G.R. No.

174143: November 28, 2011

SPOUSES RICARDO HIPOLITO, JR. and LIZA HIPOLITO, Petitioners, v. TERESITA

CINCO,CARLOTA BALDE CINCO and ATTY. CARLOS CINCO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner-spouses allege that on June 15, 1989, Edeltrudis entered into an agreement with
Francisco Villena (now deceased) to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street,
San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing
house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis
built a three-storey apartment building. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the
death of Edeltrudis.

In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of Francisco
Villena, all residing in the property, were informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Atty.
Cinco) acquired the subject property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976.

Respondents filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection.

In his memorandum, Engr. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden
materials were found in the premises and recommended that the matter be referred to the
Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate action and disposition.

Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement pursuant to the National Building Code

(NBC), the verified request of the respondents was referred to the Committee for Hearing/
Investigation.

With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, hearings were subsequently held for purposes of
resolving the focal issue of "the structural stability, architectural presentability, electrical and fire
safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the subject buildings are still safe for continued
occupancy."

A report based on another ocular inspection conducted was submitted through a Memorandum
which states the subject buildings are structurally unsafe as well as fire and electrical hazard
thereby endangering the life, safety, health and welfare [of] the general public specifically the
tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly recommended that the subject building be declared
dangerous and ruinous.

The OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and recommended their demolition. A
Demolition Order addressed to the respondents.

Petitioners thus appealed to the DPWH.

On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a Resolution dismissing the appeal of the
petitioners for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and the issuance of the
Demolition Order.

Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal with the OP but the same was denied. An MR was also
denied.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA which dismissed their petition. An
MR was likewise denied.

Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: (1) Whether OBO can render the challenged issuances, (2) Whether the CA erred in
relying on OBOs report when it rendered the assailed decision.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

OBO CAN RENDER THE CHALLENGED ISSUANCES

The Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned Demolition Order in view of his
finding that the disputed structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the purview of
P.D. No. 1096. Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which the resolution and
demolition order were issued is evident. The records show that the OBO issued the resolution
and Demolition Order only after ocular inspections and hearings. The Inspectorate Team of the
DPWH came up with the same conclusion when it conducted its own ocular inspection of the
premises.

CAS RELIANCE ON OBO REPORT

The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly received, on reported
dangerous and ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the life, health and well-
being of the inhabitants, and the general public. Otherwise stated, respondents motive in
initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the challenged OBO Resolution and
Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a
building or structure is dangerous and ruinous. Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found
no irregularities in the manner that officials of the OBO performed their duties and in coming up
with its Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was affirmed by the CA when it
resolved the petition before it. We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the
findings of fact of the OBO and the other administrative bodies.
G.R. No. 192861; June 30, 2014

LINDA RANA vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG
ONG

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 192862

SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY, WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact of TERESITA LEE

WONG, and SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG vs. SPS. REYNALDO and
LINDA RANA

Doctrine:

It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not
be summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken
under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private
nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or
unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission, establishment, business or condition of the
property of another may file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be
judicially sought through a civil action therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil
Code for summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not
concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be
demanded.
Facts:

Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong (Wong, et. al) are co-owners pro-
indiviso of a residential land situated in Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, abutting a
10-meter wide subdivision road (subject road).

On the opposite side of the subject road, are the adjacent lots of Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy
(Sps. Uy) and Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana (Sps. Rana). The said lots follow a rolling
terrain with the Rana property standing about 2 meters higher than and overlooking the Uy
property, while the Wong-Ong property is at the same level with the subject road.
Sometime in 1997, Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road that runs
between the Rana and Wong-Ong properties (subject portion) in order to level the said portion
with their gate. They likewise backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence separating the Rana and
Uy properties without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling
materials.

The matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Lahug as well as the Office of
the Building Official of Cebu City (OBO), but to no avail.

Wong, et al. then filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against Sps. Rana
before the RTC, seeking to: (a) declare the subject portion as a nuisance which affected the
ingress and egress of Wong and Sps. Ong to their lot; (b) declare the subject backfilling as a
nuisance; (c) compel Sps. Rana to restore the subject portion to its original condition; (d) compel
Sps. Rana to remove the backfilling materials along Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence and repair the
damage to the fence; and (e) pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.

In their Answer Sps. Rana countered that prior to the construction of their residence, there was
no existing road and they merely developed the subject portion which abuts their gate in view of
the rolling terrain. They claimed that Wong and Sps. Ong do not have any need for the subject
portion because their property is facing an existing road. They likewise denied having
undertaken any backfilling along the boundary of the Uy property considering the natural
elevation of their own property, which renders backfilling unnecessary.

After the filing of Sps. Rana’s Answer, Wong, et al., in turn, filed a Motion for Leave to be
Allowed to Bring in Heavy Equipment for the intermediate development of the Wong-Ong
property with a view to the use of the subject road as access to their lot. Notwithstanding Sps.
Rana’s opposition, the RTC granted Wong, et al.’s motion in a November 27, 1997 Order
(Order).

