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B E H I N D T H E N U M B E R S : Costco Wholesale Corp.

Perpetual Growth Machine


While Costco shares aren’t cheap, value investor Nicholas Sleep shares some fascinating insights
about the company and makes an excellent case for its long-term prospects.

Value investors have long been ny’s cost – with no exceptions. This The real power of Costco’s strategy –
intrigued by Costco Wholesale Corp. It pricing discipline – even Wal-Mart’s and the source of its competitive advan-
has a fabulous long-term record of mark-ups are around 20% – engenders tage, according to Sleep – is how the
steady growth, it’s old-school in its man- outstanding customer loyalty. As the benefits of growth are reinvested in the
agement and compensation practices, company has raised its annual member- relationship with the consumer. As
Berkshire Hathaway’s Charlie Munger is ship fee over time, to $45, membership Costco opens new stores, supplier and
on the board – plus, any bargain hunter renewal rates have barely budged from other scale cost savings are passed back
loves to shop there. Not so many value an enviable 86%. to customers through even more compet-
investors own the stock, however, in part
because it has extremely low margins –
INVESTMENT SNAPHOT
less than 2% after tax – and the stock
rarely looks cheap, trading today at 24x Costco Wholesale Corp. Financials (TTM):
trailing earnings per share. (Nasdaq: COST) Revenue $49.16 billion
So we didn’t expect anything particu- Operating Profit Margin 2.91%
larly new when we sat down to read the Business: Membership warehouse retailer Net Profit Margin 1.86%
discussion of Costco in the annual letter offering members low prices on limited
selection of branded and private-label prod- Valuation Metrics:
of Nicholas Sleep of London's Marathon (Current Price vs. TTM)
ucts across multiple product categories.
Asset Management. But Sleep’s fresh COST S&P 500
Primary operations in U.S. and Canada.
insights, arguments and analysis – P/E 23.9 23.1
“Mungeresque” in tone and content – Share Information P/CF 15.8 13.9
(@2/18/05):
persuaded us that Costco’s intrinsic value Largest Institutional Owners:
is probably quite a bit higher than we’d Price 45.80
Company % Owned
thought. We followed up with him to 52-Week Range 35.05 - 50.46 (@ 9/30/04)
Dividend Yield 0.9%
learn more on why he believes, even if it’s Davis Selected Advisers 7.9%
Market Cap $21.64 billion Barclays Bank Plc 3.6%
not a 50-cent dollar, Costco is an out-
standing long-term investment. Short Interest: State Street Corp 2.7%
(@1/10/05) Capital Guardian Trust 2.3%
Customer really is king Shares Short/Float 2.47% Vanguard Group 2.2%

Retailers love to boast that the “cus- COST PRICE HISTORY


tomer is king,” but none live it like 55 55
Costco. It starts with how the company
negotiates with suppliers. As Sleep notes: 50 50
“Costco’s key to negotiating terms is 45 45
that the number of items in a store
40 40
(SKUs) is fixed at around 4,000, with
those suppliers that provide the best 35 35
value proposition to the consumer win-
30 30
ning space on the shop floor. Contrast
this to normal industry practice, where 25 25
2003 2004 2005
the supermarket assumes the role of
landlord, auctions space to the highest
bidder and pockets the rents (“slotting THE BOTTOM LINE
fees” in industry parlance). Many Costco’s “perpetual machine” of growth is capable of keeping company revenue and
supermarkets make their money from cash flow growing 13% annually, says Nicholas Sleep of London’s Marathon Asset
buying from the supplier. Costco makes Management. If the market price reflected even a 10% growth expectation, he says,
COST would trade at $62, a 35% premium to the current market price.
money from selling to the consumer.”
Costco fixes its retail prices at a Sources: Company reports, other publicly available information
maximum of only 14% over the compa-

February 22, 2005 www.valueinvestorinsight.com Value Investor Insight 16


B E H I N D T H E N U M B E R S : Costco Wholesale Corp.

