Reinventing the Policy Sciences: Three Steps Back to the Future

Author(s): Peter deLeon

Source: Policy Sciences, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1994), pp. 77-95
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532307
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Policy Sciences 27: 77-95, 1994.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Reinventing the policy sciences: Three steps back

to the future1

PETER DELEON
Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver, Denve
U.S.A.

Abstract. This article examines the contemporary condition of the policy sciences in terms of
its shortcomings, which can largely be attributed to an over reliance on instrumental rationality;
the complexity of the problem contexts; and an increasingly technocratic orientation. These
have combined to distance the policy sciences from their original multidisciplinary character
and goals of human dignity and democratic governance. The essay argues that a return to these
first principles requires three inter-related steps: a revision of the present policy sciences para-
digm; the development of more democratic or participatory procedures; and a focus on prob-
lem definition. The article concludes by proposing means by which these steps could be opera-
tionalized.

Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the

corrupt few. - George Bernard Shaw, 'Maxims for Revolutionaries,' Man and Super-
man (1903)

Introduction

The policy sciences may be characterized as having a long history (if they are
defined in terms of advice to rulers [Goldhamer, 1978; Meltsner, 1990]) and a
short past (if they are defined as a systematic, institutionalized approach to
improved governance). In terms of the latter definition, they were first
broached by Harold Lasswell (1949); two years later, Lasswell and Daniel
Lerner further articulated the concept in their seminal volume, The Policy
Sciences (1951). Since then, they and their more applied 'kin,' public policy
analysis in its various guises, have become prevalent, indeed, virtually in-
grained in the fabric of government. As Rivlin (1984: pp. 18-19) noted a
decade ago in the midst of an administration widely thought to be anti-ana-
lysis, it has 'dramatically changed the nature of public policy debate.... No
debate on any serious issue ... takes place without somebody citing a public
policy study.' Certainly during the current administration headed by a presi-
dent often said to be a 'policy wonk, Rivlin's (currently the Deputy Director
of the Office of Management and Budget) depiction is more accurate than
ever. Witness, for instance, the incredible number of 'analyst-years' lavished
on the questions surrounding an American national health insurance policy.
Few people, then, question the ubiquity of the approach, although many
have questioned its methodological foundations and assumptions (e.g.,
Dryzek, 1990; Stone, 1988). Even more have questioned its actual track

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78

record in terms of designing, implementing, and evaluating successful public

policies (e.g., Hofferbert, 1990). Still, the record shows that despite these
shortcomings, policy advice, advisers, and their philosophy are found in vir-
tually every bureaucratic nook and official cranny, regardless of the level of
government. So the central question confronting the policy sciences as they
approach half a hundred years is not so much their general acceptance within
the corridors of government; rather, it is to validate their presence as an
instrument for better government or risk becoming yet another vestigial (or,
worse, dyspeptic) organ in the body politic.
For the facts of the matter are relatively undisputed: the promise of the
policy sciences and the applied social sciences as set forth by such pioneers as
Lasswell, Robert Lynd (who wrote Knowledge for What? [1939]), Abraham
Kaplan, and Robert K. Merton - i.e., better government through the intelli-
gent use of the social sciences - has seemingly not been fulfilled. The norma-
tive challenges of policy sciences dedicated to democracy have been mis-
placed as we instead confront the potential of policy sciences supporting
technological or bureaucratic tyranny (Fischer, 1990; Dryzek, 1989); and -
most telling of all for an approach that prides itself on its use by government
policymakers - the product, paradoxically, is in great demand but goes largely
unused except in the most diffuse manner, or, alternatively in an after-the-fact
manner defending a policy choice. Carol Weiss (1980) wrote about 'knowl-
edge creep' and 'enlightenment functions' which, however accurate, are only
a part of, one step towards, what Lasswell and his associates had in mind
when they talked about bringing greater knowledge to illuminate the political
process (Doron, 1992: p. 304).
Charles Lindblom and David Cohen (1979) disparaged the contributions
of 'professional social inquiry,' clearly favoring what they called 'ordinary
knowledge' as a guide to social policy. More recently, Lindblom (1990:
p. 131) cut social policy research even less slack: 'For all that effort and for all
its presumed usefulness, I cannot identify a single social science finding or
idea that is undeniably indispensable in any social task or effort. Not even
one, I suggest.' Even if we partially discount Lindblom's seeming grouch, the
policy sciences as presently rendered appear to serve little more than 'aca-
demic' purposes.
I do not mean to be overly critical in this assessment. There are some
government programs in which policy analysis has made significant contri-
butions. Two striking examples are the 1988 Family Support Act (see the
symposium chaired by Wiseman [1991]) and the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act. However, these instances are so singular as to make one
suspect that they pose as the exception that proves the rule. For the most part,
policy analysis within governments has restricted its successes to issues easily
amenable to simple cost comparisons, compiling a spotty resume of rather
mundane successes. Again, surely the policy sciences progenitors had greater
pretensions.
This article proposes to point towards some possible ways to increase the

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 79

utility of public policy analysis by, first, briefly outlining where the approach is
today (implying an even briefer summary of how it arrived there), second,
what some potential goals might be, and, third, most important of all, how
these goals might be attained.

