SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY
DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila from
implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-127405 granting respondent's application for
the issuance of inspection and production orders x x x."1 This is raised through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court
dated 20 March 2012.
From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed
a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.2 This case
was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B.
Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same
day.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist
from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of
Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."3
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered
De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing
was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During
that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate
for Amparo cases.5
In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued,
return is not the required pleading but answer".7 The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied
and thus required an Answer.9
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012.10 Even
without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within
five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by
then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their
Answer.11
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection,
production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in relation to the
evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy
Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related
to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23
March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20
March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as
enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September
2007), viz:
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not
the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule
45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo to put its
procedures in the proper context.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right
of the people to life, liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.14 The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.15 It aims to address concerns
such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.16
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford
swift but decisive relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be filed in a Regional Trial Court,
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19 The judge or justice then makes
an "immediate" evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with
the attendant circumstances detailed".21 After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the
Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the
supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat
or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in
motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to
appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and
interim reliefs are necessary.
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The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of
court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the
Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they
had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence
related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses
and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner,
location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.25 Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the
means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the
petitioner.
26
There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the
petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be
done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision.28
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29 The judgment should contain measures
which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in
the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to
verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject
to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.30 After the measures have served their purpose, the
judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty
and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically,
the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either
criminal or civil.31 Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy
of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or
final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear
from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision", to wit:
The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ
of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call upon the
assistance of any military or civilian agency of the government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given
together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim
reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered.32
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an
Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to
life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order dated 2 March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure shall apply.
Section 5. Answer – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his
Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their Answer ten (days)
from receipt of this Order.33
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for
the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
xxxx
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It
is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this
Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ
of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the
writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive
pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing.
Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a
synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case
is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.35
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its decision,
the RTC stated:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by
the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called
the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation
of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1âwphi1 It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions
filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo."
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in
elevating the matter to this Court.
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper procedure at the
right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the
substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of
procedure, delay and confusion result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated
as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is
prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the
parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo were promulgated.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.37 The rules can be
suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.38
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the
trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the
Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of
this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the
petition and its attached affidavits.
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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge Silvino
T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together
with a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC shall be meted with severe consequences.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte,
and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to
Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010
Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City,
Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the
Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.)
Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.)
William O. Fang was the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch,
both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No.
275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President"
(the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted
a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded
the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in
the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the
following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in
the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group
(STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and
captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies
PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent
personalities with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table names
a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacañang on
March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP
report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-
four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more
than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but
that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in
monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the
existence of the Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the
activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts
have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is
a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant
General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that
their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has been considerably
weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation
in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation that they revise their
validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing
provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of
these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the
Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa
averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly
tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-
Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that
her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as
published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with
her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.24
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for
the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database;
(b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage
done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against
her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued
the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the
trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used
by the Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b)
directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding
to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other government entity, information that they may have
gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written
return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the
case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their
mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information stored in
their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a)
a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077,
and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as
well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-
10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the
following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right
to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or
security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and
(c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information.31 They also contended that the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation
of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition.33 The trial
court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as
published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs,
Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her
life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG
could even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security
that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further
malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was
certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as
basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was
tasked to investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused
respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the
Zeñarosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of
information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from
respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the
benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their
official positions, information on her may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the
Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to
disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party
to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38 raising the
following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as either a
necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link
respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa Commission to
[sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an
agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present
substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b)
the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present
sufficient proof showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who
maintains a PAG.40
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Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to
dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the
gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41 She also
reiterates that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information
originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this
Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of
habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy;
and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a
long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional
sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy
as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members
of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender
to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to
various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear
witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate
to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in
Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the
Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code
makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,
and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on
privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases
supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion
or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court
underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to
state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation,
not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional
inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on
matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial
transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in
Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed
with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right
to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that
in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence.
Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection,51 this Court
can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced
the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to
protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as
a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a
restricted military security zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite personnel
control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register,
which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was
prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his
personal or political background would warrant his classification in the register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private
life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted
to an interference in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the
interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control
Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising
discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities.59 The following
statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social
need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia,
the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of
appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim
pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case,
the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
against the seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his
private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the
Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to
collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to
use this information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of
importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate interests
through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the
public service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in
the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20,
§§ 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to
his leading a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the
respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in
choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide
one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr.
Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of such
communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of
1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it
desirable that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of
the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the
control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in
the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2).
Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled
to consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual
interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was
subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
(Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of
whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in
this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and
the relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the state to
dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one police
force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a
national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of
an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony
or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents,
books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice,
the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of
its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take
all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions
accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those
individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the
Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an
unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.
Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the
fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released
information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system,
which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the
data mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence
gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the
accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities
that information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to
the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities."67

