[A.M. NO.
RTJ-05-1966 : March 21, 2006] information before the expiration of the 15-day period within which the
IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE ANACLETO L.
CAMINADE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, C.J.:
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. In all good faith, they must know the laws
and apply them properly. Judicial competence requires no less. Where the
legal principle involved is sufficiently basic and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a verified Complaint1 filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Imelda S. Enriquez. In that
case, Judge Anacleto Caminade was charged with gross misconduct,
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and gross ignorance of the law.
The material averments of the Complaint and respondent's Comment are
summarized by the OCA as follows:
"x x x [Complainant] Imelda S. Enriquez charges [Respondent] Judge
Anacleto Caminade with Gross Misconduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment and Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure relative [to]
Criminal Case No. CBU-066703, entitled 'People of the Philippines v.
Sherwin Que @ Bungol, Anthony John Apura,' for Murder. As mother of the
victim in the criminal case, [complainant] alleges that respondent issued
an order dated 31 March 2004, the decretal portion of which reads:
'WHEREFORE, the Court hereby denies the motion for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against the accused-movants; sets aside the assailed
Resolution of the City Prosecutor on the basis of which the latest amended
information was filed; quashes the latest amended information; and
remands this case to the City Prosecutor for completion of the preliminary
investigation.'
"Respondent so ruled because there was no preliminary investigation
completed on accused Alvin Taggart Pimentel Alvez and Alvin John Apura
[as] they were denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration
or a Petition for Review before the information was filed in court.
"Complainant claims that respondent was grossly mistaken when he ruled,
in effect, that the investigating prosecutor cannot file a criminal
accused are allowed by the Revised Rules of Court to move for
reconsideration or Petition for Review of an adverse 'Resolution.'
Respondent cited Sales v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. [No.] 143802, 16
November 2001) that 'the filing of motion for reconsideration is an integral
part of the preliminary investigation proper' and that an [i]nformation 'filed
without first affording x x x accused his right to file motion for
reconsideration' is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a
preliminary investigation.
"Complainant contends that Sales is not applicable to the criminal case
because of significant factual and procedural distinctions between the two
cases: (1) the Sales case proceeded under the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, while subject criminal case was conducted under the Rules of
Court; (2) there was no completed preliminary investigation in the Sales
case but there was a completed full-blown panel preliminary investigation
on the accused in the subject criminal case; and (3) it is only under the
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman that the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed and terminated upon the lapse of the period to file a
motion for reconsideration from the resolution of the Ombudsman while
there is nothing in the Rules of Court which states that a person
investigated has the right to file a motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation before the [i]nformation can be filed in court.
"In his COMMENT, respondent explains that the panel of prosecutors
conducting preliminary investigation filed in court their amended
information without furnishing accused Apura and Alvez their copy of the
resolution. He stresses that his challenged order is in accordance with law
and jurisprudence, citing among others, the case of Sales. He claims his
order was an honest response to the pending matters before him and [he]
merely granted reliefs consistent with those granted by the Supreme Court
in the Sales case.
"[Respondent judge asserts that] while the facts of Sales and the criminal
case are different, the legal principle involved in the former case 'that a
preliminary investigation is part of due process and a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of the Prosecutor finding probably cause
for the filing of information is part of a preliminary investigation and
respondent who is not given the opportunity to file the same is in effect
deprived of his right without due process of law' cannot be overlooked.
Respondent points out that complainant, who was represented by two
attorneys, should have resorted to judicial recourse such as an appeal of
the order in question via a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals."2
Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Report,3 the OCA finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. Thus, it recommends that respondent be penalized with the maximum
imposable fine of P40,000, considering that he was earlier penalized with
six months' suspension for another serious though unrelated offense.
According to the OCA, the issue raised by complainant does not pertain to
an error of judgment or to one pertaining to the exercise of sound judicial
discretion by respondent. Rather, the issue is whether respondent
complied with procedural rules so elementary that to digress from them
amounts to either ignorance or negligence. Since the procedure for the
institution of criminal actions is basic and clearly expressed in the Rules of
Court, respondent's Order is deemed to have been attended by gross
ignorance of the law.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA but reduces the penalty.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
This Court has consistently held that lack of conversance with legal
principles sufficiently basic and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.4 As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law,
a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.5
A perusal of the Order issued by respondent on March 31, 2004, shows
that he remanded Criminal Case No. CBU-066703 to the city prosecutor for
the completion of the preliminary investigation based on this Court's ruling
in Sales v. Sandiganbayan.6 Clearly, respondent failed to read the case in
its entirety, or he grossly misapprehended the doctrine it had laid down.
A careful study of Sales reveals that it applies specifically to preliminary
investigations conducted before the Ombudsman. That case was decided in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, granting the
accused fifteen days to move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of
an adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation.7 Obviously, the
criminal case filed before respondent's court was not covered by the Rules
of Procedure of the Ombudsman but by the Rules of Court, which had no
corresponding provision. Thus, Sales was not in point.
Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a
commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members of the bar.
Comprehending the Court's decisions is a different matter, however, for it
is in this area where one's competence may be tested and proven.8
As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the termination of a preliminary
investigation upon the filing of an information in court is a well-established
procedural rule under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Respondent clearly
strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly misapplied the ruling
of the Court in Sales. Since a preliminary investigation in Criminal Case
No. CBU-066703 was held, that stage of the legal process was already
completed.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to be embodiments of judicial competence and diligence.9 Those
who accept this exalted position owe the public and this Court the ability to
be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence
at all times.10 Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. This exalted
position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in
the law. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory knowledge of statutes
and procedural rules.11
Respondent judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his duties
to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing
jurisprudence.12 Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and
research from beginning to end.13
Exacting as these standards may be, judges are expected to be
personifications of justice and the rule of law and, as such, to have more
than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules.14 Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and
maintenance of professional competence.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors "men forgive and
time forgets."15 For when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the competence of our
courts.16 Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow
basic legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of
which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.17
Respondent contends that instead of filing the instant Administrative
Complaint, complainant should have resorted to judicial recourse, like an
appeal of the Order in question. It should be reiterated that the court's
power of appellate review is distinct from an administrative matter, which
involves the exercise of the court's power to discipline judges. An
administrative matter is undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare; that is, to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the
government.18
In sum, we reiterate our ruling in Abbariao v. Beltran,19 as follows:
"We emphasize that ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. For
this reason, we always remind the members of the bench of their duty to
be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence. Judges are
called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands.
Their inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render
them administratively liable. 'Where the law involved - - as in this case - -
is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.' "20

As to the charges of grave misconduct and knowingly rendering an unjust

judgment, we agree with the findings of the OCA that there is no allegation
or evidence on record to support these claims.

Regarding the penalty to be imposed on respondent, although gross

ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge, it has been
sanctioned with a wide range of penalties.21 The Court has to balance the
recommended penalty. The OCA suggests the maximum fine of P40,000,
because respondent was penalized earlier with six months' suspension for
another serious though unrelated offense. Without minimizing the
seriousness of the previous misconduct, the Court notes that the acts
presently complained of are completely unrelated to and dissimilar from
those in the prior case. The acts under consideration cannot be considered
a repetition of the same or similar acts for which respondent was
previously suspended. Neither is there any showing that he acted with
malice or bad faith in issuing his Order in the present case. Under the
present circumstances, this Court deems a fine of P20,000 to be
appropriate.

Unrelated or not, both cases reflect poorly on respondent as a public

officer. The Constitution expects judges to be embodiments of
competence, integrity, probity and independence.22 Indeed, magistrates
should personify four Ins; namely, integrity, independence, industry and
intelligence.23

WHEREFORE, Judge Anacleto L. Caminade is found guilty of gross

ignorance of the law, for which he is FINED in the amount of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043             September 5, 2007
JUAN DE LA CRUZ (CONCERNED CITIZEN OF LEGAZPI CITY), complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RUBEN B. CARRETAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 9, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by "Juan de la Cruz," a
concerned citizen of Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas,
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9. The
letter-complaint1 read:
The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court
and The Honorable Court Administrator
Supreme Court, Manila
Sir and Madam,
Kami po ay sumulat sa inyo dahil po sa reklamo sa masamang ugali at asal
ni Judge Ruben Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City.
Siya po ay isang mayabang na Judge at mahilig mang insulto sa
pamamagitan ng side comments sa mga testigo, abogado at fiscal, parang
siya na lang ang may alam sa batas. Bilang Judge siya na po ang nagdirect,
at cross-examine sa mga testigo.
Dahil sa kanyang ginagawa napapahiya ang mga testigo, abogado at fiscal
sa harap ng publiko. Nawawala din po ang respeto ng publiko sa justice
system.
Kami po ay umaasa at nanalangin sa madaliang aksyon ng inyong opisina
para malutas ang problemang ito.
Salamat at mabuhay po kayong lahat.
Ang gumagalang,
(Sgd. Juan de la Cruz)
Concern[ed] citizen of Legazpi [City]
In his comment,2 respondent judge surmised that the complaint was initiated by a
lawyer whose petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was not granted. He denied
the accusation and claimed that he had not insulted anyone. He then narrated that, in
his first few months in office, he experienced the following exasperating and
somewhat amusing incidents: a lawyer insisting on further examining a witness he
had already subjected to re-cross examination; a prosecutor proceeding with the
presentation of evidence when the accused had not yet been arraigned; a lawyer
appearing for an absent counsel de parte and manifesting that he was appearing "in
corroboration" with the latter; lawyers appearing without observing the proper dress
code; a lawyer offering the testimony of his witness "to collaborate" the testimony of
another witness; a lawyer manifesting that he was ready for trial but turning out to be
unprepared with his documentary evidence, prompting the court to call a recess; a
case for unjust vexation committed against a minor being raffled to his sala when the
records showed that the victim was waylaid, boxed and dragged to a forested area
where the accused touched her private part and mashed her breasts; a case being
filed for kidnapping and serious illegal detention only despite the fact that the girl was
raped while in captivity. Respondent judge stated that he never encountered these
mistakes "in all his years of law practice in Manila." Thus, he was shocked because
he thought that these things "happened only in anecdotes."
Respondent judge observed that due to their familiarity with each other, lawyers
appearing in his sala hardly objected even to obviously objectionable questions. In
such instances, he called the attention of counsels because, to his mind, they were
making a "moro-moro"3 out of the proceedings.
Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word sometimes,
they were made out of exasperation and with the intention merely to right the wrong
committed in his presence, not to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he apologized to those
who may have been offended by his remarks.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Dañas, executive judge of the RTC
of Legazpi City, conducted a discreet investigation.4 He interviewed lawyers who
appeared in the sala of respondent judge. He requested them to submit their
respective written comments on the decorum of respondent judge when holding trial.
Among these comments were the following:
1. Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr.
Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and
abrasive remarks. He should also limit himself to asking clarificatory
questions.5
2. Atty. Expedito P. Nebres
If not in open court respondent judge is kind, courteous and
respectful. However, in open court he is arrogant and boastful. He
has a bad habit in making embarrassing or insulting remarks when
presiding over cases. Most of the time, he was the one conducting
direct and cross-examination of witnesses. He used to scold,
harass and embarrass witnesses, litigants, lawyers, prosecutors
and PAO6 lawyers for just a slight mistake in procedure.7
 3. Atty. Alexis C. Albao
In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was
insulted and subjected to sarcastic remarks by respondent judge,
not once but for several occasions. This traumatized him and made
him avoid reading the transcript of stenographic notes of the said
hearing until now. In one occasion, respondent judge proceeded to
cut short the proceedings. When he manifested that he would
cross-examine the defendant, respondent judge stood from his seat
and in a sarcastic manner looked backward manifesting that he was
not interested or not listening to the cross-examination. Thus, he
was discouraged from proceeding with his cross-examination. Most
of the time, respondent judge would unduly intervene in the
presentation of evidence and asked more questions than counsel.
Respondent judge showed apathy to those who were subjected to
his insults. He insisted that others submit to his way of doing things.
He showed inflexibility to minor mistakes.8
4. Atty. Ricardo V. de Jesus
While he was in the process of conducting direct examination,
respondent judge instructed him to ask questions which respondent
judge thought to be material. When he was through with his direct
examination, respondent judge asked him in open court how long
he had been in private practice. He replied that he had been
practicing for only a period of one and a half (1½) years.
Respondent judge then told him to prepare supposed direct
questions and expected answers. He felt embarrassed.9
On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a
meeting to discuss the matter of assigning a public prosecutor to the sala of
respondent judge. During the meeting, the prosecutors raised their concern about the
behavior of respondent judge. Provincial prosecutor Benigno L. Tolosa furnished
Judge Dañas with a copy of the minutes of the meeting.10 The relevant portions of the
minutes11 were:
II. DISCUSSION
 The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of
the meeting. He said that the prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9,
Prosecutor Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be transferring to the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from
the group on how to go about the matter of assigning a prosecutor
in Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court
assignment and considering further that the Presiding Judge of said
Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal problem.
 Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem
with the Presiding Judge, the Provincial Prosecutor requested those
prosecutors [present] to share their experiences in the court with
the Presiding Judge.
 Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a
sudden burst of temper and wild moods, insulting and humiliating
lawyers in front of their clients even in the presence of other people.
 Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile
temper and is fond of insulting and humiliating witnesses and also
lawyers. She also said that during arraignment or trial of cases, he
would even call her attention and would insult the prosecutor who
made the Information and Resolution of the case and even the
Chief who approved the same.
 Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one
hearing [where] the Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private
lawyers who [were] much older than him. She said that being
assigned in Branch 9 will not be good for the health of any
prosecutor.
III. RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
 Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge is
temperamental, he should be given a fiscal who is not
temperamental.
 It was resolved by the group that no prosecutor will be assigned at
RTC Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court
assignment.
 It was also agreed that the Presiding Judge can request from the
Department of Justice a prosecutor who would attend to the cases
in his sala.12
Judge Dañas also received a letter13 from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of
Legazpi City. City prosecutor Rubio stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of
respondent judge did not want to comment on the conduct of respondent judge. He
suggested that members of an audit team from this Court be made to observe the
proceedings in Branch 9 to "see and feel the tension[-]charged atmosphere in the
sala once the trial started."14
To his report, Judge Dañas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he
interviewed, the letter of provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the
meeting of the public prosecutors in Albay and the letter of city prosecutor Rubio.15 He
concluded that the charges against respondent judge were true. However, he
refrained from recommending any definite action against him and left the matter to the
sound discretion of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).16
In its report,17 the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Dañas and made the following
recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the
Honorable Court is our recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben B.
Carretas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City be ADVISED to
 observe proper judicial decorum and to conscientiously abide by the
mandates of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics in the exercise of his official functions.18
We disagree. Respondent judge deserves more than mere "advice."
Respondent judge should be reminded of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 and Section 1,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:19
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.
A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law,
dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. Besides having the
requisite learning in the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint.20 In this connection, he should be considerate,
courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court.21 A judge who is
inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in
his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in
the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.22 (emphasis
supplied)
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer,23 litigant or witness. The act
betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint.24 Thus, a judge must at all times be
temperate in his language.25 He must choose his words, written or spoken, with
utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his
discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.26
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of
justice.27 A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to
run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words, snide remarks or sarcastic
comments. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence
in the judiciary.
Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not
only in the eyes of the anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers who practice
in his sala. He revealed a hint of arrogance in his comment when he professed
exasperation over minor procedural mistakes28 or even negligible lapses (such as the
confusion in the use of "collaborate" and "corroborate"). He also displayed a
condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when he implied that they
were "inferior" to lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure that his conduct
is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He must
never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer.29 A
sense of shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice
is expected of them.30 They should co-exist in a spirit of cooperation and mutual
respect, not animosity and derision. Respondent judge antagonized the lawyers
(private practitioners, public attorneys and public prosecutors alike) appearing in his
sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks. Consequently, he impaired
the administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He asked more
questions than counsel and conducted direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In
so doing, he contravened Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics:31
RULE 3.06 – While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or
clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence
during the trial, it should be borne in mind that undue interference may
prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
—∞——∞——∞—
14. Interference in conduct of trial
 While a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote
expedition and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some
obscurity, nevertheless, he should bear in mind that his undue interference,
impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe
attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or
terrified by the unusual circumstances of trial, may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto.
with lawyers, respondent judge alienated them and effectively disregarded their
significant role in the administration of justice.
Accordingly, respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is hereby found GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2,
Section 1, Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is FINED in the amount of P7,500.

Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but
the judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure
the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition.
In addressing counsel, litigants or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial
tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify
his mind as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to an
unnecessary display of learning or a premature judgment.
Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is also hereby found GUILTY of violating
Canons 1, 8 and 11 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
which he is FINED in the amount of P7,500.
Judge Carretas is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent judge.

A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and SO ORDERED.
prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the
course of the testimony of the witness or thereafter.32 Questions designed to clarify Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.33 But the judge
should limit himself to asking clarificatory questions and the power should be
sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that the court should stay out of it as much
as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial.34 A judge
must always maintain cold neutrality and impartiality for he is a magistrate, not an
advocate.35

In fine, the over-all conduct of respondent judge has been unbecoming of a

magistrate. It is classified as a light charge36 for which a fine of not less than P1,000
but not exceeding P10,000 may be imposed.37

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,38 this administrative case against respondent judge

shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the
bar.

Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 139 and 1140 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the
judicial office tends to diminish the people’s respect for the law and legal processes.
He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial
officers.

Respondent judge also transgressed Canon 841 and Rule 8.0142 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he humiliated, insulted or embarrassed lawyers
appearing in his sala. Instead of establishing a cordial and collaborative atmosphere
 [A. M. No. MTJ-04-1537 - March 25, 2004]
ARTEMIO SABATIN, Complainant, v. JUDGE EFREN B.
MALLARE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, NATIVIDAD-
LLANERA, NUEVA ECIJA, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Artemio Sabatin, in an
Affidavit-Complaint1 dated January 15, 2001, charged Judge Efren
B. Mallare, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Natividad-Llanera, Nueva
Ecija, with gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, relative to Criminal Case No. 2751-
N entitled People of the Philippines v. Artemio Sabatin for illegal
possession of firearms.
The complainant, the accused in the said criminal case, alleged
that pursuant to Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000 issued by the
respondent judge, elements of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
of General Natividad, Nueva Ecija under the command of P/Sr.
Insp. Franklin Versoza Simon, entered his home and conducted a
search thereon without his consent. The complainant averred that
the search warrant in question was actually issued against his
brother Pedrito Sabatin. When the complainant pointed this out to
the police, P/Sr. Insp. Simon merely instructed his men to erase
the name "Pedrito" and replace it with "Artemio," making it appear
that the warrant was, indeed, issued in the complainants name.
The complainant further alleged that he was arrested and brought
by the policemen to their station for investigation, but was later
released. He then received a subpoena after a few days, and it was
only then that he learned that a criminal complaint had been filed
against him for illegal possession of firearms. The complainant, in
turn, filed a complaint for illegal search, unlawful arrest, arbitrary
detention and falsification of public document against P/Sr. Insp.
Simon and his men before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan City and the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG).
On August 5, 2000, the complainant filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant No. 017-N-2000 before the respondent judges sala. After
several postponements, the preliminary investigation was again set
for November 8, 2001. The complainant narrated the events as
follows:
17. Na bago dumating and araw na iyon ay nakatanggap ako ng
MOTION TO DISMISS, petsang Oktubre 12, 2000, para sa mga
demanda ko [sic] ilalim ng I.S. No. H-3275-78 sa Cabanatuan City,
galing sa inireklamo kong mga pulis, at kabilang sa mga UNANG
PAGKAKATAON ay nahawakan ko ang kopya ng "SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000", na maliwanag na nanggaling
pala sa Branch 30 ng Regional Trial Court ng Cabanautan
City, pero ang nakapirmang hukom ay si Judge EFREN B.
MALLARE, bilang Acting Presiding Judge, gaya nang makikita sa
kopya ng nasabing SEARCH WARRANT", na minarkahang ANNEX
"K";chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
18. Sa pagka-diskubre naming ang Branch 30 ng Regional Trial
Court ng Cabanatuan City ang nag-"issue" ng pinalsipikang
SEARCH WARRANT, ako, sa pamamagitan ng aking abogada, ay
duon nag-"file" ng MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO.
017-N-2000, kasabay ng kinakailangang i-"file" ko sa 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court ng Gen. Natividad-Llanera, Nueva
Ecija, ng aking OMNIBUS MOTION TO WITHDRAW MOTION TO
QUASH SEARCH WARRANT NO. 017-N-2000 AND TO TRANSFER
ITS RECORDS TO BRANCH 30, RTC, CABANATUAN CITY, WITH
ADDED MOTIONS TO SUSPEND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
THE INSTANT CASE UNTIL RESOLUTION ON THIS PENDING
INCIDENT AND TO FURNISH ACCUSED OF ALL PERTINENT
DOCUMENTS/EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION N ITS
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, parehong may petsang Oktubre 30,
2000.2
The complainant was surprised when Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr.
of the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, issued the following
Order on November 7, 2000, to wit:
This is a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000, dated
July __, 2000 which appears to have been issued by Judge Efren B.
Mallare. Upon a careful examination of the said Search Warrant,
the caption thereof appears to be RTC-Branch 30, Cabanatuan City.
However, the Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 30 is the undersigned
presiding judge and not Judge Efren B. Mallare. Judge Mallare is
the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
General Natividad and Llanera, Nueva Ecija.
The undersigned did not issue the questioned search warrant. He is
not the Executive Judge who is the only one authorized to issue
search warrants for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The Executive Judge of the RTC, Cabanatuan City is the Hon.
Johnson Ballutay of RTC, Branch 25, Cabanatuan City.
Further, the questioned search warrant is not at all connected with
any case pending in this Court, and therefore, this Court is not the
proper forum for the quashing of the said search warrant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash search
warrant is hereby returned to the accused and his counsel, with the
advise that it be referred to the Hon. Executive Judge, RTC,
Cabanatuan City or Judge Efren B. Mallare for appropriate action.3
The respondent judge thereafter issued an Order dated December
4, 2000, to wit:
After a careful perusal of the grounds relied upon by the accused in
seeking for the quashal/dismissal of this case, the Court noticed
that the same appeared to be well taken as the records would
readily show that the Chief of Police, PNP, Gen. Natividad, Nueva
Ecija has applied for a search warrant against one Pedrito Sabatin
alias Boyet and this has been admitted by the then Chief of Police
Franklin Versoza Simon as per his comment dated 13 September
2000 (p. 27, rec.), although he misspelled the name Pedrito to
Pablito by advancing reason that an error was committed when
said first name was typewrote (sic) and in order to obviate any
leakage thereof, a correction has been made from Pedrito/Pablito
to Artemio Sabatin alias Boyet which led to the filing of the instant
case.
In short, the search warrant issued by this court against one
Pedrito Sabatin alias Boyet, after it has complied with the requisite
for issuing search warrant (Sec. 3, Rule 126 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure), has not been fully implemented.
Furthermore, the case filed before this Court against one Artemio
Sabatin y Miguel alias Boyet cannot be entertained by this court for
this court has never issued any search warrant against said
accused; and, therefore, any evidence taken from him maybe
considered inadmissible for the search undertaken by the PNP of
Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, is considered unlawful.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion To Quash/Dismiss Criminal
Complaint meritorious, the same is hereby granted and this case is
hereby dismissed.4
According to the complainant, the respondent judge issued the
questioned search warrant despite his lack of authority to do so in
order to protect P/Sr. Insp. Franklin V. Simon. He also alleged that
the respondent later on denied that he issued the questioned
warrant in order to escape possible administrative sanctions.
In his Comment, the respondent averred that the normal procedure
in criminal cases was to set them for preliminary examination in
order to determine probable cause. However, in this case, the
complainant (accused therein) through counsel practically waived
the early resolution of the preliminary examination by filing several
motions. Thus, the complainant cannot now question the delay in
the early termination of the criminal case, for had it not been for
the filing of said motions, the preliminary examination could have
been terminated since September 2000 as provided for in the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The respondent further stated, thus:
To recapitulate; therefore, the undersigned believes that being an
Acting Presiding Judge of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Gen. Natividad-Llanera, N.E., he has performed and [is] still
performing, in good faith, the duties and responsibilities vested
upon his office. In fact the records will speak for itself, and being
the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija, he has always been dedicated to his work and never
committed any absence, and this fact can also be attested by the
records of that Court which also speak for itself. Lastly, if ever the
undersigned committed an error, the same had been committed in
good faith and that the attached pertinent documents in the
criminal case filed against Sabatin will readily reveal that the
undersigned did not commit the accusation lodged against him in
this administrative case.5
The respondent then prayed that the instant administrative case be
dismissed for lack of merit.
Upon the Court Administrators recommendation that a formal
investigation was necessary to resolve the factual issues, the case
was referred to Executive Judge Tomas B. Talavera, Regional Trial
Court, Cabanatuan City.6 The Executive Judge made the following
findings:
To this Court, it appears that the complainant is no longer
interested in pursuing this case. If he still has any interest in the
prosecution of this case he should have notified this Court of his
whereabouts by furnishing his new address so that he could have
been notified about the ongoing investigation. In this regards (sic),
this Court was not able to acquire any evidence that would
substantiate the allegations of the complainant in the present
administrative case. It will be impossible for this Court to rule in
favor of the complainant lacking the latters evidence, whether oral
or documentary, not to mention his un-cooperation (sic) in the
investigation of this administrative case.
Be it noted that it was the respondent who was religiously
attending the investigation is borne out by the record of the case.
On the other hand, complainant did not appear even once though
on April 24, 2003, he was notified through his wife Vilma Sabatin
evidencing his lack of interest to further prosecute this
administrative case.7
The Executive Judge apparently re-set the case for hearing for a
total of four times, due to the complainants repeated failure to
appear.8 It was, thus, recommended that the present
administrative case be dismissed for lack of evidence, as well as
the complainants lack of interest to prosecute the case.9 ςrνll
We do not agree with the Investigating Judge.
The Court would like to stress that the dismissal or withdrawal of
charges and the desistance of witnesses does not automatically
result in the dismissal of an administrative case.10 The withdrawal
of the complaint does not have the legal effect of automatically
exonerating the respondent from any administrative disciplinary
action. It does not operate to divest this Court with jurisdiction to
determine the truth behind the matter stated in the
complaint.11 Furthermore, the need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities should not be made to depend on the whims and
caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only
witnesses therein.12 ςrνll
Pursuant to the foregoing, it was incumbent upon the Investigating
Judge to delve into the matter subject of the complaint,
considering that the pleadings submitted by the complainant and
the respondent, as well as the annexes thereof, were forwarded by
the OCA precisely for his perusal. The Court, in numerous cases,
has even acted upon administrative complaints filed by anonymous
complainants on the following rationale:
Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous
complaints, cases are excepted in which the charge could be fully
borne by public records of indubitable integrity thus needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose
identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter
involved is of public interest.13
The records in the instant case clearly show that the respondent is
administratively liable. A perusal of the questioned search warrant
shows that although it was issued by Branch 30 of the RTC of
Cabanatuan City, the signatory therein was the respondent. Judge
Federico F. Fajardo, Jr. then presiding judge of Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City denied that the questioned warrant was issued by
him. The respondent then made a volte-face and denied that he
ever issued any search warrant against the complainant in his
Order dated December 4, 2000, where he also granted the
complainants motion to quash. Furthermore, in resolving the
complainants motion to quash almost four months after it was
filed, the respondent violated Rule 3.05 of The Code of Judicial
Conduct, which requires judges to dispose of the courts business
promptly and to act, one way or the other, on pending cases within
the prescribed period therefor.14 Undue delay in resolving a
pending motion constitutes gross inefficiency,15 and constitutes a
less serious charge, punishable under Section 9 of Rule 14016 of the
Rules of Court.
Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain
professional competence at all times.17 The pursuit of excellence
must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do
to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on
them and the institution they represent.18 Judges are also human,
although they are expected to rise above human frailties. At the
very least, there must be an earnest and sincere effort on his part
to do so. Considering that they are the visible representation of the
law and of justice, the citizenry expects their official conduct as
well as their personal behavior to always be beyond
reproach.19 ςrνll

WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency and dishonesty, the

respondent Judge Efren B. Mallare is meted a FINE of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000).