Where are we now?

The intellectual and professional developments of the policy sciences (and its
policy analysis derivatives) have been well documented in a number of places
(see Torgerson, 1986; Ascher, 1986; or deLeon, 1988, for a review). Principal
among the approach's genetic composition is its methodological and utili-
tarianism debts to economics and operations research (a generous definition
meant to include systems analysis), its normative debt to political science, and
its administrative debts ascribed to the law and public administration. To be
sure, for most of its tenure, economics (and, in particular, micro-economics)
were the primus inter pares, with benefit/cost analysis representing the ana-
lyst's methodological touchstone. The primacy of this perspective was per-
haps best represented by the Executive Order issued by President Ronald
Reagan to the effect that all new federal government regulations must be
accorded a benefit/cost analysis prior to their promulgation.2
On the other side of the contribution ledger, policy scientists consciously
sought to distance themselves from public administration scholars. Although
their respective venues were basically the same, the initial cadre of policy
researchers seemed to view public administration as overly concerned with
workaday administrative rather than policymaking exercises. Similarly, public
administration treated the 'upstart' policy sciences as if they offered little that
was new or useful. This antagonistic relationship seemed to mirror the tradi-
tional public administration distinction between policymaking and program
administration. Thus, the two fields abjured each other, traveling separate
conceptual and career paths although their public sector missions regarding
better government were, for all intents and purposes, identical.
More recently, economists and their economics-based analyses, including
computer simulations, have come under attack, even from economists them-
selves. Alice Rivlin, the past president of the American Economics Associa-
tion, chastised her colleagues: 'Economists ... in their usual fashion, have
been short on realism and long on theory and prescription' (Rivlin, 1992a:
p. 319).3 Policy analysts have been forced by the field's worrisome track
record to recruit other disciplinary perspectives and approaches into the poli-
cy sciences' pantheon of preferred methodologies. For instance, Weimer and
Vining's (1992) fine Policy Analysis text features such well-honed economic
criteria as market tests, Pareto optimality, and marginal pricing; however,
much of their text is devoted to such distinctly non-economic phenomena as
implementation, communicating results, and even professional ethics.4 Downs
and Larkey (1985) have dealt a lethal blow to the wide-spread use of benefit/

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80

cost analysis, narrowing its use to only a limited number of well-bounded

(and often uninteresting) problems. A 1991 review of mathematical modeling
by a commission of the National Academy of Sciences revealed the inadequa-
cies of economic modeling and computer simulation, prompting a call for a
'second revolution' as Eric Hanushek, the commission's chair, has explained
(quoted in Kosterlitz, 1991: p. 2412):

We're talking about a second revolution in policy analysis. The first was to
bring about systematic analyses about the costs and benefits of policy. The
second we're calling for is to worry about the accuracy of the estimates and
improve them.

The increasingly obvious problem inherent in vexatious theory (Brunner,

1991) and deficient data (Maier, 1991) undermine any semblance within the
policy sciences to tightly constructed econometric models and even less to
those models posed by the natural sciences (Gilsian and Volpe, 1989).
Problems nominally suited to conventional policy analysis techniques
deriving a relatively dominant solution have been found to be political rather
than analytical in nature and disposition (Jenkins-Smith, 1990: ch. 5).
This movement away from the more empirical components of the policy
sciences is reflective of a larger intellectual trend in the social sciences, that of
post-positivism. Positivism - with its fundamental reliance on objective ana-
lysis, scientific canons, and rational action - accentuates what has been the
main pattern of Western thought since at least the Age of the Enlightenment.
However, its basic assumption of individual and institutional rationality has -
in the face of a world that is, on many occasions, deliberately and determined-
ly 'irrational' - inevitably sown the seeds for its own shortcomings (see
Brunner, 1991; and, especially, Dryzek, 1990). Even in policy debates over
issues that are apparently characterized by their economics, such as energy
and environmental policies, a close examination of the failures reveals that
economic thought must take a decided back seat to political and individual
behaviors, neither, perforce, 'rational' in nature (Stern, 1986). For example,
policymakers grappling with environmental pollution have consistently re-
jected the economists' consensual solution of market-oriented incentives regi-
men for the less efficient but politically more palatable program of regulation
(Dryzek, 1993). There can be little explanation except the primacy of homo
civicus over homo economicus, with scant regard to theoretic elegance or
analytic convenience proffered by economics.
The explanation for this seemingly 'irrational' and 'deviant' behavior is not
that policymakers are 'wrong acting' or 'don't understand.' Rather, it is that the
policy analysts and their professional paradigms are often 'wrong thinking'
and 'don't understand.' People and organizations follow their social and
political proclivities. To the extent that these priorities coincide with their
economic preferences, then economic-based policy analysis can provide
powerful policy insights (e.g., see Weimer, 1992). To the extent they diverge,

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 81

then economic-based policy analysis is of marginal, perhaps no use. The acri-

monious debates in the United States over the North American Free Trade
Association (OTA, 1992; Krugman, 1993; and Castaiieda, 1993) - putatively
a trilateral issue based on a straightforward trade and economics calculus
benefitting all concerned - illustrates the inadequacy of the economic actor
approach. More generally, it also indicates that the guiding influence of positi-
vism and its empirical progeny is insufficient to stand as the philosophical
fount of the policy sciences if they aspire to improve directly the act of gov-
ernance.

