Economic History of Argentina

Economic history of Argentina
The economic history of Argentina is one of the most studied, owing to the "Argentine paradox", its unique
condition as a country that had achieved advanced development in the early 20th century but experienced a
reversal, which inspired an enormous wealth of literature and diverse analysis on the causes of this decline.[1]
Since independence from Spain in 1816, the country has defaulted on its debt nine times and inflation has
often been in the double digits, even as high as 5000%, resulting in several large currency devaluations.
Argentina possesses definite comparative advantages in agriculture, as the country is endowed with a vast
amount of highly fertile land.[2] Between 1860 and 1930, exploitation of the rich land of the pampas strongly
pushed economic growth.[3] During the first three decades of the 20th century, Argentina outgrew Canada and
Australia in population, total income, and per capita income.[3] By 1913, Argentina was the world's 10th
wealthiest state per capita.[4]
Beginning in the 1930s, however, the Argentine economy deteriorated notably.[3] The single most important
factor in this decline has been political instability since 1930, when a military junta took power, ending seven
decades of civilian constitutional government.[5] In macroeconomic terms, Argentina was one of the most
stable and conservative countries until the Great Depression, after which it turned into one of the most
unstable.[6] Despite this, up until 1962 the Argentine per capita GDP was higher than that of Austria, Italy,
Japan and of its former colonial master, Spain.[7] Successive governments from the 1930s to the 1970s pursued
a strategy of import substitution to achieve industrial self-sufficiency, but the government's encouragement of
industrial growth diverted investment from agricultural production, which fell dramatically.[8]
The era of import substitution ended in 1976, but at the same time growing government spending, large wage
increases and inefficient production created a chronic inflation that rose through the 1980s.[8] The measures
enacted during the last dictatorship also contributed to the huge foreign debt by the late 1980s, which became
equivalent to three-fourths of the GNP.[8]
In the early 1990s the government reined in inflation by making the peso equal in value to the U.S. dollar, and
privatised numerous state-run companies, using part of the proceeds to reduce the national debt.[8] However, a
sustained recession at the turn of the 21st century culminated in a default, and the government again devalued
the peso.[8] By 2005 the economy had recovered,[8] but a judicial ruling originating from the previous crisis
led to a new default in 2014.[9]
Argentina defaulted again on May 22, 2020 by failing to pay $500 million on its due date to its creditors.
Negotiations for the restructuring of $66 billion of its debt continue.[10]
Contents
Colonial economy
Post-independence transition
1810–1829
1829–1870
Export-led boom
1870–1890
Baring crisis to World War I
Interwar period
1914–1929
Great Depression
Relative lag
First Peronist period: Nationalization
Post-Peron era and the 1960s
Stagnation (1975 - 1990)
Free-market reforms (1990 - 1995)
Economic crisis (1998 - 2002)
Return to growth (2003 - 2015)
Kirchner administration
Fernandez administration
Present
Presidency of Mauricio Macri
Argentine paradox
See also
Notes
References
In Spanish
Further reading
External links
Colonial economy
During the colonial period, present-day Argentina offered fewer economic advantages compared to other parts
of the Spanish Empire such as Mexico or Peru, which caused it to assume a peripheral position within the
Spanish colonial economy.[11] It lacked deposits of gold or other precious metals,[12] nor did it have
established native civilizations to subject to the encomienda. The sparse population was accompanied by a
difficult numeracy development in the 17th century. Nevertheless, Argentina overtook Peru, which enjoyed an
early rapid development in numeracy through the contact with Indios, in the middle of the 18th century. This
numeracy development as a measure of early modern development demonstrates the rapid and remarkable
development of Argentina in the period of colonial time.[13]
Only two-thirds of its present territory were occupied during the colonial period, as the remaining third
consisted of the Patagonian Plateau, which remains sparsely populated to this day.[12] The agricultural and
livestock sector's output was principally consumed by the producers themselves and by the small local market,
and only became associated with foreign trade towards the end of the 18th century.[11] The period between the
16th and the end of the 18th century was characterized by the existence of self-sufficient regional economies
separated by considerable distances, a lack of road, maritime or river communications, and the hazards and
hardship of land transport.[14] By the end of the 18th century, a significant national economy came into being,
as Argentina developed a market in which reciprocal flows of capital, labour, and goods could take place on a
significant scale between its different regions, which it had hitherto lacked.[14]
Historians like Milcíades Peña consider this historical period of the Americas
as pre-capitalist, as most production of the coastal cities was destined to
overseas markets.[15] Rodolfo Puiggrós consider it instead a feudalist society,
based on work relations such as the encomienda or slavery.[15] Norberto
Galasso and Enrique Rivera consider that it was neither capitalist nor
feudalist, but a hybrid system result of the interaction of the Spanish
civilization, on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and the natives, still
living in prehistory.[15]
The Argentine territories, held back by their closed economies, the lack of any
activity closely linked to foreign trade, and the scant amounts of labour and
capital they consequently received, fell far behind those of other areas of the
colonial world that participated in foreign trade.[16] Only activities associated
with a dynamic exporting centre enjoyed some degree of prosperity, as
occurred in Tucuman, where cloth was manufactured, and in Córdoba and the
Litoral, where livestock was raised to supply the mines of Upper Peru.[16]
This trade was legally limited to Spain: the Spanish Crown enforced a
An 1868 photo of a gaucho.
monopsony which limited supplies and enabled Spanish merchants to mark
Gauchos helped livestock
up prices and increase profits.[17] British and Portuguese merchants broke this
ranching extend through
monopsony by resorting to contraband trade.[18] much of Argentina.
The British desire to trade with South America grew during the Industrial
Revolution and the loss of their 13 colonies in North America
during the American Revolution. To achieve their economic
objectives, Britain initially launched the British invasions of the
Río de la Plata to conquer key cities in Spanish America but they
were defeated by the local forces of what is now Argentina and
Uruguay not once but twice without the help of Spain.[19] When
they allied to Spain during the Napoleonic Wars, they requested
the Spanish authorities to open commerce to Britain in return.[20]
Field wagons ("carretas") were introduced

by the Spaniards at the end of the 16th
century as transport for passengers and
goods.
The first Argentine historians, such as Bartolomé Mitre, attributed the

free trade to The Representation of the Hacendados economic report
by Mariano Moreno, but is currently considered the result of a general
Lassoing cattle in the pampas, 1794 negotiation between Britain and Spain, as reflected in the Apodaca-
lithography by Fernando Brambilla. Canning treaty of 1809.[21] The actions of Baltasar Hidalgo de
Cisneros in Buenos Aires reflected similar outcomes emanating from
the other Spanish cities of South America.[21]
Compared to other parts of Latin America, slavery played a much lesser role in the development of the
Argentine economy, mostly because of the absence of gold mines and sugar plantations, which would have
demanded huge numbers of slave workers.[22] Colonial Brazil, for example, imported as many as 2.5 million
Africans in the 18th century.[22] By contrast, an estimated 100,000 African slaves arrived at the port of Buenos
Aires in the 17th and 18th centuries, and many were destined for Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia.[22]
The colonial livestock ranches were established toward the middle of the 18th century.[12] The pace of growth
in the region increased dramatically with the establishment in 1776 of the new Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata
with Buenos Aires as its capital, and increased legal trading allowed by the Free Trade Act of 1778,[23] which
allowed for "free and protected" trade between Spain and its colonies.[24] This trade system disintegrated
during the Napoleonic era, and contraband became common again.[24]
Post-independence transition
During the early post-independence period, an important share of Argentina's exports came from cattle and
sheep production.[25] The livestock-raising economy was based upon the abundance of fertile land in the
littoral provinces.[25] Cropping apparently lacked comparative advantage compared to livestock grazing.[25]
Exports rose 4% to 5% annually from 1810 to 1850 and 7% to 8% from 1850 to 1870.[26] This growth was
achieved through the extension of the frontier and greater efficiency in livestock production.[27]
As a result of the diversification in markets and products, Argentina managed to escape the trap of a single-
staple economy and sustained its economic growth over six decades.[27] The combined effect of declining
prices of textiles and rising prices of livestock products produced dramatic improvements in the terms of trade,
which rose 377% between 1810 and 1825 in local prices.[25] Several governors waged campaigns against the
natives to increase the available lands, from Juan Manuel de Rosas to Julio Argentino Roca.
Most poor gauchos joined forces with the most powerful caudillos in the vicinity. As the Federalist Party, they
opposed the policies implemented by Buenos Aires, and waged the Argentine Civil Wars.[28]
1810–1829
After Argentina became independent in 1810, an era in which

