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Culture, Society, and the Individual: Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan

Author(s): Ofer Feldman


Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 2, Special Issue: Culture and Cross-Cultural
Dimensions of Political Psychology (Jun., 1997), pp. 327-353
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3791772
Accessed: 24-08-2020 00:18 UTC

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Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1997

Culture, Society, and the Individual:


Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan
Ofer Feldman
Social Science Education
Naruto University of Education
Tokushima, Japan

Studies of political behavior and attitudes in Japan have often looked to similarities
differences between the West, most notably the U.S., and Japan. This paper details
approaches concerned with examining Japanese social and political behavior within
cross-cultural context. The first-nihonjinron-works with cultural nationalism, wh
argues that Japanese values are unique and thus no social theory developed in the West c
be applied to Japanese society. The second approach is characterized by field studies
tries to assess Japanese social behavior by comparing it to that ofAmericans and Europea
There is a great deal of knowledge on political behavior in Western countries which scho
in Japan often refer to in order to evaluate the significance of their survey results. But th
is still limited information on the Japanese situation, and any attempt to construct a gener
theory in either cultural or cross-cultural political psychology will have to refer also t
human attitudes in this non-Western industrial society.

KEY WORDS: nihonjinron; cross-cultural studies; political socialization; voting behavior; pa


identification; news media effects; political personality

INTRODUCTION

Japan's cultural heritage, historical experience, and ethnic and


homogeneity reinforced by geographical isolation offer a fascinatin
for cultural and cross-cultural research into human political behavio
Since Japan is exceptionally ethnically homogeneous, with only a smal
minority (0.6%), consisting mainly of Chinese and Koreans, it has h
notable advantage of not having to face the problems of ethnic politic
complicated the process of modernization and political developme
Western societies.

327

0162-895X @ 1997 International Society of Political Psychology


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328 Feldman

Yet, urban
taken place
considerab
associated w
tional syste
affected tr
First, the
the popula
public opin
office, 90%
because of
highly hom
apathy. Se
wider and
rates, such
low sense o
institution
al., 1987;
Moreover,
as rapid ec
scandals th
als' activity
the growin
and compe
the way it
1994; Nisih
in politics,
Party (LDP
support fo
eventually
years of co
Notably, p
in the 1980
years, book
world have
ment of Je
the rising
The emerg
limited dir
from direc
The Merch
Furthermo
guish amon

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 329

Jews can direct one's anger against all foreigners. In f


these books can be viewed as a more general statemen
which exploits a certain degree of xenophobia (G
Thus, the role of this literature in Japanese society
clearly images and attitudes Japanese have toward f
sense of self.

Analyzing the reciprocal relationship among cultu


changing socioeconomic environment, and social and
ior has attracted the attention of researchers from
Barnlund, 1989; De Vos, 1992; Gudykunst, 1993). Su
effects of national character, social and family struc
media use on individual social orientation as well as
of these studies replicated in Japan the research desi
in other Western countries, and thus viewed the Jap
comparative context. For many of these researchers
U.S., became the "model" and their main concern w
which Japanese converged with, or diverged from,

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS SURVEY

In this paper, therefore, I present, in a highly selective manner, som


studies which provide a broad picture of current trends in cultural and cr
political psychology in Japan. These studies examine areas such a
attitudes, voting behavior, political socialization, party identification,
and effects, and political leadership, among others.
Indeed, there are two contrasting approaches concerned with
Japanese social and political behavior within a cross-cultural con
claims that the only possible way to compare Japan to other cult
finding out how Japan is unique. This line of study emphasizes the idi
features of the Japanese environment, arguing that no social theory
in the West can be applied to Japanese society because basic Japan
and assumptions are different. While politics is not the focus of this
research, most studies address issues related to social attitude and beh
thus indirectly affect researchers of politics in their analysis and expl
political behavior.
The opposing approach is characterized by field research, and includ
which collect quantitative data through various methods. This second
takes social theories developed in the West and tries to apply them to J
whether they can explain Japanese behavior and attitudes. It tries to detec
ties and differences in social behavior between Japanese and Westerner
to develop a broad theoretical perspective on human political attitudes
Let us look at both approaches in more detail.

