1
AC No. 4017. September 29, 1999.*
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs.
ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own.—“x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the
criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this
Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity
from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.” Administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden
of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or
suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a
criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. —It
should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in
the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.—
Juxtaposed to the complainant’s evidence, the bare denials of respondent
cannot overturn the IBP’s findings that he has indeed presented a false
receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his client’s money. We agree with
the IBP that “it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio
Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure
of filing a case before the Supreme Court, could spuriously weave such
documents which are denied by the respondent.” In view of the foregoing,
respondent has clearly failed the standards of his noble profession. As we
have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson: “[L]awyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”
Same; Same; Same; The Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer
for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an
execution. —Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he
demanded money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the
same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v.
Lumaya, the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not
remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution,
viz.: “[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his
former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to
deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear
breach of the canons of professional responsibility.”
Same; Same; Same; Same.—In Obia v. Catimbang, we meted out the same
penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him:
“The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with
disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such
misconduct discredits the legal profession.” Respondent’s acts are more
despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he
also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he
had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the
bar.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999]
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs.
ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed
before this Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R.
Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as
counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts
that respondent should be disbarred for the following acts:

1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final
and executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five
US dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for cash
bond in the appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.[1]
In his Answer,[2] respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to
file an appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who
insisted on appealing the case in order to delay the execution of the POEA
Decision.[3] He also controverts complainants allegation that he asked for a
cash bond and that he issued the fake receipt.[4]
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the complaint were summarized by the IBP in
this wise:
Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given
the task to defend the interest of the complainant corporation in POEA
Case No. 8888-06-468, entitled Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when the said case was
resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5, 1992, the
respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had
already become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an]
apparent desire to collect or to bleed his client of several thousand
pesos of attorneys fees, convinced the complainant to appeal the case
before the Supreme Court. Thus, on December 14, 1992, the
respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review which
was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter
misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the complainant
ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a] Cash Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR
amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S.
$2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order that the said appealed case
could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. The said amount
was given to the respondent.
x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that
the fees to be paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal
filing and docket fees for such kind of appeal but in order to cover up
respondents misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a
2
fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme court receipt representing
payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the
complainant corporation revealed that the said receipt issued by the
treasurers office of the Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a
fake receipt. The said verification revealed that what was only paid by
the respondent to the Supreme court was the amount of P622.00 as
shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court Docket-
Receiving Section showing the handwritten name of the respondent for
purpose of showing that the said computation was requested by and
addressed to the respondent.[5](citations omitted)
Meanwhile, a criminal case for estafa based on the same facts was
filed against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was
declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion
to Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been
acquitted in the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.[7]
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors
Resolution, which approved the investigating commissioners report[8] and
recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose
justified his recommendation in this manner:
x x x [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that
the signature [on the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was
his. Hence, respondent anchors his position on a mere denial that it is
not his signature. Likewise, the respondent denies the check voucher
dated December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of the
respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No
evidence, however, was presented by the respondent that his
signature therein was falsified and irregular. [As to the altered
Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent denied] that he ha[d]
anything to do with it because it was the complainant who signed the
Petition for Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be
the payee because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But
while it is true that the affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr.
Rogelio G. Gatchalian, president of the complainant company, the
respondent does not deny that he signed the said petition as counsel
of the petitioner corporation and that he was actually the one who
prepared the same and the notary public before whom the affiant