There is another contemporary groundwell within the

munity, a coming of professional age in which analysts
that the problems of the political world are much more
resistant to change (let alone correction) than they had
well beyond the power of their models to replicate (Hen
1992). The policy world is replete with unintended and
quences, almost all of which are damaging. For instance,
policies the government designed to rescue the Savings
caught in a credit crunch during the 1960s and early 197
the disastrous S&L crises a brief few years later. Likew
tainment policies seemingly have exacerbated health car
demons they were designed to exorcise. Simply, the comple
lems has overwhelmed our abilities to understand and th
at hand. Policy scientists regularly find themselves reduced
identifying what they do not know, an admission that lend
(a laudable advance from the self-confident heyday of e
[deLeon, 1988: Ch. 3]) but does little to instill public con
wider use.
Finally, the policy sciences find themselves in an odd position for a 'scien-
tific' discipline, namely, there is no coherent body of theory upon which to
base the causal relationships that underlie policy recommendations. Similarly,
while there are sets of propositions to guide research and inquiry, there is no
integrated body of theory to test and validate or reformulate postulates.5 This
shortcoming was recognized early on (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950, preface),
but its effects have become particularly burdensome as the approach looks to
emerge from its present case-specific wanderings or policy process orienta-
tion, an argument most clearly articulated by Paul Sabatier (1991; also Saba-
tier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The dilemma and consequences are clear:
lacking a core causal theory (or set of theories), there is little way to decide
which theoretical aspects warrant further attention and which should be jetti-
soned.

This catalog of complaints has largely been of the endogenous variety,

those that are generated within the policy sciences community regarding its
philosophy, assumptions, and methodologies. There is one last problem
facing the policy sciences, one that is primarily exogenous. We are speaking,
of course, of the apparent distance between the relatively isolated analysts

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82

and the ultimate recipient of their policy product (Greider, 1992). As I have
elsewhere suggested (deLeon, 1992: p. 126), 'In the analysts' current position
(geographical and bureaucratic), they are effectively sequestered from the
demands, needs, and (most critically) values of the people they are reputed to
be helping.' The result is what James Fishkin (1991: p. 57) terms a 'disconnec-
tion with politics.' This movement towards a policy technocracy is the crux of
Dryzek's (1989) concern with the 'policy sciences of tyranny.'6 Accepting for
a moment Jenkins-Smith's (1990) evidence refuting this particularly trouble-
some technocratic scenario, let us at least admit that this gap, juxtaposed with
public policy's worrisome track record (the two are hardly independent),
bodes ill for the public's and the public sector's confidence in the policy sci-
ences as a means to improved government. And, by extension, for the ana-
lyst's ability to attend democratically to the public's needs as perceived by the
intended recipients. And, by further extension, for the public's well-docu-
mented alienation from and cynicism towards the public sector. This is, at
base, the most baleful of the policy sciences' predicaments.
In summary, we can offer the following generalizations regarding the
present condition (some might claim malaise) of the policy sciences. The poli-
cy sciences have been well accepted within the halls of power but their record
of discernible successes has not been especially striking. The reasons for
these shortfalls can be attributed to an over reliance on instrumental rational-
ity (in general, the effects of positivism, in particular, the influence of neo-
classic economics), the complexity of the problem contexts, and an in-
creasingly technocratic, undemocratic orientation.

Where might we be?

If we can accept these observations (at least momentarily) as valid readings,

then we can see two major remedial movements within the policy sciences'
communities. The first is towards a truly more interdisciplinary approach to
policy problems, moving beyond the prevalent economics imperialism to one
in which previously neglected corners of policy design and implementation
are addressed by a now-wider spectrum of social scientists: social psycholo-
gists explore behavioral patterns (intended and otherwise) (Kahneman et al.,
1982; and Stern, 1986); political scientists deal with institutions (Moe, 1984,
1990; March and Olson, 1989); public administration scholars emphasize
public management and intergovernmental relations; and sociologists (e.g.,
Etzioni [1988]) argue for socio-economic analysis, with an emphasis on the
socio.
The second trend is towards what has been called a 'post positivist' orienta-
tion (e.g., Ascher, 1987), one in which 'critical theory' (a la Jiirgen Habermas)
plays a central role. Critical theory suggests that there are numerous valid
avenues of policy inquiry, with the traditionally dominant natural sciences
paradigm and the rational actor model being only two among many. At the

