EN BANC Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired.
During
[ GR NO. 170236, Aug 31, 2006]
PEOPLE vs. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape
committed as follows:
On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor, against
her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his arraignment,
appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon, 11-year
old son of appellant; Rowena Quiachon, the victim and appellant's daughter; Dr.
Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani; and SPO2 Noel Y. Venus.
Rowel testified that he is appellant's son. He averred, however, that he no longer
wanted to use his father's surname describing him as "masama" for raping his
(Rowel's) sister Rowena. Rowel recounted that he used to sleep in the same
bedroom occupied by his father, sister and youngest sibling. Rowel slept beside
his youngest sibling while their father, appellant, and Rowena slept together in
one bed.
On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena
and they were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's buttocks were
moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do
anything, however, because he was afraid of their father. Rowel remained in the
room but the following morning, he, forthwith, told his mother's sister Carmelita
Mateo, whom he called Ate Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together,
the police investigation, Rowel executed a sworn statement in Tagalog and
signed it using the surname Mateo.[2]
Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual intercourse
with her and even touched her breasts against her will. She was only eight years
old at the time. She cried when she was asked if she was hurt by what appellant
did to her. She consistently declared that she does not love her father and wants
him to be punished for what he did to her. [3]
Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital Health Services testified that she received a letter request from
the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct an examination on Rowena. While she
was about to proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed that Rowena was
deaf and mute, hence, could not verbally communicate her ordeal. Dr. Guialani
proceeded to conduct a physical examination and, based thereon, she submitted
her medico-legal report.
Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a "contusion
hematoma" on her left cheek, which was compatible with her claim that she was
slapped by her father. Rowena also had an "ecchymosis" or "kissmark" at the
antero-lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-genital injuries suggestive
of chronic penetrating trauma.
Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show any sign
of sexual abuse, when it was opened up, the following were discovered:
"markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis and
markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-
hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation." Further,
the labia was "very red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a
pale navicular fossa and a very red perineum."[4] All these, according to Dr.
Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent
injury which could have happened a day before the examination. She pointed
out that the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6
o'clock notch.[5]
For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant Roberto
Quiachon.
He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall by
their barangay chairman. He did not know then the reason for the invitation. At
the barangay hall, he was surprised to see the two sisters of his deceased live-in
partner and his two children. He was shocked to learn that his daughter Rowena
had accused him of raping her. Thereafter, he was taken to the Karangalan Police
Station. He suffered hypertension and was brought to the hospital. When he
recovered, he was taken to the Pasig City Police Station and, thereafter, to jail.
Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech
handicap. He denied raping Rowena and alleged that Virginia Moraleda and
Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased common-law wife, held a grudge
against him because he abandoned his family and was not able to support them.
His common-law wife died of cancer and her relatives were allegedly all
interested in his house and other properties. The said house was being leased
and they were the ones getting the rental income. Further, the nephew of his
deceased partner was sending financial support of US$100 a month for his child.
According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife, his son
Rowel was already hostile to him because he was closer to his daughters. He
disclaimed any knowledge of any reason why his children, Rowel and Rowena,
accused him of a very serious offense.[6]
After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and defense,
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered its Decision
[7]
dated September 9, 2003, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and
B [8] of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH,
including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, PI00,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the death penalty
imposed on appellant. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo,[10] the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision [11] dated August 25, 2005, affirming
with modification the decision of the trial court. In affirming appellant's
conviction, the CA held that there was no justification to make a finding contrary
to that of the trial court with respect to the credibility of the witnesses. The CA
particularly pointed out that the trial court, after having "meticulously observed"
the prosecution witness Rowel and complainant Rowena, had declared that
"their narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the
material points involved. When the testimony of a rape victim is simple and
straightforward, unshaken by rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by an
inconsistency or contradiction as in the present case, the same must be given full
faith and credit."[12]
Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena recounting
the bestial act perpetrated by appellant on the latter were corroborated by
physical evidence as presented by Dr. Guialani in her medico-legal report.
On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only proffer a bare denial.
On this matter, it applied the salutary rule that denial is not looked upon with
favor by the court as it is capable of easy fabrication. Consequently, the CA held
that appellant's bare denial could not overcome the categorical testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, including Rowena, the victim herself.
The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a charge so grave as
rape against her father because "it is very unlikely for any young woman in her
right mind to fabricate a story of defloration against her own father, undergo a
medical examination of her private parts, and subject herself to the trauma and
scandal of public trial, put to shame not only herself but her whole family as
well unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong
committed against her."[13]
In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and in imposing the supreme
penalty of death upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated September 10, 2001, the
prosecution and the defense agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
1. The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old;
2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and
3. The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]
According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and
her relationship to the offender were alleged in the Information and were duly
proved during trial. These circumstances, i.e., minority of the victim and her
relationship to appellant, are special qualifying circumstances in the crime of
rape that warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
The CA, however, modified the trial court's decision with respect to the damages
awarded to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The decretal portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. 120929-H finding
the accused-appellant Roberto Quiachon y Bayona guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified rape and imposing upon him the DEATH penalty is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is also
ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Quiachon, the amount of P75,000 as civil
indemnity; P75,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
In this case, as correctly found by the CA, there is nothing on the record that
would impel this Court to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that appellate
courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless these
were reached arbitrarily or when the trial court misunderstood or misapplied
some facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result
of the case.[19]

In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the
2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal testimonies of Rowel and Rowena. The trial court observed that Rowel and
Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court Rowena "never wavered in their assertion that accused sexually abused Rowena.
for review. Their narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the
material points involved."[20] Further, the trial court accorded great evidentiary
Costs de oficio. weight to Rowena's testimony. It justifiably did so as it characterized her
testimony to be "simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-
SO ORDERED.[15] examination, and unflawed by inconsistency or contradiction."[21]