subscribed and [swore] as the one who caused the preparation of the
said petition.
The legal form (Exh. G) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re
G.R. 107984 was denied by the respondent because according to him
he was never given a chance to cross-examine the person who issued
the [certification] x x x. However, respondent does not deny that he is
the person referred to by the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza who paid
the legal fees of P622.00.
In addition to the said respondents Formal Offer of Evidence, he
submitted to this Commission as his most important piece of evidence
the Decision of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled People
of the Philippines versus Primo R. Naldoza, the copy of which Decision
is appended to his Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated July 22,
1996 praying for the dismissal of the present administrative case in
view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based on the
same facts and evidence.[9] (citations omitted)
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondents contention that his
acquittal in the companion criminal case should result in the dismissal of this
administrative complaint. The commissioner emphasized that the criminal
case for estafa[10] was completely different from the proceedings before him;
acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter .[11] He
further noted that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability
of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant for
$2,555.[12]
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent
should be sanctioned. However, the recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondents
Motion to Dismiss should be denied. In that Motion, he maintains that
he should be cleared of administrative liability, because he has been
acquitted of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues that the issue
involved there was the very same issue litigated in this case, [13] and that his
exoneration was a result a full blown trial on the merits of this case. [14]
In a similar case, we have said:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar
to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of
xxx criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in
3
an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying
criminal cases.[15]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
 They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and
[16]
criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary;[17] in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required.[18] Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.[19]
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will
not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
[20]
 Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in
the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. [21] The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well
to remember the Courts ruling in In re Almacen,[22]  which we quote:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are  sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein.[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio . Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis ours)
We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.

First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA
Decision, despite knowing that it had already become final and
executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on
this point. Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the
appeal, his company had received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which
led him to the conlcusion that they [had] lost the case before the Supreme
Court.[23] This, however, does not substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the
appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed
on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and
executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that
the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court show that the
Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioners failure to submit an
Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order.  Clearly, this
charge has no leg to stand on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that
respondent obtained from complainant the amount of $2,555, on
the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before
this Court. According to Gatchalian,[24] respondent explained that the
amount would cover all the expenses to be incurred in the Petition for
Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer for the
payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given
or paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank
would not be garnished.[25] Corroborating Gatchalians testimony, Edna
Deles declared that respondent received the amount on the representation
that it would be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano
case.[26]
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. Quite
the contrary, when he paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as
his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not
the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of
another. This is an admission of misconduct.[27] In his Answer submitted to
this Court, he declared:
(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the
allegation of the Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being
that in all the cases and assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I was
made to report to him personally and to his Board of Directors the progress
of the cases both orally and in writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying
him P10,000.00 as my moral obligation only to find after accounting that he
still owes me P180,000.00 as attorneys fee [to] which I am entitled under
rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of the above-cited
rules, I have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in
4
satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services, otherwise known as
Attorneys Lien, as shown in my Service Billings and Statement of Accounts .
[28]
 (emphasis ours)
Contrary to respondents claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of
his attorneys lien. He demanded the money from his client on the pretext
that it was needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually
converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes malpractice.
[29]
 The claim that respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of his
client is just an afterthought, the accounting being made after the fact. It is
settled that the conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross
violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession.[30]
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money
entrusted to him, respondent gave complainant a photocopy of a
receipt purportedly showing that the Supreme Court had received
the sum of $2,555 from him. Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian [31] and
Deles[32] were equally clear on this point. After respondent had presented the
false receipt, Gatchalian learned that no such payment was made. Ms
Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash Collection and Disbursement
Division issued a certification that respondent had paid the amount of P622
only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the said case [33] contain no
indication at all the Court has required the payment of the latter sum, or
that it has been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainants evidence, the bare denials of
respondent cannot overturn the IBPs findings that he has indeed presented
a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his clients money. We
agree with the IBP that it is unbelievable that the complainant in the
person of Rogelio Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any
knowledge in the procedure of filing a case before the Supreme
court, could spuriously weave such documents which are denied by
the respondent.[34]
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of
his noble profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:[35]
[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded
money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and
then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,[36] the
 5

Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his
client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.:

[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former

client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the
amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of
the canons of professional responsibility.

In Obia v. Catimbang,[37] we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer

who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him:

The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and

gross misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with
disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such
misconduct discredits the legal profession."

Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate

the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to
part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of
this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue
being a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of

the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes,  and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,  concur.