commerce was controlled by a small group of peninsular merchants
came to an end.[25] The Primera Junta, the first government
established after the 1810 May Revolution, undertook a protectionist
policy until their fall from government.
The First Triumvirate (1811–1812), influenced by Bernardino Buenos Aires marketplace, 1810s
Rivadavia and Manuel García, instead promoted unrestricted trade
with Britain.[29] The Second Triumvirate (1812–1814) and José
Gervasio Artigas (who controlled the Liga Federal during the 1815–
1820 period) sought to restore the initial protectionist policy, but the
Supreme Director restored free trade once more.[30] Thus, the
economy of the Río de la Plata became one of the most open
economies in the world.[25]
Between 1812 and 1816 divisions developed between a Unitarist

faction centred on Buenos Aires and a Federalist faction in the
provinces, which eventually led to a series of civil wars that ended
with the conquest of Buenos Aires by Federalist caudillos at the Battle Impression of a Buenos Aires
slaughterhouse by Charles Pellegrini,
of Cepeda in 1820.[31]
1829.
Each province had its own money, and the same money had a
different value from one province and another, and even among cities
in the same province.[32]
The government of Martín Rodríguez (1820–1824) and his minister Bernardino Rivadavia, then Las Heras
and finally Rivadavia himself as the first president of Argentina from 1826 to 1827, developed an economic
plan deemed as "The happy experience". This plan increased the British influence in the national politics. It
was based on five main pillars: complete free trade and no protectionist policies against British imports, finance
with a central bank managed by British investors, absolute control of the port of Buenos Aires as the sole
source of income from national customs, British exploitation of the national natural resources, and a Unitarist
national organization centred in Buenos Aires.[33] After Rivadavia resigned in 1827, ending the "happy
experience", the federalist Manuel Dorrego assumed power as governor of Buenos Aires, but was soon
executed by the unitarist Juan Lavalle during a military coup.
The exports of gold, allowed by the free trade policies, soon depleted the national reserves. This posed a great
problem, as gold was the medium of exchange of the local economy. Rivadavia sought to fix it by establishing
the "Discount Bank", a central bank for printing fiat money. Like a number of other central banks worldwide,
this bank was not owned by the state, but by private investors, British in this case.[34]
The report of the American John Murray Forbes to John Quincy

Adams, sixth President of the United States, in 1824 mentioned that
Britain had a huge influence in the economic power of the country.
He mentioned that the government in Buenos Aires was so eager to

be on good terms with Britain and gain recognition of the declaration
of independence that most official institutions (as the Bank) were
under British control, and that Britain had similar control over the
Argentine economy to that metropole of a colony, without the
financial, civil or military costs.[34] Even the lack of an Argentine
Members of the "Sociedad El
merchant fleet allowed Britain to manage the maritime trade.[35]
Camoatí" (1848-1856), the first stock Forbes's testimony should be appraised in perspective of the
exchange in Buenos Aires contemporary Anglo-American commercial rivalry, In light of the
partial nature of the account and of his "jealousy, even antipathy"
towards the English in Rio de la Plata.[36]
In the mid-1820s, when Manuel José García was Minister of Finance, the government borrowed heavily to
finance new projects and to pay off war debts.[37] These loans were tendered at usurious rates: in one
notorious loan, the government received credit for £570,000 from the Baring Brothers in exchange for a debt
of £1,000,000.[37] In the 1820s, the peso papel began to lose value rapidly with respect to the peso fuerte,
which was linked to the price of gold.[38] In 1827 the peso papel was devalued by 33%, and was devalued
again by 68% in 1829.[38]
1829–1870
Juan Manuel de Rosas forced Lavalle to leave the province, and the
federals ruled Buenos Aires until 1852.[39] Rosas modified a number
of policies of the Rivadavian period but maintained others: he set a
customs law with protectionist policies, but kept the port under the
exclusive control of Buenos Aires and refused to call a constituent
assembly.[40]
The customs law set trade barriers to products produced in the

In 1857, La Porteña became the first country, and imposed high import tariffs on luxury goods, together
locomotive to operate in Argentina. with export quotas and tariffs on gold and silver. However, the law
was not completely effective because of the control of the port, which
did not allow the provinces a steady financial income.[41] The
exclusive control of the port was long resisted by federals from other provinces and led to the conflict of Rosas
and Justo José de Urquiza at the battle of Caseros.[42] Despite the financial obstacles, the economy of Entre
Ríos grew to a size near that of Buenos Aires, with the decline of saladeros and the growth of wool
production.[43]
In 1838 there was a new currency crisis, and the peso papel was
devalued by 34%, and in 1839 when the peso papel lost 66% of its
value.[38] It was again devalued by 95% in 1845, and by 40% in
1851.[38] The Alsina years, which coincided with the secession of
Buenos Aires, saw an extremely poor economic performance.[44]
Efforts to fund extraordinary expenditure on the conflict between
Buenos Aires and the other provinces of the Confederation caused the
fiscal deficit to skyrocket.[44] Similarly, the Confederation faced harsh
A saladero in Rosario, 1860s
economic conditions. Urquiza, president of the Confederation, issued
the 'law of differential rights', benefiting the ships trading with the
ports of the Confederation and but not with Buenos Aires.[45]
The end of the civil wars provided the political and legal stability necessary to assert property rights and cut
transaction costs, contributing to the huge inflows of capital and labour resources that built modern
Argentina.[46] In 1866 an attempt was made to stabilize the currency, by introducing a system of
convertibility,[47] which restricted the monetary authorities to issue paper currency only if it was fully backed
by gold or convertible foreign currency.[38] The decades of the 1860s and 1880s experienced the most
favourable performance of the economy overall, setting the stage for the so-called Golden Age of Argentine
history.[48] Nevertheless, the first years of independence included a difficult economic development. In spite of
the new freedom caused by the inauguration of the republic, the country was not economically united:
expansion in some parts and decline in other parts. Indeed, people experienced different levels of income and
welfare. Therefore, it is unclear if this period of time (1820 – 1870) brought an income or welfare
improvement.[49]
In the 60 years after the founding of the farming colony at Esperanza in 1856, the base of Argentine
agriculture gradually shifted from livestock to crops.[8]
Export-led boom
Argentina, which had been insignificant during the first half of the 19th century, "In spite of its enormous
showed growth from the 1860s up until 1930 that was so impressive that it was advance which the
expected to eventually become the United States of South America.[51] This Republic has made within
impressive and sustained economic performance was driven by the export of the last ten years, the most
agricultural goods.[52] A 2018 study describes Argentina as a "super-exporter" cautious critic would not
during the period 1880-1929 and credits the boom to low trade costs and trade hesitate to aver that
Argentina has but just
liberalisation on one hand and on the other hand to the fact that Argentina
entered upon the threshold
"offered a diverse basket of products to the different European and American of her greatness."
countries that consumed them".[53] The study concludes "that Argentina took
advantage of a multilateral and open economic system."[53] Percy F. Martin,
Through Five
During the second half of the 19th century, there was an intense process of Republics of South
colonization of the territory in the form of latifundia.[2] Until 1875 wheat was
America, 1905.[50]
imported as it was not grown in sufficient quantities to supply local demand;[54]
by 1903 the country supplied all its own needs and exported 75,270,503
imperial bushels (2,737,491.8 m3 ) of wheat, enough to sustain 16,000,000
people.[55]
In the 1870s real wages in Argentina were around 76% relative to Britain, rising to 96% in the first decade of
the 20th century.[56] GDP per capita rose from 35% of the United States average in 1880 to about 80% in
1905,[57] similar to that of France, Germany and Canada.[58]
1870–1890
In 1870, during Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's presidency, total debt