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330 Feldman

NIHONJINRON/NIHONBUNKARON

The so-called nihonjinron (literally, "discussions of the Japanese" or "theor


ing on the Japanese") or nihonbunkaron ("discussions of Japanese culture"), f
a genre of writings on Japanese society that focuses on the uniqueness of Japa
culture, society, and national character (Mouer & Sugimoto, 1986). These may
viewed as works of cultural nationalism concerned with the ostensible "uniq
ness" of Japan in any aspect, and which are contrary to both individual experi
and the notion of internal sociohistorical diversity (Dale, 1986, p. ii). The wri
of nihonjinron are not confined to academia but also include journalists, criti
writers, and businessmen. They have published hundreds of books on the sub
a large number of which have undergone several printings and been translated
several foreign languages (e.g., Ben-Dasan, 1972; Doi, 1986; Suzuki, 1973).
Nihonjinron tries to demonstrate that the Japanese are incomparably differe
to perpetuate a view that Japanese culture and behavior are somehow exotic a
removed from the experience of other societies; and to explain daily events in te
of culture or values considered peculiar to the Japanese (e.g., Araki, 1973; Ham
guchi, 1977; Kawai, 1984; Yoneyama, 1976). Japanese writers make claims for
peculiar status of their national culture, characterizing it as having a "disti
character," being "unparalleled" and "difficult for foreigners to understand a
perceive." Nihonjinron assumes that culture itself precedes and determines ex
ence. It depicts Japanese individuals as having no motives other than th
implanted in them by their culture.
Virtually anything can become subject matter for nihonjinron, so that nih
jinron may explain what, in cultural terms, is behind any particular subject.
example, nihonjinron has attempted to explain Japan's rapid economic growth
success in terms of what it views as the unique national character of Japan. A
when the issue of trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan emerged, on the
hand, the Americans perceived the issue largely in economic and political ter
and, on the other hand, Japan tended to explain the issue in cultural terms (Kosa
1992, p. 10). The implication is that the cultural argument is often directed
diverting attention from the real problems at issue. Differences of opinion
disagreement in the international arena are regarded as the failure of the for
country or negotiator to understand all the variables of Japanese culture. Cult
becomes an excuse for withdrawing from negotiations with partners, for n
fulfilling agreements and contracts, and for maintaining systematic exploitat
and legal abuses in the international community.
Nihonjinron writers present a series of contrasts in social structure and belie
and give a set of contrasts in intellectual styles between Japan and the West. T
see Japan as a homogeneous, monoracial, vertical society based on hierarchy
shame, duties, harmony, and dependence. The West, on the other hand, is vie
as a heterogeneous, multiracial, horizontal society, based on egalitarianism, g
rights, rupture, and independence (Dale, 1986, Ch. 4). The linguistic and comm

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 331

nicative mode of Japanese is characterized in the nih


nity, ambivalence, situational ethic, emotionality,
art of the abdomen"). This means silence is the ar
individuals, and refers also to a common way of ac
without the use of direct assertions (Nishida, 1994
Tsujimura (1987), for example, argues that much
is based on (1) ishin-denshin ("traditional ment
communication," or empathetic understanding), (2)
or "atmosphere"), and (4) respect for reverberatio
Communication in the West, on the other hand
language that values rhetoric, logic, talkativeness
and universality. Tsujimura (1977) claims that t
reticence is the homogeneity of the Japanese rac
stand each other without any verbal communicat
homogeneous culture, and have developed abun
argues.
Typically, the writers of nihonjinron have used attention-catching key con-
cepts to describe Japanese uniqueness, such as enryo ("social reserve"), uchi
("inside") and soto ("outside"), and tatemae ("formal truth") and honne ("the real
intention") (Rosenberger, 1992; Bachnik & Quinn, 1994). Benedict (1946), for
example, identifies the concept of "shame" as the most significant dynamic in
Japanese social relations. She describes Japan as a "shame culture," in which
individuals are controlled by social threats to personal honor and reputation,
whereas the West operates by "guilt culture," in which individuals are controlled
by internal sanction against the violation of a moral standard.
Nakane (1970) identifies peculiarly Japanese forms of social organization and
interactions by using the key concept of "vertical society." That is, the society is
not one of horizontal stratification by class or caste, but of "vertical stratification
by institution or group of institutions" (Nakane, 1970, p. 87). The Japanese are
described as a group-oriented (shudanshugi) people, preferring to act within the
framework of a group. Groupism refers also to the individual identification with,
and immersion in, the group. Identity is perceived invariably as a "group orienta-
tion," and the term comes to imply the submergence of the individual within
society. It denies thus the existence of the individual, uniquely personal identity.
This group orientation fosters the strength of the company or organization, distin-
guishes one's own group from other groups, and makes the organization unit the
basis of Japanese society.
According to nihonjinron, each group is hierarchically organized based on
the relationship between paternalistic superiors and their subordinates, as well as the
relationships between members differentiated by their time of entry into the group.
In these hierarchical relationships, often expressed in terms such as oyabun-kobun
(boss-employee or master-follower) or sempai-kohai (senior-junior), the seniors
are expected to protect the juniors, to give them benefits and help. In turn, the juniors