Adm. Case No. 3249. November 29, 1989.*
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURENCE
D. CORDOVA, respondent.
Attorneys; Disbarment and Suspension; Requirement of good moral
character persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in
good standing; Case at bar.—After a review of the record, we agree with the
findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent
reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to
be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral
behavior of the respondent carried out in public and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar
itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to
show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On
the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent Cordova maintained for about 2 years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman, not his wife; He flaunted his
disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage.—In the instant case,
respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general
public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he,
rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period
of “reform”, respondent took up again with another woman not his wife,
cohabiting with her, and bringing along his young daughter to live with
them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 3249. November 29, 1989.]
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, Complainant, v. ATTY. LAURENCE
D. CORDOVA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
6
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged
her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by
the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to
submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant
complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised
and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband
charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was
declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within
fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to
submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988.
Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16
December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25
January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled
two (2) more times - first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11
April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear.
Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even
though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the
Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled." In an order
dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the
telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss
the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded
and nothing was heard from either party since then.chanrobles law library :
red
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts
of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering
him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
“Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and

out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived
somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his
family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and
left her own husband and children to stay with   Respondent. Respondent
Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife,
with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely
Holgado using the name “Fely Cordova”. Respondent Cordova gave Fely
Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market
at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.”
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an
apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from
Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or
cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate
family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to
Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that
respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant’s) children in
their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter
Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complainant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her
daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her
custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent’s promises to reform, he continued to live with
Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to
his legitimate family.
Finally, the Commission received a telegram message apparently from
complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled
with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does
not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of
the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar
is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a
7
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States,
held that "the continued possession . . . of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . .
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground for disbarment." 2 It is important to note that
the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to
good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and
won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited
with him and bore him a son. Because respondent’s conduct in Mortel was
particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his
own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the
marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.chanrobles law
library
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a
member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly
disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the
complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a
number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years
an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of
the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family
which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a
brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not
his wife, cohabiting with her, and bringing along his young daughter to live
with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice
of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will
consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to
provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library

Adm. Case No. 3249 November 29, 1989 A.C. No. 6593. February
4, 2010. *
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E.
GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, respondents.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Laws dealing with double
jeopardy or with procedure—such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of
affidavits of desistance by the complainant—do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar.—Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure—such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant—do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of
law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public. The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the
standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the
outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of
the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession; Admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he
became a lawyer.—From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the
practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 398 SCRA 658 (2003)
the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude
a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became
a lawyer. Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption
that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be
8
refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after
admission to the Bar.
Same; Same; Same; The disciplinary authority of the Court over the
members of the Bar recognized to be merely incidental to the Court’s
exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law.— Article VIII
Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the
Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court’s
exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the
implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the
oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Immoral conduct involves acts that are wilful, flagrant
or shameless and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community.—Immoral conduct
involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly
immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency but also of morality, including honesty, integrity
and fair dealing.—The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to
live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and
community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct—both
public and private—fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.
Same; Same; Same; Purposes of the Requirement of Good Moral Character.
—Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to
objective reality. To have good moral character, a person must have the
personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a
good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or
the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she
is known. The requirement of good moral character has four general
 9

purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image 4.      That on May, 1991, during my light moments with
of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine,
lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other. confided to me that sometime on the later part of
1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that
Same; Same; Same; Court finds Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as her behaviour demeaned dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May
the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.—We find that Atty. Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that
Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita,
legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere Manila together with a woman and a child who was
unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. In Barrientos v. Daarol, later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia
218 SCRA 30 (1993), we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively
only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral x x x
character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral  
standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these 5.      x x x x
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a  
member of the legal profession. 6.      That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I
was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the
child, stating among others that the said child is their
Republic of the Philippines
daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido
Supreme Court
and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were
Manila
married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
 
 
EN BANC
7.      That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal
home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a
their residence x x x
supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents Atty.
 
Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty.
8.      That since he left our conjugal home he failed and
Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ( IBP) Committee on
still failing to give us our needed financial support to
Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit
the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling
states:
because of financial constraints.
 
 
1.      That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by
x x x x
virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San
 
Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings
solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty.
 
Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral
2.      That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed
acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch
with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel
 
Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed
 
Garrido;
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas
 
charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was
3.      x x x x
not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David
 
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea

after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea
knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before she
married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to
financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to
Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved
his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family.
Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children
with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in
private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who
finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea
had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past
ten (10) years.
 