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 83

same time, the postpositivist paradigm implies an egalitarian perspective and

operation, involving a larger number of policy actors than is currently the
case. This latter element has been labelled 'participatory policy analysis'
(deLeon, 1990; Durning, 1993).
These twin trends are surely not meant to suggest that 'numbers are dead'
and that policy research must rely on patently subjective approaches as politi-
cal instincts and case studies. However, it should be clear that Hanushek's
'second revolution in policy analysis' will have to 'worry about' much more
than 'the accuracy of the estimates and [ways to] improve them;' without a
broader vision, this revolution risks arriving at a wrong solution, albeit one
with enviable precision. The movement towards postpositivism does not insist
on the total abandonment of rational policy analysis nor the assumptions of
'economic man.' We are not implying here that the 'laws' of economics are
repealed. Instead, it holds that other policy research paths should be accord-
ed equal footing. In particular, the postpositivist orientation points towards an
explicit inclusion of a normative or value-critical policy analysis (Rein, 1978;
Rein, 1983), completely cognizant of the hurly-burly and ultimately decisive
role that politics imposes on the art and craft of policy analysis (Stone, 1988)
and policymaking.
I suggest that there are three principal steps or tasks for the policy sciences
if they wish to avoid the technocratic future and reclaim their original Lass-
wellian charters of the policy sciences of democracy, of knowledge of and in
the policy process, and fundamental concern with normative conditions, par-
ticularly human dignity:
* The revision of the present policy sciences paradigm;
* The development of more democratic procedures; and
* A focus on policy definition and design.
Although it is easy to draw up a prescriptive list, one needs to pay close
scrutiny to the driving assumptions. So before we discuss these recommenda-
tions in closer detail (in the next section), let us pause to examine the under-
lying assumptions.
The key assumption hold, first, that the founding arguments for the policy
sciences still reflect a worthwhile and obtainable set of goals, in spite of their
repeated failures and desuetude. Lacking a consensus on these goals, our
arguments are little better than senseless rhetoric. Second, we need to accept,
at least in broad outlines, the earlier discussion that, for a variety of reasons,
the policy sciences have not been living up to their initial promises and, con-
comitantly, that there is no reason to assume that they can unless serious
adjustments are made. And, finally, our attention covers the entire policy pro-
cess, from policy inception through implementation and evaluation to pos-
sible termination. However, the remainder of this essay will exclude a discus-
sion of implementation, which has been exhaustively covered elsewhere
(Goggin et al., 1990) and has developed a massive literature of its own under
the rubric of public management,7 and program evaluation, which is similarly
well endowed.

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84

A very personal assumption must be confessed. For years, analysts have

basically agreed with Henry Aaron's assessment that policy analysis, by its
very nature, is a cautious, conservative enterprise; Aaron (1978: p. 17)
advises 'that research, insofar as it exercises independent influences on
opinions about complex social questions, tends over time to be profoundly
conservative in its impact, not so much in terms of partisanship as in terms
of change. In keeping with the incrementalist, satisficing, or muddling through
schools of thought, policy analysis, if it were to be successful, was held
to operate only on the margins. Surely there is good cause to adhere to
this maxim but, equally surely, there is good cause to realize that the maxim
should not be held sacrosanct. Political events over the past few years have
shown that radical changes can occur in political arenas (to name two, 1989,
the annus mirabilis in international politics, and the coming of an American
national health insurance). Moreover, the traditional incremental approach to
policy research has hardly covered itself with professional glory. For this rea-
son, I find myself persuaded by Douglas Torgerson's brilliant metaphor
(drawn from Leszek Kolakowski) of the 'priest and the jester in the policy
sciences':

... the priest is one who 'sustains the cult of the final and the obvious' while
the jester, in contrast, 'doubts all that appears self-evident.' The priest fol-
lows tradition, the jester is impertinent. The priest prizes unity, form, and
closure. The jester, perhaps appearing ludicrous, is a friend of openness,
paradox, and diversity.... Without the priest there can be no coherent
focus; without the jester, no lively challenge for development (Torgerson,
1992; p. 225).

In other words, the policy sciences, like virtually every other contemporary
movement, need to be open to diversity and challenge, only more so given
their desired roles and goals. In this spirit, we should occasionally be willing
to exchange our cardinal's miter for the jester's coxcomb, and vice versa, al-
though never forgetting where we have placed the other hat. For now, let me
wear the coxcomb, erring on the side of the radical, with comfortable confi-
dence that my excesses will be tempered by the thoughtful reader.

How do we get there?

When I propose a revision of the present policy sciences paradigm, I am not

suggesting that the 'scientific' approach to policy research be abandoned.
Rather, I am suggesting a greater catholicity - a choice dictated by the re-
quirements of the issues at hand rather than the researcher's tool kit - while
still retaining the necessary rigor regardless of the methodology. Following the
lead of critical theory, the natural science model should be only one of many
modes of policy inquiry, all equally legitimated as a function of the problem

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 85

under investigation. In this, I am in close agreement with Abraham Kaplan

(1963, p. 92):

Policy must be scientific to be effective.... But to say scientific is not to

speak of the paraphernalia and techniques of the laboratory; it is to say
realistic and rational - empirically grounded and self-corrective in applica-
tion. Policy is scientific when it is formed by the free use of intelligence on
the materials of experience.