amounted to 48 million gold pesos. A year later, it had almost
doubled.[48] Avellaneda became president after winning the 1874
presidential election.[59] The coalition that supported his candidature
became the Partido Autonomista Nacional, Argentina's first national
party;[59] all the presidents until 1916 would come from this party.[60]
Avellaneda undertook the tough actions needed to get the debt under
control.[48] In 1876 convertibility was suspended.[48] The inflation
rate rose to almost 20% in the following year, but the ratio of debt to
GDP plummeted.[48] Avellaneda's administration was the first to
deliver a balance in the fiscal accounts since the mid-1850s.[48]
Buenos Aires Docks, 1915. The
British-financed docks and railway
Avellaneda passed on to his successor, Julio Argentino Roca, a much
system created a dynamic agro- more manageable economic environment.[44]
export sector that remains as an
economic pillar. In 1881, a currency reform
introduced a bimetallic
standard, which went into
effect in July 1883.[61] Unlike many precious metal standards the
system was very decentralized: no national monetary authority existed
and all control over convertibility rested with the five banks of
issue.[61] The period of convertibility lasted only 17 months: from
December 1884 the banks of issue refused to exchange gold at par for
notes.[61] The suspension of convertibility was soon accommodated
by the government, since, having no institutional power over the Quilmes brewery in 1910
monetary system, there was little they could do to prevent it.[61]
The profitability of the agricultural sector attracted foreign capital for railways and industries.[52] British capital
investments went from just over £20 million in 1880 to £157 million in 1890.[62] During the 1880s, investment
began to show some diversification as capital began to flow from other countries such as France, Germany and
Belgium, though British investment still accounted for two thirds of total foreign capital.[62] In 1890 Argentina
was the destination of choice for British investment in Latin America, a position it held until World War I.[62]
By then, Argentina had absorbed between 40% and 50% of all British investment outside the United
Kingdom.[62] Despite its dependence on the British market, Argentina managed a 6.7% annual rate of growth
of exports between 1870 and 1890 as a result of successful geographic and commodity diversification.[63]
The first Argentine railway, a ten-kilometer (6.2 mi) road, had been built in 1854.[64] By 1885, a total of 2,700
miles (4,300 km) of railways were open for traffic.[64] The new railways brought livestock to Buenos Aires
from the vast pampas, for slaughter and processing in the (mainly English) meat-packing plants, and then for
shipment around the world.[65] Some contemporary analysts lamented the export bias of the network
configuration, while opposing the "monopoly" of private British companies on nationalist grounds.[66] Others
have since argued that the initial layout of the system was mostly shaped by domestic interests, and that it was
not, in fact, strictly focused on the port of Buenos Aires.[66]
The scarcity of labour and abundance of land induced a high marginal
product of labour.[2] European immigrants (chiefly Italians, Spaniards,
French and Germans),[65] tempted by the high wages,[52] arrived in
droves. The government subsidized European immigration for a short
time in the late 1880s, but immigrants arrived in massive numbers
even with no subsidy.[67]
Immigrants disembarking to the
southern dock, port of Buenos Aires,
early 20th century Baring crisis to World War I
Juárez Celman's
administration saw a substantial increase in the ratio of debt to GDP
toward the end of his tenure and an increasing weakness in the fiscal
situation.[44] The Baring Brothers merchant bank had developed a
close and profitable association with Argentina, and when Celman's
government was unable to meet its payments to the House of Baring,
a financial crisis ensued.[63] Argentina defaulted and suffered bank
runs as the Baring Brothers faced failure.[68] The crisis was caused by
the lack of co-ordination between monetary policy and fiscal policy, Threshing scene, Buenos Aires,
which ultimately led to the collapse of the banking system.[69] The 1910s
financial crisis of 1890 left the government with no funds for its
immigration subsidies programme, and it was abolished in 1891.[70]
Loans to Argentina were severely curtailed, and imports had to be cut sharply.[63] Exports were less affected,
but the value of Argentine exports did not surpass the 1889 peak until 1898.[63]
Celman's successor, Carlos Pellegrini, laid the foundations for a return to stability and growth after the
restoration of convertibility in 1899.[71] He also reformed the banking sector in ways that were to restore
stability in the medium term.[71] Rapid growth rates soon returned: in the period 1903–1913, GDP increased at
an annual rate of 7.7%, and industry grew even faster, jumping by 9.6%.[72] By 1906, Argentina had cleared
the last remnants of the 1890 default and a year later the country re-entered the international bond markets.[72]
All the same, between 1853 and the 1930s, fiscal instability was a transitory phenomenon.[48] The depressions
of 1873–77 and 1890–91 played a crucial role in fostering the rise of industry: timidly in the 1870s and more
decisively in the 1890s, industry grew with each crisis in response to the need of a damaged economy to
improve its trade balance through import-substitution.[73] By 1914, about 15% the Argentine labour force was
involved in manufacturing, compared to 20% involved in commercial activities.[74] In 1913, the country's
income per head was on a par with that of France and Germany, and far ahead of Italy's or Spain's.[5] At the
end of 1913, Argentina had a gold stock of £59 million, or 3.7% of the world's monetary gold, while
representing 1.2% of the world's economic output.[75]
Interwar period
1914–1929
Argentina, like many other countries, entered into a recession following the beginning of World War I as
international flows of goods, capital and labour declined.[52] Foreign investment in Argentina came to a
complete standstill from which it never fully recovered:[76] Great Britain had become heavily indebted to the
United States during the war and would never again export capital at a comparable scale.[76] And after the
opening of the Panama canal in 1914, Argentina and the other Southern cone economies declined, as investors
turned their attention to Asia and the Caribbean.[77] The United States, which came out of the war a political
and financial superpower, especially perceived Argentina (and to a
lesser extent Brazil) as a potential rival on world markets.[76] Neither
the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange nor the private domestic banks
developed rapidly enough to fully replace British capital.[78]
As a consequence, investable funds became increasingly concentrated

in a single institution, the Banco de la Nacion Argentina (BNA),
creating a financial system vulnerable to rent-seeking.[78]
Rediscounting and non-performing loans grew steadily at the BNA A group of YPF workers in 1923
after 1914, polluting its balance sheet.[79] This corrosion of balance
sheets was a result of crony loans to the other banks and the private
sector.[80] In its rediscounting actions the BNA was not engaged in pure lender of last resort actions, following
Bagehot's principle of lending freely at a penalty rate.[80] Instead, the state bank allowed the private banks to
shed their risks, with bad paper used as security, and lent them cash at 4.5%, below the rate the BNA offered
its customers on time deposits.[80]
However, unlike its neighbors, Argentina became capable of still having relatively healthy growth rates during
the 1920s, not being as affected by the worldwide collapse on commodity prices such as Brazil and Chile.
Similarly, the gold standard was still in place at a time almost all European countries had abandoned it.
Automobile ownership in the country in 1929 was the highest in the Southern hemisphere.
For all its success, by the 1920s Argentina was not an industrialized country by the standards of Britain,
Germany or the United States.[81] A major hindrance to full industrialisation was the lack of energy sources
such as coal or hydropower.[81] Experiments with oil, discovered in 1907, had poor results.[81] Yacimientos
Petrolíferos Fiscales, the first state-owned oil company in Latin America,[82] was founded in 1922 as a public
company responsible for 51% of the oil production; the remaining 49% was in private hands.[83]
Exports of frozen beef, especially to Great Britain, proved highly profitable after the invention of refrigerated
ships in the 1870s.[84] However Britain imposed new restrictions on meat imports in the late 1920s, which
sharply reduced beef imports from Argentina. Ranchers responded by switching from pastoral to arable
production, but there was lasting damage to the Argentine economy.[85]
Great Depression
The Great Depression had a