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332 Feldman

demonstrat
require it,
The system
dynamics o
followers. A
and follow
regulated b
individual's
relationship
In his theo
this charac
between su
(who is a cl
Individuals
Those who
tothe syst
they are pa
turn, they
Political le
ence. The lo
the leader
and generos
the followe
found in ru
opportunit
put him in
political sy
responsive
of political
Another im
important
recommend
of the cand
than their
successful
reward is t
supply vote
representat
a whole hav
voters ten
commitme
schools rat
or internat

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 333

The "group orientation" concept of Japanese socie


ron also entails conformity and loyalty to group cau
of conflict among group members. Social control of
the conformity of individuals to the expectations o
Japanese groups are thus characterized by harmonio
members, and Japanese society is both conflict-avoi
Harmony is viewed as one of the most important co
achieve in any social interaction. To prevent open cla
often prefer subtle ways to adjust conflicts and to
among all the members of the group.
The concepts of harmony and consensus-seeking
the major characteristics in explaining the natu
leadership. Studies have suggested that in both trad
the Japanese approach to power and leadership diff
leadership role found in the West (MacDougall, 1
West are expected to demonstrate their own perso
dominance in achieving political objects; leadersh
with the demonstrated abilities, successful perform
attributes of the individual.
Yet, in Japan, emphasis is allocated to collective aspects, to group dynamism
and consensus decisions. Leaders are like effective managers: they are expected to
pay attention to the relations among all the members of the group they head; to be
sensitive to the feelings of their subordinates; to cool emotional conflicts; and to
elicit widespread support in attaining a common goal. It is consensus-building, not
decision-making ability and authority, which is the mark of a good leader (Feldman
& Kawakami, 1989).
Thus, Japanese leaders invest much energy in efforts to promote the collective
interests, as well as to achieve cooperation between the disparate interests, of all
the members of their group. When a decision must be made to resolve a conflict,
leaders turn to the unique modes of nemawashi (literally, "trimming of a tree's roots
prior to its being transplanted"). This is the process of prior informal negotiation
and persuasion among concerned parties before a proposed matter is presented to
a formal meeting (Hashiguchi et al., 1977). Through careful personal interaction,
one can improve empathy and cooperation between all members of the group and
obtain their complete support for a certain issue.
Another method which has been institutionalized in the bureaucratic policy-
making procedure is the ringisei ("a system of referential inquiry about a
superior's intentions"). This is the procedure of circulating a memorandum
along the hierarchy to the top of the organization to obtain approval of all
concerned for a proposed idea. Along the way, members of the organization are
required to approve the particular issue or proposal. The proposal may then be
sent back to its initiator with modifications. But once the proposal reaches the
desk of the top executive official, bearing the seals of approval from all

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334 Feldman

intermedia
mandatory
the specific
Because bo
opportunit
members
reached. In
slow in rea
since the g
formation.

Another o
identified v
Doi viewed
Japanese pe
describe re
relations in
loving mot
unwillingne
is Doi's cont
into adulth
people. Dep
so that a Ja
other than
This type
child relat
subordinate
then plays
the parent-
display hi
expected to
ship, the J
comfortabl
by themsel
The recipr
control. Mi
authority as
its operatio
reciprocity
attitude tow
reciprocate
trust in aut
those in pos
of others. T

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 335

by the leader as soon as needs emerge. Consequen


their followers' dependency, and providing them w
security blanket, leaders may retain their authority
ness (Mitchell, 1976).
To recap, nihonjinron refers to the set of discour
demonstrate the Japanese as a race and culture are
cultures, and, secondly, to explain Japanese behavi
cultural attributes alleged to be unique in the worl
framework, the context of the investigation is limited
Thus, researchers within this paradigm explore how
affect and shape social behavior, and focus on deta
cultural variability within that culture (social struct
for example) can determine individual behavior.
Nihonjinron strengthens thus the perception of J
and inseparable society which shares common values.
be faulted on two accounts. The first is that it does no
Japan on social and political behavior. It is therefore e
is that this very exclusivity has led to a constant s
comparative school of cultural studies, to which th
other than to become more exclusive.