The key is not a lockstep adherence to positivist methodologies, for in-

stance, welfare economics, simply because they have certain theoretic aspira-
tions or deal in quantifiable values or variables. Those approaches have al-
ready indicated their limitations in theory (Dryzek, 1989), data (Maier, 1991),
and results. Similarly, few studies of technology policy can limit themselves to
strictly technical issues (Smith, 1992). Instead, the proposition calls for a
much broader range of approaches, a true multidisciplinary exercise as de-
fined by the problem. Bobrow and Dryzek (1987) incisively demonstrate just
how important this is, as they examine the problems and solutions to air pol-
lution from a number of different conceptual perspectives, each one different
and necessary, none sufficient.
Compare, for instance, two renderings of political corruption. Robert Klit-
gaard's (1988) otherwise excellent study views corruption largely as an eco-
nomic phenomenon (e.g., personal monetary gains derived from falsifying
customs declarations or systematically abusing income tax statements). Klit-
gaard accordingly poses his recommendations in terms of the economic theo-
ry of principal agents (see Moe, 1984), or how a supervisor can monitor an
'agent's' work so as to preclude corruption. However, principal agents theory
cannot explain corruption in which the actors realize little if any monetary
gain (as was the case in the Watergate fiasco and, twenty-five years later, the
Iran-contra affair), nor how to sustain barriers to corrupt behavior because
corruption and its cures transcend strictly economic analysis and remedy.
And, in historical point of fact, we find that additional layers of supervision
and oversight have not prevented later incidents of political corruption; the
corruptions of the 1980s were carried out in spite of the Watergate-inspired
oversight legislation, such as the Ethics in Government Act and the special
prosecutor.
In contrast, political corruption can be considered a multifaceted condition
(deLeon, 1993) with its roots sunk equally in economics (i.e., pecuniary bene-
fits), political science (ability to rule), and sociology (functional aspects).
Sociologist Robert K. Merton (1968: p. 127) insightfully argues that incidents
of political corruption could be viewed as serving a structural and a function-
al basis when government services are lacking or seen as inadequate: 'the
functional deficiencies of the official structure generate an alternative (unoffi-
cial) structure to fulfill existing needs somewhat more efficiently.' Political
scientists James Scott (1972) and Michael Johnston (1982) view corruption

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86

as a means to circumvent bureaucratic 'bottlenecks.' These perspectives, com-

bined with the standard economic motives, suggest a much richer set of ex-
planations for political corruption. Furthermore, the multiple perspectives
indicate why it has proven impossible to eradicate, for corruption is often the
product of well-meaning searches for efficiencies; that is, it represents a
priority of expedition over equity in an attempt to circumvent time con-
suming, inefficient government procedures. As such, the standard corruption
cure of more oversight and regulation might well serve to create more bottle-
necks, thereby exacerbating the problem and leading to increased incidents of
political corruption!
The multidisciplinary approach also argues for a more variegated and effec-
tive menu of policy options than any single approach can muster. Political
scientists address organization while sociologist Merton (1968: p. 135) warns:
'any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing ade-
quate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by
the abolished organization is doomed to failure.' Economics disincentives are
central but incomplete; as Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978: p. 216), herself an
economist, cautions,

An effort to use economists' methods to synthesize political scientists' con-

cerns ultimately forces us to recognize the limitations of the economists'
approach itself. While information and competition may often reduce cor-
rupt incentives, they cannot completely substitute for the personal integrity
of political actors.

It is, then, the combination of disciplinary perspectives and insights that

present a more realistic opportunity to understand social and political com-
plexities. In point of workaday practice, this is usually how exemplary policy
research is engaged, with (say) statisticians, economists, political scientists,
and sociologists all working cooperatively, synergentically on a single com-
plex policy issue. The RAND study on homosexuals in the American armed
forces is a splendid illustration of just such an exercise (Rostker and Harris,
1993). The problem is that, at present, there is no overarching policy sciences
paradigm that steadfastly encourages such a multidisciplinary approach tail-
ored to the specific policy issues at hand, except for the fact that policy
problems themselves never subscribe to a single disciplinary position. Most
academic and training programs, for all their interdisciplinary posturing,
clearly emphasize one over the others. Operationally, the impetus is less in
theory or education and more in piecemeal practice that, however successful
or dismal, leaves little didactic residue.
In much the same vein, the policy sciences must avoid a reoccurrence of a
disciplinary domination, as was the case with economics during the 1960s
and 1970s, or professional ethos, such as incrementalism. There is no reason
why the policy sciences should reach a methodological consensus that would
admit only the priest or the jester; indeed, there are multiple reasons why, in a

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 87

polity characterized by diverse requirements, that the policy sciences should

insist on the dynamism of joint membership reflecting the exigencies of indi-
vidual policy problems.
The revised policy paradigm must, in addition, go beyond multidisciplinary;
it must insist upon a broader appreciation of what constitutes policy research
and makes it effective regarding matters of context, process, and client. This
implies a recognition of what Fischer and Forester (1993: p. 7) call the 'argu-
mentative turn' in policy analysis. This perspective emphasizes

in sociological terms,...the context-specific rhetoric character of analytical

practices - the ways the symbolism of their language matters, the ways the
consideration of their audiences matters, the ways they construct problems
before solving them. In political terms ... [it teaches] us about the ways
policy and planning arguments are intimately involved with relations of
power and the exercise of power, including the concerns of some and
excluding others, distributing responsibility as well as causality, imputing
blame as well as efficacy, and employing particular political strategies and
problem framing and not others.

