Mathematical Models in Philosophy of Science
Batty M, Longley P 1994 Fractal Cities: A Geometry of Form
and Function. Academic Press, New York
Cadwallader M 1985 Analytical Urban Geography. Prentice-
Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, NJ
Carroll G 1982 National city size distributions: What do we
know after 67 years of research? Progress in Human Geography
6: 1–34
Dewhurst J, Hewings G, West R 1991 Regional Input–Output
Modeling: New DeŠelopments and Interpretations. Avebury,
Aldershot, UK
Ester M, Frommelt A, Kriegel H-P, Sander J 2000 Spatial data
mining: Database primitives, algorithms and efficient dbms
support. Data Mining and Knowledge DiscoŠery 4: 193–216
Fotheringham A S 1993 On the future of spatial analysis: The
role of oGISq. EnŠironment and Planning A 25: 30–4
Fujita M, Krugman P, Venables A J 1999 The Spatial Economy:
Cities, Regions, and International Trade. MIT, Cambridge,
MA
Goodchild M F, Anselin L, Applebaum R P, Harthorn B H
2000 Toward spatially integrated social science. International
Regional Science ReŠiew 23: 139–59
Ghosh A, Rushton G 1987 Spatial Analysis and Location-
allocation Models. Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York
Gross P R, Levitt N 1994 Higher Superstition: The Academic
Left and Its Quarrels with Science. Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, MD
Haines-Young R 1989 Modelling geographical knowledge. In:
Macmillan B (ed.) Remodelling Geography. Blackwell,
London, pp. 22–39
Jin Y, Wilson A 1993 Generation of integrated multispatial
input–output models of cities oGIMIMocq 1: Initial step.
Papers in Regional Science 72: 351–68
Johnston R 1991 Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American
Human Geography Since 1945. Edward Arnold, London
King L J 1993 Spatial analysis and the institutionalization of
geography as a social science. Urban Geography 14: 538–51
Knight C 2000 Regional assessment, Encyclopedia of Global
Change. Oxford University Press, New York
Krugman P 1998 Space: The final frontier. Journal of Economic
PerspectiŠes 12: 161–74
Lawson V 1995 The politics of difference: Examining the
quantitative\qualitative dualism in postructuralist feminist
research. The Professional Geographer 47: 440–57
Longley P 1993 Quantitative analysis, technical change, and the
dissemination of oGISq research: Some reflections and
prospects. EnŠironment and Planning A 25: 35–7
Odland J 1978 The conditions for multi-center cities. Economic
Geography 54: 234–44
Openshaw S 1989 Computer modelling in human geography. In:
Macmillan B (ed.) Remodelling Geography. Blackwell,
London, pp. 70–88
Peuquet D 1994 It’s about time: A conceptual framework for the
representation of spatiotemporal dynamics in geographic
information systems. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 84: 441–61
Raymond E C 1999 The Cathedral & The Bazaar: Musings on
Linux and Open Source by an Accidental ReŠolutionary.
O’Reilly, Sebastopol, CA
Rey S J 2000 Integrated regional econometricjinput–output
modeling: Issues and opportunities. Papers in Regional
Science 79: 271–92
Sui D 2000 New directions in ecological inference: An in-
troduction. Annals of the Association of American Geographers
90: 579–82
Theil H 1971 Principles of Econometrics. Wiley, New York
Wegener M 1998 Applied models of urban land use, transport
and environment: State of the art and future developments. In:
Lundqvist L, Mattsson L-G, Kim T (eds.) Network Infra-
structure and the Urban EnŠironment. Springer Verlag, Berlin,
pp. 245–67
S. J. Rey
Mathematical Models in Philosophy of
Science
Philosophy of science analyses critically and reflects
on the nature of science, its scope, methods, practices,
principles, aims, and achievements. The central ques-
tions in the philosophy of science are about science,
addressed in a manner which is usually ‘external’ to
science. Prime examples of questions philosophers ask
and try to provide precise answers to tend to be rather
broad: ‘What is a scientific theory?,’ ‘How do scientific
models refer to reality?,’ ‘Can some theories be reduced
to others?,’ ‘How does a theory change and evolve?,’
etc. Because these sorts of questions are complex and
hard, philosophers often disagree about the answers.