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential
nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting
reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were
responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she
was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs
the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding
by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege
of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc.
No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it
denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, v. ST.
THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of
himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
which he lives.
~ Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the “Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.”
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about
to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad
only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela)
on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne,
and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5cralawlawlibrary
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually
suggestive messages, language or symbols; and
6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high
school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated
and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal
Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed
a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from
implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises. On
March 25, 2012, petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as
an intervenor.
On March 28, 2012, defendants in Civil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing
printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to
which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following
considerations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity
before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of
laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have
known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and
not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called “immoral” and
were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of
the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.
To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and,
thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas data be issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender
and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data before or at the
preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and
digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally
obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5,
2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed
to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working
days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper
parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not
one where a writ of habeas data may issue; and (d) there can be no violation of their right to
privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quo held that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted,
STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of
the Rule on Habeas Data.10cralawlawlibrary
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a writ of habeas data should be
issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the
availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12cralawlawlibrary
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age.”13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the
existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15cralawlawlibrary
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
data petition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar, this requisite begs
this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and
promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial
barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in
OSNs leaves an indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the
end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before
addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearancesContrary to respondents’ submission,
the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ
of Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas
data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may
be filed by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse,
children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a
variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age.”17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the
Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction
of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or informationRespondents’ contention that the habeas data writ
may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party,
while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea
that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party
and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in
the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means
“to do or take part in something.”19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in
pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the
nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial
and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a
very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,
and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a
right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable
of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands
of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3)
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.23cralawlawlibrary
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays,
not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason
that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, “[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful
thinking.”24cralawlawlibrary
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in
the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January 30, 2013, recognized that “[t]he law has to
take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose
credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.” Consistent with this, the Court, by developing
what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that,
generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in
mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose
of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise
remained personal.
Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to
the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of
statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin
to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or “walls,” the contents of which are
under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post
anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether
he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining
popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking
sites, including the one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which,
according to its developers, people use “to stay connected with friends and family, to discover
what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them.”28cralawlawlibrary
Facebook connections are established through the process of “friending” another user. By sending
a “friend request,” the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and
all “Public” and “Friends Only” posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, the link is
established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s “Public” or “Friends Only” posts,
among others. “Friending,” therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships
with other users, whereby the user gives his or her “Facebook friend” access to his or her profile
and shares certain information to the latter.29cralawlawlibrary
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook
states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not fool-proof.”33cralawlawlibrary
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile
picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among
others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to
make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent
to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.”34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others,
coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the
spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes
more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through
the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto.35cralawlawlibrary
This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation
of privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37cralawlawlibrary
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his
or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise,
such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her
Facebook page and sets its privacy level at “Only Me” or a custom list so that only the user or a
chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never
chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip
these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to
keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook
users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit
the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of
privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures
and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their
Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under “very private” or “Only Friends” setting safeguarded
with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their
profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their
Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their
knowledge and consent. As petitioner’s children testified, it was Angela who uploaded the subject
photos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear
on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that “my students showed me some pictures
of girls clad in brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school
[students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still
many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these
students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various
photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’
i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook.”
In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure
to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the
photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their
statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42cralawlawlibrary
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private
posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the
Web page or the photograph itself.45chanrobleslaw
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that “[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.”
That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;”47
(2) A good number of Facebook users “befriend” other users who are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of “Friends” one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can “share”49 the former’s post, or “tag”50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook
friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her
own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at “Friends,” the initial audience
of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200
friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view
the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the “democratization of fame.”51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even
a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very
private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs
in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-
38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights,
contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated,
the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft
of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make
the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs
subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that
they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that “the best filter is the one between your children’s ears.”53 This means
that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers in general is the best means
of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace community member, one has to be
proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially
minors, fail. Responsible social networking or observance of the “netiquettes”56 on the part of
teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can
sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct
themselves sensibly in a public forum.57cralawlawlibrary
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be most timely. Too, it is not only
STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include
digital literacy and good cyber citizenship in their respective programs and curricula in view of the
risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore,
considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that
these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in
cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being
a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed
that “to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and
supervision.”59cralawlawlibrary
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be
responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced
the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process,
it violated the students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage in
cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to
exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to
give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or
information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online,
the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly,
information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding
relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot
afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines
of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use
them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available
privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for
changing these settings and the site’s layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors’ privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
G.R. No. 232395, July 03, 2018
PEDRO S. AGCAOILI, JR., ENCARNACION A. GAOR, JOSEPHINE P. CALAJATE, GENEDINE
D. JAMBARO, EDEN C. BATTULAYAN, EVANGELINE C. TABULOG, Petitioners, MARIA
IMELDA JOSEFA "IMEE" R. MARCOS, Co-Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
REPRESENTATIVE RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, THE HONORABLE REPRESENTATIVE JOHNNY
T. PIMENTEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LT. GEN. ROLAND DETABALI (RET.), IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SERGEANT-AT-ARMS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents, THE
COMMITTEE ON GOOD GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, Co-Respondent.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Styled as an Omnibus Petition,1 petitioners Pedro S. Agcaoili, Jr. (Agcaoili, Jr.), Encarnacion A.
Gaor (Gaor), Josephine P. Calajate (Calajate), Genedine D. Jambaro (Jambaro), Eden C.
Battulayan (Battulayan), Evangeline C. Tabulog (Tabulog) – all employees2 of the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte and storied as "Ilocos 6" – seek that the Court assume jurisdiction
over the Habeas Corpus Petition3 earlier filed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals
(CA),4 and upon assumption, to direct the CA to forward the records of the case to the Court for
proper disposition and resolution.
Co-petitioner Maria Imelda Josefa "Imee" Marcos – the incumbent Governor of the Province of
Ilocos Norte – joins the present petition by seeking the issuance of a writ of prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court for purposes of declaring the legislative investigation into House
Resolution No. 8825 illegal and in excess of jurisdiction, and to enjoin respondents
Representatives Rodolfo C. Fariñas (Fariñas) and Johnny T. Pimentel and co-respondent
Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability (House Committee) from further
proceeding with the same. Co-petitioner prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to restrain and enjoin respondents and co-
respondent from conducting any further hearings or proceedings relative to the investigation
pending resolution of the instant petition.
In common, petitioners and co-petitioner seek the issuance of a writ of Amparo to protect them
from alleged actual and threatened violations of their rights to liberty and security of person.
The Antecedents
On March 14, 2017, House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by respondent Fariñas, along with
Representatives Pablo P. Bondoc and Aurelio D. Gonzales, Jr., directing House Committee to
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on locally manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for
a purpose other than that provided for by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7171.6 The "whereas clause" of
House Resolution No. 882 states that the following purchases by the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Norte of vehicles in three separate transactions from the years 2011 to 2012 in the
aggregate amount of P66,450,000.00 were in violation of R.A. No. 7171 as well as of R.A. No.
9184 7 and Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 1445:8
a. Check dated December 1, 2011, "to cash advance the amount needed for the purchase of 40
units Mini cab for distribution to the different barangays of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers
hereto attached to the amount of ...." EIGHTEEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP18,000,000.00);
b. Check dated May 25,2012, "to cash advance the amount needed for the purchase of 5 units
Buses as per supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of ..." FIFTEEN MILLION THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP15,300,000.00), which were all second hand units; and
c. Check dated September 12, 2012, "to cash advance payment of 70 units Foton Mini Truck for
distribution to different municipalities of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers hereto attached in
the amount of ...." THIRTY TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP32,550,000.00).9
Invitation Letters10 dated April 6, 2017 were individually sent to petitioners for them to attend as
resource persons the initial hearing on House Resolution No. 882 scheduled on May 2, 2017. In
response, petitioners sent similarly-worded Letters11 dated April 21, 2017 asking to be excused
from the inquiry pending official instructions from co-petitioner Marcos as head of the agency.
Because of petitioners' absence at the May 2, 2017 hearing, a subpoena ad testificandum was
issued by co-respondent House Committee on May 3, 2017 directing petitioners to appear and
testify under oath at a hearing set on May 16, 2017.12 Likewise, an invitation was sent to co-
petitioner Marcos to appear on said hearing.13
Since the subpoena was received by petitioners only one day prior to the scheduled hearing,
petitioners requested that their appearance be deferred to a later date to give them time to prepare.
In their letters also, petitioners requested clarification as to what information co-respondent House
Committee seeks to elicit and its relevance to R.A. No. 7171.14 Co-petitioner Marcos, on the other
hand, submitted a Letter 15 dated May 15, 2017 seeking clarification on the legislative objective of
House Resolution No. 882 and its discriminatory application to the Province of Ilocos Norte to the
exclusion of other virginia-type tobacco producing provinces.
Petitioners failed to attend the hearing scheduled on May 16, 2017. As such, the House
Committee issued a Show Cause Order16 why they should not be cited in contempt for their
refusal without legal excuse to obey summons. Additionally, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos
were notified of the next scheduled hearing on May 29, 2017.17
In response to the Show Cause Order, petitioners reiterated that they received the notice only one
day prior to the scheduled hearing date in alleged violation of the three-day notice rule under
Section 818 of the House Rules Governing Inquiries.19 Co-petitioner Marcos, on the other hand,
reiterated the queries she raised in her earlier letter.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Nevertheless, at the scheduled committee hearing on May 29, 2017, all the petitioners
appeared.20 It is at this point of the factual narrative where the parties' respective interpretations of
what transpired during the May 29, 2017 begin to differ.
Legislative hearing on May 29, 2017 and the contempt citation
On one hand, petitioners allege that at the hearing of May 29, 2017, they were subjected to threats
and intimidation.21 According to petitioners, they were asked "leading and misleading questions"
and that regardless of their answers, the same were similarly treated as evasive.22
Specifically, Jambaro claims that because she could not recall the transactions Fariñas alluded to
and requested to see the original copy of a document presented to her for identification, she was
cited in contempt and ordered detained.23 Allegedly, the same inquisitorial line of questioning was
used in the interrogation of Gaor. When Gaor answered that she could no longer remember if she
received a cash advance of P18,600,000.00 for the purchase of 40 units of minicab, Gaor was
likewise cited in contempt and ordered detained.24
The same threats, intimidation and coercion were likewise supposedly employed on Calajate when
she was asked by Fariñas if she signed a cash advance voucher in the amount of P18,600,000.00
for the purchase of the 40 units of minicabs. When Calajate refused to answer, she was also cited
in contempt and ordered detained.25
Similarly, when Battulayan could no longer recall having signed a cash advance voucher for the
purchase of minicabs, she was also cited in contempt and ordered detained.26
Agcaoili, Jr. was likewise cited in contempt and ordered detained when he failed to answer
Fariñas's query regarding the records of the purchase of the vehicles.27 Allegedly, the same
threats and intimidation were employed by Fariñas in the questioning of Tabulog who was similarly
asked if she remembered the purchase of 70 mini trucks. When Tabulog replied that she could no
longer remember such transaction, she was also cited in contempt and ordered detained.28
On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioners were evasive in answering questions and
simply claimed not to remember the specifics of the subject transactions. According to
respondents, petitioners requested to be confronted with the original documents to refresh their
memories when they knew beforehand that the Commission on Audit (COA) to which the original
vouchers were submitted could no longer find the same.29
Proceedings before the CA
The next day, or on May 30, 2017, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondent House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali (Detabali) before the CA. The
CA scheduled the petition for hearing on June 5, 2017 where the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) entered its special appearance for Detabali, arguing that the latter was not personally
served with a copy of the petition.30 On June 2, 2017, the CA in its Resolution31 issued a writ
of Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the bodies of the petitioners before the court on
June 5, 2017.
On June 5, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. Instead, the Deputy Secretary General of the
House of Representatives appeared to explain that Detabali accompanied several members of the
House of Representatives on a Northern Luzon trip, thus his inability to attend the scheduled
hearing.32 A motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also filed on the ground that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the petition.33
On June 6, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on petitioners'
constitutional right to bail. Detabali, through the OSG, opposed the motion.34
At the hearing set on June 8, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. On June 9, 2017, the CA
issued a Resolution35 denying Detabali's motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus and
granting petitioners' Motion for Provisional Release upon posting of a bond. Accordingly, the CA
issued an Order of Release Upon Bond.36 Attempts to serve said Resolution and Order of Release
Upon Bond to Detabali were made but to no avail.37
On June 20, 2017, the House of Representatives called a special session for the continuation of
the legislative inquiry.38 Thereat, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued to compel co-petitioner
Marcos to appear at the scheduled July 25, 2017 hearing.39
The tension between the House of Representatives and the CA
During the June 20, 2017 hearing, House Committee unanimously voted to issue a Show Cause
Order against the three Justices of the CA's Special Fourth Division,40 directing them to explain
why they should not be cited in contempt by the House of Representatives.41 The House of
Representatives was apparently dismayed over the CA's actions in the Habeas Corpus Petition,
with House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez quoted as calling the involved CA Justices "mga gago"
and threatening to dissolve the CA.42 Disturbed by this turn of events, the involved CA Justices
wrote a letter dated July 3, 2017 addressed to the Court En Banc deferring action on certain
pending motions43 and administratively referring the same to the Court for advice and/or
appropriate action.
Meanwhile, in the Habeas Corpus Petition, Detabali moved for the inhibition of CA Justices
Stephen Cruz and Nina Antonio-Valenzuela while CA Justice Edwin Sorongon voluntarily inhibited
himself.44
Subsequent Release of Petitioners and Dismissal of the Habeas Corpus Petition by the CA
On July 13, 2017 and while the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA,
petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
During the congressional hearing on July 25, 2017 which petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos
attended, and while the present Omnibus Petition is pending final resolution by the Court,
respondent House Committee lifted the contempt order and ordered the release of petitioners.
Consequently, petitioners were released on the same date.45 Respondent House Committee held
the continuance of the legislative hearings on August 9, 2017 and August 23, 2017.46
On August 31, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas Corpus Petition considering the
case as closed and terminated on the ground of mootness.47
The Arguments
For the assumption of jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition
Petitioners insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending before the CA can be transferred
to the Court on the strength of the latter's power to promulgate rules concerning the pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts and its authority to exercise jurisdiction over all courts as
provided under Sections 148 and 5(5),49 Article VIII of the Constitution.
Additionally, petitioners stress that the Court exercises administrative supervision over all courts
as provided under Section 6,50 Article VIII of the Constitution, and pursuant to its authority as such,
the Court has the power to transfer cases from one court to another which power it implements
through Rule 4, Section 3(c)51 of AM No. 10-4-20-SC.52
Citing People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez, et al.,53 petitioners likewise argue that the
administrative power of the Court to transfer cases from one court to another is based on its
inherent power to protect the judiciary and prevent a miscarriage of justice.54
Respondents counter that the Omnibus Petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness
as petitioners were released from detention.
In any case, respondents argue that petitioners cannot compel the Court to assume jurisdiction
over the Habeas Corpus Petition pending before the CA as assumption of jurisdiction is conferred
by law. Respondents also argue that the Omnibus Petition is dismissible on the grounds of
misjoinder of action and for failure to implead indispensable parties, i.e., the CA in the petition to
assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition and the Congress in the prohibition
and Amparo petitions. Respondents also argue that petitioners committed forum shopping when
they filed the present Omnibus Petition at a time when a motion for reconsideration before the CA
was still pending resolution.
For the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition
Co-petitioner Marcos assails the nature of the legislative inquiry as a fishing expedition in violation
of petitioners' right to due process and is allegedly discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte.
Respondents counter that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to enjoin legislative
actions. House Committee is not a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or
ministerial function but a separate and independent branch of government. Citing Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,55 and The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Hon.
Majaducon,56 respondents argue that prohibition does not lie against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.
For the issuance of a Writ of Amparo
Petitioners contend that their rights to liberty and personal security were violated as they have
been detained, while co-petitioner Marcos is continuously being threatened of arrest.57
In opposition, respondents maintain that the writ of Amparo and writ of Habeas Corpus are two
separate remedies which are incompatible and therefore cannot co-exist in a single petition.
Further, respondents argue that the issuance of a writ of Amparo is limited only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances which are not extant in the instant case.
The Issues
Encapsulated, the issues for resolution are:
1. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of petitioners from
detention was rendered moot by their subsequent release from detention?
2. Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition then pending
before the CA?
3. Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882 may be enjoined by
a writ of prohibition?
4. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of action for the issuance
of a writ of Amparo?58
Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the Omnibus Petition.
I.
The Petition to Assume Jurisdiction
over Habeas Corpus Petition
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
The release of persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was
filed renders the petition for the issuance thereof moot and academic
59
The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" was devised as a "speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom."60 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal."61 Under the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.62
As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective, case law63 deems any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action as sufficient. Thus, as provided in the Rules of Court under
Section 1, Rule 102 thereof, a writ of Habeas Corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 102 spells the instances when the writ of Habeas Corpus is not
allowed or when the discharge thereof is authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or
of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court64 because since then, the restraint
has become legal.65 In the illustrative case of Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,66 the Court dismissed
the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of mootness considering the filing of an information
before the court. The court pronounced that since the incarceration was now by virtue of a judicial
order, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies.
Like so, in Duque v. Capt. Vinarao,67 the Court held that a petition for habeas corpus can be
dismissed upon voluntary withdrawal of the petitioner. Further, in Pestaño v. Corvista,68 it was
pronounced that where the subject person had already been released from the custody
complained of, the petition for habeas corpus then still pending was considered already moot and
academic and should be dismissed. This pronouncement was carried on in Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 34,69 where the Court reiterated that the release of the persons in whose behalf
the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the
writ becomes moot and academic.70 Thus, with the subsequent release of all the petitioners from
detention, their petition for habeas corpus has been rendered moot. The rule is that courts of
justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual
interests are involved and thus, will not determine a moot question as the resolution thereof will be
of no practical value.71
Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal deprivation of freedom
of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the
absence of confinement and custody, the courts lack the power to act on the petition for habeas
corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must be refused.
Any lingering doubt as to the justiciability of the petition to assume jurisdiction over the Habeas
Corpus Petition before the CA is ultimately precluded by the CA Resolution considering the
petition closed and terminated. With the termination of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA,
petitioners' plea that the same be transferred to this Court, or that the Court assume jurisdiction
thereof must necessarily be denied.
Nevertheless, the Court, in exceptional cases, decides moot questions
Although as above-enunciated, the general rule is that mootness of the issue warrants a dismissal,
the same admits of certain exceptions.
In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,72 the Court summed up the four exceptions to the rule
when Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, thus: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.73 At the least, the presence of the second and fourth exceptions to the general rule in the
instant case persuades us to proceed.
The Court's administrative supervision over lower courts does not equate to the power to
usurp jurisdiction already acquired by lower courts
Jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus and the adjunct authority to issue the writ are shared
by this Court and the lower courts.
The Constitution vests upon this Court original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus.74 On
the other hand, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Big. 129,75 as amended, gives the CA original jurisdiction
to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.76 The CA's
original jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus petitions was re-stated in R.A. No. 7902.77 Similarly, B.P.
Blg. 129 gives the RTCs original jurisdiction in the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus.78 Family
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the CA in petitions for habeas corpus where
the custody of minors is at issue,79 with the Family courts having exclusive jurisdiction to issue the
ancillary writ of Habeas Corpus in a petition for custody of minors filed before it.80 In the absence
of all RTC judges in a province or city, special jurisdiction is likewise conferred to any Metropolitan
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge or Municipal Circuit Trial Judge to hear and decide petitions for
a writ of Habeas Corpus.81
These conferment of jurisdiction finds procedural translation in Rule 102, Section 2 which provides
that an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus may be made before this Court, or any member
thereof, or the Court of Appeals or any member thereof, and if so granted, the same shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.82 An application for a writ of Habeas Corpus may also be
made before the RTCs, or any of its judges, but if so granted, is enforceable only within the RTC's
judicial district.83 The writ of Habeas Corpus granted by the Court or by the CA may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before the RTC or any judge thereof for
hearing and decision on the merits.84
It is clear from the foregoing that this Court, the CA and the RTC enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus. As the Habeas Corpus Petition was filed by petitioners with the CA,
the latter has acquired jurisdiction over said petition to the exclusion of all others, including this
Court. This must be so considering the basic postulate that jurisdiction once acquired by a court is
not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.85 A departure
from this established rule is to run the risk of having conflicting decisions from courts of concurrent
jurisdiction and would unwittingly promote judicial interference and instability.
Rule 102 in fact supports this interpretation. Observe that under Section 6, Rule 102, the return of
the writ of Habeas Corpus may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.86 In such
case, the lower court to which the writ is made returnable by the issuing court shall proceed to
decide the petition for habeas corpus. In Medina v. Gen. Yan87 and Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz,
etc.,88 the Court held that by virtue of such designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and
authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]" Indeed, when a court
acquires jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus, even if merely designated to hear the
return of the writ, such court has the power and the authority to carry the petition to its conclusion.
Petitioners are without unbridled freedom to choose which between this Court and the CA should
decide the habeas corpus petition. Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford the parties
absolute freedom to choose the court to which the petition shall be filed. After all, the hierarchy of
courts "also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs."89
Further, there appears to be no basis either in fact or in law for the Court to assume or wrest
jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition filed with the CA.
Petitioners' fear that the CA will be unable to decide the Habeas Corpus petition because of the
assault90 it suffered from the House of Representatives is unsubstantiated and therefore
insufficient to justify their plea for the Court to over-step into the jurisdiction acquired by the CA.
There is no showing that the CA will be or has been rendered impotent by the threats it received
from the House of Representatives.91 Neither was there any compelling reason advanced by
petitioners that the non-assumption by this Court of the habeas corpus petition will result to an
iniquitous situation for any of the parties.
Neither can the Court assume jurisdiction over the then pending Habeas Corpus Petition by
invoking Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 3(c), Rule 4 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC
which both refer to the Court's exercise of administrative supervision over all courts.
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.
This Constitutional provision refers to the administrative supervision that the Department of Justice
previously exercised over the courts and their personnel. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission enlighten:
MR. GUINGONA: x x x.
The second question has reference to Section 9, about the administrative supervision over all
courts to be retained in the Supreme Court. I was wondering if the Committee had taken into
consideration the proposed resolution for the transfer of the administrative supervision from the
Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice. But as far as I know, none of the proponents had been
invited to explain or defend the proposed resolution.
Also, I wonder if the Committee also took into consideration the fact that the UP Law Constitution
Project in its Volume I, entitled: Annotated Provision had, in fact, made this an alternative proposal,
the transfer of administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice.
Thank you.
MR. CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner Regalado?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
We did invite Minister Neptali Gonzales, who was the proponent for the transfer of supervision of
the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice. I even personally called up and sent a letter or a short
note inviting him, but the good Minister unfortunately was enmeshed in a lot of official
commitments. We wanted to hear him because the Solicitor General of his office, Sedfrey Ordofiez,
appeared before us, and asked for the maintenance of the present arrangement wherein the
supervision over lower courts is with the Supreme Court. But aside from that, although there were
no resource persons, we did further studies on the feasibility of transferring the supervision over
the lower courts to the Ministry of Justice. All those things were taken into consideration motu
proprio.92
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Administrative Supervision in Section 38, paragraph 2, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Administrative
Code is defined as follows:
(2) Administrative Supervision.—(a) Administrative supervision which shall govern the
administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or
other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the authority of the department or its
equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities;
or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official
functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to
review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them[.]
Thus, administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the operations of agencies to ensure
that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically, but without interference with day-
to-day activities.93
Thus, to effectively exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts as prescribed
by the Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842,
created the Office of the Court Administrator. Nowhere in the functions of the several offices in the
Office of the Court Administrator is it provided that the Court can assume jurisdiction over a case
already pending with another court.94
Rule 4, Section 3(c) of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, on the other hand provides:
Sec. 3. Administrative Functions of the Court. - The administrative functions of the Court en
banc consist of, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(c) the transfer of cases, from one court, administrative area or judicial region, to another,
or the transfer of venue of the trial of cases to avoid miscarriage of justice[.] (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the administrative function of the Court to transfer cases is a matter of venue, rather than
jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the import of the Court's pronouncement
in Gutierrez95 is the recognition of the incidental and inherent power of the Court to transfer the
trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so
demands.96 Such incidental and inherent power cannot be interpreted to mean an authority on the
part of the Court to determine which court should hear specific cases without running afoul with
the doctrine of separation of powers between the Judiciary and the Legislative.
II.
The Petition for Prohibition
Under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government
Respondents principally oppose co-petitioner Marcos' petition for prohibition on the ground that a
writ of prohibition does not lie to enjoin legislative or quasi-legislative actions. In support thereof,
respondents cite the cases of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association97 and The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee.98
Contrary to respondents' contention, nowhere in The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee did the Court
finally settle that prohibition does not lie against legislative functions.99 The import of the Court's
decision in said case is the recognition of the Constitutional authority of the Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and provided
that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Thus, if
these Constitutionally-prescribed requirements are met, courts have no authority to prohibit
Congressional committees from requiring the attendance of persons to whom it issues a subpoena.
On the other hand, the Court's pronouncement in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association should be
taken in its proper context. The principal relief sought by petitioners therein was the invalidation of
the implementing rules issued by the National Government Center Administration Committee
pursuant to its quasi-legislative power. Hence, the Court therein stated that prohibition is not the
proper remedy but an ordinary action for nullification, over which the Court generally exercises not
primary, but appellate jurisdiction.100
In any case, the availability of the remedy of prohibition for determining and correcting grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Legislative and
Executive branches has been categorically affirmed by the Court in Judge Villanueva v. Judicial
and Bar Council,101 thus:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors
of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.102 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
The above pronouncement is but an application of the Court's judicial power which Section
1,103 Article VIII of the Constitution defines as the duty of the courts of justice (1) to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and (2) to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Such innovation under
the 1987 Constitution later on became known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and
"expanded jurisdiction," respectively.104
While the requisites for the court's exercise of either concept of jurisdiction remain constant, note
that the exercise by the Court of its "expanded jurisdiction" is not limited to the determination of
grave abuse of discretion to quasi-judicial or judicial acts, but extends to any act involving the
exercise of discretion on the part of the government. Indeed, the power of the Court to enjoin a
legislative act is beyond cavil as what the Court did in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives
Committees on Public Information, et al.105 when it enjoined therein respondent committees from
conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation on the notorious "Hello Garci" tapes for failure to comply
with the requisite publication of the rules of procedure.
Co-petitioner Marcos failed to show that the subject legislative inquiry violates the
Constitution or that the conduct thereof was attended by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
While there is no question that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative functions, the Court finds
no justification for the issuance thereof in the instant case.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is expressly
provided by the Constitution under Section 21, Article VI thereof, which provides:
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
(Emphasis ours)
Even before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the Court in Arnault v. Nazareno106 recognized
that the power of inquiry is an "essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function."107 In Senate of the Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita,108 the Court categorically
pronounced that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch, as
in the instant case.109
Although expansive, the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is not without limitations. Foremost, the inquiry must be in furtherance of a legitimate task of the
Congress, i.e., legislation, and as such, "investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory
evidence and punish those investigated" should necessarily be struck down.110 Further, the
exercise of the power of inquiry is circumscribed by the above-quoted Constitutional provision,
such that the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected."111 It is jurisprudentially settled that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must
be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against
one's self.
In this case, co-petitioner Marcos primordially assails the nature of the legislative inquiry as a
fishing expedition in alleged violation of her right to due process and to be discriminatory to the
Province of Ilocos Norte. However, a perusal of the minutes of legislative hearings so far
conducted reveals that the same revolved around the use of the Province of Ilocos Norte's shares
from the excise tax on locally manufactured virginia-type cigarettes through cash advances which
co-petitioner Marcos herself admits112 to be the "usual practice" and was actually allowed by the
Commission on Audit (COA).113 In fact, the cause of petitioners' detention was not the perceived or
gathered illegal use of such shares but the rather unusual inability of petitioners to recall the
transactions despite the same having involved considerable sums of money.
Like so, co-petitioner Marcos' plea for the prevention of the legislative inquiry was anchored on her
apprehension that she, too, will be arrested and detained by House Committee. However, such
remains to be an apprehension which does not give cause for the issuance of the extraordinary
remedy of prohibition. Consequently, co-petitioner Marcos' prayer for the ancillary remedy of a
preliminary injunction cannot be granted, because her right thereto has not been proven to be
clear and unmistakable. In any event, such injunction would be of no useful purpose given that the
instant Omnibus Petition has been decided on the merits.114
III.
The Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo
The filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo before this Court while the
Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA was still pending is improper
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and
directly intervene through the writ of Amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz, et al. v. Hon. Judge Del
Rosario, et al.,115 thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and
directly intervening through a writ of Amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that
the right to life, liberty or security — the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect — is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a
pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of
the writ with a separately filed criminal case.116 (Italics in the original)
Thus, while there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition for habeas
corpus and a petition for Amparo,117 the peculiarity of the then pendency of the Habeas
Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this Court for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo inappropriate.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
The privilege of the writ of Amparo is confined to instances of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof
Even if the Court sets aside this procedural faux pas, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos failed to
show, by prima facie evidence, entitlement to the issuance of the writ. Much less have they
exhibited, by substantial evidence, meritorious grounds to the grant of the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,118 the Court
categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, and jurisprudentially defined these two
instances, as follows:
[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.119 (Citations omitted)
The above definition of "enforced disappearance" appears in the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearances120 and is as statutorily defined in Section 3(g)121 of R.
A. No. 9851.122 Thus, in Navia, et al. v. Pardico,123 the elements constituting "enforced
disappearance," are enumerated as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.124
In Lozada, Jr., et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,125 the Court reiterates that the privilege
of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful
act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.126
Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant Omnibus Petition does not
cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. Thus, on this ground alone,
their petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is dismissible.
Despite this, petitioners insist that their rights to liberty and security were violated because of their
unlawful detention. On the other hand, co-petitioner Marcos seeks the protective writ of Amparo on
the ground that her right to liberty and security are being threatened by the conduct of the
legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882. But even these claims of actual and threatened
violations of the right to liberty and security fail to impress.
To reiterate, the writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the (1) right to life; (2) right to
liberty; and (3) right to security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
In Rev. Fr. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, et al.,127 the Court had occasion to expound on the rights
falling within the protective mantle of the writ of Amparo, thus:
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules
thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court explained the concept of right to
life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a
guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a
life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.
Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to,
will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property ...
pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense,
the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life,
his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual."
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,
in this manner:
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x x x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., thoroughly expounded on the import of
the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of
this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." x x x Some scholars postulate that
"freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international
human right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from
fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to
the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range
from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from
one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character
or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the
"right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with
violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right
to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity
or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones
body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the
context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical
intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in
criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the
bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus
to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x.128 (Citations omitted and
emphasis and italics in the original)
Nevertheless, and by way of caution, the rule is that a writ of Amparo shall not issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, every petition for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo should be supported by justifying allegations of fact, which the Court in Tapuz129 laid
down as follows:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed.130 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
Even more telling is the rule that the writ of Amparo cannot be issued in cases where the alleged
threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.131
In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has effectively ceased upon their
subsequent release from detention. On the other hand, the apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos
that she will be detained is, at best, merely speculative. In other words, co-petitioner Marcos has
failed to show any clear threat to her right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ
of Amparo.
In Mayor William N. Mamba, et al. v. Leomar Bueno,132 the Court held that:
Neither did petitioners and co-petitioner successfully establish the existence of a threat to or
violation of their right to security. In an Amparo action, the parties must establish their respective
claims by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere
imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
charged.133
Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even attended and participated in the
subsequent hearings on House Resolution No. 882 without any untoward incident. Petitioners and
co-petitioner Marcos thus failed to establish that their attendance at and participation in the
legislative inquiry as resource persons have seriously violated their right to liberty and security, for
which no other legal recourse or remedy is available. Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a
writ of Amparo must be dismissed.
IV.
Congress' Power to Cite in Contempt
and to Compel Attendance of Court Justices
It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the events surrounding the filing of the present
Omnibus Petition bear the unsavory impression that a display of force between the CA and the
Congress is impending. Truth be told, the letter of the CA Justices to the Court En Banc betrays
the struggle these CA Justices encountered in view of the Congressional power to cite in contempt
and consequently, to arrest and detain. These Congressional powers are indeed awesome. Yet,
such could not be used to deprive the Court of its Constitutional duty to supervise judges of lower
courts in the performance of their official duties. The fact remains that the CA Justices are non-
impeachable officers. As such, authority over them primarily belongs to this Court and to no other.
To echo the Court's ruling in Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez:134
[T]he Supreme Court [has] administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of
this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.135
It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined under the Constitution
that urges the Court to carefully tread on areas falling under the sole discretion of the legislative
branch of the government. In point is the power of legislative investigation which the Congress
exercises as a Constitutional prerogative.
Concomitantly, the principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic postulates for
exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for excluding the Judiciary's
privileged and confidential documents and information from any compulsory processes which very
well includes the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of legislation.136 Such exemption has been
jurisprudentially referred to as judicial privilege as implied from the exercise of judicial power
expressly vested in one Supreme Court and lower courts created by law.137
However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is not without limitations. The invocation of the
Court's judicial privilege is understood to be limited to matters that are part of the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory functions and
duties. For the guidance of the bench, the Court herein reiterates its Per
Curiam Resolution138 dated February 14, 2012 on the production of court records and attendance
of court officials and employees as witnesses in the then impeachment complaint against former
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, insofar as it summarized the documents or communications
considered as privileged as follows:
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on
each case included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to pending cases,
except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to
Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC);
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before the Court;
(3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in particular, documents
and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e, notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and
similar papers;
(4) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the
course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their
term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be
disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by the
court to the general public.
xxxx
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
By way of qualification, judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to the Judiciary's
deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. Justice Antonio T. Carpio discussed in his Separate
Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, by way of example, the non-confidential matters as
including those "information relating to the commission of crimes or misconduct, or violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, or any violation of a law or regulation," and those outside the
Justices' adjudicatory functions such as "financial, budgetary, personnel and administrative
matters relating to the operations of the Judiciary."

