CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT.
26, 2018)
II-D. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
a. In Grave and Less Grave Felonies
PRINCIPALS
RPC, Art. 17
Principals. - The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION
PEOPLE v NUNAG
G.R. No. L-54445 (May 12, 1989) | Padilla, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Lorenza Lopez was gang-raped.
2. Though she only personally witnessed 3 out of the 5 guys rape her,
the other 2 were also convicted as principals of indispensable
cooperation since they held her hands and feet still while she was
being raped.
FACTS OF THE CASE
1. (1) Mario Nunag, (2) Arnel Mandap, (3) Efren Salangsang, (4) Danilo
Carpio, (5) Diosadado Manalili were charged and convicted before CFI
Pampanga for Rape.
2. One night in May 1978, 15 year old Lorenza Lopez was raped in a
backyard, near a ricefield in Minalin, Pampanga.
3. She stood outside the house of her neighbor Carmen Laxamana when
Mario Nunag walked staggeringly, maybe drunk, towards the her.
4. Nunag held her by the hand and poked a knife at her stomach and
threatened to kill her.
5. Nunag gagged her mouth and led her to a nearby ricefield 15m away,
and they were joined by the other 4 accused.
6. Arnel and Efren held her hands, while Danilo and Diosdado held her
feet.
7. She was still conscious when Nunag and Arnel raped her but lost
consciousness after.
8. When she regained consciousness Diosdado was raping her.
9. On August 4 1978, her mother noticed that she was already pregnant
and so she told them what happened.
10. Nunag, Efren, Diosdado all admitted having sex with her at different
occasions and all upon Lorenza’s seduction for a few pesos in
exchange, but that they did not rape her.
11. Danilo and Arnel also admitted that also upon Lorenza’s seduction,
they, at different occasions, engaged in lewd acts without sex with
Lorenza.
ISSUE
1. W/N all those charged are to be convicted.
a. YES.
b. Lorenza’s failure to immediately report the incident is
understandable due to the threats she had received.
c. Upon examination by Dr. Santos (August) and Dr. Naguit
(October), Lorenza was found to be around 7 months
pregnant which makes it unlikely that she got pregnant due
to the rape. However, she had twins so the bulge was a lot
bigger than normal.
d. Each accused is responsible, not only for the act of rape
committed personally or individually by him, but also for the
act of rape committed by the others, all five (5) accused
having conspired, confederated together and mutually
helped one another.
e. Each of the five (5) accused-appellants must be found
guilty of three (3) distinct and separate crimes of rape, the
first three, namely, Nunag, Mandap and Manalili, by direct
act and participation and the other two, namely Carpio and
Salangsang, by indispensable cooperation.
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RULING: The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. All 5 are convicted
of rape, 2 as principals by direct participation (she was conscious when
the 3 raped her) and 2 as principals by indispensable cooperation (when
she was still conscious, the 2 were already holding her hands and feet still).
PEOPLE v DORIA
G.R. No. 125299 (Jan. 22, 1999) | Puno, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Florencio Doria was caught selling marijuana in a buy-bust operation
wherein the drugs were turned over but the marked money was not.
2. Doria led the police officers to the house of Violeta Gaddao, to whom
the marked money was given.
3. While Gaddao gave the marked money to SPO1 Badua, PO3
Manlangit looked around the place and saw a box with one flap open
and inside was a packaging similar to where the sold marijuana was
placed.
4. Apparently, it was marijuana and Gaddao was arrested.
5. Both Doria and Gaddao were convicted of drug pushing.
6. Gaddao was acquitted by the SC because the arrest / seizure were
illegal and since the drugs were inadmissible evidence, Gaddao’s
participation in the crime was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were convicted with violation of
Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, hence the appeal.
• During a buy-bust operation, Doria took out from his bag an object
wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit but the marked bills
were not with him.
• Upon inquiry, Doria revealed that he left the money at the house of his
associate named Gaddao and so he led the police team to Gaddao’s
house.
• SPO1 Badua asked Gaddao about the P1,600 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over her house.
• PO3 Manlangit noticed that under the dining table, a carton box had
an open flap and inside was something wrapped in plastic that
appeared similar to the marijuana sold to him earlier.
• PO3 Manlangit peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
• Gaddao claimed that she did not know anything about the box and its
contents and that it was her first time to see the box.
ISSUES
1. The validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-
appellant Doria;
a. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not
unlawful.
b. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure says: A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
i. When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
ii. When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
iii. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
c. Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense
as a result of a buy-bust operation, hence the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even
without a warrant.
2. The validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao,
the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces
of evidence obtained therefrom.
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a. Both warrantless arrest and warrantless search were
invalid.
b. The warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal:
i. She was not caught red-handed during the buy-
bust operation to give ground for arrest under
Sec. 5a of Rule 113.
ii. She could not flee from the policemen since she
was just doing her daily chores then so it could
not be said that she was arrested in “hot
pursuit”.
iii. Doria pointed to she was someone to whom the
marked money was given to but not as his
associate in the drug business, and this
information does not give reasonable grounds
to believe that she was engaged in / has
personal knowledge about drug pushing.
c. The warrantless search was illegal:
i. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence may be admissible in
the following instances:
1. search incident to a lawful arrest;
2. search of a moving motor vehicle;
3. search in violation of customs laws;
4. seizure of evidence in plain view;
5. when the accused himself waives
his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
ii. The “plain view” doctrine applies when:
1. the law enforcement officer has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can see
clearly;
2. the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent;
3. it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item is an evidence,
contraband or other item to seize.
d. PO3 Manlangit did not know exactly what the box
contained so he asked Gaddao about its contents.
RULING: The prosecution has failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with
Doria in the sale of drugs hence she is acquitted while Doria is sentenced.
BY INDUCEMENT
PEOPLE v YANSON-DUMANCAS
G.R. No. 133527-28 (Dec. 13, 1999) | Melo, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Police led by Pol. Col. Torres kidnap Danila Lumangyao and Rufino
Gargar Jr. and demand from them P353,000 that was supposedly
swindled from Jeanette Yanson-Dumangcas.
2. They could not produce the money and they were killed and buried
immediately to conceal the crime.
3. Jeanette is not a principal by inducement because it was not proven
that she used force / fear / reward / command to make the Police
commit the crime.
4. Her words “take care of the two” does not constitute command.
Prosecution witness Moises Grandeza himself said that Jeanette
uttered these words: “Bring these two to the police and I will call Atty.
Geocadin to file the proper cases.”
FACTS OF THE CASE
• On February 20, 1992, Jeannete Yanson-Dumangcas lost P352,000
in a fake gold bar transaction with Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino
Gargar Jr.
• On August 5, 1992, the police officers involved planned to abduct
Lumangyao and Gargar for swindling Dumancas.
• On August 6, 1992, acting upon the alleged inducement of spouses
Jeanette and Charles Dumancas, and under the undue influence by
Station Commander P/Col. Nicolas Torres, police officers kidnapped
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Rufino Gargar Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao for a ransom of P353,000
but failed to extort the amount.
• They killed Gargar and Lumangyao and buried their bodies to conceal
the crime.
• Moises Grandeza, an officer involved, served as state witness.
ISSUE
Whether the convictions are to be affirmed.
1. Jeanette and Abeto are acquitted.
a. Two ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime:
i. by using irresistible force or
ii. by causing uncontrollable fear.
iii. There is no evidence that Jeanette used either
method.
b. Two ways of inducing another to commit a crime:
i. by giving a prize, or offering a reward or
promise, and
ii. by using words of command.
iii. There was also no evidence for these.
c. In order that a person may be convicted as principal by
inducement, the following must be present:
i. the inducement be made with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime, and
ii. such inducement be the determining cause of
the commission of the crime by the
material executor.
d. There must exist, on the part of the inducer, the most
positive resolution and the most persistent effort to
secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the strongest kind
of temptation to commit the crime.
e. Her words “take care of the two” does not constitute
command. Prosecution witness Moises Grandeza himself
said that Jeanette uttered these words: “Bring these two to
the police and I will call Atty. Geocadin to file the proper
cases.”
f. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto did his police duties without
acting in concert with the group. When Lumangyao and
Gargar were initially interrogated in Dragon Lodge Motel
after being caught and before being transferred to la
Hacienda motel, they said that the gold bars were with
Helen Tortocion. P. Insp. Abeto prepared a search warrant
and searched her house. He did not have anything to do
with the abduction and liquidation of the victims.
2. The case against Torres is dismissed.
a. Torres’ Death extinguishes his criminal liability and civil
action may be made against his estate.
3. The other convictions are affirmed.
a. The others are principals by direct participation because
Grandeza’s eyewitness accounts are credible.
PEOPLE v BOLIVAR
G.R. No. 108174 (Oct. 28, 1999) | Gonzaga-Reyes, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Hugo Callao was invited by Rolly Brendia to drink with his group.
2. The group left Callao but returned after two hours with Cresenciano
Canaguran killing Callao.
3. Witnesses claim to have overheard Barrion telling Cunaguran to
kill Callao to which the latter responded that he will try.
4. There was no evidence of force, fear, price, promise or reward exerted
over or offered to Cunaguran by Barrion which impelled the former to
kill Callao.
5. It does not follow by inference that the order of Barrion was effective
and motivated Cunaguran to shoot Callao hence Barrion was
acquitted.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• At around 9PM on February 14, 1987, the victim Hugo Callao was
invited by one Rolly Brendia to have a drink at the back of a store
owned by Balaito, where the accused Canaguran, Bolivar, Soberano,
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
Balbon and Barrion, were already having a drinking spree in a small
hut.
• The group of the accused left after a while but at around 11:30, a spray
of bullets hit the small hut, four of the bullets found their mark on the
different part of the body of the victim, resulting in his death.
• Canaguran was identified as the hitman while accused Barrion was
pinpointed as the mastermind who allegedly induced Canaguran to
kill Callao on account of the latter’s son impregnating Barrion’s niece.
• The witnesses Rolly Brendia and Damaso Suelan Jr. claim to have
overheard Barrion telling Canaguran to kill Callao to which the latter
responded that he will try.
ISSUES
1. W/N the statements overheard by the witness are sufficient to
prove that Barrion is a principal by inducement.
a. NO. There was no evidence of force, fear, prize,
promise or reward exerted over or offered to Canaguran
by Barrion which impelled the former to kill Callao.
b. It does not follow by inference that the order of Barrion was
effective and motivated Canaguran to shoot Callao.
c. The inciting words must have great dominance and
influence over the person incited; so direct and
efficacious for it to be as powerful as physical or
moral coercion.
2. W/N Balbon, Soberano and Bolivar were conspirators in the Murder
(Callao) and Frustrated Murder (Suelan)
a. NO. Bolivar is dead, the case against him is dismissed.
b. Balbon and Soberano were acquainted and were with
Canaguran, the gunman, but there is not enough proof that
they had conspired with Canaguran to kill the victims nor
was there any evidence of giving moral support. Even
though they gave alibis, it was to protect themselves.
RULING: The decision of the trial court is reversed and only Canaguran is
convicted.
PEOPLE v ONG CHIAT LAY
G.R. No. 39086 (Oct. 26, 1934) | Abad Santos, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Ong Chiat Lay was convicted of the arson of the building in
Zamboanga in which his store was located.
2. Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted.
3. The acquittal of the perpetrators means that no crime is established,
hence no one can be a principal by inducement.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Ong Chiat Lay was convicted of the Arson of the building in
Zamboanga in which his store was located.
• Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were acquitted.
ISSUES
1. W/N evidence proves that Ong Chiat Lay committed arson.
a. NO.
b. Art. 17, RPC says that in order to convict a defendant as
principal in a crime, it must be shown either
i. that he took a direct part in the execution of
the criminal act;
ii. that he directly forced or induced another or
others to commit it; or
iii. that he cooperated in the commission of the
offense by an act without which it would not
have been accomplished.
c. Ong Chiat Lay was said to be the principal by inducement,
the instigator of the conspiracy.
d. This allegation of conspiracy, however, has been
negated by the acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing.
e. One cannot be held guilty of having instigated a crime
without a crime in the first place.
f. Conspiracy being a crime, requiring the guilt cooperation of
two, at least, to constitute it, in which there is a mutual
dependence of the guilt of each person upon that of the
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other, principle would seem to demand that all the accused
should be jointly tried and convicted, or acquitted. In other
cases of dependent crimes, that upon which the rest
depends must be first established.
2. W/N the evidence against Ong Chiat Lay proved guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
a. NO. The gravamen of the charge was conspiracy, and the
acquittal of his codefendants is clearly inconsistent with
appellant's guilt.
b. To establish the corpus delicti in arson the proof of two
elements are required, namely,
i. the burning of the house or other thing, and
ii. the criminal agency in causing it.
c. The chain of circumstances which would have pointed to
the appellant as the guilty person was broken by the
acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing.
RULING: The judgment appealed from must be reversed and Ong Chiat
Lay acquitted.
PEOPLE v DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-30912 (April 30, 1980) | Melencio-Herrera, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. The group of Agapito de la Cruz kidnapped Yu Chi Chiong and killed
him when he tried to escape.
2. Agapito was the one who formed the team, planned the ambush,
promised the rewards, without him the crime would not have been
conceived, much less committed.
3. Agapito was convicted of Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder
because he was a Principal by Inducement.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• CFI Basilan found Agapito de la Cruz guilty of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention as principal by inducement.
• Antonio Yu owned 200 hectares of rubber and coconut land in
Lantawan, Isabela, Basilan City.
• Yu Chi Chong, is Antonio’s younger brother.
• Agapito de la Cruz, was an overseer of Antonio Yu.
• Agapito and 10 others were charged the crime of kidnapping with
robbery in band and murder
• On March 5, 1968, the group met together at Agapito’s house to plan
the kidnapping and profit sharing.
• On March 6, 1968, Antonio and his brother were inside their truck
when they were ambushed.
• Yu Chi Chong was kidnapped and P50,000 was demanded as
random, while his Rado wrist watch worth P150.00 and cash worth
P400 were also stolen.
• When he tried to escape, he was shot dead and his body was dumped
into the sea.
• Only Agapito, Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin were apprehended.
• On September 24, 1968, Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin were
discharged to be utilized as state witnesses and they pointed to
Agapito as the mastermind.
• Two witnesses told the police what happened.
• Antonio said it was Agapito’s revenge for being stripped of his
managerial powers for being mismanaging the farm and stealing
cows.
ISSUES
1. W/N the trial court erred in discarding the false testimony given by the
discharged accused Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin, by applying
the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus;
a. NO. Both Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin told
inconsistent narrations because they wanted to keep their
names clean.
b. The rule "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" is not
mandatory. It does not apply where the declarants are
motivated by a desire to exculpate themselves and not
really to pervert the truth.
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2. W/N the trial court erred in not giving due credence to the testimony
of Sagap Salip, the group’s guide.
a. NO. The findings of the trial court as to the credibility of
witnesses command great respect and weight.
b. The testimony of the two discharged witnesses corroborate
on substantial points that of Sagap Salip, hence there is no
need to make this an exception to the rule.
3. W/N Agapito was a principal by inducement in the absence of the
elements of conspiracy to the crime.
a. YES. Present are the requisites necessary in order that a
person may be convicted as a principal by inducement:
i. That the inducement be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the
crime; and
ii. That such inducement be the determining
cause of the commission of the crime by the
material executor."
b. He formed the team, planned the ambush, promised the
rewards, without him the crime would not have been
conceived, much less committed.
c. One is induced to commit a crime either by a command
(precepto) or for a consideration (pacto), or by any other
similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause
of the crime and which was done for the purpose of
inducing such criminal act and was sufficient for that
purpose.
d. The inducer is guilty as principal even though he might
have taken no part in its material execution.
4. W/N the trial court erred in not accepting the alibi.
a. NO. The distance between Agapito's house and that of
Alfonso Flores which he stated in his alibi was only one
kilometer.
b. His alibi is further negated by the testimonies of Jamas
Jumaidi, Oyong Asidin and Sagap Salip, who implicated
the accused and vividly described the details of the
meeting.
5. What is the crime committed by Agapito?
a. Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder
b. The original plan of Agapito was to kidnap, not to rob or
commit murder.
c. The killing of Yu Chi Chong happened unexpectedly due
his effort to escape.
d. However, since Agapito is a principal by inducement and
conspiracy being evident, he should, therefore, be held
guilty of the same crime committed by the material
executors (even if it was not the act originally intended) in
furtherance of the offense which he induced them to
commit.
RULING: As principal by inducement, Agapito committed the complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder. Due to the voting results,
Agapito is to suffer reclusion perpetua instead of death penalty.
US v INDANAN
G.R. No. L-8187 (Jan. 29, 1913) | Moreland, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Indanan, the headman or chief next to a governor of Parang,
instructed Akiran and Kaiyakan to bring Sariol to him.
2. Indanan also instructed that Sariol be brought to the Chinese
Cemetery and killed.
3. Since Indanan misrepresented that he had the orders of the governor,
Akiran and Kaiyakan followed his orders.
4. Indanan is guilty of murder as a principal by inducement.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Panglima Indanan, the headman of Parang, is to be hanged for the
crime of murder. He appeals.
• On March 24, 1912, he sent Induk to bring Sariol to his house.
• The following day at 4:30pm, Induk brought Sariol to the house, and
Indanan instructed Akiran and Suhuri to tie Sariol.
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• They obeyed the order in the presence of the accused, who was at the
time lying upon a bed in the room.
• During the night, Indanan, claiming that he had orders from the
governor, ordered Akiran and Kaiyakan to bring Sariol to the Chinese
cemetery and kill him there.
• When the killing was reported to Indanan, he said it was all right and
appeared to be very much pleased.
ISSUE
1. W/N Indanan is guilty of murder
a. YES. It appears from the testimony of the witnesses,
Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that Indanan had a very
powerful influence over them, especially since he is the
biggest chief in the Parang ward.
b. Another witness answered, "If a chief says anything to a
man like me and tells me it is by order of the governor and
that he has a warrant there, well, a man like me does what
he tells me."
c. Another witness declared: "I am afraid of him. I did not
believe that he would make me do anything unjust."
d. The domination of the accused over the persons who, at
his orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him
responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such
orders.
e. Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those
to be principals in a crime "who directly force or induce
others to commit it." The words and acts of Indanan had
the effect of a command.
f. Indanan knew the misrepresentation of claiming to have
orders from the governor was false and purposely and
intentionally made it as an additional factor going to insure
obedience to his orders.
RULING: We affirm the decision that Indanan is a principal by
inducement.
PEOPLE v KIICHI OMINE
G.R. No. 42476 (July 24, 1935) | Vickers, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Angel Pulido and his son Hilario went to the house of their workers led
by Kiichi Omine to confront them about constructing a road he did not
authorize.
2. For some reason, they ended up in physical violence and Eduardo
Autor stabbed Angel.
3. In the midst of the commotion, Kiichi Omine said “hit him, kill him” but
he was acquitted because it was not appear that the words per se
induced Eduardo to strike Angel.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• CFI Davao found Kiichi Omine, Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion and
Agapito Cortesano guilty of frustrated homicide.
• The group worked on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido with Kiichi
Omine as overseer / manager.
• Kiichi Omine asked Angel for permission to open a new road through
the plantation but Angel refused because there was already an
unfinished road.
• Kiichi Omine contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission
requested and he began work on December 24, 1933.
• When Angel and his son, Hilario, accompanied by Saito Paton and a
Moro by the name of Barabadan, were returning home from the
cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable number of hemp
plants had been destroyed for the purpose of opening a new road.
• Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel went to the
house of the defendants, who had just finished their supper.
• Prosecution claims that the group went violent: 1) Eduardo attacked
Hilario with a bolo wounding his left thumb and then 2) Luis and
Agapito held Angel by the Arms and finally 3) Eduardo struck Angel
on his breast after Omine shouted to him “pegale y matale” (hit and
kill).
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• Defense claims Angel and Hilario entered and struck Omine and
Eduardo with brass knuckles before Eduardo was able to strike Angel
while Luis and Agapito fled the scene.
• Uncontested is that Eduardo delivered the killing blow but Omine was
responsible for the destruction of the hemp plants.
ISSUES
1. W/N Luis and Agapito were liable
a. NO. There was obviously no conspiracy among the
defendants as Luis and Agapito were not even included in
the original complainant but were only included as
defendants in the amended complaint.
b. If it were true that Luis and Agapito held Angel by the arms,
there was still no concrete evidence to determine whether
they did it to let Angel be stabbed or to prevent Angel from
attacking them.
2. W/N Omine was liable as principal by inducement
a. NO. Even if it were proven that Omine uttered the words
“hit and kill”, it does not appear that the words per se
caused Eduardo to strike Angel.
b. In the first place, the physical fighting was enough a reason
for Eduardo to strike Angel with a bolo.
c. Secondly, it does not appear that Omine had any particular
influence over Eduardo Autor.
d. US vs. Indanan (1913) held that in order that a person may
be convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that
the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime and that such
inducement be the determining cause of the commission of
the crime.
e. US v Indanan cited a Spanish Supreme Court Decision of
April 14, 1871, where it was held that one who, during a riot
in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants,
"Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing that he did anything
more than say these words except to be present at the
fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by
inducement.
f. “Although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and
even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they
may be considered the principal and moving cause of
the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred
from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act
induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal
act that without it the act would not have been performed."
g. US v Indanan also cited a Spanish Supreme Court
Decision of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a
father who simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was
not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice
was given.
h. Art. 17(2) of the RPC says that in order that, under the
provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct
inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words
have great dominance and great influence over the person
who acts, that it is necessary that they be as direct, as
efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as
violence itself.
3. W/N Eduardo is liable for frustrated homicide?
a. NO. Whether or not Eduardo intended to kill Angel, it is a
rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be
guided by the result unless the intent to kill is manifest.
b. Instead of Frustrated Homicide, he is liable for Lesiones
Graves.
RULING: Aside from Eduardo, the others are not responsible for the injury
inflicted by him on Angel. Omine, Luis and Agapito are acquitted and
Eduardo is convicted of lesiones graves.
5
BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION
PEOPLE v MALUENDA
G.R. No. 115351 (Mar. 27, 1998) | Panganiban, J. | by Lo, J.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• RTC in Lianga, Surigao del Sur found Daniel Maluenda, Gil Bueno,
Raul Mondaga, and Rodrigo Legarto guilty as co-principals for
conspiring and mutually helping one another in kidnapping Engr.
Miguel Resus for ransom with Mondaga as mastermind, Legarto as
the key person in an inside job hence co-principal by indispensable
cooperation, Maluenda as the guard of the hideout hence a co-
principal.
• Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga (later withdrew) appealed.
• On August 19, 1992 (9pm) in Brgy. Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur,
Engr. Resus and his wife Dr. Resus arrived at their residence/clinic
and were approached by the trio saying that they were asked by NPA
