Authoritarian Rule Part 1

Authoritarian Rule Part 1 1
Authoritarian rule
This module examines the key arguments and features of authoritarian rule and which arguments and
features were illustrated in the experiences of countries that were/are under former and contemporary authoritarian rule.
The author also noted the circumstances attendant to the rise and fall of authoritarian rulers. Significant emphasis
towards the last part of this module is the examination of political corruption which should be understood to be a
phenomenon that does not only happen in an authoritarian rule but also in non-authoritarian systems.
After reading the excerpted materialand watching the video, you should be able to:
a. reflect on the pros and cons of authoritarian rule
b. demonstrate understanding of the types and features of authoritarian regimes
Key Concepts to Understand:
absolute monarchy Arab Spring authoritarian regimes co-option coup d’etat
electoral fraud embezzlement hybrid regime influence peddling patronage
political corruption theocracy
(excerpted from: Hague, R., Harrop, M. & McCormick, J. (2016). Comparative government and politics: An introduction. 10th Edition.
USA: Palgrave.)
Authoritarian rulers operate within unspoken limits, recognizing the need to strike deals
with other power-holders such as business, the military, or regional bosses. Just as democratic
leaders need to retain electoral support, so authoritarian rulers must convince their allies to
continue supporting the existing regime. Furthermore, government typically takes the form not of
a single dominant leader but, rather, of an elite group within which there is considerable internal
jockeying for power. Ideology and policy are often absent. Rulers seek to maintain their control
(and increase their wealth) by limiting mass participation, rather than by mobilizing the
population. Ordinary people are unlikely to experience a knock on the door at midnight as long
as they keep away from politics. In such a situation, governance is an uneasy combination of
formally unlimited authority and considerable political vulnerability. Since non-democratic
leaders so clearly stand above the law, the constitutional architecture (if any) is a poor guide.
Laws are vague and contradictory, creating a pretext for bringing any chosen troublemaker to
court. Special courts, such as military tribunals, are often used for sensitive cases. The
legislature and the judiciary are under-resourced, unprofessional and ineffective. Civil liberties
are poorly respected and the state often requires private organizations to be licensed. The
absence of constitutional constraint leads to callous treatment of the powerless, including
women, minority groups, non-nationals, and prisoners. With no enforceable legal framework to
protect private property rights, authoritarian rule is often associated with economic stagnation.
xxx
Key Arguments:
• Identifying the dynamics of authoritarian regimes provides a useful contrast
to our understanding of democracy, and vice versa.
• The concept of hybrid regimes offers an intermediate position between
authoritarianism and democracy.
• The exploitation of the military, the use of patronage, and control of the
media are key elements in the maintenance of authoritarian regimes.
• One key to understanding authoritarian regimes is to recognize that few
are absolute tyrannies; many of their leaders are in a weaker political
position than their liberal democratic equivalents.
• Establishing hard and fast rules for authoritarian regimes, and defining
templates, is more difficult than is the case for democracies, partly
because their formal structures are weak and partly because they vary in
their source of power.
• Although we can find corruption wherever there are people willing to
abuse the offices they hold for private gain, it plays a particularly telling
role in authoritarian regimes. It is both a cause and effect of the
misuse of power.
Features:
• The absence of record on representative government, with elections – where they are held –
often accompanied by fraud, manipulation, and violence.
• Weak, immature, or poorly defined political institutions and processes, with power in the
hands of leaders and elites, and occasionally the establishment of dictatorships.
• A limited selection of forms of political participation and representation, and no guarantees
that the voices of citizens will be heard effectively.
• Relatively few limits on the powers of government, and a mixed record on the protection of
individual rights and freedoms under the law, with no independent judiciary.
• An opposition that is constrained, and subject to threats and even violence.
• A limited and controlled media establishment, subject to political controls and free to share
only officially sanctioned opinions.
Take a pause and reflect on the key arguments and features of an authoritarian
rule vis-à-vis the key arguments and features of a democratic rule which was the
preceding lesson. Then watch Snyder’s take on President Trump. His 8-minute narrative will
introduce you to the concept of hybrid regime which you will read after watching and listening
to him in this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZ-bifYqK_Q | The Path to
Authoritarianism: Historian Timothy Snyder
Hybrid regimes. The hybrid regimes described by the Democracy Index overlap with a
category described by Levitsky and Way (2010) as competitive authoritarian regimes. They
define these as states in which ‘formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal
means of obtaining and exercising political authority … [but where] incumbents violate those
rules so often and to such an extent … that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum
standards for democracy’. In the Democracy Index, hybrid regimes are described as
suffering weaknesses both in political culture and in the functioning of government and
political participation. Elections are held, but are undermined by irregularities that often
prevent them from being both free and fair, and government pressure on opposition parties and
candidates can be common. Corruption tends to be widespread, civil society and the rule of law
are weak, the judiciary lacks independence, and journalists are typically harassed.
In a hybrid regime, leaders or ruling parties are elected, but they use state resources and
their influence over the media to determine the outcome of elections long before campaigns
begin. Ballot-stuffing is only needed if a defeat is in the offing. Once elected, the government
shows only a limited sense of constitutional restraint; such concepts as fair play, a loyal
opposition, and individual rights barely register. In this kind of system, notes O’Donnell (1994: 59),
whoever wins the election ‘is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only
by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office’. The
result is what Huntington (1991: 306) once described as ‘democracy without turnover and
competition without alternation’. If liberal democracy ‘is a system in which parties lose elections’
(Przeworski, 1991: 10), competitive authoritarianism is a system in which they do not. Rather, change
at the top usually results from a constitutional limit on tenure, or the occasional resignation.
Singapore offers an example. While it has multiple political parties, a vibrant high-
technology economy and one of the world’s highest standards of living, it is classified in the
Democracy Index as a hybrid regime. This is mainly because the People’s Action Party has
governed the island state since 1959, routinely winning more than 60 per cent of the vote,
maintaining an electoral system that allowed it to win 93 per cent of legislative seats in 2011
with only a 60:14 per cent share of the vote, and directing investment to districts that vote for the
party.
Hybrid regimes are normally founded on a powerful leader or political party, rather than
on strong institutions. In return for taking care of the needs of the people, leaders claim their
respect, deference, and support. Because the judiciary is under-resourced, it is unable to
enforce the individual rights documented in the constitution. The law is used selectively, as a
tool of power, so that while political opponents are subject to detailed legal scrutiny, supporters
find that the law rarely intrudes on their activities: ‘for my friends, everything; for my enemies,
the law,’ said Getúlio Vargas, twice president of Brazil. The state intervenes in the market, with
political connections influencing economic rewards. Yet, in contrast to pure authoritarian
regimes, the leader often provides effective governance, thus earning – as well as manipulating
– popular support.
The form is particularly common in states that are poor, that suffer deep internal
divisions (whether ethnic, religious, or economic), and that face real or constructed external
threats. In these circumstances, a national father figure or dominant party can be presented as
an engine of development, as a bulwark against domestic disintegration, and as a protector
against external threats. The head, it is claimed, must be allowed to rule the body politic.
For most of its post-communist history, Ukraine has offered a representative case. A
former republic of the Soviet Union, it became independent in 1991, but remains poor (with a
per capita GNI of just under $4,000 in 2013), and finds itself torn between Western and Russian
circles of influence. The efforts made by President Leonid Kuchma to control the media,
manipulate the political system, side Ukraine with Russian economic interests, and then rig
presidential elections sparked the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ and new elections. These were
won by a pro-Western alliance of political groups which elevated Viktor Yushchenko to the
presidency. Democratic reform followed, but the country remained divided between pro-Western
and pro-Russian forces, and when Viktor Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election, he
took the country firmly in the Russian direction.