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-88-184 October 13, 1989
CALI A. IMPAO, DANIEL M. ESPERAT and NENA E. HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE JACOSALEM D. MAKILALA, respondent.
Rosamar V. Maregmen for petitioners in AM-MTJ-88-217.
R E S O L U T I O N  ordered by respondent for the roof of his house. After punching Esperat, respondent
PER CURIAM:p
Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Maganoy, Maguindanao and Designated Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Ampatuan-Sultan Sa Barongis, Maguindanao was charged in three
separate complaints by the employees of the above mentioned courts with gross
misconduct, falsification, abuse of authority and neglect and irregularity in the
performance of duties. The three letter-complaints were designated as Administrative
Matter Nos. MTJ-88- 184, MTJ-88-217 and MTJ-88-221.
Complainants alleged that from September 1985 up to the last week of April 1988,
Judge Makilala held office every Monday at his residence in Maganoy and the rest of
the week stayed at his residence in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Respondent judge
allegedly refused to hold office at the newly constructed municipal building where a
suitable space for a court was furnished by the municipal government of Maganoy. It
is alleged that whenever hearings are held in his residence, respondent judge would
always appear in sleeveless shirt and slippers while the party-litigants and their
counsels were in business attire.
While respondent judge required his staff to strictly observe the Civil Service Rules on
office attendance, he allegedly had no qualms in filling up his daily time record as if
he rendered full service when in fact he was always absent because of his illness and
when he was not absent, he only stayed in court for a short period [Affidavit of Ellen
Villaruel and Gina Natividad, Annex "D", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217].
The complainants also charged respondent judge with unduly favoring two court
personnel-Josue Calzado, Process Server of Maganoy Municipal Court, and Jose
Subaldo, Process Server of Ampatuan Sultan Sa Barongis Municipal Circuit Court —
because they were allegedly used by respondent judge in his house as driver-
mechanic, house guard or errand-boy. Calzado and Subaldo were given high
performance ratings by respondent while all the other employees were given failing
marks.
Complainants averred that Judge Makilala found pleasure in scolding them in front of
other people, uttering insulting words like "mga baboy kayong mga Kristiyano,"
[Affidavit of Rosamar Maregmen, Annex "C-3", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184.] On one
occasion, Judge Makilala allegedly told visiting soldiers to choose from among his
female staff members whom they wanted to rape. He also told the male court
employees not to waste their time and to start having sexual intercourse with the
female employees from Ampatuan [Joint Affidavit of Daniel Esperat and Cali Impao
Annex "G", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217]. At one time respondent judge threatened
his female staff members that if he could not dismiss them, he will have them
ambushed on their way home to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. The employees were so
alarmed by this threat that they reported the matter to the Office of the Provincial
Commander of Maganoy.
Complainants also alleged that Judge Makilala punched Daniel Esperat, Court Aide of
the MTC of Maganoy, because the latter failed to deliver the entire volume of nipa
judge allegedly went inside his house to get his gun and threatened to kill Esperat.
Esperat then ran away and later went to the provincial hospital for treatment. A
medical certificate issued by Dr. Teogenes F. Baluma, which was attached to the
letter-complaint of Esperat, shows that he suffered a "swelling contusion" on the right
side of the abdomen.
Respondent judge is also charged with having accepted a bribe from an accused in a
criminal case. Datu Cali Impao, Court Interpreter of the MTC of Maganoy, narrated
that during the hearing of the case entitled People v. Mario Labrador,  respondent
Judge Makilala gave a sign to the accused to follow him (respondent) inside his
chambers. When they emerged from the chambers, Judge Makilala immediately
ordered the dismissal of the case. Later, respondent proudly announced to his staff
that he got four hundred pesos (P400.00) from Labrador which will be used in
purchasing the office supplies needed by the court [Affidavit of Datu Cali Impao,
Annex "C", Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184].
To support the foregoing allegations, complainants submitted affidavits from the
employees concerned. They also submitted the affidavits of Datu Gambay A. Upam, a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maganoy, and Olandigan A. Sulaik, the
Municipal Secretary of Maganoy, who both corroborated the claim of the
complainants that Judge Makilala seldom reported in the municipal court in Maganoy
[Annexes "D" and "D-1", Adm. Matter No. MTJ- 88-184]. Also attached to the
complaints as annexes were copies of a "diary" kept by Nena Herrera, Stenographic
Reporter of the MTC of Maganoy, containing a record of the behavior of respondent
judge from April 1988 up to the time he was suspended, including the insulting
utterances he made and the time of his arrival in and departure from the municipal
court. The diary was signed not only by Nena Herrera but also by the other court
employees.
On August 22, 1988, the court employees under respondent Judge Makilala went on
mass leave to show their protest against respondent judge's behavior towards them.
On September 13, 1988 the Court issued a resolution referring Adm. Matter No. MTJ-
88-221 to Judge Ismael C. Bagundang of the Regional Trial Court of Maganoy,
Maguindanao for investigation, report and recommendation, and ordering the
suspension of respondent judge pending the investigation of the charges against him.
Subsequently, the Court issued a resolution dated September 22, 1988 ordering the
consolidation of Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-184 and Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-217 with
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-221 earlier referred by the Court to Judge Bagundang in the
September 13, 1988 resolution. The Court reiterated the order of suspension of
Judge Makilala and required respondent judge to file a consolidated comment within
ten (10) days from notice.
In his consolidated comment, respondent judge denied the charges against him and
claimed that the allegations were fabricated by the complainants to get back at him
for his strict enforcement of the Civil Service Law.
On the use of his residence as the MTC of Maganoy from 1974- 1984, respondent
explained that it was with the approval of the municipal government because at that
time there was no municipal building and the municipal government had to rent
private buildings and houses for its use as its offices. He claimed that in 1984 he
refused to transfer to the new municipal building because the municipal government
had not fixed the space allotted for the municipal court. However, from 1985 up to the
present, the municipal court and office have always been in its permanent space in
the Maganoy Municipal Building.
As to his alleged absences and short stay in court, respondent insisted that this was
due to the lightness of his caseload, and that the records will show that he has no
pending or unfinished work [Ibid., p. 4].
Lastly, respondent asked the Court to reconsider his suspension pending the
investigation of the charges against him considering his old age and his long service
without any previous record of serious official misconduct [Ibid., p. 5]. A counter-
complaint against the court personnel was also filed by respondent judge for alleged
violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and dishonesty and immorality.
The initial investigation of the case was conducted on October 17, 1988, during which
respondent judge manifested that he will file a motion to inhibit the investigating judge
due to partiality. On November 17,1988 respondent filed his motion to inhibit Judge
Bagundang but the latter denied the same. Respondent then filed the motion with this
Court but it was likewise denied by this Court in a resolution dated December
12,1988.
Meanwhile, on the scheduled hearing on December 5, 1988, respondent's motion for
postponement on the ground of Judge Makilala's illness was granted by the
investigating judge but with a warning that henceforth the hearings will continue even
without the presence of the respondent. The hearing was resumed on January
16,1989, but neither the respondent nor his counsel were present. No explanation
was given for the absence of respondent and his counsel, hence the hearing
proceeded as scheduled and was terminated on January 19,1989.
On January 30,1989 Investigating Judge Ismael C. Bagundang submitted to this
Court a report, with the following findings:
. . . there is reasonable ground to believe that Judge Makilala really
abused his authority against his staff, the utterances made by him
that he will have his staff be raped (sic), calling the staff "mga
baboy kayong mga kristiyano" which utterances have been duly
blottered in the Office of the Provincial Commander of Maganoy,
the seeming biased attitude of Judge Makilala by giving failure
rating for the majority of the staff while giving high performance
rating to Jose Calzado and Jose Subaldo, is clear indication that he
really harrassed (sic) his staff. The boxing of Daniel Esperat
because [he] failed to deliver on that particular day the nipa
intended for the roofing of his private house, is an act unbecoming
for (sic) him as a Judge. The threatening remarks that he have (sic)
uttered on several occasions against the staff of Maganoy and
Ampatuan-Sultan sa Barongis, uttered almost daily is a clear sign
that he really harrassed (sic) the employees. The entry that he
made in his daily time record from 1987 to 1988, that he reports to
the office Monday thru Friday when in truth and in fact he only goes
to Maganoy every Monday and stays most of his time in Tacurong
residence and when cases were filed, the cases has (sic) to be
brought to his residence at Tacurong for his signature, is a clear
indication that he has falsified his daily time record and is a violation
not only of the Civil Service Law but also with (sic) the Revised
Penal Code. The taking of money from Mr. Labrador for the sum of
P400.00 under the guise of donation for the purchase of supplies
for the use of the court, is a clear violation of the provision of the
law regarding bribery [Report of the Investigating Judge, p. 5].
Judge Bagundang recommended that respondent judge be separated from the
service and that all his retirement benefits be forfeited in favor of the government
[Report of the Investigating Judge, p. 6].
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the findings and
conclusions contained in the report of Investigating Judge Bagundang are supported
by the evidence on record. The Court agrees with the investigating judge that the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the complainants convincingly
established the charges against the respondent. The Court finds nothing in the
records which would warrant the reversal of the investigating judge's findings and
conclusion.
In his Comment on the Resolution of the Hearing Officer filed with this Court on May
12,1989, respondent judge assailed the findings of Judge Bagundang on the ground
of "gross denial of due process" because his counsel was not given the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses who testified against him [Comment on the Resolution
of the Hearing Officer, p. 4].
It is readily apparent from the records of the case that the above contention is
manifestly devoid of merit. Respondent and his counsel were present during the
hearings on November 17 and 18,1988 [TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 2-3; TSN,
November 18, 1988, pp. 2-3]. Respondent's counsel cross-examined witnesses Nena
Herrera and Daniel Esperat during the November 18, 1988 hearing [TSN, November
18, 1988, pp. 3-37]. As to the other five witnesses, namely,Cali Impao, Noemi Socias,
Belen Pasaforte, Ellen Villaruel and Rosamar Maregmen, the failure of respondent's
counsel to cross-examine them was entirely the fault of respondent and his counsel.
They failed to heed the warning of the investigating judge that the hearings on
January 16 to 20 would continue even without the presence of respondent. Despite
due notice both respondent and his counsel did not appear in the scheduled hearings
nor did they explain the reason therefore. By their unexplained absence, respondent
and his counsel effectively waived respondent's right to cross-examine the other
witnesses.
Judge Makilala contends that "when the sickly, old respondent failed to appear in the
investigation, proof must be shown [by the investigating judge] ... of such efforts of
giving [respondent the] opportunity to be present." It is further contended by
respondent that since his two counsel "are both residents of Cotabato City with
telephone connection in their respective homes," the investigating judge could have
"easily contacted [them] to find out why they failed to be present on the scheduled
investigation." [Ibid., p. 4.]
The above contentions sadly reflect ignorance of the requirements of due process. As
a lawyer and a municipal judge for a number of years, respondent should know that it
is not incumbent upon the investigating judge to call up respondent's counsel to
inquire into the reason for their non-appearance in the scheduled hearings. Nor is it
for the investigating judge to prove that he gave respondent "an opportunity to be
present." It is the duty of the respondent's counsel to be present during the hearings
and to inform the court of the reason for their absence.
Disagreeing with the investigating judge's recommendation, Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo Suarez recommended that Judge Makilala be instead
considered resigned from the service as of the time he was suspended with full
payment of retirement benefits. The Deputy Court Administrator is of the opinion that
the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits is too harsh considering
that Judge Makilala is "already in the twilight years of his career as a judge" and is
now "sickly and in need of medical check-ups and constant medication"
[Memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, p. 10].
. . .The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of
justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of
municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and
direct contact with the people before anybody else in the judiciary.
Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow ...
The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this case, i.e., his
acceptance of a bribe, his holding office and conducting hearings at his residence, his
falsification of his daily time record, his failure to observe proper decorum in
conducting court proceedings, his intemperate language and threats against the
personnel of his courts, and his use of physical violence against Daniel Esperat,
among others, shows beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the position of a
municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the established norms for judicial
behavior, and the best interest of the judiciary demands that respondent be dismissed
from the service.
WHERERORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of
serious misconduct and abuse of authority and is hereby DISMISSED from the
service. Any retirement benefits due him are hereby ordered FORFEITED to the
government.
SO ORDERED.

The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge Makilala is suffering from
a lingering illness. Respondent himself alleges in his Comment on the Resolution of
the Hearing Officer that he cannot travel long distances nor do any job requiring
physical exertion because the nature of his illness, known as polycythemia
vera,  requires that his blood be drained periodically. However, the seriousness of
respondent's illness cannot justify his failure to perform his duties nor does it excuse
him from the consequences of his misconduct and abuse of authority. If indeed
respondent found it difficult to discharge the functions of a municipal judge, then he
should have retired voluntarily instead of clinging to his office at the expense of the
litigants, his staff and the general public. Considering the number and the serious
nature of offenses committed by respondent judge, the Court believes that the penalty
of dismissal with forfeiture of retirement benefits should be imposed upon him.

