MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO.

190106, January 15,

2014
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did
not have his day in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria
is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the
court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property
mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the
claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of
possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they
have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to present credible
evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their
postulation as title holders of the land and the presumption of ownership
over improvements built thereon; whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was
able to show documentary proof of ownership.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners
Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015
Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the
prevailing party. While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent
on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the
Court's considered view that the Rules' procedural mechanisms cover not
only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed award's
execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that
every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege.
CORONA INTERNATIONAL VS CA, G.R. No. 127851. October 18, 2000
In upholding the disallowance of the execution pending appeal ordered by
the trial court, albeit on different grounds, we are guided by the rule that
execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to
the general rule. So, too, execution pending appeal is not to be availed of
and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary circumstances. Here, with
the alleged collapse of petitioner's business operations rendered doubtful, we
find no good reason to order execution pending appeal.