Commander Father Simmons to solicit money and medicines.
• From a demand of medicines and money worth P20,000, the couple
gave P500 cash plus medicines worth P800.
• Maluenda, Alex and Mondaga demanded that they be driven by Engr.
Resus in his Volkswagen car to San Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur,
but the couple reasoned that their car did not have enough gasoline
was not in good running condition to travel that night.
• On August 20, 1992 (5am), Mondaga arrived at the Resus residence
and they (Mondaga and Engr. Resus) rode the car.
• While on the road, they met Legarto, the engineer’s former driver,
riding his motorcycle to the opposite direction.
• As they continued to advance, they saw Maluenda and Alex waiting
for them and the two then rode with them.
• Mondaga visited Dr. Resus to demand P300,000 and a firearm owned
by Engr. Resus and his motorcycle.
• Since the motorcycle was out of order, Mondaga instructed Dr. Resus
to get the motorcycle of Legarto.
• On August 21, 1992, (5am) Mondaga and Legarto arrived at the Resus
residence.
• Dr. Resus gave health as an excuse and so Mondaga brought the
helper Maria Abne, the firearm and P10,000 ransom money.
• Mondaga compelled Engr. Resus to tell his wife to prepare more
money and the Engr. agreed on P200,000.
• Mondaga went back to Dr. Resus but Dr. Resus only committed to
give P100,000 to Mondaga and P50,000 to Legarto (since Mondaga
took his motorcycle).
• Legarto was to accompany Dr. Resus until she produces the money.
• On August 22, 1992, Engr. Resus and Maria Abne were released.
ISSUES
1. W/N Legarto is a co-principal
a. NO. Evidence of his direct participation in the kidnapping
for is not enough.
b. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires:
i. there is more than one circumstance;
ii. the facts are derived are proven
iii. the combination of all the circumstances
produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
c. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it but his acts were all after the abduction.
d. Principals by indispensable cooperation are those who
cooperate in the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished
e. Legarto admitted that Mondaga knew him but
acquaintance is not conclusive of conspiracy.
f. The fact that Legarto was seen transporting Maluenda and
Alex on his motorcycle does not also prove that he is part
of the crime that Maluenda and Alex were part of since they
could have just asked for a ride without telling him their
plans.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
g. Mondaga’s request for Legarto’s motorcycle was also
inconclusive to prove conspiracy because Legarto was
known in the area to have a motorcycle for hire.
h. His delivering the ransom money and a part allotted for him
also did not prove conspiracy because that could have
been compensation for the forcible taking of his
motorcycle.
i. A carnapping case was also filed against Mondaga for
taking Legarto’s motorcycle but Legarto did not appear
during the hearings but this non-participation (or
condonation) however illogical or doubtful it is, still cannot
be a direct evidence to him being a conspirator.
j. No evidence shows that Legarto provided the kidnappers
with information.
k. Legarto is an accessory because he reported the "loss"
of the motorcycle to the police authorities despite the fact
that it had been given to Mondaga as part of the ransom,
hence he plans to enrich himself with the P36,000 he
received that was supposed to be a partial payment for his
motorcycle.
l. Art. 19, RPC defines accessories as those who
i. have knowledge of the commission of the
crime,
ii. did not take part in its commission as principal
or accomplice, but
iii. took part in it subsequent to its commission by
(1) profiting or (2) by assisting the offender to
profit from the crime.
2. W/N Maluenda had criminal liability
a. Maluenda is a Principal by Direct Cooperation.
b. He claims that only Mondaga executed the acts
constituting kidnapping with ransom; i.e., demanding and
receiving money, medicine and ransom from the Resus
couple and detaining Engineer Resus.
c. He avers that his presence at the hideout in Alegria was
involuntary because Mondaga had threatened his life and
the lives of the members of his family.
d. However, actions speak louder than words.
e. Although only Mondaga verbally extorted money and
demanded ransom from the Resus couple, it is evident that
the kidnapping was committed with Maluenda's
participation.
f. Beyond reasonable doubt, Maluenda's actions exhibited a
community of interest and a concurrence of sentiment
with Mondaga.
g. Between the affirmative testimony of the prosecution
witnesses who are found to be reliable and sincere by the
court and that of the negative versions of the defense, the
former is stronger.
RULING: Mondaga and Maluenda are the active perpetrators. The appeal
is partially granted. The assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED as regards
Maluenda as principal by direct participation, but MODIFIED as regards
Legarto. Legarto is hereby found GUILTY as an ACCESSORY only.
PEOPLE v MONTEALEGRE
G.R. No. 67948 (May 31, 1988) | Cruz, J. | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Pfc. Camantigue caught Montealegre and Capalad smoking
marijuana red-handed.
2. Camantigue collared both of them, one on each hand.
3. Capalad pulled out a knife and stabbed Camantigue.
4. Camantigue tried to pull out his gun but Montealegre stopped him by
holding his arm.
5. Camantigue died from the wound and Montealegre is convicted of
murder as a principal by indispensable cooperation because
Camantigue would have been able to defend himself if it were not for
Montealegre.
6
FACTS OF THE CASE
• On March 11, 1983 midnight, while Edmundo Abadilla was eating at
the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell of
marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table.
• Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc.
Renato Camantigue in his car whom he hailed to report the matter.
• Camantigue entered and approached Montealegre and Capalad and
collared both of them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?"
• While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right
hand and Capalad with his left hand, Capalad suddenly and
surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a scabbard tucked in the right
side of his waist and started stabbing Camantigue in the back.
• Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the gun from his holster but
Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent
the latter from defending himself.
• Montealegre and Capalad managed to run and Camantigue managed
to fire his gun.
• Capalad died of a bullet wound, while Camantigue died of his stab
wounds.
• Montealegre was caught the next day and he gave a false name.
ISSUE
1. W/N Montealegre is a co-principal
a. YES. When he was interrogated, he kept answering “I don’t
know” to many questions which is unlikely because events
like those are usually unforgettable.
b. He claims to have run away before the stabbing and this is
unlikely because then nothing could have stopped
Camantigue from pulling his gun out.
c. Instead of reporting the incident, he ran and hid. When
apprehended, he gave a false name.
d. Montealegre was correctly a co-principal for having
collaborated by acting in concert with Capalad in the
killing of the police officer.
e. Camantigue would have been able to defend himself if it
were not for Montealegre hence he was a principal by
indispensable cooperation
f. Art. 17(3), RPC states that
i. participating in the criminal resolution, that is,
there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention immediately
before the commission of the crime charged;
and
ii. cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would
not have been accomplished" are acts of a co-
principal.
g. Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it
can be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough
that, at the time the offense was committed, participants
had the same purpose and were united in its execution; as
may be inferred from the attendant circumstances.
h. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven.
i. A conspiracy may be entered into after the commencement
of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime.
RULING: The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED, Montealegre is a co-
principal by indispensable cooperation.
US v EGUIA LIM BUANCO
G.R. No. L-5240 (Nov. 19, 1909) | Elliott, J. | by Medina, R.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco and Luciano de los Reyes were convicted of
the crime of estafa.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
2. The former drew checks to withdraw funds from the Banco Español-
Filipino despite not having sufficient credit to pay for them, and the
latter indorsed said checks and manipulated the records of the bank
to make them show an apparent credit balance.
3. The Court held that both were guilty as principals because each
performed the part which was necessary to enable them to accomplish
the crime of estafa.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Defendants Lino Eguia Lim Buanco and Luciano de los Reyes were
charged with and convicted of the crime of estafa.
• De los Reyes was employed in the Banco Español-Filipino as a
bookkeeper and check registry clerk.
o It was his duty to inspect checks to determine whether the
drawer of the check had sufficient balance to his credit to
justify payment of the check. If the check was entitled to
payment, he was required to indorse them.
• Eguia Lim Buanco had an account with the bank, and a conspiracy
existed between the defendants for withdrawal of funds by Eguia,
regardless of whether he had any funds to his credit.
o Entries in the accounts of Eguia in the books of the bank
were fraudulently manipulated by de los Reyes to make
them show an apparent credit balance.
• Oct. 6, 1906 – Eguia drew a check for P2,000. It was indorsed by de
los Reyes even though Eguia had no actual credit balance in the bank.
o With interest, the amount fraudulently obtained was
P2,273.
• Separate trial was granted to the defendants, but a joint sentence was
imposed after conviction.
o Each defendant separately moved for a new trial. Both
were denied, hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court erred in imposing a joint sentence including both
defendants despite granting their motion for separate trials
a. NO. No rights which accrue to a defendant after sentencing
(i.e., right to move for a new trial or to appeal) can be
prejudiced by the fact that another defendant is included in
the sentence.
b. The practice of issuing one joint sentence is convenient.
2. WON the fact that neither defendant testified as a witness in his own
behalf is a violation of their constitutional right
a. NO. A defendant’s neglect or refusal to be a witness shall
in no manner be used against him.
b. This circumstance was no considered as an evidential fact
in the case, and as such did not affect the conclusion of the
lower court on the guilt of either defendant.
3. WON the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to constitute the
crime of estafa
a. YES. It was sufficiently alleged that both defendants knew
that Eguia Lim Buanco did not have sufficient money in the
bank to pay the check.
4. WON the evidence proves the essential elements necessary to
constitute the crime of estafa
a. YES. Banco Español-Filipino was induced to pay the check
by the combined fraudulent act of the defendants.
b. In order to obtain this result, Eguia Lim Buanco drew the
check and de los Reyes falsified the records of the bank.
5. WON the defendants are guilty as principals of the crime of estafa
a. YES. Each performed the part which was necessary to
enable them to accomplish their criminal purpose.
b. Eguia Lim Buanco represented himself to the bank as
possessing credit to which he was not entitled. Reyes
acted in collusion with Eguia Lim Buanco by fraudulently
manipulating the records of the bank. In this way, both
succeeded in deceiving the bank.
6. WON the crime charged is conspiracy, not estafa
a. NO. The penal code defines and punishes only certain acts
as conspiracies. Estafa is not one of them.
RULING: Judgment of trial court is affirmed. The defendants were
correctly convicted as principals of the crime of estafa.
7
ACCOMPLICES
RPC, Art. 18
Accomplices. - Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in
Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts.
RA 9372, Sec. 5
Human Security Act of 2007
SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article
17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4
hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer
the penalty of from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty
(20) years of imprisonment.
PEOPLE v MANDOLADO
G.R. No. L-51304-05 (June 28, 1983) | Guerrero, J. | By Tiongson, J.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano were draftees of the AFP,
assigned to the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the Phil. Army, while Conrado
Erinada and Anacleto Simon were trainees.
• In the morning of Oct. 3, 1977, the four were passengers of a bus
bound for Midsayap, North Cotabato. They all alighted at Midsayap
bus terminal, got acquainted, and decided to drink ESQ rum together.
• After drinking for about an hour, Mandolado grabbed his .30 caliber
machine gun and started firing. His companions tried to dissuade him,
but he continued firing his gun.
• Sensing trouble, Erinada and Simon ran away, hailed, and boarded a
passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board.
• Mandolado and Ortillano followed and boarded the same vehicle. The
soldiers forced the driver to bring them to Midsayap crossing.
• On their way, Mandolado got his knife and tried to attack the driver.
After the soldiers alighted at the crossing, Mandolado fired his .30
caliber machine gun at the speeding vehicle, hitting the right side back
of the driver’s sister who was on board the vehicle.
• A privately owned jeep, owned by Herminigildo Tenorio, passed by the
Midsayap crossing. All four soldiers boarded the jeep.
• On the way, both Mandolado and Ortillano kept firing their guns,
prompting Tenorio to remark, “Kung hindi kayo tatahimik, ibabangga
ko ang jeep.”
• Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit
North Cotabato, Mandolado got angry and “cocked” his gun and
ordered the driver to stop.
• Simon and Erinada immediately jumped off the jeep and ran towards
their detachment camp located some 250m away.
• Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at and hit the occupants
of the jeep, including Tenorio and one Nolasco Mendoza.
• Ortillano fired his armalite, not at the occupants but downwards hitting
the ground.
• The Court of First Instance of Cotabato sentenced Mandolado to the
supreme penalty of death for murder and Ortillano to imprisonment of
6 yrs. prision correccional as min. to 17 yrs. of prison mayor as max.,
being merely an accessory, while Simon and Erinada were acquitted
on the grounds of reasonable doubt.
ISSUE
1. W/N Ortillano should be convicted not as an accessory but as an
accomplice
a. YES. To hold one liable as an accomplice, it must be
shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention
of the principal, w/c may be demonstrated by previous or
simultaneous acts w/c contribute to the commission of the
offense as aid.
b. Ortillano, by his acts, showed knowledge of the criminal
design of Mandolado:
i. He was present when Mandolado tried to attack
the driver of the Ford Fiera w/ a knife and fired
at the vehicle hitting a female passenger.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
ii. When Mandolado got angry and “cocked” his
gun and ordered Tenorio to stop the jeep, their
2 other companions, Simon and Erinada,
immediately jumped off the jeep and ran away,
but Ortillano stayed.
c. Ortillano’s simultaneous acts manifested his
concurrence with the criminal intent of Mandolado. His
simultaneous acts supplied moral aid in the execution of
the crime in an efficacious way.
i. In a display of unity with Mandolado, Ortillano
fired his gun towards the ground, doing so to
conceal or to destroy the body of the crime and
making it appear that the victims were fighting
them or running away or that somebody else
like the MNLF, rebels, NPA, or bandits
committed the crime and for assisting in the
escape of the principal of the crime.
ii. Ortillano’s presence served to encourage
Mandolado, the principal, or to increase the
odds against the victim.
RULING: Julian Ortillano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accomplice in the crime of murder for the killing of Nolasco Mendoza and
the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio. Similarly, there being no aggravating
circumstance but having found and appreciated the mitigating circumstance
of drunkenness w/c is not habitual in his favor, Ortillano is hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of 4 yrs, 2 months of prison correccional as min. to
10 yrs. and 1 day of prison mayor as max. in each case.
PEOPLE v DOBLE
G.R. No. L-30028 (May 31, 1982) | De Castro J. | By Luy, C.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple
homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of
persons in authority
2. 10 men arrived in Navotas, 8 of whom proceeded to the Prudential
Bank and Trust Company to rob the bank.
3. Gunshots were heard soon after and a gunfight ensued between the
robbers and the police.
4. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned to their banca,
still fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like "bayongs”
and sped away.
5. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed and some injured.
Among those who were killed were agents of the law.
6. 3/10 of the individuals were given the death penalty, which they are
currently appealing from.
7. SC decision:
a. 2/3 were found to be accomplices to the robbery
(Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin)
b. 1/3 was acquitted (Simeon Doble)
FACTS OF THE CASE
• 10 men, almost all of them heavily armed with guns, left the shores of
Manila in a motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. Taking
advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men in the direction
of the branch bank. Within a few minutes, shots were heard.
• The robbers entered The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch
office and ordered the employees to lie down, face downward. They
entered the vault and found that they could not get anything so they
went to the two teller cages and took whatever they could lay their
hands on. The men left, carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.
• A gunfight ensued between the robbers and the police.
o Cpl. Evangelista (died) & Dominador Estrella – were both
felled by the shots coming from the left side of the bank.
o Ocampo – hit in the thigh
o Sgt, Aguilos – was hit, collapsed and fell down (died)
o Sgt. Alcala – dead
• Only five of ten accused were brought to trial at the trial court, the other
five named only as "John Does" in the information having remained at
large.
o 2/5: Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino – acquitted
8
o 3/5: Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio
Romaquin – death penalty
ISSUES
1. W/N Simeon Doble should be acquitted
a. YES. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of
the act, without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose
b. Is he a principal? The court is unable to agree with the
finding of the lower court that Simeon was a principal both
by agreement and encouragement, given his non-
participation in the commission of the crime.
c. Is he an accessory? It was not clearly proven that Simeon
received a part of the looted money as to make him an
accessory.
d. Is he a co-conspirator? Simeon is by no means a co-
conspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks
among the malefactors in his house
a. He was only present in his house where the
conspirators met and told them that he could not
join them because of his foot injury; which
seems to be mere gesture of politeness and
also to avoid being suspected that he was
against their vicious plan for which they may
harm him.
e. Court finds no culpable participation of Simeon Doble
in the commission of the crime, because by his physical
condition alone, he could not be of help to the malefactors
in the pursuit of their criminal design, nor could the robbers
have wanted Simeon to join them.
2. W/N appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble’s
extrajudicial statements are inadmissible for having been allegedly
obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation of basic
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination
a. been allegedly obtained by force and intimidation
i. Use of force and intimidation was not
sufficiently proven
ii. Neither presented medical certificate to
attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted which
disproves the claim
b. violation of basic constitutional rights to counsel and
against self-incrimination
i. Interrogation was done in 1966 but, the
requisite of assistance of counsel was
granted only by the new 1973 Constitution.
ii. The right against self-incrimination, cannot
be used to impair the admissibility of extra-
judicial statements. It is the voluntariness of
an admission or confession that determines
its admissibility.
iii. If voluntariness is convincingly established
the admissibility of an extra-judicial
confession, admission or statement
becomes unquestionable.
3. W/N the appellants are principals of the crime
a. Appellants are not liable as co-principals in the crime
charged instead they are mere accomplices.
b. They joined in the criminal design when:
i. Cresencio consented to look for a banca but
this does not necessarily make him a co-
conspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe
Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into his band
of robbers
ii. Romaquin provided the banca when asked
by the gang leader and then brought the
malefactors to the scene of the robbery,
despite knowledge of the evil purpose for
which the banca was to be used. But not a
co-conspirator because he does not know
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
the principal malefactors still at large,
robbers pointed a gun at him to prevent his
escape, sum given to him could just be a
rental of his banca.
c. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an
indispensable manner. Even without appellants providing
the banca, the robbery could have been committed,
especially with the boldness and determination shown by
the robbers in committing the crime.
d. Complicity of the appellants to the crime are shown
through:
i. Cresencio: addressed a note to Romaquin
asking him not to reveal to the police the
names of their companions. He went to
Romaquin and asked for money which the
latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show
that he had helped in some material way to
deserve a share in the loot.
ii. Romaquin: hid the money he received from
the malefactors, and repainting his boat,
which shows his guilty conscience arising
from the act of cooperation he knowingly
extended to the principal culprits to achieve
their criminal purpose.
e. There must be a community of unlawful purpose
between the principal and accomplice and assistance
knowingly and intentionally given to supply material and
moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in an
efficacious way.
RULING
• Appellants joined the criminal design to rob, making them accomplices
but only to the robbing and not the killing.
• Appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery
in band
o Prision mayor minimum which has a range of 6 years, 1
day to 8 years as provided in Article 295 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the
same code.
o The commission of the crime was aggravated by nighttime
and the use of a motorized banca. There being no
mitigating circumstance, both appellants should each be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5)
years, four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum
o Indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.
• Appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal
o The immediate release of Simeon Doble who is hereby
acquitted is ordered, unless he should be continued in
confinement for some other legal cause.
PEOPLE v DOCTOLERO
G.R. No. 34386 (Feb. 7, 1991) | Regalado, J. | by Ricasio, G.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. That appellants, went to the house of Marcial Sagun, looking for the
latter; yet on the way there too was the uncle of the three, being
Marcelo Doctolero.
2. That while Conrado and Victolero were throwing stones, Ludovico
proceeds to kill multiple persons.
3. That the court rendered judgement against the Doctoleros; during its
subsistence, Virgilio passes away, while Ludovico drops his
participation to the appeal they filed.
4. WON there was basis for dubbing respondent as an accomplice,
amidst their corroborative statements to each; the lower and the SC
rules against the accomplice, affirming his guilt.
9
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Ludovico, Conrado, Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero (defendants) went
to the house of a specific Marcial Sagun on November 8, 1970, and
attacked, assaulted, hacked, stabbed, and struck Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo, Epifania Escosio (all deceased), and Jonathan Oviedo
(injured only, not dead, 1 ½ yrs. old), and subsequently while on the
road, attacked, assaulted, hacked, and stabbed Marcelo Doctolero
(deceased).
• CFI Br. 2 of Pangasinan rendered judgement of Ludovico Doctolero
guilty as principal, Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as
accomplices, to the Murder of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo, and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting Physical Injury on the
minor child, Jonathan Oviedo.
• During the pendency of the present petition appealing the decision,
Ludovico withdrew his appeal on May 17, 1976, while Virgilio
Doctolero died on October 22, 1983; thus, leaving the current petition
for appeallant Conrado Doctolero.
ISSUES
1. WON the CFI erred in ruling that the remaining appellant is an
accomplice to the crime.
a. NO. That the remaining appellant’s defense was the he
was not at the place where the crimes were committed;
yet, the aforementioned testimony is not evidenced,
except by those of his then co-appellants, a “polluted
source, and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is
subject to grave suspicion.”
b. That the witnesses to the crime, namely Maria Sagun,
Marcial Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-Disamoy, provided
statements which are considered “positive declarations
(which placed the appellant at the scene of the crime) . . .
which deserves more credence . . . (given) that there is no
showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify
falsely against appellants.”
c. “. . . it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero
and Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware
when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two
women . . . and wounding the child . . . it is obvious that
appellants Conrado and Virgilio themselves knew what
was going on inside the room of the house ath the time,
but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother
Ludovico . . .
d. “one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the
actual crime intended by the principal provided he was
aware that it was an illicit act”
2. WON the CFI erred in the penalties imposed for the Physical injuries
afflicted to Jonathan Oviedo.
a. YES. Modifications were done because the injuries
sustained by Jonathan were milder.
RULING: The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court, recognizing
Ludovico as the principal to the crime, and Virgilio and Conrado as
accessories. Modifications were done in terms of penalties incurred by
Conrado which are three indeterminate sentences varying from prison
mayor, to reclusion temporal, as well as by indemnifying the families of the
deceased, while excluding Ludovico from the changes due to his withdrawal
of appeal.
PEOPLE v ELIJORDE
G.R. No. 126531 (April 21, 1999) | Bellosillo, J. | By Baquiran, J.
NOTE: Recycled digest from Table 3
FACTS OF THE CASE
• At around 6pm of May 21, 1995, Eric Hierro and Benjamin Visbal went
out from Rodel Contemplado’s house, where they were drinking, to
buy mango at a sari-sari store.
• At the time, accused Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan (alias “Kirat”)
and a certain Edwin Menes were in front of the store. As Menes
approached Hierro, the latter warned Menes not to touch him. Menes
then punched him on the face followed by Elijorde who did the same,
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
and Punzalan kicked the victim at the back. Hierro and Visbal ran and
sought shelter at Contemplado’s house.
• After some three minutes, as Hierro together with Visbal and the
latter’s wife were walking home, Visbal noticed the accused waiting for
them. As they drew near, Punzalan again kicked Hierro at the back.
• The victim ran but was chased after by Elijorde who stabbed him at
the back. Hierro fell down and Elijorde placed himself on top of the
victim who was then raising his arms in defense while pleading,
“Maawa na kayo, huwag niyo akong patayin, wala kong kasalanan sa
inyo.” Despite the pleas, Elijorde stabbed the victim with a knife on his