It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at
all times be free from the appearance of impropriety [Luque v. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-
26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; See Section 3, Canons of Judicial Ethics]. As
held by this Court in the case of De la Paz v. Inutan, Adm. Matter No. 201 MJ, June
30,1975, 64 SCRA 540:
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248*               September 29, 2010
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARIA ELISA SEMPIO DIY, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 225, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment and dismissal from judiciary service
filed by complainant Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (Judge Angeles) against
respondent Hon. Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Judge Sempio Diy), Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225, which stemmed from consolidated
Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Proclyn Pacay" and "People of the Philippines v. P/Insp. Roberto Ganias, "
respectively.
Judge Angeles charges respondent Judge Sempio Diy with Violations of Section 15
(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; Section 2, Canon 2 and Section 5 Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; Rule 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; Number 6 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics; Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; Section 4 paragraph b of Republic Act No. 6713 of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; Falsification of
Official Documents; and Dishonesty. Complainant urges the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to examine the numerous violations allegedly committed by the
respondent and to make an assessment if, indeed, she is still worthy to wear the
judicial robe or, if her continued presence on the bench would unduly tarnish the
image of the judiciary.1
In her Comment,2 respondent Judge Sempio Diy vehemently denies the material
allegations in the complaint. She claims that complainant’s charges are harsh, rash
and baseless, calculated merely to harass and "destroy the reputation of a younger
sister in the profession."3
As synthesized by the OCA in its Report4 dated May 7, 2010, the facts of the case are
as follows:
Complainant Judge Angeles alleges that she is the private complainant in the above-
mentioned cases which, by order of respondent Judge Sempio-Diy dated 20 June
2008, were submitted for decision, and the promulgation of judgment was set for 11
September 2008. In a subsequent Order dated 8 September 2008, respondent Judge
Sempio-Diy moved the promulgation of judgment to 17 September 2008, for the
reason that she had a previously scheduled medical consultation concerning a neck
ailment. Thereafter, the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 was
cancelled and reset to 17 October 2008, with respondent Judge Sempio-Diy citing
voluminous case records and health problems as grounds to support her request
before the Court of a thirty (30)-day extension.
On 17 October 2008, the promulgation of judgment was once again cancelled and
reset to 14 November 2008 on account of a second request for extension of time
based on the ground that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy had just recently arrived
from a trip to the United States where she attended a symposium on religious
freedom. Following a third request for extension of time, the promulgation of judgment
was reset for the last time to 12 December 2008.
Finally, the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was promulgated on 12
December 2008, wherein all the accused, except for accused SPO1 Roberto C.
Carino, were acquitted. To complainant Judge Angeles, the said Decision was
belatedly rendered because there was a lapse of six (6) months from the time it was
submitted for resolution to the time it was promulgated. She further avers that her
personal examination of the case records revealed that no requests for extension of
time to decide the subject cases were made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy.
Likewise, she notes that the case records do not show that requests for extension of
time, if any had indeed been made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy, were granted
by the Supreme Court. It is her opinion that such requests and Resolutions of the
Supreme Court granting the same should be made integral parts of the case records.
As for the reasons proffered by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy for the repeated
cancellation and resetting of the dates for promulgation of judgment, complainant
Judge Angeles argues that: (1)  respondent Judge Sempio-Diy’s medical check-up
could have been done on any other day that would not conflict with the scheduled
promulgation; (2) the neck ailment was not as serious as it was made to appear
because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy was able to travel abroad to attend a
symposium; and (3) the claim that she needed time to study the voluminous case
records is not a valid excuse because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy found time to
travel abroad instead of attending to her pending cases.
In fine, complainant Judge Angeles is adamant in her contention that the Joint
Decision in the subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day period
prescribed by the Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another
instance where respondent Judge Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred
unjustifiable delay.
As it happened, convicted accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino assailed the Joint
Decision by filing an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on 5 January 2009, which the
prosecution countered in its Opposition filed on 14 January 2009. However, it was not
until 30 July 2009, or more than six (6) months later, that respondent Judge Sempio-
Diy issued an Order submitting the incident for resolution, "it appearing that the
accused through counsel has failed to file the necessary pleading despite the period
given by the Court." Less than a month later, or on 24 August 2009, respondent
Judge Sempio-Diy resolved the pending matter by denying the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Despite the denial of the said Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, things did not sit
well for complainant Judge Angeles. For her, the Resolution dated 24 August 2009
was belatedly issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. First and foremost, she
contends that the incident should have been submitted for resolution upon the filing of
the prosecution’s Opposition on 14 January 2009. And yet, it was more than six (6)
months later, or only on 30 July 2009, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued the
Order submitting the said incident for resolution. Secondly, complainant Judge
Angeles asserts that there was no basis for the trial court to have to wait for more
than six (6) months before submitting the motion for resolution considering that there
exists no order in the case records directing the accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino,
through counsel, to file the necessary pleading. Asserting that there was no basis for
submitting the incident for resolution only after the lapse of six (6) months,
complainant Judge Angeles further contends that the Resolution issued by
respondent Judge Sempio-Diy on 24 August 2009 denying the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise delayed for a total of more than seven (7) months.
To support her assertions, complainant Judge Angeles attached to her COMPLAINT
a Certification issued by Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch
225, Quezon City, wherein the latter attested that, "based on the record of People vs.
Proclyn Pacay, et al., Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690, it appears
that there is no order from the Court directing the defense to file a reply to the
Comment/Opposition (to the Motion for Reconsideration) filed by the prosecution on
January 14, 2009." She also points out that there appears to be an irregularity in the
face of the Order submitting the incident for resolution. In particular, she refers to the
date of its issuance – "July 30, 2009"—which is written in a different font when
compared to the rest of the contents of the said Order. She, therefore, contends that
the said date was "merely typewritten in lieu of another date which was snowpaked."
By failing to decide/resolve the subject cases and the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration within the period mandated by law and jurisprudence, as well as in
falsifying official documents, complainant Judge Angeles now stresses, respondent
Judge Sempio-Diy violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, New Code of
Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials.
For her part, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy belies the accusations hurled at her by
complainant Judge Angeles in the latter’s COMPLAINT. In her COMMENT dated 2
December 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy counters that she decided the subject
cases in due time and within the extended period granted by the Supreme Court. She
maintains that the orders resetting the promulgation of judgment were issued in good
faith and in the interest of full transparency, pursuant to her request to decide the
subject cases expeditiously.
For starters, she notes that she merely inherited the subject cases which had already
been previously handled by three (3) other judges from the time they were filed in
1995. Thus, the case records were voluminous.
For another, the first resetting of the promulgation of judgment from 11 September to
17 September 2008 was occasioned by her illness, which assertion she substantiated
by way of a Medical Certificate. She points out that the setting of the promulgation of
judgment on 17 September 2008 is still within the Constitutionally-prescribed 90-day
period for deciding the subject cases.
As for the three (3) subsequent re-settings, she avers that she timely asked for
extensions of the period, all of which were granted by the Supreme Court. To support
her claim that she did not incur delay in the promulgation of judgment, she appended
to her COMMENT certified true copies of her first and second letters/requests
addressed to the then Assistant Court Administrator, Jesus Edwin A. Villasor (now
Deputy Court Administrator) and other related documents. These requests were
favorably considered by the Court and she was granted an extension of a total of
ninety (90) days from 18 September 2008.
She likewise attached to her COMMENT a copy of her third letter/request to prove
that this was filed prior to the lapse of the original 90-day extended period granted to
her. In fine, she insists that there was no unjustified delay when the Joint Decision
was finally promulgated on 12 December 2008 as the same was still within the
original 90-day extended period reckoned from 18 September 2008. The Court’s
granting of her third request for an additional thirty (30) days in a Resolution dated 16
February 2009 had, by then, become moot and academic.1awphi1
While she admits that her letters/requests for extension and the Supreme Court
Resolutions granting the same were not attached to the voluminous records of the
subject cases, she nevertheless manifests that these were kept in a separate folder.
With regard to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, she points out that the delay
was inadvertently incurred in good faith. During the hearing of the said motion on 29
January 2009, the request of the defense for time to file the necessary pleadings was
granted, for which reason, she says, the said motion could not yet be submitted for
resolution. She deemed it prudent to give the parties a reasonable period of time
within which to submit their adversarial pleadings. To substantiate this contention,
respondent Judge Sempio-Diy attached to her COMMENT the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on that day and the Minutes of the proceedings of the same
day.
In the light of the foregoing, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy discredits the import of the
Certification issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Benedict S. Sta. Cruz, by arguing
that, while there is no order appearing in the case records directing accused SPO1
Carino to file his Reply to the prosecution’s Comment to his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, the said directive appears in the Minutes of the hearing conducted
on 29 January 2009. She likewise notes that during the said hearing, the said Branch
Clerk of Court was not present.
Respondent Judge Sempio-Diy likewise attributes the inadvertent delay to the
"unfortunate crises" that befell her, her mother, and the court’s personnel sometime in
May to July of 2009. She reported to the Office of the Court Administrator that they
received a series of death threats which caused, among others, disorientation. Thus,
it was only on 30 July 2009, after the semi-annual inventory, that an Order submitting
the matter for resolution was issued. She stresses that the incident was resolved
within thirty (30) days from its submission. As for the "snowpaked" correction of the
date of the said Order, she avers that this was simply due to a typographical error.5
Complainant Judge Angeles filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and, thereafter,
respondent Judge Sempio Diy filed her Rejoinder in amplification of their respective
claims. Later, complainant filed her Sur-Rejoinder on February 9, 2010 while
respondent filed her Reply to the Sur-Rejoinder on February 18, 2010.
In its evaluation, the OCA found that Judge Sempio Diy cannot be held guilty of
unreasonable delay in rendering the Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-
61294 and Q-95-62690 given her seasonably-filed requests for extension of time. The
requests were all granted by this Court in the November 24, 2008 Resolution, giving
respondent a total extension period of ninety (90) days from September 18, 2008.
The OCA, however, opined that respondent should be administratively sanctioned for
incurring delay in the resolution of accused Carino’s Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter against Judge Sempio Diy and that she be fined in the amount of ₱2,000.00
for her delayed action on a motion for reconsideration with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.6
After a judicious review of the records of the case, this Court determines that the
findings of the OCA are well-taken. However, We modify the recommended
disposition in light of the circumstances of the case.
The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of delay against Judge Sempio
Diy in rendering the Joint Decision in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-
61294 and Q-95-62690. It is the stance of the complainant that Judge Sempio Diy
merely sat on the cases for an unreasonable length of time and failed to resolve them
within the constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. This constituted gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions. Judge Angeles accuses
respondent of concocting requests for extension and making it appear that these
requests were granted by this Court. Complainant avers that she perused the records
of the consolidated criminal cases but respondent’s alleged requests for extension
and the Court’s Resolutions allowing them were nowhere to be found.
Complainant’s contentions fail.
Records reveal that Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive
extensions7 of the period to decide the consolidated criminal cases. All requests were
favorably considered by this Court.8 Respondent was granted a total extension period
of ninety (90) days to be reckoned from September 18, 2008 or until December 18,
2008. So, the promulgation of Joint Decision on December 12, 2008 was made well
within the 90-day extension period. Complainant should have first verified the veracity
and accuracy of her allegations from the records of Branch 225, this Court and the
OCA, before hurling accusations of dishonesty and slothful conduct against
respondent. Truly, respondent was charged with a litany of imagined sins relative to
her alleged undue delay in deciding the subject consolidated criminal cases without
sufficient proof.
We hold, however, that there was indeed delay in resolving accused Carino’s Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 5, 2009.
Respondent Judge Sempio Diy claims that the delay in submitting accused’s motion
for reconsideration was due to inadvertence and without bad faith on her part. She
explains that she opted to wait for the defense to file its reply to the prosecution’s
comment on the motion for reconsideration because the offense of which accused
was convicted was serious and his liberty was at stake. She adds that the death
threats she and the members of her judicial staff received from May to July 2009,
caused them disorientation and contributed further to the delay in the resolution of the
subject motion. She readily admits that it was only after the semi-annual inventory
that the pending incidents in the consolidated criminal cases were considered
submitted for resolution in the July 30, 2009 Order.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct9 admonishes all judges to
dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the period specified
in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.10 This is supplemented by
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
requiring judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness.11
A careful perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes12 and the Minutes13 of the
hearing held on January 29, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-
62690, would clearly show that respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to
submit its reply to the prosecution’s comment on the motion for reconsideration and,
thereafter, she would resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases. As
correctly observed by the OCA, the reglementary period to resolve the motion in
question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after the lapse of ten days from
January 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a
hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the
period for resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period
authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to
administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice
delayed is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending
incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a judgment.14
Judge Sempio Diy, having been a member of the judiciary for several years, should
not have any trouble disposing the court’s business and resolving motions for
reconsideration within the required period. Otherwise, she should formally request
this Court for an extension of the deadline to avoid administrative liability.
Unfortunately, she failed to do that in these cases. Delay in resolving motions and
incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the law cannot be
excused or condoned.15
Respondent’s claim of death threats on her and her staff, even if real, would not
constitute a valid excuse for her inaction. After all, as member of the judiciary, she
must display diligence and competence amid all adversities to live up to her oath of
office. Besides, when said threats were received from May to July 2009, the three-
month mandatory period for resolving the motion had already expired. Accordingly,
respondent cannot rely on said predicament to exonerate her from administrative
liability for incurring undue delay in resolving the subject motion. Although it is true
that Judge Sempio Diy finally issued a resolution16 denying accused Carino’s motion
for reconsideration on August 24, 2009 or within 30 days from the time the incident
was submitted for resolution on July 30, 2009, her inaction on the motion for more
than 6 months is not excused.
It appears that respondent has simply forgotten about the pending motion for
reconsideration in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 after said cases
became inactive due to the failure of the defense to submit its reply. The realization of
the blunder came only during the semi-annual inventory of the court’s cases. This
situation could have been avoided had respondent adopted an effective system of
record management and organization of dockets to monitor the flow of cases for
prompt and efficient dispatch of the court’s business. Elementary court management
practice requires her to keep her own records or notes of cases pending before her
sala, especially those that are pending for more than 90 days, so that she can act on
them promptly and without delay. In Ricolcol v. Judge Camarista,17 the Court
declared:
A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for decision or resolution and is
expected to keep her own record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It is
incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording and filing system in her court so
that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
Proper and efficient court management is as much her responsibility. She is the one
directly responsible for the proper discharge of her official functions.
submission for resolution on July 30, 2009. In the absence of malice, the delay could
only be due to inadvertence. It is significant to note that respondent resolved the
motion within thirty days from its submission date which clearly showed her effort to
zealously attend to her duties. Lastly, it appears that this is her first infraction and the
first time for her to face an administrative complaint of this kind.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision
or order constitutes a less serious charge punishable by either suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three
months or a fine of not more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
However, considering that this is her first infraction due to inadvertence, We believe
that admonition will suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy is found to have been in
delay in the rendition of an order in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690
and is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary
period for disposing of motions.
SO ORDERED.

The Court reminds the respondent of her duty to closely supervise and monitor the
monthly docket inventories to forestall future occurrences of this nature. Pertinently,
the Court held in Gordon v. Judge Lilagan:18

The physical inventory of cases is instrumental to the expeditious dispensation of

justice. Although this responsibility primarily rests in the presiding judge, it is shared
with the court staff. This Court has consistently required Judges for a "continuous
inventory of cases on a monthly basis so that a trial judge is aware of the status of
each case. With the assistance of the branch clerk of court, a checklist should be
prepared indicating the steps to be taken to keep the cases moving. In Juan v.
Arias  [72 SCRA 404 (1976)], the Court underscored the importance of this physical
inventory stressing "it is only by this that the judge can keep himself abreast of the
status of the pending cases and informed that everything is in order in his court."