In this Court's Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the parties were required Significantly, Rowel and Rowena's respective testimonies were corroborated by
to submit their respective supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor Dr. Guialani's medico-legal report:[22]
General manifested that it would no longer be filing a supplemental brief.
Similarly, appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested that he Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm
would no longer file a supplemental brief. noted at the left mandibular area of the
left cheek compatible with the
PERTINENT PHYSICAL
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the conviction disclosed slapping of the cheek by her
FINDINGS/PHYSICAL INJURIES
of appellant. father; 2x2 cm ecchymosis (kissmark)
noted at the antero-lateral border of the
In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three (3) well- left breast
entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility and
while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of Tanner 2
things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony Pubic hair - none
of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence Labia majora - no evident sign of
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed EXTERNAL GENITALIA
injury at the time of examination
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the Labia minora - no evident sign of
defense.[16] Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination injury at the time of examination
concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's testimony. [17] URETHA AND ERIURETHRAL Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus
AREA and periurethral area
Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of PERIHYMENAL AREA AND Markedly hyperemic perihymenal
witnesses, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to FOSSA NA VICULARIS area, and pale fossa navicularis
properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to observe Tanner 2
directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying. [18] HYMEN Annular hymen; hymenal notch noted
at 5 o 'clock with attenuation of the
 hymenal rim from 5 o 'clock to 7 o inherently weak. A mere denial, just like alibi, constitutes a self-serving negative
'clock; very hyperemic hymen evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
PERINEUM Hyperemic perineum declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. [25]
Whitish, foul-smelling discharge,
DISCHARGE All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his
minimal in amount noted
IE AND SPECULUM EXAM Not indicated daughter Rowena pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The
No evident sign of injury at the time of special qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to
ANAL EXAMINATION appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information and their existence
examination;
duly admitted by the defense on stipulation of facts during pre-trial,[26] warrant
REMARKS the imposition of the supreme penalty of death on appellant.
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
None However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 [27] on June
COLLECTED
Requested a) Urinalysis 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted
LABORATORY EXAMINATION on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which
b) Gram Stain of Vaginal smear
reads:
IMPRESSIONS
No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute) SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage and competence (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
to appear in court. nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark) and
ecchymosis on the antero-lateral border of the left breast show clear evidence
of Physical Abuse.
Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.
Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing findings were
consistent with Rowena's claim of sexual abuse. Specifically, her internal
genitalia showed signs of sexual abuse such as: "markedly hyperemic urethra
and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis, markedly hyperemic perineum,
markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the
posterior hymenal notch with attenuation." Further, Rowena's labia was "very
red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa
and a very red perineum."[23] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were
compatible with the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which
could have happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that the
hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock
notch.[24] Dr. Guialani, likewise, confirmed that Rowena was deaf and mute.
Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution, appellant's simple
denial of the charge against him must necessarily fail. The defense of denial is
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use
of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant
to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda.
Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This
principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.[28]
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346
provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law,
shall not be eligible for parole."
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
 [7]
jurisprudence,[29] correctly awarded the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil Penned by Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio; rollo, pp. 12-25.
[8]
indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances The said provision was introduced by Republic Act No. 8353 entitled The Anti-
warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral damages Rape Law of 1997 which classified rape as a crime against persons. It effectively
because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling repealed Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 266-B pertinently reads:
her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00
Art. 266-B. Penalties. –
as exemplary damages in light of the presence of the qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship. x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,[30] the said award is not ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty x x x
attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of [9]
Rollo, p. 25.
P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the [10]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the [11]
Penned by Associate Justice Amelita Q. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Roberto
displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 118-134.
[12]
Rollo, p. 127.
Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364, the [13]
Id. at 131, citing People v. Obquia, 430 Phil. 65 (2002).
[14]
Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to maintain the award of P75,000.00 Id. at 132.
[15]
for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under Id. at 133.
[16]
which the death penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No. 9346. People v. Del Mundo, Sr., G.R. No. 132065, April 3, 2001, 356 SCRA 45, 50.
[17]
People v. Turco, Jr., 392 Phil. 498, 507 (2000).
[18]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25, 2005 People v. Adajio, 397 Phil. 354, 359-360 (2000).
[19]
People v. Baygar, 376 Phil. 466, 473 (1999).
of the Court of Appeals finding appellant Roberto Quiachon guilty beyond [20]
Rollo,p. 127.
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape [21]
RTC Decision, p. 10; records, p. 130.
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death meted on the [22]
Exhibit "D," id. at 76.
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. [23]
TSN, November 12, 2001, pp. 4-14.
[24]
Supra notes 4 and 5.
[25]
SO ORDERED. People v. Geraban, G.R. No. 137048, May 24, 2001, 358 SCRA 213, 223-224.
[26]
Rollo, p. 14.
[27]
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Section 1 thereof reads:
Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur. SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 8177, otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise
Corona. J., on leave. known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees,
________________________________________ insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
[1]
Information dated May 21, 2001, records, p. 1. accordingly.
[2]
TSN, September 10, 2001, pp. 10-31. [28]
People v. Zervoulakos, G.R. No. 103975, February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 625,
[3]
TSN, September 17, 2001, pp. 3-5. citing U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5(1917).
[4]
TSN, November 12, 2001, pp. 4-14. [29]
See, for example, People v. Barcena, G.R. No. 168737, February 26, 2006, p. 15.
[5]
Id. [30]
G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, 292 SCRA 186, 201.
[6]
TSN, May 20, 2003, pp. 2-10.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-31683. January 31, 1983.]
ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Civil Service Commissioner,
HON. NORBERTO AMORANTO, as Mayor of Quezon City,
ET AL., Respondents.
Juan T. David and Eulogio V. Reyes for Petitioner.
Jose Torcuator for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM; BASIC POLICY
FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT. — The former Civil Service Act
No. 2260. as amended. stated in its Section 23 that opportunity for
government employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and positive
efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service. The
same policy is reiterated in the Civil Service Decree, Presidential Decree
No. 807, at Section 19, which superseded Republic Act No. 2260. The
requirements for applicants to a policeman’s position may be quite stringent
but the basic policy of attracting the best qualified is not served by
automatically excluding any person who violated a jaywalking ordinance or
a municipal ordinance prohibiting a cochero from occupying a seat in the
calesa intended for passengers.
2. ID.; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTS
OF VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. — The Supreme
Court takes cognizance of the distinction in the law of municipal
corporations which distinguishes between acts not essentially criminal
relating to municipal regulations for the promotion of peace, good order,
health, safety, and comfort of residents and acts intrinsically punishable as
public offenses.
3. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL REGULATION; PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
BREACH THEREOF; NATURE. — A penalty imposed for the breach of a
municipal regulation is not necessarily an exercise of the sovereign authority
to define crimes and provide for their punishment, delegated to a local
government. In many cases, the penalty is merely intended not to render the
ordinance inoperative or useless.
4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; POLICE ACT OF 1966;
INTERPRETATION AS TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT; MEANING OF
"CRIMINAL RECORD" AND "CRIME." — The phrase "criminal record"
governing qualifications for appointments could not have been intended by
the legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city
ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of
a municipal ordinance to qualify as a "drime" must involve at least a certain
degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want of
principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTOMATIC AND PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION
FOR VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES WITH NOMINAL
FINE; UNREASONABLE. — Automatic and perpetual disqualification of
a person who in one unguarded moment threw a cigarette butt on the street,
spat in public, deposited house garbage in a market receptacle for garbage,
exceeded the speed limit for vehicles, blew his car horn near a school or
hospital, or, as in this case, jaywalked, and who has paid the fine imposed
by ordinance as commensurate deterrence for the act, would be
unreasonable, if not oppressive.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM; PERIOD FOR
ACTION ON APPOINTMENT PAPERS UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE
ACT; EFFECT OF INACTION; CASE AT BAR. — Under Rule VI of Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, the respondent Commissioner had 180 days
from receipt of the appointment papers to act on them. Inaction means the
appointment is approved as properly made. The papers were returned by the
Commissioner more than a year after he received them. The appointment,
not having any defect of record except the matter in issue in this case, must
be deemed complete and properly made after the 180 days period.
7. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL AND INVALID REMOVAL; RIGHTS OF THE
APPOINTEE. — Where the termination of the petitioner’s services was an
illegal and invalid removal, the petitioner should be reinstated, assuming he
meets the physical and other requirements of the Integrated National Police
under the new legislation and procedures governing police forces. In
addition to being paid any salaries for services actually rendered but not
paid, the petitioner, following the formula in cases of illegal dismissals is
entitled to five years backpay. (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175, 187).
 DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
All persons appointed to positions covered by the civil service law are required
by regulation to accomplish an information sheet on the prescribed form. The
information sheet provides in summary outline the personal date, eligibilities,
education, experiences, and other qualifications of the appointee. Included in the
information sheet is a query on any criminal records of the applicant, which in
later versions of the prescribed form asks if he has ever been arrested, indicted,
or convicted of any crime or accused in any administrative proceeding.: red
The issue in this petition for review is whether or not a person otherwise
qualified but who admits having violated a city ordinance on jaywalking and
another ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy only the seat intended for a
cochero in a calesa is disqualified for appointment to the QC Police Force.
Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was appointed patrolman in the Quezon City
Police Department by Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto on August 16, 1965. He
was a civil service eligible having taken and passed the civil service patrolman’s
examination given on November 24, 1962. He had also passed the usual
character investigation conducted before appointment. As a newly appointed
patrolman, the petitioner went through and successfully completed the police
training course.
On March 21, 1966, the petitioner’s appointment was forwarded to the
Commissioner of Civil Service. On August 18, 1966, or a year after the
appointment and with no action on the appointment papers being taken by the
respondent commissioner, the respondents city treasurer and city auditor
stopped the payment of the petitioner’s salaries.
On May 12, 1967, the respondent commissioner returned the petitioner’s
appointment papers, without action thereon, to the respondent mayor on the
ground that Mr. de Guzman was disqualified for appointment under Republic
Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966, which provides:
"‘SEC. 9. General Qualifications of Appointment. — No person shall be
appointed to a local police agency unless he possesses the following
qualifications:
x x x the curb in violation of a Jaywalking ordinance. The same thing is true of a
"(5) He must have no criminal record.’ (SEC. 9(5), Police Act of 1966)"
The above finding was based solely on the petitioner’s own answer to question
No. 15 in the information sheet:
"15. Have you been accused, indicted, or tried for the violation of any law,
ordinance, or regulation, before any court or tribunal?
The answer given by the petitioner was:
"Yes. Jaywalking — paid fine P5.50; Municipal O.d. (Mla.) Sect 1187 (cochero)
paid fine of P5.00."
On September 7, 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City.
On May 29, 1969, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
According to the court, the requirement of "no criminal record" means without
any criminal record and makes no distinction whether an act violates a state law
or only a municipal or city ordinance.
The issue posed in this petition is presented by Mr. de Guzman, thus:
"Whether or not violations and/or convictions of municipal ordinances, one, for
‘Jaywalking’ and the other, Manila Municipal Ordinance No. 1187, prohibiting
the cochero from ‘occupying any part of the vehicle except the seat reserved for
him’, constitute ‘CRIMINAL RECORD’ to disqualify the petitioner under the
Police Act of 1966 (Rep. Act No. 4864) from appointment to the Quezon City
Police Force."
We are constrained to grant the petition.
The former Civil Service Act, Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, stated in its
Section 23 that opportunity for government employment shall be open to all
qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified
to enter the service. The same policy is reiterated in the Civil Service Decree,
Presidential Decree No. 807, at Section 19, which superseded RA 2260.
The requirements for applicants to a policeman’s position may be quite stringent
but the basic policy of attracting the best qualified is not served by automatically
excluding any person who in an absent minded mood or while hurrying to an
urgent appointment may unwittingly have crossed a street or stepped down from
person who may have worked his way through college as a cochero and, who,
pitying his horse struggling up an incline or a bridge, leaves his seat to stand aft
and forward to balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way home, sits in
the seat intended for passengers only to be fined for violating an obscure
municipal ordinance. :
The petitioner cites decisions of American courts in support of his arguments:
"‘By weight of authority, the violation of a municipal ordinance, enacted by a
city under legislative authority, as in the case of ordinances prohibiting and
punishing gaming and the keeping of gaming houses, etc., is not a crime, in the
proper sense of the term, for such ordinances are not public laws, and the
punishment for their violation is imposed by the state.’ (Withers v. State, 36 Ala.
252; City of Greeb v. Hamman, 12 Cole., 94, 20 Pac. 1; Williams v. Augusta, 4
Ga. 509) as cited on p. 7, Francisco’s Revised Penal Code, Book One, 3rd Ed."
x x x Respondent Subido should have gone deeper into the nature of the petitioner’s
"‘The common-law definition of a ‘crime’ as given by Blackstone, is ‘an act
committed or omitted in violation of a public law,’. . . giving the accused the
right to be heard in all ‘criminal prosecutions’ relates exclusively to prosecution
for violation of public laws of the state, and a city ordinance is not a public law
of the state, but a local law of the particular corporation, made for its internal
practice and good government. (Castillo [should be Costelo] v. Feagin, 50 South
134, 135, 162 Ala. 191)"
There are other federal decisions which state that prosecutions to enforce
penalties for violations of municipal ordinances are not criminal prosecutions
and the offenses against these ordinances are not criminal cases. (City of Mobile
v. McCown, Oil Co., 148 So. 402, 405; City of Mankato v. Arnold, 30 N.W.
305, 306; Village of Litchville v. Hanson, 124 N.W. 1119, 1120). We do not go
so far as to sustain the arguments that only violations of statutes enacted by the
national legislature can give rise to "crimes" or "a criminal record" as these terms
are used in our law on local governments or the law of public officers. However,
we take cognizance of the distinction in the law of municipal corporations which
distinguishes between acts not essentially criminal relating to municipal
regulations for the promotion of peace, good order, health, safety, and comfort
of residents and acts intrinsically punishable as public offenses. (See cases cited
in Dillon, A Treatise on The Law of Municipal Corporations, Vol. II, 5th
Edition, Sections 745, 746, and 749.) A penalty imposed for the breach of a
municipal regulation is not necessarily an exercise of the sovereign authority, to
define crimes and provide for their punishment, delegated to a local government.
In many cases, the penalty is merely intended not to render the ordinance
inoperative or useless.
The phrase "criminal record" governing qualifications for appointments could
not have been intended by the legislature to automatically cover every violation
of a municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce
it. A violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a "crime" must involve at
least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want
of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office.
Automatic and perpetual disqualification of a person who in one unguarded
moment threw a cigarette butt on the street, spat in public, deposited house
garbage in a market receptacle for garbage, exceeded the speed limit for
vehicles, blew his car horn near a school or hospital, or, as in this case,
jaywalked, and who has paid the fine imposed by ordinance as commensurate
deterrence for the act, would be unreasonable, if not oppressive.
acts instead of taking every "Yes" answer in Question 15 of the information
sheet as an automatic disqualification. Under Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules
and Regulations, the respondent commissioner had 180 days from receipt of the
appointment papers to act on them. Inaction means the appointment is approved
as properly made. The papers were returned more than a year by the
commissioner after he received them. The appointment, not having any defect
of record except the matter in issue in this case, must be deemed complete and
properly made after the 180 days period. The termination of the petitioner’s
services was, therefore, an illegal and invalid removal. The petitioner should be
reinstated, assuming he meets the physical and other requirements of the
Integrated National Police under the new legislation and procedures governing
police forces. In addition to being paid any salaries for services actually rendered
but not paid, the petitioner, following the formula in cases of illegal dismissals
is entitled to five years backpay (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175, 187).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is set aside. The Integrated
National Police and the respondent officials are directed to reinstate the
petitioner to the Quezon City Police Force provided he meets the age, physical,
and other qualifications and eligibilities for patrolman under present legislation
and rules. The city government of Quezon City and the incumbent Mayor,
Treasurer, and Auditor of the city are ordered to pay the petitioner any unpaid
salaries and allowances for services actually rendered and five years backpay
from the date his services were actually terminated.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 496. December 31, 1902]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellant, vs.
WILLIAM FOWLER ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for Appellant.
William Lane O’Neill, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
CRIMINAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CRIMES ON HIGH SEAS. — Courts of
First Instance of the Philippines have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
crimes committed on the high seas on board of a transport or other vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines.
DECISION
TORRES, J.:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of
champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the
transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of
champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the property of
Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri causa, and with the intent to
appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and without the consent
of the owner, against the statute in the case made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney
being present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants presented
a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to
try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the
crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within
the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile
limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these
grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the
court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds
six month’s imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the
orders of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction
over all crimes committed on board vessels flying the flag of the United States
has been vested in the Courts of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among
other laws and orders, he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76
and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. He argued that the President of
the United States had unquestionable authority to authorize the commanding
general and the Civil Commission to establish a judicial system with authority
to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in support of this doctrine, which was
applicable to this Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of some of
the States of the Union during the Mexican was and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the
court was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to have
been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the
discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the Government. Against this order
the prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the
high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the
Civil Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not
expressly confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of
all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of
the law are clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases,
this is not true with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning
the true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act. No. 400 effectively
dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of
the Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting
of seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows:
"Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the
Philippine Archipelago, on bard a ship or water craft of any kind registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The
purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance
in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed
in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class,
our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on
board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed,
with the costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
DECISION
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to
the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts
and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these
proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the
prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of
the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following
statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No.
27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto,
deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No.
27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and
in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept
in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward
the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other
part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its
entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a
small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing
this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.
In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on
the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of
any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the
door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He
heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and
the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet
and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against
the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had
been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed
to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was
his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the
steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was
wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and
ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of
the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the
defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of
these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and
gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess
hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and
Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries
for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No.
28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid
of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but
said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he
forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick
on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into
the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following
day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found
guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without
any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from
criminal liability:
x x x ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would
be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the
victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room
had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to
be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to
resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that
he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with
the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been
wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an
assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his
whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron."
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his
charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there
was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under
his charge.
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can
be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does
an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer,
and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of
fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where,
under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing
a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed
by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec.
133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power,
7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an
essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein
defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the
crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order
that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out
in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein,
unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the
express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while
it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United
States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely
contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an
essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article
1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an
essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of
express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching
liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done
by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be
observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is
little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and
within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between
a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them
may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows
by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the
harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its
own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily
unless the contrary shall appear.
A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that
which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent,
and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do
wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly
set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted
from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code
was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco,
Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only
be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence
or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the
provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can
be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions
insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that
where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without
fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act,
an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury.
(Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as,
for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the
following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to
cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering
that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made
by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no
crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or omission punished by law; nor is he guilty of
criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice
or their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive
judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which
are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with
malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its
minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to
their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed
for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph
thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the
degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the
words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on
the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American
statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word
"willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is
more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily
in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other
words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes
"malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the
difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and
signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in
the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully,"
"maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes
generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions
hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the
decided cases, thus forcibly present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in
the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but
crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it cannot be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment
would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty
unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as
probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful
intent, without which it cannot exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by
—
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern,
is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims
as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man
guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus
actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the
like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So
also —
 Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to
the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any
respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an
action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm
judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around
the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public
voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God
to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from
an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is
made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far
from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the
martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost
confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good.
Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines,
because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to
be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure
from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary
rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"),
without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled
also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of
the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and
to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say
that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to
make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the
doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited
in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law
excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because
"the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to
do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec.
300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here
is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal..,
65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46
Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209;
Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he
honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is
to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when
the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances
might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or otherwise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more
nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without
fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person
is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he
is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish
him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occasion for
the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large
array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the
application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a
footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol
leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were
such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission
of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the
real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly
be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances,
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice
or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient
of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the
"act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain
had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him,
although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will
not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide,
according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such
belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418,
Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him,
with outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces
against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same
attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at
the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the
pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he
would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold
such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the
assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which
would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is
considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to
judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be
supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth,
at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from
the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire,
there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck
him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of
which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which
he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the
head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned
out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered
assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days
in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his
father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great
grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without
sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87
of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with
accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted
by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the
facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing
her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish
with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the
there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a
situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger
his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially
because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and
in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not
exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not
rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he
killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consternation
which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him
to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the
arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that
there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not
apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of
supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.)
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was
situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was
no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying:
"Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the
same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice)
saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding
the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's
sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and
not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired
from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as
the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the
circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor
of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the
reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The
supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence,
holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under
the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed
were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March
17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened,
at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his
head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the
delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" —
because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four
individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol
at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot.
Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having
acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused
to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the
accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote
spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense
of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada,
p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us
that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in
the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room
was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of
his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the
time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt
from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from
the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should
be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged
and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the
merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of
the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was willfully (voluntariomente) killed, and
while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence,
for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the
erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the
defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to
enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should
be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory
penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with
the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, and Relova, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24978, March 27, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.
W. A. Armstrong for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
DECISION
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, in which he was held
guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty
years cadena temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Buenventura
Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed
by the fiscal charging with the said crime.
As a basis for his appeal the accused assigns the following errors as committed
by the trial court: (1) in holding that the acts committed by the accused
constituted the crime for murder; (2) in not holding that the accused was exempt
from criminal liability and in not acquitting him.
At the trial the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Before
the day of the crime several Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony
of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of Municahan of the
municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the presence of three suspicious
looking persons who were prowling around the place. The accused Fernando de
Fernando who, at that time, was a municipal policeman, when passing in front
of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter's daughter
Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the
policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that three
unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue, prowling around his
house. The accused remained in the said house talking with Paciencia Delgado,
both being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at
about 7 o'clock at night, there appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the
stairs, a person dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong Miong." At the time the
accused nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused
inquired what he wanted but instead of answering he continued advancing with
bolo in hand. Upon seeing this Fernando de Fernando took out his revolver and
fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown continued to ascend the
staircase, he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a
neighbor Leon Torres, where, after placing upon a table the bolos that he carried,
he fell on the floor and expired. Remigio Delgado, who was in the kitchen and
had recognized the voice of the unknown, on hearing the shots ran into the
parlor, took hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he had fired at
Buenventura Paulino. Fernando de Fernando only said "Let me go, that is a cross
eyed person" and immediately repaired to the house of the teniente of the barrio,
Santiago Torres, from where he telephoned to the chief of police advising him
of what had happened. When the body was examined it was found that a bullet
had penetrated the base of the neck at the right, imbedding itself in the left side
under the skin.
The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent of the
law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of suspicious looking
persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had escaped from the Penal
Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in
clothes similar in color to the prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of
the house, and the silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time
recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown
man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling
around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his mind when he saw that
the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his
question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and believing
undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired
into the air and then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him
appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was
carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the
forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take
full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be
only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character who intended to enter the
house. There is, however, a circumstance that should have made him suspect
that the man was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house
from the fact he called "Nong Miong," which indicated that the owner of the
house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in
not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with
such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used
before taking such fatal action.
Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the
meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter
he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house
against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder,
but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal
with malicious intent, because he though at the time that he was justified in
acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary
diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating
whether or not the unknown man was really what he thought him to be. In firing
the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless
negligence.
The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless
negligence defined and punished in article 568, in relation with article 404, of
the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by law arresto mayor in its maximum
degree to prision correcional in its minimum degree.
In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is
held guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, and he is
sentenced to suffer one year prision correcional, to pay the amount of P500 to
the heirs of the deceased as an indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, the costs and with credit of one-half of the preventive
imprisonment already suffered.
SO ORDERED.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcom, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 42117. March 29, 1935.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO REYES, Defendant-appellant.
Jose G. Pardo for Appellant.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES OF
A CRIMINAL ACT. — Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of
homicide as the wound actually inflicted was a superficial wound of no
intrinsic magnitude. The death having occurred in an outlying barrio, there
was no proper autopsy. So far as is known, deceased was in normal health,
but appellant contends that it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the
deceased did not die of poisoning or some other cause. In this jurisdiction it
is well settled that a person is responsible for the consequences of his
criminal act and even if the deceased had been shown to be suffering from
a diseased heart (which was not shown), appellant’s assault being the
proximate cause of the death, he would be responsible.
2. ID.; ID.; INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME PROVED. — We have
repeatedly held that when a person stabs another with a lethal weapon such
as a fan knife upon a part of the body, for example, the head, chest, or
stomach, death could reasonably be anticipated, and the accused must be
presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his wrongful act.
The means employed contradict the claim that appellant had lack of
intention to commit the crime of homicide.
3. ID.; ID.; PROVOCATION MUST COME FROM THE OFFENDED
PARTY. — The trial court considered provocation as a mitigating
circumstance based on the testimony of appellant that he had been attacked,
overlooking the fact that the law requires that the provocation come from
the offended party. Certainly, the deceased did not attack appellant, and her
refusal to renew her illicit relationship with him can hardly be construed as
legal provocation.
 DECISION
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur of the
crime of homicide committed on the person of Fausta Tavera on the evening of
April 30, 1934.
Previous to the crime, the deceased for a couple of weeks had been living with
appellant, but her parents had persuaded her to come home and were demanding
that appellant pay a dowry of P30 before the date of the celebration of the
marriage could be fixed.
That evening there had been a barrio procession, and after the procession, they
were gathered in one of the houses, where an impromptu dance took place. The
deceased and appellant were talking in the yard of the house where the dance
was taking place, and she informed him that she could not return to him and that
she was going with her parents to Catanduanes. Appellant dragged the deceased
towards the street and stabbed her in the chest with a fan knife. Deceased ran to
the house of the barrio lieutenant, a short distance away, falling dead at the foot
of the staircase, although the wound was only a slight one, it not having
penetrated the thoracic cavity, having hit a bone.
Immediately Andres Tapil, Tomas and Rufino, relatives of the deceased,
attempted to seize the appellant, but with the aid of his knife, he escaped and ran
from the scene of the affray.
Appellant as witness in his own behalf claimed that he was attacked by the three
relatives of the deceased, and if deceased was wounded by him, it was in the
midst of that affray and purely accidental on his part.
Not only is this testimony directly contrary to the witnesses for the prosecution
but is greatly weakened by appellant’s own statement given to the chief of police
the day after the crime. The story as told by appellant was not believed by the
trial court, and on the whole does not ring with sincerity and truth.
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of homicide as the wound
actually inflicted was a superficial wound of no intrinsic magnitude. As above
stated, deceased ran screaming to the nearby house where she dropped dead. The
sanitary inspector who examined the body the next day, found no other wound
and certified that deceased had died from shock as a result of the wound and so
testified at the trial.
The death having occurred in an outlying barrio, there was no proper autopsy.
So far as is known, deceased was in normal health, but appellant contends that
it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the deceased did not die of poisoning
or some other cause.
In this jurisdiction it is well settled that such is not the law. A person is
responsible for the consequences of his criminal act and even if the deceased
had been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart (which was not shown),
appellant’s assault being the proximate cause of the death, he would be
responsible. (U. S. v. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; U. S. v. Lugo and Lugo, 8 Phil., 80;
U. S. v. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U. S. v. Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22.)
Trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstances that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as committed and sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
We have repeatedly held that when a person stabs another with a lethal weapon
such as a fan knife upon a part of the body, for example, the head, or stomach,
death could reasonably be anticipated, and the accused, must be presumed to
have intended the natural consequences of his wrongful act. The means
employed contradict the claim that appellant had lack of intention to commit the
crime of homicide.
The trial court considered provocation as a mitigating circumstance based on the
testimony of appellant that he had been attacked, overlooking the fact that the
law requires that the provocation come from the offended party. Certainly, the
deceased did not attack appellant, and her refusal to renew her illicit relationship
with him can hardly be construed as legal provocation.
On a careful review of the evidence we are convinced that appellant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without either aggravating
or mitigating circumstances and therefore sentence him under Act No. 4103 to
from eight years of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months, and one day
of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the
sum of P1,000. As thus modified the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs
against appellant. SO ORDERED.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
Upon the evidence of record, I am of the opinion that the appellant should be acquitted.
I am inclined to believe the testimony of the appellant to the effect that he was attacked by the three men who were with the deceased
at the time, and that as a result of the fight that ensued, the deceased was accidentally wounded. Moreover, the physician who examined
the deceased testified that the wound he found on her body was merely a "scratch." The nature of the wound was such that, under
ordinary circumstances, would not have resulted in death. I do not believe that the appellant had intended to commit homicide.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5889, July 12, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), Defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J.:
This case is a separate part of Case No. 5887 and bears No. 5889 on the general
docket of this court, and No. 377 on the docket of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
The complaint in this case states:
That, on or about the 18th of August, 1909, within the boundaries of the
municipality of Cebu of this province and judicial district, the said Look Chaw
(alias Luk Chiu) did, without having obtained authorization from the Collector
of Internal Revenue and without being authorized in any manner and traffic in
the same.
C.J. Milliron, an internal-revenue agent, testified that Vicente Base took to the
governor of Cebu a can of opium containing 200 grammes of the said drug, in
order to show him that the accused had sold opium to Base, and the governor
called the witness in order that he might take part in this case. After the accused
was arrested, he confessed before the witness and the provincial fiscal that he
had sold to Vicente Base thirty cans of opium on the 15th of August, 1909, but
that he had received the price thereof, and that the money which was found in a
box of his on board the British steamship Erroll, P1,500 in amount, was
obtained in Manila and was seized by the captain of the vessel. According to the
accused, he had purchased in Hongkong 137 cans of opium for the purpose of
introducing it as contraband into Mexico, the destination of the vessel, but that
as the latter changed its route touching first at Manila, the opium arrived at
Cebu.
Vicente Base testified that he had negotiated with the accused with respect to
the sale of the three sacks of opium which were seized while in the latter's
possession and were the subject matter of the previous cause; that these three
sacks were not taken ashore, because the accused would not permit this to be
done without previous delivery of the whole price of P1,000, of which witness
had only paid P533; that he therefore only took one can from one of the said
sacks.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu sentenced the accused to one year's
imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P2,000, with additional subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the trial. It was ordered in the
judgment that the exhibits connected with the case should be confiscated, and
that, in case of an appeal, and even after the sentence had been served, the
defendant should not be released from custody, but delivered to the customs
authorities for the purpose of the enforcement of the existing immigration laws.
The defendant appealed and has alleged before this court that he cannot punished
in accordance with section 15 of Act No. 1761, under which the complaint was
drawn.
This said section 15 reads thus:
( a) No person shall import, cook, or prepare opium, or engage in the business
of purchasing or selling opium or of dealing or trafficking therein, unless he
shall first have secured from the Collector of Internal Revenue a license to
transact such business and shall have paid the license tax prescribed by this Act.
x x x
To make an isolated sale, says the appellant, is not to engage in the business of
selling. To negotiate the sale of opium does not mean clandestinely to sell opium
once.
In our opinion, the act defined in section 15 is distinct from that penalized in
section 5; the act referred to in the latter is any act of sale, while that concerned
in the former relates to the business of selling, in an habitual, professional
manner, as one of an undertaking or occupation, without license.
SEC. 5. ( a) It shall be unlawful to sell, transfer, give, or deliver opium to any
person except to a duly licensed and practicing physician, pharmacist, or second-
class pharmacist, or a duly licensed dispensator of opium, or duly registered
confirmed user of opium in a licensed opium dispensary for consumption therein
only, and in accordance with the provisions of this Act: . . .
(b) Any person violating the provisions of the preceding subsection shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court: . . .
The crime concerned in this case, according to this section 5, is compromised
within the language of the complaint which charges the act of selling opium
without the authorization of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
The other ground of the appeal is that the confession of the accused was taken
into account for the purpose of his conviction. The trial court pronounced its
sentence after considering that "sufficient proof has been furnished by the
evidence,' and the evidence did not consist solely in the confession that the
accused, on the day and at the place mentioned in the complaint, contracted with
Vicente Base for the sale of the opium, the subject matter of the present
prosecution; and as this finding does not appear to be erroneous nor contrary to
the conclusions reached from the evidence, it is accepted by this court in order
that thereby the judgment appealed from may be dully affirmed, as we do affirm
the same.
This disposes of the appeal; but, in the opinion of this court, the defense of
double jeopardy alleged by the accused in first instance, with exception to the
order disallowing it, cannot but be taken into consideration, although in this
instance, on appeal, that defense was not reproduced with the allegation that its
disallowance was an error committed by the lower court in its judgment. This
point appears to involve a question of jurisdiction.
Before separating the two causes, as related at the beginning of this decision,
there was but one single complaint and there would have been only one trial for
the possession of opium and for the sale of opium. But the defendant's counsel
set up a demurrer, arguing that the complaint was defective inasmuch as it
charged two distinct crimes, for according to the defense, it was alleged to be
one crime to possess opium and another different crime to sell opium; and the
court deferred to this pretension and ordered the filing of two complaints, one
for the possession of opium and another for the sale of opium; that for the
possession of opium was the one first tried by the lower court.
In answering the second complaint for the sale of opium, the defendant alleged
that he had already been in jeopardy.
The defendant was convicted yesterday," said his attorney, "for the violation of
law committed, of possessing opium, and has already been sentenced by this
court to five year's imprisonment and in addition to pay a fine of ten thousand
pesos. According to the principles of penal law, when a crime has been
committed which is necessary in order to commit another, the delinquent, of
course, cannot be punished for the two crimes, but must suffer for the crime for
which the greater penalty was provided.
The court rejected this allegation: first, because the prosecution of two crimes
instead of one was brought about by the defense itself; and second, because, in
the opinion of the trial judge, if the defendant had first been convicted for selling
opium, he certainly would have been in jeopardy in the cause prosecuted for
possessing opium, for the reason that really one cannot sell opium without
possessing it, while, if the terms are inverted, the same result does not follow,
because one may possess opium without selling it, and consequently in the
present cause the allegation of double jeopardy is an admissible.
True it is, we assert, that it is one crime to possess opium, punished by section
31 of the Act, and another, to sell opium, penalized by section 5 of the same Act
before cited.
And it is also true that when one single act constitutes two or more crimes, or
when one of them is a necessary means for the commission of the other, only
the penalty corresponding to the more serious crime shall be imposed, in its
maximum degree, and thus, he who smokes opium in a pipe, by one single act
lays himself liable to three penalties of the law, one of them, merely for the fact
of possessing opium, another, for the mere possession of a pipe in which opium
is smoked, and the other, for the act of smoking opium; but the penalties
corresponding to these three crimes ought not to be imposed upon the defendant
in this case, and only the penalty for the most serious of these crimes.
But the illegal possession of 137 cans of opium and the illegal sale of 30 cans of
opium, which are two acts confessed by the accused, are not one act which
constitutes two crimes, nor a crime which is a necessary means for the
commission of another. They are two isolated acts, punishable, each of them, in
themselves. Only in the event where all the amount of the opium possessed and
seized be in its totality the same as that which was possessed with the sole
purpose of being delivered as the matter or subject of a sale previously agree
upon, could it be said, in the opinion of this court, that the possession of the
opium was a necessary means to effect the delivery by reason of the sale, and
that the sale agreed upon was the sole reason for the possession of the opium
seized. The possession of the quantity contained in the pipe cannot be considered
as a different crime from that of smoking opium in a pipe, nor the possession of
the pipe, as a crime different from that of smoking opium in a pipe. But if the
person surprised in smoking opium in a pipe was also surprised in the possession
of the thirty cans sold by the accused, it could not properly be inferred that the
possession of these thirty cans, which in itself is a crime, was a necessary means
for the commission of the other crime of smoking opium in a pipe, and that the
person in whose possession the thirty cans were seized, possessed the same
solely and exclusively for the purpose of smoking opium in a pipe. It might very
well have been that he had acquired the drug for the purpose of inhaling,
injecting, chewing, swallowing, or other uses, and that only by chance did it
occur to him to try to smoke it in a pipe, on the very occasion when he was
surprised, this being the evident fact of the commission of the crime which
cannot, in its essence, include the existence of thirty cans, not then contained in
the pipe, each can certainly being susceptible of other various uses, every one
of which might by its nature constitute a different crime.
We consider this doctrine equally applicable to crimes which are evils by their
very nature, as well as to those which are merely malum quia prohibitum;
because it not only aims at a more or less strict application of a penal precept
which, undoubtedly, in the practice of this court, usually tends toward the lesser
severity and, occasionally, the greatest benignity when the second class, or
conventional crimes, are concerned, but also because that doctrine is the logical
result of the process of the intelligence in the derivation of consequences from
the principles constitute of the nature of things.
Thus it is that we find the institution of this cause, and its separation from the
previous one, to be founded on law and juridical principles, and the judgment
appealed from, to be in accordance with right and equity, except with regard to
the amount of the penalty, which we reduce, in harmony with the provisions of
section 5 aforementioned, to six months' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000
Philippine currency.
Therefore, with the understanding that the imprisonment and the fine imposed
shall be, respectively, six months and P1,000 Philippine Currency, we affirm, as
to all the rest, the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur. Carson, J., concurs in the result.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94953. September 5, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARDO, Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT
WARRANT; LAWFUL IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant was caught red-
handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-
buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant’s arrest was
lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the
appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen
were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the
drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest" The policemen’s entry into
the house of appellant without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed
the hot-pursuit was valid.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID AS INCIDENTAL TO
ARREST. — We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of
prohibited drugs found inside appellant’s house. The seizure of the plastic
bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant’s arrest inside
his house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of
the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION ABSENT COUNSEL, EVIDENCE ACQUIRED
THEREIN NOT ADMISSIBLE; BUT CONVICTION NOT AFFECTED
IN VIEW OF OTHER EVIDENCE. — We find to be meritorious
appellant’s claim that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the photocopy of the
marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. "F"),
and the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. "H"). The said documents are
inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was no showing that
appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing
(Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3 [2]). Be that as it may, the rejection of said
evidence would not affect the conviction of appellant in view of the
abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; SALE OF
PROHIBITED OF DRUGS; PENALTY DEPENDING ON THE
QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA INVOLVED (MORE OR LESS THAN
750 GRAMS), CLASSIFIED. — Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty to be imposed for selling, administering, delivering or distributing
less than 750 grams of marijuana, shall range from "prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity." Under Section 4 of R.A.
No. 7659, the penalty for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or
distributing marijuana in excess of 750 grams or more shall be" reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to
Ten Million Pesos." We noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as the maximum penalty when the quantity of
the marijuana involved in the offense is less than 750 grams and at the same
time as the minimum penalty when the quantity of marijuana involved is
750 grams or more. It is the duty of the Court to harmonize conflicting
provisions to give effect to the whole law (Rufino Lopez and Sons v. Court
of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 [1957]). Furthermore, one of this Court’s
primordial responsibilities is to give a statute its sensible construction. This
is to effectuate the intention of the legislature so as to avoid an absurd
conclusion with regard to its meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]).
Therefore, when the quantity involved is less than 750 grams, Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide a penalty ranging from
prision correccional to reclusion temporal only. The provision of Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony," finds
meaning in this case. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of
the penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY IN CASE AT BAR, DETERMINED.
— In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant, we first
divide the amount of 750 grams into three to correspond to the three
applicable penalties, namely, prision correccional, prison mayor and
reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the
penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is
from 250 to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if
the weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional. Since there is no evidence as to the weight
of the two foils and one plastic bag of flowering tops of marijuana seized
from appellant, we resolve the doubt in favor of appellant and conclude that
the quantity involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not less than 250
but not more than 499 grams. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be
imposed on appellant is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to appellant, who was convicted under a special law (People
v. Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such law was interpreted in
People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, the minimum penalty that
can be imposed on appellant should be within the range of prision
correccional.
DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila in Criminal Case No. 94953, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by B.P. Blg.
179.
The Information charged appellant as follows:
I
"That on or about January 9, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or
distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell
or offer for sale two (2) foils of flowering tops of marijuana and one (1) plastic
bag of flowering tops of marijuana, which are prohibited drugs" (Rollo, p. 6).
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty
to the information (Records p. 5).
II
On December 15, 1986, Capt. Restituto Cablayan of the National Criminal
Investigation Service (NCIS) of the Western Police District (WPD), instructed
Sgt. Enrique David to conduct a surveillance operation in the vicinity of Garrido
and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of rampant drug-
pushing in that area (TSN, December 14, 1987, p. 21).
In compliance thereof, a team led by Sgt. Enrique David, conducted a
surveillance operation on December 15 and 17, and confirmed the reported drug-
pushing activities in that area by the group of the appellant and a certain Ricky
alias "Pilay" (TSN, December 2, 1987, pp. 5-6). No arrest was made because the
team was instructed by their superior to conduct a surveillance operation only
(TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 28).
On January 8, 1987, Malaya (Exh. "F") and People’s Tonight (Exh. "K"),
reported that there were rampant, drug-pushing activities in the vicinity of
Garrido and Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila, prompting Gen. Alfredo Lim,
then WPD Superintendent, to reprimand the NCIS office (TSN, December 2,
1987, p. 2).
On January 9, because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt. Cablayan
instructed Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation and to form a six-man team
with Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr. as the poseur-buyer (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 6,
January 11, 1988, p. 6).
At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their confidential
informant, went to Garrido Street. Upon arriving thereat, they strategically
positioned themselves. Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the confidential informant proceeded
to the house of appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw
him standing outside. The confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to
appellant as an interested buyer of marijuana. Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr.
"Ilan ang bibilhin ninyo?" (How much will you buy?). Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. replied:
"Two foils" handing at the same time the marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E") to
appellant. The latter, after placing the money in the right pocket of his pants,
went inside his house (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 7-9). Minutes later, appellant
came back and handed two foils (Exhs. "D-1-a" and "D-1-b") wrapped in onion
paper (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 8). It was after he handed the two foils to Pfc.
Orolfo, Jr., that he sensed the presence of the police operatives. He then tried to
retrieve the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so. During
the scuffle, one foil was torn. Appellant showed the arresting officers a blue
plastic bag with while lining containing prohibited drugs. A receipt of the
articles seized (Exh. "F") was made by Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. (TSN, January 11, 1988,
pp. 12-15).
Thereafter, the team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD
headquarters for investigation. Thereat, Sgt. David ordered Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to
commence the investigation of appellant (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 19-21).
During the investigation, appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked
to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer
(TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 23).
The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for
chemical analysis. A report and certification of Ms. Aida Pascual, Forensic
Chemist of the NBI (Exhs. "C" and "D"), show the drugs to be positive for
marijuana.
Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that the arresting
officers merely planted the marijuana on his person. He testified that on January
9, 1987, he arrived home from work as a security guard of the Vergara Brothers
Agency at around 3:00 P.M. After changing his clothes, he went out to fetch his
son, who was left in the care of a neighbor. Upon returning to his house with his
son, he was arrested by the police. The police proceeded to search his house,
without any search warrant shown to him. After the search, he and his wife were
brought to the WPD headquarters. He claimed that inspite of his protestation
that he would like to wait for his lawyer before giving any statement, the police
continued their interrogation.
Appellant denied that the twenty-peso bill was given to him by the poseur-buyer.
He claimed that he was merely forced to sign his name on the photocopy of the
twenty-peso bill (Exh. "F") and that the first time he saw the blue plastic bag
containing prohibited drugs was when he was at the police station (TSN, June
14, 1988, pp. 1-11).
To corroborate his story, appellant presented his younger brother, Gerry de Lara.
On October 2, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended
as charged in the Information; and this Court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00" (Rollo, p.
24).
Hence, this appeal.
III
In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his arrest and the seizure of
prohibited drugs found inside his house. Furthermore, he claims that he was not
assisted by counsel during his custodial interrogation (Rollo, pp. 55-57).
As to the legality of appellant’s arrest, we find that the police operatives acted
within the bounds of law.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure dealing with
warrantless arrests provides:
"Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
x x x
In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils
of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned
provision of law, appellant’s arrest was lawfully effected without need of a
warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the
buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest"
(People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644 [1991]; People v. De Los Santos, 200
SCRA 431 [1991]).
Appellant, however, asseverates that his arrest was precipitated only by
newspaper publications about the rampant sale of drugs along Garrido and
Zamora Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila (Rollo, p. 53). If appellant implies that the
police merely stage-managed his arrest in order to show that they were not
remiss in their duties, then appellant is wrong. A surveillance on the illegal
activities of the appellant was already conducted by the police as early as
December 15 and 17, 1986. The newspaper reports concerning the illegal drug
activities came out only on January 8 and 14, 1987, long after the police knew
of the said illegal activities. Appellant’s eventual arrest on January 9, 1987 was
the result of the surveillance conducted and the buy-bust operation.
The evidence shows that appellant ran inside his house upon sensing the
presence of the police operatives. The testimony of Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-
buyer, is as follows:
"FISCAL:
Q: After placing the P20 bill in his right pocket, what did he do?
A: He went to his house and minutes later, he came back, sir.
Q: When he came back what happened?
A: He handed to me two tin foils containing suspected marijuana leaves wrapped
in onion paper.
Q: And what happened next when he returned with those items?
A: After he handed to me two foils, he sensed the presence of the operatives and
he tried to retrieve the two foils, sir, and I prevented him and during the scuffle
one piece of foil was broken, he tried to run inside the house, so I subdued him
immediately and apprehended him while he was inside the house.
Q: After he was subdued by your group, what happened?
A: Sgt. David confronted him regarding this case and he voluntarily admitted
that he was still keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?
Q: What did the group do after he voluntarily admitted that he was keeping
prohibited drugs inside his house?
A: He pointed inside his house (sic) one plastic bag colored blue with white
lining containing prohibited drug" (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 12-14)
The policemen’s entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was
in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest
that followed the hot-pursuit was valid (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule
113, Section 5 [a]).
We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found
inside appellant’s house.
The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of
appellant’s arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted
upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was
made (People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 [1990]).
We find to be meritorious appellant’s claim that he was not assisted by counsel
during the custodial investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the
photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E"), Receipt of Property
Seized (Exh. "F"), and the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. "H").
The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was
no showing that appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto
put into writing (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3 [2]).:
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the conviction
of appellant in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.
The ruling in People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 (1992), is apropos:
"It bears emphasis, however, that the accused appellant’s conformity to the
questioned documents has not been a factor at all in his conviction. For even if
these documents were disregarded, still the accused-appellant’s guilt has been
adequately established by other evidence of record. The trial court’s verdict was
based on the evidence of the prosecution not on his signatures on the questioned
documents. Accused-appellant’s denial simply cannot prevail over the detailed
and unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers who caught him red-
handed selling marijuana and who have not shown to have any ulterior motive
to testify falsely against Accused-Appellant."
IV
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P20,000.00 pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by B.P. Blg. 179. However, said law was further
amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed for selling,
administering, delivering or distributing less than 750 grams of marijuana, shall
range from" prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity."
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for selling, dispensing,
delivering, transporting or distributing marijuana in excess of 750 grams or more
shall be" reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos to Ten Million Pesos."
We noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No.
7659 as the maximum penalty when the quantity of the marijuana involved in
the offense is less than 750 grams and at the same time as the minimum penalty
when the quantity of marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. It is the duty of
the Court to harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole law
(Rufino Lopez and Sons v. Court of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 [1957]).
Furthermore, one of this Court’s primordial responsibilities is to give a statute
its sensible construction. This is to effectuate the intention of the legislature so
as to avoid an absurd conclusion with regard to its meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22
Phil. 456 [1912]). Therefore, when the quantity involved is less than 750 grams,
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide a penalty
ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal only.
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony," finds meaning in this case. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the
reduction of the penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant, we first divide the
amount of 750 grams into three to correspond to the three applicable penalties,
namely, prision correccional, prison mayor and reclusion temporal.
If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be imposed
is reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is from 250 to 499 grams, the
penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if the weight of the marijuana
involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional.
Since there is no evidence as to the weight of the two foils and one plastic bag
of flowering tops of marijuana seized from appellant, we resolve the doubt in
favor of appellant and conclude that the quantity involved was: (i) below 750
grams; and (ii) not less than 250 but not more than 499 grams.
Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on appellant is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to appellant, who was convicted
under a special law (People v. Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such
law was interpreted in People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, the
minimum penalty that can be imposed on appellant should be within the range
of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification that appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
years and TWO (2) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75256. January 26, 1989.]
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE IGNACIO
ALMODOVAR, Respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liaco and Roberto Madrid for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; INTENT
DEFINED. — The word "intent" has been defined as:" (a) design; a
determination to do a certain thing; an aim the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design
resolve, or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of
committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two.
2. ID.; ID.; DISCERNMENT, CONCEPT. — We have defined the term
"discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People
v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise: "The discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by
law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong . . ." (Emphasis ours) p. 583
3. ID.; ID.; DISCERNMENT AND INTENT, DISTINGUISHED. — It is
clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former
refers to the desired of one’s act while the latter relate to the moral
significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not
intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently
handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does,
that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with
discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot
his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize
the undesirable result of his negligence.
4. ID.; ID.; BASIC REASON BEHIND ITS EXACTMENT. — In further
outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is
worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on
the part of the accused.
5. ID.; ID.; INTELLIGENCE, PRESENCE OR ABSENCE, VITAL TO
APPRECIATION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY. — "The second element of
dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can
exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him)
from criminal liability." (Emphasis ours) "Intelligence" as an element of
dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of
the RPC and as defined in the case of People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580
(1939). It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or
connotes "intent" for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence,
which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of
committing an offense.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RETAINED AS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN
CULPA. — In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3)
elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and
negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However,
intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a
minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with
intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense.
For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness
of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but
below fifteen may be held liable for a said Article would reveal such fact as
it starts off with the phrase "Any person . . ." without any distinction or
exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
7. ID.; SECTION 2(3) OF P.D. 1508, CONSTRUED. — The jurisdiction of a
court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the
law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People v.
Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino v. Cruz
and People v. Savellano, 116 SCRA 415). The same principle applies in
constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which the law defining the offense
attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which
may affect criminal liability must now considered.
8. ID.; P.D. 1508, NOT JURISDICTIONAL. — The petitioner, in his
arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial
 court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been
corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales v. IAC, 127
SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol v. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D.
1508 is not jurisdictional.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable
Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch I, Legaspi City,
raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to resolve, We impleaded
the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein a resolution dated 17
September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best
friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the
morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan)
placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed
from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his
left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated
petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be
an accident. The victim’s parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which
ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless
Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed,
which narrated in part:
". . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age
and acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and
imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt
operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence one
TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pallet,
causing injuries which directly caused his untimely death; . . ." (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the
following grounds:
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE
WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGES AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9,
Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first
and third grounds relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground
was deferred until evidence shall have been represented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2)
issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED
WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE,
AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE
BARANGAY LUPON. (Petitioner, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary
controversy with respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the
term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that
"discernment" connotes "intent" (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of
People v. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the
allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that
discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15
years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:
"If discernment is the equivalent of ‘with intent’, then the allegation in the
information that the accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully,
and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner
an air rifle .22 caliber’ is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the
information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception."
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner’s argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15
may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two
different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor General’s view; the two terms
should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as:
"(a) design; a determination to do a certain thing; an aim the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve,
or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS Intentp. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of
committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other
hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the
RPC, in the old case of People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong . . ." (italics Ours) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey
two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a
person, the former refers to the desired of one’s act while the latter relate to the
moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not
intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent
act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air
rifle. It is not connected, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor
above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he
intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not
intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and
"discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the
second element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
crime can exist, and because . . . the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability." (Emphasis ours)
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not
capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years
of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed
to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it
could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and
criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment." 4 The
preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually
embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as
defined in the aforecited case of People v. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore
be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes "intent" for they refer to
two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct
element of dolo as a means of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are
indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence.
Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as
an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below
fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act
which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern
the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor
over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a said Article
would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person . . ." without
any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere
debemos:
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and
"discernment" used under the law, he cites the case of People v. Nieto, supra.
However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the
ruling he now invokes, which reads:
"That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the
formation that she . . .’with the intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the
Penaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and
died right then and there.’ This allegation clearly conveys the idea that she knew
what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of publishing her victim into
deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis ours)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent"
and discernment." What We meant was that the combines effect of the words
used in the information is to express a knowledge, on the part of the accused
Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly
contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment," it in
effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the idea of the latter; the
former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner
that the case against him should have first been brought before the Lupong
Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2 (3). He submits
that considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating
circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the
penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original
arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional medium as prescribed in Article
365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and
not the penalty ultimately imposed (People v. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People v.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino v. Cruz and People v. Savellano, 116 SCRA
415). The same principle applies in constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508,
which states:
defining the offense attaches to the later should be considered. Hence, any
circumstance which may affect criminal liability must now considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been
complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous
perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales
v. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol Vs. Amin, 135 SCRA
438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective
17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court
for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
________________________________________
1. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I, 12th Ed., 1981, p. 213.
2. Albert, the Revised Penal Code, Manila: University Publishing Co., Inc.,
1946, p. 22.