chest and then fled. Hierro later died at the hospital.
• Of the three, only Elijorde and Punzalan were charged with murder
qualified by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength.
ISSUES
1. W/N Punzalan is guilty of murder by reason of conspiracy
a. NO. The court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is
guilty of murder. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be show to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. On the basis of Visbal’s
testimony, Punzalan remained where he was and did not
cooperate with Elijorde in pursuing Hierro to ensure that he
would be killed.
b. No evidence shows unity of purpose and design
between the two accused in the execution of killing,
which is essential to establish conspiracy, as there was no
record that Punzalan knew Elijorde’s intent of stabbing
Hierro, thus creating doubt on Punzalan’s criminal intent.
As such, Punzalan can’t be considered an accomplice
to the crime.
c. Moreover, there was no record to show that the kicking
resulted to any injury on the deceased.
2. W/N the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the killing
of the victim thus qualifying the crime to murder.
a. NO. After the first assault, the victim did not expect that the
accused would persist in inflicting harm upon him. After
stabbing Hierro, the accused persistently chased after him
to ensure the success of his criminal design despite
victim’s the pleas of mercy. Treachery exists when the
offender commits any crime against a person,
employing means to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from any defense the offended party
might take.
3. W/N the court was correct in disregarding the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength alleged in the information.
a. YES. There was no sufficient evidence to show that the
requisites of evident premeditation were present. There
was no showing that Elijorde, prior to the night of the
commission of the crime, resolved to kill the victim nor
proof that such crime was the result of meditation on
his part. The time interval of 3 minutes between the two
instances of assault is too brief to have enabled Elijorde to
premeditate over his criminal intent. Furthermore, the
abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery; hence,
it cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating
circumstance when treachery is already present.
RULING: The decision of the court a quo is modified. Accused GILBERT
ELIJORDE is found GUILTY OF MURDER and is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. Accused REYNALDO PUNZALAN is ACQUITTED of the crime.
Accused ELIJORDE is solely held responsible for the payment to the heirs
of the victim Hierro the amounts of P50,000 for the civil indemnity, P35,000
for actual damages (representing uncontested funeral expenses), and
P50,000 for moral damages (reduced from P100,000). Exemplary damages
were removed.
10
PEOPLE v DE VERA
G.R. No. 128966 (Aug. 18, 1999) | Panganiban, J. | by Medina, R.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Edwin De Vera, Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo, and Elmer Castro
were charged with the murder of Frederick Capulong. Only De Vera
and Garcia were apprehended.
2. RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals. Only
De Vera appealed, claiming that he had no part in the shooting and
only accompanied Florendo upon the latter’s request.
3. The Court held that De Vera should be convicted only as an
accomplice and not as a principal because the prosecution did not
sufficiently establish that he was part of the conspiracy to kill the
victim.
4. De Vera’s admission that he knew of Florendo’s malevolent intention
and that he acted as a lookout are enough to make him an accomplice.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Edwin De Vera, Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo, and Elmer Castro
were charged with the murder of Frederick Capulong. Only De Vera
and Garcia were apprehended.
• RTC found De Vera and Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime charged. Only De Vera appealed the decision.
o Forensic evidence was sufficient to establish conspiracy,
even though Florendo was the one who actually shot the
victim.
• Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao testified that he saw Florendo shoot the
victim, after which Florendo and his companions fled. He identified
Garcia and De Vera as among the companions of Florendo.
• Witness SPO3 Mario Guspid interviewed De Vera and Garcia and
asked them if they were willing to give written statements, to which
they assented.
• They were brought to Atty. Confesor Sansano, who served as their
lawyer and never left the office during the interrogation in order to
properly safeguard the suspects’ rights during investigation.
• De Vera claims he had no part in the shooting and that it was Florendo
who shot the victim. He only accompanied Florendo, who was his
friend, upon his request. He also claimed that he was tortured and
coerced into signing his statement.
ISSUES
1. WON the appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice
and not as a principal
a. YES. Contrary to the RTC ruling, the prosecution (through
the testimony of Cacao) did not establish that appellant
was part of the conspiracy to kill the victim.
b. Cacao only testified that De Vera was in the car with
Florendo. Aside from this, no other act was ascribed to him.
Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy.
c. De Vera admitted that he knew of Florendo’s malevolent
intention and cooperated in the commission of the crime by
acting as a lookout. These facts are sufficient to make
him an accomplice, but not a conspirator.
i. Conspirators are the authors of a crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who
perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
ii. Accomplices assent to the crime and
cooperate in its execution.
2. WON appellant’s extrajudicial statement is admissible in evidence
a. YES. Appellant’s claim that the statement was not made in
the presence of counsel doesn’t hold up because of Atty.
Sansano’s testimony that he did not leave them at any
time.
b. He even checked to see if there were torture marks on De
Vera and Garcia and made sure that they understood what
they were doing.
c. Appellant’s allegations of torture are unsubstantiated.
RULING: De Vera’s appeal is partially granted. He is convicted as an
accomplice, not as a principal in the crime of murder.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
PEOPLE v CACHOLA
G.R. No. 148712-15 (Jan. 21, 2004) | Per Curiam | By Tiongson, J
FACTS OF THE CASE
• The prosecution presented several witnesses to the killings in the
Barnachea residence:
1. Jessie Barnachea’s testimony:
o 12-yr old Jessie Barnachea was about to leave their
house when 2 armed men suddenly entered the front
door.
o The two ordered Jessie to drop to the floor, then they
hit him in the back with the butt of a long gun.
o The intruders shot to death Jessie’s uncle, Victorino
V. Lolarga, who was then in the living room.
o Jessie crawled and hid under the bed, where he saw
the feet of a third man who also entered the house.
The men entered the kitchen and continued shooting.
o When the rampage was over and the armed men left,
Jessie came out of his hiding place and proceeded to
the kitchen. There he saw his mother, Carmelita
Barnachea; his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr.; and his
cousin Rubenson Abance – all slaughtered.
2. Robert Barnachea, Jessie’s eldest brother, was in his uncle’s
house next door watching tv when he sensed a commotion
outside. When he went out, he saw armed men running towards
their house. He noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and
marking “fruits and vegetables dealer” parked in front of their
house. Standing behind the jeep were 3 armed men wearing
bonnets, with only their eyes exposed.
3. Neighbors Russel Tamba and Francisco Andrada noticed the
same jeep passed by. It had the marking “El Shaddai” in front
aside from the “fruits and vegetables dealer” on the sides. Both
heard gunshots and saw the vehicle speeding away.
• The incident was immediately reported to the police including the
description of the jeep.
• The police intercepted the jeep at a checkpoint. On board were the 8
appellants, Dominador Cachola, Ernesto Amay, Nestor Marquez,
Benjamin Laegen, Rodolfo Sagun, Rodemir Guerzo, Mellke Ignacio,
and Nelson Echabaria. No firearms were found in the vehicle.
• The Chief of Police invited Jessie to identify the men as they were
boarding the suspects into the vehicle. Jessie pointed to Cachola and
Amay as the 2 armed men who entered his house and killed his
relatives. Jessie identified the same two in a police line-up in the police
station and for the 3rd time, when presented with the photographs of
the suspects.
• The 8 appellants were subjected to paraffin test but only the right
hands of Cachola and Amay yielded positive results for gunpowder
nitrates.
• The trial court convicted Cachola and Amay as principals of 4 counts
of murder and Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and
Echabaria, as accomplices of 4 counts of murder.
• Before the SC is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC.
• The OSG recommends the affirmance of the conviction for murder of
appellants Cachola and Amay and the acquittal of the other appellants
for failure of the prosecution to establish their identity and participation
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE
1. W/N appellants Sagun, Ignacio, Marquez, Guerzo, Laegen, and
Echabaria should be acquitted
a. YES. Upon a thorough review of the records of the case,
SC found nothing that would show their participation in
the commission of the crimes.
b. Not one of the prosecution witnesses identified them as
among the malefactors who were at the Barnachea
residence on that fateful day.
c. It appears that the only reason why they were implicated
was that they were with Cachola and Amay on board the
jeep that was intercepted almost 2 hrs. after the killings.
11
d. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements
must concur:
i. community of design, which means that
the accomplice knows of, and concurs
with, the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation; and
ii. the performance by the accomplice of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the
crime.
e. In the present case, neither element was proved.
i. The mere presence of the six appellants
in the company of appellants Cachola and
Amay on board a jeep is not evidence of
their knowledge of, or assent to, the
criminal design to perpetuate the
massacre.
ii. That they were found to be with appellants
Cachola and Amay almost 2 hrs. after the
commission of the crime does not
constitute previous or simultaneous act.
f. Absent a link between the crime and their presence in the
jeep 2 hrs. later, SC cannot consider their participation
even as accessories to the crime.
RULING: The assailed decision is REVERSED insofar as appellants
Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and Echabaria are concerned,
and another one is hereby rendered (1) acquitting them of the crimes
charged for insufficiency of evidence; (2) ordering their immediate release
from confinement unless their farther detention is warranted by virtue of any
lawful cause; and (3) directing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to
submit a report on their release within five days from notice hereof.
ACCESSORIES
RPC, Art. 19
Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects
or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse
of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is
guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life
of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.
RPC, Art. 20
Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such
with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural,
and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
PD 1612
ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is
rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties;
WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part
of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers,
commonly known as fence, of stolen properties;
WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an
accessory after the fact and punished lightly;
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit
by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows:
a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or
partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of
fencing.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as
hereunder indicated:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved
is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if
the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion
temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided
in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is more than
6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200
pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property
involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.
e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value
is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.
f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value
does not exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a
partnership, firm, corporation or association, the president or the manager
or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commission of
the offense shall be liable.
Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For
purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy
and sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from
an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for
sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such
store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director
General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails
to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or who violates
any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.
Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
12
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.
RA 9372, Sec. 6
Human Security Act of 2007
Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having
participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and
18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in
any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender
to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body
of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years
and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to
their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with
the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
subparagraph (a).
PEOPLE v TALINGDAN
G.R. No. L-32126 (July 6, 1978) | Per Curiam | by Lo, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. In 1967, Bernardo Bagabag and Teresa Domogma had a fight and
Teresa was violently slapped several times.
2. She called the police and Policeman Nemesio Talingdan came and
called Bernardo to come down but he did not.
3. Talingdan warned Bernardo that he will be killed someday.
4. 2 days after, Talingdan’s group shot Bernardo in his house.
5. Teresa told her daughter Corazon not to tell anyone what happened
for their safety.
6. Apparently, Teresa and Talingdan were lovers.
7. Talingdan’s group was found guilty of murder while Teresa was guilty
as an accessory for concealing the crime and aiding in the escape of
Talingdan’s group.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo
Bagabag but no certificate or any other proof of their marriage could
be presented by the prosecution.
• They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra but their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had
deserted her family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo
took time out to look for her.
• On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesio Talingdan has visited
Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during
those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old
daughter to go down the house and leave them
• Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on
between Talingdan and Teresa
• Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and
Theresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several
times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police
• Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's
house and called him to come down but Bernardo ignored him;
Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would
kill him
• On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house
and Corazon tried to call for help but she was threatened to be killed
if she does.
• Teresa tells Corazon never to reveal who the killers were.
• The day before, Corazon saw her mother Teresa meeting with
Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras,
and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo and heard one of
them say "Could he elude a bullet"
• When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell
your father that we will kill him"
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
• The defendants claim that Talingdan and Teresa never had an illicit
relationship and they were all at different places during the shooting.
ISSUE
1. W/N Teresa Domogma is an accessory to the murder
a. YES. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.
b. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she
actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband
because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her
part with co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his
death
c. It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance,
acquiescence or approval thereof on her part, which it is
argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a
conspirator
d. Since proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is
not beyond reasonable doubt, she cannot have the same
liability as her co-appellants.
e. She had no hand in the actual shooting nor is it clear if
she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof.
f. However, she knew it was going to be done and did not
object.
i. She did not only order her daughter not to
reveal what she knew to anyone,
ii. she also claimed to have no suspects in mind
when the peace officers came into their house
later to investigate
iii. Whereas before the actual shooting she was
more or less passive in her attitude regarding
the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with her co-
appellants
g. These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the
escape of the principal in the crime", making her an
accessory.
RULING: Male appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt, while Teresa
Domogma is guilty as an accessory.
PEOPLE v CUI
G.R. No. 121982 (Sept. 10, 1999) | Puno, J.| By Luy, C.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. 10 armed robbers raided the compound of the Lims
2. The faces of Wilfredo alias "Toto" Garcia, Mawe Garcia and a certain
Edgar could be seen. But the other robbers could not be identified.
3. The robbers took 20,000 php and abducted the youngest daughter of
the Lims for whom they demanded 1 million as ransom
4. Most of the robbers were apprehended and 6 were put on trial in the
trial court which found:
a. 4/6 (Obeso, Basinga, Nacario, and Sarte) were found guilty
of kidnapping with ransom
b. 2/6 (The Cuis) were found to be accomplices to the same
crime
5. SC ruling:
a. Sarte and Obeso – acquitted
b. The Cuis are not accomplices but accessories instead
FACTS OF THE CASE
• 10 armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim on
Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City
• The Lims, were able to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias "Toto"
Garcia and two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar. The
other robbers could not be identified as they had flour sacks over their
heads.
• The robbers carted away P20,000.00. They also blindfolded and
forcibly abducted 17 year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter of the
Lims. They demanded a ransom of P1,000,000.00 for her release.
• On the third day, they reported the kidnapping to the Philippine
National Police Cebu Metropolitan District Command (Cebu
Metrodiscom) at Camp Sotero, Cabahug, Cebu City
13
• Basingan (family guard) when interrogated, executed a sworn
statement identifying:
o Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and Edgar as the three (3) who
did not wear masks
o Sadam and Rey as the two (2) who held him and the Lims
at gunpoint
o Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos
and a certain Laring as the look-outs who stayed outside
the Lim compound
o That his neighbors and close family friends, the spouses
Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan.
• Basingan – arrested but escaped
• Hilaria Sarte (Laring) and her live-in partner, Luis Obeso (Leos) –
arrested
• Beverly Cui and Leonilo Cui – taken into custody but granted bail and
plea for preliminary investigation was given due course
• Joselito "Tata" Garcia – arrested but died
• Toto Garcia – killed in Davao
• The trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and
Nacario
o The Court is convinced that a conspiracy was hatched by
all the accused in perpetrating the crime charged
o The denial of accused Luis Obeso and Hilaria Sarte was
not accepted in court because they were the renters of the
house where Stephanie, the kidnapped victim, was placed
o Obeso, Basinga, Nacario, and Sarte are guilty of the crime
of kidnapping with ransom
o Leonilo Cui and Beverly Cui are only as accomplices, to
the crime of kidnapping with ransom
ISSUES
1. W/N the prosecution failed to present adequate proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt
a. Basingan’s testimony cannot be used because he escaped
and never testified in court to arm his accusation against
the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte.
b. Even if Sgt. Ouano testified for the statement, it would only
be hearsay (any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay
if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some
other person who was never presented on the witness
stand.)
c. The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a
co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless
these are repeated in open court.
i. Extra-judicial – deprives the other accused of
the opportunity to cross-examine the
confessant
ii. Judicial – confession is thrown wide open for
cross examination and rebuttal.
d. The res inter alios has exceptions. Thus, Section 30 of Rule
130 provides: "The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."
e. For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be
satisfied:
i. That the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself;
ii. that the admission relates to the common
objects
iii. that it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
f. The extra-judicial statements of Basingan cannot be used
against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte without doing violence
against their constitutional right to confront Basingan and
to cross-examine him.
2. W/N the Cuis are accomplices in the kidnapping of Stephanie
a. NO. They are accessories.
b. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes as accomplices those persons who cooperate in
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts not indispensable to the consummation of the offense.
Accomplices cooperate in the execution of the crime by
previous or simultaneous acts, by means of which they aid,
facilitate or protect the execution of the crime, without,
however, taking any direct part in such execution, or forcing
or inducing others to execute it, or contributing to its
accomplishment by any indispensable act.
c. This Court, however, holds that the Cuis profited from the
kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and are liable as
accessories (they received 10k from Toto Garcia from the
ransom money)
i. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes as accessories to the
crime those who, subsequent to its
commission, take part therein by profiting
themselves or assisting the offenders to
profit by the effects of the crime, without
having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices.
b. Conviction of an accused as an accessory requires the
following elements
i. That he has knowledge of the commission of
the crime
ii. By concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery.
iii. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his
public functions or whenever the author of
the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime.
3. W/N Obeso and Sarte should be acquitted
a. YES. The only evidence linking Obeso and Sarte to the
kidnapping of Stephanie Lim is Basingan's sworn
statements that a certain Leos and a certain Laring were
among the lookouts.
b. But because Basingan escaped before he could take the
witness stand, his sworn statements are hearsay it is
inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused
c. No direct evidence has been proffered by the prosecution
to place Obeso and Sarte at the scene of the crime. Their
alibi has to be given credence.
RULING:
• WHEREFORE, the Decision of the RTC of Cebu City is MODIFIED.
• Appellants Leonilo and Beverly Cui are CONVICTED as
ACCESSORIES and are ORDERED to serve the indeterminate
sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
• Appellants LUIS OBESO, alias "LEOS", and HILARIA SARTE, alias
"LARING" are ACQUITTED and if presently detained, they are
ordered immediately released from detention unless other legal
reasons exist to detain them.
b. In Light Felonies
c. In Crimes Punished by Special Penal Laws
PEOPLE v MORALES
G.R. No. 172873 (Mar. 19, 2010) | Del Castillo, J. | by Lo, J.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC for
possession and sale of shabu.
• The testimonies of the police officers were presented by the
prosecution.
14
• They held a buy-bust operation in which Morales was caught having
two sachets of shabu and the marked money.
• Morales, in his statement, said that the two male persons in civilian
clothing, who identified themselves as the police, handcuffed and
frisked him.
• Nothing was found on their way to the station.
• The police officer produced a sachet of shabu from his pocket and at
the station, presented it as evidence against Morales.
• The trial court found Morales guilty.
ISSUE
1. W/N Morales is guilty of possession and sale of illegal drugs.
a. NO.
b. Morales claims that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
c. The arresting officers did not place the proper markings
on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia.
d. To be guilty of sale of illegal drugs, there should be proof
that the transaction took place and the illegal drug is
presented in court as evidence.
e. To be guilty of possession of illegal drugs, it should be
established that the person possesses an illegal drug and
is freely aware of it.
f. The person to whom the police officers gave the drugs for
delivery of seized items was not present in the court, nor
did these police officers testify that they properly marked
the drugs after the arrest of Morales.
g. They also did not take photographs and had no
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice or public official to sign an inventory of the seized
items.
h. Prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody
which is fatal to its cause.
RULING: Morales is acquitted.
PEOPLE v DALIPE
G.R. No. 187154 (April 23, 2010) | Mendoza, J. | by Ricasio, G.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. The stepfather/appellant Edwin Dalipe committed three acts of
statutory rape and two acts of lasciviousness within 1992 to 1994
2. That the father, after being reported by the classmate and teachers to
the authority, arrests him for the same grounds
3. That the RTC rendered guilty, yet step dad appeals to the CA, which
subsequently denied via a motion for recons-deration.
4. That the SC clarified that for the issue of rape by member of the family
to the third degree is punishable by death while Art. 336 tis waling too
RA 7659; and those for acts of lasciviousness.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• That on May and July of 1992, and on July of 1995, appellant Edwin
Dalipe raped his stepdaughter AAA by forcibly having carnal
knowledge.
• That on February and June of 1994, appellant committed acts of
lasciviousness against AAA by inserting his fingers into the latter’s
private parts.
• That on August 1995, AAA told her classmate of the said crimes done
by appellant, of which the classmate informed their teachers, who in
turn aided AAA with the DSWD, NBI, and CHIME, and was
subsequently put under the custody of DSWD.
• That upon the examination of Dr. Arizala, an NBI medico-legal, the
genitalia of AAA had superficial lacerations which have healed,
indicator that a finger or a male penis has been inserted within the
period of 3 months to 1 year prior to the examination.
• That the RTC ruled that respondent is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
having committed 3 counts of statutory rape under Art. 335 of the RPC
and Sec. 11 of RA 7659, and two counts of acts of lasciviousness
under Sec. 5 of RA 7610
• That the CA affirms the RTC but modifies the penalties on the grounds
that the appellant is just the live-in partner of AAA’s mother due to the
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018) 15