There is, of course, a danger inherent in this advice towards a more ecu-
menical approach. Taken at full face value, an expanded policy sciences para-
digm could become a refuge for any manner of methodological sophistry, or
become such an epistemological grab bag that it loses all intellectual coher-
ence and validity. For this reason, policy researchers must adhere to the gen-
eral canons of analytic, scientific inquiry (see Kaplan, above) - so as to test
and weed out unlikely candidates - without being slave to their replication
(i.e., misuse) with tools that are ill-suited to the tasks at hand.8 The utility of
the selected approach(es) measured in terms of policy insights should be the
continuing, albeit difficult, litmus test. The basis for this advocacy returns to
the philosophical genesis of Lasswell's original statement of the policy sci-
ences, namely John Dewey's pragmatism.9
A corollary of this observation is a strong preference for approaches such
as Rein's value-critical analysis (1978, 1983), that is, ways in which a stronger
statement of the values underlying both policy means and ends can be made
more explicit. Wildavsky's (1987; also Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) empha-
sis on cultural variables, Sabatier's (1991) focus on policy change and learn-
ing, and Wilson's (1993) investigation of fundamental human values are cut
from the same postpositivist cloth. While new empirical methodologies, such
as technical risk analysis, contingent valuation, and super-optimum solutions,
might claim a certain fancy, they basically are building upon a largely prob-
lematic positivist paradigm whose returns are increasingly diminishing, or, at
best, can be seen as useful but not sufficient (Stern, 1986), that is, violating
the value-critical principle.
This thread leads directly to the development of more democratic proce-
dures within the policy sciences, via what has been called participatory policy

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88

analysis (PPA) (deLeon, 1990; During, 1993). The philosophy underlying

PPA is an applied descendant of a union between Jeffersonian democracy
and Habermasian critical theory, namely (and respectively), that all affected
parties should have a political voice and that it should be heard without pre-
judice or advantage (or what Habermas refers to as an 'ideal speech situa-
tion'). The PPA model is not proposed to involve citizens on a nominal basis
(as in perfunctory legislative or administrative hearings) or by the medium of
indiscriminate public surveys, but to enable them through the means of dis-
cursive democracy (Dryzek, 1990) to participate in the design of programs
that tangibly affect their well-being.10 Once more, the philosophic under-
pinning is drawn verbatim from Dewey: 'The essential need [in a democratic
society] is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discus-
sion, and persuasion. That is the problem of the public' (John Dewey, The
Public and Its Problems [1927]; quoted in Torgerson, 1992: p. 229).
The PPA goal is to develop and incorporate informed citizen sentiments
prior to designing new public policies that will affect those very citizens.11 In
this way, the policy analyst and, by inference, the policymaker, will have a
more complete evidential base upon which to make policy decisions, now
amended to include an articulated value component previously untapped or
unknown. The PPA rationale may be drawn from Torgerson's observation
that Lasswell

envisioned a profession which would promote both the general enlighten-

ment of the population and the widespread sharing of power in a demo-
cratic policy process. What we witness in the development of Lasswell's
work, then, is a methodological-political convergence which centers on
participation.... Just as positivism underlies the dominant technical
orientation in policy analysis, so the postpositivist orientation now
points to a participatory project (Torgerson, 1986: pp. 42, 43; emphasis in
original).

The crux of participatory policy analysis is that its purpose is to better

inform the policy process and, through direct citizen involvement, concomi-
tantly give the citizens a greater voice in and allegiance to the political system
and its processes. The means for implementing PPA, however, could be far
from axiomatic. PPA could require new (and sometimes controversial) roles
for the analysts. They must, for instance, devise ways to identify effected
groups, choose representatives from these groups, design ways to educate
them on the issues at hand, and then extract with some fidelity the sense of
the discussions - all this while maintaining a sense of impartially or, at worst,
balance. This raises the uneasy question of what happens to the interest
(lobbying) groups who already have easy access to those in positions of
authority and what their reactions would be.
The final recommendation deals with an improved policy definition and
design. The logic here is both historical and deductive. Historical, in that too