x x x 3. Ibid., referring to article 12, Number 2. See footnote, p. 22

(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00; . . ." (Emphasis supplied) 4. Ibid., p. 82

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted 5. Pe, Cecilio and Tadiar, Alfredo, "Katarungang Pambarangay: Dynamics of
P.D. 1508 has said: Compulsory Conciliation." Manila: UST Press, 1979 p. 65-66.

"The law says ‘punishable,’ not ‘punished.’ One should therefore consider the
penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty
actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant
circumstances affecting criminal liability." 5

The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore

rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 34665. August 28, 1931.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DONATO BINDOY, Defendant-appellant.
Florentino Saguin for Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellee.
DECISION
VILLAMOR , J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusión temporal, with
the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide,
according to the following information:
"That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality
of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded
Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest
which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code."
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in
this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon on May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a
tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao,
Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There
were Faustino Pacas’ wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so,
Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an
interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend
his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This
occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam,
who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what
was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the
course this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
wrenching the bolo from the latter’s hand towards the left behind the accused,
with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam’s
chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and
Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio
Omamdam’s presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the
witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to
satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy
and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle,
respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to
wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only
defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away
from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description
given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with
the size of the point of Bindoy’s bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio
Omamdam’s death, but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and
without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the
accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with
that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The
window testified that she knew of her husband’s wound being caused by Bindoy
from his statement to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the
accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The
defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring
to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated,
there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of
committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted
to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he
would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony
or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we
have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the
effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the
bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it
flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came
up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato’s seeing him, because
Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see
Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied:
"I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my
wife when I die: See that she doesn’t starve," adding further: "This wound was
an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The
testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced
by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it
existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it
well to repeat what this court said in United States v. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to
wit:
"The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals,
directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible,
the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.
"In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof
of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge
the criminal act."
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the
appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused
Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez Villa-Real and Imperial,
JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs. CORNELIO BAYONA, Defendant-appellant.
Gervasio Diaz for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DECISION
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of
the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for thirty days and
to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:
A eso de las once de la mañana del dia 5 de junio de 1934, mientras se
celebrahan las elecciones generales en el precinto electoral numero 4,
situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del Municipio de Pilar, Provincia de
Capiz, el aqui acusado fue sorprendido por Jose E. Desiderio, que era
entonces el representante del Departamento del Interior para inspecionar
las elecciones generales en la Provincia de Capiz, y por el comandante de
la Constabularia F.B. Agdamag que iba en aquella ocasion con el citado
Jose E. Desiderio, portando en su cinto el revolver Colt de calibre 32, No.
195382, Exhibit A, dentro del cerco que rodeaba el edificio destinado para
el citado colegio electoral numero 4 y a una distancia de 22 metros del
referido colegio electoral. Inmediatament Jose E. Desiderio se incauto del
revolver en cuestion.
La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D. Benliro y de Dioscoro
Buenvenida, trato de establecer que el aqui acusado paro en la calle que
daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a invitacion de dicho Jose D.
Benliro y con el objeto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado para llevar a
su casa a los electores del citado Jose D. Benliro que ya habian terminado
de votar, y que cuando llegaron Jose E. Desidierio y el comadante F.B.
Agdamag, el aqui acusado estaba en la calle. Desde el colegio electoral
 hasta el sitio en que, segun dichos testigos, estaba el acusado cuando se le
quito el revolver Exhibit a, hay una distancia de 27 metros.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el apelante fue sorprendido con
su revolver dentro del cerco de la casa escuela del Barrio de Aranguel,
Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado como colegio electoral.
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpable de la infraccion
de la Ley Electoral querrellada y, por consiguiente, al condenarle a
prision y multa.
As to the question of fact raised by the first assignment of error, it is sufficient
to say that the record shows that both Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the
Department of the Interior, and Major Agdamag of the Philippine Constabulary,
who had been designated to supervise the elections in the Province of Capiz,
testified positively that the defendant was within the fence surrounding the
polling place when Desiderio took possession of the revolver the defendant was
carrying. This also disposes of that part of the argument under the second
assignment of error based on the theory that the defendant was in a public road,
where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument
under the second assignment of error is that if it be conceded that the defendant
went inside of the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the
Election Law, because he was called by a friend and merely approached him to
find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; that there were many
people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could
not leave his revolver in his automobile, which he himself was driving, without
running the risk of losing it and thereby incurring in a violation of the law.
As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his
automobile without the risk of losing it because he was alone, it is sufficient to
say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for the defendant to leave
his automobile merely because somebody standing near the polling place had
called him, nor does the record show that it was necessary for the defendant to
carry arms on that occasion.
The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially
construct buildings for electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever building
there may be available, and all election precincts are within fifty meters from
some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd, because members
of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in
that prohibition and could not use the road in question if they were carrying
firearms; that people living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would be
prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within their own residences
on registration and election days;
That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms
with intention to influence in any way the free and voluntary exercise of
suffrage;
That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of
suffrage, the prohibition in question should only be applied when the facts reveal
that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the purpose of using them
directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the
decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536,
promulgated November 20, 1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had
been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the request of the chairman of
the board of election inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar there is
no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to
work for the candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that
the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely
passing along the road in front of the building where the election was being held
when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of
the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict
him.
We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal
of the defendant. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision,
and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that
the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any
other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside
of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of,
and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was
complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with
the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an
offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in
those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done.
"Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14
Phil., 128.)
 While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are
not and should not be held criminally responsible for acts committed by
them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's
New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the
power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by
necessity, "the great master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases
the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U.S. vs.
Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power
to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be
shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)
The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any
difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes
along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he
does not violate the provision of law in question, because he had no intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer
in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within
fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within
their own residences on election day, as they would not be carrying firearms
within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People
vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and
Degracia (p. 169, ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the
request of the board of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order
is authorized by law to carry his arms.
If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted
because it was not proved that he tried to influence or intended to influence the
mind of any voter, anybody could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or
a horse race on election day with impunity.
As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the
provision in question, that is a matter for the Chief Executive or the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
against the appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.]
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by
virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner
is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters
of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After
the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from
the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination
that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu
proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latter’s right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is
a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in
what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires
for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.
1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause
does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them
in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted,
suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by
law. The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation
is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides the
absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor
does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that
the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if
petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution
should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be
accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so
desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity

agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires
and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the
government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic

agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction
of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional
or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-32485. October 22, 1970.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF
THE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A.
No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL,
REASONS. — The questioned provision, Section 8(a) of the Constitutional
Convention Law, is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal
protection clauses of the bill of rights of the Constitution for the same is
designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin substantive
evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal
protection of the laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the
cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal chances for all
candidates and the independence of the delegates who must be "beholden to
no one but to God, country and conscience," are interests that should be
accorded primacy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID;. SEC. 8(a) OF REPUBLIC ACT 6132 NOT EX POST FACTO
LAW. — Section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132 is not an ex post facto law for
the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which arc given
retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalties a violation of any
provision of R.A. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed
only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates
that Sec. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts
carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the
entire law shall be effective upon its approval on August 24, 1970.
TEEHANKEE, J, dissenting.
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PAR. I OF SEC. 8(a) OF
REPUBLIC ACT 6132, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — The challenged
provision, together with the Act’s other restrictions and strictures
enumerated therein, oppressively and unreasonable straitjacket the
candidates as well as the electorate and gravely violate the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of
association, and deny due process and the equal protection of the laws. The
statute stifles and curtails the right to free political discussion.
2. ID.; ID.; STATUTES; WHEN PURPOSES THEREOF ARE DECLARED
MALA PROHIBITA.. — Laws that would regulate the purposes for which
associations and societies may be formed or would declare their purposes
mala prohibita must pass the usual constitutional test of reasonableness, and
furthermore must not abridge freedom of speech and press.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.,
claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit
corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination
of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner’s rights
and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has
printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of
government, which materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said
petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the
Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns, because it quoted,
only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process
clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post
facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the
questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal protection
clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the
twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process and denial
of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests
test, the cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal change for all
candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must be "beholden to no
one but to God, country and conscience," are interests that should be accorded
primacy. 1
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements
in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto
law is likewise untenable.
An ex post facto law is one which:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 3
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the
constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive
effect. 4
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No.
6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed
after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is
nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other
provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the
contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval.
It was approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of
Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion in
Imbong v. Comelec, L-32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-32443.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as they are
relevant to the issues in this case, dissents, even as agrees that Republic Act
6132 is not ex post facto.
Villamor, J., concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post facto law
and dissents as to the rest.
Concepcion, C.J., is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The Court’s decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11, 1970 in
Imbong v. Ferrer and Gonzales v. Comelec 1 upholding the constitutionality of
the first paragraph of section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132. Inasmuch as I was
unable to participate in the said cases, 2 I have expressed my contrary view in
my separate dissenting opinion in Badoy, Jr. v. Ferrer 3 that the challenged
provision, together with the Act’s other restrictions and strictures enumerated
therein, "oppressively and unreasonably strait-jacket the candidates as well as
the electorate and gravely violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association, and deny due
process and the equal protection of the laws."
I therefore dissent from the Court’s decision at bar for the same reason and
considerations stated in my separate dissenting opinion in the case of Badoy.
I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion in Imbong-
Gonzales that" (W)hile it may be true that a party’s support of a candidate is not
wrong per se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of the broad law-
making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the
exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support
prescribed in Sec. 8 (a), which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of
association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino
emphasized that ‘equality of chances may be better attained by banning all
organization support.’"
I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be construed, as
endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act’s sponsor, that" (T)he
protection of the Constitution cannot be invoked for the right of association
when the purpose is a malum prohibitum because such purpose would be
‘contrary to law’" and" (O)nce the ban (on party and organization support) is
approved into law, the freedom of association cannot be invoked against it" —
since the Constitution decrees only that" (T)he right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." 4
Such a concept of malum prohibitum vis-a-vis the Constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association which has its root in the Malolos Constitution would
render sterile and meaningless the Constitutional safeguard, should Congress be
conceded, in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, the power to strike
down at any time associations and societies by the simple expedient of declaring
their purposes or certain activities, not wrong per se, as "contrary to law" or mala
prohibita. I believe that such a concept begs the question. Obviously, the word
"law" in the qualifying clause "for purposes not contrary to law" does not mean
that an enactment of the legislature forecloses the question with finality and
sounds the death-knell. Laws that would regulate the purposes for which
associations and societies may be formed or would declare their purposes mala
prohibita must pass the usual constitutional test of reasonableness and
furthermore, must not abridge freedom of speech and press. 5
Endnotes:
________________________________________
1. Imbong v. Comelec, L-32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-32443, Sep. 11,
1970.
2. Ibid.
3. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74.
4. Fernandez v. Oasan, L-9141, Sept. 25, 1956, 99 Phil. 934, 937.
1. Nos. L-32432 and L-32443, jointly decided.
2. The writer hereof was then on official leave.
3. Nos. L-32456 and L-32551, October 17, 1970.
4. Sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo Tolentino of July 20, 1970, notes in
parentheses furnished; emphasis copied; cit, Art, III, Sec. 1(6), Philippine
Constitution.
5. See 2 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, 209.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 13005. October 10, 1917.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, Defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION, WHEN EXISTS. — Section 4,
Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law) construed as follows: Any person unlawfully
imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands when the
prohibited drug is found under this person’s control on a vessel which has come
direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the
Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the
drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
United States v. Look Chaw ([1910]), 18 Phil., 573), and United States v. Jose
([1916]), 34 Phil., 840), distinguished.
2. ID.; ID. — Defendant purchased opium in Saigon, brought it on board a foreign
vessel, and had it under his control when that vessel arrived after direct voyage
in the port of Cebu. Held: To constitute illegal importation of opium from a
foreign country into the Philippine Islands.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the
defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and
sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed
as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer
which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the
port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them
on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip
from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25,
1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium above
mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer’s engine. The
defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased
it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He
did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the
accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was
introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Ph. Islands been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the
intimation that there exists inconsistency between the doctrines laid down in the two
cases. Neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.
In the case of United States v. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion
handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found —
"That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands,
aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such
vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon
Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an inter. treaty."
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the
present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge was the
illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present case the charge is illegal
importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in
the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the
opium was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case the
opium was not landed by the defendant. In the case of United States v. Jose ([1916],
34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which resolution turned, was that in a
prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the
Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the
vessel from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign
country with the drug on board. In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted
because it was not proved that the opium was imported from a foreign country; in
the present case there is no question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu.
However, in the opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter
dicta, but which at least is interesting as showing the view of the writer of the
opinion:
"The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it
anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be discharged or
that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into
the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and
which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands with intent to
discharge its cargo."
Resolving whatever doubt may exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we
return to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that
section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring
any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are
synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere
act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. (The Mary [U.S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation
is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them
into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U.S.
v. Lyman [U.S.], 26 Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots v. U.S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As
applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person’s control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case,
a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances
exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd
to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon
and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to
conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use.
No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant
intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find
that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the
Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that
these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
as charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by
law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6486. March 2, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, Defendant-appellant.
B. Pobre for Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; PRESUMPTION OF
CRIMINAL INTENT. — In order to constitute a crime, the act must, except
with respect to crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by criminal
intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty to consequences as, in
law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea a crime i not committed if the mind of the person performing
the accomplained of is innocent.
2. ID., ID.; ACT COMPLAINED OF MUST BE UNLAWFUL. — The
presumption of criminal intent does not arise from the proof of the
commission of an act unless the act itself be unlawful. And where the facts
proven for the purpose of raising the presumption of criminal intent are
accompanied by other facts which show that the act complained of was not
unlawful, the presumption does not arise.
3. ID.; ACT NO. 1740; MALVERSATION; "PRIMA FACIE" CASE;
PRESUMPTION. — While Act No. 1740 provides that: "In all prosecutions
for violations of the preceding section (sec. 1), the absence of any of the
public funds or property of which any person described in said section has
charge, and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the funds
and property properly in his charge on demand of any officer authorized to
examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or depositary shall be
deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or property have
been put to personal use or used for personal ends by such person within the
meaning of the preceding section," yet such a presumption is a rebuttable
one and constitutes only a prima facie case against the accused person, and
when the prosecution in presenting its case against the accused, introduces
evidence showing that the money or property had not been put to personal
use by the defendant, the presumption of guilt does not arise.
DECISION
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Cagayan, Hon. Charles A. Low presiding, convicting the defendant of the
crime of malversation of public funds and sentencing him to two months’
imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to hold public office or public
employment of any kind, and to the payment of the costs.
It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the
peace of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, on the 2d day of October, 1909, had
before him sixteen separate civil cases commenced by Juan Canillas against
sixteen distinct individuals, each one for damages resulting from a breach of
contract; that said cases were all decided by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff;
that each one of the defendant in said cases appealed from the decision of the
justice of the peace and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time
giving a bond of P50, each one of which was approved by the court; that on the
12th day of said month the plaintiff in said cases presented a writing to the
appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging that the sureties on the said bonds
were insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the appellant;
that thereupon the latter ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the
same order, required each of the appellants to file another bond within fifteen
days, that, inasmuch as none of the appellants in said causes presented new
bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in said causes applied to the appellant,
as said court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of the
said sixteen cases and commanding the execution of the same, at the same time
asking that the sums deposited by the defendants in said actions be attached (so
called in the record) and delivered to him in satisfaction of said judgments; that
the accused acceded to the petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached
and delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the plaintiff a
bond of P50 for each attachment, conditioned that he would respond for the
damages which should result from such attachment.
After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the said
sixteen cases presented a complaint against the appellant to the Court of First
Instance, by virtue of which said court ordered that the plaintiff, Juan Canillas,
deliver to the clerk of the Court of First Instance the sums deposited by the
defendants in said actions. Canillas obeyed the order of the court and made the
delivery as required.
Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the
accused. We are in entire accord with that recommendation. The case made
against the appellant lacks many of the essential elements required by law to be
present in the crime of malversation of public funds. The accused did not convert
the money to his own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he
feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in
good faith under the belief that he was acting judicially and correctly. The fact
that he ordered the sums, deposited in his hands by the defendants appellants in
the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the benefit of the plaintiff in those
actions, after the appeals had been dismissed and the judgments in his court had
become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction
of the judgment which he held in those cases, cannot be considered an
appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740. He
believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a
perfect right under the law to cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to him
that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to require the filing of new
undertakings, giving the parties ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the
appeals in case said undertakings were not filed, and to declare the judgment
final. He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and said judgment
had become final, the sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of
the judgments in the actions in which said sums had been deposited and that he
was acting judicially and legally in making such applications.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by
statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or
indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal
intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be
innocent.
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court
of justice of the peace. He had jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a
right and it was his duty to require the payment by each appellant of P16, as well
as the giving of a proper undertaking with solvent sureties. While, in dismissing
the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said cases, he may have
exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction and power, a question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so
far as appears from the record, at most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of
the mind operating upon a state of facts. Giving the act complained of the
signification most detrimental to the appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply the
result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function, and not an intention to
deprive any person of his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose
to do justice to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted that honest debts
might be paid to those to whom they were legally and justly due, and not to
enrich himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was an error
committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a
mistake, not a crime.
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the
commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the
accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that the act was
done with criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this
presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such
presumption springs must be a criminal act. In the case before us the act was not
criminal. It may have been an error; it may have been wrong and illegal in the
sense that it would have been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other
proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that his conduct was arbitrary
to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as properly to subject him to reprimand
or even suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of record, it was
not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention arises
from the act.
Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act
complained of, even though it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of
malversation of public funds as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740. It is true
that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for violations of the preceding
section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person
described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person
to produce all the funds and property properly in his charge on the demand of
any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or
depositary shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds
or property have been put to personal uses or used for personal ends by such
person within the meaning of the preceding section." Nevertheless, that
presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima facie case against
the person accused. If he presents evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put
said funds or property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end and
the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the accused
to offer any such evidence, for the reason that the people’s own pleading alleged,
and its own proofs presented, along with the criminal charge, facts which
showed, of themselves, that said money had not been put to personal uses or
used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution demonstrated, both by
the allegations in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs on
the trial, that the absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal
use thereof by the accused, thus affirmatively and completely negating the
presumption which, under the act quoted, arises from the absence of the funds.
The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts which were
presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied by
other facts which absolutely prevented its creation.
On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of estafa, as
defined in paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, then the presumption
just referred to does not arise. Mere absence of the funds is not sufficient proof
of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused to turn over the funds
at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case. (U. S. v. Morales,
15 Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. v. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.) Conversion must be
affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from
which conversion necessarily follows. (U. S. v. Morales, supra.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged
from custody forthwith.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I am strongly inclined to doubt the bona fides of the defendant in the transactions
herein set out, but in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon this
point I concur in the judgment of acquittal of the crime charged in the
information.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3008, March 19, 1951]
FEDERICO SORIANO, Petitioner, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Felix V. Macalalag for petitioner.
First Assistance Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Acting Solicitor
Antonio Consing for respondent.
DECISION
JUGO, J.:
Federico Soriano was charged on August 22, 1945, with the crime of theft of
one electric motor marked "Cyclix," with Western Electric Company cable, and
one lantern slide projector, with their corresponding accessories, for the
operation of motion pictures, valued at P6,000, belonging to the eagle Cinema
Co., Inc., represented by its President Manager, Teodoro S. Benedicto.
After trial he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and sentenced
to suffer and indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor to
two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional,
with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. He appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which modified the above judgment and sentenced him to
three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs, ordering the lantern slide
projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator (Exhibit D) be returned
to the owner, the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.
The defendant filed a petition for certiorari in this Court against the Court of
Appeals. Only questions of law are raised which may be reduced to the issue
whether or not the acts of the accused, as found by the Court of Appeals,
Constitute theft.
The Court of Appeals, in a carefully prepared opinion, held as follows:
Taking into account the respective contentions of the parties and the evidence
produced in support thereof, We are of the opinion despite Emilia Saenz' letter
(Exhibit E) where she writes to Benedicto that Federico Soriano was only in
charge of collecting the rents and of transmitting them to her, that appellant was
their representative and duly appointed substitute administrator in her stead. It
seems also clear that, because of the disturbance caused by the war, the Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc., was indebted to the Saenz for rents due on account of the
lease; and that appellant in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him
(Exhibit 16) could have sued said debtor to foreclose the mortgage executed by
the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in favor of his principals, if he could not have come
to a better understanding with Teodoro S. Benedicto. It is no longer disputed
that the properties of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in the building were lost, and
that the lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator
(Exhibit D) have been found in the house and in the possession of the appellant
after having repeatedly denied any knowledge of the equipment and accessories
of the Cine and disclined any responsibility for their loss. Considering these
facts that have been fully established in the case, and particularly the manner
and circumstances under which said projector and generator were taken from
the building of the Eagle-Theater, can appellant be held liable for the crime of
theft of such properties?
Counsel for appellant contends that the latter is entitled to an acquittal, because
in the case at bar:
1. All the elements of theft are not present;
2. There was no criminal intent (on the part of the appellant);
3. The action of the appellant is susceptible of two interpretations, both
consistent with his innocence or guilt. Therefore, he should be
acquitted; and
4. The guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
5. The crime of theft of which appellant stands charged and convicted, is
covered by the 1st paragraph of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 308 Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent of gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent.
and we agree with counsel for appellant that in order to justify a
conviction for theft the following elements must concur, namely:
(a) that a chattel or personal property must have been taken or
abstracted; (b) that there be intent of gian when the taking away of
the article took place; (c) that the property stolen be owned by
another; and (d) that in the taking, neither violence of intimidation
against persons or force upon things be employed.
With regard to the "taking," appellant contends that he did not execute this
element of theft because being an attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Saenz, he acted
for his principals, and for all intents and purposes of the power conferred upon
him, he was the principal himself and, naturally, he could not steal something
belonging to him under the principle that "Rei nostrae furtum facera non pos
sumus". The power of attorney (Exhibit 16) clearly empowered the appellant "to
ask, demand, sue for, recover, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money
. . . and other things of value of whatever nature or kind," and gave him "full
power to do anything requisite and necessary to be done in the premises as fully
as I (Emilia Saenz) could if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming
all that my said attorney and substitute attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue hereof." But appellant fails to take two important factors into
consideration, to wit: firstly, that when he took, as he finally admitted to have
taken, the lantern slice projector and the "Cyclix" motor generator from the
Eagle-Theater, he did not really act in behalf and representation of this
principals, for otherwise he would not have repeatedly denied having taken said
properties and insinuated that they had been taken by the Japanese; and
secondly, that even his principals could not have taken and appropriated said
properties for themselves without previous and proper action in court, because
no mortgage creditor can foreclose the property mortgage to him without
judicial proceedings. Thus, the doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court in the
case of United States vs. Reyes, (Phil., 441); People vs. Soriano, (50 Phil.,
203) Manila Mercantile Co. vs. Flores (50 Phil., 759) and Levy Hermanos, Inc.,
vs. Ramirez (60 Phil., 978), on which appellant builds up his contention, are of
no bearing onto case at bar.
Discussing further this element of "taking," it can be added that the projector
(Exhibit C) and the generator (Exhibit D) were in the premises of the Eagle
Theater, and that sometime in September, 1944, when the Japanese Ishii ceased
to operate the Cine, appellant received the keys of the building where said
equipment was stored. So, the question that remains to be determined in
connection with this point is whether appellant, having received
those properties, could, for the purposes of the crime of theft, take things already
in his possession. If is to be remembered that the apparatus, accessories and
equipment of the Cine belonged to the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., though they were
mortgaged to appellant's principals; that the mortgage was never foreclosed, and
that neither Teodoro S. Benedicto, as President, General Manager and majority
stockholder of said corporation, nor any other duly authorized person in this
stead, had ever entrusted said properties to him for the execution of the
mortgage, or for any other purpose. And even conceding for the sake of
argument that with the return of the keys and the delivery of the building to
appellant, he would have received the physical possession of the machinery
therein located, yet, the acquisition of such possession did not carry with it the
power to exercise any act of dominion over said chattels. Among the leading
cases that can be cited to illustrate this phase of the problem, we quote the
following from Question No. XXXI of Viada (vol. 3, page 433, 4th ed.):
"Is the shepherd, who takes away and converts to his own use several head
of cattle under his care, guilty of the crime of estafa within case No. 5 of
article 548, or of theft, defined and punished in article 533, No. 2, of the
Spanish Penal Code" - The Supreme Court has decided that it was this latter
and more serious crime that was committed: "Considering that the crime of
theft is committed when one, with intent of gain, and without using violence
or intimidation against persons, or force upon things, takes away personal
property of another without the owner's consent; and in the present case
Manuel Diaz Castilla undoubtedly committed the crime defined, for, with
intent of gian, he took away two bucks and a female goat, against the will
of his mater, the owner of said animals, which were under his care as
shepherd; Considering that, in holding that the crime committed was that of
theft and not of estafa, as claimed by the appellant, ignorant of the true
elements which constitute the latter crime, the lower court did not commit
any error of law, nor violate any legal provision, as contended by defendant's
counsel in support of this appeal." (Decision rendered on June 23, 1886,
published in the Gazette of September 16, p. 189.)
And this is so, because as stated in the case of United States vs. Nieves de Vera,
(43 Phil. 1000):
When the delivery of a chattel or cattle has not the effect of transferring the
juridical possession thereof, or title thereto, it is presumed that the
possession of, and title to, the thing so delivered remains in the owner; and
the act of disposing thereof with intent of gain and without the consent of
the owner constitutes the crime of theft.
As to the element of "intent of gain," We further declare that whenever a cattle
or other personal property value is abstracted without the consent of the owner,
and the evidence on record does not show any other reason for the abstraction,
it is to be presumed and logically inferred that such act was motivated by an
intent of gain. (Decision, pp. 7-12.)
The petitioner shields himself behind the power-of-attorney, exhibit 16, granted
to him by Emilia Saenz, the owner of the building which was rented by the Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc., the essential part of which reads as follows:
To ask, take, sue for, recover, collect and receive any and all sums of money,
debts, dues, accounts, interests, demands, and other things of value of
whatsoever nature or kind as may be or hereafter be due, owing, payable or
belonging to the community entrusted to me (Emilia Saenz) in the City of Iloilo
an to have, use, and take any and all lawful ways and means for the recovery
thereof by suit, attachment or otherwise, and to compromise, settle and agree for
the same; (Decision, pp. 5-6.)
It is clear that said power of attorney did not authorize the petitioner to take
away the projector and the generator, hiding them in his house and denying to
the owner and the police authorities that he had them in his possessions, which
was an illegal act, not covered by his power-of-attorney. He was authorized only
to ask, take, sue for, recover, collect, etc., sums of money, debts, dues, accounts
and other things which were or might thereafter be due, etc., to his principal
Emilia Saenz. This authority referred mainly to the collection of the rents of the
building rented by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. The projector and the generator
were not due or owing to Emilia Saenz. It is not to be supposed that Saenz herself
would have denied the possession of those articles. It is was the purpose of the
petitioner only to protect those instruments from looting, there is no reason why
he should have concealed them from the owner and denied having them.
Even though the equipment, including those articles, were mortgaged to Sanez
to guarantee the payment of the rents due on the building, yet there had been no
foreclosure and neither she nor the petitioner had the authority to take away and
conceal those articles from the owner or the police authorities. The Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc., had the right to possess said articles.
With regard to the element of taking or asportation, there is no doubt that it
existed, notwithstanding that the petitioner had been entrusted with the keys of
the building where they were kept. This point has been settled by Viada,
numerous decisions of the Supreme court of Spain and of the Philippines, some
of which authorities are cited above.
As to the element of intent, it is clear that when the petitioner carried away and
concealed from the owner and the police authorities the above-mentioned
articles, he acted with intent of gian. Intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by the overt acts of a person, which in the present case
unmistakably point to that intent.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for the writ of certiorari is denied, with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Under the facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
cannot rightly be convicted of the crime of theft, because he had not acted with
intent of gain. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., was indebted to the Saenz heirs
(represented by Emilia Saenz) for rents of a building leased by the company.
The apparatus, accessories and equipment of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc,
contained in the leased building, were mortgaged to Saenz to secure the payment
of said rents. The petitioner was the representative and duly appointed substitute
administrator of the premises, in place of Emilia Saenz. Indeed, the petitioner
could have sued the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., and foreclosed its mortgage.
The fact that the lantern slide projector and the "Cyclix" motor generator
forming part of the equipment of the Eagle Co., Inc., were taken by the petitioner
(after the Japanese Ishii, who had ceased to operate the business, delivered to
the petitioner the keys of the building where said equipment was stored) and
removed to and kept in petitioner's house, is consistent with the theory that the
petitioner, to protect the interest of his principals, in good faith believed that he
had the right to do so under his powers and by virtue of the mortgage covering
said equipment, especially because the petitioner was empowered not only to
recover, collect or receive money, debts or dues, but also to take or recover
"other things of value of whatsoever nature or kind" that may be due from the
lessee. That the petitioner was wrong in his belief, or had been so over-zealous
in the matter as to have even denied that the articles in question were in this
possession, made him at most civilly liable but does not go to show that he acted
with intent of personal profit. The intent of gain cannot be inferred from the bare
acts of the petitioner, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case that
supply plausible reasons for said acts. Had he sold or tried to dispose of the
articles, intent of gain would have been established.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-30801. March 27, 1974.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DOMINGO URAL, Accused-Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonlo A.
Torres and Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for Plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente
G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him
of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify
the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the
costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a
twenty-six-year-old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He
had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting
bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July
31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but
night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal
building where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o’clock, he witnessed an
extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already
acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola.
As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the
tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He
poured its contents on Napola’s recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a
match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help. Nobody
came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the
municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep
quiet of what I have done" (sic) Alberio did not sleep anymore that night. From
the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed.
He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-
year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the
arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back
(Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns
were not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus
infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would "cause death",
she said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt area,
secondary infection would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of
death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the
prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin
Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution’s failure to present as
witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who
saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which was one
of the bases of the information for murder. 1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim’s widow, who was present in court, was a
vital witness who should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim’s
dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res gestae. 2
In this appeal appellant’s three assignment of error may be condensed into the
issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o’clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was
in the municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola. He
entered the cell and found Napola’s shirt in flames. With the assistance of
Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola’s shirt. Ural did not
summon a doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious.
Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc’s common-law wife, whom the trial court branded
"as a complete liar", testified that she heard Napola’s scream for help. She saw
that Napola’s shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to be
burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the
fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at
eight-thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the
municipal building at eight o’clock.
The trial court held that Ural’s denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony
of Alberio. It observed that Ural’s alleged act of removing Napola’s burning
shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the
consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the
credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution witness
and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness.
It should be noted that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should
be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police investigation. The
crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal’s office. That might
explain why it was not immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness
of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc’s common-law wife, and
Policeman Matugas are compatible with the prosecution’s theory that Ural
burned Napola’s shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given
credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the
advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, chose to
believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole record, does
not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The
presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa
de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused). "Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran la relacion de
causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicas del
lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.);
ni las condiciones concomitantes (la falta de medicos para asistir al herido); ni
las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el ttanos, la pulmon! a, o la gangrena
sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal,
12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was
the cause of the cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where
during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp, which broke
and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the
course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim’s clothes caught fire,
resulting in burns from which he died, there was a sufficient causal relation
between the death and the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of
homicide (Williams v. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another
person, which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide,
and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper medical attendance
does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. v. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the
Escalona case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused
death had it been properly treated. The victim died sixty days after the infliction
of the wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be attributed to the
wounded man the person who inflicted the wound was responsible for the result
thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio)
(Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People v. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. v.
Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440). 3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public
position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated
Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he had
access to the cell where Napola was confined the prisoner was under his custody.
"The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private
citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by medieval
practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization.
While the law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it
must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual from the abuse of
the police." (U. S. v. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par.
3, Art. 13, Revised Penal code). It is manifest from the proven facts that
appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him
may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself
inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his
felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal
dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offset the generic aggravating,
circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for
murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court’s judgment, the same is affirmed with costs
against the Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Zaldivar and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs with the qualification set forth in the observation of
Justice Barredo.
Antonio, J., did not take part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of the deceased
to his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De la Serna, all of which were not
properly presented in evidence, hence it is preferable not to mention them in
order to avoid any suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors
other than evidence duly presented in court, I concur.
Endnotes:
________________________________________
1. Republic of the Philippines . . . .)
Province of Zamboanga del Sur . . . .)
Municipality of Pagadian
JOINT-AFFIDAVIT
WE, ERNESTO OGOC, married, and JUANITO DE LA CERNA, single, both
of legal age, farmers, residents of Lakewood, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur and
at Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, respectively, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law hereby depose and say:
That both of us were confined inside the municipal jail of Buug, Zamboanga
del Sur on July 31, 1966 for offenses allegedly committed by us and on same
date our companions inside the said jail were Anisio Siton and Felix Napola,
the latter being confined for being drunk;
That at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less on July 31, 1966, our
policeman guard by the name of Domingo Ural entered the jail and called for
Felix Napola. He called for him and told him that Felix Napola is aggressive.
When Felix Napola went near Domingo Ural, the latter boxed him at his lower
chin and he fell to the cement floor of the jail. He kicked him also at the same
spot after Felix Napola fell to the floor. Because Felix Napola cannot stand
anymore, Domingo Ural got a bottle and poured the contents of said bottle to
the dress of Felix Napola. Domingo Ural lighted a match and burned the spot
where the substance in the bottle was poured in the dress of Felix Napola. The
dress of Felix Napola got burned and Felix Napola got burned. He was forced
to stand up and asked mercy from Domingo Ural. Instead Domingo Ural locked
the jail and went out and Domingo Ural threatened us not to talk about the
burning of Felix Napola to anybody or else he will burn us also.
When Felix Napola was already suffering much from the burns he sustained,
Ural became frightened and he and Inesio Siton helped put out the fire.
Affiants further sayeth none.
(SGD.) Ernesto Ogoc (SGD.) Juanito de la Cerna
ERNESTO OGOC JUANITO DE LA CERNA
(Affiant) (Affiant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1966
hereat Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur.
(SGD.) Basilio T. Roque
BASILIO T. ROQUE
Special Counsel"
2. Mrs. Napola (Mapola) testified at the preliminary investigation conducted
by Basilio T. Roque, a special counsel, that she learned from a neighbor that
her husband suffered burns in the municipal jail in the evening of July 31,
1966. Her husband told her that Policeman Ural had burned him. Ural
allowed her to bring Napola to the dispensary where he was treated. Because
of the injuries on his mouth and his swollen gums, he could not eat and move
his head. He was confined in jail due to drunkenness. He was burned from
the waist up to the neck and on the back and right arm. She reported the case
to the mayor. That functionary said that he would not take any hand in the
case. Mrs. Napola was cross-examined by Ural’s counsel.
At the same preliminary investigation, the witnesses, Ernesto Ogoc and
Juanito de la Serna, testified and were cross-examined by Ural’s counsel.
The accused presented evidence at the preliminary investigation.
3. "Un sujeto, despues de cohabitar con una prostituta, encendio un mixto que
aplic" a uno de los latones de petroleo que habia proximos la cama en que
yacieron, inflam ndose el contenido de aqul y cayendo el liquido sobre la
prostituta, que falleci" a consequencia de las quemaduras.
El Tribunal Supremo declara:
Que segun el articulo 418 del Codigo penal, es reo de asesinato el que por
medio de incendio mata persona que no le est ligada por alguno de los
vinculos familiares señalados en el art. 417, entendindose empleado el
incendio en este concepto juridico cuando se mata" intenta matar por medio
de fuego aplicado directa" immediamente sobre la persona objeto de la
accion criminal, siempre que lo sea con riesgo de propagacion cosas
distintas, en cualquiera de las condiciones previstas en el capitulo 7., titulo
13 del libro 2. del Codigo penal; cuyo medio de ejecucion de aquel delito,
principal en la intencion del culpable estima la ley con el grave car cter que
atribuye tambin a la inundacion y al empleo del veneno, no solo por los
peligros que implica, sino igualmente por la notoria malicia, semejante la
alevosia, que revela la accion que para su xito no se detiene ante el respeto
de otros derechos que pone en inminente riesgo" quebranta y lesiona
impulso de decidida resolucion.
Que todas estas consideraciones aparecen manifiestas en el acto ejecutado
por el procesado, puesto que voluntariamente emple" el petroleo inflamado
para lesionar la interfecta, poniendo el fuego, que por su natural poder se
propag" al local en que se cometi" el delito, al servicio de su proposito
punible; constituyendo por esto el incendio, elemento integrante del delito
de asesinato, . . . ." (Sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1887, II Hidalgo,
Codigo Penal, 175).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003.]

