liNl'IRONMENTAL I'OL¡CY lh\ N-O¡{l H AMLRICA

iy¡tcmn ncross borders, along with proper information, could help to ensure
mutnnl understanding of these differences.
Thc more serious concern is asymmetries across countljes ir te¡ms of the
capacity to actually implement the envi¡onmental management regimes that
hrve been put in place. To add yet another statistic to ou¡ evidence, the Global
lntcgrity Report (Global Integrity 2011)compares 34 countries with respect to
the "implementation gap"-mentioned earlier (with reference to Howlett 2001)
but defined by GIR as the difference betlveen the strength of a count¡y's Iegal
framewo¡k and its actual application. According to that measure, the United
States is the strongest of the three North American nations (legal framework -
90; implementation = 79; gap = 12). Canada follows at a considerable dis-
tance with a strong regime but insufficient application {legal framework = 90; Chapter 2
impfementation = 61, gap = 291. Mexico, with a weaker regime, also faces a
serious gap (legal framework = 83; implementatior = 52; gap = 31),'In the next
chapter, we explore the ¡ole transboundary mechanisms can play in bridging
Transbou ndary Environmental
these diffe¡ences. Governance in North America:
Bridging Differences?
Nof¿s
I At the time of writing, the Canadian and American dollars were at par
2 These fgures assuure an exchange rate ofthe 2010 average of $1 USD : $12.63
MXN (Canadian Provincial Statistics Departments; United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics; Sistema de Administración Tributaria/Federal Tax Adrni¡istration 2011).
The more neuly equal a country's income distribution, the closer its Loreoz curve THE "IDEA' OF A TRILATEML approach to No¡th Americat e¡vironmental
to the 45-degree linc and the lower its Gini lndex, e.g., a Scandinavian country with
issues has a very long histor¡ even if thesc early efforts did not yield colcrete
an index of 25. Fo¡ further explanation, see: http://wwwnationsencyclopedia.com/
WorldStats/CIA-Distribution-of-family-income-Gini.html ¡esults. I¡ 1895, after two tri¡ational meetings on shared water resoLlrces!
The HDI transforms a raw variable into a unir-free index between 0 and 1 (which
Canada a¡d Mexico asked the United States to ioin them in a tripartite com-
allows multipJe indices to be added together). For mo¡e i¡fo¡mation see: http://hdr mission to adjudicate rights on "streams of an international characte¡" The US
undp.orglen/statistics/hdi/ State Department quashed rhe idea, cautious about letting the United States be
5 CDP at prices of2003. an equal partner with its neighbors (Kiy and Wirth 1998). In 1909, US President
6 This perception was validated wheq in 2010, the Partido Verde could not get
Theodo¡e Roosevelt, urgcd on by his chief fo¡esteri Gifford Pinchot, convened
recognition by the Grcen European Parry (a coalition of 36 green parties in a "North American Conference on the Conservation of Natu¡al Resor¡rces."
Er-rrope),largely due to its weak enviro¡mental agenda and posirion on the death Mexico's own foresrry pioneer, Miguel Angel de Quevedo, was a Mexican
pelalt¡ delegate (Simonian 1995; §fakild 2009).In his invitatior to Canadat governor-
Of the three countries, Mexico is the only one that is still consolidating its general, Roosevelt wrote,'it is evident that natural tesources are not li¡nited
derrocratic system. There have been strong critiques of the fairness of the electo¡al to the boundary Iines which sepalate natiotrs, and that the need fo¡ conserv-
process, for example.
ing them on this continent is as wide as the area upon which they residc"
li For a detailed report on how corruption can affect the water sector, see (Pi¡chot 1947, 361). The conference produced a document that comprchen-
Transparency International (2008).
sively addressed water, forests, land, minerals, and public health, It also callccl
9 Canada's rather large gap is related to a perception that elected ofÉcials and rhe for each country to set up a pemranent National Conservation Commissio¡.
judiciary have co icrs of interest, and some deficiencies in the public availabilir¡ of
Months Iater, the incoming President Taft killed the plan, and Mexica¡ intcrcst
informalion from the govenlment.
in conservátion was soon to be cut off by the decaclc of revolution that startccl
rn l9l0 (Pinchor 1947; Wakild 200c).
Bilateral environn¡e¡tal cooperation, by cont¡ast, has a long tracl< rccorcl oi
nctivity. The Canada-US International Joint Commissiotl (IJC), an infltrcnrinl
body managing the ()reat Lakes ¡nd other waters on thc northcrn US bolclcr',
hirs roots in l I 9 09 agreenrent. The US-Mcxico I n rern¡ riona I Iiolt ncll ry rt tttl
W:rtc¡ (irmnrission (lll',lv(l) is cvcn oldcr, wirh ,tntcccdc¡ts in an lll89 trertty.

4II ENVIITONMENTAL POLICY IN NORTH AMIRf(:A
'l'lrcsc two commissio¡s a¡e the foundation blocks of ¡ather varied cooperative
structures on each border and, in recent decades, they have been ioined by a
wide array of bilateral mechanisms that aim to address issucs as diverse as air
t¡ualiry, fisheries management, migratory wildlife, toxics, waste, protected arcas
management, and, most recently, climate change.
The 1990s brought renewecl attempts at envi¡on¡nental trilateralism, with
the signing of the North Amedcan Agrccment on Environmcntal Cooperation
(NAAEC) and a ncw institution-the Commission for Envi¡onmental
Cooperation (CEC)-to encourage continent-wide collal¡oration on and
tracking of environmental policy activities. This new trilateral institution was
a response to fears from environmentalists that closer trade and investment tics
would encourage polluting industries to move where regulation was perceived
to be most lax, namely Mexico. This decade also saw the buildup of increasingly
dense subnational a¡d cross-border regional organizational linkages along thc
Canada US border, and to a somewhat lcsser extent the Us-Mexico borde¡.
This chapter provides an introduction to the maior sites of transboundary
environmental governancc in No¡th America now in place at the bilateral,
trilateral, and subnational levels. What we are interested in hcre is the potential
for these governancc mcchanisms to coordinate collaborative effo¡ts ácross
bo¡ders as well ás süpport domestic environmental management efforts. As
we established in chapter 1, the environmental managcment approaches of
Canada, the United States, and Mcxico cxhibit differenccs in legislative cov-
crage, proclivities toward enforceme¡t, and williogness to experiment. Also
apparent are the ásymmetries across countries in terms of environmental man-
agement capacity; here, Mexico requires considerable suppc,rt, but Canada also
shows ce¡tain weaknesses. The first section of this chaptcr desc¡ibes i¡ morc
dctail the three fu¡ctions that we believe are necessary for bridging these differ-
cnces in approach and promoting policy capacit¡ and for which cross-border
cooperation can be helpful, even essential. These functi<.¡ns are: (1) creating
comprehensive anrl stable trans boundary networks; {2) promoting mutual
lcarning and the generation and exchange of envi¡o¡mental information; and
(3) facilitating the provision of resources fcrr e¡vironmental capacity. The following
sections then discuss these functions iu dctail with refc¡encc to environmcntal
governance mechanisms at the three levels. What we find is that, while the trans-
boundary network infrastruct¡¡re in North Ame¡ica does facilitate reasonably
good and often longer-term communication across bordcrs, as well as infor-
mation exchange, policy learning, and mutual understanding, the support for
capacity-building is uneven, variable, and insufficient.
THE KEY FUNCTIONS OF EFFECTIVE
TRANSBOUNDARY GOVERNANCE
The int¡oduction to this book int¡oduced the concept of "governance" in envi-
ronmcntal decision-making and implementation, á¡d noted the shift from formal,
top-down modes of i[te¡actio¡ to more ¡rformal, nonhierarchical arrangcmcnts.
This shift has entailed the creation of new "sites" of governance where pcoplc
and intcrcst groups from both the public and private scctors interact, oufsiclc
thc frrrrull institufions of gover¡mcnt ¡ncl oftc¡ across bordcrs- As Annc_M¡ric
Sllrrghtcr (2(X)5) hrrs ¡xrintccl out, sincc thcrc lrc policy problcnrs--<nvir<¡rnrt'nt¡l
TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCI] IN NORTH AMERIC 49
degradation among them-that individual governments cannot fix by them-
selves due to spillover effects, there is a need for governancc n¡cchanisms that
can opcrate across borders. As a result, Slaughter (2005, 184) argucs, polky
actors are "netlvorking with their counterparts abroad, creating a densc web of
relations."
Build.ing Sustainable Netw oi<s
But which policy actors, cxactly, are networking? How do transbouDdary Dct-
works operate as new sitcs ofgovernance? The international relatio¡rs literatulc
shows that there are several kinds of transboundary networks, and these can
diffcr markedly in terms of the relative roles of government actors vs. civil
society groups and privatc-sector inte¡ests. Some netwo¡ks are desc¡ibed as
"transgovernmental" (Keobane and Nye 1974); they are dominated by gov-
ernrcút agency officials who form close rclationslrips with their counterparts
in ncighboring jurisdictions and, through continuing communication, wo¡k
together on common programming. These netwo¡ks exert influence over their
membcrs primarily through the operation of "soft" power; they have no abiliry
to force members to do anything but, rather, operate through deliberation and
persuasiolr lZarlng 2005; Slaughter and Hale 2011). The idea is that agency
oflicials will spend timc developing shared understandings of collective prob-
lems, co-develop regulatory soiutions, aDd thcn-because they exercise statlrtory
or regulatory authority at home-implement the decisions collcctively arrived
at. Slaughter (2005) has shown that transgovemmental networks, focusing on
specific international problems, continue to proliferate across borders. ln this
model, civil society and market actors may be involved in network deliberations,
bur rhcy rend to play a rccondar¡ role.
Other analysts, however! stress that networks link institutions and actors
across multiple levels of social organization, providing new roles for private
actors-from transnaiional environmental groups and other NGOs to major
corporations ard their lobbying arms (Rosenau 1992; Lipschutz 1996; Mathews
1997). Mathews (1997, 52), in particular, has argued that new information
technologies have disrupted cxisting power hie¡a¡chies and expanded the reach
of civil society across borders. In particular, these pdvate actors work to convert
problerrs to "issues" using powerful techniques of publicity and info¡matio¡r
transfer (Ascher, Steelman, and Healy 2010;'§lapner 1996). Environmental
pdicy analysts have lorrg rnade the case that nongovernmental civil society
intcrcsrs have much to contribute to problem-solving, and that processes that
are more open and delibcrative will yield better policy choices and outcomes
(see, for example, Diduct< 2004).
h North Amelica, retworks in the envirolmental policy area most often
resenrl-rJe tlre transgovernr¡cntai model. This is not to say that NGO- o¡ market-
dominated networks do not exist-and we point to some exrmples in the case
s¡udics that follow. But it has been natio¡al governments (acting bilaterally or'
trilatcrally) as well as subnational governmelts (state, provincial, and munici-
pal) that have put in placc most of the cooperative mechanisms we discLrss in
this bcxrl<. Diplomacy by elected and appointed oflicials as well as the enerSy
im¡lartccl by environmental NGOs and l¡y rcsealch instJtutions are both iÍt1por-
t¡nt in tcrms of providing "lift" for environme¡tal policy intcractions ¡cross
fxrldols. Ikrwcvcr. nctwork coll¡boration tends to be di¡cc¡cd ¡nd nraint¡incrl
 li)
\
l'\ llrrcnt ¡gcrcy ofliciils. This cxpleins oLlf focus l,clorv on thc l¡ilateral,
rl()\(
,r' .rl. rr.l rul'r'.rri"nrl.r',,.*lr,r,lrr r.qur'.tl lcu1.",'l ¡,'tr'r.r .c.
('r,( rrrirrlv, onc ¡rlust adopt ¡ lnulri lcvcl perspective il thc gorll is to hLrlld a
l,¡¡.rtlcl cr»rstituercy base. Nctu,ork-building L¡ Nonh Anrc'rica is lrl¿ldc ch¡l
l,'rrring by thc complexity of the contincntel environnrerrt, Í+ich collsisas (ri
rrrrrlriple overlappi¡g crlvironments. -Nlost ptoblcnts erc nr¡t rnerelt loc¡l or
rrlliol]¡1 or national or continenti¡l in rraturc, bur r11ay havc local drrd rcgiorlal
¡nd nlrionll arrd colti¡eltal ispccts. Moreovef, i¡s expl¡irlccl in chlptcl 1,
¡rolicv rral<irrg por,ver-s arc hcld not only by nrtionel g,overnnrents, bLrt also b,v
subnarional jurisclictiotrs stiltcs, provilccs, loc¡l govcrnlrcntsi and regiorl¡l
goverllments. Thcse l¡ttcr nor onll m¡ke polic,v bur llso hevc crtlci¡l roles in pol-
icy inrplcmentatir»r. Given tbat golcrnance occLrrs ¡t irll thcsc lcv.-ls siln¡.r1t¡ne
ousl)! "effective managemcnt of the cllvir(»ll¡ctlt ¿ncl niltural res()Lrrces le(ltrLrcs
intcgralion betrvee¡ the v¡rioLrs govcrr¡Dce ¡rr'¡¡gcrrrcnrs" (Bc¡sill 200-5).
Thus. a strategic linking of efforts is uecess:rry i.ross lllultiple "sp¡tiirl
i¡stitr¡¡ional lcvcls."
Fosteting Mutual Urulerstanding ancl Leataing
Nc'tu,olks do not L¡¡cl thcir n¡en¡bers iis Iormel govcrnrrent ilrstitutio¡s do;
rather, thcy crcatc informal rulc systc|rs thar exert pressure on p¡rrticip:1nts to
tollorv through on e¡y ¿greencnts maclc. Ll¡itical to ¡hcsc inform¡l svstern5 rs
the cleveioprnert of nrutual untlersta¡ding ¡nron!l p.lrticip¡nts orl ¡he b¡sis of
sha¡ccl info¡nation. As H¡as (l992) explaius, iniornr:rrion is a vit:rl resource,
ir¡d lretworl<s c:rn provide etlicicnt corr-tt¡¡ultic¡¡ion end inf()rnlation proccsslns.
Kcck ancl Sikki¡k (t999) argue th¿r inÉornatio¡ exchangc is rrr rhe core of i1
nctrvork.
At ¡ basic levcl, priority setting ¡¡d policy dialogLre rr'ill L¡c clil'6cult unlcss
there is agreeneo! on the rature of a¡ envirr¡n¡¡cntal irroblerr ¿rrd thr- bcsr
nrcans of addressing it. fhis tequircs ¡greencnt alroüg dirersc plrtics on rel
evrrt alrd rcliable d¡t¡ and infor¡naiio¡. ]Jt¡r solrc cnvilollrncnt:rl problens.
little is l<nolv¡ about sourccs alcl impacts, or about the tvpes of instrtrrrcuts
that migba ¡rrove best in terms of sotrcc lccluctior¡ or rcmcLlieti(».ln these
cases,lrrorc basic dara-gatherir'tg ancl 1lloclcling ncecls to be c¡rr'jecl our. In othcr
cases, r,ariots data sets or Dodcls mav exist, but thel- rrr¿v not bc colrPlcte or
cornpatible for thc North ADcrica[ col]tcrt. Lr olhcr rvords, the) rll¡y 's[oP" ¿t
aaional bolders despite the tect thl:¡t cnvironrlc[tnl pro[rlcnrs do nol. or the)'
may be expressecl usin¡i difterent crireriir or units r¡i me:rsttre]ncnt for cxarnPle,
ozone ler.els ave¡aged over crght hour periocls versus thc nlexinrrrnr lcvcl rtvcr
2,1 hours. Thus, continucd progress in clat¡ collcüion ancl clatl cotrlpetibilit,v
amonlj thc three countries is necessirry in orclcr Io¡ the c]jscussion to be con_
cluctecl l¡asecl oü shaled irrformiltion.
Furthermore, ltcause e¡vir'onmcnt¡l ]rr¡licy is olten interrelatcd rvi¡h bro¡clcr-
c()rlcelns! such es econorrric ¡irorvth, sr)cirl justice (i.c., dilferen¡ial ilnp¡ctri orl
thc ¡roor and thc disentianchised), a¡d comnrunity health, sornc of tirc rcqrrircd
inlorrlation may go well Lreror¡d u,har is nt)[m¿11) colsidcrcd "cnvironLucnt¡]."'
lior exilnrple, the reasons lor gathering inforr¡r¿tion about the edeqLrtcr'ol
rv,rtcr supply and sewer¡ge in thc [irst-grorvrng cities of thc Mcxico I lS l.o|Llr'r
Ircrt¡ir ¡o hur¡r'rn rvcll¡re ¡nd the ¡eeds of L¡rrsincss ancl inclustr'1, ls r t ll ,rr
t. r'r.ir4iic.rl h;rllrrrc. As rrotctl ¡hr¡rc. st¡lichol,lcr urrrl locrl hnowl,,l1r, ,.rrr
'I t{ANSBOUND^RY F.NVIRONiIIEN'IAl. (;()\illtr--{Nll- N N()lrlll^¡lllll( 1 tl
hc ¿ critic¡l rcsorrrcc for environrrrcnt:11 policv »lrl<irlt (Sri L lrrl,rrr lr)() li. l'r¡r
cxanrple, inpllt froir First N¡tions in severill p,rrrs oi ( ,rrr,r,l r lr.rt 1,,', rr r, rt
useiul in forrnul¡ting rr-source rrraü¿tgc¡rcnr str:ltegies ¡t l)(,llr 1l)( l,,l,r.r 'rrrrl
provlrcial lcvcls.
Anothcr irnport¡nf asfect of fosterin!! mutt¡i ulrdcrst¡nrlillg \\ rrlr r,,¡,,,t
to problenr solving is the sharing of"best pr¡criccs" am()rr!t t).rrlr( tir l,
Ii-rnsbounclar-v irpprortchcs to e[\'iror le]ltal prohlelrs oitir rrl,rny t)fl),) rLrrrlr(,
for sh:rring "lessons lcarnetl.' I)ilicrorccs il cconc¡rt¡ic lcrcl and irr t()\.rrrrrr, rrl
structuresandpr.rcticcsslloLrlclctlcoutegepolicy:rc«rrstoulcltrst¡ndth¡ttl¡,,
is¡no¡eth¿r'roncr\:it,vto¡aldrcssalgivenproblern,artdthattheirc¡tl¡corrrlt,t.
:rpproach nrrv not be supeÍiot. I lere) too, strkcholcler arcl l¡urc-¡ucrrrtic l<no§i
edgc ,rnd cxperiencc can be es¡recitlly valuablc. Ihc objcct hcrc. oi cor.¡r'sc, is t,,
rncour¡ge polic,v leaning, or rr,hat Kemp ¡¡cl \I/cch¡.rize[ (200-i) rcfcr «r es rr
coiscious "chirnge in thinking" ebotrt I problenr and its associetctl poliev. flrc
lear-uirg nray consisr of ¡ moclcst change (i.e., untlers¡an,.ltng ho«' ¡hc usc rrf .r
particrrlrr folicy instrtrment nright lrc inrprovc'tl t() achic!!- sct goels] or il nl¡1'
rcsult in ¡ rethink of cxisting approaches (i.e.. seeing rhiLrgs rhroLrgh I clificrcnt
evalLr¡tirc viervpoi¡t) (I(crrp encl \&'cehuizcn 2005, l0). Out of inlormatr,trr
cxchurge, dialogue. and debillc, arld the lc¡rnin!l process th¡t ilcconlprni,:s
these ¿cti\,-itics, it is hopcd lhat ¡ consenslrs rviJl emc'r'ge to guicle actiorr bt
p¡rlicip¡nts i¡ thc nc¡rvo¡k.
Irr sol])c cilses, an "epistcnric comrnr.riity" rrey be fornled. ''ir nctrv¡tlk.,i
profcssion:rls rvith rercognizecl expertise irrld c(»rpc'turlca ill ¡ particular d()nr.rrr
¿n(l iln ¡!thoritltivc clrirn to poiicy-reLevant l<nor,vletlgc r'vithirt lhi¡ Llolllai¡ ()r
issuc ¡rea" (Haes I992,3). lipistemic cornmunities c¡n bc I signiflcant lirrcc
for tra¡rsLroundirry ct)oPetationi liivcn dr¡t rlernbcrs oi an eprslenlic conulllü1iti
nr.ly hirvc influential conncctiorrs to Itrrtion¡l ¡dlrirlistliitir¡ns r¡r intern¡lioll,rl
iIlstitu¡ions (Hras 20{)0).
Resource Prouision
llven n,hc-rc there is a conscnsus on nh¡t shoulcl be clote to ¡cldress ¡n elrr i
rr¡nmcnt,rl probleln, implc[rurrtatiorl nr¡) be hindered bY rcsorücc rn(l c¡fa.lr]
incclualitics across pc-,licf irctors antl institutions. Ciiverl the v,rr',ving lcvcls o{
environrnc[tel c¡p¡city within North Amcr ic:r, as clisctrsscd in ehrt¡rter l.lllak
ing sure thac,rdcc¡rate lesourccs a¡e ¿v¡ilablc to s[PPort thc iniriatives btirrg
un(lcrtakcn is ch:rllertging. In ruany \!¡,vs, this is the re¡l tcsr ol rhc strLrllgth rrr¡l
[ikcl,v clurrbiliÍ of the network, bccausc resoutccs rlcccl to come front cftrmctrr.:
cofltrs-thcrc is, qr.rilc simplv, no inrcrnati(xlal "btrdgct" in North Anr,:ric,r i,r'
cnvironrneltll coopclarion,
Rcsources to supporl rransbound¡rr'cnvirr¡¡tr¡erlti¡l coopcratir»l, ¡s wLill
¡s thc inplcnrcnt¡lion at the dotncslic lcvcl of rrly ¡.qrcemerrts rcitchc.l. m.lt
corne in thc tangiblc fornr of dor¡estic ilikelv agercv) bLrclgerarv oLrtlx\s lt,r
srrch things as training rvolkshops, rechnicll strPport, tcch[oloqv l¡¡nsio, or
cc¡Lripnrcnt, and to pev tor implcmcnting collahorative projccts. such as rerlrr. rr5
lr¡z,rrdr¡us w¡ste or_ l)tlilding, sewagL- lrc:ltl]lellt plerlts. AlreÍnativclr, rtsoLrl,cer
rr.rv irrrolvc in l<incl contrihL¡tions fronr ¡rarticipeting,:rgcncics, inclrrtl lr11 1,, r
sorfrrl tirrrr', tcchrri.¡l sLlppl)rt, or cvcn tr¡rel funding so rlrrrt Iolr.1' ,l. torr
lr,,nr rliltr'ri rrt lrrr isrlicriorts .rtn tttccl xrl(l lt rrll ilorrr , rr¡11 otlli r' l(cs,,rrr,, '
¡r, r rl r,, l¡L I rti( tt (l li) llr()\( I ( I s ,rrr,l .r, t0r' rrl,r',r rrr rr, r rl. l'L Llr ',
sI rI
I rI I I r )I
 fÑVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN NORTH AMERIC I RANSIIOT]NDARI I]NVITIONT'IENTAL GOV!]RNANCF] IN NoRIII ]\]\1IIII(T\ JJ