CRITICISM OF NIHONJINRON

The nihonjinron approach to the study of Japanese culture started to b


challenged from the early 1950s. Critiques (e.g., Dale, 1986; Sugimoto
Mouer, 1989; Taketomo, 1986) highlight its weaknesses as a social the
on methodological, empirical, and ideological grounds, illustrating th
many phenomena, such as the concept of amae, which have been suppo
to be uniquely Japanese, can also be observed in other societies (Befu, 1
And whereas the nihonjinron explains Japan's economic success in term
the unique national character of Japan, Crawcour (1980) has criticized
theory for neglecting the importance of such factors as the availabilit
advanced technology from abroad, high rates of investment, abundant
plies of labor, and a very favorable international environment. In particula
the revisionists express criticism against the heavy reliance on conven
examples of personal experiences in support of the "group model," "con
sus model," or the images of harmony of Japanese society. In turn,
revisionists stress the importance of a "conflict model" that emphas
dissension between different groups.
Indeed, although the cultural model of harmony is more notable in Japan
in the West, research has pointed out the existence of conflict in Japanese so
and politics (Apter & Sawa, 1984; McKean, 1981; Steinhoff, 1989). Follow

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336 Feldman

rapid econo
over the c
minority r
of former
deepened.
ments, ant
groups inc
political a
During tha
unconventi
part in the
organizatio
specific iss
organizing
position. L
power for
Japanese p
were repor
These elem
Japanese so
values and
suggest. Th
culture, and
own interes
However,
a different
as well as t
1976), and
fight. They
strikes usua
Moreover, J
rarely a wa
usually sta
activities (
In his crit
of this app
factors inf
concepts s
"personhoo
orientation
ity, one wi
(Befu, 1977

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 337

CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES

In contrast to nihonjinron, the second approach concerned with


Japanese social behavior and attitudes seeks first to apply to Japan resear
theories and measures tested in empirical studies in the U.S. and Euro
tries, and second to relate the Japanese case to a broad context of politica
It endeavors to elucidate aspects related to political attitudes in Japan by
them to those that exist in other societies by employing similar meth
procedures. For example, based on comparisons of thermometer eval
parties, leaders, and groups in different countries, Richardson (1986)
the emotional level of Japanese political culture is lower than that in
industrialized countries. Japanese tend much more to emotional neutra
neither warm nor cold, or simply do not reveal their feelings towar
institutions, unlike citizens in other major democracies.
During recent years, an increasing number of books, periodical a
conferences, and panel discussions have been devoted to address
comparative perspective issues related to Japanese social behavior
tudes. The basic assumption of this extensive literature and debate is
Japanese may have, like any other people, special cultural and s
characteristics which distinguish them from other societies; yet, at
time, the Japanese can be compared to other people, and such com
needed in order to deepen understanding and to develop a genera
human behavior. Studies in this context focus in particular on sever
areas of political behavior.

Similarities and Differences

A number of studies have pointed to the similarities and differences in political


attitudes in Western culture and Japan. Kabashima (1986), for example, notes that
in comparison to U.S. voters, Japanese have a higher level of ideological conscious-
ness. As many as 85% of the Japanese voters locate themselves on a conservative-
reformist scale, and more than 70% of them distinguish each of the political parties
on such an ideological scale. Karasawa (1994) investigates the structure of national
identity among Japanese, their attitudes toward Japan, including aspects such as
patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism. Based on methods used in previous
studies in the U.S. and Japan, Karasawa constructed a new scale-the National
Identity Scale-which includes the subscales of nationalism, patriotism, and inter-
nationalism, and a number of new attitudinal questions regarding national symbols
such as the national flag and the national anthem. The analysis reveals both
similarities and differences between the American and Japanese samples regarding
the structure of national identity, including a commitment to national heritage and
attitudes toward the foreign community and other countries.