KHOSROW MINUCHER, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and ARTHUR SCALZO, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was
filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed
a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the
house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited
drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by
private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the
principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge
Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account
of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking
made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be
the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He
came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974.
In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor
Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines.
When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff
became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the
Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the
Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was
brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an
informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other
hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer
for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini
movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the
introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying
caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and
paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets,
pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the
Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During
their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling
card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines,
as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of
Justice, of the United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila.
At the back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant’s own
handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to
obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas
Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of
$2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more concentrated on
politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see
plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter
for dinner at Mario’s Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of
caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandise but for the reason that the
defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant people to . . . place
the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave
him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was again
focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter’s residence
for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of
carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they
agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did not yet have the
money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The
following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he
gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back
again to plaintiff’s house and directly proceeded to the latter’s bedroom,
where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess.
Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it,
gave it to the defendant for the latter’s fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff’s
wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very
 soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can
introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without
putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the
defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete
surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered
gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6
Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the
street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made to sit
down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The
defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant’s attaché case,
he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They
also took plaintiff’s wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house
and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the
bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he
was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his
bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the
telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant,
but the defendant told him to ‘shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he
would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to
come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the
$24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which
he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a
pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his
release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a
painting he bought P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He
claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his
wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker . . . had been well publicized
throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia,
America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers
as an international drug trafficker. . . .
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only
in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places
informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp
Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days
without food and water." 1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special
appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending
a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and Department
of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27
October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on
the ground that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being
one in personam, was beyond the processes of the court. The motion was denied
by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo
of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint was a
voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which could likewise
be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion
for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension
of time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service
of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in
cases involving the United States government, as well as its agencies and
officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1)
for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the
defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would
be expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for
reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-
G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the
appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Scalzo then elevated the incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed
G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure
to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had
failed to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a)
declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer)
and (b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo
filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the
complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his
answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the
affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action in his
complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as
being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United
States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00
to answer for attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil
case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a
special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No.
414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11
June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true
and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this
Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., v. Hon.
Wenceslao Polo, Et Al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691
be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there
docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990.
On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining
the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint
against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R.
No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher v. the Honorable Court of Appeals,
Et. Al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate
court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered
on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss
of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the
issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint
contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed
acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and,
absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity
could not be taken up.
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November
1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim
by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following:
"‘Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory
damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million;
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney’s fees in the
sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
‘The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of
the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees
considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper
litigant." ‘2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence
presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it
ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained
of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that
he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty
and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving
State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-
fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment,
following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have
precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely
different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata,
would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a
judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and
causes of action. 3 Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 —
"whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private
respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" — is also a pivotal question raised
in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved
that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation —
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his
Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would
present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his
investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as
DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present
evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged
diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to
dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution
of the diplomatic immunity." 4 —

Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which
the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit,
describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement
Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the
Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the
U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine
narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial
court a number of documents —
1. Exh.’2’ — Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh.’1’ — Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11
June 1990;
3. Exh.’5’ — Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh.’6’ — Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh.’7’ — Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh.’3’ — 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser,
Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding
Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19
(the trial court);
7. Exh.’4’ — Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement
(Exh.’3’); and
8. Exh.’8’ — Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the
Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel
Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court. 5
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States
Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine
Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United
States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985
until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States Government
was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo
with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged
the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial
court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were
presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its
Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of
Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and
his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna
Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated
Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13"
consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent
arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration of
the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned
to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power
of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel 6 to show (a) that
the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo
to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission
from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10
August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law
enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the
mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug,
and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that
Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10
August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the United States
diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of
the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas
office of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide
criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement
agencies on narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host
country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host country and
counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex
criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which
affect the interests of the United States.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of
centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961,
its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece,
among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman
Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war
and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held
sacrosanct. 7 By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on
diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly
established as a rule of customary international law. 8 Traditionally, the exercise
of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state
himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state, he represented, and
the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of
the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic
presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic
mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the
diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of
the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. 9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, 10 (b) envoys, 11
ministers or internuncios accredited to the head of states; and (c) charges d’
affairs 12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. 13 Comprising the "staff
of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and
the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members
of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical
and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the
members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding
that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms
of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and
criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of
missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the
same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who
represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and
perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of
passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths,
do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges
accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the
duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick
in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant
Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by
the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the
diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press,
administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches
belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the
foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries
or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial,
agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a
chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main
function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their
respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries
or departments in the home government. 14 These officials are not generally
regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally
designated as having diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes
Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May
1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing
much to alleviate the Court’s initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the
basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note,
the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby
divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.
x x x
"And now, to the core issue — the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private
Respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by
the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that
it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17)
days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special
Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer
because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America
were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he
could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even
granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for
damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed.
x x x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to
him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving
claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. . . . . The public respondent
then should have sustained the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.
Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It
should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note
whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet
been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the
private respondent’s claim is arbitrary."
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November
1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the
records of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during
his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August
1988) was listed as an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission
and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the
Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for
the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the
executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization v. Aquino,
15
the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are
virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of
immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should
behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign
Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than
compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the
privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 16 The government of the United States itself,
which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition
of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede
diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title
and "performs duties of diplomatic nature." 17 Supplementary criteria for
accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States
which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the
intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-
immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic
functions on an essentially full-time basis. 18 Diplomatic missions are requested
to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently
applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign
each individual to the appropriate functional category. 19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it
was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug
activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be
ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions
when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy
could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-
standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit 20 and, with the emergence
of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state,
or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign
capacity. 21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government
done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of
the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a
state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he
is, under the maxim — par in parem, non habet imperium — that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. 22 The
implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as
the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him,
the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not
been formally impleaded. 23
In United States of America v. Guinto, 24 involving officers of the United States
Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
charged with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of
prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled —
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
. . . . It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the
complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued. . . . As they have acted on behalf of
the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government,
and not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts." 25
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf v. Court of
Appeals 26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau
of Telecommunications, Et Al., v. Aligaen, Et. Al. (33 SCRA 368): ‘Inasmuch
as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against
the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within
the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a
State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he
violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have,
is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State
may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
x x x the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or
in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction." 27
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives
of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement
of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve
officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory,
under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show
any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the
United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and
related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or
imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore
elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of
both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher
at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of
the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has
given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory
of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job
description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers
who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance
activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his
official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent
of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine
government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
_______________________________
1. Rollo, pp. 39–42.
2. Rollo, p. 51.
3. Linzag v. CA, 291 SCRA 304.
4. Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 242.
5. For documentary Exhibits Nos. 1–8, see Rollo, pp. 143–155.
6. For Documentary Exhibits Nos. 9–13, See Rollo, pp. 156–168.
7. Eileen Denza, "Diplomatic Law, A Commentary on the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations," 2nd Edition, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1998, at
210.
8. Ibid.
9. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention enumerates the functions of the
diplomatic mission as
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;
(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of
its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the
receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending
State;
 (e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the
receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific
relations.
10. Ambassadors are diplomatic agents of the first class, who deal, as a rule with
the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Secretary of State, as the case may be.
(Melquiades J. Gamboa, "Elements of Diplomatic and Consular Practice, A
Glossary," Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., 1966, p. 19.)
11. Envoys are diplomatic agents of the second class. This is the title of the head
of legation as distinguished from an embassy, the head of which is called
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Like the Ambassador, the
envoy is also accredited to the Head of State. (Gamboa, p. 190.)
12. Charges d’ Affairs are either en titre or ad interim. Charges d’ affairs en titre
are appointed on a permanent basis and belong to the fourth class of
diplomatic envoys, the other three being ambassadors, minister’s
plenipotentiary and envoys extraordinary, and minister’s resident. He is the
head of the legation in his own right and is not accredited to the head of
State but to the foreign office. According to Radloric, charges d’ affairs are
sometimes used to described a person who has been placed in custody of the
archives and other property of a mission in a country with which formal
diplomatic relations are not maintained. Charges d’ affairs ad interim, in
contrast are usually those second in command of the diplomatic mission —
minister, counselor or first secretary, who are only temporarily in charge of
the mission during the absence of the head of the mission. He is not
accredited either to the Head of State or the Foreign Office. (Gamboa, Ibid.,
pp. 51–52.)
13. The classification of diplomatic representatives was considered significant
before because direct communication with the head of state depended on the
rank of the diplomat and, moreover, only powerful states were regarded as
entitled to send envoys of the highest rank. At present however, diplomatic
matters are usually discussed not with the head of state but with the foreign
secretary regardless of the diplomat’s rank. Moreover, it has become the
practice now for even the smallest and the weakest states to send diplomatic
representatives of the highest rank, even to the major powers. (Cruz,
International Law, 1985 Edition, p. 145.)
14. Gamboa, supra, pp. 32–33.
15. 48 SCRA 242.
16. J.L. Brierly, "The Law of Nations," Oxford University Press, 6th Edition,
1963, p. 244.
17. Denza, supra, at 16.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., at 55.
20. Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law," Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
New York, 1948, pp. 307–308.
21. The international law on sovereign immunity of states from suit in the courts
of another state has evolved from national court decisions with good deal of
variance in perspectives. Even though national cases have been the major
source of pronouncements on sovereign immunity, it should be noted that
these constitute evidence of customary international law now widely
recognized. In the latter half of the 20th century, a great deal of consensus
on what is covered by sovereign immunity appears to be emerging, i.e., that
state immunity covers only acts which deal with the government functions
of a state, and excludes, any of its commercial activities, or activities not
related to "sovereign acts." The consensus involves a more defined
differentiation between public acts (juri imperii) and private acts (jure
gestionis). (Gary L. Maris, "International Law, An Introduction," University
Press of America, 1984, p. 119; D.W. Grieg, "International Law," London
Butterworths, 1970, p. 221.)
22. The United States for example, does not claim immunity for its publicly
owned or operated merchant vessels. The Italian courts have rejected claims
of immunity from the US Shipping Board, although a state body, as it could
not be identified with the American government on the ground that
undertaking maritime navigation and business as a commercial enterprise
do not constitute a sovereign act. (D.W. Grieg, "International Law," London
Butterworths, 1970, p. 221.)
23. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812), cited in
Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law," New York, 3rd Edition (1948), p.
307.
24. United States of America, Et. Al. v. Guinto, etc., Et Al., G.R. No. 76607, 26
February 1990.
25. 182 SCRA 644.
26. At pp. 653–659.
27. 191 SCRA 713.
28. At pp. 727–728.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993]
ALBINO S. CO, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel - and in
payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated
- petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a
check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30,
1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984.
It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank
being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by
the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being
sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify
the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the
theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as
basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987
by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 - i.e., that a check issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or
"bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently
provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or
secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the
drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg.
22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June
19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo,
October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A.
Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida
Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on
August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) - almost one (1) year after Albino Co
had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December
15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation
in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e.
that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or
guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having
interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute,
but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings
Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after
this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an
arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a
valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction.
Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that
the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April
3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this
Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated
September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment
thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its
comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of
Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in
the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February
14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court
resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the
Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal
. . .5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been
applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June
30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans,
does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado
v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as
amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts’ jurisdiction
over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of
a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9
and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have
no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a
person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the
alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official
Gazette; Baltazar v.C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to
P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil,
and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farm-
holdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D.
No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 which
removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot
be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old
Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive
effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should
have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings
and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12,
1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a
taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-
0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168,
where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be
given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee
whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which,
"although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down
by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our
decision in People v. Mapa, 7reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on
the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of
the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a
law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement
of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of
the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true
that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied
on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205
SCRA 515, 527-528: 8
We sustain the petitioners' position, it is undisputed that the subject lot was
mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest
bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on
September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141
as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The
petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these
decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they
are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in
the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or
impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs.
Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to
decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal,
55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions
is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to
its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24,
1985 - which declared "that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect," and as regards which
declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance
on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." - the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this
Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County,
118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect
of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle
of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 - concerning the effects of
the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which
continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmeña,
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary
obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in
Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." - the Court made
substantially the same observations, to wit: 11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance
likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights
or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the
fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes a mere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act
contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may
not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have
been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so, as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions,
what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to
what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior
to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely
to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308
US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila
Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is
the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva
and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer
v. Military Commission No 34, 12 - declaring invalid criminal proceedings
conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in
the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons - this Court, in Tan vs.
Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in
principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still
ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there
should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before
the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not
be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted
person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a
retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible,
the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account
of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
x x x
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military
tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-
1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in
the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be
ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity
of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now
prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court
rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question
arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order
wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People,
154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 - should
not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go
Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita,
the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry
being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially
different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official
issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the
special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the
defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal
advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the
other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private
lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the
Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are
entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private
individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or
statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very
nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their
violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent
Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go
Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary
construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the
Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution
against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing
Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-
Pacific Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were apportioned chiefly between
FGU Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively
contributed P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.
2. Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".
3. The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration,
promulgated by the Special Former Second Division of the Court on September 21,
1987, written for the division by Paras, J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez,
Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of
approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now
settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."
4. Emphasis supplied.
5. Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired
Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol.
1, pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if
; after not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power :
e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al.
v. Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for
first time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen
v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).
6. 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal
possession of firearms, and both holding that appointment by the Provincial
Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential
agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who under
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.
7. SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.
8. The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported
in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et
al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].
9. 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.
10. And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the
decision.
11. SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987)
(Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question
arose as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order creating a
municipality wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v.
Barrios, 190 SCRA 686 (1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991);
Union of Filipino Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil
Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425.
12. 150 SCRA 144 (1987).
13. SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991; and
Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].
14. SEE footnote 3, supra.
15. Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall expose,
or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner, emblem, or
device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or
identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .
16. 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.
17. Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
H. N. BULL, Defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
DECISION
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the
judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper
assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the
trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act
No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the
evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the
said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known
as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in
carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign
port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull,
while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of
December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly
carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven
(677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master,
as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in
transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper
manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by
means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to
be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being
tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for
securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals
were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that -
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance
of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage
from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such
animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in
every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time
of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding
to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle
or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported,
without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load
or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by
means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that –
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who
knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one,
shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less than one
hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, United States money,
 for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court
of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in
which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does
not state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were
disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel
registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which
such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act
No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the
Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the
courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands
on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.)
This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province
into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed
shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon
a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the
Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law. But
the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have
then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the
neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time
the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the
Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the
high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance
to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils,
Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew
were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through
the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial
waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her
voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the
court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed
while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated
at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element
necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters.
The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person
of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether
that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every.
Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a
friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of
a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly
powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such
waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794,
Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered
opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign
ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which
he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by
Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as
1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch
(U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under
which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as
"containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose
territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the
Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the privilege of
exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of
nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the
principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int.
Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go
freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the
laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and
convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that
such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are
essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and
convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and
practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquility of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the
court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant
vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils,
Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338,
339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.)
Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right,
although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's
ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider
exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local
jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that -
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of
merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state, they
become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the
country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant
vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities,
unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty
arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys.
Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory,
Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of
the Exchange, said that –
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously
in convenient and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to
continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade,
subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they
remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty.
(U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by
article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and
Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul,
vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and
arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of
the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge,
without the interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews
or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquility of the country." (Comp.
of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies
between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee,
168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquility of the country are affected by many
events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus, an
assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of
which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty
withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a
"quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were
prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney
was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the
proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with
the view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876;
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature
as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the
mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of
Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship
while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the
treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made
through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr.
Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and
Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration
in connection with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions
of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and
Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of that
article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is
conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of
a civil nature growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but
also as to disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence
involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such
broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to
be limited to their right to sit as judges or arbitrators in such differences as may
arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not
involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the order or
tranquility of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local
magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel,
involving the disturbance of the order or tranquility of the country, it is
competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of
the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a
public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego.
In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities
whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to
determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and
tranquility, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the
conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as
may be defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore,
Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew
against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquility of the
country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un to
hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or tranquility of the
country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to do with
any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master
of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of
the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law,
are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense
charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege
that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it
is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold
with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the
complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the
animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a
reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon
the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their
disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional
element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege
that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully
includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully'
carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the
act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will
consented to, designed, and directed the act." So, in Wong vs. City of Astoria
(13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show,
in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act
complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's
counsel - that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning.
To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design - done for a certain
purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly'
done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems
to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but
his defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system
of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more
secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that
what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3,
it is only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a
crime or public offense in ordinary and concise language, without repetition. It
need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form
as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and
the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which
complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel
the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit,
so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The
allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect
and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals
were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks
and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information
does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means.
The words used are " medios suficientes" and " medios adecuados." In view of
the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words " adecuado," " suficiente," and
" conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we determine this
point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was
not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55
and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally
erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The
statute penalizes acts and omissions incidental to the transportation of
livestock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and
had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by
the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United
States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is
controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States
of the Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement
of the principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature
and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity
of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war
and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by
conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to
guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its
government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in
express terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting territory and other property belonging
to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the
territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the
Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It
may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government,
and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.
(Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress
has provided such governments for territories which were within the Union, and
for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary
to organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive,
legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general
conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. The
organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which
had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation
enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the
requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.),
129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated
that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for
the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action
of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power
has been exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States.
The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be
seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.
S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within
such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution
into contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many
people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.)
In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited
only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its
power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary.
(De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244;
Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the
United States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to
the acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised
Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States
which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all
the organized territories, and in every Territory, hereafter organized, as
elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized a civil
government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the
Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of
1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the
United States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative
authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above
state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13,
1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control,
disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the
American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within
the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on
August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty
of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the
President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender
of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the
suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace
the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to
the United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the
treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the
military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress
took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however,
had its legal justification, like the purely military government which it gradually
superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he
chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 –
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation
includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently
happens that in a single order of a military commander can be found the
exercise of all three of these different powers - the exercise of the legislative
powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the
rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as
rapidly as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of
civil government was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which
civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the
authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the
military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in
its character" was transferred from the military government to the Commission,
to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the
Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus
conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules
and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs
duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the
Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil
service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and
establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other matters
of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by
rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the
Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of
individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to
be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent
with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the
declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put
twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder
or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the
Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901,
provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the
Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in
such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President
of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and
for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901,
the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor,
was transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the
authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the
President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the
situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of
April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substantial changes in the form of government
which the President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in
operation, and approved the action of the President in organizing the
government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the
legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law,
Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution,
but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals
which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in
creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the
office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly
approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a
tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and
approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until
otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as
thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all statutes
should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of
the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission
in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to
be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses - the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was
thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory
not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although
its form and organization somewhat resemble that of both. It stands outside of
the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the
Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the
Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of
the United States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving
power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and
the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders
of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed
control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed
will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency
which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress,
and when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines
the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete
governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments
exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The
separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal
nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract
statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate
exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation
through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise much
control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive
department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine
Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress
framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and
which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and
the protection of individual rights and privileges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the
general constitutional doctrine which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it
the Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as
Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the
national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under
written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as
well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions,
it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the
United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that
government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights
under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity
of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State
court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises
such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution
of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been
granted to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter
subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether
the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied
authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or
State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the
legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been
covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some
provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general
terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to
legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that
Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however,
should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully
informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April
16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation
by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for
purposes of construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded
as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was
unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority.
To relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details,
it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the new government,
subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the
power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided
"that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul
the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not
suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws
of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands
until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether
the Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section
3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the
States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by
virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may
regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or
indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this
respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has
expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs
of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress,
but its general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to
the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with
its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation
of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress
took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275
after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military
government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power,
whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between
foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How.
(U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by
Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore
satisfied that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full
constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between
foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as
amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the
meaning of the Act cannot be left to the judgment of the master of the
ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the
evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and
disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came
from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by
the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle support for the feet and
steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six months or without stalls or any other protection for them individually can safely
thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds
transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling
and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands. or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic
and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master manner found in this case.
and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said
ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and
directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; costs. The sentence and judgment are affirmed.
and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three
others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said SO ORDERED.
cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid
danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle
were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into
the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being
made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to
maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such
transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle

abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of
Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions
between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and
cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of
that in case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such
cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching and falling,
individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and
hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this case.
Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and
experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the
Government, and stated positively that since the introduction in the
ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the
transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever
during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own
behalf, that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle
loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not
maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It cannot be urged
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES
and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales,
Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio
Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of
P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44,
landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a
notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their
appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals,
however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew
their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole
before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal
of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone
appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision
of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People
vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for review. 6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja,
the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from
his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed
Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus
would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the
knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with
blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the
police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed,
Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-
station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same
night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the
Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay
Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay,
while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's
residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8
There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an
underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for
about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and
started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10
The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene
of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other
hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the
police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion
arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company
stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident,
were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno
continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken.
The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for
autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m.
on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the following
findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built
and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower
3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary
pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right,
posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length
with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right,
with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of
the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of
the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right
nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the
thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of
the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right
thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the
8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit
directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the
left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior
aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial
aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion
of large intestine and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the
shoulder, right, directed downward to the apex of the light thoracic
cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial
portion of the medial border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior
aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior
portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the
skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine,
thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED,
STABBED (sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five
(5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs
and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before
the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to
Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having
been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be
taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already
detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police
force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26,
1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and
AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused with four other companions whose identities are still
unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with treachery
 and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to
kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and number, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack,
hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said
accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by
autopsy report attached to the record of this case which multifarious wounds
caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
Contrary to law.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea
of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have
witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie
Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify
for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the
Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales,
and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health
physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador
Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas
Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara,
Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the
deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it
was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim
suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7)
stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his
testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might
have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim,
nevertheless opined that due to the number and different characteristics of the
wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The
police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie
Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death
of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events
surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him,
the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness
account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he
testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21,
1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was
employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a
short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house
at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity
prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he
was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon
and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a
"linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as
the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after
the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his
body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated
some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on
his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother
and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did not
immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his
life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident
he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father
was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a
tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada.
Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in
Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada
lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor
as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the
crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he
was asleep 30 in his house which was located some one kilometer away from the
scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came
to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to
his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony
of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant,
contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the
testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating
his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding
Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein
accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27,
1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the
assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering that
Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say
who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because
the assailant was moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that
Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-
51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural
reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.
As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country
to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be
involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been
judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self-admitted that he had known
Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and
had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that
he could not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34)
Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of
alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the
trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-
appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the impossible penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the Supreme Court.
With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be
reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court.
(E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio,
128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court
of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the
same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much
to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn
statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21,
1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While
indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative
to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity.
This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are
two versions preferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood
stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is
more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood
stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And
this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted
rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that
the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood
stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other
authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto
Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the
reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just
so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon
likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other
persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point,
P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an
investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal complaint 38 four other
unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have
conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen
wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed
instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument
might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy
report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible
for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive
testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out
of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the
significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the
lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of
Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the
appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while
he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20
meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he
recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then
illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took
about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not
determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what
particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q: And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the
stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by you?
A: Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q: If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable
Court who was hacking the victim?
A: Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant
movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A: The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only
saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine
who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the
stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q: You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd
Peñacerrada?
A: Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q: And likewise, you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the
stabbing?
A: Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q: I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons
used because according to you it was just flashing?
A: Yes, sir. 39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific
act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court
and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of
the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the
evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under
paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
 paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the
appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court
of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the
commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or
omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised
Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means
of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found,
that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed
by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending
to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this instance, there must
therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have
inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he
did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus, this principal
witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or
"stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was
performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall
short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously
discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal
wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there
are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six
accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as
well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the
hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after
all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of
the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is
possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused
could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three,
or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable,
that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have
been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and
honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the
appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the
fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily
the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime
he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
credibility, 41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged
eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it
should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long
delay in revealing what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily
explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is
too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible
 retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify we cannot help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the
considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who least.
were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the
the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful - it is contrary to our
he testified. customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging
parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused
the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or
he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing
victim was also his landlord. of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And
considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the
x x x scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for
Q: Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing
about what happened to her husband? of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances,
A: At first, I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by like in the instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond
my conscience and secondly the victim was also my landlord, I revealed what cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with
I saw to the wife of the victim. 46 disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on
x x x record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis ours.) WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic
set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, SO ORDERED.
from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu,
tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance,
volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness and providing that
material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family
of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of
Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria
sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased
landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces
of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he
ceased to be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services
would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite
sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and
presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective
wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and
provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances,