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,19 this administrative case against respondent shall

also be considered a disciplinary proceeding against her as a member of the
bar.20 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct
constitutes a breach of Canons 121 and 1222 as well as Rules 1.0323 and 12.0424 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

In determining the sanction to be imposed on errant magistrates, the Court considers

the factual milieu of each case, the offending acts or omissions of the judges, as well
as previous transgressions, if any. In the instant case, there is no evidence to show
any dubious reason or improper motive that could have compelled respondent to
delay the resolution of the subject motion. In fact, when respondent found out about
the unresolved subject motion in the consolidated cases, she immediately ordered its
 A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291               February 8, 2012 Submitted for Decision 3[sic] 8 11

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, Inhibited 0 1 1

vs.
Suspended Proceedings 0 1 1
JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon,
Leyte, Respondent. Decided 1 2 3
Dismissed / Withdrawn 1 3 4
DECISION
Archived 1 0 1
CARPIO, J.:
Newly Filed 9 2 11
The Case TOTAL 230 126 3563

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291 originates from a judicial audit of the case records of Branch
17, Regional Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte (Branch 17) conducted from 25 to 27
November 2008 by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). At the time of audit,
the presiding judge of Branch 17, Hon. Celso L. Mantua (Judge Mantua), was on
official leave in Manila. Judge Mantua retired on 9 January 2009.
The Facts
Travel Order No. 103-2008 dated 11 November 2008 ordered the conduct of a judicial
audit in Branch 17 from 24 to 25 November 2008. The judicial audit team1 submitted a
memorandum2 dated 14 January 2009, five days after Judge Mantua’s retirement, to
Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches (DCA Vilches). The judicial audit team
quantified Branch 17’s caseload as follows:
As of audit date, the Court has a total caseload of 356 cases consisting
of 230 criminal cases and 126 civil cases based on the records actually presented to
and examined by the team which are classified hereunder according to the
status/stages of proceeding as shown by the table below:
STATUS/STAGES OF PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL CIVIL TOTAL
Warrants/Summons 21 1 22
The judicial audit team further highlighted items in Branch 17’s caseload using
tables4 which detailed the case number, parties, nature of the case, and last court
action before the conduct of the audit. There were 20 criminal cases wherein the
court failed to take any action from the time of filing, 41 criminal cases without further
action or setting for a considerable length of time, 12 criminal cases with pending
incidents or motions submitted for resolution, and two criminal cases submitted for
decision. There were 7 civil cases that remained unacted upon from the time of filing,
27 civil cases without further setting or setting for a considerable length of time, 11
civil cases with pending incidents or motions submitted for resolution, and 8 cases
submitted for decision.
The judicial audit team also found that Branch 17’s case records were not in order.
The team noted that the case records are stitched together with pagination. However,
the criminal records are not chronologically arranged. Also, the records attached to
criminal cases jointly tried are incomplete (Crim. Cases 1129, 1131, 1189, 1190,
1185, 1186, 1033, 1205, among a few). The court’s docket books are not updated.
There are no log book[s] on arrest and search warrants, exhibits,
disposed/decided/archived cases and incoming documents. There is no order on
payment of postponement fee in proper cases.
It was also noticed that alias warrants of arrest were issued without archiving cases.5

Arraignment 22 0 22
The judicial audit team recommended that Atty. Elmer P. Mape (Atty. Mape), as
Preliminary Conference / Pre-Trial / Mediation 25 23 48 Officer-in-Charge (Legal Researcher II) of Branch 17, be directed to: (1) inform the
OCA within 15 days of the status of Branch 17’s caseload and submit a copy of the
Trial 71 38 109 pertinent order, resolution and notice of hearing issued; (2) apprise the Acting
Presiding Judge from time to time of cases submitted for resolution or decision and
For Compliance 3 2 5 those cases that require immediate action; (3) implement the provisions of
No Action Taken 20 7 27 Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008 dated 17 January 2008 on the wearing of office
uniform; (4) observe the flag raising and flag lowering ceremonies as mandated by
No Further Action / Setting 41 27 68 Circular No. 62-2001 dated 27 September 2001; (5) order the stitching of all orders
issued, minutes taken, notices of hearing issued, certificates of arraignment in all
Submitted for Resolution 12 11 23 criminal case folders especially those cases jointly tried including their chronological
arrangement and pagination and the updating of both the criminal and civil docket
books; and (6) maintain separate log books for the recording of arrest and search
warrants, exhibits, disposed/decided/archived cases and all incoming documents.
The judicial audit team also recommended that Judge Crescente F. Maraya (Judge
Maraya), who replaced retired Judge Mantua, be directed to take appropriate action
on the cases where the court failed to take appropriate action, to resolve pending
motions and to decide cases submitted for decision.
In a letter6 dated 27 April 2009 addressed to DCA Vilches, Atty. Mape informed the
OCA of the status of the cases enumerated in the report of the judicial audit team and
submitted the Orders, Resolutions and Notices of Hearing issued by Branch 17. Atty.
Mape also stated that Branch 17 already complied with all other items mentioned by
the judicial audit team in their recommendation. However, the wearing of uniform was
considered optional starting 1 April 2009 in view of a memorandum issued by the
OCA. Atty. Mape begged for the OCA’s indulgence and explained that the delay in
the submission of his reply was brought about by two substitutions of the judge
assigned to Branch 17. At the time of audit, Judge Mantua presided over the court.
Pursuant to Judge Mantua’s retirement on 9 January 2009, Administrative Order No.
180-2008 designated Judge Maraya, Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial
Court, Calubian, Leyte, as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 17 to replace Judge
Mantua. Administrative Order No. 23-2009 dated 3 March 2009 revoked Judge
Maraya’s designation and Judge Rogelio R. Joboco (Judge Joboco), Presiding Judge
of Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, took over as acting presiding judge of Branch 17.
The OCA’s Recommendation
7 
On 12 May 2009, the OCA issued a Memorandum addressed to then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno (CJ Puno). The memorandum based its findings and
recommendations on the 14 January 2009 report of the judicial audit team and Atty.
Mape’s submissions dated 19 January 2009 and 27 April 2009.
In its Memorandum to CJ Puno, the OCA added an "Action Taken" column to the
tables initially submitted by the judicial audit team. The "Action Taken" column
specified the action and the date of action, but made no mention who among Judge
Mantua, Judge Maraya or Judge Joboco acted upon the enumerated items. Instead,
the OCA merely stated that there are only two cases, one civil and one criminal, that
still needed Judge Joboco’s action. There are also two motions that remained
unresolved. We reproduce the OCA’s findings and recommendations below:
From the above submissions, there are only a few cases that [are] needed to be
acted upon by Acting Presiding Judge Joboco. One case is Crim. Case No. 1432,
People vs. Juanito Dalut for Rape which was filed on 6-30-08 wherein the court failed
to take action thereon from the time of its filing. Another case is Civil Case PN 0354,
Mingasca vs. [Omega-]Reyes, et al. for Accion Reinvindicatoria wherein the court
failed to take further action from the filing of the Reply on March 27, 2008.
However, there are two (2) motions that remain unresolved. These are the Motion to
Reduce Bail Bond filed on July 24, 2008 in Crim. Case No. P-0768, People vs.
Capic[i]ño, et al. for Qualified Theft and the implied motion contained in the Social
Worker Report received on 10-16-06 recommending the dismissal of [the] case
against minor accused and the Manifestation of Atty. Opeña that accused Lubiano, a
minor, should be dismissed. These were considered submitted for resolution in an
Order dated September 11, 2008. There is no record that Judge Mantua requested
for any extension of time to resolve these motions.
Resolution of these motions should have been made on or before October 22, 2008
and December 230 [sic], 2008, respectively. The inaction of Judge Mantua created
delay in the administration of justice and constitutes a serious violation of the
constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases and manifested
his gross inefficiency in the performance of his official duties (A.M. No. RTJ-05-1917
(Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. vs. Judge William Simon P. Peralta, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, promulgated April 16, 2009).
Lower courts are mandated to decide or resolve all cases or matters within three
months from date of their submission (Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution). A matter is deemed submitted for resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading (Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 15[2]).
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs all judges to dispose of
the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law and
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
provides that judges shall perform all judicial duties efficiently and with reasonable
promptness.
The Court, however, is not unmindful of the caseloads of judges and ordinarily grants
reasonable request[s] for extension. This is not true as to Judge Mantua.
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is, under Section 9, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, a less serious charge and punishable by either suspension from office
without salary and other benefits but not less than one month nor more than three
months or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but nor [sic] exceeding ₱20,000.00.
In view of the foregoing, the Report is respectfully submitted for the consideration of
the Honorable Court with the following recommendations:
1. This judicial audit report including the submissions of RTC 17,
Palompon, Leyte in compliance with Memorandum dated January
14, 2009 be docketed as an administrative complaint against
Retired Judge Celso L. Mantua for gross incompetency and
inefficiency and that he be FINED the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(₱10,000.00) to be deducted from the retirement benefits due him;
and
2. Acting Presiding Judge Rogelio R. [Joboco], Regional Trial
Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, be DIRECTED to immediately
take appropriate action on Crim. Case No. 1432, entitled People vs.
Juanito Dal[u]t for Rape and Civil Case No. PN 0354 entitled
Mingasca vs. [Omega-]Reyes, et al., for Accion Reinvindicatoria
and to resolve with dispatch the pending motions in Crim. Case No.
P-0768 entitled People vs. Capic[i]ño for Qualified Theft and Crim.
 Case No. 1205 entitled People vs. Jonel Lubiano for Less Serious
Physical Injuries and furnish the Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator within ten (10) days a copy of each action taken
thereon.8
In a letter dated 21 July 2009, Judge Joboco reported that he took action on the
cases enumerated in the OCA’s 12 May 2009 Memorandum. Judge Joboco
dismissed Civil Case No. PN 0354, Mingasca, et al. v. Omega-Reyes, et al. Criminal
Case No. P-0768, People v. Capiciño, et al., and Criminal Case No. 1205, People v.
Lubiano, were set for hearing, while Criminal Case No. 1432, People v. Dalut, cannot
proceed because the accused has remained at large and the court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Judge Joboco appended the Orders in the
cases to his letter.
The Court’s Ruling
We cannot agree with the OCA’s finding and recommendations.
The report of the judicial audit team, and consequently that of the OCA, suffers from
inaccuracies and a slant towards mere fault-finding. Civil Case No. PN-
0354, Mingasca v. Omega-Reyes, was entered twice, but in consecutive numbers, in
the table for civil cases without further setting. Because of this double entry, the
judicial audit team and OCA probably overlooked Judge Mantua’s action dated 27
November 2008. Furthermore, despite Atty. Mape’s submissions dated 19 January
2009 and 27 April 2009 of copies of the Orders, Resolutions and Notices of Hearing
issued by Branch 17, the OCA failed to state in their Memorandum that out of the 126
cases listed, Judge Mantua took action on 114 cases, or 90.48%, before he retired on
9 January 2009.
It should be noted that the judicial audit team submitted their report to DCA Vilches
five days after Judge Mantua’s retirement. The OCA, in turn, submitted their
Memorandum to CJ Puno on 12 May 2009, or a little over four months after Judge
Mantua’s retirement. During his incumbency, Judge Mantua was never given a
chance to explain the results of the judicial audit report. With the knowledge that the
judicial audit report will be submitted only after Judge Mantua’s retirement, the judicial
audit team’s recommendations were directed only to Atty. Mape, the Acting Clerk of
Court and Legal Researcher II of Branch 17, and Judge Maraya, Acting Presiding
Judge of Branch 17 at the time of the report’s submission. In its Memorandum, the
OCA recommended that Judge Mantua be fined for gross incompentency and
inefficiency.
The report of the judicial audit team showed that no appropriate action was done in
68 cases, 23 cases remained unresolved after a sufficient amount of time, and 10
cases were not decided within the reglementary period. In contrast, there is no
showing that Judge Mantua ever requested this Court for a reasonable period of
extension to dispose of these cases.
We issued a Resolution dated 15 August 2011 which redocketed the case as a
regular administrative matter and required Judge Mantua to comment on the OCA’s
12 May 2009 Memorandum. The pertinent portions of Judge Mantua’s comment read:
When I assumed office as Judge of RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte in August
2005, my court then had no Clerk of Court. This situation was true even up to the time
when I retired in January 2009. A few months after my assumption as judge, the
Legal Researcher of the court transferred to one of the branches of the Lapu-Lapu
City Regional Trial Court. My sala then had only four (4) court stenographers, a
sheriff, a process server, a clerk and a utility worker. Then, an interpreter was
appointed before a legal researcher was also appointed. When the appointed legal
researcher assumed office, I designated him as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
Clerk of Court. I instructed the legal researcher to assist me in my administrative
functions, as the office files then as well as the case folders were in a disarray and
topsy turvey [sic]. The legal researcher assisted me in adopting a systematic filing
system, segregating the kinds of cases obtaining in the court as well as aging the
same because I inherited no filing system in the office. Be it noted also that when I
assumed office there was no court inventory from my predecessors. It was only when
I assumed office that we conducted an inventory of the court especially court cases.
Considering the load of cases of my court and the lack of filing system, I have
exercised extra efforts and divided my time to have a semblance of orderliness in the
office including the supervision of the operation of the Office of the Clerk of Court and
lower courts.
This comment is not an excuse for the findings of the Judicial Audit team of my
performance, but is made only to show the state of affairs of the court during my
stewardship of the same for a period of a little over three (3) years. However, despite
my earnest efforts, there were things which have been overlooked due to
inadvertence and these were just product [sic] of human weakness and imperfection.9
This Court has always impressed upon judges the necessity of deciding cases with
dispatch. Section 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness." Rule 3.05 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge shall dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canon 6 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that "[a judge] should be prompt in disposing of all
matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied."
Section 15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that judges of lower courts
decide cases within three months from the date of submission.10
This Court has repeatedly reminded judges that they must resolve matters pending
before them promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-
month period. If they cannot comply with the same, they should ask for an extension
from the Supreme Court upon meritorious grounds. The rule is that the reglementary
period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have been
granted additional time.
Judges must dispose of the court’s business promptly. Delay in the disposition of
cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions on them.11

Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge,12 penalized

either by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one nor more than three months; or by a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱20,000.00.13 We consider, however, that Judge Mantua’s earnest efforts
in attending to the pending cases in his docket during his incumbency serve to negate
his liability.