Yanukovych enriched himself and his political supporters, reinforcing his country’s status
as one of the world’s most corrupt. For ordinary people, the need to bribe public officials was a
fact of political life, alienating them from their supposedly democratic government. Neither civil
society nor the judiciary provided an effective check on power. When Yanukovych’s government
dropped plans in 2013 to sign a trade agreement with the European Union, mass
demonstrations ensued and the government fell. The deposed leader fled to Russia, which then
annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Fighting broke out in the eastern part of the country,
reinforcing historic divisions and threatening the ability of the Ukrainian national government to
establish effective governance.
To the extent that hybrid regimes are personal in character, they might be expected to
be unstable in the long run. Huntington (1991: 137), for example, claims that ‘this half-way house
cannot stand’. Similarly, Levitsky and Way (2010: 20) note that such regimes are marked by an
‘inherent tension’ in which oppositions can develop a serious challenge to the existing power
structure. These threats force rulers either to submit (and democratize), or to repress (and
revert to cruder authoritarian rule).
Yet, we cannot wish these regimes out of existence by just describing them as
transitional. Some (especially those far from Western zones of influence) have provided a stable
method of governing poor and unequal societies, particularly since the end of communism
rendered blatant dictatorship less defensible. Once set, a hybrid regime can be a strong
amalgam, not least in Islamic settings where liberal democracy can be equated with Western
permissiveness. Writing on sub-Saharan Africa, Herbst (2001: 359) judges that ‘it is wrong to
conclude that African states are travelling between democracy and authoritarianism simply
because a majority of them belong to neither category. Rather, the current condition of African
states could well prevail for decades.’ Such thinking led Case (1996: 464) to conclude that hybrid
regimes are not ‘a mere way station on the road to further democracy’.
Haiti provides a particularly disturbing case of a hybrid state. It has been independent
since 1804 but has never been able to settle on a durable and stable political model, and stands
out as the most troubled country in the western hemisphere. In theory it is a unitary presidential
republic with three branches of government, but in reality, it is whatever its incumbent
administration is able to fashion from the wreckage of instability, civil unrest and corruption. It
does not help that the country has suffered numerous natural disasters, ranging from hurricanes
to earthquakes, but a failure to build adequate infrastructure has made it less able to withstand
such problems. In 2006, however, the advent of a new government did encourage Freedom
House to upgrade Haiti from a ranking of Not Free to Partly Free. But then came the January
2010 earthquake, which killed an estimated 230,000 people and left government, the economy,
infrastructure, and the social fabric in ruins. On the 2014 Human Development Index it ranked
168th out of the 187 countries on the list.
Authoritarian regimes. xxx features xxx: strong leaders, centralized political control,
and weak records in popular participation, civil liberties, and civil rights. xxx, authoritarian
regimes come in different forms, ranging from states where power rests with a ruling party or the
military to systems revolving around a single individual, with the wielding of power rising and
falling with the fortunes of the leader.
Absolute monarchies apart, the absence of a clear succession procedure is a central
weakness of authoritarian regimes, providing much of their political dynamic. Because there are
no competitive elections to refresh the leadership, authoritarian leaders may continue in post
until well past their sell-by dates, as with the ageing autocrats finally overthrown in the Arab
revolts of 2011 xxx. As those uprisings show, changing the leader in an authoritarian regime is
generally a more difficult process than in a democracy. The pattern in China, where since the
1990s the Communist Party has changed its top leaders on a ten-year cycle, is
exceptional; it contributes to the party’s continued hold on power.
A decline into despotism is an inherent danger of authoritarian regimes. In the case of
Libya, Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969 as the result of a military coup, and claimed
that it was his goal to unite the Arab world. He imposed his own ideology on Libya (contained within
his Green Book), and exercised total control over his government and the people of Libya. Even
Gaddafi did not prove invulnerable. Inspired by the Arab Spring, an uprising against him in 2011
led to a brief civil war that resulted in his brutal death at the hands of rebels. But no agreement
on a post-Arab Spring settlement has emerged, resulting in fighting among competing factions.
As the example of Gaddafi shows, authoritarian rulers can be removed by upstarts at any time,
meaning that they must devote constant attention to shoring up their position. In this effort, they
normally exploit three key control devices: the military, patronage, and the media.
A strong military and security presence, and a willingness by authoritarian leaders to
use this resource, is essential. The Arab Spring generally moved further and faster in those
countries where the regime lost the support of the organs of violence, or showed an
unwillingness to use them – though government repression did not prevent violence in Libya
and Syria. High spending on the armed forces, often made possible by revenues from natural
resources, is an investment that helps rulers buy off potential opposition, and provides the
means for suppressing domestic dissent. Even when the military does not itself rule, it still
provides a key support base for the political executive. Lavish treatment of the armed forces is
therefore inevitable, producing a drag on economic performance. Authoritarian regimes lack the
separation of military and political spheres which characterizes liberal democracy.
The second device is an unofficial patronage network in which other holders of power
are incorporated by providing them with resources (such as control over jobs, natural resources,
and access to money-making opportunities) which they distribute, in turn, to their own
supporters. In this way, direct allegiance to one’s patron, and indirectly to the regime, becomes
the key to a successful career. These patron–client pyramids extend throughout society,
providing a web of allegiances which overrides the public–private divide. As long as the clients
are politically sound, their patrons will ignore shady behaviour, a fact which helps explain why
corruption is so widespread in authoritarian regimes. Institutions are weak, while pragmatic
alliances are strong, holding the regime together. But there is a high price to pay: corruption
corrodes whatever public support the regime may possess, increasing potential instability.
The third device used by authoritarian leaders is control of the media to ensure
favourable coverage for their achievements, and criticism – or neglect – of their opponents.
Censorship is implemented by catch-all offences such as threatening the dignity and
effectiveness of the state. In Iran, there is a mixture of public and private ownership of the
media, and a wide variety of options from which to choose, but the Islamic Revolutionary Court
monitors reports and actions that might be deemed as threats to the state. These are sufficiently
vaguely defined as to allow a wide range of charges, which might lead to closure, suspension,
or imprisonment of the publication in question. Many Iranians circumvent official censorship by
relying on the internet, satellite television, and mobile phones.
Aggression and belligerence are often driven by fear and vulnerability, and this is also
true of authoritarian rule. Communication is opaque, trust is lacking, government spending is
misused, corruption is endemic, laws are ignored, economics and obedience come before
private initiative, and foreign investors are cautious. In many cases, the outcome is a static
society, an underperforming economy, and a cynical population. Even so, authoritarian rule can
sometimes generate rapid economic growth. China is the notable example: its economic growth
between 1978 and 2009 far exceeded that of democratic India (Madhukar and Nagarjuna, 2011; Sen,
2011). There is evidence to suggest that authoritarian rule can generate early-stage economic
development in particular; industrialization requires massive investments in infrastructure (such
as transport, communications, and education), and authoritarian rulers can generate the surplus
for this investment by resisting short-term, electoral pressures for immediate consumption.
Simply put, they can kick-start development because they can ignore the complaints of those
whose consumption is initially limited.
Although a few non-democratic regimes initiate economic take-off, most do not. Many
traditional rulers, such as the ruling families in the Middle East, continue to resist modernization.
Other dictators – for example, Nigeria’s military ‘lootocrats’ – set back economic development
by decades through gross mismanagement. A statistical study by Przeworski et al. (2000: 271)
found that, even in those cases where authoritarian regimes have achieved growth, this
increase has depended primarily on expanding the labour force. Democracies, by contrast,
make more productive use of their inputs, a form of growth which can, in principle, continue
indefinitely.
Enhancement Activity 1:
Before you continue, review what you just read and assess what you understood by
identifying the features of hybrid regimes. Write your answers in the boxes. Your answers
should be key words or phrases.