is cliilicult in operational (i.e., appropriations and budgetary processes) and

political terms.
'fhe following sections discuss mo¡e broádly the poteltia] of arlalgements
at ttre bilateral, trilateral, and subnationaUregional cross-border levels to carry
out these üree functions associated with effective tansboundary environmental
governaoce in North America. Here, we aim to provide an indication of the
facility of environmental networks in North America to link key policy actors
and institutions across the distinctive national contexts in ways that maximize
shared knowledge and r¡utual understanding, enhance policy learning, and
increase ¡esou¡ces to support environmental managenent.
Delil's l-akc $,ater dir.ersi<»r,'bas been r-elatilcl,v clfcctivc irr ,rtltlltsrrrrg Irrrrrrr,
environment¡l threats *,ith:r minimurn of inte¡natir¡n¡1 ,¡»rilicl. (lrrr¡J¡ tlS
cooper¡tion on spccific Éc¡r¡rs oi transl¡oundary air pollurion. ior ir,lrrrplL'.h.rs
bccn quite productive (V;nNijnattcn 2003). As rvell, sr»le proglt rs r;ts lrL'r'rr
r¡¡de in coordin¡tccl effo¡ts to clc¡n up toxic "hot spots" in l¡otlr tlrc llrutL,l
States and Can¡dj¡¡ sectc¡rs ol:¡hc Crcat Lakes (Shea¡ et al.200-l).
TABLE2,2 Maior U5 Merico Envlronmenta Agreerne¡ts ¿nd lnslltutions
RELATED INSTITUTION(5)

1889 lnternational Border Convention lnternationa Boundary and

BITATERAT ENVIRONMENTAT GOVERNANCE Water Commission

In te¡ms of North Ame¡ican envi¡onnte¡taI coopererion. bilateralism has the 1936 Migratory Bird Treaty Act (Mexico lnter agency
longest track record. Since the Canada-US Boundary §Taters Treaty was signed becomes party to Canada-US Agreement)

in 1909, numerous agreements dealing with such issues as water quality iI1 1944 Water Uti ization Treaty nternatlonal Boundary and
the Great Lakes, transboundary air qualiry protected areas, fisheries manage- Water Comrnlssion
ment on both coásts, and migratory waterfowl have significantly expanded the
Ca¡ada-US bilateral environmental relationship (see Table 2.1). This relation- 1983 ASreement on Cooperation for the Protection nternatlonal Boundary and
ship, apart from a few high-profrle disputes over issues such as acid rain and the and lr¡provement of the Environment in the Border Water Comrnlssion
Area ("La Paz Agreemeni")

-1985 Annex I (pursuant to La Paz Agreement). nter-agency

TABLE 2.1 Maior Canada-US Environnrental Agreements and lnstitutions
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
19'18 Migratory Bird Treaty
1932 Glacier-Waterton Lakes National Park
.Agreement
1c56 .ónvpntion on Great Lakes Fisheries
1985 Pacific Salmon Treaiy
1986 Agreement Concerning Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wasie
1987 Great Lakes Water QLlality ProtocoL
(updale an 1972 and 197 B Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreeme¡is)
199-l Canada-united States Air Quality
Agreeme¡t
1997 Great Lakes BinationalToxics Sirategy
' Regarding the Env¡ronment along the lnland
nterr¿tiolal BoLnda'y by D'sch¿'ges ot
RETATED INSTITUTION(5)
Hazardous Waste
lniernational Joint Comrnission
-1985 Annex ll. Agreement on Cooperation nter-agency
lnter-agency Regarding Pol ution of the Environment
Agency cooperation. Area laier designated along th€ lnland lnternational Boundary by
¿s lnternational Peace Park and Biosphere Discharges of HazardoLrs Substances
Reserve
198b Arnex L Agreerrent or Coope'¿tion nter ¿gency
Great Lakes Fisheries Commission Regarding the Transboundary Shipment of
lnternational Pacif ic Salmon Fisheries Hazardous Wasies and Hazardous Substances
Commission
-'1987 Annex lV. Agreemeni of Cáoperation nter egency
No bilateralinstitution (US EPAI Regarding Transboundary Air Pollution Caused
Environment Canada) by Copper Smelters along Their Common Border
lnternationa Joint Commission, the
-'1989 (amended 1997) Annex V Agreement of lnter-¿gency
Binational Execuiive Committee, Great
Cooperation Regarding lniernaiional Transport
Lakes Water Quality Board
of Urban Air Pol ution
Canada-United States Air Quality
Commitiee -1992 Border Environment¿l Plan Comm ttees, workgroups
lnternaiiona loint Commission, the -1996 Border XX Cor¡r¡lttees, \a/orkgroLrps
Binational Executive Committee, Great
-2002 Botdet 2Al2 Region¿lworkstu)r ¡: t¡¡rrl't tr ¡|'
Lakes Water Qualiiy Board
workrr)r rs. fl) r ), l,ir ü r'