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338 Feldman

In a thorou
(1988, Ch. 5
in Japan is
participatio
the level of
politics. Co
willingness
negatively r
other causes
fication, an
negatively
cal, and psy
Following e
factor in d
Kawakami
tween lifest
U.S., there
behavior or
can electora
for the eme
voters' val
associated w
voting turn
Hirano (199
in the U.S. a
supporting t
tionally to s
the econom
evaluation o
that in com
seldom affe
in the U.S.
of the gover
the Japanes
but at the
responsibility.
Analyzing the mechanism of voting decision-making at the election for the
House of Councillors in Tokyo in 1989, Hirano (1991) reports that emotional
reaction toward political issues and parties consists of positive and negative
dimensions. Each of these two dimensions has an independent effect on party
support. Yet, the influence of the positive emotion is relatively stronger. That is,
those with positive feelings toward a particular party tended to support that party.
Hirano notes that these results are consistent with results reported in the U.S.

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 339

Several inquiries into the process and effects of p


the level of party allegiance among Japanese childr
through to adolescence, are similar to those prevailin
the U.S., U.K., and France. The influence of the fam
similar in Japan to these countries. Like children in
American counterparts, Japanese children have know
sanship; they also share their parents' party affiliati
their Western peers. Japanese parents succeed in trans
their children no less than Western parents do. Thus,
in the child's early political socialization despite the
and cultural changes that have been taking place in J
political party system, occupational and geographic
(Kawata, 1989; Massey, 1976; Iwase, 1977).
In contrast to children in the U.S., U.K., and Fran
no "benevolent leader" image, but rather possess n
leaders, particularly the prime minister. They view th
disagreeable figure, as one who lies, is wealthy, and
The Japanese prime minister does not therefore ap
person or an object of trust and affection (Massey,
Additionally, Japanese children tend to have a h
cynicism than their counterparts in other industrial a
age is associated with increasing cynicism. At the ei
more cynical than their parents about the concern
prime minister, the government, the Diet, and polit
(Massey, 1976). Increase in age is related also to a d
and in feelings of being able to act effectively in polit
students, for example, tend to have an extremely low
(Kawata, 1985).
Low levels of efficacy are also major characte
political attitudes. Nakamura (1975, pp. 172-173)
more than 65% of the voters expressed cynicism re
their opinions are reflected in politics. In compari
U.S. and the U.K., the proportion of Japanese w
influencing politics on both the national and local
individuals' feelings of being able to have an impac
national and the local level. More people feel that th
in affecting decision-making processes at the l
national.
Indeed, in comparison to voters in the U.S., the U.K., and Germany, relatively
more Japanese feel that they are capable of influencing decision-makers on both
the national and local levels through various groups rather than through personal
contacts (Nakamura, 1975, pp. 174-175). This is related perhaps to the fact that for
many social relations in Japan, the basis is the group, and the Japanese tend to

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340 Feldman

belong to s
Flanagan,

Voting

Voting att
tried de to
characteris
One such s
political par
About 60%
to question
national el
Study" pro
political sur
Voting tu
higher tha
eligible vot
house of th
Japanese p
perhaps rel
are automa
old. In som
offices and
Another e
related perh
such as dut
small and i
voting for
based on so
unions, sch
influence s
networks w
shape the
voting mo
behavior is
shaping an
Therefore
of high pol
hand, sign
tion and co
and the U.

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 341

participation in Japanese local elections is even high


elections. This also reflects mobilized participation
as the strength of personal and friendship ties bet
voters.

Notably, recent developments in global society have affected the Japane


voter in the last few years. Specifically, with the developments of communicat
technology, the availability of information, and the rise of the yen, and particula
with the end of the Cold War and the sociopolitical changes that have accompa
it in the world, Japan has started to become part of the "global village." On the o
hand, as Japanese business had shifted large parts of its manufacturing base abroa
so too have ever growing numbers of Japanese people worked or been educa
abroad, and then returned to Japan. On the other, more and more foreigners h
come to Japan to work in fields like business and education, while, at the same ti
increasing numbers of low-wage foreign workers have been laid off in the recessi
and become a controversial social issue with regard to legal status and their rig
within the Japanese health and social security system (Komai, 1994).
Along with the increasing direct contact with foreign cultures and foreigner
foreign imports are slowly extending, and the expansion of cable and satellite
have multiplied foreign news and information access. These changes have be
to affect Japanese attitudes and awareness toward environmental issues, the sea
for global peace, education reform, human rights, and the role Japan has to play
world affairs. In foreign policy, for example, the Japanese government has be
to take a more assertive role and also adopted a higher profile in United Natio
peace-keeping efforts in Cambodia, Somalia, Israel, and the former Yugoslavia
well as being active in seeking Security Council status. Thus, Japan is a changi
society both at the national and the individual level.
Becoming part of the global village has been associated with the shrinkin
power of social contexts and networks in mobilizing and guiding voting decisio
With regard to changes in voter values, the growing geographical and occupati
mobility, heterogeneity, and sophistication of the Japanese electorate, and t
weakening of community ties have led to a shift in the vote away from the ru
LDP to opposition parties. The ruling party's traditional supporters, the farm
and the self-employed middle class, have decreased. Also, international pressur
forced the LDP to withdraw from its support for the special protection these gro
had received in Japanese society in the form of farm subsidies and legal restricti
against the spread of large discount retailers.
The issue polarization that characterized Japanese politics during the 195
and the 1960s, and divided the voters into two political camps, the conserva
and the progressive, has been substituted in the 1970s and the 1980s by
"issueless" politics. That means the political debate has shifted from political is
to valence issues, which are short-lived and tend to fade often within a few sh
months, and do not split the electorate in a significant way. As a result of this tre
voters tend to make decisions on the quality of the performance of the incumb

