. Hobbes,Levliathan,ch.6; FnglishWorks. vol.3. 40.
45. This is thereasonwhyHobbescan say thatfearis thesame inall men.It is thesame
becauseitis primarily formless.
46. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch. I1; EniglislhWorks, vol.3, 95
47. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch. 11;Einglish Works, vol.3. 93.
48. Hobbes,Leviathani, ch. 14;EnglishWorks, vol.3, 116.
49. Hobbes.Leviathan, ch. 21; Eniglish Wor-ks, vol.3, 196.
50. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch. I; EnlglishWorks,vol.3, 90.
5 1. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch. II; Etnglish Works, vol.3, 92.
52. Hobbes,Leviathani, ch. 14;EnglishWorks, vol.3, 129.
53. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch.38; Entglish Works, vol.3, 437.
54. Hobbes,De Cive,VI, I1; Eniglish Works, vol. 2, 78.
55. Hobbes,Leviatlhan, ch. 2; FnglishWorks, vol.3, 1).
56. Hobbes,Leviathani, ch. 2; Entglislh
Works, vol. 3, 4.
57. Hobbes,De Corpore,Epist.Ded.; FnglishWorks, vol. 1,viii.
58. ErwinStraus,Plhentomenological Psychology (New York:Basic Books,1966),60.
59. Hobbes,Leviathan,ch. 1; Fnglislh Works, vol. 3, 3.
60. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch.2; FnglishWorks, vol.3. 4.
61. Hobbes,Leviathaan, ch.2; FnglishWorks, vol. 3, 6.
62. Hobbes,De Corpore,1,2; FnglishWorks, vol. 1,3.
63. Strauss,NaturalRight,198-199.
64. Strauss,NaturalRigit,166ff.
65. Strauss,NaturalRight,198,196.
66. Strauss,NaturalRig/it, 199;see also Johnston, Rhetoric, 92-133.
67. Hobbes,Leviathan, ch. 18;EnglishWorks, vol.3, 170.
68. Forexample,Nietzsche, Beyonld Goodand Ev:il,191.
69. Hobbes,De Corpore.1,7; FnglishWorks, vol. 1,7-8.

Jan H. Blitsteacthes
politicalaindediucationial Honors
philosophyin ilie University
nai iheUniversity
Program ofDelaware.He is currentvly
ProJrssor anldSecretary
ofthe
Fellowat thleU.S. NavalAcadl
NavyDistinguiished emyv.

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