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted
before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third
marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977.
Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
 
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the
mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal
wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the
beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic
relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and
Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship
with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia)
financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty.
Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because
of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to
her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action
against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following
motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
 
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of
Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea
filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity [7] (of marriage)
Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
 
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the complaints
after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between
Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never
the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no
10
personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged
that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty.
Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed
before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also
denied this motion.[9]
 Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints
she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.
[10]
 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion. [11] 
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan ) submitted her Report and
Recommendation for the respondents disbarment. [12] The Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors ( IBP Board of Governors ) approved
and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No.
XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality
required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against
Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of
the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under
Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
  Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present
petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not
commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also
argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on
humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the
twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and
irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
 
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty.
Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar
Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a
modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the
view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty.
Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal

also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty.
Garrido.
 
 
THE COURTS RULING
 
 
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of
the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
 
General Considerations
 
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification
of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of
offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not
apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no
reason to depart from this ruling. [14] First, admission to the practice of law is
a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public.[15] The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the
standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the
outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; [16] effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of
the Court.
  As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the
immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in
considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission
to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the
legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted
to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude
a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became
a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer;
this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even
after admission to the Bar.[19]
11
 Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution
recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the
Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit
applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this
constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required
to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and
the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or
abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more
of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that
she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her
evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and
consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not
to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of
compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest
in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
  Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community. [20] Immoral conduct is gross
when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.[22]
  In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering
lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
 In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into
multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We
ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the
institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to
for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our
nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the
wayward respondent.
 
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the
complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held
that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character

required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to
the Bar.
 
 Similar to Villasanta  was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,
[25]
 where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the
daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited
a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that
demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a
second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and
the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross
immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not
only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
 
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue
his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court
that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the
study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a
bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia. [26] This was
a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited
relationship.
 
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with
Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first
marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of
the commission of a crime.
 
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with
Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without
taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions
on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his
second marriage.
 
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his
marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty.
Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced
Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry,
considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.
12
 
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido
married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
 
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido
simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2)
women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a
double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10)
years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his
marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia
A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act
of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to
escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.
 
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the
legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules,
of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer
at the time of his admission to the Bar. [27] As a lawyer, he violated his
lawyers oath,[28]Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, [29] and
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [30] all of which commonly
require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he
committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while
his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his
bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
 
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon
7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation
and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater

to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of
convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims
and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.
 
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to
the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the
ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[31]
 Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
[32]
 Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and
community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both
public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]
Atty. Valencia
 
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that
Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for
gross immorality:
 
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet
lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall
not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral
character is required as a condition precedent to
admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim
that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall
not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although
the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently
declared null and void the fact remains that respondents
exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality
required of them as members of the Bar.[35]
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds
to objective reality.[36] To have good moral character, a person must have
the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she
has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person
or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where
she is known.[37]  The requirement of good moral character has four general
purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image
of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other.
13
 
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to
becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido
was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that
he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was
under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a
romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence
of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge
that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our
mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even
without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose
confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family
problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic
liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the
other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea
was null and void, the fact remains that she took a man away from a woman
who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to
ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-
married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have
said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her
liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away
from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse
than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with
her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism
of law.
 
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty.
Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to
marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and
was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos
marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this
expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in
Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before
the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only
call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed
her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage,  the
celebration of their marriage in Hongkong [39] leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of

avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of
using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to
mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but
with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty.
Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman. This,
to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral
values.
 
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find
Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to
approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances,
was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were
also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of
Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic
relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages.
As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous
and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency;
while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second
family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not
object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
 
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of
and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a
lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.
[40]
 In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court,
must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a
member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the
Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack
of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw
this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for
this reason.
 
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we
are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution
and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
14
character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.
[42]
 
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that
the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern of
grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and
emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities
and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
 
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion
and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation,
we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his
oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility
overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of
character.
 