lack of marriage certificate, thus finding no cause in imposing Sec. 11 Arresto menor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from
of RA 7659, penalizing rape by the step father with the death penalty, one day to thirty days.
thus reducing to reclusion perpetua. As for the acts of lasciviousness,
from Art. 336’s penalty of prison correccional, the penalty is now based Bond to keep the peace. – The bond to keep the peace shall be required to
on Sec.5(b) of RA 7610. cover such period of time as the court may determine. (as amended by R.A.
No. 7659)
ISSUES
1. WON the appellant is right to assail that the victim’s testimony was PEOPLE v GATWARD
inconsistent. (see digest under Table 7: Reclusion Perpetua)
a. NO. The trial court, CA, and SC found the testimonies to
be positive, direct, and categorical. PEOPLE v BON
b. That the SC found the inconsistencies to assailed to be (see digest under Table 7: Death)
minor and inconsequential.
2. WON it was right for the CA to base their ruling on Sec. 5 (b) of DIVISIBLE
Ra 7610, and not Art. 335 and 336
a. YES. The victim was 10 years old during the time of the RPC, Art. 76
commission of the crime. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. - The legal period of duration
of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming
RULING: The SC affirmed the decision, but increased the monetary liability three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner
imposed on the respondent, basing on the three grounds shown in the following table:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct. TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR PERIODS
subjected to other sexual abuse.
Penalties Time Time Time Time
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Entirety Minimum Medium Maximum