comparatively mild effect on
Argentina,[86] the
unemployment rate never
went above 10%,[87] and the
country largely recovered by
1935.[86] However, the
Depression permanently
halted its economic
expansion.[51] Actually, A traffic jam caused by a
much like other developing demonstration, Buenos Aires, 1936.
countries, the economy was Photo by Horacio Coppola.
Unemployed men in "Villa already in a downturn
Desocupación" in Retiro, 1930. beginning in 1927, a result of
declining prices.
Argentina abandoned the gold standard in December 1929, earlier than most countries.[76] For much of the
previous period, the country had operated a currency board, in which a body known as the caja de conversión
was charged with maintaining the peso's value in gold.[88] The devaluation of the peso increased the
competitiveness of its exports and protected domestic production.[52] Argentina saw the value of its exports
drop from $1,537 million in 1929 to $561 million in 1932, but this was by no means the most severe downturn
in the region.[89]
In response to the Great Depression, successive governments pursued a strategy designed to transform
Argentina into a country self-sufficient in industry as well as agriculture.[8] The strategy of growth was based
on import substitution in which tariffs and quotas for final goods were raised.[52] The import-substitution
process had progressively been adopted since the late 19th century, but the Great Depression intensified it.[73]
The government's encouragement of industrial growth diverted investment from agriculture, and agricultural
production fell dramatically.[8]
In 1930, the armed forces forced the Radicals from power and improved economic conditions, but political
turbulence intensified.[90] In 1932, Argentina required immigrants to have a labour contract prior to arrival, or
proof of financial means of support.[91] The Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933 gave Argentina a quota of the
British market for exports of its primary products, but the discriminatory British imperial tariffs and the effects
of deflation in Britain actually led to a small decline of Argentine exports to Great Britain.[92]
Unemployment resulting from the Great Depression caused unrest.[90] The industrial growth spurt of the
1930s gradually slowed.[93] The economic conditions of the 1930s contributed to the process of internal
migration from the countryside and smaller towns to the cities, especially Buenos Aires, where there were
greater opportunities for employment.[94] The urban working classes led several unsuccessful uprisings prior
to the 1937 presidential elections.[90] Traditional export agriculture stagnated at the outbreak of World War II
and remained sluggish.[93]
Relative lag
First Peronist period: Nationalization
After the 1943 Argentine coup d'état, Juan Perón, a member of the
United Officers Group that engineered the plot,[95] became Minister
of Labor.[90] Campaigning among workers with promises of land,
higher wages, and social security, he won a decisive victory in the
1946 presidential elections.[90] Under Perón, the number of unionized
workers expanded as he helped to establish the powerful General
Confederation of Labor.[90] Perón turned Argentina into a corporatist
country in which powerful organized interest groups negotiated for
positions and resources.[90] During these years, Argentina developed
A vocational school in 1945
the largest middle class on the South American continent.[96]
Early Peronism was a period of macroeconomic shocks during which

a strategy of import substitution industrialization was put into practice.[97] Bilateral trade, exchange control and
multiple exchange rates were its most important characteristics.[97] Beginning in 1947, Perón took a leftward
shift after breaking up with the "Catholic nationalism" movement, which led to gradual state control of the
economy, reflected in the increase in state-owned property, interventionism (including control of rents and
prices) and higher levels of public investment, mainly financed by the inflationary tax. The expansive
macroeconomic policy, which aimed at the redistribution of wealth and the increase of spending to finance
populist policies, led to inflation.[97]
Wartime reserves enabled the Peronist government to fully pay off the
external debt in 1952; by the end of the year, Argentina became a net
creditor to the tune of US$5 billion. Between 1946 and 1948, the French
and British-owned railways were nationalized, and the existing networks
were expanded, with the rail network reaching 120,000 kilometers by
1954.[98] The government also established the IAPI to control the foreign
trade in export commodities.[99] Perón erected a system of almost complete
protection against imports, largely cutting off Argentina from the
international market.[100] In 1947, he announced his first Five-Year Plan
based on growth of nationalized industries.[93] Protectionism also created a
domestically oriented industry with high production costs, incapable of
competing in international markets.[93] At the same time, output of beef
and grain, the country's main export goods, stagnated.[100] The IAPI
began shortchanging growers and, when world grain prices dropped in the
late 1940s, it stifled agricultural production, exports and business
Propaganda poster of the first sentiment, in general.[101] Despite these shortcomings, protectionism and
Five-Year Plan (1946–1951) government credits did allow an exponential growth of the internal market:
promoting the nationalization of radio sales increased 600% and fridge sales grew 218%, among
public services others.[102]
During the first Five-Year Plan, various public works and programs were
executed, with the aim to modernize the country's infrastructure. For example, a total of 22 hydroelectric
power plants were erected, increasing electrical output from 45,000 kVA in 1943 to 350,000 kVA in 1952.
Between 1947 and 1949, a network of gas pipelines, which linked Comodoro Rivadavia with Buenos Aires,
was built. The gas distribution reached 15 million m³, reducing costs by a third.[103]
During this period Argentina's economy continued to grow, on average, but more slowly than the world as a
whole or than its neighbors, Brazil and Chile.[104] A suggested cause is that a multitude of frequently changed
regulations, at times extended to ridiculous specifics (such as a 1947 decree setting prices and menus for
restaurants), choked economic activity.[104] The long-term effect was to create pervasive disregard for the law,
which Argentines came to view as a hindrance to earning a living rather than an aid to enforcing legitimate
property rights.[104] The combination of industrial protectionism, redistribution of income from the agrarian to
the industrial sector, and growing state intervention in the economy sparked an inflationary process.[105] By
1950, Argentina's GDP per capita accounted fell to less than half of that of the United States.[106]
Perón's second Five-Year Plan in 1952 favored increased agricultural output over industrialization, but
industrial growth and high wages in previous years had expanded the domestic demand for agrarian goods.[93]
During the 1950s, output of beef and grain fell, and the economy suffered.[93] The policy shift toward
agricultural production created a gap in income distribution, as the majority of those who worked in agriculture
laboured on tiny plots, while the majority of the land was in large estates.[96] Argentina signed trade
agreements with Britain, the Soviet Union and Chile, slightly opening the market to international trade as
Perón's second economic plan sought to capitalize on the country's comparative advantage in agriculture.[100]
Post-Peron era and the 1960s
In the 1950s and part of the 1960s, the country had a slow rate of growth in line with most Latin American
countries, while most of the rest of the world enjoyed a golden era.[51] Stagnation prevailed during this period,
and the economy often found itself contracting, mostly the result of union strife.[51]
Wage growth beginning in
1950 pushed prices up.[105]
The inflation rate increased
faster, and soon real wages
fell.[105] High inflation
prompted a stabilization plan
that included tighter monetary
policy, a cut in public
expenditures, and increases in In 1961, a Ferranti Mercury II named
taxes and utility prices. [105] "Clementina" became one of the first
In terms of GDP per capita,
Increasing economic computers in use in Argentina.[107]
Argentina remained well above its
neighbours as late as 1965 wariness as the 1950s
progressed became one of the
leading causes for Perón's downfall in the Revolución Libertadora of
1955, as the working classes saw their quality of life diminished, thus stripping Perón from a large part of his
popular support.
Arturo Frondizi won the 1958 presidential election in a landslide.[108] In the same year he announced the
beginning of the "oil battle": a new attempt at import substitution which aimed to achieve self-sufficiency in oil
production by signing several contract with foreign companies for the mining and exploitation of oil.[109] In
1960, Argentina joined the Latin American Free Trade Association.[100]
Another coup in June 1966, the so-called Argentine Revolution, brought Juan Carlos Onganía to power.
Ongania appointed Adalbert Krieger Vasena to head the Economy Ministry.[110] His strategy implied a very
active role for the public sector in guiding the process of economic growth,[110] calling for state control over
the money supply, wages and prices, and bank credit to the private sector.[111]
Krieger's tenure witnessed increased concentration and centralization

of capital, coupled with privatisation of many important sectors of the
economy.[110] The international financial community offered strong
support for this program, and economic growth continued.[93] GDP
expanded at an average annual rate of 5.2% between 1966 and 1970,
compared to 3.2% during the 1950s.[112]
After 1966, in a radical departure from past policies, the Ministry of

Economy announced a programme to reduce rising inflation while The Rosariazo in 1969. The
promoting competition, efficiency, and foreign investment.[93] The worsening economy and the onset of
anti-inflation programme focussed on controlling nominal wages and dictatorship led to waves of protests,
salaries.[113] Inflation decreased sharply, decreasing from an annual strikes and riots.
rate of about 30% in 1965–67 to 7.6% in 1969.[112] Unemployment
remained low, but real wages fell.[112]
A gradual reversal in trade policy culminated in the military announcing import substitution as a failed
experiment, lifting protectionist barriers and opening the economy to the world market.[100] This new policy
boosted some exports, but an overvalued currency meant certain imports were so cheap that local industry
declined, and many exports were priced out of the market.[100] The Ministry of Economy put an end to the
exchange rate policy of previous governments.[105] The currency underwent a 30% devaluation.[105] In 1970,
the "peso moneda nacional" (one of the longest-lived currencies in the region) was replaced by the "peso ley"
(100 to 1).
In May 1969, discontent with Krieger's economic policies led to riots in the cities of Corrientes, Rosario and
Córdoba.[114] Krieger was removed, but the Onganía administration was unable to agree on an alternative
economic policy.[114] By 1970, the authorities were no longer capable of maintaining wage restraints, leading
to a wage-price spiral.[111] As the economy started to languish and import substitution industrialization ran out
of steam, urban migration slowed.[96] Per capita income fell, and with it the standard of living.[96] Perón's third
term of office was characterized by an expansive monetary policy, which resulted in an uncontrolled rise in the
level of inflation.[97]
Stagnation (1975 - 1990)