Despite the limited tenor of the Order, Wong, et al., proceeded to level the subject portion,
which, in the process, hampered Sps. Rana’s ingress and egress to their residence, resulting too
to the entrapment of their vehicle inside their garage.

Feeling aggrieved, Sps. Rana, filed a Supplemental Answer, praying for: (a) the restoration of the
soil, boulders, grade, contour, and level of the subject portion; and (b) payment of moral
damages, actual and consequential damages, and exemplary damages.

Meanwhile, Sps. Rana filed with another branch of the same trial court a Complaint for
Recovery of Property and Damages against Sps. Uy. They alleged that Sps. Uy encroached upon
an 11-sq. m. portion along the common boundary of their properties. Their demands for
rectification as well as barangay conciliation efforts were, however, ignored. Thus, they prayed
that Sps. Uy be ordered to remove their fence along the common boundary and return the
encroached portion, as well as to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After the filing of Sps. Rana’s complaint, the separate cases were consolidated.
In response thereto, Sps. Uy filed an Answer with Counterclaim, averring that while they
encroached around 3 sq. m. of the Rana property, Sps. Rana intruded into 7 sq. m. of their
property. Hence, they posited that they had "a bigger cause than that of Sps. Rana in so far as
encroachment is concerned." Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of Sps. Rana’s
complaint with counterclaim for damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The RTC found that: (a) Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with the subdivision owner or
their neighbors, developed to their sole advantage the subject portion consisting of one-half of
the width of the 10-meter subject road by introducing filling materials, and rip rapping the side
of the road; (b) the said act denied Wong and Sps. Ong the use of the subject portion and affected
the market value of their property; (c) Sps. Uy have no intention of using the subject portion for
ingress or egress considering that they built a wall fronting the same; and (d) Wong, et al.’s
manner of enforcing the November 27, 1997 Order caused damage and injury to Sps. Rana and
amounted to bad faith.

In view of these findings, the RTC declared that the parties all acted in bad faith, and, therefore,
no relief can be granted to them against each other.

Separately, however, the RTC found that the backfilling done by Sps. Rana on their property
exerted pressure on the perimeter fence of the Uy property, thereby constituting a nuisance. As
such, the former were directed to construct a retaining wall at their own expense. Meanwhile, the
RTC, despite having adopted the findings of Atty. Reuel T. Pintor – a court-appointed
commissioner who determined that Sps. Uy encroached the Rana property by 2 sq. m –
dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim for damages because of the failure of both parties
to substantiate their respective claims of bad faith against each other.

Dissatisfied, the parties filed separate appeals with the CA.

The CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC.

The parties filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied.

Hence, the recourse to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC errs in (a) not finding Wong and Sps. Uy guilty of malice and bad faith
both in instituting the Civil Cases and in erroneously implementing the November 27, 1997
Order, and (b) failing or refusing to grant the reliefs prayed for. (Sps. Rana)

Whether or not the RTC errs in (a) applying the in pari delicto doctrine against the parties and
failing to abate the nuisance, and (b) not finding Sps. Rana guilty of bad faith in instituting the
Civil Cases and ordering them to pay damages. (Wong, et. al)

Ruling:
The petitions are partly meritorious.
For Abatement of Nuisance and Damages.

Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as "any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency
or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street,
or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property." Based on case law,
however, the term "nuisance" is deemed to be "so comprehensive that it has been applied to
almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property,
the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort."

Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that they
affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which "affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"); or (b) a private nuisance (or
one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" [or, as case law puts it, one which "violates
only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons"]).

Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary

abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a nuisance
may either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which "affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity"); or (b) a nuisance
per accidens (or that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its
existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.")

It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be
summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken under
the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the
Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably interfered with
by the act, omission, establishment, business or condition of the property of another may file a
civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be judicially sought through a civil
action therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the
requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement
and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not a
nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was
built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was
admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-
Ong properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se (but actually a nuisance per
accidens as will be later discussed) it cannot be summarily abated.

As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s subject portion, which was not sanctioned
under the RTC’s November 27, 1997 Order, remains unwarranted.
Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in favor of Sps. Rana particularly that of (a) nominal
damages – for the vindication and recognition of Sps. Rana’s right to be heard before the court
prior to Wong, et al.’s abatement of the subject portion (erroneously perceived as a nuisance per
se) – and (b) temperate damages – for the pecuniary loss owing to the demolition of the subject
portion, which had been established albeit uncertain as to the actual amount of loss.

Sps. Rana’s entitlement to the above-mentioned damages, however, is precluded by the damage
they themselves have caused Wong, et al. in view of their construction of the subject portion.
As the records establish, Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with Wong, et al. and to their sole
advantage, elevated and cemented almost half of the 10-meter wide subject road. As
homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the rights to the unobstructed
use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject portion, Sps. Rana
introduced a nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the aforesaid rights. Thus, for
the vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’s rights, Sps. Rana should be similarly held liable
for nominal damages.

Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, courts have the discretion to determine awards of nominal
and temperate damages without actual proof of pecuniary loss, as in this case. Assessing the
respective infractions of the parties herein, the Court finds it prudent to sustain the CA’s verdict
offsetting the damage caused by said parties against each other.

Inapplicability of the in Pari Delicto Principle

The principle of in pari delicto provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves
them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does not
apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts.

Clearly, no void or inexistent contract is herein at issue.

As for the subject backfilling touching the perimeter fence of the Uy property, records show that
the said fence was not designed to act as a retaining wall but merely to withhold windload and its
own load.

Both the RTC and the CA found the subject backfilling to have added pressure on the fence,
consequently endangering the safety of the occupants of the Uy property, especially considering
the higher elevation of the Rana property.

With these findings, the Court thus agrees with the courts a quo that there is a need for Linda
Rana to construct a retaining wall which would bear the weight and pressure of the filling
materials introduced on their property.

For Recovery of Property.

The Court finds that the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s dismissal thereof.
Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of property may prosper, the party
prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his ownership thereof.

In the present cases, the Report of the court-appointed commissioner, showed that Sps. Uy’s
perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m. of the Rana property. Both the RTC and the CA relied upon
the said report; thus, absent any competent showing that the said finding was erroneous, the
Court sees no reason to deviate from the conclusions reached by the courts a quo. Having
sufficiently proven their claim, Sps. Rana are, therefore entitled to the return of the 2 sq. m.
encroached portion.

Corollary thereto, compliance by Linda Rana with the directive to build a retaining wall on their
property shall be held in abeyance pending return of the encroached portion.

Expenses

Lastly, considering that neither of the parties was able to successfully prove (a) their claims for
malicious prosecution, (b) their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, and (c) the
attendance of any of the circumstances under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, their respective
claims for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses against each other are also denied.

GUILLERMO M. TELMO vs. LUCIANO M. BUSTAMANTE G.R. No. 182567 July 13, 2009

FACTS:

The complaint alleged that respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters in
Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos) are the
owners of the two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located
at the back of respondents lot. When his lot was transgressed by the construction of the
Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The
latter refused because they said they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being
covered by the roads 10-meter easement.

The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-
A in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos encroached upon
respondents lot. Petitioner then uttered, Hanggat ako ang municipal engineer ng Naic, Cavite,
hindi kayo makakapagtayo ng anuman sa lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng building permit.

On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00 p.m. of the
same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The following day,
respondents relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction of the concrete
poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same, because he was present when the
incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the incident in the barangay blotter.

Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just compensation from
the government when it took a portion of their property for the construction of the Noveleta-
Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due
to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos and Consumo.

ISSUE:

W/N property claimed and enclosed with concrete posts by respondent was validly taken by the
National Government through its power of eminent domain, pursuant to Executive Order No.
113, as amended by Executive Order No. 253, creating the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. In this
context, petitioner contends that the concrete posts erected by respondent were a public nuisance
under Article 694 (4)

HELD:

Petitioner contends that respondents concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se, which
may be the subject of summary abatement sans any judicial proceedings. Again, we disagree.

A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.[31] Evidently, the concrete posts
summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and
properties, which would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at
most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and
from the national road.

TIMONER VS. PEOPLE ET. AL. - NOVEMBER 25, 1983 (G.R. NO. L-62050)

FACTS: Jose Timoner, the petitioner, was convicted by the Municipal Court of Daet with the
crime of Grave Coercion, as penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, because of the
complaint by Pascual Dayaon, Lourdes Rabustillos and others. Timoner, then Mayor of Daet,
together with two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers,
was acting on the recommendation of Dra. Allegre, the Municipal Health Officer, to close among
other structures that were along the sidewalk, the barbershop of Dayaon and store of Rabustillos.
Timoner filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines Norte against Rebustillos and others for
judicial abatement of their stalls, alleged that the stalls constituted public nuisances as well as per
se. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which was the Intermediate Appellate Court
then, however, the CA affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court. Petitioner claimed that
their actions was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.

ISSUES: Whether or not Timoner committed Grave Coercion. Whether or not the structures
among the sidewalk are constituted as public nuisances, and nuisances per se. Whether or not
Timoner was within his authority to close the structures.

HELD: The petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged. He did not commit Grave Coercon as
the elements of Grave Coercion required that he acted not under the authority of the law. As the
then Mayor of the City, Timoner had the authority to act on behalf of the recommendation and
his constituents’ right to public order and safety, and that such stalls along the sidewalk affected
the community and general public, as it is in a public place, and was annoying to all who come
within its sphere. The Supreme Court did contend that the barbershop did constitute a public
nuisance, as defined under Article 694 and 695 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Furthermore, it had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer.

The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been
recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus:

Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any legality or right that
exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk,  especially in a
highway  where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through
the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly
structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit
or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend
legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or
any considerable number of persons and the general public which posed a danger to the people in
general passing and using that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of
its rights — the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere.