THE TRIBE Labor Relations
Disease as a Ground for Termination
1. VICENTE SY,et.al vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and JAIME SAHOT
FACTS: Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for
family-owned trucking business named Vicente Sy
Trucking. In 1965, he became a truck driver of the same
family business, renamed T. Paulino Trucking Service, later
6B’s Trucking Corporation in 1985, and thereafter known
as SBT Trucking Corporation since 1994. In April 1994,
Sahot was already 59 years old. He had been incurring
absences as he was suffering from various ailments.
Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which
greatly affected the performance of his task as a driver. He
inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with
the Social Security System (SSS) on April 25, 1994, but
discovered that his premium payments had not been
remitted by his employer. Sahot had filed a week-long
leave as he was medically examined and treated for EOR,
presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II, HPM, UTI,
Osteoarthritis, and heart enlargement. On said grounds,
Belen Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service management
told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave.
At the end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for
extension of his leave for the whole month of June, 1994. It
was at this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to
terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to
work. Petitioners then carried out their threat and
dismissed him from work. He ended up sick, jobless and
penniless. Sahot filed, a complaint for illegal dismissal
Petitioners contend that Sahot was not illegally dismissed
as a driver because he was in fact petitioner’s industrial
partner. Sahot become an employee of the company only in
year 1994 wh en SBT Trucking Corporation was
established and prior he went on leave, Sahot was not able
to report for work for almost seven days. And after the
expiration of his leave, he never reported back to work nor
did he file an extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the
complaint for illegal dismissal against the trucking
company and its owners. Petitioners add that due to
Sahot’s refusal to work after the expiration of his
authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have
voluntarily resigned from his work. They contended that
Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform
petitioners of his health condition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid dismissal
HELD: There was an invalid dismissal. Article 284 of the
Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an
employee on the ground of disease, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination- An employer
may terminate the services of an employee who has been
found to be suffering from any disease and whose
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial
to his health as well as the health of his co employees: xxx
However, in order to validly terminate employment on this
ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires: Sec. 8.
Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee
suffers from a disease and his continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the
health of his coemployees, the employer shall not
terminate his employment unless there i s a certification
by competent public health authority that the disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the
period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but
shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall
reinstate such employee to his former position
immediately upon the restoration of his normal health..
The requirement for a medical certificate under Article
284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with;
otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary
determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of
the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy in
the protection of labor. In the case at bar, the employer
clearly did not comply with the medical certificate
requirement before Sahot’s dismissal was effected. In the
same case of Sevillana vs. I.T. (International) Corp., we
ruled: Since the burden of proving the validity of the
dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter
should likewise bear the burden of showing that the
requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been
complied with. In the absence of the required certification
by a competent public health authority, this Court has
ruled against the validity of the employee’s dismissal. It is
therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to
prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that
petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the
dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would
be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal
premised on mere conjectures and suspicions, the
evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must
be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to
warrant his separation from work. In addition, we must
likewise determine if the procedural aspect of due process
had been complied with by the employer. From the
records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was
not observed in the separation of private respondent by
the management of the trucking company. The employer is
required to furnish an employee with two written notices
before the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge;
and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal,
to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable
opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense.
These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record
purposes. What management did was to threaten the
employee with dismissal, then actually implement the
threat when the occasion presented itself because of
private respondent’s painful left thigh.
All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of
due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahot’s
dismissal is tainted with invalidity.
Page 1 of 7
 THE TRIBE Labor Relations

2. ALEXANDER B. GATUS v. SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM
FACTS: Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac
beginning on January 1, 1972. He was a covered member
of the SSS. He optionally retired from Central Azucarera de
Tarlac upon reaching 30 years of service on January 31,
2002, at the age of 62 years.By the time of his retirement,
he held the position of Tender assigned at the Distillery
Cooling Tower. Sometime in 1995, he was diagnosed to be
suffering from Coronary Artery Disease (CAD): Triple
Vessel and Unstable Angina. His medical records showed
him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker.
On account of his CAD, he was given by the SSS the
following EC/SSS Permanent Partial Disability (PPD)
benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective September 1,
1994 and (b) 4 monthly pensions effective January 3, 1997.
He became an SSS retirement pensioner on February 1,
2002. Sometime in 2003, an SSS audit revealed the need to
recover the EC benefits already paid to him on the ground
that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic smoking, was
not work-related. He was notified thereof through a letter
dated July 31, 2003. Convinced that he was entitled to the
benefits, he assailed the decision but the SSS maintained
its position. The SSS also denied his motion for
reconsideration. Gatus then elevated the case to the
Employers Compensation Commission, which held that
although his CAD was a cardiovascular disease listed as an
occupational disease under Annex A of the Implementing
Rules on Employees Compensation, nothing on record
established the presence of the qualifying circumstances
for responsibility; that it was incumbent upon him to
prove that the nature of his previous employment and the
conditions prevailing therein had increased the risk of
contracting his CAD; and that he had failed to prove this
requisite. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the
Employees Compensation Commission despite petitioner
Gatus's allegation that his ailment was caused by his
exposure to harmful fuel and smoke emissions due to the
presence of methane gas from a nearby biological waste as
well as a railway terminal where diesel-fed locomotive
engines spewed black smoke. This allegation, according to
the findings, was not backed up by any scientific and
factual evidence.
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
employee.
Cardiovascular diseases are considered as occupational
when contracted under any of the following conditions:
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present
during employment there must be proof that an acute
exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by
reason of the nature of his work.
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack
must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within
twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac
insult to constitute causal relationship.
(c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before
subjecting himself to strain at work showed signs and
symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his
work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is
reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
The petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence that
might have shown that he was entitled to the benefits he
applied for. The quantum of proof needed in this case is
substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Gatus did not discharge the burden of proof
imposed under the Labor Code to show that his ailment
was work-related. While he might have been exposed to
various smoke emissions at work for 30 years, he did not
submit satisfactory evidence proving that the exposure
had contributed to the development of his disease or had
increased the risk of contracting the illness. Neither did he
show that the disease had progressed due to conditions in
his job as a factory worker. In fact, he did not present any
physicians report in order to substantiate his allegation
that the working conditions had increased the risk of
acquiring the cardiovascular disease.
DENIED

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of

discretion in affirming the finding of the ECC that
petitioners ailment is not compensable under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended?

HELD: Social Security System Benefits - As found by the

Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to submit substantial
evidence that might have shown that he was entitled to the
benefits he had applied for. The Supreme Court affirmed
the findings of the CA that according to Section 1, Rule III
of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, a
ground for compensability is that for the sickness and the
resulting disability or death be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex "A" of the said rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied. Otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
Moreover, according to the Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules, for an occupational disease and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, all of the following
conditions must be satisfied:
1. The employee's work must involve the risks described
herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the employee's
exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure
and under such other factors necessary to contract it;

Page 2 of 7
 THE TRIBE Labor Relations
3. VILLARUEL VS. YEO HAN GUAN, G.R. NO.
169191, JUNE 1, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner alleged that in June 1963, he was
employed as a machine operator by Ribonette
Manufacturing Company, an enterprise engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling PVC pipes and is
owned and managed by herein respondent Yeo Han Guan.
Over a period of almost twenty (20) years, the company
changed its name four times. Starting in 1993 up to the
time of the filing of petitioner's complaint in 1999, the
company was operating under the name of Yuhans
Enterprises. Despite the changes in the company's name,
petitioner remained in the employ of respondent.
Petitioner further alleged that on October 5, 1998, he got
sick and was confined in a hospital; on December 12, 1998,
he reported for work but was no longer permitted to go
back because of his illness; he asked that respondent allow
him to continue working but be assigned a lighter kind of
work but his request was denied; instead, he was offered a
sum of P15,000.00 as his separation pay; however, the said
amount corresponds only to the period between 1993 and
1999; petitioner prayed that he be granted separation pay
computed from his first day of employment in June 1963,
but respondent refused. Aside from separation pay,
petitioner prayed for the payment of service incentive
leave for three years as well as attorney's fees.
The Labor Arbiter found for the respondent, granting him
separation pay from the June 1963 up to the time of
separation, and service incentive leave equivalent to 15
days. The NLRC affirmed. On appeal, the CA reversed the
NLRC on the issue of separation pay.
ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to separation pay
under the provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article
284 thereof, which reads as follows:
An employer may terminate the services of an employee
who has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay
equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half
(½) month salary for every year of service whichever is
greater, a fraction of at least six months being considered
as one (1) whole year.
HELD: A plain reading of the abovequoted provision
clearly presupposes that it is the employer who terminates
the services of the employee found to be suffering from
any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as
to the health of his coemployees. It does not contemplate a
situation where it is the employee who severs his or her
employment ties. This is precisely the reason why Section
8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, directs that an employer shall not terminate
the services of the employee unless there is a certification
by a competent public health authority that the disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment.
On the other hand, the Court agrees with the CA in its
observation of the following circumstances as proof that
respondent did not terminate petitioner's employment:
first, the only cause of action in petitioner's original
complaint is that he was “offered a very low separation
pay”; second, there was no allegation of illegal dismissal,
both in petitioner's original and amended complaints and
position paper; and, third, there was no prayer for
reinstatement.
In consonance with the above findings, the Court finds that
petitioner was the one who initiated the severance of his
employment relations with respondent. It is evident from
the various pleadings filed by petitioner that he never
intended to return to his employment with respondent on
the ground that his health is failing. Indeed, petitioner did
not ask for reinstatement. In fact, he rejected respondent's
offer for him to return to work.
This is tantamount to resignation. Resignation is defined as
the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a
situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot
be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has
no other choice but to disassociate himself from his
employment.
It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that aside
from Article 284 of the Labor Code, the award of
separation pay is also authorized in the situations dealt
with in Article 283 [16] of the same Code and under
Section 4 (b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the said Code[17] where there is illegal
dismissal and reinstatement is no longer feasible. By way
of exception, this Court has allowed grants of separation
pay to stand as “a measure of social justice” where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character. [18] However, there is no provision in the Labor
Code which grants separation pay to voluntarily resigning
employees. In fact, the rule is that an employee who
voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to
separation pay, except when it is stipulated in the
employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by
established employer practice or policy. [19] In the
present case, neither the abovementioned provisions of
the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations
nor the exceptions apply because petitioner was not
dismissed from his employment and there is no evidence
to show that payment of separation pay is stipulated in his
employment contract or sanctioned by established
practice or policy of herein respondent, his employer.
Since petitioner was not terminated from his employment
and, instead, is deemed to have resigned therefrom, he is
not entitled to separation pay under the provisions of the
Labor Code. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court, in a
number of cases, has granted financial assistance to
separated employees as a measure of social and
compassionate justice and as an equitable concession.
Taking into consideration the factual circumstances
obtaining in the present case, the Court finds that
petitioner is entitled to this kind of assistance.
In this regard, the Court finds credence in petitioner's
contention that he is in the employ of respondent for more
than 35 years. In the absence of a substantial refutation on
the part of respondent, the Court agrees with the findings
of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that respondent
company is not distinct from its predecessors but, in fact,
merely continued the operation of the latter under the
same owners and the same business venture. The Court
further notes that there is no evidence on record to show
that petitioner has any derogatory record during his long
years of service with respondent and that his employment
was severed not by reason of any infraction on his part but
because of his failing physical
condition. Add to this the willingness of respondent to give
him financial assistance. Hence, based on the foregoing, the
Court finds that the award of P50,000.00 to petitioner as
financial assistance is deemed equitable under the
circumstances.
Page 3 of 7
 THE TRIBE Labor Relations

4. WILFREDO Y. ANTIQUINA V. MAGSAYSAY refusal to undergo the operation recommended by the

MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR
MASTERBULK PTE., LTD., G.R. NO. 168922.
APRIL 13, 2011.
FACTS: Wilfredo Y. Antiquina was hired, through
respondent manning agency Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation (MMC), to serve as Third Engineer on the
vessel, M/T Star Langanger, which was owned and
operated by respondent Masterbulk Pte., Ltd.
(Masterbulk). According to petitioner’s contract of
employment, his engagement on the vessel was for a
period of 9 months. Almost seven months later, during a
routine maintenance of the vessel’s H.F.O Purifier #1,
petitioner suffered a fracture on his lower left arm after a
part fell down on him. After first aid treatment was given
to petitioner, he was brought to a hospital in Constanza,
Romania where the vessel happened to be at the time of
the accident. At the Romanian hospital, petitioner was
diagnosed with "fractura 1/3 proximala cubitus stg." as
shown by the medical certificate issued by the attending
physician and his arm was put in a cast. On October 1,
2000, petitioner was signed off the vessel at Port Said,
Egypt and was repatriated to the Philippines, where he
arrived on October 3, 2000. He immediately reported to
the office of MMC and was referred to Dr. Robert Lim of the
Metropolitan Hospital.Petitioner was examined and Dr.
Lim subsequently issued a medical report confirming that
petitioner has an undisplaced fracture of the left ulna.
Petitioner was given medication and advised to return
after 2 weeks for repeat x-ray and re-evaluation.
After one month, petitioner’s cast was removed and he was
advised to undergo physical therapy sessions. Despite
several months of physical therapy, petitioner noticed that
his arm still had not healed and he had difficulty
straightening his arm. Another company designated
doctor, Dr. Tiong Sam Lim, evaluated petitioner’s condition
and advised that petitioner undergo a bone grafting
procedure whereby a piece of metal would be attached to
the fractured bone. Upon learning from Dr. Tiong Sam Lim
that the metal piece will only be removed from his arm
after one and a half years, petitioner allegedly reacted with
fear and decided not to have the operation.
After formally informing respondents of his decision to
forego the medical procedure recommended by the
company physician, petitioner filed a complaint for
permanent disability benefits, sickness
allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against herein
respondents.
company designated physician.
Respondents presented Dr. Tiong Sam Lim’s typewritten
opinion dated June 4, 2001, stating that: IF BONE
GRAFTING WAS DONE AND THE BONE HEALED, THEN HE
WILL BE ABLE TO GO BACK TO SEA DUTIES. IF THE LEFT
FOREARM IS LEFT AS IS, THEN, THERE WILL BE PAIN
AND INABILITY TO TURN THE FOREARM CAUSING
DISABILITY. THE DISABILITY THEN WILL BE GRADE 10.
Further citing Section 20(B)(2) of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract, respondents claimed that, although
it was their obligation to repatriate an injured or sick
seaman and pay for his treatment and sick leave benefits
until he is declared fit to work or his degree of disability
has been clearly established by the company designated
physician, it was allegedly petitioner’s correlative
obligation to submit himself for medical examination and
treatment to determine if he is still fit to work or to
establish the degree of his disability. Respondents made
known their willingness to shoulder the cost of the
operation or procedure needed but it was allegedly
petitioner who refused to undergo the operation in bad
faith and in contravention of the terms of the employment
contract. Further, respondents argued that they were not
liable for damages and attorney’s fees for there was no bad
faith or ill motive ontheir part. In all, we find that the Court
of Appeals committed no error in ruling that the Labor A
rbiter’s award of US$80,000.00 in disability benefits was
unsupported by the evidence on record, even if we take
into consideration petitioner’s late documentary
submissions. There is no cogent reason to disturb the
appellate court’s finding that the only credible and
competent bases for an award of disability benefits to
petitioner are the POEA Standard Contract of Employment
and petitioner’s own medical evidence that his disability
grade is Grade 11 (14.93%). Thus, the Court of Appeals’
computation of petitioner’s permanent medical unfitness
benefits in the amount of US$7,465.00 43 must stand.

ISSUE: WON ANTIQUINA IS ENTITLED TO PERMANENT

DISABILITY BENEFITS, SICKNESS ALLOWANCE,
DAMAGES & ATTY’S FEES.

