SANIDAD VS.

COMELEC Case Digest

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-446640
OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by
the President of his present powers.

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes
in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of
which is quoted in the footnote below.

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced
thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments
to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of
a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case?

2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:

Issue 1 – Justiciability of the courts

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that
the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the clear
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act,
provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial
but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to
and ratification by the people.

Issue 2 – Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the
Constitution?

As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter
fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment,
the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to the dictates of the
sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be
within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power
of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is
yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim
National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the
urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf
of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.

Issue 3 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame
allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision."

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29

Jan 1990]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expressionand of the press. On
October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERAAUTONOMOUS REGION" was
enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras
which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra
and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall
take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally
scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30,
1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989,
herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist
of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper
circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. —

During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for
or against the plebiscite Issue.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional

because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular
news reporter or news correspondentwho merely reports the news,
petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and
necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue
or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if
media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the
issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive
and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all
sides of the issue.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is

unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987
Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or
other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is
the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television
time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a
leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par.
Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or
commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters
to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of
absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd
par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In
fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a
decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the
Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where
the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec
radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or
television times.

The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167

is declared null and void and unconstitutional.