This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial
audit.1âwphi1 However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to
recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their
incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the
results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow
them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the
violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To
avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted at least six months
before a judge’s compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective monitoring of a
judge’s observance of the time limits required in the disposition of cases is hampered
by limited resources. These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge
Mantua’s right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the complaint against Judge Celso L. Mantua is DISMISSED. The

Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to
release the retirement pay and other benefits due Judge Mantua unless he is charged
in some other administrative complaint or the same is otherwise withheld for some
other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1688               February 10, 2009 In its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1763-MTJ) respondent violated basic procedure and the code of judicial conduct.6 It also
found that respondent had been previously admonished for gross ignorance
DANILO DAVID S. MARIANO, Complainant, of the law, dereliction of duty, partiality, oppression and incompetence
vs. in Prado v. Judge Nacional.7
JUDGE JOSE P. NACIONAL, Respondent.
The OCA recommended that respondent be held liable for violation of judicial
RESOLUTION conduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure. It proposed that
respondent be fined ₱20,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
CORONA, J.:

The findings of the OCA are well-taken but we do not agree with the
This concerns an administrative complaint stemming from an action for
recommended penalty.
ejectment1 docketed as Civil Case No. 12334.2 In the course of the ejectment
proceedings, respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional issued a pre-trial order
dated September 3, 2004 requiring the parties to file their respective position Without doubt, Civil Case No. 12334 was a case of unlawful detainer covered
papers and affidavits of witnesses on September 30, 2004. The parties by the RRSP.8 Section 5 of the RRSP explicitly provides that only complaints,
complied with the September 3, 2004 order. compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims pleaded in the answer, as well
as the answers to these pleadings, are allowed. The RRSP also expressly
prohibits the filing of a memorandum.9 The same prohibition is contained in
Subsequently, respondent issued an order dated December 28,
Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court (ROC).
20043 requiring the parties to submit their respective "memorand[a] in the
form of a court decision." The parties likewise complied with this order. The
case was eventually decided by respondent on February 14, 2005. The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in
settling unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases. To aid the judiciary in
proceeding with these cases, the RRSP was promulgated with the following
Complainant avers that the issuance of the December 28, 2004 order
rationale:10
violated the prohibition on memoranda by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure (RRSP). Complainant likewise posits that respondent violated the
Rules when he decided the case only on February 14, 2005 or 136 days from [T]he adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment
the date required by law.4 of the judiciary to enforce the constitutional right of litigants to a speedy
disposition of their cases. It was promulgated [to] achiev[e] "an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases." Any member of the judiciary who
In view of respondent’s acts, complainant filed this administrative complaint
causes the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule is sanctionable.
for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty and
violation of judicial conduct.
The necessity of promptly resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry
cases is made more imperative by the express legal provisions on periods of
In his comment, respondent admitted that he had exceeded the maximum
rendition of judgments. Specifically, Section 11, Rule 70 of the ROC provides
period allowed under the RRSP. He offered the following excuses: (1) the
that the court shall render judgment within 30 days after receipt of the
quality of his decision had priority over compliance with the reglementary
period; (2) his caseload was heavy and (3) the documents of the case were
voluminous. He also justified his December 28, 2004 order by stating that the affidavits and position papers, or expiration of the period for filing the same.
case was "not an ordinary one."5 The RRSP provides for the same period.

Respondent added that this administrative complaint was filed only because Corollarily, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct11 admonishes
the judgment was against complainant. all judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide
cases12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the
Constitution.13 This is supplemented by Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary14 requiring judges to perform
all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
We cannot accept the justifications advanced by respondent. Doing so will
undermine the wisdom behind procedural rules and diminish respect for the
law. We reiterate that a judge (by himself) cannot choose to prolong the
period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.15 If a judge needs
more time to decide a case, he should formally request this Court for an
extension of the deadline.
The rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for
interpretation.  We have held in numerous cases that the failure to apply
1avvphi1.zw+
elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and
procedure.16 Neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent
because, as previously noted, the rules violated were basic procedural rules.
All that was needed for respondent to do was to apply them.17 Unfortunately,
he chose not to.
It is settled that one who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the
public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to
maintain professional competence at all times.18 Competence and diligence
are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.19
1230 as well as Rules 1.0331 and 12.0432 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Respondent also transgressed Rule 10.0333 of the CPR
when he violated the provisions of the RRSP and the ROC.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional is hereby
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and procedure for which he
is FINED ₱40,000. He is also found GUILTY of violation of Rule 3.05, Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he
is FINED ₱20,000. Respondent is furthermore found GUILTY of violation of
Canons 1 and 12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is FINED ₱10,000.
He is hereby ordered to remit payment of the fines within ten (10) days from
receipt of this resolution.
Respondent is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall warrant an even more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of
respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

We note that aside from Prado v. Judge Nacional20 for which respondent was SO ORDERED.
admonished in 2001, he was also indicted for conduct unbecoming of a judge
in Abesa v. Judge Nacional.21

Respondent argues that his 24 years in the judiciary should be considered in

his favor. We disagree. Length of service, as a factor in determining the
imposable penalty in administrative cases, is a double-edged sword. While it
can sometimes help mitigate the penalty, it can also justify a more serious
sanction.22 Whatever it is, a judge’s long years of service on the bench are no
excuse for ignorance of procedural rules.23

As to the penalty that should be properly meted out to respondent, A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC governs.24 Gross ignorance of the law and procedure is classified
as a serious charge.25 And for his violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
the evidence shows that he only committed simple misconduct, a less
serious charge.26

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,27 this administrative case against

respondent is also considered a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
member of the bar.28 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct
embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 129 and
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017             June 19, 2008
LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (Ret.), complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de
Oro City, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM, J.:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge
filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force
Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.
On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional
Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC
Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products
from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal
and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).1
On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc.
asking for explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest
products.3 In an affidavit4 dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.’s Branch
Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the
government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines,
Inc. had no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans.
On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr.
posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container
Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative
adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody
appeared during the adjudication.5 In a resolution6 dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting
as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director Clarence
L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.
In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain
Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the
defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products
to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March 2005, Judge
Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8 ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take
possession of the forest products.

On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,9 the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen.
DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside: (1) Edma’s bond was
Mandaue City, Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and insufficient; (2) the forest products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn
the names of the shippers and consignees: grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-interest; (4) the forest products were not covered
by any legal document; (5) nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable
period of time; (6) the forest products were already considered abandoned; (7) the
Container Van No. Shipper Consignee
forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the
NCLU – 2000492-22GI Polaris Chua Polaris Chua Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper; (9) courts could not take cognizance of cases
IEAU – 2521845-2210 Polaris Chua Polaris Chua pending before the DENR; (10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and
NOLU – 2000682-22GI Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot (11) the DENR was the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a
motion to dismiss ad cautelam10 dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the
INBU – 3125757-BB2210 Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot complaint for replevin and damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the
NCLU – 20001591-22GI Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3)
GSTU – 339074-US2210 Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez the State cannot be sued without its consent; and (4) Edma failed to allege that he is
the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest products.
CRXU – 2167567 Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
NCLU – 2001570-22GI Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez
In an order11 dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the
writ of replevin for lack of merit.
The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and
other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-
DENR Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody complaint12 dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the
claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered law and conduct unbecoming a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that:
them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella,
issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc.2 During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest partiality in
favor of x x x Edma. DENR’s counsel was lambasted, cajoled and
 intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as "SHUT UP" and
"THAT’S BALONEY."
xxxx
Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from
the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies available to him.
The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have done was to dismiss the
replevin suit outright.
xxxx
[Judge Paderanga’s] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit,
issuing the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to quash
clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law.
In its 1st Indorsement13 dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed Judge Paderanga to
comment on the affidavit-complaint. In his comment14 dated 6 September 2005, Judge
Paderanga stated that he exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin
and that he could not delve into the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they
were related to a case pending before him.
In its Report15 dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; and (3) used inappropriate language in court. The OCA
recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that
Judge Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary;16 and that he be fined P30,000.
In its Resolution17 dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Judge Paderanga
manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings
already filed.18 Since Gen. Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court
considered him to have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006 Resolution.19
The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for
conduct unbecoming a judge.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4
of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the
country’s natural resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,
states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is
punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut,
gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.
In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc.
without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner.
Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.
Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.
First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals,20 the Court held that:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts,
for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits
unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to
and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity
to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum. (Emphasis ours)
In Dy v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative
remedies before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court
held that:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power
can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal
to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
(Emphasis ours)
In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He
went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of
the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR
Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President;
and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,23 the Court held that all actions
seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that
agency — not the courts. In Paat,24 the Court held that:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should
have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the
 writ [of replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative
forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and
more importantly, being an element of private respondents’ right of action, is
too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
xxxx
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to
question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the
DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended.
Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the
Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition. (Emphasis ours)
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is
the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for
replevin itself stated that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over
the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR
had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been
commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v.
Judge Lilagan25 — a case with a similar set of facts as the instant case — the Court
held that:
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized
by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the
NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and
appropriate action." x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have
been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of
the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already
been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The
prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the
replevin suit outright. (Emphasis ours)
In Paat,26 the Court held that:
[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Emphasis
ours)
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject
of replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized
the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court
held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties
seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be
subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue
of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
(Emphasis ours)
Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the
writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao,28 the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he
plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from
the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to
him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to
dismiss the replevin suit outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or
his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.
xxxx
Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit
clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to
keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound
to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and
jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross
ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a
judge. (Emphasis ours)
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of
Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should
keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.29
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make
an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and
Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have
dismissed the replevin suit outright. In Español v. Toledo-Mupas,30 the Court held that:
Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the
judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of our
courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it
could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and
title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court:
"We x x x find respondent’s intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh
inappropriate in court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for."31
Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that Judge
Paderanga was impatient, discourteous, and undignified in court:
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is...
Judge Paderanga: I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]
xxxx
Atty. Luego: I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to...
Judge Paderanga: Ready to what? Proceed.
Atty. Luego: Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your
Honor, on the grounds, first and foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor,
with all due respect of [sic] this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin
dated March 29, 2005 was improper, Your Honor, for the reasons that the
lumber, subject matter of this case, were apprehended in accordance with...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is
your proof? Is that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your
seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: Under the rules...
Judge Paderanga: Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules. What
does [sic] the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it does not
need any seizure receipt? You look at your rules. You point out the rules.
You take out your rules and then you point out. Do you have the rules?
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the
apprehension, Your Honor, there was no claimant.
Judge Paderanga: Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego: But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic]
appeared.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no...
Judge Paderanga: Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you
taking it from?
Atty. Luego: From the shipping company, Your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the
ownership of that lumber.
xxxx
Atty. Luego: But the shipping company, Your Honor,...
Judge Paderanga: Shut up. That’s baloney. You are seizing it from
nobody. Then how can you seize it from the shipping company. Are you not?
You are a lawyer. Who is in possession of the property? The shipping
company. Why did you not issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping
company?
Atty. Luego: But the... May I continue, Your Honor?
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did not
issue a seizure receipt here. Well, I’m telling you you should have issued [a]
seizure receipt to the shipping company.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. You should know how to write
pleadings. You write the pleadings the way it should be, not the way you
think it should be.
Atty. Luego: I’m sorry, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: You are an officer of the court. You should be careful
with your language. You say that I am wrong. It’s you who are [sic] wrong
because you do not read the law.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Then you read the law. How dare you say that the
Court is wrong.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]?
Atty. Luego: Yes, in this case, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: Then you are representing them. They are your
clients. What kind of a lawyer are you?32
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of
Appeals [case] that the Court should not interfere, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga: No.
xxxx
Judge Paderanga: The problem with you people is you do not use your
heads.
Atty. Tiamson: We use our heads, your Honor.
xxxx
Atty. Tiamson: Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our
heads, your Honor.33 (Emphasis ours)
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers.
Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be
patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They should avoid the
attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They
must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language.34 They should
(1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all
persons who come to their court.35 In Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas,36 the Court held
that:
A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who
appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the
people’s faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays
lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be
temperate in his language. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care
and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his
discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser
of justice. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never
allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words x x x.
As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in
the judiciary.
Judge Paderanga’s refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin,
repeated interruption of the lawyers, and utterance of "shut up," "that’s baloney," "how
dare you say that the court is wrong," "what kind of a lawyer are you?," and "the
problem with you people is you do not use your heads" are undignified and very
unbecoming a judge. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,37 the Court
already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for repeatedly saying "shut up," being
arrogant, and declaring that he had "absolute power" in court. He has not changed.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a
serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of
benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.38 Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge
as a light offense. It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not
exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.39

The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga’s third offense. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Paderanga,40 the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority
and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while
declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to
"shut up." In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,41 the Court held him liable for undue delay in
rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer
of exhibits. In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the
commission of another offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case
and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga’s arrogance,
incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge.

Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him — one42 for
gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse
of authority, and the other43 for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross
ignorance of the law.

