Professional Documents
Culture Documents
to accompany
Accounting Theory 7e
by
Ann Tarca
Chapter
Chapter 3
Applying theory to accounting regulation
THEORY IN ACTION
Theory in action 3.1 Companies should come clean on the value of leases in their
books
Accountants distinguish between capital and operating leases. Capital leases go on the
balance sheet while operating leases do not. Australian standards require that lease
classification is based on the ‘substance’ of a transaction. However, the guidance
criteria for what constitutes a capital lease (e.g. the requirements relating to the lease
term covering a major part of an asset’s economic life) leave openings for companies
to exercise discretion in classifying leases. US GAAP includes criteria such as the
present value of minimum lease payments exceeding 90% of asset’s value.
2. Why does the author call leasing standards ‘silly accounting rules’?
The author says the rules mean that companies exclude real assets and liabilities from
their balance sheets. The effect of ‘off-balance’ sheet items is that a company’s assets
and liabilities are understated and performance ratios such as return on investment are
overstated. In addition, financial risk measures are not accurate and useful (‘bear no
relation to reality’).
Off-balance sheet items attracted attention at the time of the collapse of Enron in the
USA in 2001. A report by the SEC in 2005 estimated that US companies were
committed to US$1.25 trillion in lease payments relating to leases which did not
appear on balance sheet. The author estimates that 90% of Australian leases are off-
balance sheet.
In the 2006-07 year, Woolworths had AUD $11.8 billion and Coles AUD $10.8
billion of off-balance sheet leases. Woolworths reports that net debt fell $1.3 billion,
but when analysts adjust for off-balance sheet leases, it actually remains unchanged at
$14.1 billion. Coles reported $900 million net debt, but the actual figure is $11.8
billion.
Invested capital (debt plus equity) is understated for both companies. Woolworths
adjusted debt/capital ratio is more that double that reported (71.9% compared to
30.7%); Coles is 75.1% compared to 19.4%.
The following points can be found in the article in relation to advantages of lease
capitalisation:
a. More accurate performance measures (avoid overstated
ROI);
b. Avoid misleading basis for assessing performance
trends;
c. Allow better assessment of financial risk (determining
risk/reward trade-off);
d. Allow more accurate comparisons between companies
and operating units.
The author suggests that companies will resist changes to leasing standards. He notes
there is a ‘huge industry’ which is involved in creating leases that can be classified as
operating. Members of this industry can be expected to oppose changes to current
rules.
We may expect companies to oppose rules to capitalise all leases because they
currently favour operating leases (based on their current practice). However, as long
as the new rules force all companies to show capitalised leases (that is, all companies
are affected in the same way by the new rules) companies may not oppose the change.
It is difficult to provide convincing reasons why leases should be allowed to be ‘off-
balance sheet’ so companies may be hard pressed to defend their current practices.
Off-balance sheet leases are an ‘open secret’, i.e. the impact of capitalising leases on
balance sheet can be calculated from the financial statement information. The article
states that analysts make adjustments to bring leases on balance sheet to improve the
information they use when assessing and comparing companies. We may expect
analysts to favour capitalisation of all leases. Analysts/investors are an influential user
group who may support the standard setters in changing leasing rules.
1. The article refers to a view circulating at the time, that fair value
accounting contributed to the ‘global financial crisis’ (from October 2008,
the near collapse of many banks caused capital flows to dry up and share
prices to fall dramatically.) How could fair value accounting exacerbate
the financial crisis?
Critics of fair value accounting claimed that the method forced banks to write down
asset values. The implication is that these write downs were not necessary and/or
caused the banks to be portrayed as being weaker than they really were (write downs
reduced their equity, affected their capital adequacy ratios and liquidity, and their
ability to lend funds). The implied assumption is that asset prices will recover; that the
impairment is only temporary and therefore should not be booked through profit and
loss.
There are several issues to consider. First, students should discuss why the IASB
mandated fair value for (at least some) financial instruments – to improve
transparency and comparability of information, thus assisting investors in evaluating
risk attached to the financial instruments. Fair value reporting shows market values
for financial instruments which previously were unreported or reported at (irrelevant)
historical cost, for example derivative contracts. Users benefit from more detailed and
relevant disclosures.
Second, the article notes that fair value reporting should have been more, not less.
That is, fair value measurement was used for some, but not all, financial instruments.