HELD: A seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or

more under the POEA Employment Contract shall, for the
purpose of this paragraph, be regarded as permanently
unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to
100% compensation, i.e. US$80,000.00 for officers and
US$60,000.00 for ratings, AB and below. Furthermore, any
seafarer assessed at less than 50% di[s]ability under the
Contract but certified as permanently unfit for further sea
service in any capacity by the company doctor, shall also
be entitled to 100% compensation.
Anent his prayer for damages and attorney’s fees,
petitioner asserted that respondents should be made liable
in view of their negligence and delay in the payment of his
allegedly valid claims and the latter’s
contravention of the terms and conditions of the contract
of employment.
In their defense, respondents contended that petitioner’s
monetary claims were premature by reason of the latter’s

Page 4 of 7
 THE TRIBE Labor Relations
5. COASTAL SAFEWAY MARINE SERVICES INC.,
Petitioner, v. ELMER T. ESGUERRA,
Respondent.
FACTS: Elmer T. Esguerra (Esguerra) was hired by Coastal
Safeway Marine Services, Inc. (CSMSI) sometime in 2003
as Third Mate for the M/V Mr. Nelson, an ocean-going
vessel under the flag of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
owned by its foreign principal, Canada & Middle East
General Trading (CMEGT). Subject to the provisions of the
POEA-SEC, the contract of employment executed by the
parties on 9 May 2003 provided a term of one (1) year and
a basic monthly salary of US$800.00 for a 48-hour work-
week, with provisions for overtime pay and vacation leave
with pay.Rather than the aforesaid vessel, however, it
appears that, on 13 May 2003, Esguerra, as Second Officer,
eventually boarded the vessel M/V Gondwana which was
likewise manned by CSMSI on behalf of Nabeel
Shipmanagement Ltd. Fze. (NSLF). On 28 June 2003 or
after forty six (46) days of shipboard employment,
Esguerra requested medical attention for back and chest
pains while M/V Gondwana was docked at Port Jebel Ali,
UAE. Examined on 5 July 2003 at the Jebel Ali Medical
Centre, Esguerra was declared "not fit for work until
complete cardiac evaluation is done" and "advised to rest
until then" by Dr. Zarga S. Tulmar. Thereafter, Esguerra
insisted on going home on the ground that he had been
rendered unfit for work. Alleging that he had yet to receive
his salary for June 2003 and that his employer was making
him shoulder his repatriation expenses as a consequence
of his failure to finish his contract, Esguerra also sought
assistance from the Jebel Ali police/coastguard regarding
his predicament.Subsequent to his arrival in the
Philippines on 7 July 2003, Esguerra went to the Philippine
Heart Center (PHC), the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital
(POH) and the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for
medical evaluation and treatment. On 16 July 2003,
Esguerra filed against CSMSI, its president, Benedicto C.
Morcilla (Morcilla), and CMEGT, the complaint for medical
reimbursement, sickness allowance, permanent disability
benefits, damages and attorney fees before the arbitral
level of the NLRC. Subsequent to the filing of said
complaint, Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Saguin of the PGH issued
separate medical certificates both declaring Esguerra unfit
for work. In refutation, CSMSI, Morcilla and CMEGT
averred that the tests administered on Esguerra at the
Jebel Ali Medical Centre revealed that he was in good
health; and, that disregarding the finding that he continued
to be fit for work, Esguerra insisted on his repatriation and
filed his complaint without submitting himself to a post-
employment medical examination within three (3)
working days upon his return. The Labor Arbiter, as
affirmed by the NLRC, dismissed the complaint on the
ground that Esguerra failed to prove his disability and to
submit himself to a post-employment medical examination
by a company-designated physician, pursuant to Section
20-B of the POEA SEC. Through a petition for certiorari
with the CA, Esguerra received a favorable decision. The
CA reversed the NLRC ruling and CSMSI subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
misappreciated the evidence and applied the POEA
Standard Employment Contract of 1996 instead of the
Revised Terms and Conditions for Seafarers on Board
Ocean-Going vessels, which is part and parcel of the
Contract of Employment entered into between Esguerra
and the petitioner on May 9, 2003?
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. Viewed in
light of the fact that Esguerra contract of employment was
executed on 9 May 2003, CSMSI correctly faults the CA for
applying POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 instead
of the 2000 POEA-SEC which took effect on 25 June 2000.
Deemed written in the seafarer's contract of
employment,the 2000 POEA-SEC like its predecessor was
designed primarily for the protection and benefit of
Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on
board ocean-going vessels.ection 20-B (3) thereof has been
interpreted to mean that it is the company-designated
physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the