HYBRID REGIMES
Feature 1:
Feature 2:
Feature 3:
Identify the features and devices of authoritarian regimes. Write your answers in the boxes.
Your answers should be key words or phrases.
Features:
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Device 1:
Device 2:
Device 3:
Forms of authoritarian rule. xxx. It is important to note that the most common tool of
authoritarian rule is not repression but co-option, and not just of rival elites but of whole
segments of the population. xxx five different strands xxx of authoritarian government:
Absolute monarchy. xxx absolute monarchs still wield unlimited power. They are
particularly important in the Middle East, their major oil and natural gas reserves giving several
of them – such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates –
considerable global influence.
We need to be careful in our use of the term monarchy (literally, ‘rule by one’) to
describe the traditional political systems found in the Persian Gulf, for three main reasons:
• The titles taken by Arab ‘monarchs’ reflect tribal or Islamic tradition, as in emir (leader
or commander), sheikh (revered leader of the tribe), or sultan (a leader who possesses
authority).
• The leading members of the ruling dynasty, rather than a single monarch, often
exercise authority. These countries are run by family businesses, rather than sole
traders.
• While the king typically designates a crown prince as his preferred successor, custom
requires that a clan council meets after the monarch’s death to confirm or change this
appointment. In most European monarchies, by contrast, succession is based on
inheritance by the first-born.
Authority in these male-dominated Arab dynasties is owed to the ruler, rather than to a
more abstract entity such as a state or party; the ruler is constrained neither by law nor by
competitive election. In some cases, these systems have shown remarkable staying power. In
Oman, for example, the Al Bu Said dynasty has ruled since 1749, longer than the United States
has existed as an independent country. According to its 1996 constitution, the person of the
Sultan ‘is inviolable and must be respected and his orders must be obeyed’.
Several kingdoms, notably Kuwait, have now established consultative assemblies, but
this reform is unlikely to presage a transition to a constitutional monarchy (Herb, 2005). Because
the ruler is expected to take responsibility for his people, the right of ordinary people to petition
on individual matters is well established. However, the petitioner requests benevolent treatment,
not the implementation of constitutional rights. The abstract idea of a state linking rulers and
citizens is weak, as are such modern concepts as constitutions, rights, interest groups, the
separation of powers, and the rule of law. Politics is based on intrigue at the palace, with little
distinction between public and private sectors.
Saudi Arabia offers an example of an absolute monarchy. The country’s political style
reflects the influence of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, who led the Saudi state from its inception in
1902 until his death in 1953. In true patrimonial style, Ibn Saud ran his kingdom as a gigantic
personal household, using marriage as a vital political tactic. Saudi Arabia’s sprawling royal
family, led by an influential group of several hundred princes, still constitutes the government’s
core.
Family members occupy the key positions on the Saudi Council of Ministers, serving as
a bridge between the government, the military, and the active security forces. This large ruling
family, itself divided into factions, populates and controls the leading institutions of state,
providing a form of dispersed collective leadership and a barrier to radical change. At the same
time, the ruling family does not monopolize wealth, instead leaving space for lower-tier families.
Political parties are still banned but some mechanisms of representation have emerged,
adding an institutional veneer to a traditional regime. The Basic Law of 1992, an innovation in
itself, introduced a Consultative Council, with a non-princely and technocratic membership, to
‘advise the King on issues of importance’. The Council is a strengthened form of a body which
dates back to 1927 – yet it remains, at most, a proto-legislature. Rulers also keep an eye on,
and sometimes act upon, the issues raised on social media. xxx
Ruling presidents. xxx. A president in an authoritarian system occupies a unique

position, possessing a visibility which can be invested in an attempt to transfer personal
authority to an executive post, typically by establishing a direct relationship through the media
with the people. In an absolute monarchy, the office outlasts the incumbent and is passed on
through an assured line of succession. In the case of a ruling president, the office also outlasts
the incumbent, but there is no line of succession (even if the occasional authoritarian president
will try to keep power within the family).
xxx. In the case of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko has maintained a grip on power
since winning office in 1994. While his western neighbours have been moving towards free-
market democracy, Lukashenko maintains Soviet-era policies, including state ownership of key
industries. He has been the target of US and EU sanctions for human rights violations,
maintains close relations with Putin’s Russia, and has been described as Europe’s last dictator.
He began his fourth term in 2011 after allegedly winning nearly 80 per cent of the vote on 90 per
cent turnout, figures that are too high to be credible.
Further east, the politics of Uzbekistan reveals a similar pattern. Here, Islam Karimov, a
former first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, won the 1991 presidential election,
establishing a dictatorship via a coup against the party he led. In 1994, Karimov resigned from
the communist successor party, claiming that only a non-partisan head of state could guarantee
constitutional stability. By this route, he instituted a gradual change in the nature of authoritarian
rule in his country: from a party-based regime to a presidency-based regime.
To forestall opposition, Karimov regularly dismisses ministers and replaces regional
leaders. He keeps tight control of the media, uses a traditional institution of local governance
(the mahalla) as an instrument of social control, and relies on the National Security Service for
surveillance. As with other leaders of secular regimes in Islamic societies, Karimov has sought
to prevent the mosque from becoming an explicit site of opposition, banning parties based on
religion or ethnicity. xxx
Ruling parties. The twentieth century saw the birth, ossification, and disintegration of
party-based dictatorships (communist, fascist, and nationalist) which monopolized public
authority in the name of economic modernization, social transformation, and national revival.
While they are now relatively rare, they are still found in the last few remaining communist
states, with some non-communist varieties.
Communist parties. At the time of the collapse of the communist order in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, 23 regimes claiming Marxist inspiration ruled more than 1.5 billion people:
about one in three of the world’s population (Holmes, 1997: 4). Today there are just five ‘communist’
states remaining (China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba), but most are undergoing the kind of free-
market economic change that might well lead to further political changes. xxx Although vastly
different in size, China, Vietnam, and Laos comprise a coherent regional group; they are
traditionally poor, agricultural societies in which the ruling communist parties have loosened
their direct control.
Strong military influence. The official ideology stresses national independence and self-
reliance. The Communist Party retains tight political control over the economy, while keeping a
firm grip on political power. This strategy has delivered substantial if uneven growth, most
significant in China and Vietnam. By unleashing entrepreneurial initiative, ruling parties have
averted the inertia which led to the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
and their position remains intact and largely unchallenged.
From the beginning, Chinese communism possessed distinct national characteristics, so
that while power is exerted through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party itself has
been controlled by elite factions which have embraced nationalism. Like Vietnam, China has not
so much a market economy as a highly politicized economy in which not only party members,
but also local bureaucrats and army officers, can advance themselves alongside more
conventional entrepreneurs. Business people must focus not only on market opportunities, but
also on creating strong ties to local officials that will provide access to those prospects.
China faces numerous problems, including inequality between regions and between
individuals, the inefficient allocation of capital, an ageing population, poor social services,
massive population movements into the cities, and severe environmental degradation. But the
party elite has shown exceptional skill in managing these challenges. A combination of growth,
propaganda, reform, and repression has forestalled mass public demands for democracy, and
the nationalist narrative of China rising continues to resonate. China’s success in entering the
world economy has established the world’s dependence on its goods, reducing international
pressures for democratization. Even though its Marxist legacy has faded, China continues to
offer a model of development without democratization.
Other ruling parties. Occasionally, single ruling parties other than those that are
communist provide the basis for authoritarian rule, but they are increasingly rare. Until the late
1980s, most African states (including Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia) were run
on this basis, but almost all have now switched to competitive multi-party systems. We are now
more likely to find dominant-party systems, such as those in Angola, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Mozambique, and Sudan.