As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial power, is principally for
the effective discharge of such judicial power. If the matter upon which Members of the Court,
court officials and employees privy to the Court's deliberations, are called to appear and testify do
not relate to and will not impair the Court's deliberative adjudicatory judicial power, then judicial
privilege may not be successfully invoked.

The Court had occasion to illustrate the application of the rule on judicial privilege and its
qualifications to impeachment proceedings as follows:

[W]here the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice may be called as a
witness in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter external to or is not
connected with the adjudicatory functions and duties of a magistrate. A Justice, however, may not
be called to testify on the arguments the accused Justice presented in the internal debates as
these constitute details of the deliberative process.139

Nevertheless, the traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat a positive
Constitutional duty. Impeachment proceedings, being sui generis,140 is a Constitutional process
designed to ensure accountability of impeachable officers, the seriousness and exceptional
importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial privilege.

To be certain, the Court, in giving utmost importance to impeachment proceedings even as

against its own Members, recognizes not the superiority of the power of the House of
Representatives to initiate impeachment cases and the power of the Senate to try and decide the
same, but the superiority of the impeachment proceedings as a Constitutional process intended to
safeguard public office from culpable abuses. In the words of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereneo in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, the matter of
impeachment is of such paramount societal importance that overrides the generalized claim of
judicial privilege and as such, the Court should extend respect to the Senate acting as an
Impeachment Court and give it wide latitude in favor of its function of exacting accountability as
required by the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in
the Omnibus Petition.

