Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196271               February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN
ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J.
SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners, 
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner, 
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD,
JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197221

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, 

vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197280

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO
LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as
Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197282

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197392

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, 

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197454

JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No.
196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex
abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d)
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi
Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the
temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.

These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of Republic
Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the
regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on
the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power
to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the
elected officials.

The Motions for Reconsideration

The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their motion:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL
ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS
AND IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.

II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.

III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT
IRREPEALABLE LAWS.

IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.] 1

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:

I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE

CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN
 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO EXPLICIT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN
LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS
OWN APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.

II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE

AND REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM
INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE
(OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR,
VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.

III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES
NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH
SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER TO
APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING ELECTIVE POSITIONS.

IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED
OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS.

V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS
OF OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE
ORGANIC ACTS.

VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾ VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR
REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW.

VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE

AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE
PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN
ARMM, AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN
ANALOGOUS CAUSE WARRANTING COMELEC’S HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS. 2 (italics
supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:

I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE

QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.

THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO
THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.

IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME
TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE
VIOLATED THEFOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

xxxx

II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT,
WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN
ENACTED PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054.

xxxx

III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE
2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 xxxx

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A
PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.

xxxx

V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER

OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

xxxx

VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE

APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3 (italics and underscoring supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:

A.

ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH
APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE,
WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING
THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".

B.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF
OICs FOR THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

C.

THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO
BE HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM
REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER
CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054.

D.

WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS
MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO
SHALL SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED
ELECTIONS.4

Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:

a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM elections;

b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, by constitutional mandate,
guides the governance of the Republic;

c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from
the House of Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite;

d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even after their terms are over
and non-elective individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by appointment as OICs, the
holdover option is the better choice;
 e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions, which does not include the
power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and

f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national and local elections as this
will make it easier for the authorities to implement election laws.

In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:

(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and
local elections?

(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?

(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature
of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?

(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory powers
over autonomous regions?

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the motions for lack of merit.

Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local
elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local
elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of
the Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous
with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall
serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.

To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily indicate as
Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT
NOON OF JUNE 1992."

This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by
the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."

I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the
incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the
Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in
1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never
attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.

So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we

should not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to
complete their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in
an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the
remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So,
consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12
Senators and of course to the local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we
can never have an election once every three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission
when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another six years for the Senators with the
possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are
concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election which would
mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years
to the local elective officials.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?

MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in
order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved — the first national and local
officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now
proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years
and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This
time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998,
while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995.
From then on, we shall have an election every three years.

So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections
every three years which was already approved by the body.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

xxxx

MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and Vice-
President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local
officials with the election of the President?

MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision
of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the
municipal officials.5 (emphases and underscoring ours)

The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a single
election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the
framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this
objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.

We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, 6 where we unequivocally stated that
"the Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local elections." 7 Despite the length and verbosity of
their motions, the petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this established ruling.

Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the
above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.

That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional
mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially
organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution
is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as
long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light
of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the
indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of
its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time,
to be progressive and not static.8

To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly shows the intention of the
Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of
this Article, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading
"Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local governments," and does not make
a distinction between the "local government" and the "regional government," is particularly revealing, betraying
as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate
forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local
government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified
as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.

The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local
elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed."9 Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local elections," we refer to the meaning of the
word "local," as understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a
community or minor political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of
the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.

To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not
enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. 10

RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054

The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA
No. 9054.

We cannot agree with their position.

A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections;11 it does
not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM
elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or
revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election,
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

We reiterate our previous observations:

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections
to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act
– RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of
the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No.
7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates
of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they
were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for
ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first
elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140
to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the
ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in
RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again,
this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently
with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites
embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054. 12 (emphases supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards the
date of the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054
that the succeeding elections are to be held three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections.

We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later
wisdom may recommend the inclusion. 13 Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should
be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the
omission.14 Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature, and courts, no
matter how well-meaning, have no authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space.

Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No.
10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the
supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 15 is unconstitutional for
violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.

The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the
legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike
down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:16

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things,
within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by
implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by
enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts
passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the
original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature
cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]

Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote,
provided there is quorum.17 In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting
requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated
the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding
upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. 18

We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he
stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to surmount,
effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. One
Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher
vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing
such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the
Constitution."19

Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad

Similarly, we struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite requirement 20 applies to all amendments
of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the
Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]" We
interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act21 – require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this
interpretation.