It is important in these instances to distinguish between the supports of power and power
itself. Often, the party is the vehicle rather than the driver, with real authority resting with a
dominant president, military ruler, or political elite. The supposed ruling party is an arena within
which particular elite groups express and perpetuate their control. When the elite goes, so does
the party.
The case of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt is illustrative. Until the Arab
Spring, the party formed part of an established structure of power based on a strong presidency
and an extended bureaucracy. Within this framework, however, the NDP was the junior partner:
‘the NDP has failed to serve as an effective means to recruit candidates into the elite. Rather,
persons who are already successful tend to join the party in order to consolidate their positions’
(Lesch, 2004: 600). With its close links to the state, the NDP was an arena for furthering political and
business careers, but not a major policy-making force. Even so, its headquarters were
destroyed during the Egyptian revolt of 2011 and the party itself was outlawed.
Military government. Military governments are far less common than they once were;
during the second half of the twentieth century they could be found in many parts of Africa, Latin
America, and parts of Asia. Today, we are more likely to speak of leaders who came to power in
a military coup and then transformed themselves into civilian leaders, or of regimes in which the
military influences civilian governments from behind the scenes. Since a bloodless coup in
Thailand in 2006, for example, the country has experienced phases of both military and civilian
rule, with the latter often using the military to contain anti-government protests. While currently
rare, military government remains a variety of authoritarian rule that is still worth studying.
Usually ushered in by a coup d’etat, or an illegal seizure of power, military rule typically
involves the suspension of all other key political institutions except the bureaucracy, the courts
and the police, and is based on the military principles of hierarchy and the absence of
negotiation. Coups are generally easier to stage in smaller countries where the state remains
underdeveloped, and government institutions and media outlets are focused in the capital city.
An ambitious general may just need a few tanks, commanded by a handful of discontented
officers, to seize the presidential palace and begin broadcasting from the radio and TV stations.
Once in power, military governments are typically headed by a ruling council made up of the
leader of each branch of the armed forces, with one emerging as the dominant figure.
In many African cases, military leaders have justified coups by arguing that the
civilians are doing a poor job of governing, and claiming that power will be returned to the
civilians once a new and more effective system of government is established. But then the new
military leaders often decide to stay on indefinitely, or try to reinvent themselves as civilian
politicians. Such transitions to a more civilian status may be real or purely for appearances; in
either case, the armed forces usually remain a significant political actor.
Nigeria is a representative case, having spent nearly 30 years under military government
since independence in 1960. Civilians were removed in a coup in 1983 amid charges that
political parties were becoming too ethnically based and, ironically, that the government was
becoming more authoritarian. The new military leader – Major General Ibrahim Babangida –
oversaw the transition to a new civilian system of government based on a new constitution. But
he refused to hand over power to a new president in 1993, claiming that the election had been
fraudulent. The resulting outcry forced him to step down, and he was soon replaced by Brigadier
Sani Abacha, who made no bones about his desire to be elected as a civilian president, and
actively looted Nigeria’s oil profits along the way. He died of a supposed heart attack in June
1998 (an event popularly described as the ‘coup from heaven’), and a new military leader
completed the return to civilian government in 1999. In 2015, Nigeria experienced its first
transition from one civilian government to another as the result of the defeat of an incumbent
running for re-election. Nonetheless, the military remains a powerful force in the background,
and Nigeria faces enormous internal divisions that even today might encourage soldiers to
retake power if they feel that civilians are not doing a good job.
xxx The number of coups has tailed off from an average of about ten annually in the
1960s to about three to five annually between 2000 and 2010.
Part of the explanation for the changing numbers lies with the changing attitudes of the
great powers. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were more
concerned with the global chessboard than with how their client countries governed themselves;
hence ruling generals could survive through the political, economic, and military backing of a
superpower even though they lacked support in their own country. The end of the Cold War
meant the end of superpower sponsorship, with aid and technical assistance flowing to civilian
regimes adopting democratic forms and offering at least some commitment to civil rights. In
recent times, military coups have been rare and sometimes short-lived affairs in smaller
countries xxx.
What role does the military now play in authoritarian regimes? In most cases, it remains
an important element in the civilian ruler’s support base. For example, the stance of the military
was decisive in determining the success of the Arab uprisings of 2011. Where the army
remained loyal to the regime, as in Syria, the government could fight the disparate opposition.
But where the military declined to repress protestors, as in Egypt, the regime fell. So the relative
rarity of military rule does not signal the end of political influence by the armed forces. When
new civilian rulers are unable to limit the generals to a professional military role, the armed
forces will continue to dominate, supervise, or constrain the government, compromising its
democratic credentials.
Theocracy. As with military rule, government by religious leaders is rare, but that does
not mean that religion has ceased to be a factor in authoritarian governance (or even, in some
countries, in democratic governance). A religious society may be quite different from a clerical
government, and even Muslim countries typically separate religious and civil leadership within
the context of an overall commitment to Islam. Indeed, in much of the Middle East the mosque
has become a source of opposition to authoritarian rulers, a divide which would not be possible
if religious and civil leadership belonged in the same hands.
At least since the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in 2001, the Islamic Republic of
Iran stands alone as an example of a constitutional theocracy. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Mauritania also consider themselves to be Islamic republics, but religious leaders are less
prominent. Even in Iran, rule by religious leaders (ayatollahs and mullahs) possesses limited
legitimacy, especially among the young and educated. Public demonstrations in Iran disputing
the result of the 2009 presidential election confirmed not only popular disaffection with the
political system, but also divisions between reformers and hardliners within the ruling elite itself.
Further protests during the Arab Spring in 2011 were contained by a vigorous security
response, but this did not stop the victory in the 2013 presidential election of the relatively
reformist Hassan Rouhani.
Iran’s theocracy was a child of the 1979 revolution, the last great insurrection of the
twentieth century, in which Ayatollah Khomeini, a 76-year-old cleric committed to Islamic
fundamentalism, overthrew the pro-Western Shah of Iran. The revolutionaries advocated a
traditional Islamic republic free from foreign domination; ‘neither East nor West’ was the
slogan. In power, the ayatollahs created a unique Islamic state in which they mainly govern
indirectly through secular rulers; there is a directly elected president and legislature, but Iran
remains authoritarian, real power lying with the clerics. The most senior of these is the
Supreme Leader, who has a lifetime appointment as head of state, must be an expert in
Islamic law, and has many executive powers, including control of foreign and economic policy.
Meanwhile, a 12-member Council of Guardians certifies that all legislation and candidates for
office conform to Islamic law. Government is based on strictly enforced traditional, male-
dominated Islamic codes, the Interior Ministry still makes extensive use of informants, and the
state employs arbitrary arrests as a form of control through fear.
As with many authoritarian regimes, Iran’s rulers offer no clear direction on such
practical matters as economic development, monetary policy, and overseas trade. Their nuclear
programme and sponsorship of international terrorism attracts international sanctions, thereby
limiting economic growth, oil revenues notwithstanding. Instead, the clerics have grown wealthy
by establishing bonyads – tax-exempt ‘charitable’ trusts – for their personal benefit. These
foundations – and the public sector, generally – dominate an inefficient economy. The result is
that Iran’s theocratic establishment consists of competing factions of middle-aged to elderly men
exploiting the revolutionary heritage in a successful effort to build and retain power and wealth.
Neither a strong party nor a royal family exist to impose overall direction.
Unsurprisingly in a country where the median age was just 29 years in 2015, rule by this
theocratic elite has intensified generational divisions. Well-educated young people, including
many female graduates, chafe at the restrictions imposed by the religious establishment. This
desire for freedom is not necessarily rooted in a secular outlook; rather, it reflects opposition to
the cultural repression imposed by a religious leadership lacking a positive vision of the
country’s future (Gheissari, 2009).