1999 ASreenrent for Cooperatioñ in the No bilaieral instltution (Nation¡l

Boreal Ecosystem Atrnosphere Aeronautics and Space Administralion/ -2Ut¿ ÉOtOét ¿9¿U li,|, ,L \¡/,, |r,) , ,ir l' \r,,,1

Natural Resource6 Canada) vr', l,,r ,vl,r '


'4-E¡
llilatcral e¡vironmental cooperation on the US-Mexico border has been
nrole difEcult due to the severity of problems, the trrarked socioeconomic añd
tcchnical asymmetry between the two countries, á¡d the troubled history of
bilateral ¡elations more generally. Here too, however, a full set of mechanisms
has developed to ercourage collal¡ora¡ive eflvironmefltal actiofl*from the
l¡ternátionál Boundary and Water Commission, established in 1889 and given
expanded responsibilities in 1944, to more recent mechanisms such as the
NAI'TA-¡elated Borcle¡ Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and
the North American Dcvelopnert Bank (NADBank). Besides these two NAFIA
institutions, there áre committees átrd workgroups formed under the lntegrated
Border Environme¡tal Plan (1990-5), the Border XXI program (1995-2000),
Bordcr 2012 12002-12), and, most recently, Border 2020 (201,2-2"01.
I¡ terms of ou¡ functio¡s fo¡ tla¡shou¡da¡y environmeital mechanisms,
bilateral envirr.¡nmental interáctions on both borde¡s are cl'¡aracterized by lela-
tively close working relationships among governmental officials that encourage
dialogue and network-building. §leaknesses iri the Canada-US case are, we
believe, the lack (except perlraps around the Great Lakes) of an overarching
framework fol cnvironmental management on the shared border (such as exisrs
on the southern border) and the rathcr closed, issue-speci6c networks center-
ing on agency and diplomatic actors, A considerable degree of'ad hoc-ery"
characterizes thcse relations, and they are vulnerable to diplomatic sensitivities.
On the US-Mexico bordeq interactions-including those with civil society-are
rnore institutionalized, primarily through the Border 2012 and now Border 2020
prog¡ams. Bur a higher levcl of border tension has at times clouded relarions
among goverrrrrrents and with stakeholder grorlps. Bilateral institutions and
processes o¡ both borde¡s have had conside¡able success in scoping out the
nature and extent of environmental problems through joint data-gathering,
transboundary modeling, and even basic research; as a result, a high degree of
consensus exists with regard to most environmental problems. Resources a¡e
a serious problen on both Lrorders, howeve¡, and this is li¡kcd to the vulner-
ability of border environmental budgets to chauging politicai arrd economic
priorities. It is also not clear whether resources are targeted to areas most in
néed of capacity-building,
Bilateral C ommtnication and. Nehtork-Building
As noted above, the Canacla-US bilateral envi¡onmental ¡elationship is charac-
terized by interactions that are primárily tlansgover nmental itr nature, whereby
the real work of cooperation is done at the inter-agency level to address specific
problems as thcy arise, often quite succcssfully. Transgovernmentalism cafl wo¡k
very well in particular issue areas and with regard to speci6c pollutants, where
a group of of6cials within complementary egencics may work rogether on the
same file, often for many years. In the Great Lakes, for example, Canadian
and American officials have collaborated on various iterations of the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agrcement, from the flrst version, which directed bina-
tional attention to the problem of phosphorous over'-enrichment, to the 1978
áirclldme¡rs, which highlighted the nccd for toxic substa¡ce regulations, to the
l9{i7 prorocol, which focr¡sed on ecosystem health through thc collaboÍativs
I{c¡rcclial Acrion Plans anil Lakewiclc Managcmcnt Plans. This c(}opcr¡tr()n
h¡s continr¡ctl through k) thc rcccnt rcvicw of thc (ircal l,rrkcs Wrrtcr (]rrllity
qinlihrlv fi'r rir ¡ll':rlitv. oflici¡ls r(trrr.scntins tltc lw(, l¡(,v(,
]'RANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTÁL GOVERNANCE ¡N NORT'II AMERICA 55
on the Air QLrrrlity Committee, estabiished unde¡ the 1991 Canada-United States
Air Quality Agreement, have worked to reduce successive air pollutants in
border areas-SO, (under the acid rain provisions of the agrcement), then NOx
(under the 2000 Ozone Annex), ancl now particulate matter (the two count¡ies
ate each taking additional action to reduce PM2 5).
The dow¡side of transgovernmentalism or the northern border, however, is
a fragmcntation of effort. Given the specializarion of expertise rvithin agcncies
and the dornin¿nce of these specialized agencies/personnel in transboundary
cooperation, cross-cutting linkagcs necessary for. broader communication a¡d
network-building are nor generally weJl established. Linkages across levels of
government váry considcrabl¡ though they are better in the US conrext, where
the relationship betwecn fede¡al ancl state agencies is tighter, primarily because
they have shared responsibility for implementing the major national air and
water quality laws. However, horizontal linkages between government, the
private sector, and civil society groups are limited and ad hoc, given thc closed
nature of inter ageniy relations and diplomacy. The IJC, given its pronineflce
ard long track recold, is ao exception and has 6nner linkages veÍically across
governments and with both the lesearch community and environmental NGOs,
Othe¡ institutions like the Pacific Salmon Commission or the Carada-US Air
Quality Committee are considerably narrower in their representation and rhe
degree to which they have linkages ac¡oss levels of governmcnt a¡d outwa¡d
into the nongovernmental realm, This fragmenting tendeocy is heightened by
the distinctive diplomatic tensior'¡s associated wirh bilateral engage¡nent on
particular issues, such as the diversion of exccss water from Devil's Lake in
North Dakota into a tributáry of the Red River that is shared with Canada,
initialiy without colsultation about the possible transfer j¡rto Canada of invasive
aquatic species.
In addition, because cooperative mechanisms are issr¡e- as well as media
specific, there is no overarching framework for addressing environmental
and sustainability concculs on the Ca¡ada-US border. For example, although
the IJC has made important progrcss in cleaning up toxic "hot spots" in the
wate¡s of the Great Lakes, it is only peripherally involved in the projects being
implementcd by the Canada-US Air Quality Commirtee, despire their similar
geographic focus ald despite the fact that airborne deposition is a leading source
of pollution in the Great Lakes. In orher issue areas, a plethora of l¡i¡rational
mcchanisns c¡gage in cliscrete environmental tasks with little contact añong
one another or explicit recognition that problems are generally cross-media in
nature.
Ot the US-Mexico border, transgover¡mental ties also anchor coop-
eration. Even before NAFTA, the United S¡ates c¡eated the Good Neighbor
llnvironmental Boaú i¡ 1992- as an ofGcial advisory committee concerned
with borde¡ environmental problems. Composcd of delegates from eight US
federal agencies, as welJ as representatives of state, local, and tribal governmenrs,
businesses, academics, and NGOs, it submits annual reports to the president as
well as specific lette¡s on matters such as how to minimize the environmental
irnpacts of thc border fence and tbe beneflrs <¡f re¡rew¿ble energy development
in the bortlcr regions. Although the¡e is no fo¡mal Mexican representation on
thc body itsclf, rhe board interacts with Mexican counterparts, sharing ideas
aborrt proposccl projccts among clivcrsc actors.
lIorrlcr'2012, rr contprchcnsivc progrirm of binationnl networl<-builcling
IIs (¡ Itt;trt¡iucrl hv thc lll)A rntl SIiMAItNA'l r¡vcr 201)2-12 r.n¡L.,rvor,.rl t¡¡ hrin,, .
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLTCY IN NORTH AMEITICA 'tllANsBouND^RY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCI. tN NORÜr
56 ^Mrit¡tCA 57

under
widc range of previously di§parate elvironmental management efforts bilate¡al i¡stitutions ¿nd activities have in many realms proviclcd nrr¡cll¡reeded
.,r.ir"-""*..i,. lt.st"úlish.d three tyPes ol coordrnating bodies-¡egional suPport.
*orkgroup, (for California-Baia California, Arizona-Sonora' New Mexico- On the ¡orthern b<¡rder, the International Joint Commission (l.fO) scrvcs as
io".lcftiit"¡*, Texas-Coahuila-Nuevo Leon-Tamaulipas), border-wide an umbrella Éor linking a wide array of efforts across arcl outsidc govclnmcnts
"ndon broad ropics ic g . cooper:rrive enloriement and.ct'nl-
*orL*rorra locu)ing to monitor and track water quality and quantity in the Creat Lal<cs lcgiou.
plianá¡, and policy forunls centered on categories of envjronmenlal problem\ I¡fo¡mation is generated through various channels, including tlrosc dircctly
[-"-. *r,"r. rri *aste). Besides rhe rwo nationat agencies' stare and local associated with the tlC, such as the Grear Lakes Science Advisory }lo¡rd and
"i.- p!ayed significant ¡oles in Bo¡der 2012, as they did in earlier the Grear Lakes !7¿ter Quality Board. There are also other governnrcntr¡l
*"i",-r,-"",s
versions of the sarne Program. bodies, such as the Great Lakes Fishe¡ies Comrlission ancl the C¡e¡t Lakes
Border 2012 was a unique attempt to bring about cooperation -betweefl F-nviron¡¡cntal Research Laboratory (in the United States); and the¡c are non-
governments but also benveen the governmental and nongovernmental spheres' goverrnnental efforts, such as the Great l.akes Research Consonium (¿ coalirr.rn
ít placed great emphasis on a cross-border regional approach to programming' of colleges and universities in New York and C)ntario) and the United States Sea
lu'rti.iprño., lry.luil societ¡ environmental groups, andindigenous peoples on Grant netwo¡k of centcrs atrd institutes.Indccd, there is such a widc array of
i.ii, .fu"r rú. bo.der was expressly encouraged (us EPA 2010) Issu* and research cfforts ongoing in different locatit¡¡s that it is difEcult to t¡ack them.
"r
projects were to be identified and implemenred ar rhe locaI level, and mecttngs It is also unclear whethe¡ these efforts are effectively coordinated, although
ir.ra to b" as inclusive as possible. The main mechanisms for involvement rhe !C's 2007 report to the national governments in support of the review and
were rhe Ta.k F.rces, whiuli included repre'enrarion from local commtrniries: renegotiation of the Grcát Lakes \íater Quality Agreement (completed in 2012)
relcvant local, state, federal, and tribal governmenrsl binational otganrzatlons; was an attenpt to suDrma ze the state of infolmation on regional ecosystems.
r".g.*Á-*"1 and community-based organizations' Meetings held.under Thc Remedial Action Plans, preparcd for 43 of the most highly polluted parts of
""á
it o,,rpÍ.., of Bo¡der 2012 we¡e also to be as inclusive as possible and open the Great Lakes (26 in the United States, 17 in Canada, and 5 in joint waters),
"
''
ro the public. have been unclertaken with an alnrost ulprccedcnted anrour¡t of intcraction
é"rir¡nly,,l',"r. have heen challcnges For example' nhile rhe US fedcr¿l between scieútjsts, govcrrunent officials, and a wide rangc of stakeholders, gen-
gor"aar-"n, i"."aa more enthusiastic over rinre about promoting local par- erating infor¡ratioú that would bc unavailablc from scienrists working alonc.
iicipation, Mexico is much more cenrralized in a political and budgetary sense' This kird of process would be far more difficult along the US-Mexico bordeq
*"t "., *hether and how state and local governrnents south of the reflecting dcficiencies in Iocal environmeotal capacity on both sides. Thc I.|C also
",-r,il "f"". shape bo¡der environmental decision-making' Further'
frá.¿".."utd actively pJays a éritical role i:r disseminating information through its biennial reports,
i, *k .o-" ,irn" ,o'*ork ort the lines of communication and responsibility its public consultation processes, and other nreeting minutes.
forces; it.was
between the fecle¡al bu¡eaucracies and the workgroups and task Air quality cooperation on rhc Canada-LJS border is more focused. Early
i."g that federal of6cials would take advice from these lowe¡-level cooperativc attenpts by Environrnent Canacla al.ld the US EPA to moclel t¡ans-
".."-"a but there was no formal mechanism for ensuring that this was
dalii"ru,ionr, boundary air florvs in the northeastertt portio,rs of the contine[t, particularly
communities
the case.It has also been ¡lifficult to ensure that localg¡oups and for sulfu¡ dioxides and nitrous oxidcs. were undertaken in the 1990s under the
.i."".ii"."p*l y a párticiPate fully. Finall¡ diplomatic sensirrvities are r¡.work has
terms of thc Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement. More reccntly, urder
on this border, perhaps eveu more than on rhe no¡lhe¡n border' and this the Canad¿-United Statcs Border Air Quality Strategy, the two govcrnments
sonretimes made interáctions difEcult. have initiated smaller projects tracking transboundary poJlution in palticular
Border 2020, the successor to Boder 2O12- under the La Paz Agreement' "hot spots" along the border, such as Winds<¡r Detroir (Ontario-Michigan)
builcls on the regional, bottom-up approach of Border 2012 and
mainteins and Puget Sound-Georgia Basin (lfashington State-British Columbia). These
ih" org"niáaional structure. Priuities are to be set ¡vith attentioÍl to the rcsea¡ch efforts have becn based o¡ "in-kind" support provided by participating
"u-" .f geographic area, region, or commut'tity, and.there is to be
f".,l.ri"."i"at " án il-rno.ti."tinn lvith local communities (EPA 2012b)'
agencies on both sides of the bo¡dcr-donating personnel time, equiprrent (even
ir"n rnur" planes!), and data sources. The result is a morc complete picture of air pollutant
".ph""i.
i*o-y"", u"tion ptons are intended to provide more flexibiliry to ensure that flows in thcse a¡eas.lt should be noted, however, that all infornation resulting
progá--ilrg r".ponds to changing local and resou¡ce neecls' Érom joint efforts Js gcncrally vettercl by nation:rl offlcials bcfore it is released tcr
the public; political oversight is thus present, though not usually heavy-handed.
Fostering Mutual lJnderstanding and [t is important to point out rhat there is also a small but energctic grou¡r
of nongovernrnental "policy enrrepreneurs" at work along the norrhern bor
Learaing at the Bilateral Leuel clcr-, carc[ully examining the available datá and trying to turn errvironmentll
\Vith resp"ect to the gatheritrg and coordination of data as wel] as transboundary ploblems into issues th¿t can becr¡me fodder for policy-making.': ln the Uniteri
nr,r,l"lini, lrilot"."l ásdtutio-ns have ccrtainly been beneficial along. both borders' Sretcs and Olnada, thc lole of policy entreprcncul is often taken up bv natir»ral
If thc ainr herc is to ensure thar ¡he¡e is appropriate dara and inform¡tion ( rlvirorlr)')crrt¡l org¡niz:rtions such ¡s the Wilclcrness Socict¡ thc Sicrr¡ Clt¡b,
for nro¡rtt lin!l ntr-rru¡l ttnclerst.rnding and gencrating c()nsensus on prlorltlcs lirrvit.<¡rrcntxl l)clirsc (LJnitcd Starcs), thc l)cnrbina Instittrtc, thc l)rvicl SuzLrl<i
rcquircme¡1ts)'
rrncl'policy clr,riccs (if not cxacrly a harüoniz¡tio¡r of spccific lirurttli¡tirrrr, l)ollutiorr l)r'ol¡r, ol tlrc (l¡nirdi¡rr l).rrhs itrrtl Wiltlt,r'rrcss Socicty