Starting in the 1920s, logical positivists (Carnap’s
Vienna Circle), logical empiricists (Reichenbach’s
Berlin School) and their numerous successors, im-
pressed by the success and rigor of the sciences, ap-
proached the analysis of scientific concepts (including
theory, law, evidence, explanation, prediction, con-
firmation, and reduction) in a distinctive way, by
making extensive use of the techniques of formal
language and logic. For example, their canonical
formulation of a scientific theory is tantamount to a
linguistic structure with two disjoint nonlogical
vocabularies, consisting of theoretical and nontheor-
etical (observation) terms, respectively. The resulting
obserŠation sublanguage of the latter is presumed to be
fully interpreted in a given domain of the phenomenal
world of directly observable things, events, and their
properties and relations. The accompanying theor-
etical sublanguage (erected only over theoretical
terms) is meant to include all theoretical postulates
and their deductive consequences. It is linked to the
observation sublanguage via correspondence rules—a
finite string of nontrivial ‘mixed sentences’ of the joint
language structure, with at least one theoretical and
one observation term. Because, in general, corre-
spondence rules can provide only a partial interpret-
ation of the theoretical sublanguage, the question of
referents of theoretical terms must remain open. One
of the most important duties of formalization is to
make perfectly clear what is meant by a primitive
(observational and theoretical) term, axiom, theorem,
9399
Mathematical Models in Philosophy of Science
and proof. Logical empiricists believed that casting
empirical claims into formal frameworks would aid
the clarification of the nature of scientific theories
significantly, as well as their relationships to phenom-
ena and data. Other scientific notions, such as pre-
diction and explanation, dropped out as special cases
of the concept of deduction. For many years, logical
empiricism was the standard, received, syntactic view
in philosophy of science, and it exerted considerable
power and influence.
Since the 1960s, however, many aspects of the
standard view have come under heavy attack. In
addition to showing that observational–theoretical
and analytic–synthetic distinctions are untenable, a
major criticism of the standard view focused on the
inadequacy of correspondence rules. Critics of the
syntactic view argued that these rules oversimplify
unreasonably the actual relationships between theories
and phenomena. For example, in the received view,
two or more theories cannot be applied conjointly,
because correspondence rules work independently
within component theories, without any structure for
interaction. To remedy the situation, every time
several theories are to be applied to the same phenom-
enon, one would need a simultaneous axiomatization
of all pertinent theories in a single theory, together
with a brand new set of correspondence rules. What
results is an endless proliferation of axiomatic theories.
The classic argument against the observational–
theoretical dichotomy is that all observation terms are
theory-laden and therefore there can be no theory-
neutral observation language. By way of illustration,
because the seemingly identical notion of velocity in
Newtonian mechanics vs. in special relativity is ac-
tually calculated differently in these two theories,
observational data pertaining to composite velocities
will have different empirical meanings, depending on
the underlying theory. The same goes for the analytic–
synthetic dichotomy.
Another important factor leading to the demise of
the standard view and the positivist program was the
so-called globalist challenge (also known as the
Weltanschauungen analyses) by Kuhn, Lakatos, and
others. Globalist alternatives to the standard view
have focused on the problems of scientific change, and
the social and temporal dimensions of scientific
development. From this perspective, theories are
abstract, polysemous, evolving, cultural entities,
possessing a deep structure which may be characterized
in different linguistic ways.
Around the beginning of the 1970s, several new
systematic metatheories of scientific theories emerged,
often referred to collectively as the model-theoretic or
semantic conception of scientific theories (as distin-
guished from the older syntactic conception, charac-
terized above). Instead of viewing a theory as a
deductively organized body of empirical (true or false)
claims, the semantic conception views a theory as a
way of specifying a class of models which represents
9400
various aspects of observed phenomena. This ap-
proach not only corrects the linguistic bias of radical
empiricists and handles the globalists’ formulation of
theory change, it also brings mathematics and phil-
osophy of science closer together.