Between 1975 and 1990, real per capita income fell by more than
20%, wiping out almost three decades of economic development.[76]
The manufacturing industry, which had experienced a period of
uninterrupted growth until the mid-1970s, began a process of
continuous decline.[115] The extreme dependence on state support of
the many protected industries exacerbated the sharp fall of the
industrial output.[116] The degree of industrialization at the start of the
1990s was similar to its level in the 1940s.[115] From the Rodrigazo in 1975, inflation
accelerated sharply, leading to
In the early 1970s, per capita income in Argentina was twice as high several redenominations of the
as in Mexico and more than three times as high as in Chile and Brazil. Argentine currency.
By 1990, the difference in income between Argentina and the other
Latin American countries was much smaller.[76]
Starting with the Rodrigazo in 1975, inflation accelerated sharply, reaching an average of more than 300% per
year from 1975 to 1991, increasing prices 20 billion times.[76]
When the military dictatorship finance minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz assumed power, inflation was
equivalent to an annual rate of 5000%, and output had declined sharply.[117] In 1976, the era of import
substitution was ended, and the government lowered import barriers, liberalized restrictions on foreign
borrowing, and supported the peso against foreign currencies.[8]
That exposed the fact that domestic firms could not compete with foreign imports because of the overvalued
currency and long-term structural problems.[116] A financial reform was implemented that aimed both to
liberalize capital markets and to link Argentina more effectively with the world capital market.[117]
After the relatively stable years of 1976 to 1978, fiscal deficits started to climb again, and the external debt
tripled in three years.[118] The increased debt burden interrupted industrial development and upward social
mobility.[119] From 1978, the rate of exchange depreciation was fixed with a tablita, an active crawling peg
that was based on a timetable to announce a gradually-declining rate of depreciation.[117][120] The
announcements were repeated on a rolling basis to create an environment in which economic agents could
discern a government commitment to deflation.[117] Inflation gradually fell throughout 1980 to below
100%.[117]
However, in 1978 and 1979, the real exchange rate appreciated because inflation consistently outpaced the rate
of depreciation.[117] The overvaluation ultimately led to capital flight and a financial collapse.[117]
Growing government spending, large wage raises, and inefficient production created a chronic inflation that
rose through the 1980s, when it briefly exceeded an annual rate of 1000%.[8] Successive regimes tried to
control inflation by wage and price controls, cuts in public spending, and restriction of the money supply.[8]
Efforts to stem the problems came to naught when in 1982 Argentina
came into conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falkland
Islands.[118]
In August 1982, after Mexico

had announced its inability to
service its debt, Argentina
approached the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for
financial assistance, as it too
The failure of Banco de Intercambio was in serious
Regional, in March 1980, led to runs [118]
difficulties. While
on other banks.[121]
developments looked positive
for a while, an IMF staff team
visiting Buenos Aires in Timeline of Argentine exports from
August 1983 discovered a variety of problems, particularly a loss of 1975 to 1989
control over wages affecting both the budget and external
competitiveness, and the program failed.[118] With the peso quickly
losing value to inflation, the new Argentine peso argentino was introduced in 1983, with 10,000 old pesos
exchanged for each new peso.[8]
In December 1983, Raúl Alfonsín was elected President of Argentina, bringing to an end to the military
dictatorship.[118] Under Alfonsin, negotiations started on a new programme with the IMF, but they led to
nothing.[118] In March 1984, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela lent Argentina $300 million for three
months, followed by a similar amount by the United States. That provided some breathing space as it was not
before late September 1984 that an agreement was reached between the IMF and Argentina.[118]
In 1985, the Argentine austral replaced the discredited peso.[118] In 1986, Argentina failed to pay the debt for
several months, and the debt was renegotiated with the creditor banks.[122] In 1986 and 1987, the Austral Plan
faded away, as fiscal policy was undermined by large off-budget spending and a loose monetary policy, again
falling out of compliance with an IMF programme.[118] A new IMF arrangement was reached in July 1987,
only to collapse in March 1988.[118]
The next move by the authorities was to launch the Primavera Plan in August 1988, a package of
economically heterodox measures that foresaw little fiscal adjustment. The IMF refused to resume lending to
Argentina.[118] Six months after its introduction, the plan collapsed, leading to hyperinflation[118] and riots.
Free-market reforms (1990 - 1995)

The Peronist Carlos Menem was elected president in May 1989.[118] He immediately announced a new shock
programme, this time with more fiscal adjustment in view of a government deficit of 16% of GDP.[118] In
November 1989 agreement was reached on yet another standby with the IMF, but again the arrangement was
ended prematurely, followed by another bout of hyper-inflation, which reached 12,000% per year.[118]
After the collapse of public enterprises during the late 1980s, privatisation became strongly popular.[123]
Menem privatised almost everything the state owned, except for a couple of banks.[88] In terms of service
there were indisputable improvements. For example, before the telephone privatisation, to get a new line it was
not unusual to wait more than ten years, and apartments with telephone lines carried a big premium in the
market. After privatisation the wait was reduced to less than a week.[123] Productivity increased as investment
modernised farms, factories and ports.[88] However, in all cases, there were large outlays of employees.[123] In
addition, the process of privatisation was suspected of corruption in many cases.[123] Ultimately, the privatised
enterprises became private (rather than public) monopolies.[88] Their
tariffs on long-term contracts were raised in line with American
inflation, even though prices in Argentina were falling.[88]
In 1991, economy minister Domingo Cavallo set out to reverse

Argentina's decline through free-market reforms such as open
trade.[88] On 1 January 1992, a monetary reform replaced the austral
with the peso at a rate of 10,000 australs for 1 peso.[124] The
cornerstone of the reform process was a currency board, under which
Multinational retailers like Walmart
the peso was fixed by law at par to the dollar, and the money supply and Carrefour opened hypermarkets
restricted to the level of hard-currency reserves. A risky policy which in every major Argentine city in the
meant at a later stage Argentina could not devalue.[88] After a lag, early 1990s.[123]
inflation was tamed. With risk of devaluation apparently removed,
capital poured in from abroad.[88] GDP growth increased significantly
and total employment rose steadily until mid-1993.[87] During the second half of 1994, the economy slowed
down and unemployment increased from 10% to 12.2%.[87]
Although the economy was already in a mild recession at this point, conditions worsened substantially after the
devaluation of the Mexican peso during December 1994.[87] The economy shrank by 4%, and a dozen banks
collapsed.[88] With the labour force continuing to expand and employment falling sharply along with
aggregate demand, unemployment rose by over 6% in 6 months.[87] But the government responded
effectively: it tightened bank regulation and capital requirements, and encouraged foreign banks to take over
weaker local ones.[88] The economy soon recovered and, between 1996 and 1998, both output and
employment grew rapidly and unemployment declined substantially.[87] However, at the beginning of 1999,
the Brazilian currency underwent a strong depreciation. The Argentine economy contracted 4% in 1999, and
unemployment increased again.[87]
Exports grew from $12 billion in 1991 to $27 billion in 2001, but many industries could not compete abroad,
especially after Brazil's devaluation.[88] The strong, fixed exchange rate turned the trade balance to a
cumulative US$22 billion in deficits between 1992 and 1999.[125] Unable to devalue, Argentina could only
become more competitive if prices fell.[88] Deflation came from recession, falling wages and rising
unemployment.[88] Interest rates remained high, with banks lending dollars at 25%.[88]
The share of public spending in GDP increased from 27% in 1995 to 30% in 2000.[88] Some poorer provinces
had depended on state enterprises or on inefficient industries, such as sugar, which could not compete when
trade was opened.[88] To quell social unrest, provincial governors padded their payrolls.[88] The government
had embarked on a pension reform with costs reaching 3% of GDP in 2000, as it still had to pay pensioners
but no longer received contributions.[88]
Economic crisis (1998 - 2002)