ENVIRONMEN,TAL POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA
58
(Canada). Recent collaborations among Canadian and American environmcrrtal
gr.rup. h^u" ,esolt"d, for example, in detailed examinations of the ca¡bon foot-
irint'of Albe¡ra's ¡a¡ sa¡ds proiocdon and investigations of the environmental
inrpact of oil and natoral gas pipelinc development through Canada aud into
the United States.
On the Mexico-US border, the attempt to gather and disseminate environ-
mental info¡mation under Border 2012 is-not surprisingl¡ given the programt
broad scope-quite ambitious. In support of the priotity areas of water, air'
land, envi.onmÉntal public health, errergency preparedness ald r¡¡99nser.and
.ooo".utir" fo..".ent and comptilnce' r he US EPA and SEM ARN AT en lisred
"n
nuá"rou. pu.,n"r, borh inside and outside governmenr to help develop envi-
ronmental indicators and performance measu¡es Based on these indicators'
2010'
extensive State of the Borcler Region reports were released in 2005 and
2005, 2010)'
with Progress Reports aloug the way (US EPA and SEMARNAT
These .eforts have generated critical data for furure decision-making'
Among the n-rosiprominent policy entreprencurs seeking to deepen.knowl
edge of e"nvironnerrtal conditions along the southern bo«ler:rre r'rniversity
reiarche.s, notably from such institutions as the University of California, San
lrieso, El Coleeio áe la Frontera Norte (College of the Northern Bordcr); the
Inrtlt,rto Te.r.tálógico cle Ciud¡d Juárez (Technological Institute of Ciudad
University of Texas, El Páso These
.luarez); the Univeisity of Arizooa; and the
,"r"r..ir"r, fr"qu.rrtly work collaboratively with colleagues in their owr¡ coun-
tries and also cállaborate across the border. There is even a fonnal collaboration
for
of frve American and 6ve Mexican universities (the Southwest Consorrium
Envi¡onmental Research aud Polic¡ or SCERP) based in San DieEo University
and other ¡esearchers make their work policy-relevant both by publishing results
in regional newspapers and by having meetings and conferences that generate
press coverage and are attended by policy-makers'
I Resou rce P toui sion
Bi ln t era
Qlearl¡ the resou¡ces nceded to support bilateral environmental cooperation
noted in
on boiú burd".,, brt especially on the southern border, are great' As
.t upi", f, .nritá"-ental capacity limited ir Mexico, but colsjderable
is more
s,rpport ii required at rhe local levels on both sides of the border' However'
áo'ri"rri. ug"n.y bodgetary constraints greatly limit what can be done -Under
the Bo.tler"201i, Program, for example, stakeholders could apply.for US com-
petitive grants to futid envirorrmental projecrs, especia[[y those that focLls o1-I
iapacity"-building, i,, the border region. In 2004, whereas $4 7 million worth
oÉprojá.t p,opo'.^I" *"." rubmitted fo¡ the California/Baja California and
Arirono/Sono- t"gions alone, therc was only $1'2 million available for dist¡i
trtior, (Zn¡c 2004i). Under Border 2020, funding for the priorities iclcntified
irf the.egional *orkgroups is to come from a wide variety of sources' inclr:d-
ing diffeánt "envelopes" in the EPA and SEMARNAT, the North Arnerican
the
DJvelopment Bank, t-he Border Environmental Cooperation Commission'
ltltínational state goverrlrnen¡s on b''th. sides
ÚS egJn"y fot Developmerlt!
of the"boáer, and even some private organizetions But rhe ¡rospcct of large
cuts in fecler¡l discretionary spending rnight mean th¡t somc of the agcncy
"envclo¡r's" will hc slirn, or evcn cmpry
'r"hc kcv,¡r.brcnr r.,rii,:):ll::llll:l::],:t::::::;,I,,:l,.l,,ii:l:ilI:l]'fil.::ll:
\
TRANSBOUNDAI{Y ENVTRONMENTAL COVERNANCE IN NOI{-ltl AMli¡llCA 59
continuing budget cuts over the decades, as discussed in chl¡rtcr 1. In Canada,
Envi¡onment Canada lost almost one-third of its budger irnd onc-quartcr of
its staff in the "program review" exercise of the mid-1990s enrl ncvcl rcrlly
regained these lost resources; úore recently, the Harper ¡dmin istr'¡ tir¡n h¡s
undertaken deep cuts to domestic programs as part of a conrt¡itment trr rcrlt¡cc
the public debt load.In thc United Srares, EPA plograms have undergonc crrts ls
a result of successive administ¡ations' attempts to address sizáble budget tlcfiuits,
fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and undertake "homeland sccurit¡"
though these have not been as c¡itical as in Canada. SigniGcantl¡ cuts lrnvc
tended to encourage a letreat by ágencies to their core regulatory responsibili-
ties, while funding for transboundary projects seems less imperative.ln additit n,
the dominant role of the United States in providing resources-again, espccially
ol-I the southern bo¡de¡-makes tbese budget cuts even lno¡e critical.In the
Mexican case, although environmental spending has been increasing since 2001
(SEMARNAT 2009), some offices and age¡cies have suffered cuts, as i¡ the cáse
of the environmental enforcement agcncy PROFEPA, mentioned in chapter 1.
Further, bilateral euviLonmental jnstitutio¡s and initiatives along the [wo
borders have been susceptible to the changing policy and thus finarcial prioriries
of governments. I(/ith the increased focus on do¡nestic and border securit¡ for
example, all three countries have seen the transfer of fede¡al monies to associ-
ated programs and technology (e.g., security infrastructure along the borders
and capacity-building). For example, the nurnber of US Border Patrol agents
rose from 4,287 in 1994, when NAFTA went into effect, to 27,444 in 201,1
(United States Bo¡der Patrol 201L), h 1994 there were only 306 agents on
the northern US bo¡de¡-this iumped to 2,237 by 201 [; ou the southwestern
border, agent stafñrg rose from 3,747 to 18,506,This increased vigilance did
not come cheaply-the budget for thc Border Patrol alone was $3.5 billio"
in 2011, not ro mention the Narional Guard and other assets devoted to the
borclers (Uoited States Bo¡de¡ P¿trol 2011). Securing the borders may have
encoulaged binational cooperation, but not the kind of cooperation that would
benefit the environmental agenda.
An important sourcc of funding for addressing shared pollutiorr orr the
US-Mexico borde¡ is the Bo¡der Environment Cooperátion Commission
(BECC). The BECC was set up under a NAFTA side agreeme¡t.to dcvclop
and certify "environmental infrastructure projects that incolporate innovative
sustainability and public participation concepts" (BECC 2010). lt works in
an area 100 kilometers wide in the United States and 300 kilometers wide in
Mexico. Ouce it develops projects, they are eligible for Ioans fro¡n the North
American Development Bank (NADBank), supplemented by aid from state,
federal, and local governments. Between 1995 and 2007, the commission certi-
fied 164 projects, with a total construction cost of $2.8 billion. About ec¡ually
divided between Mexico and the United States, most projects werc for water,
wastewater, and water conservation (BECC 2010). The 2010 BECC Year-il
I{eview report (BECC 2010, 5) noted that, "as of December 31,2010, there were
4-5 projects in BECC's project development pipcline, with an estimated cost of
approximately USD $905 r¡illion. Of these,24 were in the United States and 2l
in Mcxico; 3ll were lelated to water a¡rd rvastewater, 3 to solid waste (S\ü), and
4 to air <¡uality (AQ)." While Itráñcz Hcrnánclez (2008), in a detailed study of
thc llti( l( I rnd thc NAI)llrrnk, praises them as ¡rlrt of a "nestcd, but irrcrcmcntal,
btrilclttp of llolclcr cnvironrrcntal ¡.4ovcrnirncc," hc rrlso conclrttlcs rhltt "rcglrcllcss
 AMF'RICA
TRANSBOUNDATIY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN NORTH AMERICA 6A
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN NORTH

that, although the organization's autonomous political impact was timited by

of raoney along dre border' the impacts
of havi[g spent unPrecedelted amounts minor"'
its lack of formal policy advisory responsibilities, it was ncvcrtheless able to
."r,-ental infrastructure] are sti[[ considered
i,,"'.""¿".á .."f exert influence through "the broader support base and epistemic com¡runity
it is fostering through the marry expert groups, study teams, and consult¡tions
i¡ has c¡eated."
TRITATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE No¡th American Regional Action Plans (NARAPs) for selected pcrsisrent
and toxic chemicals are a good example of the way in which the C[,C builds
UnderrheNAAECenvironmentalrrdeagrcemenrtoNAFTA.lheCommi.sio¡
"to promote. rriu¡t iona I trilateral networks for environmental management. Existing NARAPs focus
for Environmcntal Cooperation (CE¿i h';" man<Jatc
and environment¿l on reducing the use and release of each of a set of "big bad" chemicals, such as
.rrstainable ¿"""top=átn" tonttrvarion'
.'^,.--."'i^ñ f,'r
oi"'ungible services' in the torm-ot achvrrres linclane, dioxins and furaos, PCBs, mercur¡ and DDI most of which are very
;;i":l;;::;h;;,*h rh" p'o'i'ion reeT' 45er crprain' longJived in the environment and tend to disperse widely. Many of these chcmi-
:il;;;;",'::'iffi;.i oun"n t ee;' 20r'j KirtoD 1
ln,l
cxclusir ely cals a¡e banned or regulated (but often in very different ways) in each of the
that NAFTA and
" NMEC pton""o 'o t"nsfo'rn u hith"no uLnostmany rssues,
'iiij,"."i ,.i",,"".rr,, t¡ilateral communiry by making three North American countries. Each action plan is the result of an extensive
inro a flew _
\lructure consensus-building process, which begins with a trilateral, collaborative evalua-
r.aa"t""t, in',¡irurions inro a new trilaterdl
the ctearion of tion ofthe threats posed by a candidate pollutant and then results in a "Dccision
""a
"'"ii"tiit ¡^ had a high l"uJái"tt'* ln faciliuting
bclween governmenr ufficials and Document" outlini¡g recommendations regarding the possible need for action
ler'els ot governmerrl' alld
liukaP.es berwcen'.ieed
en'iro'rmental problems ln fact' (CEC 2005). As the draft plan for lindane, released fo¡ public commenr in
l.."i"i:i,i"t'tiiltt *ith 'i'p"tt'o''n"tlfit tion to environmental govern¡nce 2005 (CEC 2005), noted: "The Partie§ enlisted and received input through
this has orobably been tts greatesl
"orltribT
if its abiliry.to gether a"9,ry.0-':'l::
n"" a regional task force, from various experts and representatives of indigenous
iii'ifi,iil;¿, tollo"i
The impressive amoun! ot inrormatron on
'lo,'"lv peoples, children's health interests, environmental organizations, and industry....
;;;;;;;;;ii"ues and impacts
li-i"Ii*,ii";;ild;á"tu i" Ñ'"ú'q*"n'i g*"'"t'd l'v th' !Il]li:,1'*o Public meetings were held to solicit additional input aud to enlist the aid of
and ro provide crillcal lnlorma experts in toxicology, atmospheric transport, epidemiolog¡ wildlife concerns
,o .n,a" ,ha pr.,6l. of environmental oroblems
;;";i;;';;;;;;'"tat NGo' The Ñorth A"'i"n Átla' exercise' described and indigenous/tribal issues. Prior to its approval, this plan will have undergone
As with bilateral institutions' extensive nátional public and private stakeholder review." Each NARAP thus
in the introductioo, is only one recent example' problem' creates a "toxics communiry" which can sha¡e info¡mation and best practices,
suppo't) is a.continuing
il..,i.J#il'i;:k';-f 1"'""1t' t*¿ p'ii¡cal
;il"t*ffit ;" ;*.."-nito *ii'r' tná óic '"n iealize its objectives' particularlv provide support for domestic implementation actions, and exefi peer plessure
in Mexico' on párticipalts to adhere to the agreed-upon actiol plans.
*ith ."gu.d to ."p"tity-building In another example, the CEC has facilitated the emergence of a contincntal
network across the governmental, industrial, environmental, and academic sec
Trilateral C ommunication and Nettt-totk-Building tors in Canada, Mexico, and the United States to support the development of
ins¡rrution in North-Americe'
ii" éié t" rhc key trilatcral nerwork-buildirrg lhar thc CEC i' onc
North American pollutant release and t¡ansfer registries (PRTRs). The primary
i. ,r'á*.,]"Jr',.* it works' one t"¡ 6"r ti'd""t"nd focus was to help put in place such a registry in Mexico. A PRTR is a¡ environ-
NAFTA environrnental
arm of a three-prong"A *tuttot";'i'itd
.tndet rhe
of the mental database or inventory of potentially harmful releases (generally from
"Council"' composed
^^----.-r rNAAfcl
dts¡r<trrL"t 't " 'l' '¡Ú"¡Fi.«-
"--' '
rhe N'CAE' created the
the lhree countries' ¿c rhe
point sources such as factories) to air, wate¡ and soil, often including wastes
highest (cabinet leuel) environment uilr,¡"tiri"t
r.o,n
transfer¡ed for treatment and disposal from the site of their production. Data
tne iortt of c¡C' tn addirion' a loint Public
sorernrng body rh¿t oversecs '¡" are provided by the facility to government and the public, who can the¡ track
'^irti".r"á;;;e UPAC) comp'''"'l
of 15 citize¡s (five f¡om each count¡v) the generation, release, and fate of various pollutants over time. The US Toxrc
advisestheCouncilonanyrnamerwithinthescopeoftheNAAECandserves thus Release Inventory (TRI) was the first toxics registry introduced into North
;:;; ;i;i;'-"tinn ro' rt'" c¡C TLe cEC' as the third institution' Ame¡ica in 1986, with the Canadian National Pollutant Release Inventory
;:.::'.1;i;;i;;l"iiii'nt o'n'i't"nd the nongovernmenral communitv' (NPRI) introduced some years later, in 1992. The CEC made the development of
govlrnment officials' scientifc
In áll of its activiti"" th" ctc u'it* io bring may gatn
so they
a PRTR in Mexico a priorit¡ used its newly created continental policy uetwork,
,"a'¡t"t."i .tp""s, as well as civil society interests together hosted regular meetings, and, after years of collabo¡ation and discussion of the
"ti t'.'ui'o"'""tal pioblems^and share best
;':;;;;;;;;.;";aing or'pt'i6" Canadian and American experiences, made public the first national inventory
on ln itr 2004 ev¿luation
rht" ptobl"*s
nractices wirh respecr to taking "crion ree srated rhat rhe
in Mexico, focusing on air emissions, in 2007.
commir
:it. ¡;¿.';h;'i;;-v"' 'q'i""nttnd Review of a trilateral North
The most unusual feature of the CEC is its "Citizen Submission P¡occss."
¿;'ü i-oi;;;ub"l" ,.""tpil'r'-"'i';'""f b" tl''" c'e"tion
the'pubtic" iCEC 2004b)'
Created under Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC, the process (described beJow)
ñ;.;; .;;;;;t'v i".nins tt'" ;out'ní""" 'nd
incrcased rhe ¡rurrthcr,rd rangc
provides "a means by which anyone living in any of the three countries of
il::":;:ffi'.;;;;'i.,'á""¡ítr'"t it" crcathasdifferent levels ¡rrd thcir v'rrious
N()rtlr Americ¡ may bring rhe facts to light concerning the enforcemenr of
r¡f contacts among ofÁcials
Sovernmen! j cnvironntcntal lcgislation on the b<¡<¡ks of any of thc thrcc countries" (OFlo
¡t"n ltsci'iii) crrlv on witlr rcsl)ccr n) rh('(l!l(
;ir,il;;il; ñÑ.'í( t'urccl
 ENVIRoNMENTAL PoL¡cY lN NQRTÉI
TRANSBoUNDARY ENVIRoNMENTAL GovERNANcE IN NoRTIT AMERtc^ 63
62. ^MER