The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the plebiscite requirement is
to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people.

While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, we
disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA
No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all
amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective, this
would lead to impractical and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress by impeding Congress from
enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the ARMM
government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.

Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the President the power to
appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic
structure of the government, and thus requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No.
9054.

Again, we disagree.

The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.

We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the ARMM regional
government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional
government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall
temporarily assume these offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."

Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision

The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows
the regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the
ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections
since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing
their duties in a holdover capacity.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases
ours]

On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:

Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of
three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election
and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the
autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their
offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound
by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution
does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in
RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the
Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant
difference between the present case and these past cases 22 is that while these past cases all refer to
elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor,
and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 23

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to
suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no
authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the
ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of
synchronization.

COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections

Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently
empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered
the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.24 Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has
granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific
terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the
following provisions:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due
notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone
the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause
for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous

causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after
due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and underscoring ours]

As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address
instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended
because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other
analogous circumstances.

In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.

More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has
no authority to set a different election date.

Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can compel the
COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order
to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court
nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years.

President’s authority to appoint OICs

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint pertains only to appointive
positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.

The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. 25 Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the
1935 Constitution provides:

(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and
Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments. [emphasis ours]

The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution
is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make
are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President
is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in
providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction between the
first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as made evident in
the following exchange:

MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after "captain" and x x x delete "and all" and
substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear
that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 26

The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.

The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint."27The second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the President’s appointment power, in
recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. 28 The wide latitude given to the
President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint
officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which
have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power
of the President to fill the office by appointment.

Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment power should be strictly
construed and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. 29 Given that the President derives his power to
appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential
appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s
appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in
elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, 30 which merely grants the President the
power of supervision over autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is no incompatibility
between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power
granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform
their functions in accordance with law."31 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." 32

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their
belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the
petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the
President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice
Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they
are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the
President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard
are more apparent than real.

RA No. 10153 as an interim measure

We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within the context it
was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate
to synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to
postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide the
ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in
August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the
problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of
their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be
elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President,
in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint
interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms.
We have already established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last
available option.

In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that
synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness
in responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the
unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM
officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?"33

We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as
well as the community’s choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure
is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us.
Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure is comparable to the
interim measures traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective
offices upon the creation of new local government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to
appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the
Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly
(then called the Sangguniang Pampook).34

Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated December 21, 2011, question the
propriety of the appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting
Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and
given the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in recognition of the principle
of judicial courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our decision until we have ruled with finality on this
case.

We find the petitioners’ reasoning specious.

Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to lower courts in
instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be
proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. 35 In other words, the
principle of "judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court
would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or
court of origin.36Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President, who represents a co-equal
branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on
which our whole system of government is founded upon.

Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the
effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there
is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the
case,37a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and
must be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the
voting, "the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted." 38

Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues
that since motions for reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011
decision in the present case, the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and
effective. He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18, 2011 decision
pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not outright insolence" 39 to this
Court.

In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC, 40 where the Court held that while it had
already issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can also be
the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 41 where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court had not yet
lifted the TRO previously issued.42

We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of a motion for reconsideration
filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after we have issued
a final and executory decision, especially considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October
18, 2011 decision, which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No.
10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining
order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs. 43 (emphases ours)

In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present case. While it may be true
that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws
were dismissed by the Court, an examination of the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that
the Court did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we expressly lifted the TRO
issued on September 13, 2011.1âwphi1 There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent the President from
exercising his authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in
RA No. 10153.

Conclusion

As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his
motion, that our Decision has virtually given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in
the event that the elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.

We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.

This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances which led to the
enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that:
(a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for
special elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three years.

Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials from continuing in a
holdover capacity should some exigency require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan
elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

SO ORDERED.
  
 
 
 
SECOND DIVISION
THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY G.R. No. 127383
TREASURER AND THE
CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO Present:
CITY,
Petitioners, PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus - TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL Promulgated:
COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO
CITY AND THE GOVERNMENT August 18, 2005
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS),
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
TINGA, J.:

A Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the tax-exempt status of the Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS) for the years 1992 to 1994 in contravention of the mandate under the Local Government Code of

1992,[1] the precedent set by this Court in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Marcos,[2] and the

public policy on local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution. [3]

The matter was elevated to this Court directly from the trial court on a pure question of law. [4] The facts are

uncontroverted.

