Voluntary intoxication in English law

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Voluntary intoxication, where a defendant has wilfully consumed drink or drugs before
committing acts which constitute the prohibited conduct (actus reus) of an offence, has posed a
considerable problem for the English criminal law. There is a correspondence between
incidences of drink and crimes of violence, such as assaults and stabbings. Accordingly, there is
a debate about the effect of voluntary intoxication on the mental element of crimes, which is
often that the defendant foresaw the consequences, or that they intended them.

In dealing with this issue and balancing theoretical problems with public policy issues, the
English law has categorised offences into two categories, those of basic intent and those
of specific intent. In the latter, the defendant's intoxication will be directly relevant as to whether
he or she formed the necessary intent. In the former, the picture is more complicated and unclear,
although it is known that intoxication will not provide a defence where recklessness can be
shown on the accepted facts. Crimes of specific intent include murder, and those of basic intent
most crimes of recklessness, including manslaughter.

Basis

There is a widely held belief that alcohol consumption fuels violence. [1] The picture may be more
complex involving other factors, including the effects of chronic alcohol abuse rather than its
immediate effects.[2]

Neither voluntary nor involuntary intoxication provide a defence in English law in themselves.
No behavior is excusable merely because it was committed whilst intoxicated, and the phrase "a
drunken intent is still an intent" – used in Sheehan[3] –has not been abandoned.[1] Where an
individual voluntarily intoxicates himself, it is not a defence for him to then claim he does not
intend any actions he commits while intoxicated.[4] The Earl of Birkenhead stated in 1920 that
until the early 19th century voluntary drunkenness was never a defence, based on the principle
that "a man who by his own voluntary act debauches and destroys his will power shall be no
better situated in regard to criminal acts than a sober man".[5] This was considered the authority
by Lord Elwyn-Jones in the Majewski case.[6] Instead, intoxication may assist the defence
arguing that the defendant lacked the appropriate mens rea (mental element) for the crime.
[1]
 However, it has been recognised at common law that those who would not intend to commit a
crime if sober cannot be held to the same level of culpability as those who would. Thus, the
approach of the courts is generally to find intoxicated individuals guilty of crimes which require
basic intent, rather than the specific intent required for other crimes.[7]

Specific and basic intent[edit]

In Majewski, Lord Elwyn-Jones, giving judgement, indicated that a crime was one of specific
intent if the mens rea went further than the actus reus (prohibited acts, as they actually
occurred); in other words, that the crime was one of ulterior intent.[6][8] This makes sense in the
case of burglary and of criminal damage with intent to endanger life, where the intent need not
be carried out, and which have been judged crimes of specific intent. [8] However, this fails to
explain why murder is considered a crime of specific intent, despite the fact that its mental
aspect, intent to cause grievous bodily harm or death, is equal or less than the actus
reus requirement of causing death.[8] Similarly, causing gross bodily harm with intent (contrary
to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861) has a matchingmens rea and yet is
also considered a crime of specific intent.[9]

Lord Simon's judgement in the same case advanced a different definition: crimes of specific
intent required a "purposive element". The court in Heard considered a specific intent one which
fitted either possible definition.[10] However, murder is again an exception: since Woolin, it can
be committed not by intent but by virtual certainty and foresight of virtual certainty. [11] Lord
Elwyn-Jones also expressed that if a crime could be committed recklessly, it was one of basic
intent. This is supported by a number of academics, who do however consider it a matter for the
common law to establish by precedent.[11][12]

The distinction between crimes of specific and basic intent is demonstrated by the intoxication
case of R v Lipman.[13] Here, a man who had voluntarily taken LSDstruck and asphyxiated a
woman while hallucinating, believing her to be a snake. The man was found to lack the specific
intent required of murder, but satisfied the basic intention of manslaughter, that of recklessness.
While it has been argued that there is no consistent principle behind the distinction, [12] there has
been some judicial effort to suggest a means of categorisation.[12]