The article says the IASB’s preferred position is that fair value measurement applies
to all financial instruments not a selection as occurs under IAS 39. Wider use of fair
value aims to provide relevant information for users (for decision making) and to
avoid managerial discretion leading to manipulation of asset values.
Third, the banks’ claim that they should not have to book the write downs seems to be
a public relations exercise, that is, an attempt to obtain rules which will let them
present a favourable and optimistic picture. Avoiding taking a write down would be
favourable because the current value of the loans (actual or estimated) is below book
value and optimistic because it assumes the value of the loans will increase in the
future. The situation emphasises the differences in incentives of preparers and users of
financial reports. Preparers want to present the best possible picture of the company
(to maintain share price, investor confidence, remuneration) while users want the
most realistic picture to assist with decision making.
2. Why does the IASB member refuse to accept responsibility for the
financial crisis?
Mr Cooper of the IASB states that the role of the Board is not to promote financial
stability, which is the job of prudential regulators. (The IASB’s role is to set
accounting standards for private sector entities throughout the world. Those standards
aim to assist companies to produce information which is useful for a range of users.)
He states that people should not be asking the IASB to do something which it is not
equipped to do.
He highlights areas where the regulators should be active – in avoiding lax rules
which permitted companies to ‘make risky bets, dole out excessive bonuses and pay
too much in dividends.’ He argues that the banking regulators are close to the banks
and the markets and can make decisions about the extent of write downs necessary
which cannot be made by the IASB. It is not their role and they do not have the
expertise for this type of decision.
The IASB’s mandate is promoting the development and adoption of one set of
international accounting standards around the globe. In favouring the use of IAS
standards in the USA, the IASB is of course promoting its own self interest but that is
to be expected. The IASB may also have informed economic views behind its position
(e.g. to avoid the risk of regulatory arbitrage, that is, the comparison of different rules
and use of more favourable rules on a selective basis to gain financial advantage) and
if it can convince regulators in the USA of the soundness of its arguments then
progress towards the adoption of IASB standards into the USA will continue.
At March 2009, adoption of IFRS in the USA had been delayed because of the impact
of the global financial crisis, which was absorbing regulators’ attention. In 2008
adoption was planned for 2011-2014. By 2009, the date had been pushed back to 2016
in response to serious liquidity problems in financial markets and asset write downs
among financial sector firms. In 2010 the SEC was reviewing its position on adoption
of IFRS in the USA.
The backdating of stock options is beneficial for the executives who receive the
options. If the value at grant date is lower, then the ability to gain from the options is
greater, that is, a smaller increase in share price is required for the options to be ‘in
the money’. The larger the difference between value at grant date and value when
exercised, the greater the benefit to the executive. A lower value on grant date also
means that the expense recorded in the company’s accounts is lower, with a
favourable effect on profit. If the vesting of options is linked to accounting earnings,
then it may be easier for executives to achieve accounting earnings performance
hurdles and thus qualify to exercise their stock options. The parties who do not benefit
from the back dating of options are shareholders who are not receiving accurate
information about the value of options granted. In addition, the incentive effects of the
options scheme may not be transparent or operate as expected if the grant date is
manipulated, to the detriment of shareholders.
3. If options can be backdated, has the standard setting board (in the USA,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board or FASB) been effective in
role of promulgating accounting regulations?
The FASB promulgates accounting standards, but it does not enforce them. When we
measure the effectiveness of an accounting standard, we consider how it works in
practice. Does it achieve the desired outcome? In this case, the standard has not
achieved the desired outcome (the recording of the fair value of equity instruments on
grant date). However, the fault may not lie with the standard itself, but rather with the
party required to follow the standard or the way the standard is enforced. When we
come to a red light at an intersection with traffic lights, we are required by law to
stop. If we fail to stop, the problem is not with the requirement to stop but with our
wilful disobedience in relation to the law. Thus, the failure to comply with the
accounting standard (determine the expense at grant date) does not mean that the
standard is ineffective, but rather that companies have chosen not to comply with the
standard. The enforcement of the requirements of the standard (via auditors or the
securities market regulator) may be the weak link in the regulatory framework.
The SEC is responsible for ensuring compliance with accounting standards. When the
SEC became aware companies were selecting grant dates to suit their own purposes
rather than using the actual grant date, the SEC took action to indicate this breach of
the law was not acceptable. The success in the case against Brocade Communications
may serve as a deterrent to other companies.
1. What does the headline of the article mean by ‘small cap’ and ‘flash
orange’?
‘Small cap’ refers to companies with relatively smaller market capitalisation (i.e.
smaller companies in terms of total assets or total revenue compared to the entire
listed company sector). The article focuses on concerns about these companies
because they have fewer resources and are more likely to have difficulties generating
profits in adverse economic conditions. ‘Flash orange’ refers to a warning light, a
signal that these companies could be risky and for investors to take care because
returns are not guaranteed.
When auditors place an emphasis of matter paragraph in an audit report they are
making sure that the readers of the report have their attention drawn to a particular
matter. In this case the emphasis of matter refers to doubt about going concern issues,
which should be properly disclosed by management in the main body of the financial
report. If the auditor believed that the issue was not properly disclosed by
management then they would qualify the report. There is an argument that by drawing
the readers’ attention to this issue they are emphasising it to the point that the investor
would ‘take fright’ and believe the company was at very high risk of failure. This
could then lead to a sell-down of the company’s shares and a refusal by its customers
and other parties to do business with it. These reactions would serve to make the
uncertainty about the company’s going concern turn into a definite failure of the
company. Under this argument, if the auditor had not raised the issue in the audit
report, this chain of events would not have happened.
Bank covenants are clauses in borrowing contracts between companies and banks
where the company promises to meet certain conditions. For example, the company
could promise to maintain certain debt/equity or profitability ratios. If the company
fails to meet these ratios, the bank is entitled to seek penalty interest, and/or early
repayment of the debt. The balance sheet based ratios rely on asset values. For
example, the debt/equity ratio is the amount of debt divided by the amount of equity.
Any asset impairment loss will reduce equity, increasing the relative amount of debt
in the company’s balance sheet. If this causes the relative amount of debt to exceed
the amount the company promised it would not exceed, the company is in breach of
its debt agreement. Given that the ratios are calculated using accounting numbers, the
bank contracts make the financial reports very important to the survival of the
business.
CASE STUDIES
1. Explain the reasons for the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA)
in the United States in 2002.
2. Why are some parties now opposed to SOA? Has their view changed from
when the law was first introduced?
It has become apparent that compliance with Section 404 of the law (which requires
managers to certify about the company’s internal control system) is a costly and time
consuming exercise. Law makers may have underestimated the costs of implementing
the section. Managers who initially supported the introduction of new regulation
(because of its role in restoring confidence in capital markets and thereby improving
share prices) may have become less enthusiastic as the cost of compliance became
more apparent.
Basically, his argument is that rules can have benefits, but they must be carefully
framed so as not to destroy business initiative and confidence. Criteria referred to in
the article include:
that people’s interests are protected, but not to the extent that business cannot
function efficiently);
(c) rules should emphasise substance over form to avoid penalising people who
make innocent mistakes.
The aim of this question is have students consider the implications of making a law to
regulate financial reporting in circumstances such as those surrounding SOA.
1. List possible factors contributing to the banking crisis (the problem of bad
debts relating to collateralised debt obligations, i.e. the so-called sub-prime
crisis, which began in mid-2007 and became a more general global financial
crisis in October 2008).
2. Has the market benefited from the regulation requiring the use of fair value
accounting for financial instruments?
Fair value accounting for financial instruments aims to improve the transparency and
usefulness of information about financial instruments, assisting investors to better
evaluate potential risk and return associated with the instruments.
With the benefit of knowledge of subsequent events, we can see that the loans did not
recover in value so the write downs were more accurate rather than less accurate.
However, the article raises the question whether the write downs overstated the extent
of losses, causing a loss of confidence in some banks which was not warranted but
nevertheless fed into a complicated situation of frozen credit flows, collapse of
demand and a global economic recession by 2009.
The question of whether banks should reveal their losses can be discussed more
generally, for example in relation to some Japanese banks which were insolvent in the
1980s but propped up by government funding. Such banks must eventually fail or be
bailed out by taxpayer funds. The questions of whether this is an efficient use of scare
resources should be discussed. The extent and timing of government intervention can
be used to illustrate views about intervention in capital markets.
According to the article, the Chicago University view is that the market is efficient,
that is, ‘the market is always right’ and the current value is the current value. If loans
have declined in value, they should be shown at the reduced value to capture the
economic reality of the situation. However, the issue is complicated by the fact that
the CDOs do not have an observable market price, so fair value is estimated, which
may involve intentional or unintentional measurement error.
The article points out that an accounting rule should apply in all conditions (i.e.
irrespective of whether markets are ‘up’ or ‘down’) to assist investors’ decision
making. The rule should not be used selectively at managers’ choosing because this
could lead to manipulation of reported values. Students seeking a better understanding
of the financial crises should be directed to papers such as ICAA (2009) and Laux
and Leuz (2009) in the end of chapter readings.
2. OCTOBER 2004 The European Commission endorses IAS for use in the EU,
with the exception of certain provisions of IAS 39 relating to hedging
accounting and fair value measurement of financial instruments. When
complying with IASB standards from 2005, companies will not be required to
follow the excluded provision of IAS 39.
3. APRIL 2005 The European Commission seeks rule changes to make it easier
for EU companies cross-listed in the USA to de-list from USA stock
exchanges. The Commission is seeking agreement from the USA securities
market regulator the SEC to change the current requirement that companies
show they have fewer than 300 shareholders before they are permitted to
cease registration in the USA.
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (see C12) significantly increases the reporting obligations
and potential legal liability of EU firms cross-listed in the USA. Some US listed EU
companies objected to the requirement to comply with the Sarbanes Oxley Act and
have considered de-listing in the USA. They have sought assistance in expediting this
process through discussions with the SEC by a EC representative. One might argue
that the EC commissioner is encouraging companies to seek capital at home in Europe
and thus promote the EU capital markets, but it is just a speculation. I don’t have
evidence on this point.
It seems reasonable that EU companies want to be able to list in the USA without
reconciliation to US GAAP following their adoption of IAS. Consequently, EU
companies lobbied hard (through their EC representatives) for the US GAAP
reconciliation requirements to be removed. Pressure on the SEC comes from several
areas. First, the US stock exchanges do not want companies to be discouraged from
listing or to de-list, which may occur while the US GAAP reconciliation requirements
are in place. Second, the US standard setter FASB is converging its standards with
IAS, suggesting that IAS are of acceptable quality. To converge US GAAP and IAS
on the one hand, yet not accept the use of ‘converged’ IAS standards in US markets,
seems inconsistent. In response to various markets pressures the SEC made the 2007
announcement.
The IASB amended IAS 39 and IFRS 7 to allow the reclassification of some financial
instruments. As a result of the financial crisis, the Board was under pressure to amend
the standards to permit a reclassification practice that was allowed under US GAAP.
The Board did not follow due process because they considered an immediate response
was required. Some parties were highly critical of the Board for making the change
and doing so without consultation. The Board made an assessment of the political and
economic situation and decided that their action was warranted in the circumstances.
It should be remembered that the view in October 2008 was that the world’s financial
system was in crisis (market liquidity was frozen) so taking no action may have been
politically unacceptable.
QUESTIONS
Until the establishment of the ASRB and subsequent legislative support for
accounting standards, compliance with accounting standards could not be legally
enforced. The profession could take disciplinary action against members for non-
compliance; however, large-scale monitoring was impossible, and so discipline was
on a very ad hoc basis. The problem of enforcing standards detracted from the
professional status of the accounting profession and also meant that the standard-
setting process may be lost to a third party. As such, the profession sought legislative
backing for standards in order to enforce compliance and increase the professional
status of the accounting bodies. The profession did not want to lose control of this
standard-setting process, but sought to use legislation to enforce compliance.
Students might choose any accounting issue as long as they can explain why it is
political in the sense of affecting the wealth of parties in the political process.
Legislating for accounting standards reduces the outcomes to one of the political
trade-offs of competing interests. The political process, as identified by Watts &
Zimmerman (1978), involves competition for wealth distributions between different
interest groups. In the accounting arena it involves politicians who have incentives to
increase government resources and retain their political positions; companies who
have an incentive to avoid political costs, such as increased taxes or regulations; and
voters whose participation in the political process is a function of the cost of
interpreting and processing vast amounts of information. Managers have incentives to
adopt procedures that would decrease the political sensitivity of reported earnings
and/or increase their personal wealth.
There are many groups who will lobby in the standard-setting process for preferred
outcomes. The groups include trade unions, financial institutions, analysts and social
groups. Individuals also lobby in the process.
Overall, the political process is seen as a means of pursuing individual or group self-
interest (Watts & Zimmerman, 1979).