On 8 April 1994, the GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction scheduling the

public bidding of GSIS properties located in Matina and Ulas, Davao City for non-payment of realty taxes for the

years 1992 to 1994 totaling Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty One Pesos and Sixty

One Centavos (P295,721.61).[5] The auction was subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension allowed by

Davao City for the payment of delinquent real property taxes. [6]

On 28 July 1994, the GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land

owned by the GSIS. Another Notice of Public Auction was received by the GSIS on 29 August 1994, setting the

date of auction sale for 20 September 1994.

 

On 13 September 1994, the GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus And/Or Declaratory

Relief with the RTC of Davao City. It also sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The case was

raffled to Branch 12, presided by Judge Maximo Magno Libre. On 13 September 1994, the RTC issued a

temporary restraining order for a period of twenty (20) days, [7] effectively enjoining the auction sale scheduled

seven days later. Following exchange of arguments, the RTC issued an Order dated 3 April 1995 issuing a writ

of preliminary injunction effective for the duration of the suit.[8]

At the pre-trial, it was agreed that the sole issue for resolution was purely a question of law, that is, whether

Sections 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax exemptions of

government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be

exempted from payment of the realty taxes sought to be levied by Davao City. [9] The parties submitted their

respective memoranda.

On 28 May 1996, the RTC rendered the Decision[10] now assailed before this Court. It concluded that

notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code, the GSIS retained its exemption from all taxes,

including real estate taxes. The RTC cited Section 33 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, the Revised

Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by P. D. No. 1981, which mandated such exemption.

The RTC conceded that the tax exempting statute, P.D. No. 1146, was enacted prior to the Local

Government Code. However, it noted that the earlier law had prescribed two conditions in order that the tax

exemption provided therein could be withdrawn by future enactments, namely: (1) that Section 33 be expressly

and categorically repealed by law; and (2) that a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of

exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS fund. [11] The RTC concluded

that

both conditions had not been satisfied by the Local Government Code. The RTC likewise accorded weight to

Legal Opinion No. 165 of the Secretary of Justice dated 16 December 1996 concluding that Section 33 was not

repealed by the Local Government Code, and a memorandum emanating from the Office of the President dated

14 February 1995 expressing the same opinion. [12]

 

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

 
Now then, in light of the foregoing observation, the court perceives, that the cause of action
asseverated by petitioner in its petition has been well established by law and jurisprudence, and
therefore the following relief should be granted:
 
 a)      The tax exemption privilege of petitioner should be upheld and continued and that the
warrants of levy and notices of levy issued by the respondent Treasurer is hereby voided
and declared of no effect;
b)      Let a writ of prohibition be issued restraining the City Treasurer from proceeding with the
auction sale of the subject properties, as well as the respondents Register of Deeds from
annotating the warrants/notices of levy on the certificate of titles of petitioners real
properties subject of this suit; and
c)       Compelling the City Assessor of Davao City to include the properties of petitioner in the
list of properties exempt from payment of realty tax and if the warrants and levies issued by
the City Treasurer had been annotated in the memorandum of encumbrance on the
certificates of title of petitioners properties, to cancel such annotation so that the certificates
of titles of petitioners will be free from such liens and encumbrances.
 
SO ORDERED.[13]
 

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 30 October 1996, hence the

present petition.

Petitioners argue that the exemption granted in Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, was

effectively withdrawn upon the enactment of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 193 and 294

thereof. These provisions made the GSIS, along with all other GOCCs, subject to realty taxes. Petitioners point

out that under Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code, even special laws, such as PD No. 1146, which are

inconsistent with the Local Government Code, are repealed or modified accordingly.

On the other hand, GSIS contends, as the RTC held, that the requisites for repeal are laid down in Section 33 of

P.D. No. 1146, as amended, namely that it be done expressly and categorically by law, and that a provision be

enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the

GSIS fund. It stresses that it had been exempt from taxation as far back as 1936, when its original charter was
enacted through Commonwealth Act No. 186. [14] It asserts further that this Court had previously recognized the

extraordinary exemption of GSIS in Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim v. City of Manila, [15] and such exemption

has similarly been affirmed by the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the President in the aforementioned

issuances also cited by the RTC.[16]

GSIS likewise notes that had it been the intention of the legislature to repeal Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146

through the Local Government Code, said law would have included the appropriate retraction in its repealing

clause found in Section 534(f). However, said section, according to the GSIS, partakes the nature of a general

repealing provision which is accorded less weight in light of the rule that implied repeals are not favored.