Differing versions have been developed by a number
of philosophers and logicians. In present-day phil-
osophy of science there are three main directions. The
first and perhaps most familiar is the so-called set-
theoretical predicate approach. This view is very close
to the practice of scientists, and it provides a natural
and convenient way of formulating theories and
reasoning about them. For instance, the monograph
of Krantz et al. (1971) relies entirely on this mode of
presentation. The second approach—popular mainly
in philosophy of physics and biology—is the topological
state space method. And the third, and by far the most
formal conception, is implemented by the structuralist
program. It attempts to address systematically a large
number of important problems of philosophy of
science, including the structure and dynamics of
scientific theories, their equivalence, reduction, ap-
proximation, idealization and empirical content. Al-
though recently the semantic conception has been
consolidated and extended by a number of philoso-
phers from a variety of perspectives, subtle differences
still remain.
1. The Set-theoretical Predicate Approach
The set-theoretical predicate view was originally pro-
posed by Suppes (1957, last Chap.). Unlike the logical
empiricists, who defined theories to be axiomatic
deductive systems (see Axiomatic Theories) formalized
within a language of (say) first-order logic with
equality, Suppes (1988, 1993) argues that a scientific
theory should be viewed as being determined by the
class of those set-theoretic models in which the
empiricists’ axioms are true. Accordingly, whenever
the standard view specifies an empirical theory by a
body of non-logical axioms (e.g., a customary list of
ordinary or partial differential equations), Suppes
introduces a corresponding set-theoretical predicate
whose extension coincides with the collection of those
models which satisfy the axioms. The choice of set
theory as the best formal tool for representing theories
is amply justified by its universal character.
The great classical example of a set-theoretical
predicate is given by a simplified theory of classical
particle mechanics. In its model-theoretic reconstruc-
tion, one begins with a finite principal domain (non-
empty set) D of (idealized) dimensionless particles or
mass points the theory is meant to be about and the
auxiliary quantity domains of real  and natural
numbers. In general, auxiliary domains are viewed as
previously defined and known structures, serving as
parameters in the definition of a model. Because
particles are situated in space–time and the interest is

in explaining their motion caused by various external
forces, two additional ambient geometric domains are
needed: S for physical space points, and T for time
instants.
The next step in formulating the pertinent set-
theoretical predicate is to enrich the inventory of
domains by including a longer list of set-based
functions. In intended applications of classical particle
mechanics one needs, above all, a mass function
m : D + that assigns to each particle a in D its
unique mass m(a), a dimensionless positive number.
Axioms of mechanics also require a position function
s : DiT S that assigns to each particle a at each
time instant t its (dimensionless) geometric position
s(a, t). Because the relevant space and time structures
are carried by the real line, one can use a metric
isomorphism τ : T  to numerically coordinatize the
time domain and, likewise, a metric isomorphism
σ : S $ can be designated to coordinatize the
physical space domain. The job of τ−" is to transport
metric and differentiable structure from  to T. The
last item of the conceptual inventory is an external
force function f : DiTi
$ such that to any back-and-forth move between syntactic and semantic
particle a at any time t and to any itemizing natural
number n it assigns the nth external force vector
f (a, t, n) exerted on a at time t.
The ordered sextuple
Mathematical Models in Philosophy of Science
A few words about these axioms are in order.
According to the set-theoretical predicate view, the-
ories are not treated as families of statements or
axioms (i.e., linguistic entities). Rather, they are
viewed as certain classes of set-theoretical structures,
serving as extensions of ‘interesting’ set-theoretical
predicates. It should be noted that this approach does
not provide a sharp distinction between theories in
mathematics vs. empirical science. Evidently, the set-
theoretical predicate program is extremely general; it
comprises many models nobody would ever seriously
regard as ‘useful’. For example, the CPM predicate
above applies both to the traditional models of the
planetary system and to infinitely many unintended
numerical and geometric models (see Mathematical
Psychology).
The foregoing definition and example may lead one
to believe that in an attempt to overcome the weak-
nesses of the standard view with the help of set theory,
actually nothing has been accomplished, because
the familiar Galois connection between first-order
theories and their models automatically justifies a
formulations of theories. Indeed, a first-order formal
theory T automatically defines its collection of alter-
native models Mod (T ), namely, the body of set-
theoretic structures in which the theory’s axioms are
true, and conversely, a given collection of models 
f D, S, T, s, m, f g specifies the theory Th(), comprised of all sentences
which simply lists the foregoing set-based conceptual
inventory, is the common mathematical shorthand
for a possible classical particle model. (To reduce no-
tational clutter, auxiliary domains and isomorphism
maps are not included.)
