You are on page 1of 4

GR No.

L-21450

Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy

Facts:

A suit for a collection of money in the sum of Php 1,908 was filed by spouses
Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against spouses Magdaleno Sibanghonoy and
Lucia Baguio in the Court of First Instance in Cebu. A writ of attachment was issued by
the court against defendant’s properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the
filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety.

On January 12, 1963, 15 years after the action was commenced in the Court of
First Instance in Cebu, the Surety filed its motion to dismiss the case raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time five days after the Surety received the
Court of Appeals’ adverse decision.

The Surety alleged that a month before the appellee’s action was filed in the
Court of First Insance in Cebu on July 19, 1948, Republic Act NO. 296, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 had already become effective which placed all civil
actions where the value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand does not
exceed Php 2,000, exlcusive of interest and costs in the exclusive original jurisdiction of
inferior courts of and hence, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals
certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

Issue:

Whether the Surety is barred by laches from invoking his plea for the purpose of
annulling everything done in the case with its active participation

Ruling:

Yes. It has been held that that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has also been held
that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved,
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
GR No. L-35830

Mercado vs. Ubay

Facts:

An action for partition was filed by the petitioners filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite against Antonio, Ely and respondents Lucina and Trinidad, all
surnamed Samonte and who are brothers and sisters.

The Court of First Instance of Cavite rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners
and against all of the defendants in the civil case, including private respondents. Since
no appeal was made by any of the defendants from the decision of the trial court, the
same became final and executory and the court issued the corresponding writ of
execution. However, before the writ of execution could be carried out, all the
defendants, thru the same counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus to annul the writ of execution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.

Respondent Lucina and Trinidad Samonte filed an action before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the trial court in
Cavite alleging that they did not authorize anyone including Atty. Pine to represent them
in said case. Petitioner’s motion to dismiss was denied.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without jurisdiction in denying the petitioners’ motion to
dismiss the action for annulment of the final and executor judgment rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Cavite

2. Whether or not Atty. Danilo Pine is properly authorized to represent the


petitioners

Ruling:

1. No. The applicable rule is Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known
as “The Judiciary Act of 1948,” which was the law in force when the disputed
action for annulment was filed on May 27, 1972 in the CFI of Rizal. This is based
on the principle that the facts alleged in the complaint and the law in force at the
time of commencement of action determine the jurisdiction of a court.
Section 44(a) of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 then vested original
jurisdiction in the Courts of First Instance over all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation and an action for the
annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to this
category. A court of first instance or a branch thereof has the authority and the
jurisdiction as provided for by law to annul a final and executor judgment
rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same
court.

It is significant to state that although the prevailing rule before B.P. 129 was
that courts of first instance and their branches have jurisdiction to annul each
other’s judgments and orders, fundamental principles still dictate that the better
policy, is for the annulment of cases to be tried by the same court or branch
which heard the main action sought to be annulled. Moreover, recent decisions
still uphold its rationale that pursuant to judicial stability, the doctrine of noon-
interference should be regarded as highly important in the administration of
justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

2. Yes. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in


which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him
to appear in court for his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court) The filing of
the answer by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to
give private respondents standing in court.

You might also like