NGg:: regulatory and enforcement activitics, yet it does have the function of "bringJng
encourages a broacl range oI interests' particu]itt'
lt
rhat.itLl'k'
2002). facts to light" about issues that tend to get little ¿ttention.
some would argue lends
irrJn iron.*ral dclihc¡ationr' alrhough
ol lnc
in..h¿os"r,bv nece\§it')a luorc conlronL¿tional tollc to di5cll\\lol1s
cnvl_
The process is arguably Fosteing MutuaI Understanding and
lil;;J'""t.ii"*'ut Ñot,h e',,""tun governme'rts' and t"pt:.t:l-ttd'
ii. Á""i irp""r* .ubstantive p"tt of ti" side agreeurent'trade sancrions' but
Learning at the Tilateral Leuel
laws through
i.#;;it;"Ñ;;nforcing eávironmental
important
The CEC co¡tributes to knowtedge creation and policy learning in four ways: ir
.ir*el,lougl, ,o t".,rre key iupport for NAFTA from most of the
builds its own continental databases for pollution levels and impacts; ir supporrs
US uational envi¡onmenral groups' data and information gathering for its own projects; it undertakes research
organizarions)
It allows individual citizens (in pracrice' usually environmental
j) on topics that it considers pertinent to fostering environmental sustainability
lo enlorce
to lhc L tC chargc: r har a national govc¡-nment lallrng
bt tne before in North America; and it plovides a ureans by whicJr individual citizens ancl
rnu5r re:pond t' the charge'
;;;;'i,.-;;;',,;;mc,,ralirws The gouernment
country's envi¡onmental
groups ca¡r acccss critical informatiorr about the euvi¡onmeutal enforcement
;;"."*il ilAo*ii, .on,l'ting of tht Lead of eachdecides whether a"Factual
activities of their goverr[r1ents.
,n.,r.u tu, at the bcginning ofthis section)' First, with respect to building databases, the CEC has put together an impres-
"*pluirr"d ü.ilp.á uv tñ' cEC' After receiving the Factual Record
;.'":;iYil;il; eccused government'
sive array of information, comparing, for example, environmental legislation
;;;;;'^,G;.--"nts bv bothihe complainant artd tothemake the entire record
and policies in the th¡ee countries, certification schemes for green goods and
,¡.'é."*ii-r, ¿."ide by a two-rhirds vote whether trade sanctions.againsr services (e.g., renewable electricity production), and transboundary environ-
;;ll;. il; C.ir".ii .""". .lct independenrly to seek
mental agreements in No¡th America. In its most high-pro6le project, the CEC
mcmberswhofailtoentorceenv'ro¡u"e"tallaws'burthereisaprocedurcthat initiated a Taking Stock series, whicb reports annually on comparative Canadian
an atbitration panel if the
;it:;;;;;;i;;;i;;;"¡,,,re'ts to take action through
practices and Amclican-and now Mexican-pollutant ¡eleases a¡d tra¡sfers. The Taking
environmental iifraction leads to unfair trade . Stock database makes use of a NAFTA-inspired reform of economic statistjcs,
""'ñ .
conplaint
¿;a;;;i;;, quit stti"t 'boot -hen it will forward a citizen
be hanned by
accomplished by a task force from the three countries'statistical of6ces, which
complainant
to the Co,rncil. Arnong the requirements are that the created thc North American Industry Classification Systcm. This standardized
oÍ the cnvironmental law and that all appropriate national
io-J-ár-errfor..-.,r. the definition of va¡ious industries across each country and enabled ¡esearchers
2012' 82 submissions were
..nrá*-i""" U.". "xhausted' Between 7995 a¡d still active 120L2 data
and interest groups to unde¡stancl much more precisely how various types of
,.".i""¿, *ift is f"ctual reco¡cls released and 11 6les
fums were responding to NAFTA or othe¡ fo¡ces. But it also has great useful-
about enfo¡cemerrt of
i..," óié]. ói,rr" submissions,4l were complain^ts ¡ess for e¡vi¡onmental policy-making and enfo¡cemcnt. Once the location of a
."lir.rrn"",l f"*, in Mexico,31 in Canad¿, and 10 in the United.St¡res of particul¿r irldustry is known, it is possible to infer a great deal at,out emissions,
nine with Canada'
tñ.'ili".,r"r records released, eight dealt with Mexico'
with a remarkable-range
water der¡and. and solid ¿rrd toric w:stc gcneration.
,ri """ *iii rfr" u"ited States The cases have dealt
hog farms. poli uting'
Second, the CEC provides support for its own ongoiug projects, which often
.fitrr..', .¡rtg* of logging huning fish in Ont¿rio and
involve rcconciling different comparative databases or summarizing/reviewing
lead smelter ln I lluana
air and water in Quebec; pollution from an abandoned the state of scientific understanding with respect to particular environmental
..r",.".¡i,,,, of a c'ui"" ship dock in Cozumel; impacts ol.logging problems. lirr example, the CEC has published several overviews and fact sheets
"rJiil"*ri birds in thc United States; and ¡rercury emissions trom u5 power
on migátory on toxic chemicals such as lindane ard rnercur¡ which were used in its North
plants.' American Rcgional Action Pla¡ (NARAP) process. In 2002, as the release of
ror' itl sottlt clses'
The role o¡ rhe cirizen submi'sion process il1 stlpporring genetically modified corn, aheady wiclely used in the United States and Canada,
Du.hjnP')dome.ljLenvi¡.onmcnraleffortsi'mixedatbe§l.I¡onenotahlec¿se. became a major political issue in Mexico (see chapter 6), the CEC commis-
il;;#;;;;;;t;atelv reg'lar;ng lo¿gins altivitics ar the expenscof irnpov sioned background papers, colveled a public conference, involved a prestigious
the steep canyon§ ot uurango
erished Raramuri indigenous people, who live in scientific review panel, and, in 2004, published a 50-page summary report.
r,"i" it "".rfr*" l¿.x"i.o.t r¡. zi+ page Facrual Record cont¿i¡s and ro.work
somc damn-
Third, Article 13 of the NAAEC allows the CEC Secretariat to prepare a
n*.rj¿"r." ol lailure tt¡.nfo,t" l"i' ro monitor compliance' research rcport for the Council on any matter withi[ the scope of its annual
conlended th'lt rr was
wirh co-munirier. However, the Mexlcan govcrnment work program. For example, it has paid particular attention over the yeárs to
l¡ws' r'r ¿' hampercd hy Iaik
t-i..,ir-1"¿i",¡ral cascs ot violations of irs bLrr
the problern of air pollution in Nortlr Ame¡ica. An earl¡ high-profile study irr
:i,"",l;;:.1;' ;;io'r,g "'¿ ""r"*"-ent, duc in part to-the r,ernotc¡ess of the 1990s focused on t¡a¡sboundary flows of air pollutants. The study high-
;h; i;",h"t ."."r, sulh "t thu'g"t "gainsr Cauada and the Uni¡ed states Iighted thc coltroversial role of eJectric power plants itr the geleration of emls-
";;;.ro r¡" impacts of logging on birds in vir¡latiou of national laws nleant
r"ioi"a sions, associated human health irnpacts, the decline of govemment furding for
broad analvses
;;iÑ;;;;;iÉ."rorv biriireities, the CEC hegan.to p.roducenattoncl govern-
tracking and reducing pollutants, and the need for collal'nrative action (CEC
of the violations-only ro come up against opposition.trom 1997).This study was influential in Canada US discussions ofthe Ozone Anncx
na'rowcd ¡r
;.;;. ;ñ;i;;;"..i,1ü) n,su"d thn¡;t" factLi¿i rec<"d be 'pccific
lt t'¡as bccort¡c clc¡rr tlt¡t
to ¡hc (l¡rn¡cli¡-US Air Qtrality A¡¡reement (VanNijnattcn 2003) and e¡rcor¡r-
il;l';;;;;,|;;t,;n.íio*ínt nll"gttl «¡ be violatctl lgcd frrrtlrcr study of air pollution on thc [iS-Mcxico borclcr.'fhc CE(j tlrcn
,;;;,;;,,;lt;i,r, c¡n rl. litttrit. c.mpcl thc cotrnrrics t. ir¡Pr.vc tlx'i¡'
;;;,¡css
64 ENVIRoNMIINTAL PoLICY rN NoRTH AMERrca
undertook to st¡¡dy the environmental effects of rapid changes in rhe electriciry
systems of Canaáa, the U[ited States, and Mexico, namely the opening of
eiectricity markets to cornpetition. This study again highlighted the rolc of the
elcctricity sector in terms áf air emissions and alerted govefirments to the large
number of power proiects being planned near inte¡national borders that were
likely to affect the well-being of the public and the environment in neighboring
cotrntries (CEC 2002). As part of its work on the envirollmental impacts of the
electricity sector, the CEi has also conducted research into the possibility of
establishing a multi-pollutant enrissions trading regile within North America
(Russell 20¡2). AU of this activity has served to set our an agenda for addressing
air emissions in North America, pirrticularly ftom power plants, and to hjghlight
thc need for common goals.
The 6tal role, "bringing facts to light," is the essence of the CEC's Citizen
Submission Process, as discussed above. Although there is considerable debate as
regards the usefulness of the Citizen Subrnission P¡ocess in changing government
po'licy in a particular case, the reports gcneratcd when the CEC orde¡s a factual
,..oá p."pot.d p.nride iodividuals and groups with access to information they
woul<i noi oth.iwise havc about the environl:rental policy activities of their
governments. For example, the Raramuri logging case, mentioned above, may
ielp persuade the Mexiian governmeut to pay more attention to the JiBhts of
indig"nou. people, whosc very existence has often been ignored by Mexican
¡',oliiy-makers. Also, it helped pull together a ca§e fot the
indigenous com-
th"r, point, could be presented in national courts with the
^uniii". "t "ome
legitimacy granted by the ffilateral commissiou. EvcnWilson (2003), who was
uJ .r"g"iire aborrt the CEC performance in rhe US and Canadian cases on the
effects of logging on birds, noted that environmental organizations can still use
rhe processiá highlight issues not easily pursued in other political forums and
gain access to information they would not otherwise have'
Trilateral Re s ource Prouision
,Despite rhe inrpressive array of projects and tasks undertaken by the CEC, its
'*ork
ho. been hampered by a severe lack of ¡esources. The budget provided
to the Secretariat by the rhree narional govemments is decidedly meager, and
the¡e is a continued reluctaflce to inc¡ease that budget, While the US govern-
ment had initially preferred a total annual budget for the CEC of $1'5 million
USD, Canacla, at the timc undergoing radical budget cuts to its envirorimcr¡t
and natural ¡esource agencies, agreed to a $9 million USD budgct for the CEC,
with each parrner contiibuting a third of this total. Mexico, given its di¡e ñscal
situation the mid-1990s, would doubtless have preferred to contribute far
i^¡
less than its $3 million USD share. To make matters worse, as is noted in the
2004 rcport of the Ten-Yea¡ Review and Assessment Committee to the CEC,
given that "the CEC's budget has not changed since 1994, its real value has
declined by almost 20 per cent."
Euen .á.p"."d to the modesr resources provided by the infrastructure plan-
ning ancl funáing BECC and NADBank, the CEC's budget, in light of the con-
siderable environmental capacity problem in Mexico, is certainly problenrtic'
As Gallagher notes, "Itlhe CEC is largcly ill-cquipped to help solvc Mcxicot
si¡¡ni6cant cnvironnTclrtal problcrts bccausc it l¡cl<s thc rcsourccs to coulltcr
tlrcsc¡rroblcns. lly its vcry natllrc, il¡l insritt¡tion with ¡l¡ ¡n¡lttirl buclgct of
TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE TN NORTH AMERIC 65
$9 million can hardly make a de¡rt in a series of problems that costs thc Mexrcxn
economy over $40 billion annually" (Gallagher 2003, 125). The NAAE(l
appears to demand equal effort on the part of all th¡ee co¡.¡nt¡ies, with no spccial
treatment for the partner that has more limited human, technical, and financial
resources (Torres 2002). Capacity-building is "implicit in the achjevement of
mos¡ of the NAAECT objectives" and, indeed, it became a formal goal of the
CEC's work progranr nr I998 (CEC 2004b). As implied in some ofthe exampJes
above, CEC program man¿gers run seminars, workshops, and exchanges to
promote technical training, deveJop merhodologjes, rools, and databases to
support policy formulation, and fund community-based projects in the three
countries. Fol some time, these activities ¡eceived modest support through the
CECt North American Fund for Environmental Cooperarion (NAFEC), which
was highly valued by Mexican government ofñcials,6 and through its Fund for
Pollution Prevention. However, due ro a lack of rcsources, the CEC was forced
to eliminate the NAFEC completely in 2004, and its ability ro bring officials
from the th¡ee countries together has also been affected. The lesource crunch
has encouraged the CEC to focus on add¡essing discrete problems that are firmly
within the CEC's mandate and that have a high lilcelihood of success.
It is also very likely that the CEC's budgetary problems are linked ro a
lack of political support. The NAAEC atd CEC bear the scars of thcir highly
political origins. The NAAEC was the price Canada a¡d Mexico had to pay
for US congrcssional approval of NAITTA, and they sought to Iimit l¡oth thei¡
or¡,n commitments under the agreement as well as the CEC's powers. Certainl¡
from its signing, thc agteement "continue[d] to coJor environltenral relations
among the three countries" (Torres 2002).? Often viewed with suspicion by
¡atio¡al ánd agency officials in all three count¡ies! any attempts by the CEC
Sec¡etariat to be ambitious in its undertakings or, some would argue, even to ful-
fill the basic requircments of its mandare have been met with ¡esistancc, Indeed,
the autonomy of the Sec¡etariat has been const¡ai¡ed at numerous points by tlre
involvement of national political leaders in the Secretariatt program operations
(Kirton 1997). Carlsen and Salazar put it more bluntly: "the [CEC1s] tluee-party
governing council appears to have made the success of rhe [CEC] a relatively
low priority. This lack of commiture¡t limits the [CEC's] authoriry, its decision-
making power, and its political leverage as well as diminishes its profile in each
uf rhe rhree countrie\" \200),224-f).
A Note on the SPP and Leaders' Summits
In this discussion of environmental t¡ilateralism, it is important to mention rhe
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), in operation over
2005-8. The SPP came into exisrence primarily due to Canadian and Mexican
concerns about the US ¡est¡ictions on border crossing after the September ll,
2001, attacks. Howcver, the SPP also undertook a "qualiry of life" agenda, which
included a commitment to "joint stewardship of the environment." Among orher
activities, the three gove¡rments took very initial steps to iink the continent¿rl
cnergy and climate change agendas'by jointly pursuing opportunities for lowcr-
carbon technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within No¡th Ar¡errc¡.
Ovcr 200.5-tl, these attempts ranged from'nuts and bolts,,iniriativcs suclr ¡s
harmonizing clcrgy cfficicncy stlndarcls to broader pro¡rosals tirr coustructirrg
rt joint visir»r of biofucls for transportatiorr by 2020, In adclitior), ir¡r illlr.ccnrcll