In this simple modeling situation, the pertinent set-
theoretical predicate ‘… is a CPM’ (designating the
property of being a classical particle mechanics model)
is defined extensionally as follows:
Definition: fD, S, T, s, m, f g is a CPM if and only if
the following axioms hold:
Frame Conditions
(a) D, S, and T are nonempty sets, and D is finite;
(b) m : D +, s : DiT S, and f: DiTi
$ bitrary but fixed similarity type (i.e., models in the
are set-theoretic maps; and
(c) The implicit maps τ : T  and σ : S $ are
(metric) isomorphisms such that the composite map
σ @ s(a, τ−"(:)) :  $ is twice differentiable for all
a ? D.
SubstantiŠe Laws
The following equation (Newton’s second law of
motion)
d#
m(a): σ @ s (a, τ−"(x)) l  f (a, τ−"(x), n)
dx# n?
concrete empirical situations, Suppes identified three
holds for all particles a ? D and reals x ?  with a
presumed absolutely convergent right-hand side.
satisfied by the models in . But this is not the case in
general. For example, set-theoretic structures of the
form fD, S, T, s, m, f g can be described in many non-
equivalent (usually higher-order) ways, without alter-
ing the extension of the predicate ‘… is a CPM.’ The
above discussion shows that the semantic view does
not require any specific ‘laws of nature’ and is not
committed to any particular linguistic formulation.
In order to be able to draw a demarcation line
between classes of models used in pure mathematics
and empirical science, various alternatives to the set-
theoretical predicate approach have been developed.
One idea was to define an empirical theory in terms of
a collection of set-theoretic structures of some ar-
sense of Tarskian logical model theory), together with
a designated subset of models, serving as intended
applications of which the theory is expected to be
definitely true.
Suppes (1962) argued that the deficiency of the
syntactic conception in explaining the role of ex-
perimental procedures in relating theories to phenom-
ena can be corrected by postulating a hierarchy of
models which mediate between a designated higher-
level theory and an experimental situation. To tie the
set-theoretical predicate treatment of theories to more
typical levels of theories, which are sandwiched be-
tween a top-level theory and phenomena: theory of
experimental design (see Experimental Design: OŠer-
9401
Mathematical Models in Philosophy of Science
Šiew). Each level in the hierarchy is treated model-
theoretically, via a specification of a set-theoretical
predicate. This may also resolve the potential draw-
back of not being able to put a demarcation line
between mathematics and empirical science. Also, one
can obtain new models out of old ones by means of
standard product, quotient and other model-theoretic
constructions. The set-theoretical predicate approach
has numerous applications in the study of axiom-
atizability, undecidability, incompleteness, and theory
reduction.
In sum, this approach can be thought of as an
extension of Bourbaki’s ‘species of structures’ program
in mathematics to empirical science.
2. The Topological State Space View
The state space formulation of a theory was initiated
by Beth (1961), and further developed by Van Fraassen
(1970) and Suppe (1988). On this view, theories of
empirical systems are represented by topological state
spaces with a dynamic structure. Specifically, the set-
based triple fX, G, ∆g is called a state-space model of
a dynamical system iff X is a topological space, called
the state (phase) space of the system, G is a topological
group, referred to as the dynamic group of the system,
and ∆ : GiX X is a continuous group action,
satisfying ∆(1, x) l x and ∆(g, ∆(gh, x) l ∆(ggh, x) for
all g, gh ? G and x ? X.
The canonical example of a state-space model is the
classical phase space of a single particle, moving in a
potential field. In this case, the representing state space
X of the particle is given by the sixth Cartesian power
' % $i$ of the real line. Its elements are ordered
sextuples of the form f x, y, z, p, q, r g, specified by
conjugate pairs of position-momentum vectors, com-
monly used to provide a complete description of all
possible instantaneous states of a dynamical system.
Specifically, f x, y, z g is the position vector of the
unconstrained particle, measured in three independent
spatial directions, and likewise f p, q, r g codes the
particle’s momentum vector, viewed in three inde-
pendent directions. Of course, X is understood to be a
topological space, induced by the natural topology of
the real line. (For dynamical systems with n un-
constrained particles, the representing topological
state spaces have 3nj3n l 6n dimensions.)
Generally, physical quantities (observables) are
represented by continuous real-valued state functions
f : X . In particular, the Hamiltonian (total energy)
function h is given by the sum of the particle’s potential
and kinetic energy
1 possesses an empirical substructure isomorphic to the
h(x, y, z, p, q, r) l V(x, y, z)j ( p#jq#jr#)
2m
where m stands for the particle’s mass. Upon denoting
the state of the given particle at time t by
9402
f x(t), …, r(t) g, the coordinate functions x(t), …, r(t)
will satisfy the well-known sextuple of first-order,
deterministic Hamiltonian differential equations
(three for describing how the position coordinates are
changing with time, and another three for characteriz-
ing how momentum coordinates are changing with
time)
dx ch dp ch
l ,…, lk , …
dt cp dt cx
which in ‘practice’ tend to have unique solutions for all
t. That is, given any time instant t and a state
f x ,…, r g in X, there exists a unique ! differen-
! !
tiable map ∆h :   such that ∆h(t) l f x(t), y(t),
z(t), p(t), q(t), r(t) g and the coordinate function x(t),
…, r(t) satisfy the differential equations with the initial
condition ∆h(t ) l f x , …, r g. Consequently, some-
!
what more formally, ! any!t there is a dynamic map
for
∆h(t) : X X with the interpretation that if x is the
state of the particle at time th, then ∆h(t) (x) is the
particle’s state at time tjth. Simply, there is a one-
parameter time group G l , acting on the state space
X via ∆ : i  where ∆(t, x) l ∆h(t) (x).
The Hamiltonian equations determine the phase
trajectory of a given state x in the state space, i.e., a
curve (geometric orbit of states) o∆(t, x) Qt ? q in X,
representing the evolution of the dynamical system
with initial state x. The set of phase trajectories
constitutes a complete phase portrait of the dynamical
system under consideration. The phase portrait can be
thought of as the ‘law’ governing the particle’s motion.
An essential point here is that within the state space
framework one can work with the geometric structure
of the state space model, even when analytic in-
tegration of the Hamiltonian differential equations
proves impossible. In sum, the state space view does
not require any specific equational laws of nature;
qualitative state space geometry can be studied and
applied in its own right.
Van Fraassen (1980) interprets the state space model
empiricistically. Although in general, state spaces tend
to include many states which do not correspond to
anything observable, there are special subsets of states
that can be specified observationally, by means of
designated state functions, representing measurable
quantities, such as position and velocity. Under-
standably, their values can only be measured with finite
accuracy and during a limited period of time. Van
Fraassen refers to these subsets of ‘observable’ states
together with a string of measurable state functions as
empirical substructures of a state space model. On the
state space view, a state space model is empirically
adequate for a dynamical system just in case it
observable phenomena associated with the dynamical
system. Since there may be no objective way to single
out the totality of observable phenomena associated
with a dynamical system, there is considerable debate

over the seemingly inocuous notions of ‘empirical
substructure’ and ‘isomorphism.’
In sum, the state space conception is particularly
useful in representing the dynamic aspects of time-
dependent phenomena. Specifically, chaotic behavior
and stability conditions of nonlinear dynamical
systems may be more conveniently handled within the
geometric universe of state spaces than by the tra-
ditional analytic method of equations. Traditionally,
however, state space reconstructions are intended for
modeling the behavior of so-called dissipative and
conservative systems, and in view of their highly
specialized geometric structure, they do not always fit
the prevailing views about models and modeling in
philosophy of science.
Mathematical Models in Philosophy of Science
A scientific theory is defined, in essence, by a
collection of models of an arbitrary but fixed similarity
type of the foregoing kind. The choice of axioms to be
satisfied by the models of such a class is considered to
be of secondary importance, so long as alternate
collections of axioms continue to individuate the same
class of models. Structuralists tend to classify axioms
into frame conditions and substantiŠe laws. Frame
conditions specify the domains and codomains of all
functions and relations given in the model, and the
laws state (in the language of available concepts)
suitable structural or technical conditions pertaining
to those aspects of the world that are of modeling
interest. There are many conditions placed on classes
of models in various contexts, and a number of them
are summarized below.
In structuralism, the totality of models p satisfy-
ing only the frame conditions of a theory is called its
3. The Structuralist Program
The structuralist view, advocated by Stegmu$ ller (1976)
and his followers (see Balzer et al. 1987, 1996), holds
that the most adequate way to understand the essence
of scientific theories is by treating them as complexes
of set-theoretic structures, made up of simpler struc-
tures. On this bottom-up conception, in analogy with
the Bourbakian notion of species of structures, a
larger variety of classes of models is considered. It is a
formal theory about scientific theories, their structure,
interaction and dynamics.
The structuralist school provides a systematic for-
mal methodology to reconstruct particular scientific
theories and their development. It has great philo-
sophical appeal because it also handles many global
issues, including reduction, equivalence, approxi-
mation, and specialization of scientific theories.
Very much as in the set-theoretical predicate frame-
work, the simplest structural units of a theory are its
models (in the sense of formal semantics), that is, n-
tuples of the form
f D, Dh, …, R, Rh, …, f, f h, … g
collection of potential models. The body of models 
satisfying all the frame conditions and the substantive
laws of a theory is called its class of actual models.
Because structuralists lean towards an empiricist
outlook on science, they usually assume a dichotomy
of theoretical and non-theoretical (observation) rela-
tions and functions in their models. The theoretical
component of a model (given by its domains, and
designated theoretical relations and functions) is
regarded as something intrinsic to the ambient theory.
That is, the truth values of relations and numerical
values of functions can only be determined by as-
suming the theory. On the other hand, the non-
theoretical part of the model can be determined from
sources external to the theory. This also means, in
particular, that the values of non-theoretical functions
and relations in the model can be obtained from
measurement (see Measurement Theory: History and
Philosophy), governed by other (auxiliary) theories.
This distinction is quite similar to the standard
dichotomization of statistical concepts into para-
meters and statistics (see Statistics: The Field), and
the system engineers’ partition of concepts into a pair
of disjoint sets of system parameters and input\output
variables, respectively. The collection of models pp
understood to be comprised of three types of math-
ematical objects:
Ontology: D, Dh,… are the principal domains of
the model. They contain objects (or rather their
idealizations), such as particles, fields, genes, com-
modities, persons, etc., assumed by the theory. Typical
standard auxiliary mathematical domains of reals,
integers, etc., are also included, but for the sake of
brevity, they are not made visible in the model’s
notation.
Relational Structure: R, Rh, … denote the basic
(reducts) obtained from p by simply lopping off all
theoretical relations and functions is called the class of
partial potential models of the theory. (There is a
serious debate over the desirability and tenability of
assuming the foregoing dichotomy.)
Models of a theory are usually related by various
constraints. For example, in the theory of classical
particle mechanics, it is usually assumed that the mass
of a given particle is the same in all models, whose
principal domains contain the particle. Formally,
constraints  are families of sets of models. In this
comparative relations, defined on (some) of the do- example, the class p of possible models consists of
mains listed above. sextuples fD, S, T, s, m, f g, satisfying only the frame
QuantitatiŠe Structure: f, f h, … designate func- conditions of classical particle mechanics, and the
tions from products of principal and auxiliary domains class  of actual models is defined by sextuples
to real numbers or their vectors. fD, S, T, s, m, f g, satisfying both the frame con-

9403
Mathematical Models in Philosophy of Science
ditions and the substantive laws. Since external force
and mass function are regarded as theoretical, partial
potential models have the simple form fD, S, T, s g.
In a somewhat arcane way, with the notation above,
the structuralist school represents a scientific theory in
terms of quadruples of classes of models of the
following form:
enough to treat theories category-theoretically, but it
seems far less clear how to isolate interesting and
powerful categories that include a number of decisive
constructions, essential for characterizing the struc-
ture and dynamics of actual scientific theories.
Another mathematical direction in twentieth–
twenty-first century philosophy of science is the
algorithmic (computational) approach (see Algor-
f , p, pp, g
ithms and Algorithmic Complexity). Along the lines of
where  9 p,  9 p, and there is an implicit Chaitin (1992), one can consider syntactically formu-
projection map π : p pp.