III. PENALTIES From 14

From 12 From 17
From 12 years, 8
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES years and 1 years, 4
Reclusion years and 1 months and
day to 14 months and
temporal day to 20 1 day to 17
years and 8 1 day to 20
INDIVISIBLE years. years and 4
months. years.
months.

RPC, Art. 47
Prision mayor,
In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of absolute From 10
the Death Penalty Cases. – The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases From 6 years From 6 years From 8 years
disqualification years and 1
and 1 day to and 1 day to and 1 day to
in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty and special
12 years. 8 years. 10 years.
day to 12
person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of temporary years.
the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or disqualification
automatic review of the case by the supreme court, the required majority
From 2
vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases From 6 From 4
Prision From 6 years, 4
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. correccional, months and
months and
months and
years, 2
1 day to 2 months and
suspension 1 day to 6 1 day to 4
years and 4 1 day to 6
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records and destierro years.
months.
years and 2
years.
shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment months.
by the court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15)
days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for From 1 From 2 From 4
month and 1 From 1 to 2 months and months and
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within Arresto mayor
day to months. 1 day to 4 1 day to 6
ten (10) days from the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (as months. months. months.
amended by R.A. No. 9346)
From 1 to 30 From 1 to 10 From 11 to From 21 to
Arresto menor
RPC, Art. 27 days. days. 20 days. 30 days.
Reclusion perpetua. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from
twenty years and one day to forty years.
RPC, Art. 77
Reclusion temporal. – The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties. -
twelve years and one day to twenty years. In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct
penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. – The duration of the penalties minimum the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and
one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its durations shall be that provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying by
of the principal penalty. analogy the prescribed rules.