Authoritarian rule
This module examines the key arguments and features of authoritarian rule and which arguments and
features were illustrated in the experiences of countries that were/are under former and contemporary authoritarian rule.
The author also noted the circumstances attendant to the rise and fall of authoritarian rulers. Significant emphasis
towards the last part of this module is the examination of political corruption which should be understood to be a
phenomenon that does not only happen in an authoritarian rule but also in non-authoritarian systems.
After reading the excerpted materialand watching the video, you should be able to:
c. reflect on the pros and cons of authoritarian rule
d. demonstrate understanding of the types and features of authoritarian regimes
Key Concepts to Understand:
absolute monarchy Arab Spring authoritarian regimes co-option coup d’etat
electoral fraud embezzlement hybrid regime influence peddling patronage
political corruption theocracy
(excerpted from: Hague, R., Harrop, M. & McCormick, J. (2016). Comparative government and politics: An introduction. 10th Edition.
USA: Palgrave.)
Authoritarian rulers operate within unspoken limits, recognizing the need to strike deals
with other power-holders such as business, the military, or regional bosses. Just as democratic
leaders need to retain electoral support, so authoritarian rulers must convince their allies to
continue supporting the existing regime. Furthermore, government typically takes the form not of
a single dominant leader but, rather, of an elite group within which there is considerable internal
jockeying for power. Ideology and policy are often absent. Rulers seek to maintain their control
(and increase their wealth) by limiting mass participation, rather than by mobilizing the
population. Ordinary people are unlikely to experience a knock on the door at midnight as long
as they keep away from politics. In such a situation, governance is an uneasy combination of
formally unlimited authority and considerable political vulnerability. Since non-democratic
leaders so clearly stand above the law, the constitutional architecture (if any) is a poor guide.
Laws are vague and contradictory, creating a pretext for bringing any chosen troublemaker to
court. Special courts, such as military tribunals, are often used for sensitive cases. The
legislature and the judiciary are under-resourced, unprofessional and ineffective. Civil liberties
are poorly respected and the state often requires private organizations to be licensed. The
absence of constitutional constraint leads to callous treatment of the powerless, including
women, minority groups, non-nationals, and prisoners. With no enforceable legal framework to
protect private property rights, authoritarian rule is often associated with economic stagnation.
xxx
Key Arguments:
• Identifying the dynamics of authoritarian regimes provides a useful contrast
to our understanding of democracy, and vice versa.
• The concept of hybrid regimes offers an intermediate position between
authoritarianism and democracy.
• The exploitation of the military, the use of patronage, and control of the
media are key elements in the maintenance of authoritarian regimes.
• One key to understanding authoritarian regimes is to recognize that few
are absolute tyrannies; many of their leaders are in a weaker political
position than their liberal democratic equivalents.
• Establishing hard and fast rules for authoritarian regimes, and defining
templates, is more difficult than is the case for democracies, partly
because their formal structures are weak and partly because they vary in
their source of power.
• Although we can find corruption wherever there are people willing to
abuse the offices they hold for private gain, it plays a particularly telling
role in authoritarian regimes. It is both a cause and effect of the
misuse of power.
Features:
• The absence of record on representative government, with elections – where they are held –
often accompanied by fraud, manipulation, and violence.
• Weak, immature, or poorly defined political institutions and processes, with power in the
hands of leaders and elites, and occasionally the establishment of dictatorships.
• A limited selection of forms of political participation and representation, and no guarantees
that the voices of citizens will be heard effectively.
• Relatively few limits on the powers of government, and a mixed record on the protection of
individual rights and freedoms under the law, with no independent judiciary.
• An opposition that is constrained, and subject to threats and even violence.
• A limited and controlled media establishment, subject to political controls and free to share
only officially sanctioned opinions.
Take a pause and reflect on the key arguments and features of an authoritarian
rule vis-à-vis the key arguments and features of a democratic rule which was the
preceding lesson. Then watch Snyder’s take on President Trump. His 8-minute narrative will
introduce you to the concept of hybrid regime which you will read after watching and listening
to him in this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZ-bifYqK_Q | The Path to
Authoritarianism: Historian Timothy Snyder
Hybrid regimes. The hybrid regimes described by the Democracy Index overlap with a
category described by Levitsky and Way (2010) as competitive authoritarian regimes. They
define these as states in which ‘formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal
means of obtaining and exercising political authority … [but where] incumbents violate those
rules so often and to such an extent … that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum
standards for democracy’. In the Democracy Index, hybrid regimes are described as
suffering weaknesses both in political culture and in the functioning of government and
political participation. Elections are held, but are undermined by irregularities that often
prevent them from being both free and fair, and government pressure on opposition parties and
candidates can be common. Corruption tends to be widespread, civil society and the rule of law
are weak, the judiciary lacks independence, and journalists are typically harassed.
In a hybrid regime, leaders or ruling parties are elected, but they use state resources and
their influence over the media to determine the outcome of elections long before campaigns
begin. Ballot-stuffing is only needed if a defeat is in the offing. Once elected, the government
shows only a limited sense of constitutional restraint; such concepts as fair play, a loyal
opposition, and individual rights barely register. In this kind of system, notes O’Donnell (1994: 59),
whoever wins the election ‘is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only
by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office’. The
result is what Huntington (1991: 306) once described as ‘democracy without turnover and
competition without alternation’. If liberal democracy ‘is a system in which parties lose elections’
(Przeworski, 1991: 10), competitive authoritarianism is a system in which they do not. Rather, change
at the top usually results from a constitutional limit on tenure, or the occasional resignation.
Singapore offers an example. While it has multiple political parties, a vibrant high-
technology economy and one of the world’s highest standards of living, it is classified in the
Democracy Index as a hybrid regime. This is mainly because the People’s Action Party has
governed the island state since 1959, routinely winning more than 60 per cent of the vote,
maintaining an electoral system that allowed it to win 93 per cent of legislative seats in 2011
with only a 60:14 per cent share of the vote, and directing investment to districts that vote for the
party.
Hybrid regimes are normally founded on a powerful leader or political party, rather than
on strong institutions. In return for taking care of the needs of the people, leaders claim their
respect, deference, and support. Because the judiciary is under-resourced, it is unable to
enforce the individual rights documented in the constitution. The law is used selectively, as a
tool of power, so that while political opponents are subject to detailed legal scrutiny, supporters
find that the law rarely intrudes on their activities: ‘for my friends, everything; for my enemies,
the law,’ said Getúlio Vargas, twice president of Brazil. The state intervenes in the market, with
political connections influencing economic rewards. Yet, in contrast to pure authoritarian
regimes, the leader often provides effective governance, thus earning – as well as manipulating
– popular support.
The form is particularly common in states that are poor, that suffer deep internal
divisions (whether ethnic, religious, or economic), and that face real or constructed external
threats. In these circumstances, a national father figure or dominant party can be presented as
an engine of development, as a bulwark against domestic disintegration, and as a protector
against external threats. The head, it is claimed, must be allowed to rule the body politic.
For most of its post-communist history, Ukraine has offered a representative case. A
former republic of the Soviet Union, it became independent in 1991, but remains poor (with a
per capita GNI of just under $4,000 in 2013), and finds itself torn between Western and Russian
circles of influence. The efforts made by President Leonid Kuchma to control the media,
manipulate the political system, side Ukraine with Russian economic interests, and then rig
presidential elections sparked the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ and new elections. These were
won by a pro-Western alliance of political groups which elevated Viktor Yushchenko to the
presidency. Democratic reform followed, but the country remained divided between pro-Western
and pro-Russian forces, and when Viktor Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election, he
took the country firmly in the Russian direction.