The lobbying may also be indirect and framed in a manner that draws attention away
from the direct benefits of those lobbying.
(d) The structure of the IASB from 2001 aims to ensure the Board is independent.
Members are appointed based on their expertise and experience. They do not
represent the countries from which they are drawn. The Board has an oversight
body (the IASC Foundation) which acts to ensure the Board can operate
without interference. Fund raising is the responsibility of the IASC, allowing
the Board to be independent of parties providing contributions. A large
number of parties are involved in the operations of the IASC and the IASB.
These include organisations (companies, audit firms, government bodies,
standard setters and professional bodies) which contribute cash resources and
skilled personnel. A range of people serve on the Board, its technical staff and
advisory committees. These organisations and people are drawn from many
countries throughout the world, suggesting that any one country or group of
constituents is unlikely to come to dominate the standard setting process.
fact that the IASB and FASB work together and that convergence involves
changes to both sets of standards (US GAAP and IFRS) not just to IASB
standards.
In favour of the free- market approach (and against the regulatory approach)
As with other products, information about a company is subject to
the factors of demand and supply, with price as the operating mechanism. An
equilibrium price can be found — this is the price where the supplier still
finds it advantageous to furnish information, and users believe the price is
equal to the benefits (value) of the information.
Free-market forces would determine what type of accounting data to
provide, and therefore what standards are necessary in order to gather such
data. In this way, unnecessary information is avoided — that is, information
where the cost exceeds the benefits. This can be determined because people
will not be willing to pay the price.
[The question could be raised — will regulation necessarily prevent fraud or flag the
corporate collapses we have seen in recent years?]
Die-hard proponents of the incrementalist view would argue that the IASB should
withdraw its proposal and seek a compromise solution. The IASB needs to be political
for its own survival, and compromise is a part of the political game. Depending on the
circumstances, if an opponent is too powerful, the wise course of action is to retreat,
because the possibility of defeat is great. As long as an incremental step forward is
made, the Board would argue that the accounting profession should be satisfied. A
series of incremental steps over time could result in eventual victory.
Others would argue that if a proposal has theoretical merit, and especially if there is
also empirical evidence to support it, the IASB should seek to establish the proposed
standards. The proposal would result in more relevant and reliable accounting
information, which should be the primary consideration in the formulation of
standards. Incrementalists argue that the IASB should retreat for its survival, but it is
for the sake of survival that it should not back off. People are watching the profession
to see if it favours special-interest groups. If the integrity of the IASB is tarnished, its
survival will be jeopardised. However, if the theoretical-empirical support for a
proposal is weak, a wait-and-see attitude may be justified.
6. How do you think accounting standards should be set? Is that the approach
currently taken by the IASB?
Here is one possible answer. The most feasible way may be to be aware of both the
politics of the environment and the significance of scientific evidence in the
formulation and implementation of standards. Where there is substantial theoretical
and empirical evidence in support of a proposal, the IASB should be resolute in
seeking to establish the standard. But presently such strong support does not occur
often.
The fact is that pressing issues need to be resolved immediately, and there may be
little, if any, empirical evidence pointing to any particular direction. In such cases, the
IASB needs to follow a theoretical (rational) argument, based on the objective of
providing more useful information.
With the adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS), it has been
suggested that the AASB and Australian constituents will have less influence over the
IASB due process than was possible in the domestic standard setting environment.
The AASB has a specific strategy of contributing to standard setting at the IASB to
maintain its influence.
7. ‘We should disband national standard setters. They are of no use following
the adoption of international accounting standards.’ Explain whether you
agree or disagree with this statement.
People who agree with this statement would argue that the national standard setters
such as the AASB no longer have a role to play in standard setting. The standard
setting function is carried out by the IASB and interpretations are issued by the
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC). Australia has
made a commitment to use IFRS and therefore it will be accepting all standards issued
by the IASB. The AASB is no longer necessary as it will not be developing private
sector standards. A common interpretation of IFRS is necessary to assist companies in
producing comparable financial reports. However, this must come from an
international body not the AASB or a body associated with the AASB.
People who disagree with this statement would point to the fact the AASB has a role
in developing standards for the public sector and not-for-profit entities. This role has
not been assumed by the IASB. In addition, the IASB relies on the contribution of
national standard setters in the development of its standards. National standard setters
such as the AASB can contribute technical expertise based on its past experience and
skill of current staff. They can work on research projects for the IASB. In this way,
the AASB can actively contribute to international standard setting. By maintaining the
AASB, Australia can contribute to international standard setting on issues of national
importance. One example is the forthcoming extractive industry standard which could
be important for Australian companies and the national extractive industry.