Argentina fell into a deep recession in the second half of 1998, triggered and then compounded by a series of
adverse external shocks, which included low prices for agricultural commodities,[126] the appreciation of the
US dollar, to which the peso was pegged at par,[126] the 1998 Russian financial crisis, the LTCM crisis and the
devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999.[127] Argentina did not enjoy a rapid recovery, and the
sluggishness of GDP growth fuelled concerns about the sustainability of public debt.[127]
In December 1999, President Fernando de la Rúa took office, seeking assistance from the IMF shortly
thereafter.[128] In March 2000, the IMF agreed to a three-year $7.2 billion stand-by arrangement with
Argentina, conditioned on a strict fiscal adjustment and the assumption of 3.5% GDP growth in 2000 (actual
growth was 0.5%).[128] In late 2000, Argentina began to experience severely diminished access to capital
markets, as reflected in a sharp and sustained rise in spreads on Argentine
bonds over U.S. Treasuries.[127] In December, the de la Rua government
announced a $40 billion multilateral assistance package organized by
IMF.[128] The uneven implementation of fiscal adjustments and reforms, a
worsening global macroeconomic environment, and political instability led
to the complete loss of market access and intensified capital flight by the
second quarter of 2001.[127] Argentine debt, held mostly in bonds, was
massively sold short and the government found itself unable to borrow or
meet debt payments.[129]
In December 2001, a series of deposit runs began to have a severe impact

on the health of the banking system, leading the Argentine authorities to
impose a partial deposit freeze.[127] With Argentina no longer in
compliance with the conditions of the expanded IMF-supported program,
the IMF decided to suspend disbursements.[127] At the end of December,
in a climate of severe political and social unrest, the country partially
February 2002: depositors
defaulted on its international obligations; in January 2002, it formally
protest against frozen accounts
abandoned the convertibility regime.[127] for fear they might lose value,
or worse.
The ensuing economic and political crisis was arguably the worst since the
country's independence.[76] By the end of 2002, the economy had
contracted by 20% since 1998.[127] Over the course of two years, output fell by more than 15%, the Argentine
peso lost three-quarters of its value, and registered unemployment exceeded 25%.[76] Income poverty in
Argentina grew from an already high 35.4% in October 2001 to a peak of 54.3% in October 2002.[130]
Critics of the policy of economic liberalization pursued during the Menem Presidency argued that Argentina's
economic woes were caused by neoliberalism, which had been actively promoted by the U.S. government and
the IMF under the Washington Consensus.[76] Others have stressed that the main shortcoming of economic
policy-making during the 1990s was that economic reform was not pursued with enough determination.[76] A
2004 report by the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office criticised the IMF's conduct prior to Argentina's
economic collapse of 2001, saying the IMF had supported the country's fixed exchange rate for too long, and
was too lenient towards fiscal deficits.[131][132]
Return to growth (2003 - 2015)

In January 2002 Eduardo Duhalde was appointed president,
becoming Argentina's fifth president in two weeks.[134] Roberto
Lavagna, who became Minister of the Economy in April 2002, was
credited for the ensuing recovery of the economy, having stabilised
prices and the exchange rate in a moment when Argentina was at risk
of hyperinflation.[135] Since the default in 2001, growth has resumed,
with the Argentine economy growing by over 6% a year for seven of
the eight years to 2011.[136] This was achieved in part because of a
commodity price boom, and also because the government managed to
keep the value of the currency low, boosting industrial exports.[136]
In the mid-2000s, soybeans,
soybean oil and meal generated
Kirchner administration more than 20% of Argentina's export
revenue.[133]
Néstor Kirchner became president in May 2003. In the mid-2000s, export of unprocessed soybeans and of
soybean oil and meal generated more than 20% of Argentina's export revenue, triple the joint share of the
traditional exports, beef and wheat.[133] Export taxes comprised 8% to 11% of the Kirchner government's total
tax receipts, around two-thirds of which came from soy exports.[137] Taxes on imports and exports increased
government spending from 14% to 25% of GDP.[136] However, the import and export taxes have discouraged
foreign investment, while high spending has pushed inflation over 20%.[136]
An attempt by the Kirchner administration to impose price controls in 2005 failed as the items most in demand
went out of stock and the mandatory prices were in most cases not observed.[138] Various sectors of the
economy were re-nationalised, including the national postal service (2003), the San Martín Railway line
(2004), the water utility serving the Province of Buenos Aires (2006)[139] and Aerolíneas Argentinas
(2009).[140]
In December 2005, Kirchner decided to liquidate the Argentine debt to the IMF in a single payment, without
refinancing, for a total of $9.8 billion.[141] The payment was partly financed by Venezuela, who bought
Argentine bonds for US$1.6 billion.[141] As of mid-2008 Venezuela hold an estimated US$6 billion in
Argentine debt.[142] In 2006, Argentina re-entered international debt markets selling US$500 million of its
Bonar V five-year dollar denominated bonds, with a yield of 8.36%, mostly to foreign banks and Moody's
boosted Argentina's debt rating to B from B-.[143]
In early 2007 the administration began interfering with inflation estimates.[144]
Fernandez administration
In December 10, 2007, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner became

president. In 2008 the rural sector mobilized against a resolution that
would have increased the export tax rate on soybean exports from
35% to 44.1%.[146] Ultimately, the new taxation regime was
abandoned.[146] Official Argentine statistics are believed to have
significantly underreported inflation since 2007, and independent
economists publishing their own estimates of Argentine inflation have
President Cristina Fernández de
been threatened with fines and prosecution.[147]
Kirchner inaugurating a factory in
In October 2008 President Fernández de Kirchner nationalised private
Ushuaia. Firms like Blackberry, HP
pension funds for almost $30 billion, ostensibly to protect the
and Motorola have set up plants in
Tierra del Fuego, drawn by tax
pensions from falling stock prices around the world, although critics
breaks.[145]
said the government simply wanted to add the money to its
budget.[148] Private pension funds, which were first licensed in 1994,
suffered large losses during the 1998–2002 crisis and by 2008, the
state subsidized 77% of the funds' beneficiaries.[149]
The late-2000s recession hit the country in 2009 with GDP growth slowing to 0.8%.[150] High GDP growth
resumed in 2010, and the economy expanded by 8.5%.[151] In April 2010, Economy Minister Amado Boudou
prepared a debt swap package for the holders of over US$18 billion in bonds who did not participate in the
2005 Argentine debt restructuring.[152][153] In late 2010, the largest new natural gas deposits in 35 years were
discovered in Neuquén Province.[154] The unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2011 was 7.3%.[155]
In November 2011, the government laid a plan to cut utilities subsidies to higher income households.[156] By
mid-2011, credit was outpacing GDP by a wide margin, raising concerns that the economy was
overheating.[157] Argentina began a period of fiscal austerity in 2012.[158][159] In April 2012, the government
announced plans to expropriate YPF, despite the opposition of some energy experts, claiming that YPF's
Spanish partner and major holder, Repsol, had not done his duty as to provide the financial support for
research and land exploitation, as well as being a bad administrator concerned only in sending profits to Spain
and forsaking YPF's economic growth.[160]
Rising inflation and capital flight caused a rapid depletion of the country's dollar reserves, prompting the
government to severely curtail access to dollars in June 2012.[161] The imposition of capital controls, in turn,
led to the emergence of a black market for dollars, known as the "dólar blue", at higher rates than the official
exchange rate.[162]
By May 2014, private forecasts estimated annual inflation at 39.9%, one of the highest rates in the world.[163]
In July 2014, a ruling from a New York court ordered the country to pay the remaining holders of the bonds
defaulted in 2001, which by then were mostly American Vulture funds, before it paid any of its exchange
bondholders. The Argentine government refused, causing the country to default on its debt again.[164]
Present
Presidency of Mauricio Macri
On December 17, 2015 Macri released the exchange restrictions, which meant, according to the opinion of
some, that the peso undergoes a devaluation near 40%,[165] It would be the largest recorded since 2002, when
convertibility ended.[166][167][168] In January 2016 it devaluated again strongly, climbing to 44 Cents[169]
Also, the measure of some products for a contraction of consumption.[170] To top it off, unemployment will
reach double digits as a result of current economic measures and the multiplication of layoffs in the public and
private sector. Layoffs in the private sector have increased five-fold.[171]
In April 2016, monthly inflation in the country rose to 6.7%, the highest since 2002, according to the indicator
disseminated by Congress based on reports from economic consultants for the suspension of INDEC indices,
decreed in December In interannual terms, inflation reached 41.7%, one of the highest in the world.[172] By
2016, it is estimated that inflation reached 37.4%, the fiscal deficit 4.8% and GDP will fall by 1.9%.[173] In
December 2015, in fiscal year 2015, it announced the elimination of export retentions for wheat, maize and
meat, while reducing withholding taxes on soybean to 30%, with a fiscal cost of 23,604 million pesos.[174]
This led to strong increases in staple products, including oil which increased by 51%, flour 110%, chicken
90%, and noodles 78% among others, and a 50% increase in the price of meat in two weeks.[175] Because of
the new prices of cereals, which increased by about 150%, many producing pigs are in crisis. The removal of
the retentions has caused the cost of corn to increase by 150% and soybean by 180%. It is estimated that in the
province of Buenos Aires alone 40 thousand pork producers would be in crisis.[176]
One of Macri's promises during the 2015 campaign was the elimination of Income tax for workers, saying
"During my government workers will not pay tax on profits".[177] The Minister of the Economy and Public
Finances, Alfonso Prat-Gay said that the draft amendments to the income tax will be sent to Congress for
treatment on March 1, 2016.[178] As of December 2017, Macri had not fulfilled his promise, and it was not in
the government's plan to eliminate the Income tax in the future either.[179]
Among the most notorious vulnerabilities of the current administration is an extremely high inflation rate,
which, in the middle of the current economic crisis is still strangling the urban and rural, less-privileged
population: although it was seen as coming down from the astounding 40% of 2016, it was expected to be of
only 17% in 2018, from 27% in 2017 (while the government and the Central Bank said it was expecting a
17% inflation rate for the whole year of 2017).[180] Other vulnerabilities includes the unemployment rate close
to 9% (and expected to be in two digits in the next two years), as well as the sharp rise in the current-account
deficit, which is likely to be around 3% to 4% of GDP in 2017-2018 thanks to an over-valued currency.[180]
Forecasts from the IMF show GDP growth backsliding a little in 2018, decelerating to 2.5% from 2.75% this
year, and clearly any halting of the cyclical upswing in the global economy would set the country back.[180]
Argentine paradox
The Nobel prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets is said to have
remarked that there were four types of countries: the developed, the
underdeveloped, Japan and Argentina.[181]
According to Di Tella and Zymelman (1967), the main difference