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
July 4, 2017
G.R. No. 231658
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO,
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 231771
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A.
COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG, RENATO REYES, JR.,
CRISTIN A E. PALABAY, AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE
ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE
i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO,
MAE PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D.
LIM, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 231774
NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI,
ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA
ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a
state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law x x x';
WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that
'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives';
WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent
acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in
Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain
government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and
started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly
attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to
maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to
sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other
parts of Mindanao.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a
period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the
aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
Seventeen.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. In more
recent years, we have witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the
authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the
Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among
others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group
(ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute Group.1
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the
high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These
groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. As narrated in the
President's Report:
On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG,
and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with
armed resistance which escalated into open hostility against the government. Through these
groups' armed siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities,
institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and
political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was
intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in
Mindanao.
Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of
around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in
furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has
extensive networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah
Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by the
DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its publication of a video footage declaring its allegiance
to the DAESH. Reports abound that foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical support to the
Maute Group.
The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the groups' clear intention to
establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the
President, foremost - of their powers and prerogatives.2
In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017
in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus, to wit:
• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with their sympathizers, commenced
their attack on various facilities - government and privately owned - in the City of Marawi.
• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jail being manage by the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its main gate, and assaulted on-
duty personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed, tied, and/or locked inside the cells.
• The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two [2] prisoner vans
and private vehicles).
• By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted, and sporadic gunfights
were heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the power outage had spread citywide. (As of 24
May 2017, Marawi City's electric supply was still cut off, plunging the city into total black-out.)
• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of the Maute Group ambushed and burned the
Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Station was also taken.
• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed during the takeover of the Marawi
City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail.
• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas to evacuate.
• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo,
and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these groups. They threatened to bomb the bridges to pre-
empt military reinforcement.
• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupied several areas in Marawi
City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street, Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the following
barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi, Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong, Marantao,
Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and Abubakar.
• These lawless armed groups had likewise set up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan
City-Marawi City junction.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
• Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria
Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages
were taken from the church.
• About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had been reportedly killed by the
lawless groups.
• Other educational institutions were also burned, namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino College
Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.
• The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there, among
other several locations. As of 0600H of 24May 2017, members of the Maute Group were seen
guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital. They held hostage the employees of the
Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office located thereat.
• The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital, which they
later set ablaze.
• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered
one of its armored vehicles.
• Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) of Marawi City has been
infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As of
the time of this Report, eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces and the Philippine National
Police have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others have been seriously wounded.
• There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching for Christian communities in
Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes
and forcing young male Muslims to join their groups.
• Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP, there exists a strategic
mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities,
perpetrating killings of government personnel, and committing armed uprising against and open
defiance of the government.3
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to
conclude that -
These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups'
seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province
covering the entire Mindanao.
The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further
expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members
throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the
brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.
There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his
power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control
over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments,
bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed;
and remove his supervisory powers over local govemments.4
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals,
brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel,
particularly in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the
civilians, viz.:
Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their
reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have
been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road
blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic
services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government
from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel
to and from the city is likewise hindered.
The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by
foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden
other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in
Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao.5
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it
plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible
tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the
easy access it provides to other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used
provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.
Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals,
and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal:
absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive
action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national integrity.6
The President ended his Report in this wise:
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going
rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled.7
In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military and police
authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives relative to the
declaration of martial law.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No.
3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to
be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate
declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate thus resolved as
follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by way of the sense of the
Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law. The Senate hereby supports fully Proclamation No.
216 and finds no compelling reason to revoke the sarne.9
The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House of
Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING THE FULL
SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS
IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED 'DECLARING A
STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'.
The Petitions
A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano,
Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition11 Under the Third
Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that
acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is
to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its
territory.13 It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying
areas as mere propaganda114 and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance
to the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief Executive of the assertion and exercise of his
powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the Maute Group is a mere private army, citing
as basis the alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly
mentioned that the Maute Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand
theatrically to inflate perceived capability".15 The Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing,
representatives of the military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor deny the
presence of an ISIS threat in the country but that they merely gave an evasive answer16 that "there
is ISIS in the Philippines".17 The Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr.
himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the
government in its bid to capture Hapilon.18 Based on said statement, it concludes that the objective
of the Maute Group's armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute brothers from
the government forces, and not to lay siege on Marawi City and remove its allegiance to the
Philippine Republic.19 It then posits that if at all, there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City
which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a valid ground for the
declaration of martial law.20
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual
basis because the President's Report containef "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic
accounts".21
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked Amai Pakpak
Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber (Dr. Saber), the hospital's
Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute Group merely brought an injured member to the
hospital for treatment but did not overrun the hospital or harass the hospital personnel. 22 The
Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's Report that a branch of the Landbank of
the Philippines was ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered. It alleges that the bank
employees themselves clarified that the bank was not ransacked while the armored vehicle was
owned by a third party and was empty at the time it was commandeered.23 It also labels as false
the report on the burning of the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School. It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of
May 24, 2017 and that according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central
Elementary Pilot School was not burned by the terrorists.24 Lastly, it points out as false the report
on the beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, and the occupation of the
Marawi City Hall and part of the Mindanao State University.25
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao
del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the Zamboanga
siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for the proclamation of martial
law. It contends that these events either took place long before the conflict in Marawi City began,
had long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been arrested.26
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual
basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military establishment or
any ranking official27 before making the proclamation.
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial law lacks sufficient
factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of the Whole of
the House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in pre-empting
the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there
was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of foreign
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only a meager number
of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.29
Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to: (1)"exercise its
specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient
factual basis.30
31
In a Resolution dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment on the Lagman
Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.
On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and 231774 were filed
and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658.32
B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)
33
The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII" of the Constitution, likewise seeks
the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient
factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration. 34
In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to
events happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that
Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the entire
Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege that
public safety requires the imposition o martial law in the whole of Mindanao".36
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel
groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property"37 does not rise to the level of
rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao.38 It also posits that there is no
lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.39
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel groups" in the last
Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these rebel groups
and specify the acts of rebellion that they were supposedly waging.40
In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the
Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the Amai Pakpak Hospital, the
ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the killing of five teachers of Dansalan College
Foundation, and the attacks on various government facilities.41
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as
unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the Court find justification for the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City, to declare the
same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao.42
C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)
The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual
Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as "a special proceeding"44 or an "appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen"45 authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort46 and should be invoked
by the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary
powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the
armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally,
the power to declare martial law.48 It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose
which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and
commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.49
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the
imposition of martial law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a
public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial law
can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x
is compelled by the needs of public safety"52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.
Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Congress, to wit:
that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that they have the capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities of their powers and prerogatives; and that the Marawi
armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are
conclusions bereft of substantiation.53
The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and without
waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail the
sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency ofthe factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions,
[and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".54 Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative
assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is shifted to and lies on the
respondents.55 It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to divulge relevant
information"56 in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review, "compel
respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao"57 and declare as
unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.
The Consolidated Comment
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
The respondents' Consolidated Comment58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as required by the Court.
Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of the 119th anniversary of the independence
of this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) felt that "defending the constitutionality
of Proclamation No. 216" should serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to unite behind one true
flag and defend it against all threats from within and outside our shores".59
The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the
authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial
law.60 The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the
exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle,
mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted
to. The OSG suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section 18, Article VII may
be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or 5,
of Article VIII.61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review power is not mandatory, but
discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 The Court has the discretion not to give due course
to the petition.63
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse of
discretion"64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness,
should be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the petitioners to prove
that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.1âwphi1 It thus takes issue with petitioners'
attempt to shift the burden of proof when they asked the Court "to compel [the] respondents to
present proof on the factual basis"66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who alleges must
prove"67 and that governmental actions are presumed to be valid and constitutional.68
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the
trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the
decision was made.69 It argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be
examined not based on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare
martial law because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an
impossible standard.70 It reiterates that the President's decision should be guided only by the
information and data available to him at the time he made the determination.71 The OSG thus
asserts that facts that were established after the declaration of martial law should not be
considered in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law.
The OSG suggests that the assessment of after-proclamation facts lies with the President and
Congress for the purpose of determining the propriety of revoking or extending the martial law.
The OSG fears that if the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to
determine whether martial law should be revoked or extended.72
It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence reports
coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;73 and that he could not be expected to
personally determine the veracity of thecontents of the reports.74 Also, since the power to impose
martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation
from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or
affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts cited by
the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely citing news
reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the
happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay evidence, twice
removed,"75 and thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the "legal
presumption bestowed on governmental acts".76
Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the petitioners. However, the OSG
still endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied upon by the President "if only to remove any doubt
as to the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216".77
The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail in the
Court's Ruling.
ISSUES
The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as follows:
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus:
a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National
Defense;
c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;
3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null
and void:
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region;
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the
President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao 1 region;
8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and
the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and supplemental
memoranda.
OUR RULING
I. Locus standi of petitioners.
One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question is brought
before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it."79 As a general rule, the
challenger must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."80 Over the years, there has been a trend
towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of
Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the
suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer."81
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the
Republic;"82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all
women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City".83 In the Lagman Petition, however,
petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing's citizens but merely referred to
themselves as duly elected Representatives.84 That they are suing in their official capacities as
Members of Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion considering the issuance by the
House of Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support to President
Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution, the House of
Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the martial law declaration, which is in direct contrast to the views and arguments being espoused
by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of
the rules on legal standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions,
the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, "the
Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of
a [bona fide] case or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing]
could compel assumption of jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of
the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine
citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider
them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents did not question
petitioners' legal standing.
II. Whether or not the petitions are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph
3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required
by the Court.
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.87 It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.88
The Court agrees.
a) Jurisdiction must be
specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by law.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the
law.89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative
act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution.
It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied
from the language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It must appear clearly from the law or it will not
be held to exist.91
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
b) "In an appropriate
proceeding" does not refer to a
petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5
of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18,
Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in
a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article
VII.
c) Purpose/significance of
Section 18, Article VII is to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
martial law ruling in In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution
to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Lansang,92 to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely
within the ambit of judicial review.
"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of
the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct
relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper
subjects of inquiry."93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand
Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court
decisions during that period upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule
part of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the Constitutional Commission,
very much aware of these facts, went about reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a
view to dismantling what had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula
included revised grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them,
the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action.94 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda95 that the authority to
decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive
upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the
factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is not a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.96 However, in
1983, or after the declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court,
in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted
to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the President to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry.98
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987
Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
d) Purpose of Section 18,
Article VII is to provide additional
safeguard against possible abuse by
the President on the exercise of the
extraordinary powers.
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.99 This is
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on
whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress. Thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is
vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has
strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular, phrase. May we be informed of
his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I
understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the
President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a
maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the
judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even
during those first 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past administration, if we give exclusive
right to the President to determine these factors, especially the existence of an invasion or
rebellion and the second factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I
call the attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past administration.
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of the
Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of
the Constitution, wherein he made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision:
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the
Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines
by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order No. 3, also promulgated by
Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said,
among other things:
Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton destruction of lives and properties,
widespread lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now prevailing throughout the
country, which condition has been brought about by groups of men who are actively engaged in a
criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the Philippines in order to take over the
government by force and violence, the extent of which has now assumed the proportion of an
actual war against our people and the legitimate government ...
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declare
martial law in our country without justifiable reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the
deletion of the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the
Congress'?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr.Marcos, he is undoubtedly an
aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be
another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as
the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis
because the paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review,
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof
and must promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests
of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion
as against the rights of citizens. And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972
when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned.100
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only
placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing
any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or
suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any
citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or
suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate
proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited
period of 30 days from date of filing.
e) Purpose of Section 18,
Article VII is to curtail the extent of
the powers of the President.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not
placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive
Department.
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia
Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-
year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the
office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions
which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition
of martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of the writ even after
the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be
exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period
not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or
proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More
importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding
jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction
of the courts to adjudicate.
For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military
tribunals over civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I
state that this constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written during my
tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases.101
f) To interpret "appropriate
proceeding" as filed under Section 1
of Article VIII would be contrary to
the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of
the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably,
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In
other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
g) Jurisdiction of the Court is
not restricted to those enumerated in
Sections I and 5 of Article VIII
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section
4, Article VII.102 The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).103
h) Unique features of the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should
be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different
rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers.
The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has
to promulgate its decision.
A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and
defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of
opposing judgments, and of executing."104 In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding"
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
III. The power of the Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to give! deference to the actions of the two
co-equal branches of the Government: on' the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief, in
resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216
and not revoking the same.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the
President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
a) The judicial power to review
versus the congressional power to
revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke
the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available
prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look
into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could
probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is
automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of
the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
b) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the judicial
power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional
power to revoke.
If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and
Congress with veto powers independently from each other, we quote the following exchange:
MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be safeguards that
Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation.
MR. RAMA. Yes.
MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested or that the
Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declare that such a proclamation was not
warranted?
xxxx
MR. REGALADO. May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not exactly just
standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately
be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall also review the factual basis. x x x107
c) Re-examination of the
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, reconsider, and set
aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo108 to the effect that:
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that
the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.109
xxxx
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or
suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions
challenging the President's action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. x x x110
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and
surrendered the same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse,
the Court considered' itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case
Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside
in this proceeding.111
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default
on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency
of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
of the President's decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation.
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the
armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c) declaring martial
law.112 These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-Chief by
revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of activating them, the
scope of the powers, and review of presidential action."113
a) Extraordinary powers of the
President distinguished.
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves
ordinary police action.114 The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power
to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115 the only limitations being that he acts within
permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not
subject to judicial review."117
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring
martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety
requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1)
a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and
possible nullification by the Supreme Court."118
The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger
thereof' as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration
of martial law.119 They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of
abuse;"120 besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent
danger."121
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called
upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains,
the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more
difficult to restore order and enforce the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent
safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court.123
b) What really happens during martial law?
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens during the
imposition of martial law? What powers could the President exercise during martial law that he
could not exercise if there is no martial law? Interestingly, these questions were also discussed by
the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What
precisely does martial law add to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first
and second lines in this provision state:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies...
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the
case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the
President automatically has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the principle
of separation of powers.
The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave to
that question in the Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of a
commanding general in a theatre of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the
President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have the effect of
law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during the period of martial law. In
other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was
developed especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater of
war.124
xxxx
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of
martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in international
law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in
the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military commander is
authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil
courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no
case can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of
war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.
MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified
critical area.
FR. BERNAS. That is correct.
MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-
Chief.
FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The
understanding here is that the phrase 'nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians' has reference to the practice under the Marcos regime where
military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow that
except in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes necessary for
some kind of court to function.125
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power,
with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which
for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the
control of the State.126
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's
(Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated
that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the
"(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x
x".128
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give him
unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of
civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in
place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or
offenses connected with invasion.129
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties,130 the
Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.
c) "Graduation" of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope
and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by
which the Commander-in-Chief must
adhere to.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of
'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial
law."131 It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope
and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict
the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-
in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the
situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which
among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the
part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his
prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity
of the State.132
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.
d) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the Congress
not to interfere a priori in the
decision-making process of the
President.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of
the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial review does not include the
calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be availed of in a given
situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the requirement of
congressional concurrence in the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege.133
MR. PADILLA.x x x
We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial law should not require
beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the Members of the Congress. However, as
provided by the Committee, the Congress may revoke, amend, or shorten or even increase the
period of such suspension.134
xxxx
MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first
imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the Members of Congress because
the provision says 'in case of actual invasion or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion,
as Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because there
is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical because the roads
might be blocked or barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority
of all Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical as I can
see it.
Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question and no longer a
political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that
there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x135
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase 'and,
with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the Members of the Congress...'
MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would be an
exclusive prerogative of the President?
MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days may be
shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the next sentence says that the Congress or
the Senate may even revoke the proclamation.136
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this means that he is
vesting exclusively unto the President the right to determine the factors which may lead to the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has
strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be informed of
his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I
understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the
President has to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a
maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the
judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation always exists, even
during those first 60 days.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an
aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be
another Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as
the Gentleman mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis because
the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must
promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to balance the interests
of the country. And here we are trying to balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion
as against the rights of citizens. x x x
MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?
MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos. What
we are looking for are safeguards that arereasonable and, I believe, adequate at this point. On the
other hand, in case of invasion or rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is
to protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that there should be a
concurrence on the part of the Congress, which situation is automatically terminated at the end of
such 60 days.
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative
check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under those
conditions.
MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority?
MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of
Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will be able to act quickly in order to
deal with the circumstances.
MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency?
MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the country in the
event of an invasion or a rebellion.137
The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow Congress to
interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.
e) The Court must similarly
and necessarily refrain from
calibrating the President's decision of
which among his extraordinary
powers to avail given a certain
situation or condition.
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time
element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of 1
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires
it, and is no longer under threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for
the President to act quickly to protect the country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus
accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by
the Constitution to the Executive Department.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
j) The recommendation of the
Defense Secretary is not a condition
for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other
high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain
reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the
decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly
so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.
g) In any event, the President
initially employed the most benign
action - the calling out power -
before he declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial
law on May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued Proclamation No. 55 on September 4,
2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in
fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing
presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his
part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the President made
the conscious anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his extraordinary
powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the armed
hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the
situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and
exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to
actual rebellion and public safety requires it.
V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may
be considered vague and thus void because of (a)
its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the
absence of any guideline specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region.
Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of
the phrase "other rebel groups"139 in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines
specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making the
proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.
This argument lacks legal basis.
a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."140 "[A] statute or act may be
said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle."141
b) Vagueness doctrine applies
only in free speech cases.
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.142 A facial challenge
is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible
"'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who
does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may
simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or
vague law thus chills him into silence."143
It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech cases.
They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the
reason as follows:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that ' [w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
xxxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal
statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that'one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context,
like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.' x x x 145
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in striking down
statutes entirely on the ground that they might beapplied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected.146 "Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile
abstract context having no factual concreteness."147
c) Proclamation No. 216
cannot be facially challenged using
the vagueness doctrine.
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted.
Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
that may be facially challenged.148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,149 the facial review of Proclamation
No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a state of national
emergency, on ground o vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading of Proclamation No.
10171 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-related1 conduct. It is
actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Like Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
d) Inclusion of "other rebel
groups " does not make Proclamation
No.216 vague.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.
In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated that:
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down an ordinance that had made it illegal for 'three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk
and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly, the
ordinance imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in advance what annoys
some people but does not annoy others.'
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act whose obscurity is evident
on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language - but
which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased - in which case, it may be
'saved' by proper construction.151
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses.
e) Lack of guidelines/
operational parameters does not
make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the ground that it
has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region.
Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information
or data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or
suspension. And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the review will be confined to the
proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued
after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said
orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations,
should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into
these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for
Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No.
216 will (a) have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts
of the President in calling out the armed forces to
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
of the Mindanao region.
a) The calling out power is in a
different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state
of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55
dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National 1
Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the
Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere
in the Philippines.
152
In Kulayan v. Tan, the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different
category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to
declare martial law:
x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with
the revocation or review of the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation
and review without any qualification.153
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently
of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law,
although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as
in this case.
Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the
Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,154 the President's exercise of his
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
may only be examined by the Court as to whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.155
In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines had failed to
sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any specific
injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order deploying
the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis.156
This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege ofthe writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional
design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the Court,157 without the need to
prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the
questioned Presidential act/s.
But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration of martial
law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's exercise of his calling out power
through Proclamation No. 55.
b) The operative fact doctrine.
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the
President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is
recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.158
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: 'When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no
rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications,
however. As the American Supreme Court stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a
determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect to particular regulations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and
provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under
the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative
attitude of theemerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which
the more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive
order, or ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be indisputable. What is more appropriate
and logical then than to consider it as 'an operative fact?' (Emphasis supplied)159
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that
would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling rebellion or
invasion, and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise.
VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.
a) The scope of the power of
review under the 1987 Constitution
refers only to the determination of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus.
To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang,160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can inquire into, within
proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or compliance with the constitutionally-
imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.162 "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of
arbitrariness."163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper bounds" in Lansang as follows:
What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts? The Court first gave the
general answer that its power was 'merely to check - not to supplant - the Executive, or
to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the
Court said that its power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil or criminal cases
elevated thereto by appeal...in which cases the appellate court has all the powers of the courtof
origin,' nor to its power of quasi-judicial administrative decisions where the Court is limited to
asking whether 'there is some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the Court
accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the
President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified
the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.'164
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing
only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in
fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
b) The "sufficiency of factual
basis test".
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987
Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the
Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision
is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual
bases.
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the
introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the
review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the
determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such,
must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he
made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as
well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should
be from the present depends on the President.
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as
these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the
President.165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include and
what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the urgency of
the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and
confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the
written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since
these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be
used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual
basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the
Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President
to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that
only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not
only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency
powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to
"immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the
President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not
impossible, to curtail.
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as
credible evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment,167 as
appears to be the case here.
At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:
President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information given to her by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, considering that the matter of the
supposed armed uprising was within their realm of competence, and that a state of emergency
has also been declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the
'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to the public safety
warranting a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ.
Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before declaring martial law or
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in
establishing the fact of rebellion. The President is called to act as public safety requires.168
Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim
martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's
review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been accurately reported to him.
After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand
during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the
Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60
days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and,
this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration.169
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of
and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not
enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are
other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an
actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient
factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on whether the President acted
within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at
the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
VIII. The parameters for determining the
sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration
of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
a) Actual invasion or rebellion,
and public safety requirement.
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.
As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is construed to
have the same technical or legal meaning.171 Since the Constitution did not define the term
"rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).172
During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under Article 134 of
the RPC:
MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer
imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual shooting or actual
attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary
event - this Manila Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee
consider that an actual act of rebellion?
MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an armed public uprising
for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under Article 135. x x x173
Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under
Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create confusion but would
also give the President wide latitude of discretion, which may be abused - a situation that the
Constitution see k s to prevent.174
Article 134 of the RPC states:
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public
uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory
of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b)
to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives."175
b) Probable cause is the
allowable standard of proof for the
President.
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is
probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is
being committed.176 To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise
of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the
standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of
declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most
expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of
rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because
unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the President
and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement of probable
cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed x x x by the accused."177
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and
3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall nowproceed to the core of the
controversy - whether Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis.
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of
accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the
factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must
also be reiterated that martial law is a matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should be
accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he
received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land,
naval or other armed forces or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.178
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City.179 However, they insist
that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable
political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i)
the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed
forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives.
The contention lacks merit.
a) Facts, events and
information upon which the President
anchored his decision to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at 10:00 PM,180 the
Court will consider only those facts and/or events which were known to or have transpired on or
before that time, consistent with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or
events were deemed to have been considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216,
as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:
1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on
account of lawless violence in Mindanao;181
2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including:
a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur m February 2016, killing
and wounding several soldiers;
b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades of the
Maute Group and other detainees;
3. On May 23, 2017:183
a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi; 15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS;199