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342 Feldman

governmen
issues in sh
the chance
(Flanagan e
Generally
(voters' opi
party's po
feelings to
Miyake &
nationwide
electoral r
addition to
and satisfac
which indir
Moreover,
constituenc
networks h
his finding
habitual vot
local elite w
emphasize
dictating th
focused pol
Candidate e
the medium
combination
has yet bee
between thr
ency when t
system, lar
constituenc
political par
campaigns t
party appea
vote for a c
between dif
backed by t
a political p
Miyake (19
from the t
belonged to
parties, bec

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 343

evaluate candidates more on the basis of their personal


partisan factors. The personal factor became crucial
While issues do affect voting choices in certain inst
emerges as the stronger of the attitudinal forces affec
Levels of issue awareness, measured in terms of the
opinion about issues or designation of a party "clos
traditionally low. Issue opinions are also relatively w
This is reflected by the fact that relatively few party
being close to their own positions (Flanagan et al.,
Various studies of party identification in Japan hav
weak in intensity, that fewer Japanese identify with
in other industrialized countries, and that relative
countries, there are lower levels (between 50-60%) o
loyalties (e.g., Miyake, 1986). Richardson (1986) rev
the tendency to vote consistently, in the absence of
identification, for the same party in the past-plays
choice in later elections. At least one voter out of fiv
the same party. For these individuals, voting habit ta
identification.
Miyake (1991) develops a fourfold classification of
loyalists, negative partisans, nonpartisans, and the
partisan demonstrate different patterns of political in
issue opinions, and voting behavior. Loyal partisans
paign activities more often than other kinds of vote
to vote for a candidate from their own party. They
awareness of parties and a strong positive affective
party. They are the most psychologically involved, t
politics, and are low in cynicism. Where past suppor
the most stable, tending to switch their party suppo
with partisan issues, and are the most likely to name
closest to their position on the issues.
Negative partisans are individuals who continue to
cal party, but lack a strong positive affective tie wit
levels of political awareness as well as the same lev
loyal partisans. However, their level of psychological
than that of loyal partisans. Nevertheless, in comparis
partisans have a high level of cynicism. Next, the no
of the loyal partisans. They have low levels of poli
affection for any party, and only volatile attachments
uninformed partisans are also the least involved in
trusting feelings toward the party they regularly v
knowledge of politics.

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344 Feldman

In compar
national el
a few diff
as describ
the uninfo
negative pa
for. Second
as a relativ
because of
partisan is
from party
tisanship.
conceptual
differ in i
concept of
In most stu
38 %) has of
Nevertheles
of cynicism
voting dec
hold of var
actions are
construct i
Indeed, stu
have at lea
identifiers
people, 13%
firm ident
importanc
identificat
Political Stu
therefore,
identificati
based more
affective fe
the concep

The News Media

That the news media greatly affect the way voters perceive and form th
images toward parties and candidates has often been reported (e.g., Feldman, 1
Indeed, a large number of studies have detailed the role the media play in Jap