seaman's disability,whether total or partial, due to either
injury or illness, during the term of the latter's
employment. Concededly, this does not mean that the
assessment of said physician is final, binding or conclusive
on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts. Should he
be so minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to request a
second opinion and to consult a physician of his
choiceregarding his ailment or injury, in which case the
medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by
the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent
merit.For the seaman claim to prosper, however, it is
mandatory that he should be examined by a company-
designated physician within three days from his
repatriation.Failure to comply with this mandatory
reporting requirement without justifiable cause shall
result in forfeiture of the right to claim the compensation
and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC.
There is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had
altogether failed to comply with the above-discussed
mandatory reporting requirement. Beyond his bare
assertion, however, that CSMSI "never gave him referrals
to continue his medications as recommended by the
foreign doctor" despite his call on 8 July 2003 "to inform
them that he will report the next day in order to submit his
medical evaluation abroad," Esguerra did not present any
evidence to prove justification for his inability to submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician. If a written notice is
required of a seafarer who is physically incapacitated for
purposes of compliance with said requirement, the Court
fails to see why a more tangible proof should not likewise
be expected of Esguerra who, after his arrival on 7 July
2003, appears to have been well enough to consult with
Dr. Vicaldo and Dr. Saguin on 9 July 2003. Esguerra
compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement
under the POEA-SEC was made even more imperative by
the fact that his repatriation for medical reasons was
categorically disputed by CSMSI. Consistent with the 5 July
2003 diagnosis made by Dr. Tulmar at the Jebel Ali Medical
Centre declaring him "not fit for work until complete
cardiac evaluation is done" and advising him "to rest until
then," it appears that Esguerra underwent serology,
hematology, biochemistry and x-ray diagnostic tests which
yielded no significant findings relative to the back and
chest pains he claims to have suffered.Although the 5 July
2003 notation made on the M/V Gondwana Chief Officer
Logbook states that he was "advised to be repatriated" on
the same day and "to continue his medication in the
Philippines," no less than Esguerra himself confirmed in
his 6 July 2003 letter to the Jebel Ali police/coastguard
that he had yet to undergo a compete cardiac evaluation
and that CSMSI foreign principal, NSLF, had refused to
shoulder his repatriation expenses on the ground that he
was unable to finish his contract. Quite significantly,
Esguerra also filed his complaint on 16 July 2003, before
his impediment rating was definitively assessed by either
Dr. Vicaldo or Dr. Saguin. Perusal of the record further
shows that, by and of themselves, the medical
certifications upon which Esguerra anchored his claims for
disability benefits and sickness allowance were not
supported by such diagnostic tests and/or procedures as
would adequately refute the normal results of those
administered to him at the Jebel Ali Medical Centre.
Page 5 of 7
 THE TRIBE Labor Relations
6. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION
and/or WASTFEL-LARSEN MANAGEMENT A/S,
Petitioners, v. OBERTO S. LOBUSTA,
Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Oberto S. Lobusta is a seaman who
has worked for Magsaysay Maritime Corporation since
1994. In March 1998, he was hired again as Able Seaman
by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. Lobusta boarded MV
"Fossanger" on March 16, 1998. After two months, he
complained of breathing difficulty and back pain. On May
12, 1998, while the vessel was in Singapore, Lobusta was
admitted at Gleneagles Maritime Medical Center and was
diagnosed to be suffering from severe acute bronchial
asthma with secondary infection and lumbosacral muscle
strain. Dr. C K Lee certified that Lobusta was fit for
discharge on May 21, 1998, for repatriation for further
treatment. Upon repatriation, Lobusta was referred to
Metropolitan Hospital. The medical coordinator, Dr. Robert
Lim, issued numerous medical reports regarding Lobustas
condition. Upon reexamination by the Orthopedic Surgeon
on August 11, 1998, he opined that Lobusta needs surgery,
called decompression laminectomy, which was done on
August 30, 1998. As the parties failed to reach a settlement
as to the amount to which Lobusta is entitled, Lobusta filed
on October 2, 2000, a complaint for disability/medical
benefits against petitioners before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter rendered
a decision ordering petitioners to pay Lobusta (a)
US$2,060 as medical allowance, (b) US$20,154 as
disability benefits, and (c) 5% of the awards as attorney’s
fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision.