The realm of observable phenomena to which
theory users may want to apply their theory’s concepts
and laws can also by represented by suitable collec-
tions, usually denoted by . Concretely, structuralists
propose to capture bodies of intended applications
lated scientific theories of empirical phenomena as
analogs of algorithms or computer programs, capable
of encapsulating all data available about the phenom
ena in question. The reason for doing this is that the
interpretation of theories as programs and data as
program outputs leads to an important measure of
empiricistically by  9 pp or realistically by algorithmic complexity of scientific theories. The
 9 p. The second alternative is more appropriate
when some of the values of theoretical functions and
relations are already known. For empiricists, at any
given stage of knowledge, the set  refers to the
totality of potential data the theory is supposed to
account for. Finally, the structuralists are also able to
characterize the content of their theories. It is a range
of ways the phenomena could be (i.e., possible
configurations of data) according to the given theory.
algorithmic complexity of a theory of a particular
phenomenon is taken to be the length of the shortest
program (understood as the counterpart of the theory)
that reproduces all pertinent data about the phenom-
enon. Here, the length can be measured by the
number of symbols needed to present the program in
a universal programming language. According to the
algorithmic approach, the point of a scientific theory is
to reduce the arbitrariness in its data. If the program
Formally, the content Cont(, p, pp, ) of a that reproduces the data (and serving as the theory’s
theory consists of all subsets of partial potential counterpart) has the same length as the body of data
models in pp whose members are extendable (by itself, then the theory is obviously redundant. Algor-
adding suitable theoretical components) into a full ithmically incompressible data possess no regularities
model that is a member of both  and . Now an whatsoever. They are random in the sense that they
empirical claim of a theory is just a simple condition can be neither predicted not characterized by laws
 ? Cont(, p, pp, ), stating, in an extremely
high-flown way, that the entities to which the theory is
to be applied actually bear the structure proposed by
the theory.
Often scientific theories form a partially ordered
network of directly or indirectly related theories
(theory nets) which can be aggregated into still larger
units, called theory holons. Models in theory holons
are not necessarily of the same similarity type. These
models are usually interrelated by external links. For
example, links between Newtonian, Hamiltonian, and
Lagrangue’s mechanics can be understood as part of a
physical theory holon.
With this apparatus, Stegmu$ ller and others have
(more or less) successfully reconstructed Kuhn’s the-
ory of paradigm shifts and Lakatos’ research pro-
grams. Of course, model-theoretic approaches cannot
resolve all problems of philosophy of science, but they
can make them clearer and hopefully more tractable.
More recently, some philosophers of science (e.g.,
Mormann 1996) have considered casting the structural
approach to scientific theories in the framework of
category theory. In this approach, objects of categories
are given by models or model classes, or pairs of such
descriptively shorter than the body of data itself.
Chaitin points out that these ideas of complexity can
be extended readily to empirical systems. Specifically,
algorithmic complexity of an empirical system is the
length of the shortest program that simulates (or
describes) it.
The dual idea of organizational complexity (compu-
tational cost) derives from the running time for the
shortest program that generates the data. To ap-
preciate the nicety of this concept, observe that while
the time required for solving finite systems of algebraic
equations grows only as a polynomial function of the
number of equations, the solution time for the famous
Tower of Hanoi toy problem increases exponentially
with the number of rings. For example, with only 64
rings the problem requires 2'%k1 steps, taking over
five trillion years with one ring transfer per 10 seconds.
In brief, organizational complexity subdivides the
class of computable entities into those that are
‘practically’ computable and those that are not.
Algorithmic and computational approaches are at the
heart of many modern logical techniques, applied in
philosophy of science. These approaches suggest that
scientific theories and systems can be compared with
classes (e.g., fp,  g), and the arrows are appro- respect to both their degrees of algorithmic com-
priate structure-preserving maps (e.g., sending pairs of pressibility and amounts of organizational complexity
model classes to their direct images). It is plausible (intrinsic depth).

9404

4. Conclusion
The most immediate connection between philosophy
of science and mathematics is via the structure of
scientific theories. Although all three approaches
examined here are employed frequently in actual
scientific work, they harbor serious difficulties. The
popular set-theoretical predicate approach does not
draw a line between empirical and mathematical
theories. A far more specialized topological state space
method fails to provide sufficient support for the
empirical meaning of its topological structure. Finally,
the extensive complexity found in the structuralist
methodology generates pessimism regarding the re-
construction of actual scientific theories. Be that as it
may, close analysis of these different approaches will
affirm that the semantic method has cast a good deal
of light on the nature of scientific theories and
therefore will stay for the present. There is, however, a
strong possibility that in the foreseeable future the set-
theoretic approach will be replaced gradually by the
methods of category theory.