Yanukovych enriched himself and his political supporters, reinforcing his country’s status
as one of the world’s most corrupt. For ordinary people, the need to bribe public officials was a
fact of political life, alienating them from their supposedly democratic government. Neither civil
society nor the judiciary provided an effective check on power. When Yanukovych’s government
dropped plans in 2013 to sign a trade agreement with the European Union, mass
demonstrations ensued and the government fell. The deposed leader fled to Russia, which then
annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Fighting broke out in the eastern part of the country,
reinforcing historic divisions and threatening the ability of the Ukrainian national government to
establish effective governance.
To the extent that hybrid regimes are personal in character, they might be expected to
be unstable in the long run. Huntington (1991: 137), for example, claims that ‘this half-way house
cannot stand’. Similarly, Levitsky and Way (2010: 20) note that such regimes are marked by an
‘inherent tension’ in which oppositions can develop a serious challenge to the existing power
structure. These threats force rulers either to submit (and democratize), or to repress (and
revert to cruder authoritarian rule).
Yet, we cannot wish these regimes out of existence by just describing them as
transitional. Some (especially those far from Western zones of influence) have provided a stable
method of governing poor and unequal societies, particularly since the end of communism
rendered blatant dictatorship less defensible. Once set, a hybrid regime can be a strong
amalgam, not least in Islamic settings where liberal democracy can be equated with Western
permissiveness. Writing on sub-Saharan Africa, Herbst (2001: 359) judges that ‘it is wrong to
conclude that African states are travelling between democracy and authoritarianism simply
because a majority of them belong to neither category. Rather, the current condition of African
states could well prevail for decades.’ Such thinking led Case (1996: 464) to conclude that hybrid
regimes are not ‘a mere way station on the road to further democracy’.
Haiti provides a particularly disturbing case of a hybrid state. It has been independent
since 1804 but has never been able to settle on a durable and stable political model, and stands
out as the most troubled country in the western hemisphere. In theory it is a unitary presidential
republic with three branches of government, but in reality, it is whatever its incumbent
administration is able to fashion from the wreckage of instability, civil unrest and corruption. It
does not help that the country has suffered numerous natural disasters, ranging from hurricanes
to earthquakes, but a failure to build adequate infrastructure has made it less able to withstand
such problems. In 2006, however, the advent of a new government did encourage Freedom
House to upgrade Haiti from a ranking of Not Free to Partly Free. But then came the January
2010 earthquake, which killed an estimated 230,000 people and left government, the economy,
infrastructure, and the social fabric in ruins. On the 2014 Human Development Index it ranked
168th out of the 187 countries on the list.
Authoritarian regimes. xxx features xxx: strong leaders, centralized political control,
and weak records in popular participation, civil liberties, and civil rights. xxx, authoritarian
regimes come in different forms, ranging from states where power rests with a ruling party or the
military to systems revolving around a single individual, with the wielding of power rising and
falling with the fortunes of the leader.
Absolute monarchies apart, the absence of a clear succession procedure is a central
weakness of authoritarian regimes, providing much of their political dynamic. Because there are
no competitive elections to refresh the leadership, authoritarian leaders may continue in post
until well past their sell-by dates, as with the ageing autocrats finally overthrown in the Arab
revolts of 2011 xxx. As those uprisings show, changing the leader in an authoritarian regime is
generally a more difficult process than in a democracy. The pattern in China, where since the
1990s the Communist Party has changed its top leaders on a ten-year cycle, is
exceptional; it contributes to the party’s continued hold on power.
A decline into despotism is an inherent danger of authoritarian regimes. In the case of
Libya, Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969 as the result of a military coup, and claimed
that it was his goal to unite the Arab world. He imposed his own ideology on Libya (contained within
his Green Book), and exercised total control over his government and the people of Libya. Even
Gaddafi did not prove invulnerable. Inspired by the Arab Spring, an uprising against him in 2011
led to a brief civil war that resulted in his brutal death at the hands of rebels. But no agreement
on a post-Arab Spring settlement has emerged, resulting in fighting among competing factions.
As the example of Gaddafi shows, authoritarian rulers can be removed by upstarts at any time,
meaning that they must devote constant attention to shoring up their position. In this effort, they
normally exploit three key control devices: the military, patronage, and the media.
A strong military and security presence, and a willingness by authoritarian leaders to
use this resource, is essential. The Arab Spring generally moved further and faster in those
countries where the regime lost the support of the organs of violence, or showed an
unwillingness to use them – though government repression did not prevent violence in Libya
and Syria. High spending on the armed forces, often made possible by revenues from natural
resources, is an investment that helps rulers buy off potential opposition, and provides the
means for suppressing domestic dissent. Even when the military does not itself rule, it still
provides a key support base for the political executive. Lavish treatment of the armed forces is
therefore inevitable, producing a drag on economic performance. Authoritarian regimes lack the
separation of military and political spheres which characterizes liberal democracy.
The second device is an unofficial patronage network in which other holders of power
are incorporated by providing them with resources (such as control over jobs, natural resources,
and access to money-making opportunities) which they distribute, in turn, to their own
supporters. In this way, direct allegiance to one’s patron, and indirectly to the regime, becomes
the key to a successful career. These patron–client pyramids extend throughout society,
providing a web of allegiances which overrides the public–private divide. As long as the clients
are politically sound, their patrons will ignore shady behaviour, a fact which helps explain why
corruption is so widespread in authoritarian regimes. Institutions are weak, while pragmatic
alliances are strong, holding the regime together. But there is a high price to pay: corruption
corrodes whatever public support the regime may possess, increasing potential instability.
The third device used by authoritarian leaders is control of the media to ensure
favourable coverage for their achievements, and criticism – or neglect – of their opponents.
Censorship is implemented by catch-all offences such as threatening the dignity and
effectiveness of the state. In Iran, there is a mixture of public and private ownership of the
media, and a wide variety of options from which to choose, but the Islamic Revolutionary Court
monitors reports and actions that might be deemed as threats to the state. These are sufficiently
vaguely defined as to allow a wide range of charges, which might lead to closure, suspension,
or imprisonment of the publication in question. Many Iranians circumvent official censorship by
relying on the internet, satellite television, and mobile phones.
Aggression and belligerence are often driven by fear and vulnerability, and this is also
true of authoritarian rule. Communication is opaque, trust is lacking, government spending is
misused, corruption is endemic, laws are ignored, economics and obedience come before
private initiative, and foreign investors are cautious. In many cases, the outcome is a static
society, an underperforming economy, and a cynical population. Even so, authoritarian rule can
sometimes generate rapid economic growth. China is the notable example: its economic growth
between 1978 and 2009 far exceeded that of democratic India (Madhukar and Nagarjuna, 2011; Sen,
2011). There is evidence to suggest that authoritarian rule can generate early-stage economic
development in particular; industrialization requires massive investments in infrastructure (such
as transport, communications, and education), and authoritarian rulers can generate the surplus
for this investment by resisting short-term, electoral pressures for immediate consumption.
Simply put, they can kick-start development because they can ignore the complaints of those
whose consumption is initially limited.
Although a few non-democratic regimes initiate economic take-off, most do not. Many
traditional rulers, such as the ruling families in the Middle East, continue to resist modernization.
Other dictators – for example, Nigeria’s military ‘lootocrats’ – set back economic development
by decades through gross mismanagement. A statistical study by Przeworski et al. (2000: 271)
found that, even in those cases where authoritarian regimes have achieved growth, this
increase has depended primarily on expanding the labour force. Democracies, by contrast,
make more productive use of their inputs, a form of growth which can, in principle, continue
indefinitely.
Before you continue, review what you just read and assess what you understood by
identifying the features of hybrid regimes. Write your answers in the boxes. Your answers
should be key words or phrases.
HYBRID REGIMES
Feature 1:
Feature 2:
Feature 3:
Identify the features and devices of authoritarian regimes. Write your answers in the boxes.