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration of the
penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six
months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed
as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the
principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from
one month and one day to six months.
Cf. RPC, Art. 65
Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. - In
cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three
periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles,
dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed,
and forming one period of each of the three portions.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
ACCESSORY PENALTIES
RPC, Art. 40
Death; Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not executed
by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual
absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years
following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
RPC, Art. 41
Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. -
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with
them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as
the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
RPC, Art. 42
Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision mayor, shall
carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall
suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
RPC, Art. 43
Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
RPC, Art. 44
Arresto; Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of arresto shall carry with it
that of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during
the term of the sentence.
RPC, Art. 45
Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. -
Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government, unless they be property of a third person not
liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.
MEASURES NOT CONSIDERED PENALTY
RPC, Art. 24
Measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties. - The
following shall not be considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well
as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness
requiring their confinement in a hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned
in Article 80 and for the purposes specified therein.
3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial
or in order to institute proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of
their administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may
impose upon their subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may
establish in penal form.
RPC, Art. 247
Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. - Any
legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or
16
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them
any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents
with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
Family Code, Art. 228
Parental authority terminates permanently:
1. Upon the death of the parents;
2. Upon the death of the child; or
3. Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Family Code, Art. 229
Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also
terminates:
1. Upon adoption of the child;
2. Upon appointment of a general guardian;
3. Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case
filed for the purpose;
4. Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party
concerned of parental authority; or
5. Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person
exercising parental authority. (327a)
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PENALTY AND CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES
PEOPLE v JUGUETA
G.R. No. 202124 (Apr. 5, 2016) | Peralta, J. | by Leal, R.
FACTS OF THE CASE
1. The family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by side about
to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when
suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by appellant and his
companions.
2. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite
his plea for mercy, they fired at them successively and
indiscriminately.
3. The act caused the death of his two daughters, Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine who were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively.
4. Norberto believes that it the act of him filing for a case of molestation
against the appellant’s brothers that prompted the attack
5. Appellant tried to argue that there were inconsistencies with the
petitioner’s statement as to who really had the gun/ whose shot it was
that killed the daughters as a defense but this proved to be
unmeritorious
6. The charges against 2 other suspects Estores and San Miguel have
been dismissed.
ISSUES:
1. Conspiracy
a. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement regarding the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it.
b. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to
discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as
long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and
unity of purpose.
c. Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally
responsible for the death of Norberto’s daughters
d. The three perpetrators conspired to kill the family and
therefore, it mattered not whose shot actually killed and hit
the girls
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
2. Murder
a. Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as
treachery or evident premeditation.
b. There is treachery in this case because:
i. Norberto’s family were all unarmed and his
children were of tender age
ii. The perpetrators had firearms
iii. The attack was made suddenly as to render
victims helpless and defenseless
3. Attempted murder
a. a felony is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.
b. Killers failed to kill Norberto nor his wife
4. A clarification had to made with the use of ‘double murder’ (killing of
victims was not the result of a single act but several – in this case,
shooting of the guns) and ‘multiple attempted murder’ compared to
convicting the appellant with 2 separate counts of murder and 4
separate counts of attempted murder
a. This clarification was important because in the revised
rules of court, each information was to charge only one
offense but here, it charged 6, so the information here is
defective – which gives the defendant the chance to quash
the information BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA.
b. But since the defendant/appellant already made a plea, he
waived his right to question the existence of multiple
charges per information
5. Another clarification with the separate criminal acts and complex
crimes
a. In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually
committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the
conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime,
thus, only one penalty is imposed.
b. In the case at hand, it clearly showed the the suspects in
firing successive indiscriminate shots at the family showed
the intent to kill several individuals thus they are committing
more than one crime
6. Dwelling as an aggravating circumstance
a. In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that “[i]t has been
held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating
because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to
human abode. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him
or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere.” Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime
is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided
that the latter has not given provocation therefore.
b. In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance,
the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant.
c. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus,
with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the
imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of
murder.
i. However, due to RA 9346, proscribing death
penalty, the penalty to be imposed should be
reclusion perpetua for each count of murder
without eligibility for parole
ii. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted
murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is
prisión mayor. With one ordinary aggravating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in
its maximum period.
7. Regarding the 3 types of damages generally awarded by court in crim
cases where reclusion perpetua to death is the imposable penalty
a. Civil indemnity ex delicto
i. the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for
the offended party, in the amount authorized by
the prevailing judicial policy and apart from
other proven actual damages, which itself is
17
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages
in civil law.
b. Moral damages
i. may be awarded to compensate one for
manifold injuries such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be
understood to be in the concept of grants, not
punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.
c. Exemplary damages
i. Civil Code:
1. ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
2. ART. 2230. In criminal offenses,
exemplary damages as a part of the
civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances.
Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the offended party.
3. Also known as “punitive” or
“vindictive” damages,
4. exemplary or corrective damages
are intended to serve as a deterrent
to serious wrong doings
RULING: The appeal is dismissed. The CA decision is reaffirmed with
modifications.
RPC, Art. 100
Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.
RPC, Art. 104
What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in Articles
100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
RPC, Art. 106
Reparation; How made. - The court shall determine the amount of damage,
taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its
special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made
accordingly.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
TABLE 7
DEATH
Classification: Capital
Nature: Indivisible, Grave
Period: N/A
Accessory Penalties: RPC, Art. 40
RA 9346
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-
Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by
Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty
Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code; or
b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not
make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at
least one a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are
being considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided,
however, That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant
executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitutions.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two
national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 24, 2006
PEOPLE v BON
G.R. No. 166401 (Oct. 30, 2006) | Tinga, J. | By Lansangan, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Alfredo Bon is charged with 6 counts of consummated rape and 2
counts of attempted rape of his nieces AAA and BBB, both of which
were minors when the acts were committed.
2. Aside from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, their birth certificates
were also presented by their mother CCC to prove that they were
minors when the acts were committed.
3. A medical examination by Dr. Purita T. Tullas also confirmed that there
was indeed sexual contact.
4. The CA originally convicted the appellant on 8 counts of rape but 2
counts in relation to AAA were lessened to attempted rape since there
was no evidence that penetration occurred and since AAA testified
that it was painful when Bon tried to do so and he stopped in fear of
being caught as she was raising her voice.
5. Appellant is condemned to death yet in light of Republic Act No. 9346,
he is charged with reclusion perpetua for the 6 counts of rape and
prision mayor for the 2 counts of attempted rape.
18
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Alfredo Bon is charged with 6 counts of consummated rape and 2
counts of attempted rape of his nieces AAA and BBB, both of which
were minors when the acts were committed.
• On June 12 and June 14, 2000, both girls respectively told their mother
the abuses they suffered.
• The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances
over a span of six (6) years starting from 1994 (AAA) and 1997 (BBB).
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both
identified him as the man who had raped them.
• Both AAA and BBB were raped and threatened by respondent with a
knife and that he would kill their families if they don’t keep quiet.
• During trial, their respective birth certificates were entered as
documentary evidence to prove that they were indeed minors when it
all happened.
• Furthermore, a physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified
for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas, medical officer of Gumaca
District Hospital, testified that she was the one who examined BBB
and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for each child.
These medical certificates were presented in court.
• Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly
gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without resistance
and there were hymenal lacerations. Dr. Tullas concluded that there
might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for
several times.
• AAA’s labia majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen
was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could
happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration
with a person having an elastic hymen.
• On the other hand, when asked on cross examination, she stated that
there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of
the pudendum of AAA.
• Bon only offered weak defenses to his case, such as being 2
kilometers away from the house of his parents where and when the
rapes occurred and a general denial of the events.
• He further asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal case
against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only
reason the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law
and the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his
deceased father, who would call CCC “lazy” within earshot of other
family members
• The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. The RTC
pronounced appellant’s defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing,
citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak
defenses.
• The RTC concluded that appellant failed to controvert the clear, candid
and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship
of the victims and appellant, the latter being the former’s relative by
consanguinity within the third degree.
• As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the
records of the case were automatically elevated to the Supreme Court
for review.
• The CA affirmed 6 of the 8 charges however ruled that 2 of the charges
in relation to AAA were only attempted rape as no penetration
occurred upon review of the facts.
• The Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2)
counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for attempted rape.
• Alfredo Bon then assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
children such as the location, time, and how long the events actually
happened.
• The SC rules however that these inconsistencies are immaterial as
the children were at a tender young age when it happened, were
testifying in an open court, and that these do not discount the fact of
the acts committed.
• Furthermore, in the case at bar, appellant’s alibi that he was at his
sister’s house barely two (2) kilometers away when one of the rapes
took place on 15 January 2000.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
• Appellant could have easily left his sister’s house in the middle of the
night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sister’s house.
• Regarding his claim that the present case was merely instituted
because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father, the Court
finds it outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her
daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and
narrate their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by
her father-in-law as lazy.
• In addition, CCC’s father-in-law had died several years before the
criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted.
• The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it
has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty
of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape.
• However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346 (AN ACT PROHIBITING THE
IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES), the
appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.
ISSUES:
1. Does the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346 result in the statutory
interdiction of the death penalty?
2. Should appellant’s 2 charges of attempted rape, which under the penal
law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated qualified
rape, be computed from death or reclusion perpetua?
RULING:
1. For the 6 counts of consummated rape, the sentence of death
imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA can no longer be affirmed
in view of Rep. Act No. 9346.
2. Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
3. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is
affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.
4. For the 2 counts of attempted rape, in relation to Articles 51, 61, and
71 of the RPC, the CA sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for
attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion
temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next
lower, or prision mayor.
5. However, if Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would
have affirmed such sentence without complication.
6. The court questions if with the elimination of death as a penalty, should
it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty
with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346.
7. If it so followed, then the appellant would be sentenced to prision
mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
8. RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties
attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71.
9. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the
application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for
accessories and accomplices.
10. In the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for
attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than
death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.
11. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion
temporal, as ruled by the CA, but instead, prision mayor.
12. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court
sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of
consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos.
6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905,
and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB
for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each of them.
13. For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No.
6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) of prision
mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition,
19
appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2)
counts of attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
RECLUSION PERPETUA
Classification: Afflictive
Nature: Indivisible, Grave
Period: 20y1d-40y
Accessory Penalties: RPC, Art. 41
PEOPLE v GATWARD
G. R. Nos. 119772-73 (Feb. 7, 1997) | Regalado, J. | By Ledesma, K.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Nigel Gatward and U Aung Win were found guilty of violating the RPC
and the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
2. Gatward appeals in this present case, citing that the trial court erred
in the imposition of penalties.
3. The Court modified the judgment sentencing both Gatward and U
Aung Win to reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and full extent.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• 3:30 pm, August 30, 1994 – Win arrived from Bangkok. He presented
his luggage for examination however, just when the inspector was
about to begin his inspection, Win left and went to the conveyor.
• The inspector then proceeded w/ the inspection but still Win did not
return so he suspected that the bag might contain illegal articles. He
then reported this to his superior and the proceeded w/ conducting an
x-ray exam. They found heroin in between its partitions (5579.80 g).
• 7:45 of the same day, Win appeared at the check-in counter as
departing passenger. During investigation, they found that Win had a
contact in Bangkok and that there were other drug couriers in the PH.
• They went to City Garden Hotel so Win could communicate w/ his
contact in Bangkok. There they found Gatward and Zaw Win Naing
who were scheduled to leave for Bangkok.
• 3:00 pm, September 1, 1994 – Gatward’s luggage was brought back
to NAIA from Bangkok through Thai Airways. Upon retrieval and
inspection, they also found heroin inside it (5237.70g)
• Gatward pleaded not guilty; Win pleaded not guilty.
• Gatward was sentenced to 35 yrs of reclusion perpetua and 5M fine;
U Aung Win was sentenced to 25 yrs and 1M fine bc of the mitigating
circumstance of his guilty plea.
ISSUE
1. WON the trial court erred in the imposition of penalties
a. NO. The reclusion perpetua pertained to by the trial court
is the same as that which is affirmed by the Court in this
case. The error was only in the trial court citing a case
which was not yet final and executory.
RULING: Trial court judgment modified, both Gatward and U Ang Win
sentenced to reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and full extent.
PEOPLE v MALAKAS
G.R. No. 92150 (Dec. 8, 1993) | Bellosillo, J. | By Madcasim, A.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. In 1989, the accused was arrested for violating the Dangerous Drugs
Act, as a result of a buy-bust operation.
2. The accused, Efren Malakas, averred that (1) he was not the target of
the buy-bust operation; (2) a plastic-wrapped package was planted to
him by one of the NARCOM officials; and (3) the witness accounts
failed to establish that an entrapment operation (or even a mere
transaction) indeed took place.
3. The Court ruled in favor of the accused, arguing that the prosecution’s
account was indeed implausible. They added that reclusion perpetua
is not synonymous to life imprisonment.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
FACTS OF THE CASE
● In April 1989, Efren Malakas was arrested for allegedly violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as a result of a buy-bust operation led by 2Lt.
Ricomana.
● Upon receiving a tip from a private informant, the buy-bust team went
to a basketball court where the accused allegedly operated.
● While undercover, Sgt. Anata allegedly asked the accused “Pare,
mayroon ba tayo diyan, kumpromiso ako sa aking barkada.” Upon
asking this, Sgt. Anata averred that the accused handed him a pack
of 40 marijuana cigarettes. He then handed him a marked 50-peso bill.
● However, the accused argued that the target of the buy-bust operation
was not him but, instead, a certain Virgilio “VR” Villamin. He was only
caught because the buy-bust team lost Villamin due to a commotion
in the court. He alleges that one of the undercover officers gave him a
package wrapped in plastic.
● From this, the RTC charged the accused with 2000 PHP in fine and
life imprisonment.
ISSUES
1. WON the petition is meritorious
a. The Court ruled that they find merit in the petition, given the
implausibility of the prosecution’s account. In particular, the
Court sustained the petitioner’s argument that
i. There was barely a conversation
between the accused and the
undercover NARCOM officers to
establish entrapment;
ii. There was no account of a price
negotiation typical in a transaction
involving the sale of illicit goods (Sgt.
Anata cannot recall how much the
transaction cost); and
iii. The officers that accompanied Sgt.
Anata failed to witness the said
transaction itself.
2. WON the life imprisonment is the same as reclusion perpetua
a. The Court ruled that the trial court erred in sentencing
the accused with life imprisonment, even if the
Dangerous Drugs Act expressly prescribe reclusion
perpetua. While it notes that these two are commonly
understood as synonymous terms, they differ in that
reclusion perpetua involves a sentence of at least 30 years
and accounts accessory penalties. Life imprisonment is
also not prescribed in the RPC, unlike reclusion perpetua.
RULING: The Court REVERSED the RTC’s decision and ACQUITTED the
accused.
RPC, Art. 9
Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. - Grave felonies are
those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which
in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of this
Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which
in their maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the above-
mentioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is
provided.
RPC, Art. 27
Reclusion perpetua. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from
twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. – The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from
twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. – The duration of the penalties
of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and
one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is
20
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its durations shall be that
of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration of the
penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six
months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed
as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the
principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from
one month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from
one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. – The bond to keep the peace shall be required to
cover such period of time as the court may determine. (as amended by R.A.
No. 7659)
RPC, Art. 70
Successive service of sentence. - When the culprit has to serve two or more
penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties
will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall
be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may
be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph
the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance
with the following scale:
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10. Temporal absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for,
the right to follow a profession or calling, and
12. Public censure.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum
duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after
the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties
(pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended by Com.
Act No. 217)
RPC, Art. 71
Graduated scales. - In the case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower
or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules
prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which
is comprised the given penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Public censure,
10. Fine.
SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
2. Temporal absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for,
the right to follow a profession or calling,
4. Public censure,
5. Fine.
LIFE IMPRISONMENT
Classification: N/A
Nature: N/A
Period: No definite duration, dependent on law
providing for the penalty
Accessory Penalties: None
PEOPLE v GATWARD
(see digest under Reclusion Perpetua)
RA 9165
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
PEOPLE v MEDINA JR.
G.R. Nos. 127756-58 (June 8, 2003) | Callejo Sr., J. | by Marquez, A.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Defendant-appellant Benjamin Medina Sr. is the stepfather of the
victim Maria Theresa Salvatierra
• Medina Sr. raped Salvatierra on four occasions (around the year 1990,
sometime in 1994, and the morning and evening of August 3, 1996)
• Due to the threats of Medina Sr. that he will kill the victim’s mother and
sisters if she told them what happened, the victim kept silent for a long
time
• It was only when the mother asked her if the defendant did anything
to her when Salvatierra told them about Medina raping her
• Medina Sr. was charged with four counts of rape by Salvatierra
• The Regional Trial Court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the four counts of rape and imposed upon him “the supreme
penalty of triple death and life imprisonment”
• As the case involves the imposition of death penalty, it was
automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court
ISSUES
1. WON the Trial Court showed bias and partiality hence depriving the
appellant of a fair and impartial trial as the judge actively participated
in the cross examination
a. NO. The questions asked by the judge during the cross
examination were meant “merely to expedite the
proceedings and to clarify events”
b. The judge has the “duty to ask questions to elicit relevant
facts and to make the record bear truth”
c. When the judge asked questions to the doctor, it was “only
to clarify certain aspects of the testimony of the doctor in
relation to the examination of the private complainant and
her report thereon and not really to help the prosecution
build its case against the appellant.”
2. WON the Trial Court erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of
complaining witness in violation of the constitutional right of the
accused appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him
a. NO. Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense.—It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise date the offense was committed except when it is
a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
21
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)
b. “It was only on appeal that the appellant alleged for the first
time that the criminal complaints were defective. The Court
believes that the appellant’s assertion is but an
afterthought.”
3. WON the penalty imposed upon the appellant was in accordance
with the law
a. NO. For the first count of rape: Under Art. 335 of the RPC,
the punishment for the crime of rape was Reclusion
Perpetua; life imprisonment is not synonymous with
Reclusion Perpetua, hence the decision of the RTC to
impose life imprisonment should be changed to
Reclusion Perpetua
b. For the other three counts of rape:
i. Death penalty should only be imposed in
relation to the crime of rape when the victim is
below 18 years of age and the accused is a
relative (RA 7659)
ii. The relationship of the accused and the victim
was never alleged and proved concurrently
iii. The accused was merely a common law spouse
of the mother of the victim,; they were never
legally married
iv. Hence, the penalties should be reduced to
reclusion perpetua for each count of simple
rape
RULING
• WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 23, 1996, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Cases Nos.
7062, 7099, 7100 and 7101 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant Benjamin Medina, Sr. y Palancio is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four counts of simple rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
He is, likewise, ordered to pay private complainant Ma. Theresa
Salvatierra, the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as
moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each of the
four counts of rape.
• The SC affirmed the conviction of the accused with four counts of rape.
However, the SC modified the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua
for each count of rape.
PEOPLE v BALLABARE
G.R. No. 108871 (Nov. 19, 1996) | Mendoza, J. | By Martinez, E.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Gerry and Eder Ballabare shot and killed Leonardo and Juan Tacadao
outside the latter’s residence. Gerry was eventually caught and Eder
was at large.
2. Witness, sister of victims, testified that she saw the events happening
from inside of the house. She later filed an affidavit to withdraw her
testimony because her father no longer wanted to pursue the case.
RTC rejected this because she was a credible witness.
3. RTC convicted Gerry with 2 counts of murder and illegal possession
of firearms, sentenced to life imprisonment.
4. Gerry petitioned that he was supposed to be presumed innocent and
that he was a victim of double jeopardy (murder and illegal
possession).
5. Courts decided that there was overwhelming evidence against him,
considering that the witness positively identified him and there was
gunpowder found on his hands.
6. However, there was no evidence of conspiracy so he should be held
liable for only 1 death.
7. Charge should also be homicide instead of murder because there was
no treachery involved.
8. No double jeopardy because homicide and illegal possession are 2
different charges.
9. Life imprisonment was also incorrect because it is meant to be used
for grave crimes punished by special laws.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
FACTS OF THE CASE
• On September 16, 1990, accused-appellant Gerry and Eder Ballabare
shot and killed Leonardo Tacadao (chest penetrating heart) and Juan
(head penetrating brain), respectively.
• Sole witness Tessie Asenita, sister of victims, testified that from her
kitchen, she saw Edito Ballabare (accused’s brother) boxing Moreto
Miason, a farmhand of her father.
• Edito was initially with 4 other people while Miason was with 3 other
people (including the victims).
• Edito’s group grew to 11 people (including accused) and they started
throwing stones at the house.
• While Leonardo and Juan were running away, they were shot by the
2 accused.
• Gerry was caught while Eder escaped and is at large.
• Accused’s (Gerry) alibi was that he was playing basketball in his yard
when the incident happened.
• Witness Tessie also submitted an affidavit for the withdrawal of
testimony because her father was no longer interested in pressing
charges. Her husband testified that Gerry had nothing to do with the
crime and that only Eder was the one who shot the victims. RTC
rejected Tessie’s affidavit.
• Gerry was declared guilty of Illegal Possession and 2 counts of
murder. Sentenced with life imprisonment.
ISSUES
1. W/N RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in not according
accused his constitutional right to be presumed innocent and to an
impartial tribunal.
a. NO. Evidence was overwhelming against Gerry.
b. RTC denied affidavit because it would be wrong to
discredit such a credible witness.
c. The affidavit was just a way for accused to escape liability
(possibly due to an agreement between both families who
were also neighbors). Tessie’s positive identification of
Gerry should be given much weight because she was so
close to the incident.
d. NBI forensic chemist found gunpowder on Gerry’s
hands.
e. Alibi does not work because place he says he was in was
just 200 meters away so it wasn’t impossible for him to be
there.
f. However, there is not enough proof to show conspiracy
since he and Eder were not in the original group that
attacked, so he should be held liable for only 1 death.
g. He should also be guilty of homicide, not murder because
there was no treachery:
a. Attack happened at 4 PM
b. Attack started with stone throwing so the victims
had opportunity to defend themselves
h. Also, there is an aggravating circumstance of
superiority in number and arms. Not a qualifying
circumstance because it wasn’t alleged in the information.
2. W/N RTC’s charges of illegal possession and murder constitutes
double jeopardy.
a. NO. Accused relied on Lazaro v. People, where the Courts
said that Illegal Possession barred the prosecution of
Parricide because of double jeopardy.
b. The Courts have since declared that Lazaro was no
longer controlling in their decisions. Illegal possession
and murder (or homicide) are 2 different charges.
3. Other Errors of the RTC
a. RTC erred in imposing life imprisonment.
b. Reclusion perpetua is literally translated to “life
imprisonment,” but that isn’t the case.
a. Life imprisonment is imposed on serious
offenses penalized by special laws, while
reclusion perpetua is prescribed by the RPC.
c. Life imprisonment does not carry with it accessory penalty
unlike reclusion.
d. Life imprisonment does not have a definite extent or
duration, while reclusion is imprisonment for 30-40 years.
22
RULING: Decision of RTC modified. Accused guilty of (1) homicide with 1
aggravating circumstance, sentence of 12- 20 years imprisonment and (2)
illegal possession, sentence of reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE v GREGORIO
GR: 109614 (Mar. 19, 1996) |Kapunan, J. | by Mendizabal, C.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Carlos Catorse and his son Romeo Catorse went to the wake of
Adronico Gregorio’s grandson.
2. At the wake, Adronico started beating his son Tunggak. Carlos tried
to pacify the situation, but then Ricardo Gregorio and Adronico
stabbed and hacked him.
3. Adronico and Ricardo also hacked Marcelo Lo while the latter is trying
to save his uncle.
4. Both Carlos and Marcelo died. Siblings Ricardo and Adronico
Gregorio used self-defense as a justifying circumstance for the murder
of the victims.
5. Both RTC and SC found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and self-defense was rejected since they were not able to prove
that all elements are present at the time of the incident.
6. Ricardo died prior to the issuance of SC’s decision . Hence, his
criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished. Adronico, was
sentenced with reclusion perpetua and asked to pay 50,000 each to
the heirs of the victims.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Carlos Catorse and his son Romeo Catorse went to the wake of
Adronico Gregorio’s grandson.
• Adronico asked guests to deposit weapons to him upon their arrival at
the venue to prevent trouble.
• Later on, Adronico started beating his son Tunggak. Carlos tried to
pacify the situation, but then Ricardo Gregorio (Adronico’s brother)
stabbed him multiple times. Ricardo used Carlos’ own samurai to stab
him. Adronico then stabbed Carlos multiple times using a bolo, after
he fell to the ground.
• Romeo fled the house out of fear. Jovito Nicavera, one of the guests
in the wake, also tried to escape the house but, Adronico stabbed him
by his left shoulder using a bolo.
• Marcelo Lo (Jovito’s nephew) tried to help Jovito, but Ricardo also
hacked him several times using the samurai used to kill Carlos.
Marcelo ran out of the house, but Adronico followed him and hacked
him on the nape.
• Carlos sustained 12 hacks and 4 stab wounds while Marcelo
sustained 6 hack wounds which resulted to their death.
• Both Ricardo and Adronico fled to Sitio Anangge after the incident.
• The RTC ruled that both of them were guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of committing murder. However, both of them asserted that they killed
the victims due to self-defense.
• Ricardo Gregorio died after the RTC issued its decision, thus his
criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished by his death.
ISSUES
1. W/N the trial court erred in rejecting Adronico’s defense of self-
defense
a. NO
b. For self-defense to be an affective justifying circumstance
in this case, the presence of these three elements must be
proven by the accused:
i. unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims;
ii. means employed to repel or prevent
aggression were reasonable;
iii. there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
c. The post-mortem results showed that the number of hack
and stab wounds obtained by the victims shows absence
of unlawful aggression on the victims’ part. The victims
have sustained multiple stab and hack wounds while the
appellants remained unharmed.
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
d. The appellants’ testimonies narrating the events during the
incident also did not match the result of post-mortem exam.
They said they only got one chance to stab or hack the
victims, but the autopsy revealed that victims sustained
multiple stab and hack wounds which are unreasonable
means to repel aggression.
e. The testimonies of the prosecution proved that the
appellants caused the unlawful aggression and not the
victims
2. W/N there exists a conspiracy and treachery in the case at bar and
W/N they are guilty beyond reasonable doubt
a. YES. The orchestrated actions of the siblings Ricardo and
Adronico Gregorio clearly show that they intend to
successfully kill the victims without risk to themselves
arising from the defense which Carlos and Marcelo might
make.
RULING: SC held that Adronico Gregorio is to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Carlos and Marcelo the
sum of 50,000 each. Ricardo Gregorio’s death extinguished his criminal
and civil liability.
PEOPLE v MALAKAS
(see digest under Reclusion Perpetua)
PEOPLE v LUSA
G. R. No. 122246 (Mar. 27, 1998) | Romero, J. | By: Montano, J.
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Michelle Lusa was abused, raped, and impregnated by her father at
14.
2. She gave birth to the baby and gave him up for adoption.
3. She filed for rape against her father.
4. Her father was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt but the trial court
erred in sentencing him to “reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment”
5. SC stated that reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment.
6. Art. 335 of the RPC mentions only reclusion perpetua while special
laws impose life imprisonment as penalty.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Michelle Lusa was abused, raped, and impregnated by her father
(Bobby Lusa) at 14. She is the eldest of 6 children and they lived in
Silang, Cavite
• In the second week of Sept. 1993, at around 12 o’clock midnight, she
was sleeping with her brothers and sisters inside one of the rooms in
the house when she felt someone touching her private parts. She
kicked him and removed his hand. Her father hurriedly left the room.
Michelle did not talk about the incident.
• In the first week of October 1993, 3am her father again raped her. She
tried resisting but he was on top of her and reeked of alcohol. He
forcibly removed her shorts and succeeded in forcing himself on her.
He warned Michelle not to tell anyone or else she would be killed
• These sexual assaults were repeated approximately 10 times, last one
on March 28, 1994. 3 days later, Michelle told her aunt what had
happened because she was asked about her growing abdomen.
• She executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay on April 1, 1994 narrating
experiences with her father
• She was medically examined on April 4, 1994 by Dr. Engracia Dela
Cruz and it was established that she was indeed pregnant.
• Gave birth on July 21, 1994 to a baby boy in Fabella Hospital. She
gave him up for adoption because she would not support him.
• She filed for rape against her father. Accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty, trial proceeded.
• Lower court convicted him of rape and was sentenced to pay Michelle:
Php 50,000.00 by way of indemnity, Php 25,000.00 as moral
damages, Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the penalty imposed
upon the accused.
• Accused appellant appeals that trial court erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt
23
ISSUES
1. W/N trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape
a. NO.
b. Accused appellant claims that:
i. Disparities between the complainant’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay and testimony in
open court proves that he is not guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Court disagreed.
Differences are minor and do not affect
credibility of complainant. Sinumpaang
Salaysay is not expected to be as exhaustive
as testimony in open court
ii. Certificate of Live Birth carried name of
Jessie Hernaes as father of the
complainant’s child. This does not affect or
exonerate the accused appellant from the
crime of rape.
iii. His daughter was raped and impregnated by
Ramil Estrada, their househelp. Court
disagreed. Uncorroborated and based on
pure hearsay.
c. Court believes the complainant’s testimony because no
person would be willing to undergo public trial and
humiliation to testify on details of incestuous rape.
2. W/N accused appellant should be convicted only of one count of rape
a. YES. Prosecution failed to establish and prove all the other
rapes committed after the first incident
b. Sentence of the lower court was “reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.” This is erroneous.
c. Reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment
d. Art. 335 of RPC mentions only reculsion perpetua
e. Special laws impose life imprisonment as a penalty
RULING: Court ruled that Bobby Lusa is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and is ordered to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify victim Michelle
Lusa Php 50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, Php
25,000.00 for moral damages, and Php 10,000.00 for exemplary damages.
Cf. PEOPLE v SABEROLA
G.R. No. 132023 (Oct. 12, 1998) | Puno, J. | By Muhlach, A.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Accused-appellant Larry Saberola y Loquenario, together with his
brothers, Benjamin Saberola y Loquenario and Jaime Saberola y
Loquenario were charged with the crime of murder before the RTC of
Kalookan City in June 17, 1993.
• On June 14, 1993, the brothers conspired together and helped one
another, with deliberate intent to kill, with the use of their superior
strength, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and stab on the
different parts of the body of Fernando Penalosa y Bulan, thereby
causing his death.
• The prosecution established that at about 4PM of June 14, 1993,
Penalosa went to the house of Recenti Bertos to engage his game
cock in a “pakahig.” An hour later, Larry invited him to a drinking spree
at his brother’s place located in the same neighborhood. At 10PM, a
commotion erupted at Jaime Saberola’s yard, which led to the killing
of Penalosa.
• The witnesses were the neighbors, among them, Recenti Bertos and
Alfredo Rebamonte. They testified that they were inside their
respective homes when they heard shouts from Jaime’s house. They
went out and saw that Larry stabbed Penalosa on the left portion of
the chest. Immediately, Jaime approached Penalosa and stabbed him
on the left side of his body. Benjamin Saberola then struck Penalosa
with a piece of wood. After this, the assailants fled to their houses.
Penalosa died the next morning.
• The defense presented a different version of the story. Zenaida Nanta
testified that she was at Benjamin’s house on June 14, 1993. Larry
and Penalosa came by, looking for Nizare, Penalosa’s brother-in-law,
who was helping in the construction of the house. Larry went home at
7PM, leaving Penalosa and his brother-in-law. Nanta heard that the
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018)
two were having a heated argument and that they left the house
around 9PM.
• Larry testified that he was on a drinking spree with them at the house
of his brother, Benjamin. While they were drinking, Nizare had an
altercation with Penalosa about the burial of his wife. Larry left the
others there around 6PM. This testimony was corroborated by his wife,
Elvira Saberola.
ISSUES
1. W/N Larry Saberola conspired with his brothers, Benjamin and Jaime,
to commit murder
2. W/N the felony was attended by treachery and evident premeditation
RTC RULING:
• The RTC held accused-appellant guilty of murder. It found that there
was conspiracy among the Saberola brothers to kill Penalosa and that
the killing was aggravated by treachery and abuse of superior
strength. They sentenced Larry to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
CA RULING:
• The CA modified the judgment of the trial court although it affirmed
Larry’s conviction.
• First, it found that the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy among
the three accused. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. One’s
mere presence in the crime scene, by itself, does not make him a
conspirator.
• Second, it found that the felony was not attended by treachery and
evident premeditation.
• However, there has been a clear showing of abuse of superior
strength which qualifies the killing to murder where, as in this case,
three assailants utilized their superiority in numbers and employed
deadly weapons in assaulting an unarmed victim.
• The CA then increased the prison penalty to reclusion perpetua.
• In view of the imposition of reclusion perpetua upon Larry, the CA
certified the case to the SC.
SC RULING:
• No reason to disturb the ruling of the CA.
• The guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Two eye-witnesses positively identified Larry as one of the
assailants. His alibi cannot overcome their eyeball testimonies,
especially since it has not been shown that it was impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The
narration of the events by the testimonies jibed with the result of the
autopsy on the victim’s body.
• Court affirms the finding that accused-appellant committed murder
and the imposition of reclusion perpetua upon him.
• Treachery or alevosia may be appreciated when the following
requisites are present:
1. The employment of the means, method and manner of execution
which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or
retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being
given to the latter to defend himself or retaliate
2. Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method or
manner of execution
• Before evident premeditation may be considered, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The time when the accused determined to commit the crime
2. An act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination
3. Sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act
24
LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE
Classification: N/A
Nature: N/A
Period: Not provided
Accessory Penalties: None
RA 9346, Sec. 3
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall
not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
40 YEARS WITHOUT PAROLE
Classification: N/A
Nature: N/A
Period: Not provided
Accessory Penalties: None
RA 9372, Sec. 3
Human Security Act of 2007
Terrorism. – Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a) Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in
the Philippine Waters);
b) Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c) Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private
persons;
d) Article 248 (Murder);
e) Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f) Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
i. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
ii. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and
Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
iii. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory
and Liability Act of 1968);
iv. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
v. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
vi. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree
Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives),
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and
shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the
benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
RA 9372, Sec. 4
Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. – Persons who conspire to commit the
crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section
3 hereof and decide to commit the same.
RECLUSION TEMPORAL
Classification: Afflictive
Nature: Divisible, Grave
Period: 12y1d-20y
Accessory Penalties: RPC, Art. 41
RPC, Arts. 9, 27, 70, 71
(see Reclusion Perpetua)
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018) 25