8. What are ‘free-riders’? How can a system ensure that those who benefit
most from an accounting standard requiring certain disclosures also bear
the greatest costs of it?
Free-riders are people that can utilise information once it is publicly available.
Although information may be sold to certain people only, others who did not pay
cannot be easily excluded from using the information. Examples of free-riders are
financial analysts and potential investors. There is no simple solution to the problem.
Students should be encouraged to offer ideas. Companies may act to restrict access to
the financial statements to shareholders and associated parties. Companies may
establish a user-pays system where financial information is available to non-
shareholders on a fee-for-information basis. If the fee was sufficiently high, those who
pay are less likely to share the information. Nonetheless, such systems would be
difficult to administer and control, and are unlikely to be successful.
There will always be ethical issues associated with the development of accounting
standards because there are ethics involved in deciding between providing
information that is representationally faithful for users and requiring information that
may be detrimental to the interests of preparers. The most obvious example of this is
where information is proprietary (that is, information that competitors could use to the
disadvantage of the reporting firm) — the information may be useful to investors but
disadvantage the firm that provides it. Furthermore, the provision of additional
accounting information may provide information that is useful to investors and other
users of accounts, but it may be expensive to acquire the data and process it, thereby
imposing costs upon firms and reducing the value of the shares held by existing
shareholders.
Accounting standards have the potential to affect levels of wealth and its distribution
because they affect:
decisions made by individuals who rely upon the accounts
the terms of contracts that rely upon accounting numbers (for
example, debt covenants requiring that a company not exceed a certain ratio
of debt to total tangible assets)
decisions made by regulators who base assessments of ability to pay
or of the harm felt from regulation on the financial statements of the firms.
As long as accounting has economic consequences, some people gain from certain
regulations and others stand to lose. As such, its regulation necessarily has ethical
implications. Even the decision to ensure that the accounts always give a faithful
representation of the firm’s economic circumstances involves an ethical assessment
that needs or preferences of the users of the accounts have primacy over the
preferences of the preparers.
10. You have been appointed as chief accountant of a firm that will be
adversely affected by the method of accounting that is proposed in an
exposure draft. Write a report of 500 words or less explaining to your
Board of Directors how you could lobby the AASB to change its mind and
adopt an accounting practice other than the one proposed in the exposure
draft. Also comment on the costs and benefits of each to the firm.
There are many ways in which organisations might lobby to affect the requirements of
an accounting standard:
write responses to exposure drafts
write to members of the accounting standards boards putting
forward their views
make oral presentations to the boards, or to individual members of
the boards
hold meetings where key issues are discussed and ensure that
members of the accounting standards boards are invited, or get to hear the
meetings
hold demonstrations against a proposal that they do not favour — as
occurred in Silicon Valley where executives demonstrated against proposals
for accounting for executive stock options (the ‘Rally in the Valley’)
release media releases expressing their disagreement with proposed
accounting regulation; these releases would then result in articles in the
media or announcements over the news
form groups to lobby using any or all of the above methods
offer to provide funding to the regulatory bodies for an accounting
standard that suits them.
The preceding methods have all been employed, and instructors may be able to think
of others. Other less acceptable methods that have been employed include threats
made to individual members of standard-setting bodies. Both financial and non-
financial costs and benefits of each should be discussed, including reputational
effects, the time and effort costs of organisation, and potential benefits from a
standard that reduces information, bookkeeping, and contracting costs.
11. In 2001 and 2002 there were several high-profile US corporate collapses
associated with misleading financial statements and accounting practices.
Following these collapses, new laws were introduced to improve the quality
of financial reporting.
(a) In your opinion, will further regulation prevent deliberately
misleading reporting? Explain.
(b) Are additional laws likely to prevent corporate collapses? Why or
why not?
(c) How important is the enforcement of financial reporting
requirements in promoting high quality reporting?