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 89

often we have found that a poor definition of the problem destroyed whatever
semblance policymakers had of dealing with a problem, as we discovered with
Lyndon Johnson's Wars on Poverty and Southeast Asia. Recent examples are
just as vivid: The American amity towards Panamanian President Manuel
Noriega turned to enmity primarily as a result of faulty problem definition.
The initially praiseworthy 1992 American involvement in Somalia for hu-
manitarian reasons crumbled because the policy design failed to contemplate
a change in conditions, in this case, a change in roles for the US military from
provisioner to peacemaker (Clark, 1992/93). Deductively, without deni-
grating the importance of the respective phases of the policy process and their
individual (and combined) contributions to policy, it is fair to say that most of
the other policy phases are already the recipient of exhaustive study (the
exception being policy termination). However, with a few notable exceptions
(e.g. Kingdon, 1984; J. Weiss, 1989; and Dery, 1984), little concerted atten-
tion has been focused on the tasks of policy definition. A great amount of the
recent literatures on problem recognition, cognitive limitations, organization
theory, cultural considerations, contextual analysis, and policy learning would
seem immediately pertinent but little utilized. A large number of policy areas
would be richly suited for the methodological and substantive contributions
available using ethnographic approaches.12
Yet we know that the problem definition stage frames and generates virtual-
ly everything that follows in the policy process, so our failures to examine
problem definition sentences us to operate through a glass darkly. In particu-
lar, it renders the promising efforts towards policy design - exercises that pre-
suppose an accurate reading of the problem, the context, the actors, and the
targeted clients to employ the appropriate policy tools and behavioral link-
ages13 - especially nettlesome. What do we know about, for example, the
roles of analysis and institutions in policy learning (Rose, 1993; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith, 1993), or time frames, or changing priorities when it comes to
policy formulation?
A specific example in the American system of government of this neglect is
the role of federalism or intergovernmental relations. At one time, it was
hardly considered, and then only in terms of policy implementation. Now we
typically address federalism in problem definition with only the vaguest idea
as to its structure, complexities (e.g., 'picketed-fence federalism') and ramifi-
cations. Rather, the issue of intergovernmental relations should be viewed as
both part of the problem and part of the remedy. As Krane (1993: p. 187)
admonishes, American federalism is more than a maze of institutions; it is a
matrix of reciprocal power relations.' Without these and other definitional
data, subsequent policy research almost invites failure or serious revision at a
later and probably more costly date. It follows, then, that policy definition
deserves a more detailed examination, both from a conceptual basis and from
a policy design perspective.

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90

Conclusion: Reinventing the policy sciences

Borrowing unconscionably from the current rage for 'reinventing government'

(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), this essay has proposed three ways in which we
might 'reinvent' the policy sciences. In this context, the word 'reinvent' sug-
gests that there is nothing particularly new, per se, in this advocacy. Rather, it
is a return to first principles, to the purposes and ideals set forth by Lasswell,
Kaplan, Merton, and Dewey. In this sense, reinventing the policy sciences
requires that we take three steps 'back' to find 'the future.' The vehicle may be
contemporary postpositivism, but the underlying assumptions are completely
consonant with Lasswell and Kaplan's (1950) original insistence on demo-
cratic processes and human dignity as the philosophical bedrock of the policy
sciences.

The binding theme among the three propositions is the importance of re-
establishing the policy sciences of democracy. This participatory orientation
is finding wide-spread currency throughout the literature on governance,
ranging from Rivlin (1992a, 1992b) and her vision of 'reviving the American
dream' to Sclove (1993) promoting 'Technology Politics as If Democracy
Really Mattered' to Dryzek's (1990) discursive democracy to Fishkin's (1991)
'deliberative democracy' to Yankelovich's (1991)'coming to public judgment.'
Ingram and Schneider (1993: p. 71) encourage policy design by observing
that 'Our central purpose is to identify policies that foster democratic partici-
pation' noting that policy design's greatest asset is 'an understanding of the
impact of policy upon citizen participation.' The discriminating question,
then, becomes less one of ends and more one of means.
It would seem that the most immediate means to this end would be to en-
gage the citizens more directly in the policy process. But this remedy, if un-
adulterated, could be dangerous; excessive participation at the wrong time
could lead to governmental paralysis; for instance, a national electronic 'town
meeting' on environmental protection versus economic development could
result in interminable debate, little concensus, and no decision. Witness the
spotted owl controversy in the Pacific Northwest and the debate as to where
to bury radioactive waste materials. In times of political crisis, the inability to
reach a decision could be dangerous; under more normal conditions, open
citizen participation in decisionmaking (e.g., Barber's 'strong democracy')
would almost surely present delays.
For these reasons, we have proffered participatory policy analysis as a
potentially viable course towards the proposed democratization of the policy
sciences. In addition, the expansion of multidisciplinary approaches assures
that a wider diversity of perspectives will be articulated. PPA has several dis-
tinct advantages. It is based on democratic theories of genuine citizen partici-
pation rather than (or in addition to) the participation of only vested interest
groups as interpreted by a removed, technocratic analyst corps. PPA engages
citizens in significant ways during the crucial policy definition and formula-
tion periods, those times before the policy die is cast. It encompasses citizen's

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 91

feelings, not just expert or technical testimony, for it explicitly assumes that
every person's opinion carries social weight. PPA directly involves citizens in
their government, its processes, and its choices, thus reducing the alienation
factor that permeates the contemporary political scene; in essence, PPA
'invests' the citizens in what they come to see as their polity.14 Ingram and
Schneider (1993: p. 89) correctly observe:

Persistent construction of certain classes of people ... imparts messages

that relate to citizenship and participation. The unvarying experience
people have with policy informs them of their status as citizens and how
they and people like themselves are likely to be treated by government.
Such information becomes internalized.