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN NORTI{ MERICA
on the exchange of ififo¡mation for clean energy was signed by the th¡ee leaders,
Annual meetings of the Mexican and US presidents and the Canadian prime
minister set out the agenda for the year aod provided an impetus for program-
ming. The programmirg was implemented, however, tfuough transgovernmental
channels; committees of officials from complementary national agencies met
regularly ro plan and monitor projects. This process was quite closed, occa-
sionally iuvolving business but not civil society gl oups, and thus engendered
considerable c¡iticism.
Due to its unpopulariry, the "security and Prosperity" nomenclature was set
aside by political and br.¡reaucratic ofEcials atd, after the election of President
Obama, governmetrts changed the narrre of the meetings to "the Leaders'
Summits.i'The summits continued to feature annual discussions among the
three leaders, during which a common agenda for trilateral cooperation
was set out/updated, At the 2009 Leaders' Summit, for example, the three
governments agreecl to undertake further cooperation in the area of energy
and climate technologies, primarily through the pre-existing North American
Energy §(/órking Group. The three governments also requesred that the CF,C
prepare naterials outliring options for continental climate policy cooperatron.
Ho*.u.r, th"r" -ere no Leaders' Summits in 2010 or 2011, and some analysts
wondered whether they had been discontinued entirely. Instead, diplomatic and
policy energy appeared to be channeled into bilateral interactions, as discussed
above, in just about all policy areas, including the environment.lo early 2072,
however, the three leaders did meet, suggesting that a limited trilateral agenda
was ongoing.
SUBNATIONAT ENVIRONMENTAT GOVERNANCE
North A¡re¡ican ¡etworks have also been built "from the bottom up." There can
be no doubt that Canadian provinces and American states arc key e¡vironmental
policy actors. Whether because of political, ñnancial, or (in rhe Canadian case)
colstitutional coflstraiuts on federal actors, the focus shifted over the course
of the 1990s to Ame¡ican states and Canadian provincial governments, whose
capacity to address environmental challenges had grown considerably. Canadian
provinces already control the most important co¡stitutional and policy levers
to address environmental protection and natural resou¡ce matters, as cliscussed
in chapter 1, while the involvement of US states in environmental protection
activities has increased significantl¡ to the point where thcy are the primary
implementers and euforcers of nationally set pollttion standards Studies have
demonstrated a willingness on the Part of states, and fo á lesser extent on the
part of provinces, to undertake innovations in environmental policy approaches
and i¡stLuments (see, for example, Rabe 2002; VanNijnatten 2006).
The Mexican states, as constituent Linits in a highly centralized federation,
have much less power and autonomy. However, they have begu¡ to play a more
significant role in the Mexican environmental protection regime in recert years,
both as a result of ¡eceflt federal constitlrtional and legislative changes and the
manne¡ in which transboundary cooperation is t¿king place (Environmental
Law lnstitute 1996). As explained in chapter 1, the foundational Gencr¡l [-aw
of Ecological Bala¡ce and E¡vito¡mc¡tal Protcction (1,(;tr,l'll'A) now ¡llows
for thc clclcgntion of cnvironn¡ental powefs to statc govcrtrnrcnls, nncl lll 32
,I'RANSBOUNDARY
ENV¡RONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN NORTH A]IIIiI{ICA
have enacted their own comprehensive ecology laws. Al example of this is thc
variety of climate action plans that states are starting to develop (see qhaptcr 5),
most of them with either advisory functions or funding coning from bilaterrrl
cooperation with US states or associatio:rs. Vhile states a¡e still in the process ol:
implementing these laws (and resources are scarce), in general there has l¡een irn
upward trajectory in terms of subnational involvement in e¡vironmental ¡rlicy.
At the sar¡e time that Canadian provinces, as well as American and Mexre¡rr
states, have been gaioing more policy latitude within their respective intcr-
governmental contexts, they have been interacting more frequently wirh orrc
anothe¡ across international bo¡de¡s. A succession of studies found that nor
only were state-provi¡rce and state-state environmeutal agreemetts becomin¡¡
more numerous, they were also more formalized and increasiugly multilateral
or regional in orientation, as well as more ambitious in terms of the projects
urdeftake¡ (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al. 1998; VanNij[atten 2006), Indeed, sincc
about the mid-1990s, subnational governments, with US states often taking thc
lead, have often been the primary locus of environmental policy initiarives anrl
innovations to address transbounda¡y problems.
If subn:rtional gove¡¡firents are increasingly wolking together with their
cross-border regional partners to address environmental problems, what are thc
prospects for effective transboundary goverrance at this level? With regard to
the conditions laid out earlier in the chapter, subnational governance shows con-
siderable promise iri terms of facilitating communication and network-buildiog.
However, knowledge creation at the subnational level is weaker and heavily
¡eliant on tcch¡ical and info¡mational aid from othcr partners, párricularly fed-
eral agetcies. And, as with national bilateralism and t¡ilater¿lism, subn:rtional
environmental governance is unde¡-resourced. Interestingly, however, collabo
rátion at thc cross-border regional level has att¡acted attenrion and rcs¿¡urccs
from bilateral and trilateral orgadzations and actors, which bas aided iu policy
Iearning and capacity-building across subnational jurisdictions.In addition, ar
this subnarional level, there appears to be a high level of awarcness of the policy
and capacity needs of Iocal Mexican jurisdictions.
Subnational Comnunication and Nehaork-Bailding
Subnational cooperation is quite similar in narule to cooperation at the bilateral
level in that it is tra¡sgovernmental--domioated by executive acto¡s and involv-
ing communication and cooperation among officials in related deparrnrents
of all participating governments. These interactions are typically initiatcd rt
annual confe¡ences of political leaders (preitiers, governors); conferencc rcso-
lutions then provide direction to committees of senio¡-level officials invosrcrl
with rnanagement responsibilities, after which mid-level officials are assigncrl
project-speciñc tasks. Between meetings, further deliberation and communru.r
tion is ca¡ricd out electlonicall¡
But to what extent do these interactions provide sustainable networks ¡mong
those withi¡ "regional" boundaries-especially lcgions rhar make scnsc rrr
tcnrs of thc scope of pollution problems or of ecosystems? Fimpirical stuclics
(VxnNijnattcn 2006,2009) have traced the form¿rl imprint of cross-bordcr
cnvironment¡llgovernance by analyzing stare-provincc and stltc-statc cnviron-
nrcntll "linl<l¡¡cs" th¡t support tr¡,rsbounclary nctworl<s. On thc (l¡rrldl-[JS
borrlcr' (scc'l"rrblc 2,3 lxlow), this rescurch hns srrggr.rs[crl thc prescncc oi thrr.r
68 ENVIRoNMENTAL PoLICY IN NoRTH AMERICA 'I RANSUOUNDAItY Ll¡lVll(O\Nll.N l Govl:ltNAN(lL lN NoRI l l
^f, ^i\)l.RI(l\

"cross-borde¡ regions" that build upon distinct core clusters of subnational
jurisdictions-the Pacific Northwest (encompassiog British Columbia, Alberta,
'Washington
State, Idaho, Oregon, and Montana), the G¡eat Lakes-Hea¡tland
(which includes Ontario, Minnesota, Michigan, New York, Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, §lisconsin, and Pennsylvania), and the New Elgland/Maritime a¡ea
(including Quebec and the four Maritime provinces as weil as Vermont, Mairre,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut). These core
clusters can radiate influence outward to draw in other states and provinces on
the periphery for particular purposes.
The New England/Maritime region has a straller number of agreements and
institutions, but these are largely multilateral, involvlog most o¡ all menbe¡s of
rhe region. llre Conference ol Nen fngJand Gorernor. and ta.rerrr'Canadian
Premiers (NEG/ECP)' as well as the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Envi¡onme¡te account for r¡uch of the closs-bordef activity in the region. As
one of the oldest cross border regional mechanisms, the NEG/ECI established
h 1,976.]has devoted considerable attention to environment arrd sustainable
development issues. The NEG/ECP's member govertments have formulated
a series of action plans to reduce air pollutnnts, mercur¡ and, most recentl¡
greenhouse gases.
In the Great Lakes-Heartland region, there are numerous mecha[isms
incorporating all G¡eat Lakes jurisdictions-notably the International Joirl
Commission-but also a host of bilate¡al agreements beñveen Ontario and its
teighbors. The Great Lakes states and provinces, working through the Great
Lakes Comr¡ission and the annual Conference of G¡eat Lakes Governo¡s and
TABLE 2.3 Top 20 State Province Palrs by Number of Environmental Linkages
(increose ¡n l¡nkoges* since 1980)
BC WA 22 (4 s0%) QC'VT
ONM 1t (240%) NS-ME
P¡cmicrs. h¿rc ¡t times üo!ccl ¡llead of thc two ieLlar ¡l goverllrrl('rlls in l)r(il{ ! I
ing lirshw.tcr in the (l c:rt L:rl<es.
Thc I'aciiic Nonhr,vcst is ¡lso rrctir,c in terr¡s of subn¡rionrrl ncn'-or l< bLrilclrrrrl
Thc vcry closc British Colu¡rbia-llashin!,t(xl rcl¡tionship lies lt irs cor-c' irl' i
tutir¡r¡lized ir thc I1(i-Washington lln',irorrnrcntal Coopcre¡ion Cotrncil ¡n¿ rl
r',r¡ir¡us t¡sk irrces. For cxemple, thc ll(i_\X'ashirlgton (l¡ast¡l ¡ntl Oce¿rl Trrl
l'olce ploviclcs a ltcch¡nism to cr¡ll¡br¡r¿tc on ¡clivities thdt I)n¡rcct and rcstoll
co¡s¡rl antl r¡¡¡rinc h¡l¡itats in l\rget Soun.1, thc C,:orgia l3asin, and th.'outL'r
coasts of \X,ashington ¿Ircl Blitish (irlu¡¡1¡i¡- Therc :rlc also nlultilater¡l nle¡h¡
nisnrs clceliug rvith ni¡ur¡l rcsourcc Lll¡rl¡!,emerlt, inclucling u'¡tcr ¡¡ci for'ests.
l'erhaps chc highest profile multil¿rcral mech¡ttism in the rcgion is the lr¡clfr'
Northrves¡ Ect¡nonric ltegiorr (PNWEIt), whosc mcntrerrs inclucle Ahskr,l.1eho.
N'[ontanl. Orcgon, rrr<1 tñ'ashurgtott ¡s tlcll es the (ienaclien pr-or inccs erld tcr
li¡orics r¡f tsr'rtish ( irlLrnrhirt, Albcrta, encl thc Yuko¡. l'N§'ER has u'o king ¡lrotrps
on valioLrs issucs. inclLrrling cnvilorrrnctt, sustaireLrle cler'.'Lrfrrrelrl, rnd ahet ¡ti\L
cno ijy, which involvc govcrnncnf officiills rrlld nlclrbtrs oI thc privilte scctol.
()n the LIS \lcxico 1.lordcr. su[¡natio¡¡l ¡nd cross horclcl legiorlal ncnvorks
.lre ¿t ¡lr cilrlicr stagr ()[ developlncnr. With orrly l$() excePLions' ¡11 clr!iron
nrcntcl lirrkirgcs bctwcor Arncric¡rl alld N4c\ic¡Il st¡tcs hLrve becn put ur ¡tJ.trc
srncc 199.5. It is ¡ot¡blc that cnvirr¡nr¡errt¿i linl<,rgcs reprcscnr 90 per ccnt,,i
thc totll hnkltgcs benvee¡ llS entl Mc'ric¡rl st¿tes, sho\ring tha inlPort¡rlaa
th¡t go!ernnrcrlts alolg tlris border irrttcit to e¡¡vironnrcrll¡l cooPcr¡tjorl. lrl
¡ddition, l¿ble 2.4 indicates plrticulal strenS,rh i11 tcr¡ls of connections al(»!',
th¡:'§cstcrr cnd of tht borclc¡.
Bil¡rcl'al intcr¡cti(»rs hirve un¡il rect¡tlv clr¡lrin¡ted llS-Nlcxico cr()ss_horrlcl
cnvilr¡rrmenL,rl coopclation. (-¿liiornir ancl liajr Cirliftrrnie Noltc is ¡rcrhrP'
thc ¡¡ost clvn¡nic plir iLr tcruts oi the nu¡rbl-f :rncl varjttl t¡f environnlc¡t¡l
link:rges. thc t\\() stiltcs sh:1re issuc specilic linkrrgcs, cspeciallv rvith reg'rr-rl
to tri¡nsl)ordcr ¡jr ¡ncl rv¡ter pollution. rvhilc ¡lso irtteracring to pro¡r1()te.r
bro¡der sustirin:rb1c clcvclopnrent agen,-14 through ¡hc Border Environmcrtt¡l
I'rograrr ¡rcl the N,lerrror,rn,:lurrr c¡I Llnclcrsr:rrltlirlg for thc I'rrrpose ofI'r'otlrorLn¡
12 (100%) SLrst:rinebk'I)o,clo¡lnent. AriTorl:1:1rrLI Sonore are also cltLitc ¡etivci itl addirrt)rr
1o p()irrt solrÍ.c spccific encl techtlical linkagcs, thc Arizort¡ Nlcxico
(lon¡¡lissi"rr
12 (tAAo/a)