itive prices. Customers then respond to that’s just Wall Street’s obsession with with Price Club in 1993, Costco
the better prices, driving incremental short-term outcomes. The firm could thought 31 stores were too many for
revenue at both new and old stores. As earn Wal-Mart margins by taking pric- the market, but today there are 36.
Sleep writes: ing up a little and the stock would then Likewise, in Seattle and Alaska, the
“In the office we have a white board trade at 11x earnings, but would it be a penetration of membership cards is an
on which we’ve listed the very few better business as a result? We think astonishing 65% of households, but in
investment models that work and that not, because it might allow the competi- most markets it is below 10%.”
we can understand. Costco is the best tion to catch up.” All told, Sleep estimates that Costco
example we can find of one of them: Contributing to margin pressure in can conservatively increase revenue and
scale efficiencies shared with customers. recent years has also been a rise in free cash flow by 13% per year into the
We often ask companies what they SG&A costs as a percentage of rev- foreseeable future – 4% from the
increasing asset turns of newer stores as
they mature, 4% from same-store
PRIVILEGES OF MEMBERSHIP
growth at already-mature stores, and
Costco’s membership-only model helps foster a 5% from new stores.
unique relationship with its customers. People shop “This is an early life-cycle company
there because it’s Costco, not because it stocks whose competitive moat gets deeper as
Pepsi or Pampers. As Costco has raised its basic the company gets bigger and the con-
annual membership fee over time, to $45 currrently,
sumer is consistently cut-in on the bene-
membership renewal rates have barely budged from
an enviable 86%. fits of the company’s growth,” Sleep
says, terming this cycle a “perpetual
machine” of growth.
would do with windfall profits, and enues, fueled in large part by spending The market, which currently prices
almost no one replies ‘give it back to on a new warehousing and distribution Costco shares at around $46, is not so
customers’. How would that go down system and rising employee wages and generous in its growth expectation.
with Wall Street? That is why competing benefits. A sign of trouble? No, Sleep calculates that if Costco shares
with Costco is so hard to do. The firm is explains Sleep: “We clearly differentiate were priced to reflect just 10% annual
not interested in today’s static assess- between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ SG&A spend- growth, the stock would trade at $62
ment of performance. It is managing the ing,” he says. “In both of these cases, today. Even at that price he wouldn’t
business to raise the probability of long- Costco is investing in areas critical to its sell, he says, given his expectation for
term success.” growth.” With the new warehousing even faster growth.
By sharing the cost savings of growth, system in place, efficiency gains will What could go wrong? Wal-Mart,
Costco earns revenues per square foot – start showing up in the financials this with Sam’s Club, could mount a sus-
around $830 – that are the envy of the year. And the slightly higher wage base tained direct attack to undercut Costco’s
industry. Wal-Mart’s Sam’s Club checks in helps Costco retain its employees twice prices. Sleep considers that unlikely, as
at around $500 per square foot, while BJ’s as long as competitors do, which Sleep Costco has shown itself more than capa-
Wholesale Club is about $400. Even more sees as positively impacting customer ble of competing head-to-head with the
importantly, Sleep estimates that mature service and contributing to its very high discounting giant. The departure of
Costco stores – open at least five years – customer retention. CEO James Sinegal, 68, the architect of
generate revenue of over $1,000 per Costco’s unique and disciplined culture,
square foot. Still an early life-cycle company could also be a blow. Sleep points out
Even with annual sales of nearly $50 that Sinegal shows no sign of slowing
Margin trouble? billion, Sleep makes a compelling case down, and that Costco’s experienced
Costco’s pricing discipline, by defini- for Costco as a growth company, board can be counted on to appoint a
tion, keeps margins low – at 1.9%, they through geographic expansion, worthy successor.
are roughly half those of Wal-Mart increased market penetration, and the We’ll leave to Marathon’s Nicholas
(3.6%) and Target (4.1%). Sleep argues virtuous cycle of growth in maturing- Sleep the final word on Costco: “The con-
that Wall Street’s focus on margins is store asset turns as scale efficiencies sensus has it that Costco is a low-margin
short sighted: result in even lower prices. retailer with an expensive stock and a cost
“True, the company has low margins, “One-third of the store base remains problem. That is certainly one description.
but that’s the point. The firm is defer- in California, and almost half on the But in our judgment it is a cost-disciplined,
ring profits today in order to extend the West Coast. Management always con- intellectually honest, high-product-integri-
life of the franchise. Of course Wall fesses to underestimating saturation. In ty, perpetual motion machine trading at a
Street would love profits today, but Los Angeles, for example, after merging discount to value.” VII

February 22, 2005 www.valueinvestorinsight.com Value Investor Insight 17

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