PPA should not be employed as an umbrella wherewithal. Just as Rivlin

(1992b) warns against the blanket decentralization of government, there are
policy issues and time frames that are not conducive to implementing parti-
cipatory policy analysis: strictly legal matters need to be resolved by points of
law; crisis management by the discursive masses would hardly be manage-
ment. However, excluding such a set of issues, there is still a large majority of
pressing policy issues that could responsibly be dealt with by a policy sciences
of democracy. There are areas and times when discursive, deliberative de-
mocracy is appropriate, such as the debates over the federal deficit, national
health care, infrastructure, and public vs. private investments. On a local level,
versions of deliberative democracy have been suggested for in urban planning
(Forester, 1988), regional transportation systems, and, increasingly, education
policy. The key criteria are that PPA must be 'pragmatic' - must be accepted
and operationalized by analysts and citizens (rather than remain an elegant
theory in an academic's eye) - and must choose its applications with pru-
dence.

In summary, there is nothing wrong with the policy sciences today that
defies fixing tomorrow. A 'reinvented policy sciences' appears to be within
our grasp, albeit not without a few obstacles. One obstacle lies with moving
beyond established operating procedures, which should not be especially dif-
ficult since their successes have been much less than certain. A more serious
obstacle lies with the new choice of sense and purpose. In this instance, we
can draw support and guidance from some of the initial policy sciences'
protocols, in particular, the participatory opportunities as enunciated by
Lasswell and others. This troika strategy could validate the 'policy sciences of
democracy' and, if successful, could bridge the present-day separation
between the rulers and the ruled, thereby revitalizing democracy itself. In
doing so, the policy sciences could help retire Shaw's curmudgeonly denun-
ciation of the democratic experience, to the benefit of all concerned.

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92

Notes

1. This paper was initially prepared for presentation under the auspices of the Distinguished
Professor series at the University of New Mexico's Institute for Policy Studies in Novem-
ber 1992. It was greatly revised for presentation at the 1993 International Congress of
Public Administration: 'Challenges of the Changing World,' sponsored by el Colegio de
Mexico, Mexico City, October, 1993. The paper has benefitted from the advice of Profes-
sors Hank Jenkins-Smith (University of New Mexico), Michael Cort6s, Linda deLeon, and
Richard Stillman (University of Colorado at Denver), Arturo Alvarado (el Colegio de
Mexico), Duncan MacRae, Jr. (University of North Carolina), and, especially, Douglas
Torgerson (Trent University, Canada).
2. One might legitimately wonder if the President was aware of what he was asking for, never
mind what he would be getting, but that is a discussion for another time and place.
3. Or, as Rivlin (1987: p. 1) warned her fellow economists during her presidential address to
the American Economics Association, 'If a golden age of economists' self-confidence ever
occurred, it is long since past.'
4. Compare Weimer and Vining (1992) to Stokey and Zeckhauser's earlier text, A Primerfor
Policy Analysis (1978), in which seldom is heard an encouraging word about the more
social side of the policy sciences.
5. Brunner (1991: pp. 69-70) disputes this 'alleged lack of theory,' claiming that 'From a poli-
cy sciences perspective ... there is no lack of central theory, which is something quite dif-
ferent from a causal theory.'
6. Lasswell (1951: p. 471n) had earlier addressed the 'policy science of tyranny.' His frame of
reference grew out of his concern over the possibility of the 'garrison state,' which devel-
oped from his earlier observations of militarism and totalitarianism.
7. Lynn (1992) both describes the evolution of public management as well as discerns its
major trends and directions.
8. Brewer (1973) relates how an unemployed physicist was hired to build a computer model
of residential housing patterns in San Francisco. Not surprisingly, given his training, he
based his model on the intensity and flux of magnetic fields in a vacuum!
9. Lasswell (1971: pp. xiii-xiv) wrote: 'The policy sciences are a contemporary adaptation of
the general approach to public policy that was recommended by John Dewey and his col-
leages in the development of American pragmatism.'
10. This differs in important ways from Fishkin's (1991) deliberative democracy; the selection
and education processes are similar but Fishkin's group conducts actual ballots that are
then treated as binding upon the policymaker. It also differs from Barber's (1984) 'strong
democracy' in that citizens are involved in policy advising rather than 'empowerment' and
actual decisionmaking.
11. PPA might indicate a departure from the priest/jester metaphor; both of those advisers
serve at the pleasure of the ruler, while PPA deliberately involves actors beyond the throne.
I am indebted to Michael Cort6s for this observation.
12. The classic example is by Howard Becker and his colleagues (1968) as they examine
students' perceptions of the academy.
13. For an elaboration of policy design, see Bobrow and Dryzek (1987), Schneider and
Ingram (1990), Weimer (1992), and Ingram and Schneider (1993).
14. By much the same logic as modern public management strategies 'empower' workers in
managerial decisions as a means to an improved working atmosphere and enhance pro-
ductivity; see Barzelay (1992).

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