(220%) AB.MT (17s%) atttlrrpts to br'oaclcn coopcrltion betweel¡ rhe lespecti|c state ell\ironrlclla.ll
ON MN 16 11
ir¡1cncies, hartnonize cornpliance, art(l ttronitor ilctivirics, ancl it undertel<es i""'r
QC NY 1s (276%) AB, D 11 (267%)
pollution rccllrctiorr ¡rojects. Nc',1'Nlcxico appears to bc lhc lcast ¡ativ('r!r
ON NY 13 (16A%) QC PA 11 (267%)
-l.rp ¡k¿ge. (2005)
ONW 13 (22s%) ON, N 11 (124o/a) fABLE 2.4 State St¡te Pa rs by Number of Envlronr¡ent¿ L

ON OH 13 (16A%) ON- L 11 (120%)

BCD 13 (22s%) AB.WA 11 (267%)

CA.BCN B

ON.PA 13 (n7%) BC MT 11 (267o/a)

6
AZ-Son.
BC OR 13 (22s%) BC-CA 11(17solo) 2
N /\¡-Chih.

\()( lt(lll, \'.¡r!\,i,,¡rren -100(,. TX-Chih. 2

lli, LLIri sttug lortli proec.lrrcs :nJ co,r,l,t,,r,s h,, n$ lrrir-l

ll¡1.,¡rr(" 1..1,,,1,'s m'rh.,nios TX-Coah. 2
Irr,, ¡r r,,¡ \ l. ¡ n)!m¡ i7(,1 f,¡r.c¡ h|,ie¡is (,1 io rrl\ siB,.,l ¡¡r, rfc,,rirL(,n. irl.or1,or¡ri(,,,,j
r,',nr,,r,1,¡r'rrr rrt ¡r,,rcrlrrcs rnJ ulrt,t',r, rl,rr.L,l.i.lrIrrIr i,r i,,'ri,,l, TX-N t 2

,,l,i,l r,' f!,1,,,r\.,,rt ¡ f r , . \\, . , , , 1 ,, ,.1\r,,,.: r\l!

t
, s, , 1 , i r 1 , , ,'. r,,l ,' TX-Tamps. 2
,,.,,,, ,,\ r!. 11

7O ENVIRONMENTAL POLTCY ¡N NORTI{ AMERICA
terms of environmental li¡lages with its neighbors, preferring instead to take
part itr multilateral activities with other states (see below). For its part, Texas
shares a bilateral strategic environrnental plan with each of its three rreighboring
Mexica¡ states-Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. These plans overcee
a variety of joirt initiatives. For examplc, the Texas-Nuevo León Strategic
Environmental Pla¡ (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 2005, i) is
a "multi-year planning and action document" desig[ed to provide a "framework
for cooperation between the cnvironmental agencies of the two states a¡d to
outline an actiol] plan of activities and projects desiglred to add¡ess comnon
environmental issues faced by both entities." The plan focuses on four main
environmental issues: air qualit¡ water supp)¡ water quality and treatment,
and waste management.
Envi¡o¡mental r¡ultilateralism is also becoming increasingly popular on
the southern border At one point, the Border Governors' Confererce, which
includes the governors of states on both sides of the borcle¡ and which has
not traditionally been active on environmental issues, adopted a nrore expan-
sive view of its responsibilities via Environment and Energy "Worktables." In
particuiar, the conference focused on promoting renewable energ¡ address-
ing air emissions from vehicles, and promoting sus¡ainable water systems in
the border area. ln addition, the Border Legislative Co¡rference (2006), which
encourages dialogue among lnrder state legislators via rwicc-yearly meetings,
addresses such issues as solid wáste, wastewater management, renewable energ¡
and, more generall¡ sustainable development in the border region. Moreovcr,
the Western Governors Association (WGA) sponsored "Ten State Retreat"
meerings of the errvironmental directors and secretaries frour all border states
over 2003-7 to identify priorities for joint action (California EPA 2007). The
retrcats do not scem to be ongoing, perhaps because the WGlfs agc[da is now
completely dominated by environmental issues: every one of the WGA's nine
collal¡orative initiatives is linked to sustajnability and environrnental protection.
Also interesting in this respect is the t¡i-state Chihuahua-New Mcxico-Texas
Strategic Envilonmental Plan, which adopts a cross-border regional approach
to envi¡onmental management on the border.
Suppolting collabolatio¡, then, are mechanisms that v¿ry greatly along ánd
between the bo¡ders. [n general, however, those along the northern border
tend to have more elaborate organizatiofls that operate permanent committee
systems, though they may not be well staffed. The Gulf of Maine Council and
PNWER are the best examples of well-articulated transboundary networks
with sophisticated committee and administrative systems. In many cases, c,:oss-
border regional organizations will appoint one jurisdiction to take the lead on
manage¡r¡ent ¡esponsibilities for a period, after which a different participatirg
government will take its turn. On the southern border, cross-borde¡ interactlons
are less institutionalized. lfhile r¡ultilateral organizations like the WGA and the
Bo¡de¡ G<¡vernors' Conference have permanent committee systems (gencrally
co-chaired by US and Mexican jurisdictions) as well as some basic administra-
tive support, bilateral interactions, such as those between Arizona and Sonora,
rely on interpersonal communication. For obvious resourcc-reláted reasons,
US-Mexico cross-bor<ler regional cooperation often relies on the Ieadcrs¡rip
¿1ncl rcsoL¡rccs ol US agcncies rnd ofñcials,
An inr¡xrrtlnt lspcct of subnatir»ral cnviro¡mental govcrnancc is its abil-
ity to intcglurc xctivirics fro,¡ lrighcr to lowcr lcvcls of gov|rrr:rrrec. lrr thc
.II"INSBOUNDAIIY
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE TN ÑORTH AMERTCA 7 I
Ca[ada-US case, states and provinces themselves set out the te¡ms of fccl
eral parricipation in cross-border activities, and federal agencies have formal
"observer status" on coñÍrittees; for exampJe, federal bf6cials si¡ on co¡.r.r»r¡r-
tecs of hoth the NEG/ECP and the Gulf of Maine Council. ln the Great Lakes.
the fedelal presence is stronger given the presence of the International
Joinr
Commissio¡ and va¡ious bilareral organizations. Local governments a¡e also
increasingl), brought into collabo¡ative activities; the Gulf of Maine Council.
for example, has a long hisrory of collaborating with local and regional gov-
enlr¡e¡ts, and in the Paci6c Northwest, collaboratjon with regional govem-
ments, such as the Greater Vancouver Regional Districr, is fairly rourine. On
the US-Mexico borde¡ federal participation and coordinarion is very visible,
This has its roots in the constitutio¡al and resource posirion of suúnarional
jurisdictions (cspecially Mexican states), the strong environmental regulatory
role of the US EPA, the programming reach of Border 2012, and the presence
of bilateral organizations-such as the BECC and NADBank, which have no
courrrerparts irr rhe norrhern bordcr region.
Another questiou concerning networks is whethe¡ subnational and cross-
border regional initiatives involve ¡elevant stakeholde¡s ,,outside,, of govern-
mcnt. Given ¡he dominance of state officials in transboundary activiiies, ooe
might expect the saflre ki¡d of situatjo[ ol1e sees at the bilateral )evel, i.e., a
rather closed process ofdeliberation. This diffculty is nor as ma¡ked at the sub,
national level, however. The Gulf of Maine Council, for example, uotes that..we
organize conferences and workshops; ... raise public awareness about the Gulf;
and connect people, organizations, and info¡nution,, (Gulf of Maine Council.
2013). In fact, represenratives of NGOS sit on the central council and also servc
on its more tháÍ a doze¡ committees, although they are far outnumbered by
governnrent offlcials. The NEG/ECP interacts frequently with nongovenrnert
policy experts.In rhe Pacific Northwesr rhere is a tendency ro seek interáctioos
with the p¡ivate sector over those with civic groups. Great Lakes organizations
ofren have very close relationships with civic and environmental organizations,
as well as the policy and technical comrnulrities. In the US-Mexico case, ther.c
arc also attempts to wo¡k with local groups in state-state interactions, though
pcrhaps not as much through border-wide organizations, such as the WGA ancl
Border Gover¡ors' Conference.
§7e can also see that subnational networks are themselves becoming..net-
worked." For example, states and provinces along the §7est Coast have under-
taken a collaborative program to redLrce diesel engine emissions. Originatirrg
with various clistinct jnitiatives across the British Columbia-Vashington borclcr.
as well as in California, thc program grew into what is now known as thc
"\West Coast Collaborative." It targets sources of diesel pollution bombarding
the regior, including long-haul rrucks, cargo ships, and farm and constrr¡c
tion equipment. Thc collaborative, involving subnational governmenrs fronr
C¡lifornia to Alaska, is supported by the US and Canadian national gover.n
mcnts! with some projects being integrated into Border 2020 programmil-Ig.
Fosteing Mutual Understanding and Learning
at the Subnational Leuel
'I hc irLrove cliscussion indicates that the
number and sco¡rc of cross-bordt,¡.
lcgir¡n¡l projccts is incrcasing. l.lowcvcr, thcsc inrcractions ¡rc rclinnt fo n
 !]NVIRONMENTAL lOLlCY IN NORTH AMEü
TRANS:]OUND RY ENVIRONMEN'I-AL GOVERNANC]] ¡N NOI(IH AMERICA 73
72

of Clearl¡ national governments have played a morc significant role in provid-

consideráblc cxtent on basic dara and technical support from higher levels
Environment Committee ing a framework for faci[itating and supporting environmental action on the
govemmenl and agencies. To offer blrt one example, the
southern borcler thar on the northem one, particularly with regard to basic pro-
áf th" Arironr-M"*ico Commission turned to the BF,CC and NADBank for gram support. However, it is important to note that the decentralized, regional
technical assistonce i[ their attenpt to iclentify implementation opportunitics
approach of J3order 2012 was iostituted in respo¡se to sustained c¡iticisnr of
for greenhouse gas emissions reduction ptojecrs in thc shsred border.regiol h
the "top-down" approach of the previous Bo¡der XXI. US-Mexico bo¡dcr states
,he NEG/ECP's Iqc8 Mercury A'tio¡ Plan' which ourlirrcs
"noih", "*u.pl"". have undertaken a variety of specific joint proiects, though maly of tlrcrn,
a v"riety of point-source reduction and pollution prevention initútives.to be
(ll'C ini¡iared at the subnational level, receive support from federal as well ¡s state
t.ken bi pariicipating státes and provinces, was supportcd by US EPA and
support state initiátivcs, agencies and are included under the Border 2012 umbrella.
¡esea¡ch. Vhile in the American casc national databases
It should also be noted that cross-border regional efforts are in some
the relationship between Canadian provinces/Mexican sta¡es and their respective
cases supported with private or nongovernmental funds. Land protection
national gove;nments is less clear and support is more sporadic' -
organizations such as Ducks Unlimited and thc Natu¡e Conservancy have
HowÑer, subnational interactions are a very useful nrcchanism for disscr'¡i-
is e been vely active ir wildlands protectiorl on both sides of the US-Mexico
nating information and best practices. The Climate Registr¡ for exa[rple,
transparent standards for border. Increasingly, they arc seeing their individual preserves as part of a
nonpiofrt organization that istablishes consiste[t,
contine¡t-wide system. Charitable foundations have also become involved.
bu.irr"r.", onld gou..nments to calculate, verify, and publicly report their carbon The F<¡rcl Foundation, which has had an of6ce in Mexico City since 1962,
footprints. Theicgis¡ry was an initiative of the American states but ¡ow incor-
has a Sustainable Developmenr program, which "supports the development of
poraies Canadianlrot inces and Mcxican states. Similarly, the research base and
natural resource policies and programs that give poor ... communities more
strategy un.lerlying the NEG/ECl"s Mercury Action PIan has been transmitted
cont¡ol over these resources ard a stronger voice in decision making on land
to the"óanaclian Cáuncil of Ministcts of the Envilonmcnt, an intergovernmcntal
use and development" (Ford Foundation 2013). Another conservation furder,
body incJuding all provinces, and has been integrated ioto the council's own
the Go¡do¡ and Betty Moore l'oundation, had in the past done Iittle in Mexico
mercury-reduction programming.
and had not included the Baja California coast in its important §üest Coast
fisheries work. However, late in 2011 it announced a $2.3 million grant to
Subnational Resource Proui sion monit<¡r Mcxican deforestation, Iinked to participation in á multi-donor global
Resources arc a problem for ahnost all subnational and cross-border regional changc initiative. The US-Mexico Borde¡ Philanthropy Partnership, started in
áctivities. All jurisdictions share a key vulnerability in l)eing reliant on depart- 2002 and seeded by 11 US foundations and corporations and one Mexican
mental o¡ exccutive branch funds for ongoing managemcnt activities and spcciÉc foundation, has created a network of 22 local courmurity foundations along
projects. A chronic problem is that for the executivc e¡tities providing fund- l¡oth siclcs of the border. The partnership seeks to inrprove the quality of life of
ingiollars, the prioiities of fullilling domestic mandates take precedence over the poor, includilg concerns of environment and eDvironmental justice. Anrong
t.insborder pró¡ects-particularty in the United States, where there is active the projects thus far havc becn flood relief in Ciudad Juarez, a proposed "Las
tegislative ovcrsiiht. Máre ominously, US state budgcts have fallen precipirously Californias Binational Conservation [nitiative" to create a buffer of natural
siice the onset óf th" zoog economic crisis. Being reliant on executive-level lands in the San Diego Tijuana-Tecate triangle, and several health-relatcd activi
funding also renders cross-border regional initiatives susceptible to chañges ties thar include <l¡inking-water quality. Even more important, the partnership
in gouiurn"nt in one or mo¡e jutisdictions and, potentially, a correspondi¡8 has been offering training in furdraising and creating a culture of philanthrop¡
lesiening of political support and rcsources for regional proiects' ár attitucle much less developed in Mexico than it has been historically in tbe
The iaiá¡ity of práfect-specific funding is sought from An:rerica¡ and Unitcd States and Carada.rt'
Canadian federal dep..r-.ntr. Fo, a*rrrple, while thc Arizona Departtnent of
Environmental Quality and the Comisión de Ecología y Desarrollo Suste¡table
del Estado de Sonora (Commission for Ecology and Sustainable Development coNctustoNs
of the State of Sonora) have unde¡taken to plomote projects to pilot green
Cetting a clear picture of how the clifferentiated, fragmented system of trans-
transportation routes in Arizona and Sonora, under the auspices of the C<¡misión
bounclary cnvironmental coo¡rerative institLrtions itr North America operates,
Arizána-Sonora, fun<Jing is coming from the US fedclal government Similarly,
aod drawiug conclusions as to the effectiveness of its netwo¡ks, may secm like
the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound lnternational Air Qua!ity Manageme¡t Stratcgy,
án exercise i:'r "trying to sec thc forest for the trees." However, stepping back
a s-og-riduction initiative on the British Colurnbia-\iüashington border', relied
and thinking about how transboundary institutiolrs operate, both independenrly
on En-vironment Canada support. Yet such fundiug is generally temporary in
obstaile to -edium- and long-term planning' Similarl¡ and togcthcr, is critical to understanding wherher the cooperation taking place
nature, which can be
^n across borders cán work to bridge and perhaps even ameliorate the diffcrences
the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, the economic stimulus program
ideotified in the int¡oduction,
in the Unired States, provided a large (but clearly one-time) pool of funcls Éor
At rhc st¡rt of this chapter wc noted that nost of North Ame¡icat cnviron-
"gteen" projects. There is a nccd for funding to support ttavel and in-pcrsol'l
l¡cntil¡ pr()hlcnrs "arc rroI orcrcly local or regional or nation¡¡l or c(úri¡cr)l¡l ir]
iritclr¡ctit¡rs-¿nd furds for this:rctivity are highly variabJe'
 ENVIRONIIIrN l¡L POI I(i! lN NORI lI ¡'LllR
1,1
n¡ture, but I¡al have loc:rl :r[d legiotl¡i i¡nd [ational and cotltir-rerltal aspccts "
So thc fact thilt during the past clec;rdc pressing issues such as telro¡isnr ¡nd
cco¡orrtic turmoii h:rve diverted thc ¡ttc[tion of nerional politici¡trs elrd tlip-
Iomars arvay frorn ervironmental problcrrs cloes not ne¿n that u'¡nsbound¡r',Y
e,r.,i.,r¡nrerrtol coop"ration stoPpcd. In the ¡hsc¡cc ol srveeping conlinent ltirle
atticks oll eúvirorulle¡ta] Problcnls, thcre h¿s bceu a flourishirg of acti\'ity on
othcr scales, particul¡rl) at thc suhn¡tioral lc¡'e1. Mc¿rnwhile, the bil¡rtcral ¡nd
trilateral institLrtiorls origin:rll,v set rr¡ in the 1990s have cont ruecl fo fullc!i¡ '11)
often to gooci effect, thoLrgh too oftcn unclcriuudecl.
Takcn together, the tr¡nsbotrl¡d¡rY ¡efrtotk i¡Érlstructure i¡ North Anrcrr' ¡
docs providc Éor gt,od com ¡trnic¡tion s,vstctrs across borcler's to lacilitarc nrfi'r'
rnati,rtr cxchange, mutudl unclerst¡nding, ancl policv learning Rilatc'ra1 enrl
rormcntal irtcr:actions, relyrng:1s thcv do o¡ n:ltioDal cnvironmental agcncl
il placc the tools lor.di'r¡:
cepacit\,, sho$ particular sfrcngth ill ter:tlls oÉ putting
no.irg .rr"i.on-.,rtnl problerns-thet ioint chre gathcring' nlodclurg
is, thlorrgh
erlvi¡orureltirl offici:rls
a¡d rJsearch. erd buLiláing rrutual ttnderstrnding arnong
lirnction the inrpressive caPilbilirir\
ecross countries. EsPecirlly critical to this irre
of the US EPA. fhe trilateral CEC is also iur rrnportrnt:rrd in this reg:rrrl, u'ith
its rvorl< on h¿rmonizing data, buildirg comPer¡tive d¡tlb¡ses, rncl unclelt'rlong
focused rescir¡ch on particulal) cdltincnt-rvidc envirc»lmentrl problenrs'
'1-herc are two key vulncral¡iljtics rvith nctworks in North Amerjca, ho(1(-!cr'
Fir'sr, networks are priruarily transgovc¡nnte¡tal and do l]ot provicle r'nough
access for NGOs anal private ¡ctors. In p¡lticul¡1. folrral bililler¡l ins¡inrtions
tc¡d tt¡ be more exclusio¡er,v atrd closed. focusccl as the,v arc on spccialized
bnreaucrirtic coopcratio¡. There arc certaillly excepriors herc Both the IJC ¡nd
the Border 2020 structures provicle bro:rdcr-básed net\ "orlis that drarv i¡ ¡':u'i'rrrs
public, privatc, acadcmic, and activist interests. Bolcler 2012 ('rncl norv 2020)' in
rn linking envirorlrlcrt¡l :1Ltr\ I
fiarticuLar', mirl-prove to be soflethirrg of a modcl
iies lroth ncross spatial leve]s ancl acloss cor¡munities of intcrcst' For irs f'ut, thc
tril¿tc'ral CEC can perform this linking functiol rcesonabll'\&'e11. tirough ¡trhrps
in a quieter fashion, through its basic structurc end thc cr¡11¡bor:1tive llr¿rnne! in
whicir it ca¡ries or¡t its nr¡ndate. Sub[ation¡l end cross-border regioll¡1 rü'cha-
nisms also providc a focrl point or avenue for bringing togcther qovL-rn[1e]rts
ancl intcrests or.ttside of govcr[[renl into delibc¡:¡tic¡ns. This :rlso clplalrs lvh1,
rlthough sub]latiolal governance is not strorg in terms of informatiul crcatlorl)
it is:r good means by rvhtch inform¡¡ir»l can be clisscmi¡atcd'
The sccc,nd key vulnerability is dre lack of sufficie¡t rcst)Lllces ¡c¡:oss thc s,vs
teln oi nctworks. All governllllce levels li¡cl tesotrrcc act¡lisirion ¡ d ílPplic¡rri()l1
c1ifficult, aJthough it is most djfllcult for subnationel actors, for: rhc CEC, anrl for
\,lexica¡ authoritics. State artd l¡¡c¡l governments. $¡hich havc clevelofccl ¡ia¡v
poinfs of interactiolr, have lioitcd resc]Ltrccs of theil o\\¡r'r encl cannot dc¡cntl
on nattonal governme¡T Ior needed subvenriolls for policy suppor-t, rnuch lcss
the builcling oÉ [eecled envi¡on¡rcnr¡r1 irrfrastntct¡.rre. Vr'hat this highlights is rhe
cc¡rtinued rcliance of rctors ar all levcls of el¡'i¡c¡rrncntal govcrn¡¡cc ifl 1.\orrh
A¡leric¿ orr llatio[al funcling rnd p¡rticulerl! l]S nation:r1 agencv furldillg'
Vhile the rclirtionship on the northern border'is soule\¡l.lt rlorL- cqti¡l (lhoLllah
t lrc t Irritctl St¡tcs .loes c¡¡ltt¡il¡trlc nlorc'th¡n Ca¡¡cl¡ in tcrms
r¡i Lrrlgiltlt fLrncls
,rrr,l irr kirrri rtsottrccs), tl-rc rehtiorlship orl tlll s()r.rthcrn lxrrtlcI it ¡Ir0l"'LrIr'III
(lS lrt'l rl"r
"rh''r 'rr"'' ' '
,rslrrrrrr¡r'irrrl irr tlris rcslr'tt. llrrrs,ttrts t,,lhc rrrll
tr,,,l rrrrrr|,,,,,rr,i.,rr,,rvlr,,IILI,rrr,r| Irr{ltrrrl,irrrl\lr:rrr.r 'rirr'rirrr¡''r "'l
TRANSBOUNDARY ENV¡RONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN NORTTI A¡,IERICA 75
This leads us back to a particular challenge we noted both in the introduc-
tion and earlier in this chapter-how to get environmental problems onto
national agendas, and particuJarly the US national agenda, at a time when
economic, political, and security crises have crowded the e¡vi¡onment off
those agendas. The paradox we are left with is this: in terms of carrying out
the actual work of cooperation-constructing networks for collaboration,
creating afld disseminating information to suppo¡t joi¡rt action, and birilding
capacity for implementation-subnational and cross-bo¡der ¡egional environ-
mental infrastructLrre (and we would include here the decentralized regjonal
approach of Border 2020) seems to provide a very useful app¡oach. The CEC
also appears to be importart in this regard, providing a light but visible tri
late¡al framework for thinking about environmental problems at a contirental
scale. It is the bilateral level of governance, howeve! that has relatively more
resources and capacity that might be used fo¡ t¡ansboundary environmental
initiatives-yet this level seems least able to bring interests and stakeholders
outside government together, o¡ least able to ensure that the envilonment
is at the fo¡ef¡ont of political attention.
Nor¿s
1 TITe lake is in North Dakota, but thele are potential impacts to Minnesota and
Manitoba.
2 For an extended discussion of how this works, and of the role of information
generally in making environmental polic¡ see Ascher, Steelman, and Flealy (2010).
3 Measures for imposing trade sanctions ol Mexico in the event of non-compliance
with envi¡onmental laws we¡e included in the NAAEC, but given the political
delicacy of ernploying such sanctions, they have neve¡ been used. Canada refused
to have such measu¡es apply to their environmental legislation.
4 For the politics of the side agreement, see,Torres (2009).
5 Case SEM 00-006, filed in 2000, Factual Record published in 2006.
6 rbid,42.
7 As Torres (2002) argues, particularly offensive to Mexico was the provision in
the NAAEC for the possibility of trade sanction mechanisms in the event of non-
compliance with domestic environnental laws.
8 The NEG/ECPI members include Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Quebec, New Brurswick, Nová Scotia,
P¡ince Edward Islancl, and Newfoundland.
9 The Gulf of Maine Council's members include Massachusetts, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.
10 This statement does not imply that Mexicans are not generous. However, in
Mexico (and in smalle¡ communities on the United States side of the border),
giving has tended historically to be person-to-person or oriented to very local
ends, such as building a church or school. This could be supported and enhanccri
by the development of cornmunity foundations both in rnobilizilg resources and
in dealing with larger scale problems, including environmental problems. One
long-standing philanthropic difference between Mexico aud the Urited States (arr(l
to a lesser degree Canada) has been the failure of extremely wealthy Mexicam
to set up formal institutions comparable to, for example, the Ford Foundation
¡nd the Rockefelle¡ Foundation. Such foundations have beefl major slrpporters ol'
crrvirorrurcntal NGOs as well as research. The¡c is evidence tlr¿t this is chauging ,rr
Mcxir;o, howcver. See Centro Mexicano pnra la Filantropí.r (2013).