Your answers should be key words or phrases.
Features:
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Device 1:
Device 2:
Device 3:
Forms of authoritarian rule. xxx. It is important to note that the most common tool of
authoritarian rule is not repression but co-option, and not just of rival elites but of whole
segments of the population. xxx five different strands xxx of authoritarian government:
Absolute monarchy. xxx absolute monarchs still wield unlimited power. They are
particularly important in the Middle East, their major oil and natural gas reserves giving several
of them – such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates –
considerable global influence.
We need to be careful in our use of the term monarchy (literally, ‘rule by one’) to
describe the traditional political systems found in the Persian Gulf, for three main reasons:
• The titles taken by Arab ‘monarchs’ reflect tribal or Islamic tradition, as in emir (leader
or commander), sheikh (revered leader of the tribe), or sultan (a leader who possesses
authority).
• The leading members of the ruling dynasty, rather than a single monarch, often
exercise authority. These countries are run by family businesses, rather than sole
traders.
• While the king typically designates a crown prince as his preferred successor, custom
requires that a clan council meets after the monarch’s death to confirm or change this
appointment. In most European monarchies, by contrast, succession is based on
inheritance by the first-born.
Authority in these male-dominated Arab dynasties is owed to the ruler, rather than to a
more abstract entity such as a state or party; the ruler is constrained neither by law nor by
competitive election. In some cases, these systems have shown remarkable staying power. In
Oman, for example, the Al Bu Said dynasty has ruled since 1749, longer than the United States
has existed as an independent country. According to its 1996 constitution, the person of the
Sultan ‘is inviolable and must be respected and his orders must be obeyed’.
Several kingdoms, notably Kuwait, have now established consultative assemblies, but
this reform is unlikely to presage a transition to a constitutional monarchy (Herb, 2005). Because
the ruler is expected to take responsibility for his people, the right of ordinary people to petition
on individual matters is well established. However, the petitioner requests benevolent treatment,
not the implementation of constitutional rights. The abstract idea of a state linking rulers and
citizens is weak, as are such modern concepts as constitutions, rights, interest groups, the
separation of powers, and the rule of law. Politics is based on intrigue at the palace, with little
distinction between public and private sectors.
Saudi Arabia offers an example of an absolute monarchy. The country’s political style
reflects the influence of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, who led the Saudi state from its inception in
1902 until his death in 1953. In true patrimonial style, Ibn Saud ran his kingdom as a gigantic
personal household, using marriage as a vital political tactic. Saudi Arabia’s sprawling royal
family, led by an influential group of several hundred princes, still constitutes the government’s
core.
Family members occupy the key positions on the Saudi Council of Ministers, serving as
a bridge between the government, the military, and the active security forces. This large ruling
family, itself divided into factions, populates and controls the leading institutions of state,
providing a form of dispersed collective leadership and a barrier to radical change. At the same
time, the ruling family does not monopolize wealth, instead leaving space for lower-tier families.
Political parties are still banned but some mechanisms of representation have emerged,
adding an institutional veneer to a traditional regime. The Basic Law of 1992, an innovation in
itself, introduced a Consultative Council, with a non-princely and technocratic membership, to
‘advise the King on issues of importance’. The Council is a strengthened form of a body which
dates back to 1927 – yet it remains, at most, a proto-legislature. Rulers also keep an eye on,
and sometimes act upon, the issues raised on social media. xxx
Ruling presidents. xxx. A president in an authoritarian system occupies a unique

position, possessing a visibility which can be invested in an attempt to transfer personal
authority to an executive post, typically by establishing a direct relationship through the media
with the people. In an absolute monarchy, the office outlasts the incumbent and is passed on
through an assured line of succession. In the case of a ruling president, the office also outlasts
the incumbent, but there is no line of succession (even if the occasional authoritarian president
will try to keep power within the family).
xxx. In the case of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko has maintained a grip on power
since winning office in 1994. While his western neighbours have been moving towards free-
market democracy, Lukashenko maintains Soviet-era policies, including state ownership of key
industries. He has been the target of US and EU sanctions for human rights violations,
maintains close relations with Putin’s Russia, and has been described as Europe’s last dictator.
He began his fourth term in 2011 after allegedly winning nearly 80 per cent of the vote on 90 per
cent turnout, figures that are too high to be credible.
Further east, the politics of Uzbekistan reveals a similar pattern. Here, Islam Karimov, a
former first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, won the 1991 presidential election,
establishing a dictatorship via a coup against the party he led. In 1994, Karimov resigned from
the communist successor party, claiming that only a non-partisan head of state could guarantee
constitutional stability. By this route, he instituted a gradual change in the nature of authoritarian
rule in his country: from a party-based regime to a presidency-based regime.
To forestall opposition, Karimov regularly dismisses ministers and replaces regional
leaders. He keeps tight control of the media, uses a traditional institution of local governance
(the mahalla) as an instrument of social control, and relies on the National Security Service for
surveillance. As with other leaders of secular regimes in Islamic societies, Karimov has sought
to prevent the mosque from becoming an explicit site of opposition, banning parties based on
religion or ethnicity. xxx
Ruling parties. The twentieth century saw the birth, ossification, and disintegration of
party-based dictatorships (communist, fascist, and nationalist) which monopolized public
authority in the name of economic modernization, social transformation, and national revival.
While they are now relatively rare, they are still found in the last few remaining communist
states, with some non-communist varieties.
Communist parties. At the time of the collapse of the communist order in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, 23 regimes claiming Marxist inspiration ruled more than 1.5 billion people:
about one in three of the world’s population (Holmes, 1997: 4). Today there are just five ‘communist’
states remaining (China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba), but most are undergoing the kind of free-
market economic change that might well lead to further political changes. xxx Although vastly
different in size, China, Vietnam, and Laos comprise a coherent regional group; they are
traditionally poor, agricultural societies in which the ruling communist parties have loosened
their direct control.
Strong military influence. The official ideology stresses national independence and self-
reliance. The Communist Party retains tight political control over the economy, while keeping a
firm grip on political power. This strategy has delivered substantial if uneven growth, most
significant in China and Vietnam. By unleashing entrepreneurial initiative, ruling parties have
averted the inertia which led to the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
and their position remains intact and largely unchallenged.
From the beginning, Chinese communism possessed distinct national characteristics, so
that while power is exerted through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party itself has
been controlled by elite factions which have embraced nationalism. Like Vietnam, China has not
so much a market economy as a highly politicized economy in which not only party members,
but also local bureaucrats and army officers, can advance themselves alongside more
conventional entrepreneurs. Business people must focus not only on market opportunities, but
also on creating strong ties to local officials that will provide access to those prospects.
China faces numerous problems, including inequality between regions and between
individuals, the inefficient allocation of capital, an ageing population, poor social services,
massive population movements into the cities, and severe environmental degradation. But the
party elite has shown exceptional skill in managing these challenges. A combination of growth,
propaganda, reform, and repression has forestalled mass public demands for democracy, and
the nationalist narrative of China rising continues to resonate. China’s success in entering the
world economy has established the world’s dependence on its goods, reducing international
pressures for democratization. Even though its Marxist legacy has faded, China continues to
offer a model of development without democratization.
Other ruling parties. Occasionally, single ruling parties other than those that are
communist provide the basis for authoritarian rule, but they are increasingly rare. Until the late
1980s, most African states (including Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia) were run
on this basis, but almost all have now switched to competitive multi-party systems. We are now
more likely to find dominant-party systems, such as those in Angola, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Mozambique, and Sudan.
It is important in these instances to distinguish between the supports of power and power
itself. Often, the party is the vehicle rather than the driver, with real authority resting with a
dominant president, military ruler, or political elite. The supposed ruling party is an arena within
which particular elite groups express and perpetuate their control. When the elite goes, so does
the party.