Unsatisfied, Lobusta brought the case to the CA. The CA
granted the petition for certiorari of Lobusta and modified
the findings of the NLRC. As aforesaid, the CA declared that
Lobusta is suffering from permanent total disability and
increased the award of disability benefits in his favor to
US$60,000. Hence, this petition. Petitioners argue that the
CA erred in applying the provisions of the Labor Code
instead of the provisions of the POEA contract in
determining Lobustas disability, and in ruling that the
mere lapse of 120 days entitles Lobusta to total and
permanent disability benefits. The CA allegedly erred also
in holding them liable for attorney’s fees, despite the
absence of legal and factual bases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in in applying the
provisions of the Labor Code instead of the provisions of
the POEA contract in determining Lobustas disability, and
in ruling that the mere lapse of 120 days entitles Lobusta
to total and permanent disability benefits.
HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed. Standard terms of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract agreed upon are
intended to be read and understood in accordance with
Philippine laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the
Labor Code, as amended, and the applicable implementing
rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or
grievance.
Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard
Employment Contract that must be considered in
determining Lobusta's disability. In Palisoc v. Easways
Marine, Inc., we said that whether the Labor Codes
provision on permanent total disability applies to
seafarers is already a settled matter.
In Palisoc, we cited the earlier case of Remigio v. National
Labor Relations Commission where we said (1) that the
standard employment contract for seafarers was
formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under
Executive Order No. 247 "to secure the best terms and
conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and
ensure compliance therewith," and "to promote and
protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas"; (2)
that Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment
Contract itself provides that all rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract, including the annexes thereof,
shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, international conventions, treaties and
covenants where the Philippines is a signatory; and (3)
that even without this provision, a contract of labor is so
impressed with public interest that the Civil Code
expressly subjects it to the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop,
wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects.
Temporary total disability only becomes permanent when
so declared by the company physician within the periods
he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the
maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a
permanent disability.
To be sure, there is one Labor Code concept of permanent
total disability, as stated in Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor
Code, as amended, and the ECC Rules. We also note that
the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA
Standard Employment Contract was lifted verbatim from
the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 1996 POEA
Standard Employment Contract, to wit:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the
seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-
designated physician, but in no case shall this period
exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
Applying the foregoing considerations, we agree with the
CA that Lobusta suffered permanent total disability. On
this point, the NLRC ruling was not in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was first examined by the
Pulmonologist and Orthopedic Surgeon on May 22, 1998.
The maximum 240-day (8-month) medical-treatment
period expired, but no declaration was made that Lobusta
is fit to work. Nor was there a declaration of the existence
of Lobustas permanent disability. On February 16, 1999,
Lobusta was still prescribed medications for his
lumbosacral pain and was advised to return for
reevaluation. May 22, 1998 to February 16, 1999 is 264
days or 6 days short of 9 months.
In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work
again as a seaman and that his disability is permanent "as
he has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the
present or for more than 120 days." This period is more
than eight years, counted until the CA decided the case in
August 2006. On the CA ruling that Lobustas disability is
permanent since he was unable to work "for more than
120 days," we have clarified in Vergara that this
"temporary total disability period may be extended up to a
maximum of 240 days."
Thus, we affirm the award to Lobusta of US$60,000 as
permanent total disability benefits, the maximum award
under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard
Employment Contract. We also affirm the award of
US$2,060 as sickness allowance which is not contested and
appears to have been accepted by the parties.
DENIED
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 THE TRIBE Labor Relations