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time
unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which
we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal
profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice
into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but
a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents
crossed into the illicit.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
 
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross
immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and
 
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for
gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of
Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
 
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E.
Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
February 4, 2010A.C. No. 6313. September 7, 2006.*

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO M.
RONGCAL, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Attorneys; Good moral character is a continuing condition in the privilege of
law practice; One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character, which requirement persists as
a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.—One of the
conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition
for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof
is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. As officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.
Same; Disbarment; While it has been held in disbarment cases that the
mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient
to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with
respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.—While it is has been held
in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgrace-ful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
Same; Same; By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of
immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.—By
his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to
consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in
luring com-plainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in
order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in
the affirmative, we find otherwise.
15
Attorney-Client Relationship; It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his
client in entering into settlement with Aquino after explaining all available
options to her, since the law encourages amicable settlement of disputes
which might otherwise be filed in court.—It was not unlawful for respondent
to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining
all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not
only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in
court. Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is
the father of complainant’s daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As
complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino,
she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart.
Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also
acted as Aquino’s counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have
complainant’s bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.
Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has
regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
Evidence; The Court cannot and should not rule on mere conjec-tures.—We
find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a
finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule
on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the
parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions
through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of
the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in
whose favor the substantial evidence level tilts.
Administrative Law; Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a
lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or criminal action—
hence it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.—Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is
sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action. It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to
protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and
women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. As such, it
involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyer’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.

Same; Attorneys; Respondent’s express of remorse over his in-discretion
and the fact of ending the brief illicit relationship with complainant, the
Court takes such signs as not a character of such severe depravity and thus
should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.—We note that
from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed
remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit
relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of
such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances
in his favor. Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that
a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to
the outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation
of funds of the client.
__________________________________
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more
sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims
is called for disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe
forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and
only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.[1]
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment
filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M.
Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of he said, she said , the parties
conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter
presented.
  Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in
December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing
Arnulfo Aquino (Aquino), the biological father of her minor daughter, for
support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred
her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent
a demand letter[2] in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the
continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less
than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for
her congenital heart ailment.
 At around this point, by complainants own admission, she and
respondent started having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist
in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he
had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started
courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making
sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet
inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her
16
daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support
against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these
advances, assured by respondents claim that the lawyer was free to marry
her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
 On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant
to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer [3] (Affidavit) categorically stating that even
as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate [4] of her
daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read
the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her
that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that
Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and educational
support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the
Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because
the Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him
at this point, she signed the document without even taking a glance at it.[5]
 On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant
that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2)
postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his
personal check[6] in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the
balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May
2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount
because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the
position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
 Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and
the fact that respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter,
he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file
the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr. (Atty. Tolentino).
 Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a
criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the
criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August
2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement.[7] It was only when said cases
were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
 Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest
when he personally prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same,
which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that
all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his
marriage had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into
yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence
she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and
dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for

himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that
respondents aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a
lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), particularly
Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. [8] Hence, she
filed the instant complaint[9] dated 2 February 2004.
 Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to
him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action
for support. Complainants former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil
Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He
admits sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support
for the child.[10] Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an
emissary. He learned that because of Aquinos infidelity, his relationship with
his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were
willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an
affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
 Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his
advice. He then advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a
practical mindset.He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the
case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court
settlement of no less than  P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount,
negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino
allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within
four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount
the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The
resulting amount was P188,000.00.
 Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily
signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted
to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly
refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and
that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before
the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college
graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands
English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the
settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the
emissary handed to her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly
told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00,
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why,
he assumed that it was for his attorneys fees.
 As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual
liaison with complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words
and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a chemistry of (sic)
two consensual (sic) adults,[11] complainant then being in her thirties. He
17
denies that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already
annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate
that complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced
what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had
met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school
classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence
where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant
called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a
circumstance so disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant
not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to
2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council
(ABC) and as such was an ex-officio  member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in
2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for
complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived
no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively
helped him in his campaign.
 Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from
Aquino was being worked out, complainant moved to a rented house
in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval
Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had
to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was
about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for
financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against
Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her to look
for the right man[12] and to stop depending on him for financial
assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the
case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.  He,
however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino. 
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with
complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance
of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and
have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003,
complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June when her
alleged fianc from the United States would have arrived. Respondent
agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for the last
time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.
 Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a
friend of respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for
a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the
message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a
prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme

Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being
blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she
filed the instant complaint.
 On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [13] After
the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting
documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation[14] dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties
conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence
to that of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the
Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
 Respondent, through the above mentioned acts,
clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character,
putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member
of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the
privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high
sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously
described as MORAL CHARACTER.
 Respondent, unfortunately took advantage
and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his
lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,]
respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by
her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting
allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for
support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all
because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her
seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
 Without doubt, a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions
(sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. x x x[15]
 It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution[16] dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
18
considering Respondents obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client
relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission, [17] respondent was meted out the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition
of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to
return P58,000.00 to complainant.
 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set
Case for Clarificatory Questioning[18] (Motion) dated 9 March 2006 with the
IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning
dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version
of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired
between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a
shrewd and manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support
and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing that the IBP
based its Resolution solely on complainants bare allegations that she failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-
opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who between
them is telling the truth.
 In a Resolution[19] dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion
on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter
had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
 While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter
differently from what the IBP has recommended.
 On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and
which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [20] in
order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
 One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a
continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
[21]
 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
[22]
 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. [23] A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
[24]
 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. [25]
 

While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, [26] it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. [27] Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[28]
 By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality
in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next
question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful
conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire
financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded
the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
 Complainants allegations that she succumbed to
respondents sexual advances due to his promises of financial
security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case
against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant
deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated
woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that
time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by
promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no
showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical disability as to
justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. [29] Respondents
numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove
that he took advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite
being a married man, precisely the fact on which the finding of immorality is
rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does
not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never
denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
 Neither does complainants allegation that respondent lied
to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find credence in
respondents assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of
his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by
her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay
official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone
number and that she had called him there. She also knew that respondent is
an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in
2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondents allegations that she had met
and talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence,
that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so
as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously
19
had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be
unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with
respondent whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his
background, if it were true that she preferred to change [her] life for the
better,[30] as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned
allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence
required in disbarment cases.[31] We are left with the most logical conclusion
that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship
with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
 Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage
of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her to sign the
clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and
without explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her
counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
 We find complainants assertions dubious. She was clearly in need
of financial support from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering
from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to
respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk
the welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she
knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit
consists of four short sentences contained in a single page.  It is unlikely she
was not able to read it before she signed it.
 Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully
explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the consequences
of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her to use her head
as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandras medical and
educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer. [32] If
her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-
going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the
latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she
was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not
deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands
English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she
signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the
part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and
notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a
violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.

 It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering
into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to
her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases
but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. [33] Moreover,
there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of
complainants daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant
voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot
later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides,
the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as
Aquinos counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have
complainants bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.
[34]
 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of
contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent
has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath. [35]
 Complainant further charged respondent of
misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her
daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to
her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and pocketed the
remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her
counsel.
 The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but
simply ordered respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to
complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
 We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino
actually gave in settlement of complainants claim for support. The parties
are in agreement that complainant received the amount
of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received
more as there were two postdated checks amounting to P58,000.00 that
respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the
amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and
complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorneys
fees.
 We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to
prove that there existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the
amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is
actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an
agreement for attorneys fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the
same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by
respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his
Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an
explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he
20
supposes that complainant requested for it as she did not want to travel all
the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
  We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is
wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in this respect.  We
cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the
written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the
veracity of the assertions through the question and answer modality. With
the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-
depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the
substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the
case to the IBP for further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
 We also are unable to grant complainants prayer for respondent to
be made liable for the cost of her childs DNA test absent proof that he
misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
 
Neither shall we entertain complainants claim for moral damages
and attorneys fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a
lawyer is sui generis,  one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.
[36]
 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in
the legal profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary
objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its
officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
[37]
  As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.[38] The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the lawyers alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice.[39]
 
Respondents misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is
a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent
contracted a bigamous marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an innocent woman
into marriage,[43] or was found to be a womanizer. [44] The instant case can be
easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment
where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish
the end desired.[45] In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[46]  respondent was found to have
sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein
 21

sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of
men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire.
Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended
him indefinitely . However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no
conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was
fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite
his retirement during the pendency of the case.
 