See also: Axiomatic Theories; Explanation: Con-
ceptions in the Social Sciences; Functional Ex-
planation: Philosophical Aspects; Kuhn, Thomas S
(1922–96); Logical Positivism and Logical Empiri-
cism; Reduction, Varieties of; Structuralism
Bibliography
Balzer W, Moulines C U (eds.) 1996 Structuralist Theory of
Science. Focal Issues, New Results. Walter de Gruyter, New
York
Balzer W, Moulines C U, Sneed J 1987 An Architectonic for
Science: The Structuralist Program. D Reidel, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands
Beth E 1961 Semantics of physical theories. In: Freudenthal H
(ed.) The Concept and the Role of the Model in Mathematics
and Natural and Social Sciences. D Reidel, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands
Chaitin G J 1992 Algorithmic Information Theory. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK
Krantz D H, Luce R D, Suppes P, Tversky A (eds.) 1971
Foundations of Measurement, Vol. I. Academic Press, New
York
Mormann T 1996 Categorical structuralism. In: Balzer W,
Moulines C U (eds.) Structuralist Theory of Science. Focal
Issues, New Results. Walter de Gruyter, New York
Stegmu$ ller W 1976 The Structure and Dynamics of Theories.
Springer, New York
Suppe F 1988 The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific
Realism. University of Illinois Press, Chicago, IL
Suppes P 1957 Introduction to Logic. Van Nostrand, Princeton,
NJ
Suppes P 1962 Models of data. In: Nagel E, Suppes P, Tarski A
(eds.) Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Pro-
ceedings of the 1960 International Congress. Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford, CA
Suppes P 1988 Scientific Structures and their Representation,
preliminary version. Stanford University, Stanford, CA
Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
Mathematical Psychology
Suppes P 1993 Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science:
Selected Essays. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, The Nether-
lands
Van Fraassen B C 1970 On the extension of Beth’s semantics of
physical theories. Philosophy of Science 37: 325–39
Van Fraassen B C 1980 The Scientific Image. Oxford University
Press, New York
Z. Domotor
Mathematical Psychology
Mathematics has been used in psychology for a long
time, and for different purposes. When William James
(see Miller 1964) writes
Success
Self-esteem l (1)
Pretensions
he is using mathematical notation metaphorically.
Because no method is provided to measure the three
variables, the equation cannot be taken literally. James
means to convey, by a dramatic formula, the idea that
if your pretensions increase without a corresponding
increase of your success, your self-esteem will suffer.
Such usages of mathematics, which (Miller 1964) calls
‘discursive’, can be found in psychological discourse at
least since Aristotle. They were especially in favor in
the last three centuries, often in the guise of some
monomial equation resembling those of classical
physics, whose success invited emulation. Examples
can be found in the works of Francis Hutcheson,
Moritz W. Drobisch, Johann F. Herbart, or more
recently, Kurt Lewin, Edward C. Tolman, and Clark
L. Hull. Despite their historical interest, we shall not
review such metaphorical uses of mathematics here
(see rather Boring 1950, or Miller 1964).
In this article, we reserve the term ‘mathematical
psychology’ to the elaboration and the testing of
mathematical theories (or models) for behavioral data.
In principle, such a theory entails an economical
representation of a particular set of data in math-
ematical terms, where ‘economical’ means that the
number of free parameters of the theory is substan-
tially smaller that the number of degrees of freedom
(e.g., independent variables) in the data. In that sense,
mathematical psychology plays for behavioral data
the role that mathematical physics or mathematical
biology play for physics or biology, respectively. In the
best cases, the theory is cast in probabilistic terms and
is testable by standard statistical methods. The large
majority of such mathematical theories for behavioral
data have emerged from four partially overlapping
traditional fields: psychophysics, learning, choice, and
response latencies. Each of these fields is outlined
9405
ISBN: 0-08-043076-7