The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen
short of their accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of
public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.44

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW and UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTJ               September 19, 2012
ATTY. ARTURO JUANITO T.MATURAN, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A judge must exert every effort to timely rule upon a case submitted for decision. If
she thinks that she would need a period to decide a case or to resolve an issue
longer than what the Constitution prescribes, she may request an extension from the
Court to avoid administrative sanctions.
Antecedents
On August 12, 2004, complainant Atty. Arturo Juanita T. Maturan (Maturan), the
counsel for the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 67659 entitled People v.
Anicia  C. Ventanilla,  filed a sworn complaint against Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-
1 
Torres, the former Presiding Judge of Branch 60 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Mandaluyong City, charging her with unjustifiably delaying the rendition of the
decision in his client’s criminal case. Atty. Maturan averred that the criminal case had
remained pending and unresolved despite its having been submitted for decision
since June 2002 yet, pertinently alleging in detail as follows:
Court Record show that-
1. 10 April 2002- This is the date of the last hearing during which the defense
counsel, Atty. Williard S. Wong, manifested in open court that he has no
more documentary exhibit to offer and accordingly rested his case. The
Honorable Court then ordered the parties to file their respective
memorandum after which, the case was ordered submitted for decision.
2. 03 June 2002- The prosecution filed its MEMORANDUM. (Copy attached
as  ANNEX "A") The defense waived filing any MEMORANDUM as court
records show that up to this day, the defense counsel, Atty. Wong, did not
file any.
3. 09 December 2002- The prosecution filed a MOTION TO DECIDE case
dated 09 December 2002. (Copy attached as ANNEX "B") The Honorable
Presiding Judge simply sat on said motion and did not take any action
thereto.
4. 10 July 2003- The prosecution filed a SECOND MOTION TO DECIDE
CASE dated 10 July 2003 (Copy attached as ANNEX "C"). The Honorable
Presiding Judge denied it for the alleged failure to comply with the ORDER
dated 03 May 2001. Said ORDER involves sur-rebuttal evidence, however,
this has been rendered moot by the proceedings held on 10 April 2002.
Court records would show that as mentioned above, Atty. Wong manifested
in open court that the defense is already resting its case. In fact, the
Honorable Court thereafter ordered the parties to file their respective
memorandum and ordered the case submitted for decision thereafter.
5. 04 February 2004- The prosecution filed a THIRD MOTION TO DECIDE
CASE dated 04 February 2004 (Copy attached as ANNEX "D").
6. 11 August 2004- In the morning of 11 August 2004, undersigned
thoroughly reviewed the court records and discovered that the Hon.
Presiding Judge has not taken any action to the motion. Records also show
that the Hon. Presiding Judge has not yet made a decision on the case
despite the lapse of more than 2 years. When undersigned came back to
again examine the records in the afternoon of 11 August 2004, he was
surprised to be shown with a newly-signed ORDER also dated 11 August
2004 stating completion of the transcript of records and considered the case
is now supposedly "submitted for decision". 2
Atty. Maturan stated that Judge Gutierrez-Torres’ failure to render the judgment within
the 90-day period from submission of the case for decision violated Canon 3, Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Constitution, and constituted gross
inefficiency.
3
On August 27, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge
Gutierrez-Torres through its first indorsement of the complaint to submit her comment,
and also to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for her
violation of her professional responsibility as a lawyer pursuant to the Resolution
dated September 17, 2002 issued in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. 4
On September 24, 2004, Judge Gutierrez-Torres implored the OCA to grant her a 20-
day extension of the period within which to submit her comment. Despite her request
being granted, she failed to submit a comment, causing the Court to issue on June
29, 2005 its Resolution "to REQUIRE the respondent to (a) SHOW CAUSE why she
should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to submit her comment despite
the two directives from the Office of the Court Administrator; and (b) SUBMIT the
required COMMENT, both within five (5) days from receipt hereof, failing which the
Court shall take the necessary action against her and decide the administrative
complaint on the basis of the record on hand."  5
The records show that Judge Gutierrez-Torres sought four more extensions of the
period within which to submit a comment; and that the Court granted her further
requests through its Resolutions dated September 12, 2005, October 19,
6 
2005, February 8, 2006, and March 21, 2007. The Court likewise granted her request
7  8  9 
to photocopy documents relevant to the complaint. Notwithstanding the liberality of
10 
the Court in granting several extensions, she still did not submit a comment. In its
Memorandum dated August 25, 2011, the OCA rendered the following findings, to
11 
wit:
The respondent has consistently exhibited indifference to the Court’s Resolutions
requiring her to comment on the instant complaint. Her behavior constitutes gross
misconduct and blatant insubordination, even outright disrespect for the Court. It must
be borne in mind that a resolution of the Court requiring comment on an
administrative complaint is not a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively. Failure by the respondent to comply betrays not
only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful order
and directive.
Moreover, she has no defense whatsoever to refute the charges against her. The
records are replete with documentary evidence that in Criminal Case No. 67659,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Anicia C. Ventenilla," she miserably failed to
decide the said case within the reglementary period of 90 days. In fact, three (3)
successive Motions to Decide Case dated 9 December 2002, 10 July 2003 and 4
February 2004, were filed by the prosecution without any action on the part of the
respondent. By the time the instant administrative complaint was filed on 12 August
2004, more than two (2) years had already elapsed since the said criminal case was
submitted for decision. Clearly, the respondent is not
only guilty of insubordination and gross inefficiency, but also
of grave and serious misconduct, having violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Considering the gravity of the above-mentioned offenses committed by the
respondent, the penalty of dismissal from the service is commensurate, imposing the
penalty of dismissal from the service on the respondent will be in consonance with the
ruling of the Court in the consolidated cases of Alice Davila vs. Judge Joselito S.D.
Generoso and Leticia S. Santos vs. Judge Joselito S.D. Generoso, to wit:
"The failure of the respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions
aforecited constitutes ‘grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and
worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office. It is noteworthy that
respondent judge was afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to decide
the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply with the directives of
the Court, but he has failed, and continues to fail, to heed the orders of the Court; a
glaring proof that he has become disinterested in his position in the judicial system to
which he belongs.
It is beyond cavil that the inability of respondent judge to decide the cases in
question within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their date of
submission, constitutes gross inefficiency and is violative of Rule 3.05, Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that ‘[a] judge shall dispose of
the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.’
The separation of the respondent judge from the service is indeed warranted, if
only to see to it that the people’s trust in the judiciary be maintained and speedy
administration of justice be assured."
It bears mentioning that the instant case is not an isolated one. Several administrative
cases against the respondent are still pending before the Court, all of which invariably
charge her with gross misconduct and inexcusable inefficiency, among others, for
failing to decide cases or resolve pending incidents for inordinately long periods of
time. in similar lackadaisical fashion, the respondent has ignored the orders of the
Court directing her to comment on said complaints. She has likewise been previously
penalized with fines and suspensions. However, the respondent Judge has not shown
any sign of remorse or contrition, even as the administrative complaints against her
piled up. And worse, in her sala, hundreds of criminal and civil cases submitted for
decision and/or resolution remained untouched and unresolved, gathering dust as
they aged.
Finally, on 23 November 2010, in three (3) consolidated cases against the
respondent, docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-08-1719, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1722, and A.M.
No. MTJ-08-1723, the Court, in a Per Curiam  Decision, finally DISMISSED the
respondent from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except earned
leave and vacation benefits, with benefits, with prejudice to employment in any
branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities including government-owned
and controlled corporations. The court ruled therein that:
"The magnitude of her transgressions in the present consolidated cases – gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and insubordination, taken collectively, cast a heavy shadow on her
moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence. She has shown herself unworthy of the
judicial robe and place of honor reserved for guardians of justice. Thus, the Court is
constrained to impose upon her the severest of administrative penalties – dismissal
from the service, to assure the people’s faith in the judiciary and the speedy
administration of justice."
Even though the respondent has been dismissed from the service, this does not
necessarily mean that she cannot be held administratively liable in the instant case. In
its fairly recent Decision in Narag vs.Manio, the Court ruled that:
"Unfortunately for the respondent, this did not render her case moot. She must not
be allowed to evade administrative liability by her previous dismissal from the
service. Thus, for this case involving additional serious offenses, the Court finds it
proper to impose upon her a fine of ₱ 20,000 to be deducted from her accrued leave
credits in lieu of dismissal from the service."
Upon the foregoing findings, the OCA recommended that Judge Gutierrez-Torres be
administratively sanctioned as follows:
xxxx
2. Respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres be
found GUILTY of INSUBORDINATION, GROSS INEFFICIENCY,
and GRAVE and SERIOUS MISCONDUCT;
 3. In view of her previous dismissal from the service, a FINE of ₱
20,000.00 instead be imposed upon her, to be deducted from her accrued
leave credits;
Ruling
We adopt the findings and uphold the recommendations of the OCA.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters
filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-
four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by
the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution mandates all justices and judges
to be efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or matters pending in their
courts.
Reiterating the mandate, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary requires judges to "devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which
include xxx the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the
making of decisions xxx," and to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
12 
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness." Likewise, Rule
13 
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct  imposes on all judges the duty to
dispose of their courts’ business promptly and to decide cases within the required
periods.
These judicial canons directly demand efficiency from the judges in obvious
recognition of the right of the public to the speedy disposition of their cases. In such
context, the saying justice delayed is justice denied becomes a true encapsulation of
the felt need for efficiency and promptness among judges.
To fix the time when a case pending before a court is to be considered as submitted
for decision, the Court has issued Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989,
whose third paragraph provides:
A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of
the parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) day period for deciding
the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision
without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case
shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier.
Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or
suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by
another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period
of ninety (90) days for the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the
same.
The time when a case or other matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
by a judge is, therefore, settled and well defined. There is no longer any excuse for
not complying with the canons mandating efficiency and promptness in the resolution
of cases and other matters pending in the courts. Hence, all judges should be mindful
of the duty to decide promptly, knowing that the public’s faith and confidence in the
Judiciary are no less at stake if they should ignore such duty. They must always be
aware that upon each time a delay occurs in the disposition of cases, their stature as
judicial officers and the respect for their position diminish. The reputation of the entire
Judiciary, of which they are among the pillars, is also thereby undeservedly tarnished.
A judge like Judge Gutierrez-Torres should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of the obligation to promptly administer justice. She
must cultivate a capacity for promptly rendering her decisions. Should she anticipate
that she would need a period longer than what the Constitution and the issuances of
the Court prescribe within which to render her decision or resolution, she should
request a proper extension of the period from the Court, through the OCA, and lay out
in the request the justification for her inability. Yet, she did not at all do so in Criminal
Case No. 67659 entitled People v. Anicia C. Ventanilla. She was clearly guilty of
gross inefficiency, especially because her inability to decide the case within the
required period became absolutely devoid of excuse after she did not bother to proffer
any explanation for her inability.
The gross inefficiency of Judge Gutierrez-Torres warranted the imposition of
administrative sanction against her. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
14 
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less
serious charge punishable by either: (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more
than ₱ 10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱ 20,000.00. We adopt the OCA’s
recommendation as to the fine in the maximum of ₱ 20,000.00, considering that she
had already been dismissed from the service due to a similar offense of unjustified
delay in rendering decisions. 15
As a final word, the Court must focus attention to the indifference of Judge Gutierrez-
Torres towards the Court’s directive for her to file her comment despite the repeated
extensions of the period to do so liberally extended by the Court at her request. Such
indifference reflected not only that she had no credible explanation for her omission,
but also that she did not care to comply with the directives of the Court. The latter
represents an attitude that no judge should harbor towards the Highest Tribunal of the
country, and for that reason is worse than the former. She should not be emulated by
any other judge, for that attitude reflected her lack of personal character and ethical
merit. To be sure, the Court does not brook her insubordination, and would do more
to her had she not been removed from the Judiciary. Accordingly, the Court must still
hold her to account for her actuations as a member of the Law Profession, which is
what remains to be done after first giving her the opportunity to show cause why she
should not.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court finds former Metropolitan Trial Court JUDGE LIZABETH
GUTIERREZ-TORRES guilty of gross inefficiency, and imposes on her a fine of
F20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits, if any.The Court
orders JUDGE GUTIERREZ-TORRES to show cause in writing within ten days from
notice why she should not be suspended from membership in the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for her act of insubordination towards the Court.The Court directs the
Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA to compute the
balance of Judge GutierrezTorres' earned leave credits and forward the same to the
Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which shall compute its monetary
value. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J               April 12, 2011
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-
RODRIGUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We resolve: (a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 filed
by respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and (b) the Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision Dated 1 September) dated
September 15, 2010 of the complainant.
Both motions seek the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on August 24, 2010,
albeit on different grounds.
Through the Decision, we found and held Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez liable
for simple misconduct, and disposed against them and Associate Justice Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of
₱15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with
more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be
more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before
his court.1
A brief account of the factual antecedents is first given.
The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong,
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to
hear cases as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division
held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself
and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on
their having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the
procedure); (b) falsification of public documents (grounded on their issuance of orders
relative to the hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear
as if all of them had been present during the particular hearing acting as a collegial
body, when in truth they were not); (c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that
amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave misconduct (grounded on
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez’s making the following intemperate and
discriminatory utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime
in September 2006), to wit:
(a) ‘We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt
is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will
appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.’2;
(b) ‘You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director
Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for
one prosecutor who is doing nothing.’3;
(c) ‘Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang,
you are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of
their (sic) mother’4; and
(d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had
graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice
Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was better than
his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater.
and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that
Criminal Case No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the
criminal case had never been perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution,
the dismissal order being signed by all three respondents).
In the Decision of August 24, 2010, we explained as follows:
A.
Respondents’ Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
x x x           x x x          x x x
We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial
hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and
the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the
procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division
of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby
rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on
the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan
was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets.
They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices’ adoption of the
irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a
lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is
to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The
respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct – defined as the
transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or
disregard of well-known legal rules – considering that the explanations they have
offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to
maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing
distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which
must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-
motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was
attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had
not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in
adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby
expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their
proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence
that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is
not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption
motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure
was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition
of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the
irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit
recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded
judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro, viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it
should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and
deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race
to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration
before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration
of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which are more important than a
reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
x x x           x x x          x x x
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not
mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are
both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits
include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural
rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty
or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to
exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life."
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices’ signing of the orders issued
during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they
thereby made it appear that they had all been physically present when the truth was
different. Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated
as a separate offense.
B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrator’s finding and recommendation that no
evidence supported the complainant’s charge that Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the
offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the
complainant’s charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court
must accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings,
because they bear the certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who
had prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels
appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their
engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law
schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a
lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected
a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial
temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid
especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange
banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter
how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe).
Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy
towards all who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary clearly enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied
in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have
even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or
against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands
that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their
judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards
any person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they should live up
to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this
regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of
unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming
conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method."
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already
mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No.
171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such
dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court
of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction."
In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez make it
clear that they:
[A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer contest the Honorable Court’s
finding that the proceedings they had adopted in their provincial hearings fell short of
what the provisions of the law and rules require. For such shortcoming, respondents
Ong and Hernandez can only express their regret and apology.
Nonetheless, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pray for exoneration, contending
that they are not liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct
for the simple reason that, as the Decision has indicated, they "have not been ill-
motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rules in adopting the
erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their
disposition of cases in the provinces;" their actions were not willful in character or
motivated by a "premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose;" or even if their
actions might be "irregular, wrongful, or improper," such could not be characterized as
simple misconduct necessitating administrative sanction.
Also, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez posit that they cannot be made accountable
for unbecoming conduct because they admittedly posed questions on the law schools
of origin of the counsel appearing before them; that their propounding the queries, per
se, did not justify a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they
thereby never derided any law school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the
basis of their school affiliations, nor exhibited bias for or against any lawyer based on
their alma mater.1avvphi1
In the alternative, Justice Ong prays that the sanction imposed upon him be made
equal to that meted on Justice Hernandez. He "implores the Honorable Court to re-
examine the propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and
take into due consideration its own pronouncement in its decision that ‘the
Sandiganbayan is a collegial court,’ and ‘in a collegial court, the members act on the
basis of consensus or majority rule.’"
For her part, the complainant insists that respondent Justices be found guilty of all
administrative charges made against them; and that the penalties or chastisement be
increased to be commensurate to their infractions.
Ruling
Finding the arguments of the complainant to be matters that the Court fully dealt with
and discussed in the Decision, and there being no other substantial matters raised by
her, we deny her Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision
Dated 1 September).
We deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration,
considering what we held in the Decision, which we reiterate hereunder, as follows:
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit
together as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and determination of a case or
cases assigned thereto." The information and evidence upon which the Fourth
Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it
must be made directly available to each and every one of its members during the
proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the
trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three
members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of
one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even
in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became
impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The
internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility.
Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly
requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the
trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously,
the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in
the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the
hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents’ non-observance of collegiality contravened the very
purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all
three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and
employees triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always
required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding
higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a
Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener
judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases.
The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated
to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via
ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo
intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., the Court delved on the
nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its
head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the
collegial body itself. There, the question presented was whether Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two
other commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote
out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or
any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the
required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts
through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has
one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein
that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the historical
milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under
Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and
expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the
NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the
NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was
acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent
Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no
malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed
procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the
indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
As to the argument of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez against this Court’s finding
of unbecoming conduct on their part, the matter has been fully addressed in the
Decision of August 24, 2010.
We hold to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong that the penalty imposed upon
him be similar to that meted upon Justice Hernandez.
The variance in the responsibilities of respondent Justices as Members of their
Division compel the differentiation of their individual liabilities. Justice Ong, as the
Chairperson, was the head of the Division under the Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, being the most senior Member, and, as such, he possessed and
wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the
proceedings of the Division. This circumstance alone provided sufficient justification to
treat Justice Ong differently from the other respondents.
Moreover, we have noted in the Decision that in the exercise of his powers as
Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an
unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and
steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to
guarantee that proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of
substantive and procedural rules. To be sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada did not direct and control how the proceedings of the Division were to be
conducted. Their not being responsible for the direction and control of the running of
the Division and their having relied without malice on the Justice Ong’s direction and
control should not be reproved as much as Justice Ong’s misconduct. Hence, their
responsibility and liability as Members of the Division were properly diminished.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision
Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special
Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. NO. MTJ-04-1534 : September 7, 2004]
EMELIE TAGUBA LUCERO, Complainant, v. JUDGE FELINO U.
BANGALAN, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Allacapan,
Cagayan, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.1 As an administrative officer of the court, a judge should
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of
high standards of public service and fidelity.2
On August 15, 2003, Emelie Taguba Lucero filed a verified complaint3 with
the Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Felino U. Bangalan,
the presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Allacapan,
Cagayan, with Gross Ignorance of the Law for Rendering an Unjust
Judgment, Violation of Republic Act No. 6713, Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and Violation of the Rule of Summary
Procedure and Legal Ethics.
The present complaint originated from three (3) separate cases of Forcible
Entry filed against herein complainant by Wilfredo Garo in Civil Case 250-
L;4 by Federico Aguinaldo in Civil Case 248-L5 and by Rogelio Antonio in
Civil Case 249-L.6 All these cases were heard before the sala of the
respondent judge.
In relation to the aforementioned civil cases, the office of the respondent
judge through his Clerk of Court II, Fredelito R. Baltazar, issued three
separate summonses7 all addressed to complainant, Emelie Lucero.
Contrary to the express provisions of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure that all cases of forcible entry, irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, will be governed by the
said Rule,8 the above summonses failed to state that summary procedure
shall apply to the three civil cases of forcible entry.9 Each of the said
summons also required Emelie Lucero to file her answer to the complaint
within 15 days upon her receipt of the summons. Under the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, defendants are required to file their answers
within 10 days from receipt of the summons.10
On November 13, 2002, Process Server Bernardo B. Tan served the
summonses together with copies of the complaints upon the person of
Rendon Rivera, a purported nephew of complainant Emilie Lucero.11 In her
complaint, Emelie Lucero stated that the deficiencies in the summons
issued by the office of the respondent judge confused and misled
her.12 Notwithstanding the confusion, complainant filed her answers to
each of the complaint filed against her on November 26, 2002.
Thereafter, respondent judge set the three civil cases for preliminary
conference on January 15, 2003. However, the preliminary conference for
Civil Case Nos. 250-L and 249-L was reset to February 6, 2003. On the
other hand, the preliminary conference for Civil Case No. 248-L was reset
to February 16, 2003,13 a Sunday.
On February 12, 2003, before the preliminary conference in Civil Case No.
248-L was conducted, respondent judge rendered three separate
decisions14 ordering complainant to surrender the possession of the
contested property. Respondent judge grounded his decision upon the
failure of the complainant or her counsel to appear during the preliminary
conference set on February 6, 2003.
Complainant appealed15 the three decisions of the respondent judge to the
Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros, Cagayan, Branch 33, which annulled,
reversed and set aside the same on the ground of violation of due process
in depriving the defendant, herein complainant, an opportunity to be
heard. The Regional Trial Court held:
The records of the case bears out that on January 16, 2003 or prior to the
scheduled preliminary conference, the defendant-appellant has submitted
her pre-trial brief, thru counsel, while the plaintiff-appellee did not, which
is a procedural requirement before the parties may go to the preliminary
conference hearing. Instead, the lower Court has favorably granted the
moved (sic) of the counsel for the plaintiff-appellee for judgment based on
the allegations in the complaint.
It also shows that the notification for the pre-trial conference sent to the
defendant-appellant was February 16, 2003, however, the decision was
rendered on February 12, 2003, hence there was miscommunication of the
scheduled pre-trial conference which the lower Court should have better
look out (sic).16
When ordered to comment,17 respondent judge raised the defense that it
was his Clerk of Court II, Mr. Fredelito R. Baltazar, who erroneously
indicated in the summons that the reglementary period to file answers was
fifteen days instead of only ten days as provided for under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Such error notwithstanding, respondent
judge claimed that when complainant filed her answers to the three
complaints on November 26, 2002, she effectively waived whatever formal
defects may be found in the summonses issued by his office.
In his Comment, respondent judge did not explain why the summonses
issued in the three civil cases of forcible entry filed against complainant
failed to state that it shall be governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Neither did he explain why the preliminary conference for Civil
Case No. 248-L was calendared on a Sunday, a non-working day.
On January 19, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its
report and recommendation18 that respondent judge be penalized with a
fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for negligence, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we agree with the
findings of the Court Administrator, except as to the amount of fine to be
imposed on respondent judge.
All the complaints filed with the lower court against the complainant clearly
showed that they were "For: FORCIBLE ENTRY." These words appearing on
the captions should have alerted the respondent judge that the Rule on
Summary Procedure should be applied to all the three cases. Respondent
judge's apparent laxity in the conduct of his official affairs paved the way
for the issuance of three deficient summonses which not only failed to
state that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall govern but also
gave defendant fifteen days to answer the complaints, instead of only ten
days.
Courts exist to dispense and promote justice. The realization of this
solemn purpose depends to a great extent on the intellectual, moral and
personal qualities of the men and women who are called to serve as
judges.19 A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart basic
legal principles and to harness his legal know how correctly and justly.
When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law by a
judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.20 Thus, to the end that
they be the personification of justice and rule of law, judges should strive
for a level of excellence exceeded only by their passion for truth. Anything
less than this strict standard would subject them to administrative
sanction.21
Respondent judge's explanation that his staff was responsible for
erroneously stating in the summons that complainant has 15 days to file
her answer instead of the 10 day period prescribed under the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure deserves no consideration. Time and again we
have ruled that a judge cannot hide behind the incompetence of his
subordinates. He should be the master of his own domain and take
responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.22 A judge should be an
effective manager of the court and its personnel.23 He is directly
responsible for the proper discharge of the official functions of his staff.
The efficient administration of justice cannot accept as an excuse the
shifting of the blame from one court personnel to another.24
The setting of the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 248-L on a
Sunday, a non-working day, further underscores the negligence of the
respondent judge. His collective actions fell short of the competence and
faithfulness to the law required of judges.25
However, we find no basis to hold the respondent judge administratively
liable for Rendering an Unjust Judgment and violation of Republic Act No.
6713. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence.26 In this
case, the complainant failed to substantiate her charges that respondent
judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment and that he violated the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6713. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.27
In its report, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent judge be fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).28 We find the recommended amount not commensurate to
the professional infractions committed by the respondent judge.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended,29 the
violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives and circulars is classified as a
Less Serious Charge.
The prescribed penalty for a Less Serious Charge is any of the following
sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that a fine of
Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) is commensurate to respondent
judge's infraction.WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Judge Felino U.
Bangalan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Allacapan, Cagayan, is
found guilty of violation of the Revised Rule of Summary Procedure for
which he is FINED Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00). Judge
Bangalan is further sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1785. March 10, 2005
DANILO ESPINELI, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for gross inefficiency, neglect of duty and
dishonesty/falsification of ‘certificate of non-pending case,’ filed by Danilo
Espineli against Judge Dolores L. Español1 of Branch 90 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite.
In his letter-complaint, Espineli averred that he was the accused in a murder
case that was tried before the branch presided by respondent judge. After the
prosecution rested its case, Espineli’s lawyer filed a demurrer to evidence on
March 8, 1999, without leave of court. Respondent judge ordered the
assistant provincial prosecutor to file his comment to the demurrer within ten
days. She then set the continuation of the trial of the case on April 19, 1999.
On the date of the hearing on April 19, 1999, respondent judge ordered that
the case be considered submitted for decision in view of the demurrer to
evidence submitted, without leave of court, by the accused’s counsel.
However, after accused’s counsel left the courtroom, Espineli arrived with his
NBI escorts so respondent judge set aside her previous order, reopened the
case and set it for hearing on May 19, 1999. She decided the case on August
31, 1999, convicting the accused Espineli (complainant herein).
On October 8, 1999, Espineli filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision but it remained unresolved as of June 19, 2001.2 Respondent judge
averred that she did not act on it because she was still waiting for the
comment of the prosecution.
Espineli surmised that respondent judge falsified her certificate of service by
not indicating that there was, in her branch, a matter that remained
unresolved even beyond the 90-day period set by law, for otherwise she
could not have collected her salary.
In her letter dated January 7, 2002, respondent judge explained that the
delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration was not intentional.
She said that the delay was merely an oversight "which could be attributable
to the maze of record that could not be properly kept, managed and reviewed
considering the limited space being occupied by the court and its staff."3 She
further alleged that she could not act on the accused’s motion because the
prosecution had not yet filed its comment.
In its re-evaluation of Espineli’s complaint against respondent judge, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the latter guilty of inefficiency
and recommended that she be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.
We agree, with modification of the fine.
As correctly discussed by the OCA, when an accused files a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution.4 From March 8, 1999 when the demurrer was
filed without leave of court by counsel for the accused, the case was already
deemed submitted for decision although the court could require the
prosecution to comment on or oppose the demurrer.
Respondent judge, however, set the case for hearing first on April 19, 1999
and then May 19, 1999. But it was not shown whether the setting was to hear
the opposition of the prosecution or to hear the evidence for the defense.
Assuming that it was to hear the prosecution, then the case should have
been considered submitted for decision on May 19, 1999. Respondent judge
decided the case only on August 31, 1999 which was more than three
months from May 19, 1999 or more than five months from March 8, 1999
when the demurrer was filed.
On October 4, 1999, accused Espineli moved for a reconsideration of the
decision of conviction. But as of June 19, 2001, the motion had not yet been
resolved. Respondent judge explained that she could not act on the motion
because she was still waiting for the comment of the prosecution and the
"working conditions (in her court were so) inadequate (and) unimaginable."
We find her excuse flimsy and unacceptable.
The Constitution provides that all cases or matters filed before lower courts
must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are
submitted for decision or resolution.5 Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires that "a judge should administer justice without
delay." Rule 3.05 thereof provides that "a judge shall dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." A judge is
mandated by the Constitution to render judgment and resolve pending
incidents not more than 90 days from the time the case is submitted for
resolution.6