7. PHILASIA SHIPPING AGENCY CORPORATION,
ET AL. VS. ANDRES G. TOMACRUZ. G.R. NO.
181180, AUGUST 15, 2012.
Disability benefits; entitlement.
Entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits is governed
not only by medical findings but also by contract and by
law. By contract, Department Order No. 4, series of 2000,
of the Department of Labor and Employment and the
parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement bind the seafarer
and the employer. By law, the Labor Code provisions on
disability apply with equal force to seafarers. The seafarer,
upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment
but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on
temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work.
He receives his basic wage during this period until he is
declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable
Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded
and no such declaration is made because the seafarer
requires further medical attention, then the temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum
of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare
within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be
declared fit to work at any time such declaration is
justified by his medical condition.
From the time Tomacruz was repatriated on November 18,
2002, he submitted himself to the care and treatment of
the company-designated physician. When the company-
designated physician made a declaration on July 25, 2003
that Tomacruz was already fit to work, 249 days had
already lapsed from the time he was repatriated. As such,
his temporary total disability should be deemed total and
permanent, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor
Code and its implementing rule.
8. JESSIE V. DAVID, represented by his wife, MA.
THERESA S. DAVID, and children, KATHERINE
AND KRISTINA DAVID,Petitioners, v. OSG
SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC. AND/OR
MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES,
Respondents.
the CA ruled against Davids entitlement to the benefits he
claimed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Davids illness is compensable?
HELD: The petition has merit.
LABOR LAW: compensability of illness
In this case, David suffered from malignant fibrous
histiocytoma (MFH) in his left thigh. MFH is not one of the
diseases enumerated under Sec. 32 of the POEA-SEC.
However, Sec. 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC clearly
established a disputable presumption in favor of the
compensability of an illness suffered by a seafarer during
the term of his contract. This disputable presumption
works in favor of the employee pursuant to the mandate
under Executive Order No. (EO) 247 dated July 21, 1987
under which the POEA-SEC was created: "to secure the
best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino
contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and
"to promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers
overseas." Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by
the seafarers employer/s, this disputable presumption
stands.
David showed that part of his duties as a Third Officer of
the crude tanker M/T Raphael involved "overseeing the
loading, stowage, securing and unloading of cargoes." As a
necessary corollary, David was frequently exposed to the
crude oil that M/T Raphael was carrying. The chemical
components of crude oil include, among others, sulphur,
vanadium and arsenic compounds. Hydrogen sulphide and
carbon monoxide may also be encountered, while benzene
is a naturally occurring chemical in crude oil. It has been
regarded that these hazardous chemicals can possibly
contribute to the formation of cancerous masses.
It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be
the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the
seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage
between the disease suffered by the employee and his
work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may
have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least,
aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have
had.
Petition is GRANTED.

FACTS: Petitioner Jessie David (David) entered into a six-

month Contract of Employment with respondent OSG
Shipmanagement Manila, Inc. (OSG Manila), for and in
behalf of its principal Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc.,
(Michaelmar) as a Third Officer of the crude tanker M/T
Raphael. Part of his duties as a Third Officer of the crude
tanker involved overseeing the loading, stowage, securing
and unloading of cargoes. David was also frequently
exposed to the crude oil that M/T Raphael was carrying.
Barely six months into his employment, David complained
of an intolerable pain on his left foot. Thus, David was
repatriated to the Philippines to undergo treatment.
Immediately after his return to the country, OSG Manila
referred David to the company-designated physician, Dr.
Robert Lim, who referred him to the Cardinal Santos
Medical Center for a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI).
The pathology report showed that David was suffering
from malignant fibrous histiocytoma (MFH) in his left
thigh. Due to his condition, David underwent
chemotherapy. However, despite several requests, OSG
Manila and Michaelmar refused to shoulder Davids
expenses and medication. Hence, David filed a complaint to
recover his disability benefits. The LA ruled in favor of
David. The NLRC affirmed the Decision of the LA. However,

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