Consequently with its position that it remains exempt from realty taxation, the GSIS argues that the Notices of

Assessment, Warrants and Notices of Levy, Notices of Public Auction Sale and the Annotations of the Notice of

Levy are void ab initio.

A review of the relevant statutory provisions is in order.

 

Presidential Decree No. 1146 was enacted in 1977 by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative

powers. Section 33, as originally enacted, read:

 
Sec. 33. Exemption from tax, Legal Process and Lien.- It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the System shall be preserved and
maintained at all times and that the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under
this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the system
and/or their employees. . . . Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the System,
its assets, revenues including the accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all
taxes. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the System as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
 

As it stood then, Section 33 merely provided a general rule exempting the GSIS from all taxes. However, Section

33 of P.D. No. 1146 was amended in 1985 by President Marcos, again in the exercise of his legislative powers,

through P.D. No. 1981. It was through this latter decree that a second paragraph was added to Section 33

delineating the requisites for repeal of the tax exemption enjoyed by the GSIS by incorporating the following:
 
 
Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary,
such as the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1931 and other similar laws that have been
or will be enacted, unless this section is expressly and categorically repealed by law and a
provision is enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as
an essential factor for the solvency of the fund. [17]

It bears noting though, and it is perhaps key to understanding the necessity of the addendum provided under

P.D. No. 1981, that a presidential decree enacted a year earlier, P.D. No. 1931, effectively withdrew all tax

exemption privileges granted to GOCCs.[18] In fact, P.D. No. 1931 was specifically named in the afore-quoted

addendum as among those laws which, despite passage, would not affect the tax exempt status of GSIS.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1931 states:

 
Sec. 1. The provisions of special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, all
exemptions from the payment of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges heretofore
granted in favor of government-owned or controlled corporations including their subsidiaries,
are hereby withdrawn.
 

There is no doubt that the GSIS which was established way back in 1937 is a GOCC, a fact that GSIS

itself admits in its petition for certiorari before the RTC. [19] It thus clear that Section 1 of P.D. No. 1931 expressly

withdrew those exemptions granted to the GSIS. Presidential Decree No. 1931 did allow the exemption to be

restored in special cases through an application for restoration with the Secretary of Finance, but otherwise, the

exemptions granted to the GSIS prior to the enactment of P.D. No. 1931 were withdrawn.

Notably, P.D. No. 1931 was also an exercise of legislative powers then accorded to President Marcos by

virtue of Amendment No. 6 to the 1973 Constitution. Whether he was aware of the effect of P.D. No. 1931 on the

GSISs tax-exempt status or the ramifications of the decree thereon is unknown; but apparently, he immediately

reconsidered the withdrawal of the exemptions on the GSIS. Thus, P.D. No. 1981 was enacted, expressly stating
that the tax-exempt status of the GSIS under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 remained in place, notwithstanding the

passage of P.D. No. 1931.

However, P.D. No. 1981 did not stop there, serving merely as it should to restore the previous

exemptions on the GSIS. It also attempted to proscribe future attempts to alter the tax-exempt status of the GSIS

by imposing unorthodox conditions for its future repeal. Thus, as intimated earlier, a second paragraph was

added to Section 33, containing the restrictions relied upon by the RTC and presently invoked by the GSIS

before this Court.

These laws have to be weighed against the Local Government Code of 1992, a landmark law which

implemented the constitutional aspirations for a more extensive breadth of local autonomy. The Court,

in Mactan, was asked to consider the effect of the Local Government Code on the taxability by local governments

of GOCCs such as the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Particularly, MCIAA invoked

Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code as the basis for its claimed exemption, the provision reading:

 
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
 
....
 
(o)   Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities and local government units.

However, the Court, in ruling MCIAA non-exempt from realty taxes, considered that Section 133 qualified

the exemption of the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities from local taxation with the phrase

unless otherwise provided herein. The Court then considered the other relevant provisions of the Local

Government Code, particularly the following:

 
SECTION 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemption or incentives granted to, or enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
 
SECTION 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building,
machinery, and other improvements not hereafter specifically exempted.
 