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-27031. May 31, 1974.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, v. LORETO
RENEGADO y SEÑORA, Accused-Appellant.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio
A. Torres and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-Diy for Plaintiff-appellee.
Roberto C. Alip (Counsel de Oficio) for Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
On September 4, 1966, Mamerto de Lira, a teacher of the Tiburcio Tancinco
Memorial Vocational School," died at the Calbayog City General Hospital from
a stab wound inflicted upon him a few days before, more particularly, on August
29, within the premises of the school by Loreto Renegado, an employee of the
same institution. As a result, the City Fiscal of Calbayog City filed with the local
Court of First Instance an Information against Loreto Renegado for "Murder
with assault upon a person in authority," which, as amended, reads:
"That on or about the 29th day of August, 1966, at about 9.30 A.M., in
Calbayog City, Philippines, and within the premises of the Tiburcio
Tancinco Vocational School and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court; the above-named accused armed with a sharp-pointed double bladed
weapon, with decided intent to kill, with assault upon a person in authority;
the deceased being at the time a public school teacher of the Tiburcio
Vocational School and therefore a person in authority; and at the time was
in the lawful performance of his duties as such or on the occasion of such
performance and, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with his
weapon Mamerto de Lira, who, as a result thereof, sustained stab wound on
his abdomen which caused his death." (p. 11, original record)
The Hon. Jesus N. Borromeo who conducted the trial of the case found the
accused guilty as charged and pursuant to Articles 148 and 248 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 48 thereof, sentenced him to "suffer the
supreme penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mamerto de
Lira in the amount of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs." (p. 94, ibid) The case is
now before Us on automatic review.
We find the following facts duly established by the evidence of the prosecution:
The Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School is run by the-national
government in the City of Calbayog, and for the school year 1966-67 its
principal was Mr. Bartolome B. Calbes, and in his absence, Mr. Felix U.
Tingzon was authorized to act as officer-in-charge (Exhibit E). The
deceased Mamerto de Lira was a classroom teacher of mathematics in said
school with dally classes from Monday to Friday, starting at 7:10 o’clock in
the morning till about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon with vacant periods in-
between (Exhibit D) while accused-appellant, Loreto Renegado, was a clerk
in the same institution whose duties included the following:
1. To type correspondence, memorandum circulars of the Heard of the
school.
2. To help type test questions of teachers for every periodical test.
3. To help type reports of the schools.
4. To help type handout of the teachers.
5. To file and account records of the school.
6. To mail some reports, prepared form like Form 137 and mail it, etc."
(Exhibit F)
A periodical test was scheduled on September 2, 1966, and the teachers were
instructed to submit their questions for approval and cutting of the stencil for
mimeographing purposes by August 25 and 26. 1
At about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, 1966, appellant
Renegado was in the school canteen and other persons present at the time were
teachers Natividad Boco, Mrs. Alviola, and Mrs. Benita Tan, and some students.
On that occasion Lira entered the canteen and seeing Renegado he requested the
latter to type the stencil of his test questions for the examination set for
September 2. Renegado answered that he had much work in the principal’s
office and that typing test questions was not among his duties. Lira reminded
Renegado of the instructions of the principal that he could be asked by the
teachers to type their test questions especially if the teacher concerned had no
knowledge of typing, and Lira finished his remark stating: "you can finish your
work if you only will sit down and work." At this remark, Renegado became
angry and as he stepped out of the canteen, he boxed with his fist a cabinet which
belonged to Mrs. Alviola. Seeing the hostile attitude of Renegado, Lira followed
the latter outside of the canteen and asked Renegado if he was challenging him.
Renegado did not answer but quickly left the place. 2
On his way out of the school premises, later that afternoon, Renegado passed by
the guardhouse where he met security guard, Primitivo Velasco, and Renegado
told the latter: "Friend, I will be sad if I could not kill somebody," and having
learned about the altercation between Renegado and Lira, Velasco placed his
arm around the shoulder of Renegado and pacified him with these words:
"Loreto, do not do that because that is a little trouble, you might be able to kill
someone and you will be separated from your family." 3 Also on that afternoon
before leaving the school, Renegado met Basilio Ramirez, another employee, to
whom he recounted his altercation with Lira and ended up saying: "I am going
to kill him." Basilio Ramirez, however, advised Renegado: "Padi, do not take
that to the extent because to kill a person is not good, think of your family, you
have many children." 4
In the evening of that Friday, August 26, there was a dance at the school
premises and on that occasion Renegado was seen cycling around the school
several times, 5 and Renegado inquired from security guard, Nicomedes Leonor,
if Lira was at the dance. Leonor informed Renegado that the teacher was not
around and at the same time advised Renegado thus: "Choy, do not attend to that
small trouble and we have families. Have patience because we have families." 6
Another teacher, Arturo Querubin, likewise saw Renegado that evening acting
in a suspicious manner and sensing the state of mind of Renegado because of
the incident which happened earlier in the afternoon, Querubin approached
Renegado, advised him to "calm his temper," and told him "remember, you have
plenty of children, please be calm." 7
Came Monday morning, August 29, and at around 9:00 o’clock, Erlinda Rojo,
a bookkeeper in the school, met accused Renegado in the office of the principal.
Renegado inquired from Erlinda about his salary loan, and during their
conversation, the school janitor called the attention of the two to some boys
quarelling near the school’s shop building and Renegado remarked: "stab him”;
to those words Erlinda replied: "That is the case with you. Your intention is to
stab. If that is your attitude, there will be nobody left on earth, they will all die,"
to which Renegado countered: "So that the bad persons will be taken away and
eliminated," and after that exchange of remarks Renegado left the room. 8
That same morning, past 9:00 o’clock, which was his vacant period, Lira went
to the school canteen, seated himself at the counter, and ordered a bottle of
"Pepsi cola" from the girls who were then serving, namely, Venecia Icayan and
Lolita Francisco. At about 9:30 while Lira was drinking his "Pepsi cola",
Renegado entered the canteen and seeing Lira with his back towards him, he
immediately and without warning stabbed Lira with a knife hitting the latter on
the right lumbar region. The wounded Lira turned around holding his abdomen
and raised a chair to ward off his assailant who was poised to stab him for the
second time. Renegado tried to reach Lira but he was blocked by Mrs. Tan who
shouted "Stop it, Loreto, don’t anymore." Because of the intervention of Mrs.
Tan and the screaming of the girls inside the canteen, Renegado desisted from
continuing with his attack and left the canteen. 9 During that incident, Felix
Tingzon was also in the canteen having a snack with a guest and although he did
not actually see the very act of stabbing, he saw however that when Renegado
entered the canteen Lira was beside the counter and had his back towards
appellant Renegado. 9
Lira was brought to the Calbayog City General Hospital and was attended by
Dr. Erlinda Ortiz who performed an operation on him. Dr. Ortiz found that the
weapon of the assailant entered through the right lumbar region of the victim
and penetrated the right lower lobe of the liver. Notwithstanding the medical
attention given to Lira, the latter died on September 4,1966, from "hepatic
insufficiency" caused by the stab wound which perforated the right lower lobe
of the liver resulting in internal hemorrhage. 10
Appellant Renegado asks Us not to believe the above-given narration of the
witnesses for the prosecution and submits instead his own version of the incident
as follows:
At about 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, he was in the
school canteen for a snack and on that occasion Lira arrived and approached
him with a bunch of papers and told him to type the stencil of his test
questions; he answered that he could not do the work because he was busy
in the principal’s-office; Lira got mad and pointing his finger at him said:
"The question with you is that the work that you can do in a day you finish
it in to many days, because you stroll only in the office and keep on
sleeping" ; scared by the aggressive mood of Lira, he went out of the
canteen, but Lira followed him and, overtaking him near the door, boxed
him on his stomach; he told Lira that he was not fighting back, however,
Lira angrily shook his fingers at him and said: "don’t show yourself to me,
I will kill you with maltreatment" ; he proceeded to the office of the principal
and informed the latter about the incident but the principal advised him not
to mind Mr. Lira and to go ahead with his work; later, in the afternoon, he
went home; the following morning Saturday, he was in his house repairing
the "pantao" or wash stand and on that occasion spouses Lourdes and Feling
Renegado came to the house and they talked about the incident between him
 and Lira; Lourdes Renegado suggested the filing of a complaint against Lira
but he replied he was not taking the matter seriously and, at any rate, he was
resigning from his job; on Monday, August 29, at about 7:30 o’clock in the
morning he went to his work in the school as usual; upon reaching the
school, he proceeded to the room of Miss-Rojo to get some papers on which
he was working, and then he returned to his room; at about 9:30, he went to
the canteen for a snack and on the way, he was "singing, whistling, and
tossing a coin in his hand" ; before reaching the canteen, he saw Lira and
Manuel Cordove conversing and when the two parted, Lira went to his
room; upon reaching the canteen, he went to the counter (see Exhibits 3 and
3-A), and while he was there standing, Lira arrived, stood beside him,
elbowed him, and said in a loud voice: "Ano ka?" ; he turned around to face
Lira and the latter banged on the counter the folders he (Lira) was carrying;
Lira then placed his right hand inside his pocket, pulled with the other hand
a chair and pushed it at him; he became confused and remembered that on
Friday afternoon Lira threatened to kill him if he (Lira) would meet him
again; after a while he saw Mrs. Tan standing before him and heard her say:
"Loreto, don’t do that" ; upon hearing those words, "he regained his senses"
and only then did he realize that he had wounded Lira; he became panicky,
left the canteen, proceeded home, and informed his wife that he had
wounded a person; he then called for a tricycle, looked for a policeman, and
surrendered to the latter. 11
To corroborate his testimony that in the morning of the stabbing incident he was
ahead of Lira in the school canteen, appellant called to the witness stand Manuel
Cordove who declared that on Monday morning after he and Lira had conversed
and parted, Lira proceeded to his (Lira’s) office while he went to his own room
and on the way he passed by Renegado who was then standing by the door of
the canteen and greeted him; after a short while he heard shouts from the canteen
and he learned that Renegado had stabbed Lira 12 Another witness, Lourdes
Renegado, testified on the conversation between her and her brother-in-law, the
herein appellant, on Saturday morning, and she tried to impress the court that
appellant Renegado had dismissed from his mind his altercation with Lira and
as a matter of fact on the following day, Sunday, she met Renegado who had
just come from church and was on his way to attend a cockfight. 13 Appellant’s
wife, Elena de Guia, also took the witness stand and declared inter alia that when
her husband returned home on Friday afternoon and narrated to her the
occurrence at the canteen she suggested that a complaint be filed against Lira
but her husband said: "never mind" ; in the evening of that same day, Friday,
her husband invited her to go with him to the school dance, however, she
excused herself because of the children; on Monday morning, August 29, her
husband reported for work at the school as usual and before leaving the house
he told her that he was returning about 9:00 o’clock for his "merienda" ; her
husband returned later in the morning only to tell her that he had stabbed
someone; upon hearing the news she cried out: "Oh my God what have you done
to us?", and he replied: "I would not have done that had he not bullied me, he
purposely did it to me, that is why I was hurt." ; after that, her husband left the
house to surrender to the police. 14
On the basis of the testimony of appellant, his counsel-de-oficio, Atty. Roberto
C. Alip, in his well-written brief pleads for an acquittal with the argument that
accused should be exempt from criminal liability "because at the precise time
that the prosecution claims de Lira was stabbed, Accused lost his senses and he
simply did not know what he was doing." 15 To bolster his argument on the
mental condition of appellant, defense counsel directs Our attention to that
portion of the evidence showing that sometime in June of 1950 Renegado was
"clubbed" on the forehead by Antonio Redema and was treated by Dr. J.P.
Rosales for head injuries (Exh. 4-A), and as a result of that incident Redema was
charged with and convicted of "frustrated murder" in the Court of First Instance
of Samar on July 21, 1950; 16 that the head injury of appellant produced "ill-
effects" because since that particular occurrence appellant would have fits of
violent temper such as maltreating his wife and children for no reason at all, and
for which he would ask forgiveness from his wife because "he lost his head." 17
For purposes of disposing of appellant’s defense it becomes necessary to restate
certain basic principles in criminal law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for
a felony committed by him; 18 that a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso) is
presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is with freedom,
intelligence, and malice 19 because the moral and legal presumption is that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the
absence of evidence to the contrary; 20 that one of the causes which will
overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in
which event the actor is exempt from criminal liability-as provided for in Article
12, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 21 The onus
probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance
and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 22
Applying the foregoing basic principles to the herein appellant, his defense
perforce must fail.
By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment he was
unaware or unconscious of what he was doing, that he "regained his senses"
when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan telling him: "Loreto, don’t do that," and
only then did he realize that he had wounded Lira. That, to Us, is incredible. For
it is most unusual for appellant’s mind which was in a perfect normal state on
Monday morning, August 29, to suddenly turn blank at that particular moment
when he stabbed Lira. Appellant himself testified that he was acting very sanely
that Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he went to the canteen in a jovial
mood "singing, whistling, and tossing a coin in his hand" ; he saw the persons
inside the canteen namely Venecia Icayan, Lolita Francisco, Benita Tan, Felipe
Tingzon and a guest of the latter (all of whom, except the last one, testified for
the prosecution); he noticed the arrival of Lira who banged his folders on the
table, elbowed him, and said in a loud voice: "ano ka" ; he saw Lira put his right
hand inside his pocket and with the other hand push a chair towards him; he
became "confused" because he remembered that Lira threatened to kill him if he
would see him again; at this point he "lost his senses" and regained it when he
heard the voice of Mrs. Tan saying: "Loreto, don’t do that", and he then found
out that he had wounded Lira. If appellant was able to recall all those incidents,
We cannot understand why his memory stood still at that very crucial moment
when he stabbed Lira to return at the snap of a finger as it were, after he
accomplished the act of stabbing his victim. His is not a diseased mind, for there
is no evidence whatsoever, expert or otherwise, to show that he is suffering from
insanity or from any other mental sickness which impaired his memory or his
will. The evidence shows and the trial court did find that appellant is a perfectly
normal being, and that being the case, the presumption is that his normal state
of mind on that Monday morning continued and remained throughout the entire
incident.
The testimony of appellant’s wife, Elena, that her husband at times manifests
unusual behavior, exempli gratia: lashing at his children if the latter refuses to
play with him, tearing off the mosquito net if not properly tied, "executing a
judo" on her person, boxing her, and so on and so forth, is not the evidence
needed to prove a state of insanity. At most such testimony shows that appellant
Renegado is a man of violent temper who can be easily provoked to violence for
no valid reason at all. Thus in People v. Cruz, this Court held that breaking
glasses and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an explosive temper
and do not constitute clear and satisfactory proof of insanity; they are indications
of the passionate nature of the accused, his tendency to violent fits when angry,
and inasmuch as the accused was not deprived of the consciousness of his acts
but was simply obfuscated by the refusal of his wife to live with him, his
conviction for parricide was proper. 23
Very relevant to the case now before Us in U.S. v. Ramon Hontiveros Carmona,
18 Phil. 62, where the appellant was accused of serious. physical injuries
committed on his wife, mother-in-law, and sisters-in-law. The accused
Hontiveros pleaded insanity as a defense, and claimed that immediately before
the incident he had intermittent fever at intervals of a few hours during which
he lost consciousness and after he regained consciousness he found himself
outside of the house and heard voices commanding him to surrender his weapon,
and he came to know that he had wounded his wife, his mother-in-law and
sisters-in-law. The Court sustained the conviction of the accused holding.
"In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became
demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it
is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to
conclude that he acted unconsciously in order to relieve him from
responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his
insanity and absence of will are proven. Acts penalized by law are always
considered to be voluntary, unless the contrary be shown, and by this rule
of law Ramon Hontiveros, by inflicting upon the offended parties the
respective wounds, is considered to have been in a normal, healthy, mental
condition, and no weight can he given to the defendant’s allegation of
insanity and lack of reason, which would constitute an exceptional
condition; nor, for lack of evidence, can his state of mind be deemed to have
been abnormal." (p. 65, emphasis Ours)
The next point raised by the defense is that the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution comes from "biased, partial, and highly questionable sources," and
is not to be believed. 23
Appellant claims that it is highly improbable for a person who intends to kill
someone to reveal his plan to others such as what the prosecution witnesses
Velasco and Ramirez testified that Renegado told them on Friday afternoon that
he was going to kill Lira. It may be true that ordinarily one would keep to one’s
self such a hideous plot, but the workings of the human mind are at times
mysteriously incomprehensible, and to a man like the herein appellant who is
pictured by his own evidence to be one of violent disposition, it was natural for
him to blurt out his outraged feelings and his evil design to his two co-employees
in the school because the incident with Lira was still fresh in his mind at the
time.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution witnesses are biased and partial.
We find that contention unjustified. The mere fact that the witnesses of the
People were employees, students, and teachers in the school is no reason to
consider their declarations biased in the absence of satisfactory proof that any
of them had personal motives of his own either to favor the deceased or prejudice
the herein appellant. In assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
the trial judge found no sufficient evidence proving hostility towards the herein
appellant or any notable relationship of friendship with the deceased, and We
see no valid reason for discrediting His Honor’s findings in this regard. Time
and again this Tribunal has stated that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed for the trial judge is in a better
position to appreciate the same, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their behavior and manner of testifying during the trial, unless
there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case; in the case at bar, there is no such showing. 24 The
rule is so, because as rightly said, the opportunity to observe the demeanor and
appearance of witnesses in many instances is the very touchstone of credibility. 25
As a last issue, appellant claims that the court a quo erred in holding the
appellant guilty of "murder with assault upon a person in authority." 26
The zeal of appellant’s counsel-de-oficio in pursuing all possible lines of
defense so as to secure the acquittal of his client or at least to minimize his
liability is truly laudable. However, predicated on the credible and impartial
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses the judgment of the trial court finding
the accused guilty as charged is to be sustained for the following reasons:
First, the killing of Mamerto de Lira is qualified by evident premeditation.
The circumstance of evident premeditation is present because on that very
Friday afternoon immediately after the incident at the canteen appellant
Renegado, giving vent to his anger, told his co-employee, Ramirez, and the
security guard, Velasco, that he was going to kill Lira. That state of mind of
appellant was evident once more when he went to the school dance that same
Friday evening and was seen cycling around the school premises several
times, and he asked another security guard, Nicomedes Leonor, if Lira was
at the dance. On the following day, Saturday, appellant met Mrs. Benita Tan
to whom he confided that had he seen Lira the night before he would surely
have killed him. And on Monday morning, knowing the time of Lira for a
snack (tsn, Nov. 17, 1966, p. 307), appellant armed himself with a knife or
some bladed weapon which by his own admission on cross-examination was
his and which he used for "cutting bond paper" (tsn. ibid, p. 299), proceeded
to the canteen at around 9:30 o’clock, and seeing the teacher Lira with his
back towards him, without much ado, stabbed Lira from behind hitting the
victim on the right lumbar region. Appellant’s attempt to show that he does
not remember how the weapon reached the canteen is of course futile,
preposterous as it is. (tsn. ibid, pp. 299-300) There is no doubt that the act
of appellant in bringing with him his knife to the canteen on Monday
morning was the culmination of his plan to avenge himself on Lira for the
remark made by the latter on Friday afternoon. Evident premeditation exists
when sufficient time had elapsed for the actor to reflect and allow his
conscience to overcome his resolution to kill but he persisted in his plan and
carried it into effect. 27 Here, appellant Renegado had more or less sixty-
four hours from the Friday incident up to 9:30 o’clock of Monday morning
within which to ponder over his plan and listen to the advice of his co-
employees and of his own conscience, and such length of time was more
than sufficient for him to reflect on his intended revenge.
Second, treachery attended the killing of Lira because the latter, who was
unarmed, was stabbed from behind, was totally unaware of the coming
attack, and was not in a position to defend himself against it. There is
treachery where the victim who was not armed was never in a position to
defend himself or offer resistance, nor to present risk or danger to the
accused when assaulted. 28
Third, the killing of Lira is complexed with assault upon a person in
authority. A teacher either of a public or of a duly recognized private school
is a person in authority under Art. 152 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 578. 29
The defense claims, however, that while it is true that Mamerto de Lira was at
the time of his death a teacher of the Tiburcio Memorial Vocational School run
by the national government, he was not stabbed while in the performance of his
duties nor on the occasion of such performance. According to the defense
counsel, the motive of the assault is important to determine whether or not the
assault falls under Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code; 30 in the instant case it is
clear that the underlying motive for the assault was not that Renegado was asked
to type the test questions of the teacher Lira but that the latter made insulting
and slanderous remarks to the herein appellant. This contention of the defense
is incorrect. The assault or attack on Lira was committed on the occasion of the
performance of the duties of the latter as a teacher because: as narrated in the
early part of this Decision, Lira was scheduled to give a periodical test on
September 2, 1966, and was required to submit his. test questions for approval
and mimeographing by August 25 and 26; Lira asked appellant Renegado to
prepare the stencil of his questions inasmuch as he was not versed with typing; Makalintal, C.J. Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio,
appellant was duty bound to type said stencil under the memorandum-circular Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
enumerating his duties as a clerk of the school; appellant refused the request of
Lira under pretext that he had much work in the principal’s office and Barredo, J., took no part.
furthermore that typing test questions for teachers was not among his duties;
Lira reminded Renegado that the principal gave necessary instructions for that Endnotes:
purpose, and ended up with the remark: "you can finish your work if you only ________________________________________
will sit down and work" ; Lira’s remark was neither insulting nor slanderous but
more of a reminder to Renegado that if he would sit down and work he could 1. Exhibits G & G-1; T.s.n. Tingzon, October 8,1966, pp. 168-172.
finish all the work that had to be done; as a teacher of the school, Lira had the 2. T.s.n. Boco, Sept. 28, 1966, pp. 3-8; T.s.n. Tan, Sept. 30, 1966, pp. 99-101.
authority to call the attention of an employee of the institution to comply with 3. T.s.n. Velasco, Sept. 29, 1966, pp. 34-35.
his duties and to be conscientious and efficient in his work; it was Renegado’s 4. T.s.n. Ramirez, ibid, p. 58.
violent character, as shown by his own evidence, which led him to react angrily 5. T.s.n. Boco, ibid, p. 8.
to the remark of Lira and conceive of a plan to attack the latter. Under these 6. T.s.n. Leonor, ibid, pp. 69-71.
enumerated facts, We conclude that the impelling motive for the attack on 7. T.s.n. Querubin, ibid, p. 75.
Mamerto de Lira was the performance by the latter of his duties as a teacher. 8. T.s.n. Rojo, ibid, pp. 82-85.
9. T.s.n: Tan, Sept. 30,1966. pp. 102-107: T.s.n. Francisco, Oct. 1. 1966, pp.
In Justo v. Court of Appeals, wherein the offended party was a district supervisor 137-143; T.s.n. Icayan, ibid, pp. 151-153.
of the Bureau of Public Schools, the Court held that the phraseology "on 10. 9a T.s.n. Tingzon, Oct. 8,1966, p. 175.
occasion of such performance" used in Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code 11. Exhibit C: T.s.n. Dr. Ortiz October 7, 1966, pp. 156-159.
signifies "because" or "by reason" of the past performance of official duty, even 12. T.s.n. Renegado, pp. 265-275.
if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being discharged, inasmuch 13. T.s.n. Cordove, October 14, 1966, pp. 212-215.
as the evident purpose of the law is to allow public officials and their agents to 14. T.s.n. Lourdes Renegado, ibid, pp. 224-227.
discharge their official duties without being haunted by the fear of being 15. T.s.n. Elena Renegado, October 28, 1966, pp. 244-246.
assaulted or injured by reason thereof. 31 16. Appellant’s brief, p. 21, p. 98 rollo.
17. T.s.n. Renegado, Nov. 16, 1986, p. 276; see Exh. 4;
Inasmuch as the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in 18. T.s.n. Elena Renegado, supra, p. 228-229.
authority and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is offset by the 19. Art. 4, Revised Penal Code.
aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty of DEATH imposed by the 20. Art 3, ibid; Guevara’s Commentaries Revised Penal Code 52.
trial court is pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Articles 148 and 248 of the 21. People v. Formigones, 27 Phil. 52.
Revised Penal Code. The court a quo, however, in its decision recommends to 22. People v. Formigones, 37 Phil. 658, 661, citing from Judge Guillermo B.
the President of the Republic the commutation of the death penalty to reclusion Guevaras’ Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code 4th Edition, pp. 42-43,
perpetua, and the Solicitor General ** concurs with such recommendation. On Decision of Supreme Court of Sapin, November 21, 1891, 47 Jur. Crim. 413
the part of the Court, for lack of ten votes for purposes of imposing the death & Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, April 20, 1911, 86 Jur. Crim 94, 97;
sentence, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, is to be imposed. see also People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292.
23. People v. Bascos, 44 Phi. 204; People v. Formigones, supra; People v. Cruz,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the conviction of appellant Loreto supra; People v. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155.
Renegado for murder with assault on a person in authority and We sentence him 23. a. supra, p. 293.
to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mamerto 23. b. pp. 10-15, appellant’s brief, pp. 87-92, rollo.
de Lira in the sum of twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos 32 and to pay the costs. 24. see People v. Lumayag, L-19142, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 502, 506;
Decision modified. People v. Sampang, Et Al., L-15843, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 531; People
v. Orzame, Et Al., L-17773, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 161; People v. Ablaza,
 L-27352, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 173; People v. Espejo, Et Al., L-
27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400.
25. Connor v. Connor, 77 A. 2d 697, cited in Francisco’s Volume VII, Part II,
on Evidence, Revised Rules of Court, p. 546, 1973 Ed.
26. appellant’s brief, pp. 15-21, pp. 92-98 rollo.
27. People v. Ompad, Et Al., L-23513, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 750;
Guevara’s Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Fifth Ed., pp. 56-57;
28. People v. Vicente, Et Al., L-26241, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 247;
29. "Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority - Who
shall be deemed as such. —
x x x
"In applying the provisions of Articles one hundred forty-eight are one
hundred fifty-one of this Code, teachers, professors and persons charged with
the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, shall be deemed persons in authority." (As amended by Com. Act
578, which took effect June 8, 1940)
30. "Art. 148. Direct assaults. — Any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or
when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays
hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present,
the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed."
31. 99 Phil. 453.
** Mr. Justice Antonio P. Barredo was then the Solicitor General.
32. People v. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25459 August 10, 1926]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RAMON MABUG-AT, Defendant-appellant.
Vicente Sotto for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon Mabug-at
the penalty of twelve years and one day cadena temporal, with the accessories
of the law, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P700 and to pay the
costs, for the crime of frustrated murder.
The appellant appealed from this judgment, making two assignments of error as
committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder, and
2. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the defense, finding
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana Buralo was
sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of the latter
having frequently visited the house of one Carmen. Their relations were such
that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9, 1925.
Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the third day, or the
night of August 11th, the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house
where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion. There the accused,
revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come downstairs
and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not want to go
upstairs, I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her, I will kill him."
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs,
when they went in the direction of their house. The accused, who was seen by
the two girls, followed them without saying a word. It is only a short distance
from the house where the devotion took place to that of the offended party, the
houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while
standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which
wounded Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of her neck, having
entered the posterior region thereof and coming out through the left eye, which
was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did
not die and is one of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case.
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not
responsible for the crime, contends that the crime proven is not frustrated murder
but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven that it
was the accused's intention to kill.
The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his
disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that
the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the house where
the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and especially
having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit of
no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was accused's intention to kill.
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15 Phil.,
1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm
at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to
kill, and there are many cases in the books wherein the attendant
circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at
another the actor was not in fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in
seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act is committed, it
is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all
the attendant circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence;
and where, as in the case at bar, a revolver is twice discharged point-blank
at the body of another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the
body, it needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does
not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.)
The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are evidence
premeditation and treachery. Even when there is sufficient proof of
premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently established), yet,
it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case, because
the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta Buralo, who was
hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana Buralo. Had evident premeditation been
proven, and there being no other qualifying circumstance of frustrated murder
present in this case, the acts should be held to be frustrated homicide and
punished with the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law. (Question
2, p. 28, 1890 ed., Viada's Penal Code.) But the fact is that treachery was proven
and must be taken into consideration in this case, because the accused fired at
Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to ensure the execution of the
crime without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to
defend the said offended party. The treachery which, according to the evidence,
would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in
this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going
upstairs with their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver. The
Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp. 29, 30),
in holding a crime to be murder and not homicide, stated the following:
Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as it is explained in
article 10 of the Civil code dealing with said circumstance, it is evident that
in firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused the death
of Nazario Iñigo, he employed means which tended to insure the
commission of the crime without any risk to himself arising from any
defense that might be made by the offended party, for neither the wounded
party Bartolome Lobejano, at whom the shot was aimed in order to kill him
so that he might not testify as to the assault committed upon him shortly
before, as held by the trial court, was not in a position to defend himself in
any way, nor could Nazario Iñigo become aware of any attack so unjustified,
rapid and unforeseen; considering, further, that the purely accidental
circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than the one intended
was killed, does not modify, in the instant case, the elements constituting
the crime of murder qualified by the treachery with which Alejandro Sola
acted, whether with respect to the wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the
deceased Nazario Iñigo, for which reason the rules of article 65 are not
applicable herein, the culprit not having, in fact, committed a crime different
from that which he intended, taking into consideration the substantial and
intrinsic meaning thereof, etc.
Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated murder, the
doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case at bar so far as the
concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is concerned.
The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended to
kill and performed all the acts of execution, which would have produced the
crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.
We find no merit in the first assignment of error.
In regard to the second, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts FIRST DIVISION
enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated murder.
[G.R. No. L-18924. October 19, 1922. ]
With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no other
aggravating circumstance.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), Defendant-Appellee.
proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against the appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for Appellant.
SO ORDERED. Edgardo Gutierrez Repide for Appellee.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real JJ., concur.
SYLLABUS