c) Burning of certain government and private facilities; 16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to ISIS;200

d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government; 17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical support to the Maute Group;201

e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and 18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:

f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG attacked various
damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao; and the government and privately-owned facilities;202
Report184 submitted to Congress:
b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the Marawi City Jail; facilitated the
1. Zamboanga siege;185 escape of inmates; killed a member of PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel and/or
locked them inside the cells; confiscated cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles;203
2. Davao bombing;186
c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city-wide power outage by
3. Mamasapano carnage;187 evening;204

4. Cotabato bombings;188 d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the Marawi Police Station;
commandeered a police car;205
5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;189
e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected areas;206
6. Sulu bombings;190
f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was taken by
191 the rebels;207
7. Basilan bombings;
g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi
8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance by combined forces of ASG junction;208
and the Maute Group;192
h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in
9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops;193
the church, and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony;209

10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and establishments but
i) taking of hostages from the church;210
civilians as well;194
j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College foundation;211
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations which paralyzed Marawi City;195
k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi Central Elementary Pilot
12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a School;212
DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province;196
1) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213
13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat-ready;197
m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214
14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local armed groups;198
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital;215
o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeering an armored
vehicle;216
p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians;217
q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes;218
r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and
s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in
Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of government personnel1 ,
and committing armed uprising against and open defiance of the Government.220
b) The President's Conclusion
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following
conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives
to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting
the crime of rebellion."221
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly
constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing
Mindanao - starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur - from its allegiance to the Government
and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws
of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice,
and detriment of the people therein and the nation as a whole."222
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an
Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities - the President,
foremost - of their powers and prerogatives. "223
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the
groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or
province covering the entire Mindanao."224
5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to
further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members
throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the
brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government."225
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his
power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control
over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments,
bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed;
and remove his supervisory powers over local governments."226
7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their
reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have
been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The bridge and road
blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver basic
services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government
from restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel
to and from the city is likewise hindered."227
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by
foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden
other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in
Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao."228
9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals,
and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal:
absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive
action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national
integrity."229
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which
was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of
proof.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As Justice
Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such amount of proof as to
unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her from exercising such powers.
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify
conviction.

Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of
proof required for convicting an accused charged with a criminal offense.x x x
xxxx
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence, and to require the President
to establish the existence of rebellion or invasion with such amount of proof before declaring
martial law or suspending the writ amounts to an excessive restriction on 'the President's power to
act as to practically tie her hands and disable her from effectively protecting the nation against
threats to public safety.'
Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either criminal or civil cases, is
indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This amount of proof
likewise unduly restrains the President in exercising her emergency powers, as it requires proof
greater than preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt.
Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most reasonable, most practical,
and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-
existence of rebellion, necessary for a declaration of martial law x x x230
c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
falsities, and hyperboles.
The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report
are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is
not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so
would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.
Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-evidence.231
FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVIDENCE

Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof necessary in civil cases, is (1) that the Maute group attacked Amai Pakpak Statements made by:
demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law. Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there, (a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the Hospital
among several locations. As of 0600H of 24 (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial;
May 2017, members of the Maute Group were (c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt. Dionardo
xxxx
seen guarding the entry gates of the Amai Carlos;
Pakpak Hospital and that they held hostage the (d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co. Edgard
Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two opposing sides, before she employees of the Hospital and took over the Arevalo; and
can act and impose martial law or suspend the writ unreasonably curtails the President's PhilHealth office located thereat (Proclamation (e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra denying
emergency powers. No. 216 and Report); that the hospital was attacked by the Maute
Group citing online news articles of Philstar,
Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction on the President's use of her Sunstar, Inquirer, and Bombo Radyo.232
emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the amount of proof required in administrative or
quasi-judicial cases, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as 2. that the Maute Group ambushed and burned Statements made by PNP Director General
adequate to justify a conclusion. the Marawi Police Station (Proclamation No. Ronald dela Rosa and Marawi City Mayor Majul
216 and the Report); Gandamra in the online news reports of ABS-
CBN News and CNN Philippines233 denying that
I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion or rebellion suffices and the Maute group occupied the Marawi Police
satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ. Station.

Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a criminal information by the 3. that lawless armed groups likewise Statement made by the bank officials in the on-
prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge. Probable cause has been defined ransacked the Landbank of the Philippines and line news article of Philstar234 that the Marawi
as a 'set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to commandeered one of its armored vehicles City branch was not ransacked but sustained
believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been (Report); damages from the attacks.
committed by the person sought to be arrested.'
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot Statements in the on-line news article of Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report;
School was burned (Proclamation No. 216 and Philstar235 made by the Marawi City Schools along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more
the Report); Division Assistant Superintendent Ana Alonto likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or
denying that the school was burned and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be precise, the alleged false and/or
Department of Education Assistant Secretary inaccurate statements are only five out of the severa1 statements bulleted in the President's
Tonisito Umali stating that they have not Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the
received any report of damage. oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal
knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no question or challenge with
5. that the Maute Group attacked various Statement in the on-line news article of respect to the reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the
government facilities (Proclamation No. 216 and Inquirer236 made by Marawi City Mayor Majul conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without
the Report). Gandamra stating that the ASG and the Maute sufficient factual basis.
Terror Groups have not taken over any
government facility in Marawi City. Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's imposition of
martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate, simulated, false
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the and/or hyperbolic.
internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof It
was not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances X. Public safety requires the declaration of
proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
proving the truth of the matter asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal force to the Mindanao.
Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news articles238 as basis for their claim of
insufficiency of factual basis. Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a
Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid,
these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In
indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis, stands. Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against
civilians and their properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats
d) Ruling in Bedol v. were issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set up;244 schools and churches were
Commission on Elections not burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or Christians were
Applicable. targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their group;248 medical services and delivery
of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement
were hindered;250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.251
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections,239 news reports may be
admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners' reliance on this
case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already escalated to a
statement, which is an ·exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial."240 Here, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared:
question is not whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but rather whether what they
said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no application While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going
here. rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
e) There are other independent Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is completely quelled.252
facts which support the finding that,
more likely than not, rebellion exists Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and
and that public safety requires it. suspension of the privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with.
Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
XI. Whole of Mindanao
a) The overriding and
paramount concern of martial law is
the protection of the security of the
nation and the good and safety of the
public.
Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience martial law under the Marcos
regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at nothing
from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional writers
entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary power
and thus, once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law
albeit in its diluted form.
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are necessary
for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is "precautionary , and although it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the
purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the entire country and our
sovereign people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal
enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."254
Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and promotes public
safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must
likewise be present.
b) As Commander-in-Chief, the
President receives vital, relevant,
classified, and live information which
equip and assist him in making
decisions.
In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the basis for
Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely than not,
shows that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated, the President believes
that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public safety warrants the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving at such a conclusion,
relied on the facts and events included in the Report, which we find sufficient.
To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive
or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief,
the President has possession of documents and information classified as "confidential", the
contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security.
These documents may contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels,
stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and
sympathizers, etc. , In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some information
came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report. But then again, the discretion
whether to include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the President. In
fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the
assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the President."255
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified documents. "It is
for the President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified
evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety demands the suspension of
the writ."256 Significantly, respect to these so-called classified documents is accorded even "when
[the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed."257
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the
right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with
his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
c) The Court has no machinery
or tool equal to that of the
Commander-in-Chief to ably and
properly assess the ground
conditions.
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President. However, this
should not be considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, this is in line with the function
of the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination by the Court of the
sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the
Report and Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,258 cautioned
not to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the Court
will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the
Executive Department will have to open its findings to the Court,260 which it did during the closed
door session last June 15, 2017.
d) The 1987 Constitution
grants to the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage
or application of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to
the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part
thereof under martial law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,
particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live
information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President
has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of what is
happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application,
which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or
area of coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the
assessment of the President.
e) The Constitution has
provided sufficient safeguards against
possible abuses of Commander-in-
Chief's powers; further curtailment of
Presidential powers should not only
be discouraged but also avoided.
Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial law would
engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution cannot project a
stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context of our society should
outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law should not
be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial
to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the
survival of our country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies
but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be
cast aside, or its scope and potency limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated
assumptions.
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which
effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the
powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the previous regime."261 Not
only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at
60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto
powers of the Court and Congress.
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted
his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law from a new perspective by
elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed safeguards:
MR. MONSOD. x x x
Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere declaration of martial law for
a fixed period not exceeding 60 days, which is subject to judicial review, is going to result in
numerous violations of human rights, the predominance of the military forever and in untold
sufferings. Madam President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion. We may not have any
freedom to speak of after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the concurrence of Congress. That
might prevent the President from acting at that time in order to meet the problem. So I would like
to suggest that, perhaps, we should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only looking at a
very specific case. We are only looking at a case of the first 60 days at its maximum. And we are
looking at actual invasion and rebellion, and there are other safeguards in those cases.262
Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough safeguards against
presidential abuses and commission of human rights violations. In voting yes for the elimination of
the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote II yes is that despite my concern for
human rights, I believe that a good President can also safeguard human rights and human lives as
well. And I do not want to unduly emasculate the powers of the President. Xxx263
Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam President.
x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very high and delicate
nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power, and the power to
impose martial law is certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the
Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3)
the Supreme Court can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated Commissioner
Monsod, it is said that the power to impose martial law is dangerous to liberty and may be abused.
All powers may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point
out any other hands in which this power will be more safe and at the same time equally effectual.
When citizens of the State are in arms against each other and the constituted authorities are
unable to execute the laws, the action of the President must be prompt or it is of little value. x x
x264 (Emphasis supplied)
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the Commander-in-
Chief of his extraordinary powers are already in place and that no further emasculation of the
presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards. The Constitution recognizes
that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the presidential powers would not
generate any good among the three co-equal branches, and to the country and its citizens as a
whole. Thus:
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of these
encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual invasion or rebellion,
given an intractable Congress that may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually
impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a
revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. x x
x265 (Emphasis supplied)
f) Rebellion and public safety;
nature, scope, and range.
It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against
the government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or multitudes,
involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined bounds."267 We
understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by
exact metes and bounds.
To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura,
Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the guards, entered
the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e., they want to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of the Philippines,
particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.
Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion, could we
validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely not. The
possibility that there are other rebels positioned in the nearby buildings or compound of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be
discounted. There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside
the Court's compound.
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS
is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact, they were merely
lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out that for the crime
of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants should congregate
in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms against the government
for the attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of the contingent gathered
and formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising against the government.
Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on which the armed public uprising
actually to6k place should be the measure of the extent, scope or range, of the actual I rebellion.
This is logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or elsewhere, whose participation
did not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as engaging in the crime
of rebellion.
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after finding probable
cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety requires it, declares martial law and
suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Metro Manila, could we then say that the
territorial coverage of the proclamation is too expansive?
To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine the
territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the prerogative
whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There is no
constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where the armed
public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial law is an
urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As such, the
President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for
another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could impose martial law thereat. If that
is the case, then the President would have to wait until every remote corner in the country is
infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this is
not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to impose martial law
only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired,
he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the
coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within
predetermined bounds.
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the
prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from
significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is
an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not
be physically measured by metes and bounds.
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be limited to
the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique
characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of
rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed in one single crime of
rebellion."269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance".270 Direct
assault,271 murder,272 homicide,273 arson,274 robbery,275 and kidnapping,276 just to name a few, are
absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a
basis of a separate charge."277 Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common crimes may be
absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No.
1829]278 which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense".279 "All crimes, whether
punishable under a special law or general law, which are me e components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.280
Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if committed in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, is
stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This all the more
makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place where the armed public
uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura could only be the nerve
center of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening in Makati City.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion to
the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public safety have
no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise measurements;
hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from arbitrary,
not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these limitations when it granted the
President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial scope of martial law.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place
where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger
of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi
City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different
parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is
actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the
exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
g) The Court must stay within
the confines of its power.
The Court can only act within the confines of its power.1âwphi1 For the Court to overreach is to
infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application
belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the
principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican
system."281
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine
the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace.
It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the
territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of
martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that more than ten thousand
souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would have
to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be
arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu,
Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
(BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no military background and
technical expertise to predict that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to
determine which part of Mindanao would best serve as forward operating base of the military in
their present endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate
whether the 60-day lifespan of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in
Mindanao. It is on this score that the Court should give the President sufficient leeway to address
the peace and order problem in Mindanao.
Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President is goaded into
using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot"282 by attempting to impose another
encumbrance; after all "the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is essentially an executive act."283
Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein in, or give the
President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of reminder of the nation's experience under the
Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to judge President Duterte based on the ills some
of us may have experienced during the Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the Court quotes the
insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:
MR. OPLE. x x x
xxxx
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with rendering the executive branch of
the government impotent, as though by reducing drastically the powers of the executive, we are
rendering a service to human welfare. I think it is also important to understand that the
extraordinary measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical state of
war existing in this country when national security will become a common bond of patriotism of all
Filipinos, especially if it is an actual invasion or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to
be given a minimum flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of a nation. I
think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in any manner, shunned the task
of putting these powers under a whole system of checks and balances, including the possible
revocation at any time of a proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite
determination of these extraordinary powers, subject only to another extension to be determined
by Congress in the event that it is necessary to do so because the emergency persists.
So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is completely responsible; it is attuned to
the freedom and the rights of the citizenry. It does not render the presidency impotent and, at the
same time, it allows for a vigorous representation of the people through their Congress when an
emergency measure is in force and effect.284
h) Several local armed groups
have formed linkages aimed at
committing rebellion and acts in
furtherance thereof in the whole of
Mindanao.
With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the South." 285 On
April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of Marawi."286 The city's first name,
"Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal', meaning a destination point or rendezvous.
Literally, it also means arrival or coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the
Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi City thereby making Marawi City the point
of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion,
both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao.
As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining
Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to
establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23,
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao,
such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder
of military and police personnel,289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of
truth to the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City. Consider these:
a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in Barangay Campo Uno,
Lamita City, Basilan. A civilian was killed while another was wounded.290
b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan Island, Taganak,
Tawi-Tawi.291
c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah, Albarka, Basilan
resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of three others.292
d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED explosions by the
BIFF in Mindanao. These resulted in the death and wounding of several personalities.293
e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu.294
f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights between rebels and
government troops.295
g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel Besconde.296
h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him three days later.297
There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by the ASG and
other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has already spilled over to
other parts of Mindanao.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among
rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined
only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the
Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless
bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot
simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the
President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law, as well as the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most
necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.
i) Terrorism neither negates
nor absorbs rebellion.
It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for decades. While
some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to violent extremism
and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader
scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed.299 However, while the scope of terrorism may be
comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is to sow and
create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear is traditionally achieved through
bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast, the purpose of
rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any
body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the
malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the
Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other hand,
the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the
crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled that the President did not err in
believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as
terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as
the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of
terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the extraordinary powers of the
President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or
diminish such powers.
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion and
terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA 9372 does
not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of the predicate
crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements.300
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity or
correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we espouse, advocate or
champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the Filipino people, are confronted with a
crisis of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity and act as
one undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month and only
God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the casualties of the war
are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels as against 71
government troops and 44 civilians.

Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our differences
and prejudices?