No amount of explanation can justify respondent’s failure to decide the case

beyond the 90-day period prescribed by law and to resolve the motion for
reconsideration for 23 months. The noble office of a judge is to render justice
not only impartially, but expeditiously as well, for "delay in the judiciary lowers
its standards and brings it into disrepute."7

On the charge of dishonesty/falsification of respondent judge’s certificate of

service, no evidence at all was submitted by complainant. Hence, the same
has to be dismissed.

We note, however, that this is not respondent judge’s first infraction of the
rules and the Code of Judicial Conduct. In A.M. No. OCA IPI 98-523-RTJ
(Atty. Rexie Efren Bugarin vs. Judge Dolores L. Español, RTC, Branch 90,
Dasmariñas, Cavite), the Second Division of this Court resolved "to
reprimand respondent judge for acting in violation of the rules on fine in direct
contempt cases, with a warning that a repetition of the same offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely."8 The records of the Legal Division of
the Office of the Court Administrator likewise reveal that respondent judge
has been charged in 13 other administrative complaints; five have been
dismissed and seven are pending resolution.9

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and as recommended by the

Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL
is hereby found liable for inefficiency and neglect of duty. She is fined the
amount of ₱11,000 to be deducted from her retirement benefits, considering
that she compulsorily retired from the service on January 9, 2004.

SO ORDERED.