between Argentina and other settler societies such as Australia and
Canada was its failure to seek adequate alternatives to compensate for
the end of geographical expansion with the definitive closing of the
frontier.[182] Solberg (1985) noted the differences between the land Argentina's GDP per capita (in 1990
distribution in Canada, which led to a rising number of small farmers, international Geary–Khamis dollars)
and the small number of landowners each with large areas of land in as a percentage of the US's, 1900–
Argentina.[182] 2008
Duncan and Fogarty (1984) argued that the key difference lies in the
contrast between the stable, flexible government of Australia and the poor governance of Argentina.[182]
According to Platt and Di Tella (1985) the political tradition and immigration from different regions were the
key factors, while Díaz Alejandro (1985) suggested that a restrictive immigration policy, similar to Australia's,
would have increased productivity encouraged by the relative scarcity of labour.[182]
More recently, Taylor (1992) pointed that the relatively high dependency ratio and the slow demographic
transition in Argentina led to a reliance on foreign capital to offset the resulting low savings rate.[182] From the
1930s onwards, the accumulation of capital was hampered by the relatively high prices of (mostly imported)
capital goods, which was caused by the industrial policy of import substitution, in contrast with the export-led
growth favoured by Canada.[182] Other distorting factors behind the high relative prices of capital goods
include the multiple exchange rates, the black market for foreign currencies, the depreciation of the national
currency and high customs tariffs.[182] This resulted in a lower capital intensity, which led to lower rates of
labour productivity.[182]
The ultimate cause of Argentina's historical backwardness appears to be its institutional framework.[182]
See also
British investment in Argentina
Notes
1. della Paolera, Gerardo; Taylor, Alan M. (October 1997). "Finance and Development in an
Emerging Market: Argentina and the Interwar Period" (https://doi.org/10.3386/w6236). NBER
Working Paper No. 6236: 1. doi:10.3386/w6236 (https://doi.org/10.3386%2Fw6236).
2. Galiani & Gerchunoff 2002, p. 4.
3. Yair Mundlak; Domingo Cavallo; Roberto Domenech (1989). Agriculture and economic growth
in Argentina, 1913–84 (https://books.google.com/books?id=8uv7WrI4cE4C&pg=PA12).
International Food Policy Research Institute. p. 12. ISBN 9780896290785.
4. "Argentina's Economic Crisis: An "Absence of Capitalism" " (https://web.archive.org/web/20120
119174030/http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/04/argentinas-economic-crisis-an-ab
sence-of-capitalism). Heritage.org. April 19, 2001. Archived from the original (http://www.heritag
e.org/research/reports/2001/04/argentinas-economic-crisis-an-absence-of-capitalism) on
January 19, 2012.
5. "Becoming a serious country" (http://www.economist.com/node/2704457). The Economist.
June 3, 2004.
6. Della Paolera & Taylor 2003, p. 87.
7. GDP per capita graph 1960-2015 (https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8
f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&idim=country:NZL:AUS:USA&hl=pt&dl=pt#!ctype=l&strail=false
&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=cou
ntry:ARG:AUT:JPN:ESP:ITA&ifdim=region&tstart=-301611600000&tend=1433991600000) by
Google Public Data Explorer, sources from World Bank
8. "Argentina" (https://archive.today/20111214235850/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topi
c/33657/Argentina/33120?view=section). Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original
(http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/33657/Argentina/33120?view=section) on
December 14, 2011.
9. Alexandra Stevenson; Irene Caselli (July 31, 2014). "Argentina Is in Default, and Also Maybe in
Denial" (https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/argentina-is-in-default-and-also-maybe-in-de
nial/). NYTimes.com. Retrieved August 1, 2014.
10. Politi, Daniel (May 22, 2020). "Argentina Tries to Escape Default as It Misses Bond Payment"
(https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/world/americas/argentina-default.html). The New York
Times. ISSN 0362-4331 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0362-4331). Retrieved May 24, 2020.
11. Ferrer 1967, p. 22.
12. Ferrer 1967, p. 23.
13. Baten, Jörg (2016). A History of the Global Economy. From 1500 to the Present. Cambridge
University Press. p. 163. ISBN 9781107507180.
14. Ferrer 1967, p. 32.
15. Galasso 2011, p. 117.
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mas-alta-desde-2002-rozo-el) Article of May 25, 2016 on the website Om Radio (Buenos Aires)
- Opens the audio of the radio without consulting the user (in Spanish)
73. Franco, Liliana (2016): Bein estimates for a 2016 inflation of 37.4 (http://www.ambito.com/8404
81-bein-estima-para-2016-inflacion-del-374-deficit-del-48-y-caida-del-19-en-pbi) Ambito
Financiero (in Spanish)
74. Retentions: the fiscal cost of the removal provided by Macri, by Darío Gannio (http://www.eldest
apeweb.com/retenciones-el-costo-fiscal-la-quita-dispuesta-macri-n13174) El Destape Website
(in Spanish)
75. [1] (http://www.elsol.com.ar/nota/253094/el-pais/la-carne-subio-50-de-devaluacion-del-peso.ht
ml) El Sol Website (in Spanish)
76. http://www.0223.com.ar/note/2016-4-8-more-of-40-thousand-pig-producers-are-in-crisis-for-the-
increase-of-foods
77. "Macri Video" (http://mauriciomacri.com.ar/spots/trabajadores-sin-impuesto-a-las-ganancias).
Mauricio Macri Official Site. October 2015. Retrieved December 31, 2015.
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79. Macri: “Los trabajadores no van a pagar impuesto a las Ganancias”: INCUMPLIDA (Macri -
fulfilled and unfulfilled promises) (http://chequeado.com/ultimas-noticias/macri-los-trabajadores
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80. Macri’s election success is no cure-all for Argentina’s structural issues (https://www.euromoney.
com/article/b15mnhpb1p12hw/macris-election-success-is-no-cure-all-for-argentinas-structural-i
ssues) November 17, 2017, Euromoney
81. Saiegh, Sebastian M. (June 1996). "The Rise of Argentina's Economic Prosperity: An
Institutional Analysis" (https://web.archive.org/web/20140223164842/https://files.nyu.edu/sms2
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ms267/public/tesis.pdf) (PDF) on February 23, 2014. Retrieved February 18, 2014.
References
Della Paolera, Gerardo; Taylor, Alan M. Rock, David (1987), Argentina, 1516–1987:
(2003), A new economic history of Argentina from Spanish colonization to Alfonsín (http
(https://books.google.com/books?id=1Pxjco s://books.google.com/books?id=FHTczGi4s
YAohcC), Cambridge University Press, v4C), University of California Press,
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Bethell, Leslie (1991), The Cambridge Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (2003), The
History of Latin America (https://books.googl Economic History of Latin America since
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Di Tella, Guido. The political economy of Pineda, Yovanna. Industrial Development in
Argentina, 1946-83 (U of Pittsburgh Press, a Frontier Economy: The Industrialization of
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the economic history of the Argentine Prados de la Escosura, Leandro; Sanz-
Republic (Yale University Press, 1970) Villarroya, Isabel (December 2004),
Ferrer, Aldo (1967), The Argentine economy Institutional Instability And Growth In
(https://books.google.com/books?id=EED17 Argentina: A Long-Run View (https://web.arc