RPC, Art. 25 4. SC said a buy bust operation was a valid means to apprehend
Penalties which may be imposed. - The penalties which may be imposed violators of the dangerous drugs law; with that, Danilo was arrested in
according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in the flagrante delicto (caught in the act) which is one of the instances when
following: one may arrest someone w/o a warrant
Scale 5. However, since the Dangerous Drugs Act had been amended, Danilo
Principal Penalties was only sentenced to a minimum of aresto mayor (6mo.) and a
Capital punishment: maximum of prision correcional (4 years) instead of life imprisonment.
Death. Since by this time Danilo had been in prison for over 5 years, he was
Afflictive penalties: ordered to be immediately released (not retroactive as the DDA was
Reclusion perpetua, enacted in 1972, while the amendments in 1980)
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, FACTS OF THE CASE
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, • On July 5, 1991, after receiving a tip and having observed the suspect
Prision mayor. for a week, an 8 member police team by order of P/Maj. Cipriano
Correctional penalties: Herrera Jr., and led by Lt. Enrique Sy went to Instruccion St.
Prision correccional, Sampaloc, Maynila to perform a buy bust operation on Danilo Juatan
Arresto mayor, Y Capsa
Suspension,
Destierro.
• Pat. Ernesto Yamson was the poseur-buyer and “bought” the shabu
from Danilo for 500php
Light penalties:
Arresto menor, • Danilo was subsequently arrested, and 0.395 grams of shabu was
Public censure. found
Penalties common to the three preceding classes: • A search was also done at the house of Danilo to look for Boy Chua,
Fine, and who was subsequently found there and arrested, despite protests from
Bond to keep the peace. Danilo’s wife Aurora, who was also asking for a warrant
• On Jul. 9, 1991, Danilo was accused of willfully, unlawfully, and
Accessory Penalties feloniously selling/offering to sell shabu or metamphetamine
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, hydrochloride
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification, • On Feb. 23, 1992, The RTC of Manila Branch 45 pronounced Danilo
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the “guilty beyond reasonable doubt” of violating Sec. 15 of RA 6425, as
profession or calling. amended by PD 1683. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and
Civil interdiction, ordered to pay a fine of P20k
Indemnification, • Danilo appealed, claiming he was arrested w/o a warrant, after asking
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense, for it while he was captured
Payment of costs.
ISSUES
PRISION MAYOR 1. Is there the need for a warrant to arrest Danilo?
a. NO. A buy bust operation, which is a valid means to
Classification: Afflictive arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law, is
Nature: Divisible, Grave different from an ordinary arrest.
Period: 6y1d-12y b. A violator of the Dangerous Drugs Law caught during a buy
Accessory Penalties: RPC, Art. 42 bust operation need not be presented w/ a warrant for he
is caught in flagrante delicto (caught in the act) w/c is one
RPC, Arts. 9, 25, 27, 70, 71 of the situations where a warrantless arrest is acceptable.
(see Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal) 2. Is life imprisonment the correct punishment?
a. NO. The punishment under the Dangerous Drugs Act as
PRISION CORRECCIONAL amended was reclusion perpetua to death; however, due
to the shabu found to only be 0.395 grams, the sentence
Classification: Correctional should be amended to arresto mayor to prision
Nature: Divisible, Less Grave correccional, as there is also no mitigating nor aggravating
Period: 6m1d-6y circumstance
Accessory Penalties: RPC, Art. 43 b. As of the trial, he has served 5 years in jail, thus he is to be
released
RPC, Arts. 9, 25, 27, 70, 71
(see Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal) RULING
• Danilo Juatan found guilty of violating Sec. 15 of the Dangerous Drugs
ARRESTO MAYOR Act for carrying shabu
• No need for warrant due to it being an official buy bust operation and
Classification: Correctional the suspect in flagrante delicto
Nature: Divisible, Less Grave
Period: 1m1d-6m
• Punishment of arresto mayor (6mo.) to prision correccional (4 years)
instead of life imprisonment. As he has served beyond the maximum
Accessory Penalties: RPC, Art. 44
already, he is to be immediately released.
PEOPLE v JUATAN
RPC, Arts. 9, 25, 27, 70, 71
G.R. No. 104378 (Aug. 20, 1996) | Vitug, J. | By Nebres, C.
(see Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal)
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Danilo Juatan was arrested for carrying and trying to sell 0.395 grams
of shabu during a buy bust operation
2. Danilo was sentenced to life imprisonment
3. Danilo contended he was arrested, and his house was searched w/o
a warrant (Police did not have any during the operation)
CRIMINAL LAW I | MAKEUP CLASS 1 (SEPT. 26, 2018) 26