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 345

society and their ability to influence attitude and behav


particular the extraordinary power the dailies have-a sma
newspapers with a very wide circulation. Because people
television channels that collaborate in their news and ent
people are exposed to almost the same information the w
choice.
Arai (1989) suggests that this media exposure leads to closing the cultural gap
between different segments of the public and between different aspects such as
gender, age, socioeconomic status, and place of residence. Another consequence is
the overall sense of satisfaction with life, a sense of helplessness in politics and
society, and a growing lack of interest in communicating with other people. Tsuruki
(1982) views the media, particularly the newspapers, as one of the most important
factors that have contributed to the standardization of information and knowledge
in Japanese society: the rapid standardization of culture, to the extent that there are
no longer differences in ways of talking, dressing, and living between rural areas
and the large cities; the increasing homogeneity of lifestyle and attitude; and the
disintegration of the class structure, to the degree that 90% of the population regards
itself as belonging to the middle class.
Communication researchers note that the media seem to be playing an
increasing role in American elections, and research reveals that media coverage
of election campaigns and candidates influences voting behavior, such as
putting issues on voters' agendas. In the Japanese case, studies which examine
the ability of the press to put various political, social and economic issues on
the public agenda, especially during election campaigns, report the limited
effects of the media. For example, individuals who were most interested in
politics and had frequent contact with the media appeared to be least affected
by the media's agenda priorities (Takeshita, 1988, 1993). More recently, Take-
shita and Mikami (1995) examined the role played by the media and its
agenda-setting effects on voters in Tokyo during the 1993 general election
campaign. They analyzed the content of three news programs and two newspa-
pers and found that agenda-setting effects were detected in the issue of political
reform, which was predominantly emphasized in the campaign. Since political
reform was advocated mainly by non-LDP candidates, the increased importance
of this issue might have benefited such candidates. Additionally, content analy-
sis revealed bias in the campaign news to the advantage of the non-LDP
candidates. This is generally considered to have affected the voters' perceptions
of these candidates and to have motivated electoral support for them.
There are also other important findings that concern media influence on
election outcomes. Studies note, for example, that voters frequently switch candi-
dates after following the newspapers' predictions of the possible results of the
elections. Kabashima (1988) reveals that during the 1986 election campaign 16%
of the voters were influenced by newspaper announcements. This points to the
relative significance of the percentage of voters who tend to either change their vote

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346 Feldman

from one ca
election pre
A buffer pl
close ties wi
Buffer play
generally su
by putting
opposition, t
failed pledg
when it was
the period f
this period,
(1994), in th
majority.
Demographically, Kabashima (1988) notes, those who tend to change their
vote from one candidate to another are mostly male high school graduates living
in urban areas and working in service industries. The group which, after following
announcements in the newspapers, tends to refrain from voting comprises mostly
young men and women in their 20s, students, female office workers, and urban
dwellers. These findings suggest that voters who have a keen interest in politics
tend to switch candidates, and those who have a low political interest tend to refrain
from voting.
Following studies that noted the crucial role the news media play in shaping
public perception of environmental problems in Western society, Mikami and
his associates (Mikami et al., 1994) examined the Japanese case. They used the
agenda-setting approach to examine public awareness of environmental issues
and the influence of TV news or newspapers reporting upon 1,000 citizens in
Tokyo. Content analysis of the media revealed that during the period examined
the environmental issues received a heavy media treatment. Yet there was a
weak relationship between TV news content and newspaper coverage and public
attitudes, indicating that TV and the newspapers failed to affect or reflect
public awareness toward the environment. Interestingly, however, in testing the
hypothesis of agenda-setting research and cultivation analysis, there was a
long-term or accumulated media effect on the salience and attitude of the
audience toward the environment. This suggests that the news media may be
able to exert influence on public cognition and behavior by continuing coverage
for a longer time.

Political Leadership

Last, cross-culturally related studies have examined aspects related to political


leaders in Japan, including the prime minister (e.g., Igarashi, 1989; Johnson, 1986).

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 347

This type of study received little attention probab


ministers have, by standards of most other advanc
less real power either to establish new priorities fo
important measures. Usually they do not have clea
to advocate. Rather than being strong and assertive, th
remarkably weak and reactive (Hayao, 1993). As a r
their energy to issues that happen to be salient at a
to resolve them in some way. They do not take init
involved directly in the content of change. They tr
programs or resolve major conflicts at crucial time
must reach a decision, or when the Diet is confron
legislation. Only a handful of studies have focused
other politicians in order to examine questions rela
political post, their role orientations, and other ps
their attitudes.