gtJ4cMC), University of California Press hive.org/web/20120626022951/http://docubi
Lovering, Rick; Southgate, Douglas (2007), b.uc3m.es/WORKINGPAPERS/WH/wh0467
An Interpretation of Argentine Economic and 05.pdf) (PDF), IDEAS, archived from the
original (http://docubib.uc3m.es/WORKINGP
Political History: Dutch Disease on the
APERS/WH/wh046705.pdf) (PDF) on June
Pampas (Thesis), The Ohio State University,
26, 2012
hdl:1811/28514 (https://hdl.handle.net/181
1%2F28514) Sánchez-Alonso, Blanca (November 2010),
Making sense of immigration policy:
Galiani, Sebastián; Gerchunoff, Pablo
Argentina, 1870–1930 (https://web.archive.o
(November 2002), A study of the evolution
the Argentine labor market (https://www.web rg/web/20120316212358/http://e-archivo.uc
citation.org/63mE4l8K6?url=http://cdi.meco 3m.es/bitstream/10016/9737/1/wp_10_14.p
n.gov.ar/biblio/docelec/udesa/WP56.pdf) df) (PDF), IDEAS: Economics and Finance
(PDF), archived from the original (http://cdi. Research, archived from the original (http://e
mecon.gov.ar/biblio/docelec/udesa/WP56.p -archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/9737/1/w
df) (PDF) on December 8, 2011 p_10_14.pdf) (PDF) on March 16, 2012
Paolera, Gerardo Della, and Alan M. Taylor. Sanchez-Alonso, Blanca. "Making sense of
A New Economic History of Argentina immigration policy: Argentina, 1870-1930."
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) Economic History Review (2013) 66#2 601-
627.
Rocchi, Fernando (2006), Chimneys in the
desert: industrialization in Argentina during Smith, Peter H. Politics and beef in
Argentina. Patterns of conflict and change.
the export boom years, 1870–1930 (https://b
(1969).
ooks.google.com/books?id=HVhRKS1uAjY
C), Stanford University Press, Smith, William C. (1991), Authoritarianism
ISBN 9780804767453 and the Crisis of the Argentine Political
Economy (https://books.google.com/books?i
Richardson, Neal P. (December 19, 2008),
d=fFxjhApECCcC), Stanford University
"Export-Oriented Populism: Commodities
Press, ISBN 9780804719612
and Coalitions in Argentina" (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20120426082608/http://npr.ber
keley.edu/Richardson_eop.pdf) (PDF),
Studies in Comparative International In Spanish
Development (SCID), 2009, Volume 44, Abad de Santillán, Diego (1965), Historia
Number 3, archived from the original (http://n Argentina [History of Argentina] (in
pr.berkeley.edu/Richardson_eop.pdf) (PDF) Spanish), Argentina: TEA (Tipográfica
on April 26, 2012 Editora Argentina)
Della Paolera, Gerardo; Taylor, Alan M. Galasso, Norberto (2011), Historia de la
(November 2002), Gaucho Banking Redux Argentina, Tomo I&II, Buenos Aires:
(https://web.archive.org/web/201204061043 Colihue, ISBN 978-950-563-478-1
38/http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/docum Pablo Gerchunoff (1989), Peronist
ents/seminaire8-01-03.pdf) (PDF), archived Economic Policies, 1946-1955, di Tella y
from the original (http://www.ofce.sciences-p Dornbusch
o.fr/pdf/documents/seminaire8-01-03.pdf)
(PDF) on April 6, 2012
Further reading
Amaral, Samuel, The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The Estancias of Buenos Aires, 1785-
1870. New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Barbero, Inés and Fernando Rocchi, A New Economic History of Argentina
Díaz Alejandro, Carlos Federico (1970). Essays on the economic history of the Argentine
Republic. Yale University Press.
De la Balze, Felipe A. M. (1995). Remaking the Argentine economy. Council on Foreign
Relations.
Ford, A.G. The Gold Standard, 1880-1914: Britain and Argentina (1962) online (https://www.qu
estia.com/library/619773/the-gold-standard-1880-1914-britain-and-argentina)
Francis, Joseph. 2013. "The Terms of Trade and the Rise of Argentina in the Long Nineteenth
Century." PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. (http://www.joefranci
s.info/pdfs/Francis_PhD_diss.pdf)
Katz, Jorge and Bernardo Kosacoff, "Import-Substituting Industrialization in Argentina, 1940-
1980," in An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Latin America vol. 3.
Lewis, Colin M. British Railways in Argentina, 1857-1914: A Case of Foreign Investment.
London: Athlone 1983.
Lewis, Daniel. "Internal and External Convergence: The Collapse of Argentine Grain Farming,"
in Latin America in the 1940s, David Rock, ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press 1994, pp. 209–223.
Lewis, Paul H. The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press 1990.
Lloyd, A. L. "Meat from Argentina The History of a National Industry," History Today (1951) 1#4
pp. 30–38.
Rocchi, Fernando. Chimneys in the Desert: The Industrialization of Argentina in the Export
Boom Years,1870-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2006.
Solberg, Carl E. (1987). The Prairies and the Pampas: Agrarian Policy in Canada and
Argentina, 1880–1930 (https://www.questia.com/read/24519196/the-prairies-and-the-pampas-a
grarian-policy-in-canada). Stanford Univ Pr.
External links
"The Crisis that Was Not Prevented: Lessons for Argentina, the IMF, and Globalisation" (https://
web.archive.org/web/20111208235151/http://www.fondad.org/product_books/pdf_download/9/
Fondad-Argentina-BookComplete.pdf) (PDF). Fondad. Archived from the original (http://www.fo
ndad.org/product_books/pdf_download/9/Fondad-Argentina-BookComplete.pdf) (PDF) on
December 8, 2011.
Ana I. Eiras And Brett D. Schaefer. "Argentina's Economic Crisis: An "Absence of Capitalism" "
(https://web.archive.org/web/20120426035658/http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2001/pdf/b
g1432.pdf) (PDF). Archived from the original (http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2001/pdf/bg1
432.pdf) (PDF) on April 26, 2012.
Miguel Braun. "The Political Economy of Debt in Argentina, or Why History Repeats Itself" (http
s://web.archive.org/web/20150904073548/http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/
Resources/20061012_03.pdf) (PDF). Archived from the original (http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/20061012_03.pdf) (PDF) on September 4, 2015.
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Economic history of Argentina

Field wagons ("carretas") were introduced

The first Argentine historians, such as Bartolomé Mitre, attributed the

After Argentina became independent in 1810, an era in which

Between 1812 and 1816 divisions developed between a Unitarist

The report of the American John Murray Forbes to John Quincy

He mentioned that the government in Buenos Aires was so eager to

The customs law set trade barriers to products produced in the

In 1870, during Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's presidency, total debt

As a consequence, investable funds became increasingly concentrated

The Great Depression had a

First Peronist period: Nationalization

Early Peronism was a period of macroeconomic shocks during which

Post-Peron era and the 1960s

Krieger's tenure witnessed increased concentration and centralization

After 1966, in a radical departure from past policies, the Ministry of

Stagnation (1975 - 1990)

In August 1982, after Mexico

Free-market reforms (1990 - 1995)

In 1991, economy minister Domingo Cavallo set out to reverse

Economic crisis (1998 - 2002)

In December 2001, a series of deposit runs began to have a severe impact

Return to growth (2003 - 2015)

In early 2007 the administration began interfering with inflation estimates.[144]

In December 10, 2007, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner became

Presidency of Mauricio Macri

According to Di Tella and Zymelman (1967), the main difference

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