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216
and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
G.R. No. 167569 September 4, 2009 These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit9 for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T.
CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner, Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
vs. represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent. indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy,
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as
"FChinese." Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He
G.R. No. 167570 also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner, untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign
vs. Affairs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,10 averring that the complaint for deportation
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their
business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and
G.R. No. 171946 insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of
a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV,
Section 1, paragraph 411 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 62512 (Com. Act No.
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of the BUREAU OF 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having
IMMIGRATION; ATTY. FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their capacity as executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although the said oath
Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners, and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration
vs. was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Respondent. 1955 elections.13 He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien,
alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit
DECISION precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent
Ilonggo and Tagalog.14
QUISUMBING, J.:
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he maintained that
Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions for review on certiorari such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil
to set aside the October 25, 2004 Decision1 and February 16, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Registrar’s Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed the Decision3 dated January 6, 2004 and entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his father’s
Order4 dated May 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that
2218 upholding the preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.15 As regards the entry in his
corresponding Charge Sheet5 dated July 3, 2001, and the deportation proceedings thereunder siblings’ certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese,
conducted. Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with
his father.16
On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on certiorari, seeks to set aside the
December 8, 2005 Decision6 and March 13, 2006 Resolution7 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP In a Resolution17 dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla
No. 88277. dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed
the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s
father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine
Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to
Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy,
consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution8 dated February
making him a Filipino as well.
26, 2007.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that
Carlos’ election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine
citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board
directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of
violating Section 37(a)(9)19 in relation to Section 45(c)20 of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as
The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,21 as amended, committed as follows:
xxxx
1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy
of his birth certificate wherein his citizenship was recorded as "Chinese";
2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to subsequently cover
up his true and actual citizenship as Chinese and illegally acquired a Philippine Passport
under the name JAIME T. GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, in violation of the above-cited provisions of the Immigration Act[;]
3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially represent[ed] and
introduce[d] himself as a citizen of the Philippines, for fraudulent purposes and in order to
evade any requirements of the immigration laws, also in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.22
On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition23 with
application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA No.
2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of
Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had therein. In essence, they challenged
the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision24 dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117,
ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby Orders the
apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and that he be then deported to
CHINA of which he is a citizen, without prejudice, however, to the continuation of any and all
criminal and other proceedings that are pending in court or before the prosecution arm of the
Philippine Government, if any. And that upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered barred from entry
into the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.25
In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for
certiorari and prohibition26 before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue,
enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision.27 Later, however, the trial court
dissolved the writ in a Decision28 dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the
petition.
Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.29
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of
deportation30 which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas
corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.31
Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution
denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was
merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.32 It did not find merit in their argument that the issue
of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that
neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines
and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim
that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and
hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine their citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never extended to
the Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to one’s claim of Philippine citizenship. Like
the trial court, the appellate tribunal found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship within
the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it held that
the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance in
September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of
allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not
satisfactorily explained.
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The
Court of Appeals stated that the trial court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal
bases warranting the deportation proceeding in order to determine whether the Board acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court
found that due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board, contrary to
the claim of Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been
denied,33 Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court,
respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Immigration Their motion for reconsideration40 having been denied on March 13, 2006, Hon. Alipio Fernandez,
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation No. AFF-04-00334 dated in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and
November 16, 2004 to carry out the April 17, 2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of Immigration, are
resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan before this Court as petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.
Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.35
The parties have raised the following grounds for their respective petitions:
On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus36 before the RTC
of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and G.R. No. 167569
detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.
I.
In an Order37 dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the
remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation
order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
this was also denied by the trial court in an Order38 dated December 28, 2004. (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN
THE PERSON OF PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
II.
appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the
court. The Court of Appeals held as follows: … GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER CARLOS GO
SR.’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF
EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO
xxxx
DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE COURT A
…the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any proof whatsoever of his QUO.
violation of the bail conditions [that he was previously granted] is arbitrary, inequitable and unjust,
for the policies governing the grant of his bail should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said
III.
bail. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, yet
considering that it is such a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person who all his life has always lived in the Philippines, where he has A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
established his family and business interests, one who appears to be not completely devoid of any
claim to Filipino citizenship, being the son of a Filipina, whose father is alleged to also have IV.
elected to be a Filipino, the constitutional right of such person to due process cannot be
peremptorily dismissed or ignored altogether, and indeed should not be denied. If it later turns out ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD
that the petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the overly eager Immigration authorities would have COMPLIED WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF COM. ACT NO. 625.
expelled and relegated to statelessness one who might in fact be a Filipino by blood.
V.
xxxx
PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE "PRESUMPTION OF CITIZENSHIP."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with reference to the Warrant of Deportation
issued by the BID is hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, through
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., Atty. Faizal Hussin and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of VI.
their deputized agents, are ENJOINED from deporting petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T.
Gaisano, until the issue of petitioner’s citizenship is finally settled by the courts of justice. RESPONDENT’S "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.41

SO ORDERED.39 G.R. No. 167570

SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
(B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN
THE PERSON OF PETITIONER’S FATHER, CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS
FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
III.
THE B.I.D.’S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER JIMMY T. GO HAD
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
IV.
… GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER’S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE
PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO
DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D.42
G.R. No. 171946
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ENJOINING RESPONDENT’S
DEPORTATION.43
Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause of action of the Bureau
against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (b) whether the deportation proceedings are null and
void for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein; (c) whether the evidence
adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and
sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in
order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage; (d) whether due
process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board; and (e) whether the petition
for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are merely a rehash of the
arguments they adduced before the appellate tribunal and the trial court. Once again, they raised
the same argument of prescription. As to Carlos, it is his position that being recognized by the
government to have acquired Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued
to him on September 11, 1956, his citizenship could no longer be questioned at this late date. As
for Jimmy, he contends that the Board’s cause of action to deport him has prescribed for the
simple reason that his arrest was not made within five (5) years from the time the cause of action
arose, which according to him commenced in 1989 when he was alleged to have illegally acquired
a Philippine passport.
In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be nullified altogether for failure to
implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein. Jimmy posits that the deportation case against
him was made to depend upon the citizenship of his father, Carlos, in that the Board found
justification to order his deportation by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen even though
the latter was never made a party in the deportation proceedings. They argue that the Board could
not simply strip Carlos of his citizenship just so they could question the citizenship of Jimmy. To do
so without affording Carlos the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine
citizenship would be the height of injustice. For failing to accord him the requisite due process, the
whole proceeding should perforce be stuck down.
While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien, they
insist that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is so substantial
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct, like in this case. Their claim
to Philippine citizenship, they said, is clearly shown by the fact that they were born, had been
raised and had lived in this country all their lives; they speak fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo; they
engage in businesses reserved solely for Filipinos; they exercise their right to suffrage; they enjoy
the rights and privileges accorded only to citizens; and they have no record of any Alien Certificate
of Registration. More importantly, they contend that they were validly issued Philippine passports.
They further posit that the judicial intervention required is not merely a judicial review of the
proceedings below, but a full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules of
evidence are strictly observed.
Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to present controverting
arguments to sustain his claim to Philippine citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that according to
him, he was never impleaded in the deportation proceedings.
Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine of jus soli failed to
accord him Philippine citizenship for the reason that the same was never extended to the
Philippines. He insists that if his Philippine citizenship is not recognized by said doctrine, it is
nonetheless recognized by the laws enforced prior to the 1935 Constitution, particularly the
Philippine Bill of 190244 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law of
1916).45
According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands as well as their children born after the passage of said laws to be citizens
of the Philippines. Because his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of
the passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his father’s citizenship.
Article IV, first paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies to him. Said constitutional
provision reads:
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
xxxx
Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he followed the
citizenship of his Filipina mother, being an illegitimate son, and that he even validly elected
Philippine citizenship when he complied with all the requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits
that what is being disputed is not whether he complied with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the
timeliness of his compliance. He stresses that the 3-year compliance period following the
interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice46 to Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must be made, is not an inflexible rule. He
reasoned that the same decision held that such period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his
case.47
We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable.
Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put
into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections,48 we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.49 Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts,
leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not
be precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same
has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
Jimmy’s invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b) of Com. Act No. 613
states:
Section 37. …
xxxx
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section at any time after
entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises….
xxxx
As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section 37(a)(9),50 in relation to
Section 45(e)51 of Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing provision, his deportation may be
effected only if his arrest is made within 5 years from the time the cause for deportation arose. The
court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from July 18,
2000, the time when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the
action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of
prescription.52 Additionally, Section 2 of Act No. 3326,53 as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
xxxx
The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued because the
government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the government been aware at
such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or there were certain anomalies attending his
application for such passport, it would have denied his application.
As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an indispensable
party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who
shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant.54 To be indispensable, a person must first be a real
party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.55 Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does
not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation
of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be decided on is the
propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under Section
1(3),56 Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen.57 Since
his citizenship hinges on that of his father’s, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of
the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos’ citizenship will in no way prejudice
him.
Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res
judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that
every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.58 Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if
the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same
has to be ascertained once again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no
preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he
cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case.
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation
case against a deportee and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by
him.60 However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the
primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation
Board61 wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts
themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.62 Moreover,
when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings.63
While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the
sound discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings.64 After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is
not divested by the mere claim of citizenship.65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen
and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts,
after the deportation proceedings.66 The decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not
final but subject to review by the courts.671avvphi1
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same
was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings
considering that what were presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those
of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore,
like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as
additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of
whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular
courts is a question of fact which is beyond this Court’s power of review for it is not a trier of
facts.68 None of the exceptions69 in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to
exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented once
again, the same conclusion will still be reached.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus
soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We
agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s
citizenship.70 However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan
Chong v. Secretary of Labor.71 Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were
individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken
application of jus soli.72
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 190273 nor the Jones Law of 191674 make Carlos a citizen of the
Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time
of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality.75 Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform
any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself.76 However, it is our considered view that absent any
evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established
rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino
citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."77
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the
time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3)
years from reaching the age of majority.78
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as
when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered
view that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year
period. The fact that Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate
such belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the
other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election of
Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this
jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent
himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.79
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.80
As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented
substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Board’s jurisdiction over the
deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is
not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of
citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a
judicial determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings should not be
enjoined.
In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not observed in the
deportation proceedings must likewise fail.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings.81 The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.82 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.83 Although Jimmy was not furnished
with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found
that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence, thus:
x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001 signed by BSI
Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when his
representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about the said Order, the latter chanced upon the
Resolution dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet dated July 3,
2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum"
and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days to submit his
required memorandum. x x x84
This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.
As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate tribunal erred in
enjoining Jimmy’s deportation.85
Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the existence of the remedy
of an ordinary appeal proscribes the filing of the petition for certiorari as was done in this case.
They point out that the appeal period in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that
an ordinary appeal is the more plain, speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one
availed of.86 Since the decision of the trial court was not properly appealed, the same may be said
to have attained finality, and may no longer be disturbed.87
They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A
petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a
lawful ground for Jimmy’s apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of
the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmy’s deportation has already attained finality by
reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the
Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said
decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension and
detention.88
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he
was previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is
still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the
Board.89 Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the
petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper
once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with
Jimmy.90 Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as
Jimmy is no longer being detained.91
On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most
appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal
considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the
avails of the extraordinary writ.92 Contrary to the petitioners’ stand, Jimmy argues that the April 17,
2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies,
one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due
process.93 He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final
determination of his citizenship before the proper courts.94 Moreover, he maintains that the petition
for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if
found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.95 As in his petition in G.R. No. 167570, Jimmy
also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father,
and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove his
citizenship.96
Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in G.R. No. 171946
meritorious.a1f
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or
where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.97
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more
plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such
remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
SpecPro Rule 102 Habeas Corpus
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired
into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 498 of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application.99

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through
a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the
party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" in this context
includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.100 Likewise, the cancellation
of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation
Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas
corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.101

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending
his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other
arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED. The Decision dated
October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December 28, 2004
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.