One cross-cultural study, which compared Ameri


Japanese, examines the belief system of Diet memb
inquires how open or closed to change the belief syst
are and considered the significance of such finding
study reveals that as in Italy and the U.S., dogmatic,
well as democratic, open-minded personalities functi
in Japan. In comparison to politicians from other
Japanese Diet members who are dogmatic is neither
nor as low as for American politicians. Thus, the Jap
between the Italian and the American cases--less do
more dogmatic than their American counterparts. T
members are distinguished from nonpoliticians in te
structure: Diet members are more closed-minded th
the personality structure of a Diet member is affected
ence at the local level and by the desire to attain p
press).
Utilizing a theory and research method (the social-self symbol task) developed
and applied in the U.S. to measure self-esteem, it was revealed that in comparison
to the general public, newly elected Diet members tend to have a relatively lower
level of self-esteem. Diet members with high and low self-esteem are distinguished
from each other in terms of attitudes, motivation, work patterns, and their respon-
siveness to the electorate. A large number of Diet members who wanted to become
politicians in childhood tended to have lower self-esteem. The combination of a
strong mother and low self-estimate led the child to want a future position in which
he would be able to exercise power, such as in becoming a politician. Such
individuals are more likely to take an active part in public activity even before they
have reached the age of voting, such as serving in leading positions in student
associations (Feldman, 1994).

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348 Feldman

Summary

In conclusion, different scholars have endeavored to describe and detail


political behavior and attitudes in Japan through comparison with Western socie-
ties. This has also been reflected in a tendency to use interchangeable terms such
as "cross-cultural," "cross-national," and "intercultural." In doing so, such studies
have tried first to examine theories and assumptions developed in one culture
(Western), and then to apply them to another culture (Japan), and to observe and
measure to what extent these theories and assumptions can be generalized across
such apparently disparate cultures.
To the degree that universal theories of political psychology and behavior are
both desirable and feasible, such scholarly work has an important role to play. But
it is a role that must be carefully circumscribed, for these attempts to create universal
theories have led to a certain washback effect, whereby the more Western models
are applied to the Japanese case, the more it becomes clear that such models need
to be reworked through further investigations in Western countries.
Thus, the need to redefine terms and to narrow down or broaden out the
conceptual base becomes imperative for future collaboration in this field--as does,
too, the need to use different research methods for continuing to test the validity
and reliability of such universal hypotheses.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

An increasing interest in political psychology in recent years in


resulted in numerous books and articles on related topics. For examp
(1994) and his associates collaborated in editing a book which details
as women and politics, political education, and political cognition. Mos
Wakata (1995) has also examined the links between politics and psych
referring to issues such as public opinion, media, culture, and intercultur
nication. Additionally, a large number of books on politics, society, a
published by leading publishing houses in the U.S. and Europe, are tra
the Japanese language immediately upon publication.
Through such literature, Japanese students of political behavior are a
detailed information about both global states of affairs as well as recent
studies in the field, and can apply in Japan research methods used i
conducted in other cultures. This literature also offers rich and varied inf
on research results which scholars in Japan often compare with their ow
in order to assess the significance of the latter. In fact, there is a strong
tion with comparing Japanese behavior and attitudes with existing
Western countries, either for the purpose of illustrating how much the
different or unique, or just to examine to what extent the case of Japa
or far from the Western "model."

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Cross-Cultural Political Psychology in Japan 349

However, whereas much cross-cultural compariso


ior takes place in Japan, there is not sufficient inf
researchers on political attitudes and behavior in Jap
to the fact that most of the work regarding Japan is
many Japanese researchers have studied and trained i
prefer to publish their research findings in Japanese
They have an enormous domestic market for their
of local academic associations, each of which has an
Because these periodicals are more accessible to Ja
parison to American or European journals, are less
they are the arena in which many researchers pre
Consequently, Western researchers who do not read
information on studies done in Japan and to compar
their own countries.
On the other hand, perhaps because of the barriers
scholars come to Japan to gather data. Of course,
conducting cross-cultural comparative studies. Thes
translations of terms and concepts, connotation and
preting response patterns. In addition, one has to
characteristics, social structure, and the history an
Japan in order to interpret appropriately the coll
resolved, perhaps, through cooperation with Japan
studies. To date, there have been only a few researc
Japanese and Westerners to examine aspects of polit
ciplinary approach. Yet because the Japanese case is
in any attempt to construct a general theory in cul
psychology, further international cooperation is cer

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to Andrew Barfield, John Duckitt, and Stanley Resho


most valuable suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this arti

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