DESTIERRO RPC, Arts. 9, 25, 27, 70, 71

(see Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal)
Classification: Correctional
Nature: Indivisible, Less Grave RPC, Art. 35
Period: N/A Effects of bond to keep the peace. - It shall be the duty of any person
Accessory Penalties: N/A sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties
who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to
RPC, Arts. 9, 25, 27, 70, 71 be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the
(see Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal) amount determined by the court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit
such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said
ARRESTO MENOR undertaking.

Classification: Light The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration
Nature: Divisible, Light of the bond.
Period: 1d-30d
Accessory Penalties: RPC, Art. 44 Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be
detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, is he shall
RPC, Arts. 9, 25, 27, 70, 71 have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
(see Reclusion Perpetua and Reclusion Temporal) thirty days, if for a light felony.

PUBLIC CENSURE

Classification: Light
Nature: Indivisible, Light
Period: N/A
Accessory Penalties: N/A

FINE

Classification: Common Penalty to Afflictive,

Correctional, and Light Penalties
Nature: Divisible
Period: Afflictive if excess of P6,000; correctional if
between P200-P6,000;
light if less than P200
Accessory Penalties: N/A

RPC, Arts. 9, 70, 71

(see Reclusion Perpetua)

RPC, Art. 26
When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. – A fine, whether imposed as
a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive
penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not
exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty, if it
be less than 200 pesos.

RPC, Art. 66
Imposition of fines. - In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within
the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention
shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but
more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.

RPC, Art. 75
Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees. -
Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by
one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each
degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without
however, changing the minimum.

The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not consist of
a fixed amount, but are made proportional.

BOND TO KEEP PEACE

Classification: Common Penalty to Afflictive,

Correctional, and Light Penalties
Nature: Divisible
Period: Determined by the court
Accessory Penalties: N/A