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. -- The following are exempted from payment of
the real property tax:
 
(a)              Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person;
(b)             Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious charitable or educational purposes;
 (c)              All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local
water districts and government-owned and controlled corporations engaged in the distribution
of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
(d)             All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No.
6938; and
(e)              Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
 
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all
government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, Section 133 was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the power of LGUs to tax the

National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, as evidenced by these cited provisions which otherwise

provided. But what was the extent of the limitation under Section 133? This is how the Court, in a discussion of

far-reaching consequence, defined the parameters in Mactan:

 
The foregoing sections of the LGC speak of: (a) the limitations on the taxing powers
of local government units and the exceptions to such limitations; and (b) the rule on tax
exemptions and the exceptions thereto. The use of exceptions or provisos in these sections,
as shown by the following clauses:
 
(1) "unless otherwise provided herein" in the opening paragraph of Section 133;
(2) "Unless otherwise provided in this Code" in Section 193;
(3) "not hereafter specifically exempted" in Section 232; and
(4) "Except as provided herein" in the last paragraph of Section 234
 
initially hampers a ready understanding of the sections. Note, too, that the aforementioned
clause in Section 133 seems to be inaccurately worded. Instead of the clause "unless
otherwise provided herein," with the "herein" to mean, of course, the section, it should have
used the clause "unless otherwise provided in this Code." The former results in absurdity
since the section itself enumerates what are beyond the taxing powers of local government
units and, where exceptions were intended, the exceptions are explicitly indicated in the next.
For instance, in item (a) which excepts income taxes "when levied on banks and other
financial institutions"; item (d) which excepts "wharfage on wharves constructed and
maintained by the local government unit concerned"; and item (1) which excepts taxes, fees
and charges for the registration and issuance of licenses or permits for the driving of
"tricycles." It may also be observed that within the body itself of the section, there are
exceptions which can be found only in other parts of the LGC, but the section
interchangeably uses therein the clause, "except as otherwise provided herein" as in items
(c) and (i), or the clause "except as provided in this Code" in item (j). These clauses would be
obviously unnecessary or mere surplusages if the opening clause of the section were "Unless
otherwise provided in this Code" instead of "Unless otherwise provided herein." In
any event, even if the latter is used, since under Section 232 local government units have the
power to levy real property tax, except those exempted therefrom under Section 234, then
Section 232 must be deemed to qualify Section 133.
 
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that
as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government
units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government
units"; however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the
Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of
Section 234.
 
 As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or
judicial persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the
LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC,
except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No.
6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise
provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234 which enumerates the
properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further
qualifies the retention of the exemption insofar as real property taxes are concerned by
limiting the retention only to those enumerated therein; all others not included in the
enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as to real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions covered
by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial
use of such property has been granted to a taxable person for consideration or otherwise.
 
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity
of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical
persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the
said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it
necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter,
R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the
petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under
Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by
Sections 232 and 234.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
 

This Court, in Mactan, acknowledged that under Section 133, instrumentalities were generally exempt

from all forms of local government taxation, unless otherwise provided in the Code. On the other hand, Section

232 otherwise provides insofar as it allowed local government units to levy an ad valorem real property tax,

irrespective of who owned the property. At the same time, the imposition of real property taxes under Section

232 is in turn qualified by the phrase not hereinafter specifically exempted. The exemptions from real property

taxes are enumerated in Section 234, which specifically states that only real properties owned by the Republic of

the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions are exempted from the payment of the tax. Clearly,
instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the exceptions under Section 234.
 

Worth reckoning, however, is an essential difference between the situation of the MCIAA (and most other

GOCCs, for that matter) and that of the GSIS. Unlike most other GOCCs, there is a statutory provision Section

33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amendedwhich imposes conditions on the subsequent withdrawal of the GSISs tax

exemptions. The RTC justified the affirmance of the tax exemptions based on the non-compliance by the Local

Government Code with these conditionalities, and not by reason of a general proposition that GOCCs or

instrumentalities remain exempt from local government taxation.

Absent Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, there would be no impediment in squarely applying the

express provisions of Sections 193, 232 and 234 of the Local Government Code, as the Court did in Mactan and

recently in Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. et al. v. Secretary of Interior And Local

Government, et al.  [21] and in ruling that the tax exemptions of GSIS were withdrawn by the Code. Thus, the

crucial proposition is whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the Local Government

Code notwithstanding Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 as amended.