1. JURISDICTION; FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS; CRIMES

COMMITTED ABOARD. — There are two fundamental rules on this
particular matter in connection with International law; to wit, the French
rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel
should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial
jurisdiction they were committed unless their commission affects the peace
and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial
principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of
the country within whose territory they were committed. Of these two rules,
it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on the matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

2. ID., ID., CRIME OF SMOKING OPIUM. — The mere possession of opium

aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court in United States v.
Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), not triable by our courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its
mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not
bring about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates
avoiding. hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of
the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature had in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute, and is, therefore, triable in our courts.
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant
to the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of
having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles
from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which
so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according to said court has
or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
a crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdictional waters.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within whose territory they were committed. Of these two
rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the case of The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U.
S.]. 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
". . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the law
to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such
individual or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . ."
In United States v. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
". . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or
crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the
headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs.
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such
limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . ."
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus v. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U. S., 1), wherein it was said
that:
". . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which
disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with
exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which
disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders
punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be
easy at all times to determine to which of the two jurisdictions a particular
act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious
homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no
right to interfere to prevent it."
Hence in United States v. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
"Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands,
such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same
rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the
Islands, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil; in such a case an
open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which,
 as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship
of the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to
jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an smoke opium on board."
international treaty."
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special finding
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so as to costs.
far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question
was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," SO ORDERED.
volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ.,
"There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and concur.
all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of
commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have
liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such
places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners
are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in
any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses
and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the
merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most
complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to
the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively." (Art. 1, Commerce
and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in
transit was held by this court not triable by our courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession
in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not bring about in the
said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a
mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly
observes:

". . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel
at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who
are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17958. February 27, 1922. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee, v.
LOL-LO and SARAW, Defendants-Appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for Appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154 PENAL CODE; WHETHER I FORCE. —
The provisions of the Penal Code relating to piracy are not inconsistent with
the corresponding provisions in the United States.
2. ID; ID. — Those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of
piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines.
3. ID; ID.; ID. — Article 153 of the Penal Code now reads as follows: "The
crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens
of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed against
nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
4. ID; DEFINED. — Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas,
without lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
5. ID; JURISDICTION . — Piracy is a crime not against any particular State
but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crime has no territorial limits.
6. ID; ID. — It does not matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral
to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. v. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
7. ID; INSTANT CASE. — One Moro who participated in the crime of piracy
was sentenced to death and another to life imprisonment.
8. PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF
TERRITORY. — The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution,
the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force.
9. ID.; ID; ID. — Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure
good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal
character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are
altered or repealed.
10. ID.; ID.; ID. — Wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal Code, it should
be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned the word should be substituted by the expression, "citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when the picturesque buccaneers
Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the
imagination, when grotesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away
in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a
tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near
murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta,
another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch
subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o’clock in
the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by
twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the
Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of
the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and
repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of
First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by
counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of
the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense,
under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was
overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding
the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants
in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of coprax which
had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay
a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney
de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be
quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without
lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court
and as is gain done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without
jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a
crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished
in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does
it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of
a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
(U. S. v. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision
for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with
the crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code read
as follows:
“ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a
penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at
war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty or presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph
of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph
of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon
the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any
of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and
fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and
two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity
specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of the book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means
of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title as well as all others of
this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any
part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every
person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status
of a Spaniard shall be considered as such."
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States
relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United
States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution,
the laws of the United States or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting
at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the
community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct
action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock
Island, etc., R. Co. v. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the
Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,1889, to
General Wesley Merritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation
in the Philippines, when he said:
"Thought the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of
person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed
to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so
far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." (Official Gazette,
Preliminary Number, Jan. 71. 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt’s
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with
piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal
Code of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish
Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to
Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing
as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific
provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions
elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the
Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the
power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The
Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United
States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly
death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines
relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force
in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States.
A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with
the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be
substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." Somewhat similar
reasoning led this court in the case of United States v. Smith ([1919]); 39 Phil.,
533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the penal Code a limited
meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil
officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would
read as follows:
"The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war
with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation
at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of
presidio mayor."
We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy,
notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in
relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named
in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime
of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena
perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding
present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the
same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by
article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in
the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior
strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural
effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the
crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the
imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo (the
accused who raped one of the women) but is not unanimous with regard to the
defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the court, Mr. Justice
Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant
and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced
therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the
judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants
together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924
rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances.
SO ORDERED.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120921. January 29, 1998.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO
and ALVIN BULUSAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua, with
all the accessory penalties provided by law, and further sentencing them to pay
jointly and solidarily —
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the
defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee
is accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila
Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court,
which so held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling
is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according to said
court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction
over a crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within whose territory they were committed. Of these two
rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the case of The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U.
S.]. 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
". . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the law
to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such
individual or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . ."
In United States v. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
". . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or
crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the
headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs.
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such
limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . ."
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus v. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U. S., 1), wherein it was said
that:
". . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which
disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with
exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which
disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders
punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be
easy at all times to determine to which of the two jurisdictions a particular
act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious
homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no
right to interfere to prevent it."
Hence in United States v. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
"Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands,
such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same
rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the
Islands, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil; in such a case an
open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission
of the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has
jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty."
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so
far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question
was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.,"
volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
"There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and
all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of
commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have
liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such
places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners
are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in
any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses
and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the
merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most
complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to
the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively." (Art. 1, Commerce
and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in
transit was held by this court not triable by our courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession
in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not bring about in the
said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a
mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly
observes:
". . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel
at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who
are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It
requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship
may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to
smoke opium on board."
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special finding
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ.,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO
Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, Defendants-Appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for
appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER. — Appellants Corporal Galanta and Chief
of Police Oanis were under instructions to arrest one, Balagtas, a notorious
criminal and an escaped convict, and, if overpowered, to get him dead or
alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, appellants went into a room and
on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers, without
first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out
to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal. Held: That
under the circumstances, the crime committed by appellants is murder
though specially mitigated by circumstances presently to be mentioned.
2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR DISTINGUISHED FROM UNITED STATES v.
AH CHONG (15 Phil., 488). — In support of the theory of non-liability by
reason of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of United States
v. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In
the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is
there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he
leaped from his bed and called out again, "if you enter the room, I will kill
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who
 turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake
of fact is the case of a man who was masked as a footpad at night and in a
lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol
demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded
and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed
without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or
opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances
to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case,
appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the
room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed, according to one eyewitness. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was
really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas, at sight, but to
arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is
offered by him.
3. ID.; ID.; FORCE WHICH A PEACE OFFICER MAY USE IN MAKING
ARREST. — Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in
using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm (People v. Delima, 46 Phil., 738), yet he
is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him wanton
violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
effected otherwise (6 C. J. S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the
new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be
used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par.
2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he
uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. (5 C. J., p. 753; U.
S. v. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Balagtas was a notorious
criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of
the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing
him when, in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance, or in fact no
resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in United States v.
Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARREST OF A NOTORIOUS CRIMINAL. — It is suggested
that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his
right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. This Court
may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise, this court cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere
fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of
the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled
official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the
cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants
has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to
warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise this
Court would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
5. ID.; ID.; KILLING AT BAR IS INTENTIONAL AND NOT MERELY
ACCIDENTAL. — The crime committed by appellants is not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People
v. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "para que se califique un
hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni
intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el
hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion
del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo."
(Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed., pag. 7.) And, as once
held by this court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People v. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232; People v. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is
willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
 considered as reckless imprudence (People v. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to
support a plea of mitigated liability.
6. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE DEFINED IN
ARTICLE 11, NO. 5, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. — As the
deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such
legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are
two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying
one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is
present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second
requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed be the necessary
consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest
Balagtas, or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they
are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire
to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by
killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance
from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one
or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
DECISION
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio
Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the
Philippine Constabulary, respectively were, after due trial, found guilty by the
lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each
to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and
two months of prision correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately
from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938, Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from
Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina named Irene in Cabanatuan get him
dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and
asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and
privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of
their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were
shown a copy of the abovequoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing
a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by
the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew
one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same
name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate
some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas’
whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the
party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal
street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group
arrived at Irene’s house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then
stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene’s room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping
with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room
which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis
and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and on seeing a man sleeping with
his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired
at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene
saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots
came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene,
Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson, Irene’s paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the
killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased,
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse
was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr.
Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers were found on Tecson’s body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the
evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave,
however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta,
when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene’s room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry
as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in
the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the
curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the
supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in
bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis
receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that, after he had opened the curtain covering
the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up," Galanta at once
fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed,
and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets; that it was only thereafter
that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who
was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired
at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly
incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate
themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory.
Oanis averred that he fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching
somebody in an attitude of picking up something from the floor; on the other
hand, Galanta testified that Oanis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit
up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that
he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him.
But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on
bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants
tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other;
but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with, and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that,
according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to
death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants
themselves in their mutual recriminations. According to Galanta, Oanis shot
Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened
by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that
no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful
examination of Irene’s testimony will show not only that her version of the
tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-
examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful,
the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under
these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings
of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his
room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him
simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but
without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And
the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for
the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both
of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty
of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion,
however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by
appellants is murder though specially mitigated by circumstances to be
mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact,
appellants rely on the case of U. S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is
ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after
having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called
out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was
a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "if you enter the room, I
will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had
been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned
out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is
the case of a man who was masked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demanded his
money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the
attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life
and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these
instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or
carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a
further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts
justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in
the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them
to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene
Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to
follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance
or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as
is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm (People v. Delima, 46 Phil., 738), yet he is never justified in
using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting
to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C. J. S., par.
13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the
person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for
his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim
exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in
making an arrest. (5 C. J., p. 753; U. S. v. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true
that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from
justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone
constitute no justification for killing him when, in effecting his arrest, he offers
no resistance, or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This,
in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U. S. v.
Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm"
without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already
forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the
criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger
of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the
mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands
of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official
alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of
human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of
such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not
condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we would offer a premium to crime
in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused
to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People v. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada,
"para que se califique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado
en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera
calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la
intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se
produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as
once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil.,
232; People v. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is willfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless imprudence (People v. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of
mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with
the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal
provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in
order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b)
that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the
instant case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is
offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-
anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the
fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas
without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to
his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby
declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned,
and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of
prision correccional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson
jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and
flee from Manila to the provinces. Receiving information to the effect that he
was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the
Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by
telegram dispatched on December 24, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive."
Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio
Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary
corporal, to whom the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a
newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary
private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to gather information about
Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered, to follow the instructions contained
in the telegram," proceeded to the place where the house of Irene was located.
Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then
gathering banana stalks in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After
Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by Oanis to tell where Irene’s
paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was sleeping with
Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former
had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting the man who was
found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but
Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and
Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder.
The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of
homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio
Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have
appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they
undoubtedly followed the order issued by the Constabulary authorities in Manila
requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive,
in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter
became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a record that
made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities
were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said order
and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to
have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by them to be
the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be
captured, the appellants did not want to take chances and should not be penalized
for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be commended for their bravery
and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or
ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they
proceeded thereto without hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to
use their revolvers only after being overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place,
the alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in violation
of the express order given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which
was shown to the appellants. In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for
the appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to have waited until
they have been overpowered before trying to put out such a character as
Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given
by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the facts exist
that the appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior
Constabulary authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein
questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite
psychological or sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was not Balagtas
who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep."
Anybody’s heart will be profoundly grieved by the tragedy, but in time will be
consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not vainly
sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one
desiring to follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly
constituted authorities will, upon proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture
of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person
killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they did so in
the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also
cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not
Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest
mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U. S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.,
488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable
since the killing of the person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already
stated, not wrongful or felonious.
The case of U. S. v. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is
not in point, inasmuch as the defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario
Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not
be exempted from criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario
Lauigan, there being a malicious design on his part. The other case invoked by
the prosecution is U. S. v. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it
appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had
already surrendered and allowed himself to be bound and that the said
defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to capture
Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio
Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a
notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without regard to his life which he
has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers resistance
or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack.
Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z.
Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very
similar to this. It must be remembered that both officers received instructions to
get Balagtas "dead or alive", and according to the attitude of not only the said
appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva
Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first
part; namely, to take him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting,
and having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and
Galanta might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties
concerned honestly believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a
dangerous criminal who had escaped from his guards and was supposedly armed
with a .45 caliber pistol. Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met
upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas,
informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a
man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: "If you are Balagtas
stand up." But the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the
appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt
offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying
down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the
part of the appellants to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order
to repel the imminent attack by a person who, according to their belief, was
Balagtas. It was unfortunate, however, that an innocent man was actually killed.
But taking into consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble
opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. v. Ah
Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part
of the accused, who, having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative
but to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this
case which favored the accused-appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an
incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, according to
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one
which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. This
incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5, of the
Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe that the application of this
circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code provides as
follows:
"ART. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the
lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12,
provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of
the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking."
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal
Code of the Philippines, and which was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by
Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the drafting of the
Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying
circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject
matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense
of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly,
justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty
or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its
scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article
87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our
Code, says:
"Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni
del que obra violentado por una fuerza irresistible o impulsado por miedo
insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en
el ejercicio legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia
debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por
causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que
comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas exenciones hay
pluralidad de requisitos. La irresponsabilidad depende de una sola
condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no
menor de nueve años; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible,
etc., etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para
declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, impossible que
acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas requiere, para que
se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto
es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de
 responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor número de ellos, toda vez que, Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This
en los casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones." testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets
exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted from the head of the deceased,
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is place of the shooting, — had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from
not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible
by the law to justify the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word for the accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L
"conditions" should not be confused with the word "requisites." In dealing with was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the deceased was none
justifying circumstance No. 5, Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore
in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the offender there was no reason why Galanta should carry along another gun, according to
acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from wound No. 3 as above
That the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver
performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident bullet. Doctor Castro’s record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have
that these two requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound’s
connection between the order given to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because
showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a according to the medico-legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45
bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida caliber will produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter.
Mallari and giving a warning to the supposed criminal when both found him All other wounds found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to
with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting. have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be stated
that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there is no reason why he should be declared criminally responsible for said
there are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant Galanta. According death.
to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio
Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45
caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was corroborated by the
unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica.
According to this witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of the
Constabulary he was given, as part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a
serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and, according
to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it from
his trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24, 1938, upon order of
Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to the witness with
five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also
taken from Galanta by Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment
of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of December 24, 1938, when
Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession of
the non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post at
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116736. July 24, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN
ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN
DOE, Accused, BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL
GARCIA y RIVERA, Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-appellee.
Evaristo P. Veligaria for Accused-Appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were charged with the
killing of Andre Mar Masangkay, attended with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. They were found guilty and
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. The trial court explained its basis for
appellants’ conviction as follows: "The Court is convinced that the concerted
acts of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega
in lifting, carrying and dumping the victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still
alive and breathing inside the deep well filled with water, head first and threw
big stone/rocks inside the well to cover the victim is a clear indication of the
community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar Masangkay. Wounded and
unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no position to flee and/or defend
himself against the three malefactors. Conspiracy and the taking advantage of
superior strength were in attendance. The crime committed by the accused is
murder."
May as accused who originally intended to conceal and bury what he thought
was the lifeless body of the victim be held liable as a principal, where it is proven
that the said victim was actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of
such concealment and burial?
Article 4, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be
incurred by "any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended." In assisting appellant Ortega, Jr. carry
the body of Masangkay to the well, appellant Garcia was committing a felony.
The offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery, i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. Although
appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he
assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the direct
and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is
worse than that intended.
True, appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But
the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim
at that time was still alive, and that he died subsequently of drowning. That
drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the
muddy particles found in the victim’s airway, lungs and stomach.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that
appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem
covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a
person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH; NOTHING IN THE TESTIMONY AND
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASE AT BAR CAN BE INTERPRETED
AS ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH. — Although treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength were alleged in the
information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of superior
strength. We disagree with the trial court’s finding. Abuse of superior
strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take
advantage of such superiority. It must be shown that the accused purposely
used excessive force that was manifestly out of proportion to the means
available to the victim’s defense. In this light, it is necessary to evaluate not
only the physical condition and weapon of the protagonists but also the
various incidents of the event. In his testimony, Witness Dominador
Quitlong mentioned nothing about Appellant Ortega’s availment of force
excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim
to defend himself. It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-
footer, whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches tall.
There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The accused and
the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the
foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse superior
strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; THE LIABILITY OF APPELLANT
MANUEL GARCIA; HE IS LIABLE FOR THE DIRECT AND
NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF HIS FELONIOUS ACT, EVEN IF THE
 RESULTING OFFENSE IS WORSE THAN THAT INTENDED. —
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall
be incurred by "any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential
requisites for the application of this provision are that (a) the intended act is
felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended
albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. In
assisting Appellant Ortega. Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well,
Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that of
concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that of being
an accessory in the crime of homicide. Although Appellant Garcia may have
been unaware that the victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in
throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural
consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than
that intended. True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body
of the victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer
showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died
subsequently of drowning. That drowning was the immediate cause of death
was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victim’s
airway, lungs and stomach. The drowning was direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony that Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it
exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of homicide
although he had no original intent to kill.
3. ID.; ED.; TWO LEGAL OBSTACLES BAR APPELLANT GARCIA’S
CONVICTION AS PRINCIPAL, EVEN AS AN ACCESSORY, IN THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE; REASON. — The Information accused Appellant
Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of "attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing]
repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one
ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA." The prosecution’s evidence
itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was
solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the
attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim
Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused
cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a
violation of this constitutional right. By parity of reasoning, Appellant
Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information
that charges murder by means of stabbing. Second. Although the
prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in "concealing
. . . the body of the crime, . . . in order to prevent its discovery," he can
neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19,
par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia
is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, the latter’s sister, Maritess, being
his wife. Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability
as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code.
4. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY AND DAMAGES. — The award of actual
damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from P35,000.00. The former
amount was proven both by documentary evidence and by the testimony of
Melba Lozano, a sister of the victim. Of the expenses alleged to have been
incurred, the Court can give credence only to those that are supported by
receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the
death of the victim. However, in line with current jurisprudence. Appellant
Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P50,000.00. Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and
appellant’s responsibility therefor. The penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which is imposable
in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as
in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower,
that is, prision mayor.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious
than that intended. Hence, an accused who originally intended to conceal and to
bury what he thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a
principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was
actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and
burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia cannot be held liable
as a principal because the prosecution failed to allege such death through
drowning in the Information. Neither may said appellant be held liable as an
accessory due to his relationship with the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who
is his brother-in-law.
Statement of the Case
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Decision, 1 dated February 9, 1994
written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio, 2 finding them guilty of murder.
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an
Information 3 dated October 19, 1992, as follows:
"That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with abuse of superior strength (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one
ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the
latter serious physical injuries which directly caused his death."
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de
officio, 4 pleaded not guilty to the charge. 5 Accused "John Doe" was then at
large. 6 After trial in due course, the court a quo promulgated the questioned
Decision. The dispositive portion reads: 7
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and
Manuel Garcia y Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, the Court hereby sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs of suit.
Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00
for funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay and death
indemnity of P50,000.00."
The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by Atty. Evaristo P.
Velicaria 8 who took over from the Public Attorney’s Office as counsel for the
accused.
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
follows: 9
"Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at about
5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto,
Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the
compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal,
Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That while they were drinking,
Accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were [already] drunk
arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the
call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. That accused
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they [referring to the
participants in the drinking session] heard the victim Andre Mar shouted,
‘Don’t, help me!’ (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto
ran towards the back portion of the house and [they] saw accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal
with his face up and stabbing the latter with a long-bladed weapon. That
Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused
Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the place where
they were having the drinking session [for the latter] to pacify his brother
Benjamin, Jr. That Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and
together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar
Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped
the latter inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet
in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the body of Andre Mar Masangkay
inside the well. That Romeo Ortega warned him [Quitlong] not to tell
anybody of what he saw. That he answered in the affirmative and he was
allowed to go home. That his house is about 200 meters from Romeo
Ortega’s house. That upon reaching home, his conscience bothered him and
he told his mother what he witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col.
Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him to
the Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers went with them to
the crime scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were
apprehended and were brought to the police station.
On cross-examination, he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was
presented as witness in this case. That he narrated the incident to his mother on
the night he witnessed the killing on October 15, 1992. That on October 15, 1992
at 5:30 in the afternoon when he arrived, victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Romeo
Ortega, Serafin and one Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree and he
joined them. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were not yet
in the place. That the stabbing happened between 12:00 midnight and 12:30 a.m.
That they drank gin with finger foods such as pork and shell fish. That he met
the victim Andre Mar Masangkay only on that occasion. That accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia joined them at about 11:00 p.m. That there was
no altercation between Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia in one hand and
Andre Mar Masangkay, during the drinking session. That at about 12:30 a.m.
Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion
of the house. That he cannot see Andre Mar Masangkay from the place they
were having the drinking session. That he did not see what happened to Andre
Mar Masangkay. That he only heard Masangkay asking for help. That accused
Manuel Garcia was still in the drinking session when he heard Masangkay was
asking for help. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia are his friends
and neighbors. That when he heard Andre Mar Masangkay was asking for help,
he and Ariel Caranto ran to the back portion of the house and saw Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. on top of Andre Mar Masangkay and stabbing the latter. That Andre
Mar Masangkay was lying down with his back in the canal and Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. on top stabbing the former. That he did not see any injuries on
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. That he called Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother
Benjamin, Jr. That he did not do anything to separate Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Masangkay. That he knows that Andre Mar Masangkay was courting Raquel
Ortega. That Raquel Ortega asked permission from Andre Mar Masangkay
when she left between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. That there was no trouble that
occurred during the drinking session.
PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig substantially testified that Diosdado
Quitlong is his neighbor for about 9 years. That on October 16, 1992 at 5:00 in
the morning, he was summoned by Diosdado Quitlong and reported to him the
stabbing incident that occurred at Daangbakal near the subdivision he is living.
That he relayed the information to the Valenzuela Police Station and a police
team under police officer Param accompanied them to the place. That he asked
the police officers to verify if there is a body of person inside the well. That the
well was covered with stones and he asked the police officers to seek the help
of the neighbors (sic) to remove the stones inside the well. That after the stones
were removed, the body of the victim was found inside the well. That the lifeless
body was pulled out from the well. That the body has several stab wounds. That
he came to know the victim as Andre Mar Masangkay. That two men were
arrested by the police officers.
On cross-examination, he said that he saw the body when taken out of the well
with several stab wounds. That Diosdado Quitlong told him that he was drinking
with the victim and the assailants at the time of the incident. That Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. stabbed the victim while the latter was answering the call of nature.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat substantially testified that he
conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of Andre Mar Masangkay on October 16,
1992 at the Valenzuela Memorial Homes located at Macarthur Highway. That
he prepared the autopsy report and the sketch of human head and body indicating
the location of the stab wounds. That the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, [a]sphyxia by submersion in water. That there were 13 stab
wounds, 8 of which were on the frontal part of the body, 2 at the back and there
were contused abrasions around the neck and on the left arm. There was stab
wound at the left side of the neck. That the contused abrasion could be produced
by cord or wire or rope. That there is (an) incised wound on the left forearm.
That the stab wounds which were backward downward of the body involved the
lungs. That the victim was in front of the assailant. That the stab wound on the
upper left shoulder was caused when the assailant was in front of the victim.
That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab wound near the upper
left armpit was inflicted as well as the stab wound on the left chest wall. That
the stab wound on the back-left side of the body and the stab wound on the back-
right portion of the body may be produced when the assailant was at the back of
the victim. That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab wound[s]
on the left elbow and left arm were inflicted. That the large airway is filled with
muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the
muddy particles. The heart is filled with multiple hemorrhage, loss of blood or
decreased of blood. The lungs are filled with water or muddy particles. The brain
is pale due to loss of blood. The stomach is one half filled with muddy particles
which could [have been] taken in when submerged in water.
On cross-examination, he said that he found 13 stab wounds on the body of the
victim. That he cannot tell if the assailant or the victim were standing. That it is
possible that the stab wounds were (sic) inflicted when both [referring to
participants] were standing or the victim was lying down and the assailant was
on top. That he cannot tell the number of the assailants."
Evidence for the Appellants
Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October 15, 1992,
he and his wife, Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish daughter, Marjorie, to
the Polo Emergency Hospital. He left the hospital at seven o’clock in the
morning, went home, changed his clothes and went to work. 10 After office
hours, he and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of work.
After drinking beer, they left at eight o’ clock in the evening and headed home.
En route, they chanced on Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar
Masangkay, who invited them to join their own drinking spree. Thereupon,
Appellant Garcia’s wife came and asked him to go home because their daughter
was still sick. To alleviate his daughter’s illness, he fetched his mother-in-law
who performed a ritual called "tawas." After the ritual, he remained at home and
attended to his sick daughter. He then fell asleep but was awakened by police
officers at six o’clock in the morning of the following day.
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her husband.
She however added two other participants in the drinking session aside from
Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay, namely, a
Mang Serafin and Boyet Santos. 11
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. likewise substantially corroborated the testimony of
Appellant Manuel Garcia. 12 According to him, between eleven and twelve
o’clock in the evening, Masangkay left the drinking session. Thirty (30) minutes
after Masangkay left, he also left the drinking place to urinate. 13 He went behind
the house where he saw Masangkay peeping through the room of his sister
Raquel. He ignored Masangkay and continued urinating. 14 After he was
through, Masangkay approached him and asked where his sister was. He
answered that he did not know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed
him in the mouth, an attack that induced bleeding and caused him to fall on his
back. When he was about to stand up, Masangkay drew a knife and stabbed him,
hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him. Masangkay then gripped
his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega
shouted for help. Quitlong came and, to avoid being stabbed, grabbed
Masangkay’s right hand which was holding the knife. Quitlong was able to wrest
the knife from Masangkay and, with it, he stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times
successively, in the left chest and in the middle of the stomach. When the
stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay to avoid being hit.
15
Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the well.
Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated his injured left armpit and lips. Then,
he slept.
When he woke up at six o’clock the following morning, he saw police officers
in front of his house. Taking him with them, the lawmen proceeded to the well.
From the railroad tracks where he was asked to sit, he saw the police officers lift
the body of a dead person from the well. He came to know the identity of the
dead person only after the body was taken to the police headquarters. 16
The Trial Court’s Discussion
The trial court explained its basis for appellants’ conviction as follows: 17
"The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega,
Jr., Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and
dumping the victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and
breathing inside the deep well filled with water, head first and threw big
stones/rocks inside the well to cover the victim is a clear indication of the
community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar Masangkay. Wounded
and unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no position to flee and/or
defend himself against the three malefactors. Conspiracy and the taking
advantage of superior strength were in attendance. The crime committed by
the accused is Murder.
Concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form
and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal
wound may determine complicity where it would not otherwise be evidence
(People v. Yu, 80 SCRA 382 (1977)).
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Accused
(m)ust reimburse the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the amount of
P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of the deceased."
The Issues
In their ten-page brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following: 18
I. “The trial court erred in holding that there is conspiracy on the basis of
the prosecution’s evidence that at the time both accused and one Romeo
Ortega lifted the body of Andrew Masangkay from where he succumbed
due to stab wounds and brought and drop said body of Andrew
Masangkay to the well to commit murder;
II. The trial court erred in finding and holding that Andrew Masangkay was
still alive at the time his body was dropped in the well;
III. The trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not acquitting
the latter of the crime charged; and
IV. The trial court erred in not finding that if at all Benjamin Ortega Jr. is
guilty only of homicide alone."
On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the appellants and the
People, we believe that the question to be resolved could be simplified thus:
What are the criminal liabilities, if any, of Appellants Ortega and Garcia?
 The Court’s Ruling
We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of
homicide. Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega
The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting narrations.
The prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime and positively
identified appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses for the defense, on the
other hand, attempted to prove denial and alibi. As to which of the two
contending versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a critical evaluation of
the credibility of the witnesses and their stories. In this regard, the trial court
held: 19
"The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and their
witnesses and the- prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their
behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that the story
of the prosecution is the more believable version. Prosecution eyewitness
Diosdado Quitlong appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is
reinforced by the fact that he has no reason to testify falsely against the
accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the
police authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he
will keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding. . . ."
Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor
and deportment on the stand as they rendered their testimonies, its evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect. Therefore, unless
the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility must
be respected. 20
In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no
reason to reverse the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies 21 insofar as Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration
of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It
is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full
credence.
On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered the
unbelievable. Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself
from ‘Masangkay’s grip, he went home, treated his injuries and slept. 22 This is
not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortega’s version of the assault
was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police
authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who came to his rescue.
Likewise, it is difficult to believe that a man would just sleep after someone was
stabbed in his own backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado
Quitlong would stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively, completely
ignoring Benjamin Ortega Jr. who was grappling with Masangkay. Also
inconsistent with human experience is his narration that Masangkay persisted in
choking him instead of defending himself from the alleged successive stabbing
of Quitlong. 23 The natural tendency of a person under attack is to defend himself
and not to persist in choking a defenseless third person.
Murder or Homicide?
Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were
alleged in the information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of
superior strength.
We disagree with the trial court’s finding. Abuse of superior strength requires
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority.
It must be shown that the accused purposely used excessive force that was
manifestly out of proportion to the means available to the victim’s defense. 24 In
this light, it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon
of the protagonists but also the various incidents of the event.25
In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing about
Appellant Ortega’s availment of force excessively out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the victim to defend himself. Quitlong described
the assault made by Appellant Ortega as follows: 26
"ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q: Will you please tell me the place and date wherein you have a
drinking spree with Andrew Masangkay and where you witnessed a
stabbing incident?
A: It was on October 15, 1992, sir, at about 5:30 in the afternoon we
were drinking in the house of Mr. Benjamin Ortega, Sr., because the
house of Benjamin Ortega Sr. and the house of his son Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. are near each other.
 x x x
Q Mr. Witness, who were the companions of said persons, Benjamin Ortega, Jr.,
Manuel Garcia, you (sic) in drinking in said place?
A The other companions in the drinking session were Ariel Caranto y Ducay,
Roberto San Andres and Romeo Ortega.
Q What about this victim, Andrew Masangkay, where was he at that time?
A Also the victim, Andrew Masangkay, he was also there.
Q You said that the two accused, Manuel Garcia and Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
arrived drunk and joined the group?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next?
A While we were there together and we were drinking . . . (interrupted by Atty.
Altuna)
Q Who is that ‘we’?
A Referring to Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Ariel Caranto, Romeo
Ortega, Roberto San Andres, myself and Andrew Masangkay. Andrew
Masangkay answer to a call of nature and went to the back portion of the
house, and Benjamin Ortega; Jr. followed him where he was.
Q What happened next?
A And afterwards we heard a shout and the shout said ‘Huwag, tulungan n’yo
ako’.
Q From whom did you hear this utterance?
A The shout came from Andrew Masangkay.
Q After Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed Andrew Masangkay to answer a call of
nature and after you heard ‘huwag, tulungan n’yo ako’ coming from the
mouth of the late Andrew Masangkay, what happened next?
A Ariel Caranto and I ran towards the back portion of the house.
Q And what did you see?
A And I saw that Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was on top of Andrew Masangkay and
he was stabbing Andrew Masangkay.
Q Will you please demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the stabbing was
done telling us the particular position of the late Andrew Masangkay and how
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. proceeded with the stabbing against the late victim,
Andrew Masangkay?
INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture, the witness demonstrating.)
Andrew Masangkay was lying down on a canal with his face up, then
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was ‘nakakabayo’ and with his right hand with
closed fist holding the weapon, he was thrusting this weapon on the
body of the victim, he was making downward and upward motion thrust.
ATTY. ALTUNA: (To the witness)
Q How many times did Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed Andrew Masangkay?
A I cannot count the number of times."
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas
Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches tall. 27 There was
no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The accused and the
victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the
foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of
superior strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.
Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia
Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court "is based on
mere assumption and conjecture . . .." 28 Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that
the large airway was "filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was
alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles" did not necessarily mean that
such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still alive. The
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, "Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang
mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr." Thus, the prosecution evidence
shows Masangkay was already "dead" when he was lifted and dumped into the
well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an accessory. 29 Q So, in short, you are telling or saying to us that if there is no inhaling or
the taking or receiving of muddy particles at that time, the person is still
We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised alive?
Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by "any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from A Yes, sir.
that which he intended." The essential requisites for the application of this
provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is Q Second point?
likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily
caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the A The heart is pale with some multiple petechial hemorrhages at the anterior
body of Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The surface.
offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery,
i.e., that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. 30 Although Appellant Q And this may [be] due to stab wounds or asphyxia?
Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he assisted
Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and A These are the effects or due to asphyxia or decreased amount of blood
natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse going to the heart.
than that intended.
Q This asphyxia you are referring to is the drowning?
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But
the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim A Yes, sir.
at that time was still alive, and that he died subsequently of drowning. 31 That
drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the Q Next point is the lungs?
muddy particles found in the victim’s airway, lungs and stomach. 32 This is
evident from the expert testimony given by the medico-legal officer, quoted A The lungs is also filled with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
below: 33
Q What could have caused this injury of the lungs?
ATTY. ALTUNA:
A This is due to asphyxia or the loss of blood.
Q “Will you please explain this in simple language the last portion of Exhibit
N, beginning with ‘tracheo-bronchial tree’, that is sentence immediately Q Are you saying that the lungs have been filled with water or muddy
after paragraph 10, 2.5 cms. Will you please explain this? particles?