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein
respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact
ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his
is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as
mitigating circumstances in his favor.[48]Considering further that this is his
first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would
suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of
this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M.
Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

 The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is

REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent

as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED. 

 

SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 3319. June 8, 2000.*
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; Practice of law is a privilege;
Requisites for admission to the practice of law.—The practice of law is a
privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission
to the practice of law are: (a) he must be a citizen of the Philippines; (b) a
resident thereof; (c) at least twenty-one (21) years of age; (d) a person of
good moral character; (e) he must show that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; (f) possess the
required educational qualifications; and (g) pass the bar examinations.
Same; Same; Same; Possession of good moral character must be continuous
as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice.—Clear
from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar
is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is
a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with
a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution.—Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the
effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry
from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of
social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent
would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she
exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos
Ui’s personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Same; Same; Same; To warrant disciplinary action, conduct must be
“grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.—All
these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains
that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
22
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly
immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards.—We have held that “a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.”
Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the
contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This,
herein complainant miserably failed to do.
____________________________
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris
Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui,
husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our
Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital
union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl
Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant
found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship
with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter
sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a
graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent.
Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June

1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon,
respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,
however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant
believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn
out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between
her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December
1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child.
Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and
pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui
but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came
to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his
company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed
on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met
Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor,
with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated
that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to
marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 [3]. Upon their
return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued
to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and
Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of
his second marriage before they would live together. [4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she
would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice
and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June
1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who
insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon
her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989
with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported
to work with the law firm [5] she was connected with, the woman who
represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office,
demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
23
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit
because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when
respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with
him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and
that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It
was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her
mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively
from her parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral
damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against
complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless
disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that
respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant
and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui,
and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2)
children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar,
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the
crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The
resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the
respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered
by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and
they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988,
when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that
altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it,
had been prima facie established by complainants

evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima
facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St.,
Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable cause for the
offense charged. The statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the
fact of cohabitation does not make the complainants
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong
and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by
respondents in support of their respective positions on the
matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that
the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to
the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos
Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which
was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent
filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she
was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of
Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record
on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by
the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the
date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was
October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation
was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth
of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. [12] It is the contention
24
of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 [13] and
184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission;
and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),
[15]
 respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the
marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui,
and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what
appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the
lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral
manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2)
grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner
consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession;
and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation
that respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who
was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that
Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact,
respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that
there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of
Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her,
and he was so open in his courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it
was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage
certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make
it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987,
because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier

marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for
changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and
complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on
this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of
respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a
garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another
picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the
house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral
manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were
taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not
presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the
Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427
dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of
evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the
dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of
her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered
the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral
indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single,
and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with
him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui,
she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that
respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a
married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew
complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients
of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. [23] It was thus
highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of
1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was
a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed
disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her
disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact
25
of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother
knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information
was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline
submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent
was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to
be single. The Commission does not find said claim too
difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human
experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single
woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or
without any firm commitment to another woman. The
reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very
nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became
aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for
the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all
contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in
March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro
Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each
other because of the children whom he was allowed to
visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails
to find any act on the part of respondent that can be
considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more
of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this
sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and
happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for
Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for
knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified
Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to
enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate
of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications;
and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to
the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the
26
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held
-
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to
the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when
she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell
in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she
gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of
respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on
how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined.
Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to
be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of
public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and
thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this
case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and
 27

been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with
Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent
admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from
Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to
find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite
their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first
child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains
that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
[27]
 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must
be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute
a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [28]
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in
an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith
of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L.
Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a
photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date
thereof, with a STERNWARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future.
SO ORDERED.

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards." [29] Respondents act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies
just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent

to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent
that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which
was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage
ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her
marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the
case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is
contrary to human experience and highly improbable.