(a) Opinions may differ about the extent to which regulation can prevent
deliberately misleading reporting. One effect of regulation may be to
(b) The extent to which additional laws can prevent corporate collapses will
depend on the cause of the corporate collapse. If the cause is failure of the
audit function, it is possible that effective regulation to improve
independence and performance of auditors could reduce the likelihood of
corporate collapse. However, if the corporate collapse stems from
fraudulent behaviour of company officers, it will not be prevented by
additional laws. If a person considers that the benefits of breaking the law
outweigh the risk of being caught and punished, then the law will not be
effective in preventing criminal behaviour leading to corporate collapse. It
may be that a government introducing additional regulation will be
satisfied with a law that makes corporate collapse less likely, even if it
does not remove it completely.
12. Each of the three theories of regulation discussed in this chapter has its
strengths and limitations in describing accounting standard setting, either
past or present. What do you believe are those strengths and weaknesses?
Provide an example of where you believe each of the theories has applied,
or is likely to apply.
From 1 January 2005 the AASB will issue Australian equivalents to IFRS. This
process involves the AASB issuing IASB exposure drafts as exposure drafts in
Australia. Constituents can provide comments on standards to the AASB and IASB.
Final standards issued by the IASB are subsequently issued in Australia with any
additional paragraphs necessary to make the standards suitable for public sector and
not-for-profit entities.
(a) Students’ answers will vary, but should cover the following
points.
Critics of adoption refer to the costs involved, such as acquiring technical expertise,
changing accounting systems and educating investors. Adoption affects all reporting
entities in Australia, irrespective of whether harmonisation has any benefits for the
company. For example, smaller firms may not benefit from improvements in
international comparability. Critics also point to loss of influence in the standard
setting process.
14. What is the role of the Financial Reporting Council? Do you think that all
members of the Financial Reporting Council should be qualified
accountants? Why or why not?
The FRC does not get involved in technical deliberations so it is not necessary that
members be qualified accountants. (This would create the impression of regulatory
capture theory.) It would be expected that the members of the FRC have significant
business experience and are aware of accounting issues and the economic
consequences associated with regulation. In their capacity as Council members they
are interacting with the various stakeholders and should have an understanding of
contemporary accounting issues.
16. Should the SEC allow the use of IASB standards for US domestic listed
companies? Discuss reasons for and against the use of IFRS by US
companies.
1. US GAAP and IFRS are not the same. It is not clear that IFRS is higher
quality GAAP than IFRS. IFRS standards are not as comprehensive as US
GAAP.
2. Standard setting benefits from competition between standard setters. One set
of standards will not necessarily mean that the highest quality standards are
developed.
3. The USA will lose sovereignty in standard setting. Use of IFRS will reduce
the influence of the SEC and FASB.
4. Many US companies are not SEC registrants. The cost of changing to IFRS
will be expensive, possibly without benefit for private companies lacking
international operations.
5. US accountants and auditors are not technically proficient in IFRS.
IFAC has established the PIOB to ensure the independence of the IAASB from the
auditing profession. Most members of the IAASB are, or have been, professional
auditors. This raises the suggestion that the IAASB has been captured by the auditing
profession and causes doubt about whether the standards are written to protect the
public interest or the interest of auditors. If IFAC (and the IAASB) are to be able to
continue to write international auditing standards and exert influence, it needs to
establish structures to guard against this accusation. The PIOB also offers a place for
regulators to go to express their opinion about auditing standards and functions as a
liaison body with the IASB’s Monitoring Group (see Chapter 14 for more details).
This assists a greater level of cooperation between the auditing and accounting
standard setters.
18. Why would the quality of accounting and auditing standards affect the
development of financial markets? Why is the strength of enforcement of
the standards and investor protection important in this relationship?
High quality accounting standards assist the production of high quality financial
information which is useful for decision makers, including investors. High quality
auditing standards guide auditors to conduct audits which are more likely to reduce
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud or error in the financial statements.
High quality and credible financial information allows investors to have less
uncertainty, and greater confidence in trading. Confident investors are more likely to
participate in the share markets, providing greater liquidity. Greater trading volumes
mean that share prices are more likely to reflect all publicly available information.
Enforcement of the standards and investor protection laws are vital to ensure the high
quality accounting and auditing standards impact positively on share market trading.
Investors gain confidence from standards only if they are enforced. Unenforced
standards are ‘not worth the paper they are printed on’, that is, they may as well not
exist because all parties know there are no consequences of breaching the standards.
Investor protection laws give investors the right to sue if accountants and auditors are
negligent, particularly when they also include provisions that ensure the audit firms
are likely to have the resources to meet their negligence liability.