A The trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with muddy particles. A Yes, sir.

Q I ask you a question on this. Could the victim have possibly got this Q And, precisely, you are now testifying that due to stab wounds or
particular material? asphyxia, the lungs have been damaged per your Report?

A No, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q What do you mean by no? Q Continuing this brain and other visceral organs, pale. What is this?

A A person should be alive so that the muddy particles, could be inhaled. A The paleness of the brain and other visceral organs is due to loss of blood.
 A The victim could have taken these when he was submerged in water.
Q And, of course, loss of blood could be attributed to the stab wound which
is number 13? Q What is the take in?

A Yes, sir. A Muddy particles.

Q And the last one, under the particular point ‘hemothorax’? Q And he was still alive at that time?

A It indicates at the right side. There are around 1,400 cc of blood that
accumulate at the thoraxic cavity and this was admixed with granular
materials.
Q And what cause the admixing with granular materials on said particular
portion of the body?
A Could be muddy particles.
A Yes, sir." (Emphasis supplied)
A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the following
medical findings may show that drowning is the cause of death: 34
1. “The presence of materials or foreign bodies in the hands of the victim.
The clenching of the hands is a manifestation of cadaveric spasm in the
effort of the victim to save himself from drowning.

Q Due to the taking of maddy (sic) materials as affected by asphyxia? Am I 2. Increase in volume (emphysema aquosum) and edema of the lungs
correct? (edema aquosum).

A It’s due to stab wounds those muddy particles which set-in thru the stab 3. Presence of water and fluid in the stomach contents corresponding to
wounds. the medium where the body was recovered.

Q So, because of the opening of the stab wounds, the muddy particles now
came in, in that particular portion of the body and caused admixing of
granular materials?
A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing with your report, particularly, the last two portions, will you
Please explain the same?
4. Presence of froth, foam or foreign bodies in the air passage found in the
medium where the victim was found.
5. Presence of water in the middle ear."
The third and fourth findings were present in the case of Victim Masangkay. It
was proven that his air passage, or specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree, was
filled with muddy particles which were residues at the bottom of the well.

A The hemoperitoneum there are 900 cc of blood that accumulated inside Even his stomach was half-filled with such muddy particles. The unrebutted
the abdomen. testimony of the medico-legal officer that all these muddy particles were
ingested when the victim was still alive proved that the victim died of drowning
Q And what could have caused the same? inside the well.

A [T]he stab wound of the abdomen. The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that
Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem
Q The last one, stomach 1/2 filled with muddy particles. Please explain the covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a
same? person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill. 35
In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable as
principal in the crime of homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles
barring his conviction, even as an accessory — as prayed for by appellants’
counsel himself.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of
"attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on
the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA."
The prosecution’s evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the
stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility
relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting
drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is
that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in
the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of
this constitutional right. 36 Section 14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
guarantees the following:
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure, to appear is
unjustifiable." (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Pailano, 37 this Court ruled that there can be no conviction for rape
on a woman "deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious" where the
information charged the accused of sexual assault "by using force or
intimidation," thus:
"The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime
through the first method although the prosecution sought to establish at the
trial that the complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so is
not clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the
ground that he violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or
unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible under the
criminal complaint as worded. This described the offense as having been
committed by ‘Antonio Pailano, being then provided with a scythe, by
means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant,
Anita Ibanez, 15 years of age, against her will.’ No mention was made of
the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita
while she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason — and not
through force and intimidation, which was the method alleged — would
have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.[Article IV, Sec. 19, Constitution of 1973; now
Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is safeguarded by the Constitution to every
accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against
him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged would, plainly be unfair and
underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the herein Accused-
Appellant.
In People v. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person charged with
rape could not be found guilty of qualified seduction, which had not been
alleged in the criminal complaint against him. In the case of People v.
Montes, [fn: 122 SCRA 409] the Court did not permit the conviction for
homicide of a person held responsible for the suicide of the woman he was
supposed to have raped, as the crime he was accused of — and acquitted —
was not homicide but rape. More to the point is Tubb v. People of the
Philippines, [fn: 101 Phil. 114] where the accused was charged with the
misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return
the same under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, but
was convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses, under paragraph
2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The Court
said such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights."
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide
through drowning in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia
assisted in concealing . . . the body of the crime, . . . in order to prevent its
discovery," he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined
under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that
Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, 38 the latter’s sister,
Maritess, being his wife. 39 Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and appellant’s
criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code: responsibility therefor. 43

"ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who
are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article."
On the hand, "the next preceding article" provides:
"ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of
the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either
as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any
of the following manners.
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating
or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. Appellant Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY of homicide and
sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. Appellant Ortega, Jr. is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000.00 as indemnity and P31,790.00 as actual damages. Appellant Manuel
Garcia is ACQUITTED. His immediate release from confinement is ORDERED
unless he is detained for some other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
Endnotes:
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal ________________________________________
of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, 1. Original Records, pp. 183-198; rollo, pp. 29-44.
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief 2. Footnote text is not found in the original copy.
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime." 3. Original Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 8.
4. Atty. Ricardo Perez of the Public Attorney’s Office.
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal accused, 5. Original Records, p. 25.
Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision 6. After promulgation of judgment, John Doe was identified as Romeo Ortega
of the Revised Penal Code. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit him. and the latest trial court’s Order in this case was for the state prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation to determine his liability. (Original
Penalty and Damages Records, pp. 207-210).
7. Original Records, p. 198; rollo, p. 44; Decision, p. 16.
The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from P35,000.00. 8. Original Records, p. 205.
The former amount was proven both by documentary evidence and by the 9. Ibid., pp. 185-187.
testimony of Melba Lozano, a sister of the victim. 38 Of the expenses alleged to 10. Footnote text is not found in the original copy.
have been incurred, the Court can give credence only to those that are supported 11. Ibid., pp. 11-20.
by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the 12. TSN, August 16, 1993, pp. 7-19.
death of the victim. 39 However, in line with current jurisprudence, 40 Appellant 13. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00. 14. Ibid., pp. 23-25.
15. Ibid, pp. 26-35. 31. The exact words used by the medico-legal officer were: "The multiple stab
16. TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 3-22. wounds sustained by the victim and asphyxia by submersion in water."
17. Original Records, pp. 197-198; rollo, pp. 43-44; Decision, pp. 15-16. (TSN, April 16, 1993, p. 8).
18. Rollo, p. 63; original text in upper case. 32. TSN, April 16, 1993, pp. 20-24.
19. Original Records, pp. 196-197; rollo, pp. 42-43; Decision, pp. 14-15. 33. TSN, April 16, 1993, pp. 20-24.
20. People v. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 405, 410-411, August 7, 1990. 34. Pedro Solis, Legal Medicine, 1987, p. 448.
21. People v. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663, 671, July 11, 1996 citing the cases of 35. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 edition, Volume 1, p. 70 citing Pico
People v. Vallena, 244, SCRA 685, 691, June 1, 1995; People v. Jaca, 229 v. U.S., 57 L. Ed. 812, 40 Phil. 117, 15 Phil. 549.
SCRA 332, January 18, 1994; People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535, 552, 36. People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740, 751, December 4, 1989 citing the cases
December 4, 1991; and People v. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769, 779, July 31, of Matilde, Jr., v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456, 461, December 29, 1975 and U.S.
1995. v. Ocampo, 23 Phil. 396.
22. TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 6-14. 37. 169 SCRA 649, 653-654, January 31, 1989.
23. Ibid., pp. 4-6. 38. TSN, June 14, 1993, p. 39; August 16, 1993, p. 9.
24. People v. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, 46, March 29, 1995. (Footnote reference and footnote text copied from the Supreme Court
25. People v. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87, 97-98, May 11, 1995 citing the case of Advance Sheets)
People v. Martinez, 96 SCRA 714, March 31, 1980 and People v. Cabiling, 39. TSN, October 13, 1993, p. 16.
74 SCRA 285, December 17, 1976. (Footnote reference and footnote text copied from the Supreme Court
26. TSN, February 12, 1993, pp. 11-15. Advance Sheets)
27. TSN, October 27, 1993, p. 12. 38. The following receipts were offered as evidence: (1) receipt of the Diocese
28. Rollo, p. 64. of Lucena for funeral and electricity charges (350.00); (2) receipt for
29. Ibid., pp. 65-66. transportation expense for the transfer of remains of Andre Mar Masangkay
30. Paragraph no. 2 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code provides for (3,500.00); (3) receipt of Funeral Helen for home and coach services
accessories’ manners of participation: (5,000.00); (4) receipt of the Diocese of San Pedro Bautista Parish for
ARTICLE 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having mortuary rental (350.00); (5) receipt of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish for
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having use of mortuary (2,590.00); and (6) receipt of La Funeraria Paz for their
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part services (20,000.00).
subsequently to its commission in any of the following manners: 39. People v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 123073, June 19, 1997 citing the cases of
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the People v. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658, 671, July 18, 1995 and People v.
effects of the crime. Degoma, 209 SCRA 266, 274, May 22, 1992.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects 40. People v. Quinao, Et Al., G.R. No. 108454, March 13, 1997; People v.
or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. Azugue, G.R. No. 110098, February 26, 1997; People v. Ombrog, G.R. No.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the 104666, February 12, 1997.
principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse 41. Footnote reference and footnote text are not found in the original copy.
of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is 42. Footnote reference and footnote text are not found in the original copy.
guilty of treason parricide, murder or attempt to take the life of 43. People v. Cayabyab, supra.
the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.
Under this Article, it is required that: (1) the accessory should have
knowledge of the crime, (2) he did not take part in its commission as
principal or accomplice, and (3) subsequent to its commission, he took
part in any of the three ways enumerated above.