The case of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt is illustrative. Until the Arab
Spring, the party formed part of an established structure of power based on a strong presidency
and an extended bureaucracy. Within this framework, however, the NDP was the junior partner:
‘the NDP has failed to serve as an effective means to recruit candidates into the elite. Rather,
persons who are already successful tend to join the party in order to consolidate their positions’
(Lesch, 2004: 600). With its close links to the state, the NDP was an arena for furthering political and
business careers, but not a major policy-making force. Even so, its headquarters were
destroyed during the Egyptian revolt of 2011 and the party itself was outlawed.
Military government. Military governments are far less common than they once were;
during the second half of the twentieth century they could be found in many parts of Africa, Latin
America, and parts of Asia. Today, we are more likely to speak of leaders who came to power in
a military coup and then transformed themselves into civilian leaders, or of regimes in which the
military influences civilian governments from behind the scenes. Since a bloodless coup in
Thailand in 2006, for example, the country has experienced phases of both military and civilian
rule, with the latter often using the military to contain anti-government protests. While currently
rare, military government remains a variety of authoritarian rule that is still worth studying.
Usually ushered in by a coup d’etat, or an illegal seizure of power, military rule typically
involves the suspension of all other key political institutions except the bureaucracy, the courts
and the police, and is based on the military principles of hierarchy and the absence of
negotiation. Coups are generally easier to stage in smaller countries where the state remains
underdeveloped, and government institutions and media outlets are focused in the capital city.
An ambitious general may just need a few tanks, commanded by a handful of discontented
officers, to seize the presidential palace and begin broadcasting from the radio and TV stations.
Once in power, military governments are typically headed by a ruling council made up of the
leader of each branch of the armed forces, with one emerging as the dominant figure.
In many African cases, military leaders have justified coups by arguing that the
civilians are doing a poor job of governing, and claiming that power will be returned to the
civilians once a new and more effective system of government is established. But then the new
military leaders often decide to stay on indefinitely, or try to reinvent themselves as civilian
politicians. Such transitions to a more civilian status may be real or purely for appearances; in
either case, the armed forces usually remain a significant political actor.
Nigeria is a representative case, having spent nearly 30 years under military government
since independence in 1960. Civilians were removed in a coup in 1983 amid charges that
political parties were becoming too ethnically based and, ironically, that the government was
becoming more authoritarian. The new military leader – Major General Ibrahim Babangida –
oversaw the transition to a new civilian system of government based on a new constitution. But
he refused to hand over power to a new president in 1993, claiming that the election had been
fraudulent. The resulting outcry forced him to step down, and he was soon replaced by Brigadier
Sani Abacha, who made no bones about his desire to be elected as a civilian president, and
actively looted Nigeria’s oil profits along the way. He died of a supposed heart attack in June
1998 (an event popularly described as the ‘coup from heaven’), and a new military leader
completed the return to civilian government in 1999. In 2015, Nigeria experienced its first
transition from one civilian government to another as the result of the defeat of an incumbent
running for re-election. Nonetheless, the military remains a powerful force in the background,
and Nigeria faces enormous internal divisions that even today might encourage soldiers to
retake power if they feel that civilians are not doing a good job.
xxx The number of coups has tailed off from an average of about ten annually in the
1960s to about three to five annually between 2000 and 2010.
Part of the explanation for the changing numbers lies with the changing attitudes of the
great powers. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were more
concerned with the global chessboard than with how their client countries governed themselves;
hence ruling generals could survive through the political, economic, and military backing of a
superpower even though they lacked support in their own country. The end of the Cold War
meant the end of superpower sponsorship, with aid and technical assistance flowing to civilian
regimes adopting democratic forms and offering at least some commitment to civil rights. In
recent times, military coups have been rare and sometimes short-lived affairs in smaller
countries xxx.
What role does the military now play in authoritarian regimes? In most cases, it remains
an important element in the civilian ruler’s support base. For example, the stance of the military
was decisive in determining the success of the Arab uprisings of 2011. Where the army
remained loyal to the regime, as in Syria, the government could fight the disparate opposition.
But where the military declined to repress protestors, as in Egypt, the regime fell. So the relative
rarity of military rule does not signal the end of political influence by the armed forces. When
new civilian rulers are unable to limit the generals to a professional military role, the armed
forces will continue to dominate, supervise, or constrain the government, compromising its
democratic credentials.
Theocracy. As with military rule, government by religious leaders is rare, but that does
not mean that religion has ceased to be a factor in authoritarian governance (or even, in some
countries, in democratic governance). A religious society may be quite different from a clerical
government, and even Muslim countries typically separate religious and civil leadership within
the context of an overall commitment to Islam. Indeed, in much of the Middle East the mosque
has become a source of opposition to authoritarian rulers, a divide which would not be possible
if religious and civil leadership belonged in the same hands.
At least since the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in 2001, the Islamic Republic of
Iran stands alone as an example of a constitutional theocracy. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Mauritania also consider themselves to be Islamic republics, but religious leaders are less
prominent. Even in Iran, rule by religious leaders (ayatollahs and mullahs) possesses limited
legitimacy, especially among the young and educated. Public demonstrations in Iran disputing
the result of the 2009 presidential election confirmed not only popular disaffection with the
political system, but also divisions between reformers and hardliners within the ruling elite itself.
Further protests during the Arab Spring in 2011 were contained by a vigorous security
response, but this did not stop the victory in the 2013 presidential election of the relatively
reformist Hassan Rouhani.
Iran’s theocracy was a child of the 1979 revolution, the last great insurrection of the
twentieth century, in which Ayatollah Khomeini, a 76-year-old cleric committed to Islamic
fundamentalism, overthrew the pro-Western Shah of Iran. The revolutionaries advocated a
traditional Islamic republic free from foreign domination; ‘neither East nor West’ was the
slogan. In power, the ayatollahs created a unique Islamic state in which they mainly govern
indirectly through secular rulers; there is a directly elected president and legislature, but Iran
remains authoritarian, real power lying with the clerics. The most senior of these is the
Supreme Leader, who has a lifetime appointment as head of state, must be an expert in
Islamic law, and has many executive powers, including control of foreign and economic policy.
Meanwhile, a 12-member Council of Guardians certifies that all legislation and candidates for
office conform to Islamic law. Government is based on strictly enforced traditional, male-
dominated Islamic codes, the Interior Ministry still makes extensive use of informants, and the
state employs arbitrary arrests as a form of control through fear.
As with many authoritarian regimes, Iran’s rulers offer no clear direction on such
practical matters as economic development, monetary policy, and overseas trade. Their nuclear
programme and sponsorship of international terrorism attracts international sanctions, thereby
limiting economic growth, oil revenues notwithstanding. Instead, the clerics have grown wealthy
by establishing bonyads – tax-exempt ‘charitable’ trusts – for their personal benefit. These
foundations – and the public sector, generally – dominate an inefficient economy. The result is
that Iran’s theocratic establishment consists of competing factions of middle-aged to elderly men
exploiting the revolutionary heritage in a successful effort to build and retain power and wealth.
Neither a strong party nor a royal family exist to impose overall direction.
Unsurprisingly in a country where the median age was just 29 years in 2015, rule by this
theocratic elite has intensified generational divisions. Well-educated young people, including
many female graduates, chafe at the restrictions imposed by the religious establishment. This
desire for freedom is not necessarily rooted in a secular outlook; rather, it reflects opposition to
the cultural repression imposed by a religious leadership lacking a positive vision of the
country’s future (Gheissari, 2009).

Authoritarian Rule Part 1

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Ruling presidents. xxx. A president in an authoritarian system occupies a unique

Ruling presidents. xxx. A president in an authoritarian system occupies a unique

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