 

Concededly, it does not appear that at the very least, the second conditionality of Section 33 has been met. No

provision has been enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential

factor for the solvency of the fund. [22] Yet the Court is averse to employing this framework, in the first place as

utilized by the RTC, for we recognize a fundamental flaw in Section 33, particularly the amendatory second

paragraph introduced by P.D. No. 1981.

The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, effectively imposes restrictions on the

competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue

restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially considering that it is a

lawmakers act that imposes such burden. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on

the amendment or repeal of laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter

should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.

It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition

against the passage of irrepealable laws. [23] Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental

best senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an

unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the

times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, [t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws

just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear

change.[24]

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability

to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing,

exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a

legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments

labors under delusions of omniscience.

It might be argued that Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, does not preclude the repeal of the tax-exempt

status of GSIS, but merely imposes conditions for such to validly occur. Yet these conditions, if honored, have

the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting irrepealable laws

applies in prohibiting restraints on future amendatory laws. President Marcos, who exercised his legislative

powers in amending P.D. No. 1146, could not have demanded obeisance from future legislators by imposing

restrictions on their ability to legislate amendments or repeals. The concerns that may have militated his

enactment of these restrictions need not necessarily be shared by subsequent Congresses.

 
We do not mean to trivialize the need to ensure the solvency of the GSIS fund, a concern that has seen

legislative expression, even with the most recently enacted Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997.
[25]
 Yet at the same time, we recognize that Congress has the putative authority, through valid legislation, to

diminish such fund, or even abolish the GSIS itself if it so desires. The GSIS may provide vital services and

security to employees of the civil service, yet it is not a sacred cow that is beyond abolition by Congress if, for

example, more innovative methods are devised to ensure stable pension funds for government employees. If

Congress has the inherent power to abrogate the GSIS itself, then it necessarily has the ability to inflict less

detrimental burdens, such as abolishing its tax-exempt status. If there could be legal authority proscribing the

Congress from enacting such legislation, such should be sourced from the Constitution itself, and not from

antecedent statutes which were themselves enacted by legislative power.

The Courts position is aligned with entrenched norms of statutory construction. In Duarte v. Dade,[26] the Court

cited with approval Lewis Southerland on Statutory Construction, which states:

 
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to
persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,
unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by
its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so
restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its
predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act
was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law.  This legislature
cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance
the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
statutes. (Emphasis supplied.)[27]
 

The citation is particularly apropos to our present task, since the question for resolution is primarily one of

statutory construction, i.e., whether or not Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 has been repealed by the Local
Government Code. It is evident that we cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of Section 33

as the RTC did, for by doing so, we would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through

legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a particular mode of repeal.

Thus, the two conditionalities of Section 33 cannot bear relevance on whether the Local Government

Code removed the tax-exempt status of the GSIS. The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded to all

persons, natural or juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the Local Government Code, applies without impediment

to the present case. Such position is bolstered by the other cited provisions of the Local Government Code, and

by the Mactan ruling.

There are other reasons that guide us to construe the Local Government Code in favor of the City of  Davaos

position. Section 5 of the Local Government Code provides the guidelines on how to construe the Codes

provisions in cases of doubt, and they are self-explanatory, thus:

 
Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
 

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
 
(b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against
the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.  Any tax exemption,
incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this
Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it; (Emphasis supplied.)
 

Also worthy of note is that the Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy as embodied

in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, [28] and local

governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to

congressional guidelines and limitations.[29] The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a

constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court.

We are aware that this stance runs contrary to that which was adopted by the Secretary of Justice in his

Opinion dated 22 July 1993, as well as the memorandum from the Office of the President dated 14 February

1995, expressing the same opinion. However, statutory interpretations of these executive bodies do not hold

decisive sway upon the judiciary but are merely persuasive. These issuances cannot derogate from the binding

precept that one legislature cannot enact irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its own power or the power of

its successors as to the repeal of statutes. [30] The act of one legislature is not binding upon and does not tie the

hands of future legislatures. [31]

 

The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but

restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section

39.[32] The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local

Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The

appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of DavaoCity, Branch 12 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

 

Costs de oficio.
 

SO ORDERED.